

FBI file: Saddam Hussein (pre-released portions, part 1)

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FD-340 (7-19-00)

Universal Case File Number 315E-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence CTD, BAGHDAD OPS CENTER

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received _____

From _____

(Name of Contributor)

(Address of Contributor)

(City and State)

By SA

To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☒ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes ☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-27-2009 BY uc/baw 60324

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 315E-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence _____

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received 6/29/04

From Saddam Hussein

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 315E-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received 6/29/04

From Sulaiman Hussein
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

Baghdad, Iraq (City and State)

By _____

To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☒ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☒ No

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Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure**

☐ Yes ☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
☐ Yes ☒ No

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-26-2009 BY uc/baw 60324

Title: Operation Desert Spider
IT - IRAQ

Reference: EC.TMI.C6292004
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☐ Original notes re interview of

b7E

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 06/29/2004

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: ITOS II
SC M. Chris Brieese
ASC [REDACTED]
UC [REDACTED]

From: Counterterrorism
Baghdad Operations Center
Contact: SSA [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Approved By: Piro George [Signature]

Drafted By: [REDACTED] tmi

Case ID #: (U) 315E-HQ-1448534 -107 (Pending)

(U) **Title:** ~~(S)~~ DESERT SPIDER
IT - IRAQ

Synopsis: (S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
located at the High Value Detainee (HVD) Detention Facility, Camp
Cropper, Baghdad, Iraq.

(U) ~~Derived From : G-3~~
~~Declassify On: X1~~

Details: (S/OR/NF) [REDACTED]

b1

~~SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN~~

~~SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Counterterrorism
Re: (U) 315E-HQ-1448534, 06/29/2004



b7E

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON DC

(U) For information, read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 05-08-2009
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/LSC
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-08-2034

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3ISE-HQ-1448534

(S)

b1

~~SECRET~~

CBT

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 315E-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence _____

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received 6/20/04

From Saddam Hussein

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 315E-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence _____

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received 6/20/04

From Saddam Hussein
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

Baghdad, Iraq
(City and State)

By _____

To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☒ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☒ No

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Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes ☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes ☒ No

Title: Operation Desert Spider
IT-IRAQ

Reference: _____
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☐ Original notes re interview of

[Redacted Description Box]

b6
b7c

b7E

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DATE: 05-08-2009
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/LSC
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-08-2034

315E-HQ-1448534

(S)



(S)

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FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

ENC. BEHIND FILE

File Number 315E-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence _____

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received 6/14/04

From Saddam Hussein
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

Baghdad, Iraq
(City and State)

By

To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☒ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☒ No

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Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
☐ Yes ☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
☐ Yes ☒ No

Title: Operation Desert Spider
IT-IRAQ

Reference: 315E-HQ-1448534 - 78
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☐ Original notes re interview of

b6
b7C

b7E

b6
b7C

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 31SE-HQ-1448534-1430

Field Office Acquiring Evidence FRINA

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received 5/1/2004

From HVA #1 - SADDAM HUSSEIN
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

BAGHDAD, IRAQ
(City and State)

By SSA

To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☒ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes ☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes ☒ No

Title: OPERATION DESERT SPIDER
IT- IRAQ

Reference: SADDAM 05012004
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☒ Original notes re interview of

- SADDAM HUSSEIN - HVA #1 on 5/1/2004

~~SECRET~~

5-1-04

FMM

Int Saddam Hussein

OBSERVATIONS

Re



b1

(S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

cross arms

digs nails

leans back

inhales

adjust clothes

crosses legs

digs nails

DATE: 05-27-2009

CLASSIFIED BY uuc/baw 60324

REASON: 1.4(c)

DECLASSIFY ON: 05-27-2034

listening intently

lifts head, scratches neck
(air of superiority)
thinking - playing w/ nails

looking down

b1

(S)



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b1

(S)

[Digging nails]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S)

b1

[sitting ednky w/
interlocking fingers]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b1

A: I think we have
found a disease
on this issue

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Only I don't take
Sheik.

Who could I go to find

— ^{with more details}
LAUGHING — Ask —

my girl.

A. Bealows are truckers

Q How is your relationship
then?

A Excellent.

A When we get to know
someone on a
personal level we
feel comfortable.

END 11:50 pm

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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DATE: 05-27-2009
CLASSIFIED BY uc/baw 60324
REASON: 1.4 (c)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-27-2034

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INTERVIEW OF DS.

Date 5/1/04 No. 1

- SSA GEORGE AIRD : SSA [REDACTED]

- SA [REDACTED]

- FBI TRANSLATOR [REDACTED]

@ 11⁰⁴ A - DS PRESENT WITH STANDARD ROOM.

- DISCUSSION INCLUDING DS' CURRENT MEDICAL
CONDITION (GASTROINTESTINAL)

- DISCUSSION REGARDING DS' CLOTHING. HE WEARS 2/5
LIGHT CLOTHING FOR THE WARMER TEMPERATURES.

- DISCUSSION REGARDING HIS CURRENT WEATHER COMMENTS.

DISCUSSION [REDACTED]

(S)

b1

~~SECRET~~

1A Envelope

Case ID: 315E-HQ-1448534 (S)(S)

! DG 29 ! ORIGINAL NOTES RE INTERVIEW OF SADDAM HUSSEIN
! ! BY GEORGE L PIRO

~~SECRET//X1~~



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Baghdad Operations Center
June 17, 2004

Session Number: 24
SSA George L. Piro

- (U) ~~(S)~~ While engaging SSA George L. Piro in casual conversation in his detention cell, Saddam Hussein provided the following information:
- (U) ~~(S)~~ Saddam Hussein stated on most days his work schedule consisted of meeting ordinary Iraqi citizens. Hussein preferred to meet them where they worked or lived instead of his office. Normally, Hussein tried to schedule time between 3:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. to interact with the Iraqi citizens. Hussein preferred to drive himself and would direct his protective detail to ride as passengers, which gave him the ability to stop whenever and wherever he wanted. Hussein took advantage of this time to address individual issues with citizens, which included discussions involving medical issues, personal grievances, etc.
- (U) ~~(S)~~ Hussein enjoyed exchanging ideas with those around him for purposes of developing solutions. He encouraged those around him to discuss issues and exchange ideas amongst each other as well as with him. However, Hussein did not enjoy debating others, even though he considered himself an excellent debater, and superior to those around him. Whenever there were debates, Hussein stated he normally wouldn't take part, and would remain silent.
- (U) ~~(S)~~ Hussein discussed individuals either related or close to him within the former Iraqi Government. Hussein stated Tariq Aziz (Black List #25) was very intelligent, and had the most knowledge regarding the West of all the Ba'ath Party officials. Aziz was an excellent speaker, as he was a former English teacher and former editor of the Ba'ath Party newspaper.
- (U) ~~(S)~~ Hussein stated Ali Hasan Al-Majid (Black List #5) thought like an Arab. SSA Piro stated Al-Majid thought like a Bedouin, and Hussein stated that is what he meant to say. Al-Majid had limited experience outside of his tribe and his decisions were based on that limited experience. However,

~~SECRET//X1~~

~~SECRET//X1~~

Baghdad Operations Center

Al-Majid followed orders and carried out his duties as instructed.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Hussein described former Vice President, Taha Yasin Ramadan's (Black List #20) personality as open. Ramadan was the type of individual who continually talked about himself, which Hussein allowed him to do.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Hussein then discussed his two half brothers, Barzan Ibrahim Hasan (Black List #38) and Watban Ibrahim Hasan (Black List #37). Hussein stated Barzan was very intelligent, but had a closed personality. SSA Piro told Hussein that Barzan was not very friendly, and would not be the type of person with whom SSA Piro could develop a friendship. Hussein laughed, and stated that SSA Piro knew Barzan's personality. Hussein then stated Watban was the opposite of Barzan, friendly but simple. According to Hussein, Watban could not carry out his Ministerial duties and was not capable of handling political positions or issues.

(U) ~~(S)~~ SSA Piro inquired about Abid Hamid Mahmoud (Black List #4), Hussein's Presidential Secretary. Hussein stated Abid was a good and loyal employee who carried out his duties and orders well. Hussein then asked SSA Piro his opinion of Abid. SSA Piro described to Hussein the meaning of a "used car salesman." Hussein again laughed and stated SSA Piro was correct in his description of Abid.

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FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 315 E-HQ-1448534-1A 29

Field Office Acquiring Evidence FBIHQ

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received 06/17/2004

From _____
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

(City and State)

By

To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☒ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
☐ Yes ☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)
☐ Yes ☒ No

Title: ① DESERT SPIDER
IT - IRAQ

Reference: _____
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☒ Original notes re interview of
SADDAM HUSSEIN

AZIZ - INTELLIGENT, EXCELLENT SPEAKER AS
HE WAS DRIVER & TEACHER. MOST KNOWLEDGEABLE
ABOUT THE WEST THAN ANYONE ELSE.

ALI HASAN - THOUGHTS LIKE AN IRAQI ARAB
(BESIDE) LIMITED EDUCATION, DECISIONS BASED
ON ARAB MENTALITY. BUT FOLLOWED INSTRUCTIONS
AND WELL & COMPLETES HIS ORDERS.

TAMAR - OPEN PERSONALITY - JUST LET HIM
TALK WILL TELL EVERYTHING, TALKS
ABOUT HIMSELF.

ABID - DID JOB WELL FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS
WELL LOYAL. LAUGHED @ USED
CAR SALESMAN COMPARISON

BARZAN - INTELLIGENT, CLOSED PERSONALITY
NOT FRIENDLY.

WATBAN - SIMPLE, BUT FRIENDLY. CAN NOT
HANDLE POLITICAL POSITIONS OR
ISSUES. DID NOT HAND MINS. JOB.

6/17 DISCUSSIONS:

Date

No.

HIS WORK SCHEDULE 3-6 WOULD WANT
MEET PEOPLE (BROUGHT ON BY DISCUSSION OF THE
HEAT & TEMP.) HE PREPARED TO GO SEE
THEM. HE WOULD DRIVE AND MAKE THE
DETAIL BE PASSENGERS SO HE COULD STOP
WHEREVER HE WANTED, WHEREVER. IF THEY
DETAIL DROVE, IT WAS HARD FOR HIM TO GET
TO STOP & LET HIM JUST DIRECTLY APPROACH
AS THEY WOULD HAVE THE ASSEMBLY AROUND
HIM.

HELPED THOSE WHO NEEDED MEDICAL,
TOOTH PAIN, CIRCUMNCISE ETC.

HE TALKED ABOUT EXCHANGE OF IDEAS. HE
ENJOYED IT & ENCOURAGED THOSE AROUND
HIM TO DO SO IN THE FORM OF DEVELOPING
SOLUTIONS. DID NOT LIKE TO DEBATE &
WOULD NOT DO SO EVEN THOUGH BETTER
THAN OTHERS. WOULD REMAIN QUIET
IN DEBATE SITUATIONS.

TALKED ABOUT THOSE AROUND HIM

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/27/2004

On 02/24/2004, Fadil Sulfa'ij Muhammad Azzawi, date of birth, 07/01/1944, was interviewed at the military detention facility, Baghdad International Airport, Baghdad, Iraq. Azzawi was advised of the identities of interviewing agents as representatives of the United States Government. The interview was observed by DOD personnel. Azzawi provided the following information regarding his employment and education:

Azzawi was born on a farm in Iraq in 1944. He attended primary and secondary school in Iraq and became a member of the Ba'ath Party in 1963. He attended college in Baghdad between 1968-1972, graduating with a degree in Accounting. During the summer of 1968, he attended a summer course at Cambridge University in England. Between 1972-74, he was assigned to the Diplomatic Institute in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1974, he received training at the National Assembly of the United Nations in New York. This training was provided by Dr. Khatan, whom he described as an eminent Iraqi diplomat. Between 1975-78, he served as the Ba'ath Party's Counsel to Egypt. From 1978 to 1980, he worked as the First Secretary to the Iraqi mission in New York. During this assignment, he obtained a Master's degree in International Studies from Johns Hopkins University.

Azzawi then served as the Iraqi Ambassador to India from 1980-1982, and as the Ambassador to the Soviet Union between 1982-1984. It was while he was working in the Soviet Union that he learned from Abd Hamid, Saddam Hussein's personal secretary, that he had been selected to become the Director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS). According to Azzawi, this selection was the result of his impressive work in the Soviet Union and to a recommendation made by Abd Hamid to Saddam Hussein. Since Azzawi did not feel qualified for this assignment, he was able to convince Saddam Hussein to let him assume the position of Deputy Director of Operations for M4 (External Intelligence) and M5 (Internal Intelligence). He served in this position between 1985-1989.

Between 1989-1991, Azzawi served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after which he served as the Governor of Salau-al-Din. In 1993, he was fired from the Ba'ath Party. Azzawi was arrested by the Special Security Organization (SSO) and was held in a high risk cell, secured by five doors each with two latches. He

Investigation on 02/24/2004 at Baghdad, IraqFile # 315E-HQ-1448534-28Date dictated 02/27/2004by SSA George Pirob6
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315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Fadil Sulfaej Muhammad Azzawai, On 02/24/2004, Page 2

was whipped 20 times each day and expected to be executed. However, as Hussein loved poetry, his family wrote a very nice flattering poem to Hussein, which Azzawi credits to improving his situation. Azzawi was not executed, and after eight months was released.

Each intelligence service in Iraq has its own prison, which house the various services' prisoners. For example, the Directorate of General Security's prison is located within its facility. The IIS' facility is an area known "52", the SSO was located behind the Abu Sind Hospital (phonetic). Abu Gharib Prison was one of several general prisons through the country. Others were located in Mosul, DIALA, and Basra. When government officials were arrested, especially any associated with the various intelligence services, they would be housed in prisons they were not familiar with or associated with, so as not to get milder treatment. Since Azzawi was formerly a member of the IIS, he was arrested and imprisoned by the SSO.

On Azzawi's first day in the IIS, he requested to be taken to the IIS prison for a visit. Azzawi found the cells to be very small and some prisoners were being held for long periods of time without any disposition on their case. When he asked as the cause of the failure to resolve the outstanding cases, he was told it was due to lack intelligence officers. Azzawi noted an Iranian prisoner, who had been held in detention without any action on his case for over three years. The prisoner was detained for spying, as he crossed the border without a pass. The prisoner's wife turned out to be a famous person in the West German parliament and had previously spoken to the Iraqi Foreign Minister regarding the whereabouts of her husband. When Hussein became aware of the situation, he asked the IIS if the person was in their custody which the IIS denied, before confirming. Once the IIS realized he was in their custody, they told Azzawi he could not be released as it would demonstrate to Hussein they had lied to him. Azzawi demanded that the Iranian prisoner be immediately released and reunited with his wife, which he was.

Azzawi described Hussein as being nice, brave and good to his friends until 1988. Azzawi then noticed a change in Hussein, who became stubborn, power hungry, and domineering. This change was enhanced by the weak leadership around Hussein. According to Azzawi, Hussein only admired himself. Early example of this was in 1983, when Hussein celebrated his birthday as a national holiday. Azzawi disagreed with this and wrote Hussein a letter. Azzawi

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Fadil Sulfaij Muhammad Azzawai, On 02/24/2004, Page 3

criticizing him, stating that such action were expected of kings and not revolutionaries such as Hussein. Azzawi claimed to be the only person honest and open with Hussein. Azzawi did not regard Iraq as being open or democratic, but that it was a country being led by Hussein alone.

According to Azzawi, Hussein was threatened by his half brother, Barzan Ibrahim Hasan, which may have led to Barzan's removal as director of the IIS. When Barzan was the director, he controlled the service, thus making him very powerful within the government.

FD-340a (Rev. 9-23-03)

(Title)

(File No.) 315E-160 - 1448534

[illegible]

~~SECRET~~

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FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-00)

215B-440-144 8534-1A2B

(S) File Number

Field Office Acquiring Evidence

BAGHDAD OPERATIONS CTR - NSI

Serial # of Originating Document

21

Date Received

1/30/06

From GEORGE PIRO

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

FBI BAGHDAD OPERATIONS CTR

(Address)

BAGHDAD, IRAQ

(City and State)

By

To Be Returned ☐ Yes

☐ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes

☐ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes

☐ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes

☐ No

Title:

(S)

Reference:

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description:



Original notes re interview of

ALI HASAN AL-MAJID AL-TIKRITI

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b1

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b7C

b1

notes of SSA

George L. Piro

translate 1/3/04

Ali Hasan Al-Majid Al-Tikriti

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 05-11-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/LSC

✓ Vision of Ba'ath Party - when firsts started
still believes in principles

✓ humanitarian & democratic

✓ acts of some members ^{ind.} Saddam

✓ brought change to party

✓ Party does not believe in war, killing, mass killing, oppression

✓ we are all brothers since Saddam

filling charges,
oppression,
backstabbers

✓ individual acts of party members

probably only wanted to work in party, not in govt
appointed 3 times w/o notice as Minister
heard there a revolution as a TV

✓ Islam does not believe in violence or oppression as does
Ba'ath Party

✓ Contradiction? ⇒ Agreed (between original Ba'ath Party)
Change along the way ⇒ Agreed

(1)

- ✓ Tribe/origin
- ✓ From Abu Nasr group/tribe
- ✓ Al-Bajit
- ✓ grandfather - governor of Tihrit
- ✓ 14 different tribes/clans in this area
- ✓ no problems w/ these clans
- ✓ solved before going to court
- ✓ father was famous in Tihrit / respected
- ✓ no problems w/ anyone
- ✓ family - 8 sons, 4 daughters
- ✓ rules of tribe/family
- ✓ all areas tribal?
- ✓ tribal thoughts permeate Iraq thru all parts incl. Baghdad
- ✓ example if someone kills someone in ~~car~~ car accident
- ✓ agreement made between two tribes - driver / victim -
short sentence
- ✓ presented in front of court after agreement
- ✓ cannot fight within clan cannot talk again
- ✓ you will be killed will be killed
- ✓ in past & now

✓ oldest generally the "sheikh" of the clan
sometimes not able mentally or financially

~~1991~~ X Saddam - before collapse?

✓ Saddam to make "sheikh" Jan the sheikh of the tribe

✓ He became "sheikh" after 3rd group in line died (Al-Rajid)

✓ tend to go to me repeated, who's fair

✓ Early Ba'ath involvement

✓ Mtg July 18, 1979

✓ Invited to a meeting

✓ He was branch leader of Ba'ath at time

✓ Director of Datta Branch

✓ Hussein delayed coup attempt in party - continued until 1979 plot

✓ two years before another plot - 1977

✓ Abdul Wahid Al-Samarrai - head of Ba'ath

✓ ~ Nagar

✓ Sab mood - he had in 1979

✓ "Said Al-Samarrai lives, coup will continue"

✓ 1979

✓ Investigation headed by Barzan Saddam's brother

(4)

- ✓ People (B) participated
- ✓ Barzan knows details
- ✓ Al-Majid didn't know how to fight or fly
- ✓ Heard nothing until that moment
- ✓ (Many) were already "marked"
- ✓ if some possibly wrongly accused
- ✓ not by Saddam^{by} Barzan Tikriti
- ✓ Think they were all guilty
- ✓ Views on Saddam
 - ✓ 20 or more
 - ✓ closest person to him was Saddam
 - ✓ got apart over time until about 10 years ago
 - ✓ thinking at first (even in the party) some to cross roads
 - ✓ Saddam - dead in Iraq / everyone in relation
- ✓ During 1980s years
 - ✓ Refused to accept advice or criticism even if ^{deploring} very
 - ✓ Perhaps would leave party in 2004 Saddam
 - ✓ "Against day of his life"
 - ✓ I had dispute w/ Saddam, must go to other person in party
 - ✓ does not ~~dispute~~ w/ Kuba
 - ✓ but he was President in Iraq

(5)

- ✓ I lost despite, would lose "place in history"
- ✓ w/o Saddam's approval, Ba'ath party would bring shame on fathers, Saddam was Pharaoh
- ✓ At 1941 conference - would have been approved by Saddam
- ✓ At 1941 conference, before elections, Ba'ath Party not?
- ✓ asked Saddam "am I good to be a member?"
just wanted out of party but he said no
- ✓ Saddam did not listen to anyone in Party, not even Ba'ath
- ✓ M. Majid not a volunteer for public service last 10 years
because of Saddam
- ✓ growing apart from him
- ✓ after Hussein didn't escape, Saddam didn't trust anyone & changed anyone w/o respect in party, Saddam partly didn't trust appointed Minister w/o knowledge, broadcast on TV
didn't even call to tell back him
- ✓ Saddam ~~thought~~ thought he would replace Saddam
- ✓ Majid wanted inspectors to come last year "USCIB"
- ✓ Saddam did not
- ✓ Majid would not be allowed w/o certification of Ba'ath destruction
- ✓ majority of Ba'ath wanted to let them in
- ✓ If he sided w/ them, like being a traitor vs Saddam

6

✓ In my front of leadership, Majid said Iraq will be the way
Askinho:

✓ In fact, Saddam is not

✓ He wanted to resign so he wouldn't have to take responsibility

✓ For the actions of one Saddam

✓ Doesn't have chance to clear his name while here

? Majid "I think different of him, but I tell you later."

✓ Would like to see all leaders criticized/dismant Saddam, who not viewed
as a spy.

✓ Would have to talk to the best

✓ Saddam - dictatorship of one man

Way he will?

✓ Sometimes Saddam would ask for a thing

✓ If "give all his money to someone who needed

✓ "I could, could I imagine

✓ If someone came up and said "I'll make decisions quickly, well,

✓ Would have trust his son

Started believing those who praised him, modestness of
him, pictures of him

✓ Had no friends, including within family

✓ Personality not stable; someone; doesn't say good

✓ Was ^{not} a war, 20 years of war, 3 years of boy

⑦

✓ Saddam
G. Th. he was going to win war; no precautions taken; no prep
for afterwards

Al-Majid knew facts before war - th. that they would lose

✓ why didn't take action?

✓ would be considered traitors / on US side

spy or instrument of evil?

history will record Al-Majid fairly but probably as instrument

Saddam blaming others? of tribe?

tribe leadership (what they say) vs Saddam

tribe will not talk on political things

✓ How to get Saddam to take responsibility? (tribe leadership)

Facing up w/ facts

return of US inspectors, for example, which Saddam opposed

WMD discussion?

Tamir Abbas, Tariq, Thabani, Taha Bannan, al-Majid

pressed him to say "we don't have WMD" Ibbi Fajon

Saddam the way it had would strike

Majid asked Saddam: "Do we have WMD?"

Saddam "Don't you know?"

Majid "No."

Saddam "No."

8

~~Wanted Saddam to sign WMD law?~~

~~he wouldn't~~

(If you wrote out suggestions that leadership made to Saddam, that he rejected, would you present it to Saddam and he possibly accept it?

→ No, would have to do it outside w/ his own party, first send talks to cabinet then

Final thought:

Demonstrated that you are loyal member of clan, in our opinion, still Sheikh of clan, with responsibility.

Must take Saddam's statements and put in Saddam leadership statements. Saddam has to come to

Iraqi and tribe. Led leadership to 9x9 cell. As

Sheikh, it's your duty to reclaim war for clan. Agree all

only you can do that. (God willing) It is up to him.

Clan + country need this. (Have to give vengeance to meet w/ other clan members here in prison?) To

him can't let him out. Must think about his father's shame

Letter Al Hassan Al-Majid Al-Tikriti

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DATE 05-11-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/LSC

you
1/30/04

I still believe in the principle of the party
Hussein et al brought shame to the party

Party does not believe in war
I hope you take a look at the history

As a Baath member and member,

The party does not believe in killing or
mass killing or one person being in charge.
Doesn't believe in bad behavior

There are bad acts of some party members.

Embassy wanted to work in party but not
to fight. 3x party made (appointed) me
a minister.

North Islamic origin no Baath party doesn't
believe in violence.

re: Event concerning video

I was branch leader - I was director of one branch of both

Pres. Hussein

Deera was caught.

2 yrs prior to this

Saddam

I remember moments in '75
Iraq in a sad mood.

Bargain my ~~has~~ when
Bargain ~~for~~ takes responsibility
Thinks they are all guilty

Q: SADAM 10 yrs ago :

20 yrs ago - Saddam the closest to me
I came to a crossroads - that is
is when dealing w/ my ~~body~~ my

" SADAM

Plans were for me to leave in 2004 - Resign

• Most happy day in my life

• ~~I slept~~ I slept

This doesn't ~~agree w/~~ ^{agree w/} child prod

SHADAN said there is no more shark —
he was referring to his own Tike.
Daskal said if

Any last 8 yrs, ^{5 years} he didn't listen to any ~~more~~ ^{more}
any more

The last yrs my participation in Political office appt. was not voluntary. When I found out I had been selected I went & asked why & S. said b/c if I asked you, you would have said "no".

After Assar Kamil was gone, Spoom
strangled

SADAM didn't want to call Ali and ask if I'd
take ~~the job~~ ~~any job~~ ~~the job~~ only to have me
turn it down

But 10 yrs ago, I had a good relationship w/
Sam - even asked his daughter ~~not~~ hand
in marriage for my _____.

After Weapon 23 protocol, in 5 PM AM warbe

I wanted to resign b/c I didn't want to work for one person (Samantha).

If I'm released, I'll not be able to finish
Bogdanov's.

SAD AM HAD NO FRIENDS

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 05-11-2009
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/LSC
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-11-2034

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 03/09/2004

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: ISLU/ITOS II Room 4383

SSA [REDACTED]

IA [REDACTED]

From: Philadelphia

Squad 17, Joint Terrorism Task Force

Contact: [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

jsm

(U) **Case ID #:** (S) 315E-HQ-1448534 (Pending) - 27
(S) 66F-HQ-C1384970 (Pending) - 7740
(U) 66F-HQ-C1384970 (Pending)

(U) **Title:** (S) DESERT SPIDER
IT - IRAQ.

(U) **Synopsis:** (S) To respond to lead set by Counterterrorism to
provide information from logical sources relating to prosecution
of Saddam Hussein.

(U) (S) ~~Classified By: 11109, ITOS II/CTD~~
~~Reason : 1.5(c)~~
~~Declassify On: X1~~

(U) **Reference:** (S) 315E-HQ1448534 Serial 9

Details: (S) Referenced communication requested Philadelphia to
review [REDACTED]

(S)

[REDACTED]

b1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(U) To: Counterterrorism From: Philadelphia
Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534, 03/09/2004

(S)

(U)

~~(S)~~ Philadelphia canvassed logical sources to determine if any individuals could provide information relevant to the prosecution of Hussein. No positive information was developed as of the date of this communication. However, some sources could not be reached because they were traveling and were out of the area. Philadelphia will provide any positive information that is responsive to the referenced communication as it is received.

(S)

~~(S)~~ In addition, Philadelphia believes that a review of the interviewees by an FBIHQ analyst may produce results that are responsive to the request. Philadelphia considers this lead covered.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(U) To: Counterterrorism From: Philadelphia
Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534, 03/09/2004

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT ISLU/ITOS II

(U) ~~(S)~~ FBIHQ analysts should review the above referenced file and serial numbers to determine if these serials meet the criteria as set out in the lead.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

(Title)

(File No.)

[illegible]

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 05-11-2009
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/LSC
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-11-2034

FD-340 (7-19-00)

315E-HQ-1448934-1A27

(S)

Universal Case File Number

Field Office Acquiring Evidence

Baghdad Operations Center-FBI

Serial # of Originating Document

20

Date Received

2/4/04

From

George Piro

(Name of Contributor)

FBI Baghdad Operations Center

(Address of Contributor)

Baghdad, Iraq

By

To Be Returned

☐

Yes

☐

No

Receipt Given

☐☐

No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐

Yes

☐

No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐

Yes

☐

No

Title:

(S)

Reference:

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description:

☒

Original notes re interview of

ALI HASAN AL-MAJID AL-TIKRITI

~~SECRET~~

Notes of SSA


b6
b7C

SSA

SSA

2/19/04


Al Hasan Al-Majid Al-Tikriti



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DATE 05-11-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/LSC

- ✓ Role in Kuwait Aug, 1990 - Jan, 1991
- ✓ Background of appt in Kuwait
- ✓ called to leadership mtg Aug 7, 1990
- ✓ Saddam & leadership some were standing
- ✓ greeted to food with
- ✓ Saddam said ^{the} go to Kuwait
- ✓ told him leadership is here
- ✓ previously you sent intel director
- ✓ me going will do no good
- ✗ Kuwaiti Yassin, Samir Shakill, Ismail Tibi?
- ✓ → Saddam - Oh, we'll see
- ✓ mtg finished
- ✓ Saddam announced Ali would go to Kuwait ^{putting up an act of time} ^{so that}
- ✓ Ali said "by orders" I go
- ✓ Saddam brother Sabawi there already
- ✓ Divided written for 2 parts
- ✓ Director of Intel
- ✓ Security committee for Kuwait
- ✓ members were rep of intel, police, ^{security police, military} ^{national guard} ^{police}




②

- ✓ My responsibility
- ✓ organization between Ministries
- ✓ Saddam demand to leadership
- ✓ authorized Ali & Sabawi responsibility of
- ✓ managing Kuwait
- ✓ Government to Kuwait
- ✓ Atty. Gen. Numan - read in security plan
- ✓ Harriet to protect belongings & Kuwait people
- ✓ severe in performing my job
- ✓ crimes

In zone - captain in Iraq (Iraqis)

- ② ✓ military trouble in front of store
- ✓ told soldiers to break into store & loot electronic TVs etc
- ✓ when I heard, I order his arrest
- ✓ to arrest an officer requires Saddam or MoD approved
- ✓ committed to investigate
- ✓ started to die
- ✓ Ali called one of Saddam's bodyguards
- ✓ asked for approval to carry out
- ✓ informed of approval by Saddam's Humvee
- ✓ execution in front of gun club (Al-Qadhafi?)



(3)

Under Labay in Kuwait - Labana person

✓ she considers Trajja as cousin

To Ali Gunde; was supposed to be here to libate for us

✓ is it right to assault women in Shamma area?

✓ Council said - head of military unit

✓ committee investigated

✓ sentenced to death

✓ intended w/ execution

asked execution at same place where assaulted woman

3rd one crime

✓ 3 individuals stole from Kuwait house, assaulted / kidnapped

✓ sent to court, sentenced to die

not instructed head of troops present in Kuwait - Surgeon
present. ✓ asked him to contact Kuwaiti lady to see if

✓ objection to carry out execution at her home

✓ executed at house

✓ Only attacks executions of military - not all

Minister of High Education

Min of Agriculture

Dr. Alwan

Dr. Abdulhadi

Minister of Trade

Min of Transportation

Minister?

name?

same

Director of Ministry

Minister of Education

for Sudan

Min of Local Government

Minister of Justice

Ministry of Industry

Ministry?

Who had overall responsibility? (for Kuwait)

✓ Ali > both same, but Ali older

Sabawi

George

Facts of international investigation (of Kuwait)

✓ 2 dozen torture sites

✓ 40 public facilities or sports facilities

✓ amputations - limbs, eyes, ears, noses, genitalia, tongues

✓ electric shocks to sensitive body parts

✓ 5000 traps to trap way animals

X 1226 was a missile crater

✓ 1982 Kuwaiti civil and water supply killed from Iraqi aircraft

✓ and 57 mentally handicapped killed because handicapped

✓ All in violation of Geneva Convention

Just common violation - failure to display picture of Saddam + displaying him with Iraqis, contractors, etc. (5)
- 5000 of Bergen + Remington in file
X Employment of mines in Iraq
Execution authorities

Ma
Aware of these facts?

✓ Ollender - responsibility of military, not his
activities

✓ If hand of, would have asked to be released from Iraq

✓ never heard anything about accusations or other activities

✓ doesn't doubt they occurred

✓ security services took orders from Saddam? - Director of Iraqi
Hanan Ibrahim

✓ who would have carried out atrocities, not Ali

connected to Saddam - not Ali

✓ I don't know or witness

✓ Did you fear Saddam in past? - 7 exp. in Iraq, Iraqis

✓ yes, fear what he would do to him - towards

2. Do you fear him now?

no, in the past, he would have sent him in Iraq

3. Execution authorities, appoint for all, the police?



6

Beane

- ✓ persecution of Shias - mass graves found
- ✓ Kurdish Anfal Campaign
- ✓ Millions of documents found
- ✓ documents / activities which took place
- ✓ satellite photo of destroyed Shia village

✓ Arrived in Iraq in 1991, he had nothing to do with me

✓ Saddam was watching him
started taking lands from him

~~South in 1991~~

~~only stayed in Basra 8 days~~

~~Did not go to his inspection Aug 1991~~

~~which he had given was M.I. at time~~

~~Never used or saw anything about chemicals~~

~~Was in charge of 3 countries in South~~

~~Basra, Kirkuk, Amara~~

~~Wished to be martyred or kill himself~~

~~better than being~~

~~was died normally (even though ill day had)~~



7

- ✓ With he was ~~dead~~ ^{dead}
- ✓ offered to US military to kill Saddam
- ✓ his cowardice is common to the
- ✓ most of them would bring him to the
- ✓ history will judge Iraq under Saddam

X personal/professional personal difference?
doesn't see a big difference

- ✓ Not a failure / except staying w/ Saddam this year but had to carry out orders
- ✓ Couldn't fight because would shame the tribe
- X would hurt them
- ✓ If could talk to the, might be able to explain to them
- X some people inside tribe as Saddam as much as his brothers and cousins
- ✓ Saddam not head of tribe now - no power

End of Notes

[illegible]

~~SECRET~~

DATE 05-11-2009
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/LSC
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-11-2034

FD-340 (7-19-00)

(S)

315E-HQ-1448534-1A26

b1

Universal Case File Number

Field Office Acquiring Evidence

FBI Baghdad Operations Center (BOC)

Serial # of Originating Document

19

Date Received

2/5/04

From

(Name of Contributor)

FBI Baghdad Operations Center (BOC)

(Address of Contributor)

Baghdad, Iraq

By

To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☐ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☐ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes ☐ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes ☐ No

Title:

(S)

b1

Reference:

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☒ Original notes re interview of

Khalid Najim Abdallah Al-Sultan, aka

Khalid Abdul Al-Majid Al-Tikriti

~~SECRET~~

SSA

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

2/5/04

Khaleel Abdul Al-Majid Al-Tikriti

Khaleel Najm Abdallah Al-Sayid

Jan 30, 1984 Tikrit, Iraq

B.S. in Pol Sci, Baghdad, 1984 finished 1996 - dropped

Director M-6, Security of ISS, head

Himaya 1982 - 2002 Baghdad

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How got to be body guard

when's talent at ^{highly} school, 1982

Hussain Khawari relation - mother approached Khawari

for this job → mother of

graduated 1983-84 Chicago

→ not first son but corner maybe

→ Khawari was in Iraq at time

Took a course - military course

45 days "physical training, how to use weapons"

Himaya after that

primary duties

protect Saddam

he would be primary with him a lot of plans, did the details
sit chairs, did the work he's going

②

Circle around Sadden at location

Sometimes he would summon people to stand

Himanga would bring them to him

Murakia, Himanga, sometimes Population Guard

if longer trip to Basca, for example, large contingent

~100 close trip

~1000 Basca 1988-89 → Population Guard

Himanga

was in charge of Himanga

was shot at approx 30 people - 60 total

~30 with Sadden

Murakia

was killed w/ 2 people

→ 48 hours each, both

Actions in Bmt & around

Sadden watched Himanga all the time

wanted to see it done something very

he did, or thought did, sent to prison

Example
1989

going to airport

in car in back - checked - could have put in jail

Saddam saw car / truck to the lamp in street on opposite side of street

wanted to know why didn't he get out truck - could ask possibility?

put in prison for two weeks

Concerns

Saddam did not let anyone stand outside, stand on street etc.

Satellites would take plates

Cars not parked outside

Satellites again

No use of telephone after first Gulf War - 1990

or internet

Saddam overreacted

protected detail would talk "in paranoid"

think satellite could map to his plate

thus changed behaviour of satellites especially in 1990s

9

Protestant "Ishak" / "Ishak"

didn't want to do it

Only 4 pairs to the Homage to trust; careful to keep to wife of home
Placing Homage as spies?

I don't know for sure, had suspicions

thought plan is misfired

some left Homage

some left on it

some transferred to other groups (Protestant)

1979 mtg - any friends ever talk about

yes 7 that there was long attempt, M. S. and A. 3 by
billed by Syria

Muhammad Mahjoub

What makes him happy

when he meets one of his good friends as people's favorite

Ghannima Al-Sabouni - is in his house before he joins the protest

Saga said last 5 years

On the 17th day (Sabbath) - Engineer is good

bring it to the Sabouni when desired

Saga usually came to Sabouni by himself

some communication arrangement

Since 1988-1990

Saddam stopped giving him
sometimes brought family to him for dinner - but not
that they even go
not close to wife or kids

Saw Qusay much more than Uday - stranger almost
↳ involved in plots

Was Qusay being "granned" =

Saddam is selfish - only likes himself

would never think of going to him, thus not thinking about replacement
would like to stay 200 years

he was afraid of Uday

Uday does not listen to Saddam but scared/intimidated by
Saddam, Qusay listened

Uday's acts shameful

not bothersome to Saddam

Ever see a caring Saddam?

1982-84 car accident coming back from Basra

heard Saddam on radio directed doctors up him

to help victims - sent to Baghdad to Europe it was easy

told them was cars for them

6

Change Committee to "World War (I)"

In 1980s, never said bad words to Hinnage

after 1990, became "like chess"

paranoid, fear of America, chairman

was in 1991, incidents w/ no fly zone, weapons inspectors

all anti-UN, but his mind set

not mobile after 1990

stayed in a "cocoon"

He brought this all out in 1991 with invasion of Kuwait

never heard him say he regretted

Saddam (President of Kuwait)

after that, stopped trusting everyone but Qusay, total trust

#4 trust to - next in line after Qusay

#5 trust to - close to #4

Any of protection details but Saddam

no

Acts of brutality by Saddam

nothing directly - hitting or beating

w/ those angry at Saddam - brought 2 weeks prison for Hinnage

sent out as Secretary or bodyguard to handle

no other than few weeks

⑦

Dates / anniversaries / celebrations Saddam liked

Birthday - he is public first then private

New Year

No other celebrations that he knew of incl. B days of kids

girlfriend came out with photos

Superstitious Saddam?

Never bothered

Religious activities - Saddam?

1983 - Najaf - prayed there - kneled - and treats since then

Sometimes to Badkhanjaf to pray during war

won't kneel through - 1990s - now

why didn't kneel

back problems? pretended probably to say doesn't want to

have injury

Debatable on same level as God?

1) he knows

100%

he thought on same level as Muhammad, Jesus, Hannuwa

ways in Iraq & other parts of world

his writings / speeches show that

1991

to fight this war Saddam
proves he wanted to be king

Felt he was in sand

leadership around him

others lions of yemen

would have been scared too

Who's responsible for situation in Iraq

Saddam Hussein leadership around him

→ Ba'ath Party leadership, PCC, etc

National Command

People in TV around him - responsible

Rituals - Saddam

video swimming & fishing almost every day in 1980s

for kidnapping & shoot birds, from his plane, 1980s

Daylight person

1990s - stayed awake in bed / uncomfortable at times at night

1990s - Did between 9-11 pm, woke up early

Eating habits

3 standard meals a day 8:00 AM, 1:00 PM, 8:00 PM

Dairy products morning, star fruit, fresh lunch; fish, meat, vegetables, fruit

Saddam
Drank alcohol - 70s -
didn't observe last 10 -
12 years

9

Traveled a lot in 80s
not so much after that

Hunting / fishing Saddam
for sport or fun or both?
hobby but he ate also
game at times; jbar abo didn't eat
birds ducks

Recognition of Himaya by Saddam?
attended graduation / recognized at retirement?
no

Why did #43 come back?

Feb April 7, during war, to Syria
came to give set up, called Grand - said came to Jordan, didn't have
passport, came to Baghdad to turn a self in, ^{rough} not a list
came because had nothing / wanted to know go with

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

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DATE 05-11-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/LSC

2/5/04

Khalid Abdul al - HAMAS in TIKRIT

6-30-64 DOB TIKRIT POB

Response to greeting is "Alabaha"

Khalid NAJIM Abdul Sultan

6/30/64 - DOB TIKRIT

Baccalaureate in Law + Polysci - 1996

Position in IDS 2002-2003

Dir of M6 - Security of all the
buildings - (in our terms physical
security) - prior to this served in
Hamaya from 1982-2002

Parent - Dad had small shop in TIK
shop shut ~~with~~ after IS

~~Hamaya~~ Obtained job below

~~Hamaya~~

18 yrs old he got 7⁸⁹ job in
Hamaya

Grand Hs 83-84 =

Relative to Hssein Karam =

has not the 3rd or 4th
cousin but further away
than that.

Hssein Karam was in Muradagin

My mom spoke to Karam's mom
about me getting ^{me} a job

took military course for
45 days = pre-m course

- physical training
+ weapons

Continued working while going to school
in order to get his BA
degree.

Bushnell HS 1983

- 84-88 to Baccals
96 got degree

Work in Hungary

Protect 1 SADDAM

When Saddam goes somewhere,
we don't know where

we are from telling us - we get
in cars and follow - when SADDAM
gets out of vehicle

we make a circle around him
to protect him.

not just moral figure but
sometimes SADDAM's personal guards
around him as well
as Republican guards

If goes overnight ... he takes a
1000 Republican guards as well

to trip to BASRA

If local trip then @ 100-300 Republican
guards / escorts
of Hungary

Himry had 2 shifts 7 60 people -
 30 on each shift. Each shift takes
 48 hours.

Thurafigun - 2 shifts of 1 or 2 people

changes?

mood

temperament

(likes
 dislikes)

re: people
 + things
 dress
 manners

manners

SADDAM was always watching us,

ie: something wrong w/ car,

He would have guns put in position
 then fired.

Another example

Truck in motorcade,
 we passed a tank
 on side of road firing
 something - we chose
 to ignore -

Spader put all 3 of us + drove
into prison for 2 wks.

Spd didn't talk w/ us personally
but conveyed this to our boss.

or cars/trucks
not let anyone in protest on dates
stand outside for fear satellite
take pictures & know Spd
is there,
or use phones

Before 1990, Gulf War,
Spd became much more
paranoid in using phone
& worried about satellites.

'He over-reacted to everything'
he chatted among ourselves his
paranoia & that satellite
can read his transcripts

we had change license plates
continuously of SAM's car
+ prototype cars.

Those standing outside had to
stand under scrutiny
so as not to be seen.

Along with that, it
wasn't doing this.

It was like hell -
we hated what we did
though we didn't like.

When he spoke among his friends
he ~~wasn't~~ only spoke
to those he trusted.

Always suspected his phone
was bugged - so when
he contacted Hussein
to his wife, he
always either covered
the phone or talked
away from the phone.

NO info on ¹⁹⁷⁹ Corp & Use of Thompson
to remove peps -

Am in sarcas
Avoid
happy

Very happy when he meets one of his girlfriends

u/ SAD prior to 82
last 5 yrs.

b6
b7C

He had other, these were a few
favorites

One of the protection guys would bring
Saamira from her home to Saddam
In essence, he was her driver.

b6
b7C

was an engineer
building palaces - she would meet SAD -
DIDN'T need a driver

Since 88-89 - he'd not visit his family very often - once or twice a month, he would ~~be~~ ~~invite~~ invite them to dinner at one of his palaces for 1-2 hrs. and then all would leave.

Q
↓
Dietrich
↓
Charm
for selection
and retirement

→ NOTHING

Very like a stranger
was he grooming

he was afraid of Uday

Brutally
Businessman
tall guards

See a selfish person - he'd like to stay 200 yrs & be presi
Difficult to think of him as wanting to groom anyone ~~for~~ to be his successor

changes
Hobbies

Uday wouldn't listen to Saddam
" not intimidated by

Fears

Superstitions

QESAY did listen to his father.

Sleep
Death
Eating

Example of caring Saddam -

They ~~saw~~ came up an.
 auto accident on highway - He
 heard SADDAM telling his security people + doctors
 to send V's to Europe + give them
 each a new car since their
 cars had been totaled.

During 1980's he never had mouthed
 his security detail.

After 1990, he became ~~tho~~
 heart - swore, And
 had-mouthed security

More paranoid
 Fear, Satellites

Before 1990's, he was very
 mobile; but after Gulf War,
 he was concerned about his own safety
 + self. (Cocon) - He brought this
 onto himself by going into Kuwait.

After S. Kamal fled, he stopped
~~trusting~~ trusting everyone except Ousey.

This trust in others varied as

Ousey	100%
Mahmoud	Just under 100%



Ever
 known
 Acts
 Protably?
 My SANITAM



If you'd let
 tell either one
 his bodyguard
 or his parent
 searching to
 arrange for
 punishment

Let these servants
 be punished for
 short term

~~Amir Khan~~
HIS B-DAY
The New Year

11

H3
B-DAYS

→ public celebration
celebrated by (friends)
not with kids
But don't know what they
did inside

Superstitions - NO

83 - PRAYED in WATER

Sometimes to mosques
but he never performs
the (ceremony) in the
prayer while he was standing

ble at
back
problems?
or
pretending
to have
back
problem

Not a religious person

Pretend to pray while in the middle
of the streets. Pray in Raza
ble a protected area.

Instead of kneeling, lower head, cross arms & bow

12

Based on his speeches & writings,
100% Saddam thought he was one
of the great kings like Nebuchadnezzar
Nebucanster and other great
kings of the world.

Opinion } no sane person would go
to war w/ Iran,
Kuwait (world coalition)
and then latest conflict.

Leadership around him were either
liars or yes men.

Saddam & his leaders were responsible
for what happened. Those below
had no voice.

RETURNS Surfers & likes fishing - especially in 80's
almost every day
would shoot birds (migrating) from helicopter

Sleep

13

80's stay awake in office a
c.p. + stay thru Am
watching news

90's go to bed slw 9-11 pm
And waking up earlier

Patry

3x day
Regular Food ?

General
Health
Joints
BP ↑
bad back

Morning - dairy products
honey, dairy

Lunch - stew, rice
fish (halibut)

night - Kabob, BBQ
fish

Alcohol
Previous 4 or
but not 10-12
yrs

His life changed after 1981
In 80's he was ranch in BAKHADO

Before the war, he fled to Syria.
Ren returned to give myself up
to Americans. My name was not
among the SS - I was not wanted
at that time. Wanted to see family.

END

12:10 pm

FD-340a (Rev. 9-23-03)

(Title)

(File No.) 315E-HQ-1448534-

[illegible]

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 05-11-2009

CLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/LSC

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 05-11-2034

b1

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☐

No

Title:

(S)

Reference:

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description:

☒

Original notes re interview of

ABD HAMID MAHMOUD AL-KHATTAB AL-NASIRI AL-TIKRITI

~~SECRET~~b6
b7C

b1

Notes of SSA

SSA

SSA

2/3/04

b6
b7C

Abid Hamid Mahmud Al-Tikriti / BL #41

also Abid Hamid Mahmud Al-Khattab Al-Nasiri Al-Tikriti

DOB 7/1/56 POB Al-Rajja, Tikrit, Iraq

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DATE 05-11-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/LSC

Masters Thesis 1st

~~Israeli Mossad and Effect on Israeli~~ role in govt

Israeli military establishment and part in creating Israel
main result / conclusion

military organization controls Israel

4 parts

military establishment 3rd part

Leadership of govt

made no provisions w/o opinion of military

in any operation

because military would become executive operations

Iraq, other countries

executive dept given input to military

is Israel where military provides input first

Professor Ramadan

checked his work, encouraged thesis

View based on analysis of military in Israel
military influenced politics / controlled country

Rate Israeli military

impressed by plans to call reservists

Israeli military not big but reserves

can be called fast and in big numbers

well trained

very good at using tactics, taking war to enemy

like Six Day War vs Egypt

L-100 to not have small land but, take the war overseas
like Iran vs Udon

Duties as Presidential Secretary

Secretary - in of many - other

here

Foreign Affairs
Egypt Al-Tikriti

Military Affairs
Secretary

Gen. Rifan Al-Fakhri

Secretary Baath National Party

Abdullah Muhammad Amin

Secretary Baath National Party

Dr. Khalil Al-Mansuri

Council of Ministers

here

Muhammad Hussein Al-Samarrai

Presidential Secretary

#4 Control mail for President

mail from Senators & Congress to President

Duties Continued

E.g. - If I want to approve something
then #4

~~Special Security~~ Sometimes direct communication &
Saddam requested something

- Foreign cabinet consultation
- Approval of Ambassador
- Any director to be appointed
- Anything for media
- Private of defense requests

Asked about opening mail sometimes
had say open, then not check

Chairman, NATO Security Council

Duties

#4

c 1983 no secretary for President

1985-1991

↑

then established w/ Hammadi #1991 Chas had

9-10 employees

all military officers intelligence, security

(4)

Transfer of folders approved by NSC

Israt Durr - provided an NSC mtg

Members

✓ President #1 - about 10/10

✓ Vice President Al Durr

✓ Secretary - #4

MD - only of military matter

✓ IIS head of int

✓ Special Security ~~identical security~~

✓ DMI

✓ MPT

or head of cabinet if matter to be ~~discussed~~ ^{discussed}

Budgets approved for all ^{special} security, intelligence, DRR, gen ad security
deadpoints?

Most significant while Secretary of NSC? → deadpoints?

Without President, no one would know anything - Pres. never
talked about us, staff attend

didn't serve a purpose

3

< 1983

President attended NSC, had meeting

> 1983 after did not attend
Secretaries of State?

Hussein, Aziz, Dawi, Majid, Saddami - B
→ made decisions

Saddam

Admittedly having Saddam pay back
he was first to see/identify him

knows he will go to international court

found out he is EPL - responsibility of USA
potential charges

massive grave yards

did he see Saddam for many years

Arabs

education

Examples of charges:

July 18, 1979 - Mt. where Saddam took charge

bodyguards only - location seemed poor not on stage

⑥

I was putting guard in hall / the center

holds 723 people

2nd floor fairy stage

his duty was on 2nd floor

Rahid Khan, Saad Yasin, others - 3 guards for Saddam at time

medicines sent to Saddam - Mogh & Hamari

Baith party there

Saddam told Mashri to talk - who's with you either plot

told all out plot / others

Saddam said talk out

Hamari took to Mukhabarat

(Talked for hours under half

7 took to in 1st cars

Head of Mukhabarat

Baqar Tikriti or ? Saadun Shakir ^{there}

changed around this time

~ 67 members taken

doesn't know number

knows some of them

Did you believe him? - believed

yes, my grandfather, ~~old~~ ^{old} ~~man~~ just did his job

(7)

5 leaders executed

others executed, imprisoned
high court

5 or 6 deaths, Saddam & others? (Only ones he knew) ✓
militiamen in 1991 - after war

Damir Al-Hajj

Gen. Ahmad Lari - Special Forces

others - unknown

Don't know if they were right

haven't seen film of Saddam & killing someone ✓

I am not afraid of Saddam, before war & arrest.

He is strong, even though same as Hussein

I won't be hurt

Always with him in the office since 1991

When busy, he's there

b6
b7C

Mr. Hasan al-Majid

(5)

Majid in charge of 3 others - Southern party

Amir al-Khaffi - governor of Kuwait -

Subaltern to the guy

Activities in Kuwait

one captain caught stealing

being from Crane in town

knowing the

babies from incubators

where they will know of incidents

do the companies have by date to not hang picture of Saddam

does not know

illegal to hang picture of Kuwaiti officials

no

heard of various investigations thru media

don't trust Kuwaiti otherwise good

Radiwanqah Camp

Muhammad Khawar in charge of investigation

Two committees - int'l & local groups

Saddam Khawar / officer in charge

→ but he was w/ him

didn't take in last of him

in Amman say #4 was there w/ Ghassan
 claimed Hajj Rida, aka Rida Omar
 deputy director of intel
 mis taken w/ #4

Hussein & brothers careful not to "show" the world
 Once, Hussein confided w/ Hajj Rida

There was at Raed Mansour

#4 as President / compared to Hussein

#1 question Hussein has ambition
 I have qualifications but not desire to become President

① He treats people w/ respect / legally

② He reads alot / empowered me to read

③ Always fair - mistaken (#4) about this,
 discovered 1 1/2 year ago

wanted to get out of govt

Problem between Hussein's nephews & Saddam's nephew
 Hussein judged for his ^{own} nephews

(10)

Hussein brought in assistant to #4

his wife's brother - her
Jamil bin Naim al-Hakei (Saddam's daughter)

My felt he was being replaced

My would point out things wrong

Hussein said don't concern self

Decided to stop giving of advice after this - #4

Because Secretary

Come after all Minister, even though always al-Saddam

Worked for Saddam because

for protection of Baghdad

if Baghdad falls, Saddam falls

Saddam had big ego

war w/ US ~ 2003

invasion of Kuwait 1990

#4 was not convinced of the "national agenda"

Arab countries should fight other countries

Did Saddam blame himself

never to compromise

Moral issues w/ Saddam's workers

went thru Program of Divan & others

11

Saddam's habits

exaggerated himself always to others

Saddam in prison

easy to take because in prison before

Nothing I can be blamed for by Saddam

Saddam ^{might} blame others

Saddam

mentally - safe

personality not balanced

if wrote book about him, 3 most important things?

will have to think about

Order from Saddam to directly to the 100 in charge of computer

Izzat Darzi

Nasiriyah Fannan

Hala + Najaf

Muhammad Sabir

↳ in charge of "main" "

#4 didn't

know about

admission

before

Karbala + Najaf - Saddam didn't

Requested to list atrocities for as + Saddam habits

End of notes

Def of Abd Hamud Mahamoud

2/3/08

— Al Khattab Al-Nasiri —

DUTIES AS PERSONAL SECRETARY

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(1) Anything re. Baath Party

(2) Nationalism

(3) Communist Ministers

(4) All mail comes through him
i.e. cards to the President
including appts

(5) Secretary of National Security Council

Q What do you think will happen to SA?

A Taken to Intl (or Inq) Ct possibly Court
He's a prisoner a war

Q What will happen

A I don't know - I

Q I was asked if I saw him (SA) anyone?

A I have not

1-

2 Shooting guy on ground

Disguised into his correct name

Q 1979 - I was a guard that day

Place holds 723 people - This a
2nd floor my duties were on 2nd fl.
Next to him was one of guys accused
Moshemori next to him. SA told M. to talk

first and tell ~~who~~ the people were

and tell us how you planned for the corp.
guys named stand up - we had orders
to take them out to ~~the~~ el muhabrat.
we put them in a truck

At that time not sure if Barzan (possibly)
Sadun Shaka ; one was director +
one was asst director - were there

Doesn't know how many Baath members
removed that ~~big~~ day.

Claims not to have known anyone
personally - no connection/
his family, tribe

But he can name some of the
corp leaders.

Q what happened to those convicted?

A 5 leaders executed - Barzan
would know more - Barzan has a
book about these things.

Q Name 5 people ordered executed by Sft.
1-

2.

3.

4.

5.

A - Executed b/c they did not perform
their military ^{DUTIES} ~~responsibilities~~ right.

Q Severe punishment?

A The ones who didn't perform
in battle

Q Why not exact to soldiers
who ran/retreated
During Kuwait war
including leaders

Q Agreed - except they were
not "ordered" to stay

Q - When we have a meeting

Q - What do you know about ASG's ASG?

A -

- WHAT DO YOU THINK WILL HAPPEN TO:
- How did you feel when murdering husbands?
- ARE YOU EVIL?
- HOW DOES IT FEEL NOW THAT SE IN CUSTODY
- WERE THERE THINGS YOU FELT LIKE TO? WHY?
- DID YOU EVER FEAR HIM? HOW DID YOU DEAL WITH IT?
- DATES OF SIGNIFICANCE
- DID YOU TAKE PART IN ANY EXECUTIONS? MASS GRAVES
- WHAT MADE ANGRY, HAPPY, SAD
- S.H.'S COMMUNICATION STYLE?
- WHO DID S ADMIRE - HOW?
- How DOES S.H. LIKE/USE HUMOR
- ~~WHAT~~ WHAT MAKES HIM HAPPY
- DO YOU EVER DISAGREE W/ SADAM
- How DID YOU PREVENT HIM FROM GETTING UPSET WITH YOU,
- ~~How CAN WE~~
- DO YOU BELIEVE IT'S THE END
- WHAT DOES HE THINK WILL HAPPEN TO HIM?

WHAT DO YOU THINK WILL HAPPEN TO?

you are a high energy guy

WHO IN HISTORY HE WOULD ~~BE~~ YOURSELF
WHAT MATTERS ~~THE~~ MOST ~~TO~~ S?

WOULD YOU HAVE SMN HAAT WAS ON YOUR PHONE
WHAT ARE HIS FLAWS?

WHAT PERSONAL HABITS ~~HE~~ DID YOU OBSERVE
HOW DID YOU DEAL WITH THEM?

~~NAMES OF SONGS~~
~~HE EVER~~

SURPRISE YOU, HE'S BLAMING THINGS ON YOU.

WOULD HE EVER TAKE RESPONSIBILITY
FOR ANYTHING?

HOW DO YOU THINK HE'S DOING IN
C. ACTIVITY?

~~HOW DID YOU FEEL~~

DID S. HAVE PEOPLE EXPECTED?

~~HOW DID YOU KEEP~~

~~IT~~

WERE THERE MURDER / PEOPLE YOU KNEW?

HOW DID YOU FEEL ABOUT THIS

WHAT PERSONAL HABITS OF S.H. DID YOU NOTICE
S. & HIS WIFE. -6-

~~The Director as presented Sunday~~

~~I will ~~say~~ name of the lead~~

• What do I think about America

Q. ^{Knowledge of} Attractions in

A In any war there are many
commit acts

~~Q~~ Denied any knowledge that pic
of SAO had to be hung or
punishment of death.

You can ask Ali MAJID, etc.

I was a body guard and didn't have
the right to ask about such
things.

Q Did you know then, were several
US POWs being held?

A I heard something via
media but I don't know
for sure

Q Think allegations falsified?

A Yes no doubt about investigation
but doesn't trust witnesses.
Necessary - 8

Q - Wania Camp?

A -

- Claim false identity
- SAs & his brother careful not to show mother work
- SAs he never went to Norway with a

has to pass for the President to do whatever he wants. He took his orders from SAADAN.

He was engaged bc there was no communication with Saddam. The responsibility is the head of that sector and SAADAN.

was said by NASIR

11/11/11

(1)

MAIN RESULT MILITARY ORG IS CONTROLLING
THE ISRAELI GOVT. ALL PARTS OF THE
MIIT ARE INFILTRATED.

THESIS 4 PARTS - MIL 3RD
THE LEADERSHIP WOULD NOT MAKE ANY
MOV. W/OUT OPINION OF MIL. EXECUTABLE
PART OF GOVT.

OTHER COUNTRIES (DIFF) POLITICAL MAKES
DEC & THEN CARRIED OUT BY MIL. WHERE
IN ISR MIL GUIDE POLITICAL DECISIONS.
THAT WAS HIS FINDING BASED ON
HIS RESEARCH.

ISRAELI MILITARY NOT BIG, BUT IMPRESSED
W/ THE RESERVE CAPABILITY & TRAINING
PROVIDED MAKING IT VERY PROFICIENT.
VERY GOOD @ HITTING TARGETS AWAY
FROM ISRAELI SOIL & @ THE ENEMY'S
HOME.

LIKE IRAN WILL STRIKE U.S. IN IRAQ
INSTEAD ON US SOIL

#1

HOSSAIN RAHIMED	SEC FOR MILITARY
ADHAN AHADITHI	" BAHART REGIONAL AFF. COMM.
ABDUL FAKH MITRAD AMIN	" NAT. COMM.
DR. KITALI AL MA'AMOURI	" COUNCIL OF MINST.
AHMAD SAMMARI	SEC. OF DIWAN

2

DUTIES:

CONTROL MAIL ~~ENTERED~~ NOT INCLUDED WERE
MAIL FROM OTHER SEC DIWAN ETC.

APPTS FOR IIS, DIR OF GEN SEC.

W/IN ~~OUTSIDE~~ OF CONTROL OF QUSAY DID NOT
CABLES FROM FOREIGN MIN/ APPOINTMENT OF
AMBASSADORS, DIRECTOR
MEDIA

MINST. OF DEFENSE

CONFIDENTIAL LTRs FROM LIKE IZZAT, ALI
HE WOULD NOT OPEN.

BEFORE 83 THERE WAS NOT SEC FOR PRES.
JUST SEC. NSC. ALL OF THIS WAS DONE
BY IHM. ↓ WAS HAMIN HAMAD 1-83-91
HE TOOK OVER 3/91

NSC 9-10 OFFICERS FROM MIIT
SERVICE & DIR GEN SEC.

TRANSFERS OF OFFICERS ARE APPROVED
BY NSC. IZZAT PRESIDED OVER NSC
THE PRES. NEVER ATTENDED.

NSC - PRES

VP IZZAT

SEC Δ

THE MINST OF INTERIOR LSO DIR

DIR. TIS

DIR. AMN AL AM.

DIR DMI

OTHER

MINISTERS WOULD ATTEND ONLY IF IT
DEALT W/ THE TOPIC

BUDGET FOR ALL 3 SERVICES WERE
APPROVED BY NSC SSO APPROVED
BY SEC OF DIWAN

DISCUSSIONS

ITS NOT ALLOWED TO DISCUSS ITS OP.
AMN AL KHAS SAME
AMN AL AM ONLY AFTER APPROVAL
OF PRES.

~~REMARK THE MOST AMBITIOUS~~
DID NOT DIFFERENTIATE BTWN THE
LEADERSHIP. SADDAM LIKED HARD
WORKERS.

READS A LOT

HE THOUGHT HE WAS FAIR IN TREATING
EVERYONE. BUT 1/2 HE SAW DIFFERENT
WHICH MADE HIM WANT TO GET OUT
OF GOVT. CONFLICT BTWN HIS NEPHEWS
AND SADDAM'S NEPHEWS & HE TOOK HIS
NEPHEWS SIDE

FAULTS - OTHER TAMIR MUSTAFA ABDALLA
AS D'S DEPUTY TO DISTANCE/ISOLATE
D'S TO EVENTUALLY KILL ME OUT. COULD
NOT KILL HIM BUT BECAUSE HE HAD A
CLAN BEHIND HIM

④

He could not just resign but had discussions w/ Qusay who was his friend. He would speak out & point out - Saddam told him not get involved in this. His #1 but in reality should be behind the ministers.

Protective Brigades was the most important thing. As it also is connected to the estate & Fowel was evidence - & examples, Kuwait, war w/ Iraq.

D was opposed to war w/ Kuwait as Arab country against Arab country w/ Arabs.

Never heard Saddam blame himself

Because he ^{was} involved before he ^{could} handle person

mentally normal, Personality is not because of some his decisions

(5)

703 - HELD IN HALL AS WAS HIMAYA
DESIGNED TO THE 2ND PHA

SADDAM WAS ON THE STAGE NEXT TO
HAM MUTHI. SADDAM INSTANCED MUTHI
TELL US HOW THE COUP WAS PLANNED
MUTHI HE WOULD DESCRIBE EVENTS
AROUND 1 1/2 & THEN THE PERSON WOULD
STAND UP PROBABLY WALK THEM OUT TO
THE & TURN THEM OVER. A TENCH WAS
WAITING THE DIR COULD HAVE BEEN
BAZAR & SA'DAN SARKER, DIR & DSP.
DIR.

(File No.) 315E-140-1448534-

[illegible]

~~SECRET~~

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Title:

TARIQ AZIZ

Reference:

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☒ Original notes re interview of

TARIQ AZIZ

~~SECRET~~

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2ND
Intro TARIQ AZIZ

Present

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TMM
2/1/04
10:12 AM
Monday

SSA George Piro - FBR
SSA [redacted] - FBR
SSA [redacted] - FBR
[redacted] - US Army

b6
b7C

After 1975 relat b/w Iran - Iraq became
normal w/ visits back & forth b/w
Shah & Prime Minister

c 1978 - Khomeni started living in Iraq
Shah asked Saddam to hand Khomeni over
b/c Khomeni was begining to make
statements

Khomeni felt a grudge toward Iraq,
but I'm not here protesting Saddam
~~but~~ I don't think Khomeni
should have a grudge b/c
Iraq didn't hand him over
but Iraq did let him to leave

Khomeni to Paris

Khayeri wrote a book before Fran
reached. He said it was not
right to wait for an Imam —
might take too long.

Ottoman empire — Sultan became a
caliphate

Fran began to criticize Iraq

Fran considered Iraq an atheist ruler.

Samir set Iran documents
reminding the 9/11

Clashes on borders begin

Samir liberated small parts

At RCC, we took a vote

We rarely had to take votes
BASSAM would make a decision
and write it into a book for members
of the RCC to sign.

In 1990, the final decision rested
w/ Saddam. No one in RCC protested

Iraq initiated hostilities, Saddam
w/ 1. Minister of ^{his} (cousin) - Saddam's cousin
2. Chief of Staff
I decided to go to work

I refused to go in w/ Iraq
Saddam visited the front many
times

1982 King Hussein in Jordan

1982 - Serious talk about ~~replacing~~ ^{replacing} Saddam
~~Saddam~~

Talk of replacing him to Sel
Chief of Staff...

↳ but Saddam sent him as
ambassador to Saudi Arabia

war not going well, Iran targets

1984 Iran used SCV missiles against Iraq — which they acquired from N. Korea & Libya.

Iraq did not have long-range planes to attack Tehran

1988 — Iraq attacked Iran w/ SCV missiles.

Saddam began micromanaging military to the point of telling how deep trenches should be dug.

Only a Staffer was a very qualified officer but Saddam made all the decisions.

1984 — Iraq used chemical weapons, b/c afraid they would lose.
America's military sent me a letter saying it was not appropriate to use chemical weapons. DCC knew but didn't

protest. Saddam did not
officially tell the rcc about his
decision to use chemical weapons.

It was common knowledge.

He didn't ask the rcc before
using them nor did he tell us afterwards.
But none of us on rcc staff disagreed
w/ its use b/c of fears ~~that~~ that Iraq
was going to lose the war.

The use of chem. weapons was
not a issue in discussion w/
Pres Bush et al.

(he had been capable of
winning the war in 1988.

I was told that ~~that~~ early on
the Iraqis ~~were using~~ ~~very early~~

were using Chem Weapons on a
smaller scale.

Actually, it was the most
foolish decision of both nations

to go to war.

After the Iran-Iraq war, Iraqis saw it has a victory & lived well.

After Gulf war, Iraqis found the parts of their country destroyed. Despite Saddam's claiming a victory, no one in Iraq took this seriously.

Instead of war, if it went into reconstruction, b/c of doctors, & experts, etc.,

we could have become like

Switzerland.

~~to avoid end of~~

~~87-88 - 1990-91 of Kurds~~

S. wanted to take control back of northern mountainous region to eliminate insurgency.

He sent Ali MAJID to north

and gave him exceptional powers

He was given the power of the RCC

And this was not constitutional.

MAJID was not even a member of

the RCC. It was very strange

It was a decision by Saddam

and it allowed
MAJID to use
the military

and printed + circulated to me +
other members.

Gradually Saddam sidelined the PCC

Q - who was MAJOR accountable to?

Anti-Communist began + Kurds were
relocated

The border areas b/w Iran + Iraq were seen
as being a threat to Iraq b/c Iran
~~was~~ ~~wasn't~~ from

It was done in a harsh manner.
Those who made these decisions were
"idiots", i.e.

1. Ali MAJID

2.

3. ~~governor~~ of the region
governor

PCC became a paper tiger

~~As~~ foreign minister I heard
from media & the Kurds

From media, Kurds & Human Rights, I heard
about what was happening in terms of
Atrocities with the Kurds.

I wasn't being ^{informal} ~~that~~ as I remember

That was not my way of doing things.

Acts not criminal but very harsh
& badly b/c it generated
protests from the Kurds & the world.

Khazargh, chief of Staff,
would not have been the one making
the decision.

On the western media,
I saw a few corpses, men, women
& children — not hundreds &
thousands.

I saw document — Inst of Defense ¹⁹⁸⁹ by
Pentagon sent to me by over embassy in NY

Said Iran used chem weapons
first in 1980s.

After returning from PARIS etc, I asked

SADAM SAID YES

in the use of Chem in
war in hands of COM & chief (SADAM)

Then, Deputy min of Defense asked for
authority to use chem weapons in Iran
war. Later, ~~the~~ SADAM

realized they were ^{using} chemical
weapons extremely & he said
he withdrew his authority

Later ^{commander in chief} Deputy Def Minister asked
SADAM to restore ~~partly~~ power
to use Chem. weapons & SAM
agreed.

Subsequently, ~~SADAM~~

and used
Chem weapons in IRAQ AB and

SADAM said we don't need to
use chem weapons in IRAQ AB
ble I wasn't that into.

∴ After cease fire was reached b/w Iran - I
M. MASUD was put in chg of the
north. He was given the ^{Absolute} power of the
RCC After the cease fire and after
the use of chem weapons on Kurds.
MASUD was to eliminate the insurgents in
the north.

In 1988, SAADAM was using telephone
to speak of health & state but not after Aug '2, '90.

Special telephone - Govt phone
in homes of high-ranking officials

SAADAM gave authority to use chemical weapons
to the
Commander in chief - N
Minister of Defense) When they
chief of Staff) both
decide

b6
b7C

Retracted early 1988

Restored in HAJABAS
in

Heard that MASUD used flour
to scare people in north

He did punish reprimand them for using
Chem weapons.

Saddam did not think that the
Use of chem was called for in AACADDS
b/c it was not a critical area - He was
upset b/c of the world-wide repercussions.

~~ASAD was not in the very hotel in the north.~~
ASAD was known as a violent man.

If people made decisions Saddam
did not like, he would punish or
execute them. But he didn't reprimand
or punish those carrying out the chemical
Attack,

21
END 12 pm

Tariq Aziz - interview #2

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From George

(We're here for a specific purpose
not necessarily associated with your hot lines & investigations - TA
related to another investigation/area
he acknowledged understanding/ready to help)


✓ Iran-Iraq War (1980)

✓ Iranian incursion into Iraq started

✓ after 1975

✓ relations between I & I became normal

✓ 1978-79



Al-Badr
released to get
him in

✓ things changed - dossier - Khomenei in Iraq (Iraqi SV)

✓ Shah asked Saddam to hand over Khomenei

✓ Saddam refused, cited tradition / He is not the man to go to

✓ Khomenei proposed to stay in Iraq

✓ Baghdad for Khomenei agreed to leave

✓ went to France, Paris

✓ Khomenei put "graffiti" against Iraq

✓ He was "political enemy" but supported the Kurds

✓ Plus 1975 agreement → defining friendly relations

✓ 1979

✓ Khomeini came to power in Iran

✓ Imam - direct descendant of ^{Imam} ~~Imam~~

✓ 12th Imam - last - disappeared for 40 years

✓ awaiting return - similar to Jesus

✓ Khomeini said he ought to wait for Imam

✓ might take thousands of years

✓ Khomeini proposed "deputy of Imam" as himself

✓ who would conduct affairs of Imam until his return

✓ First, Imam & Shiite, then all Muslims

X Therefore, first target of Khomeini was Iraq

✓ For Shia, all of the important "sanctuaries" or religious sites are in Iraq

✓ When Khomeini declared himself as "deputy of the Imam" he

✓ was targeting Iraq in TA's opinion

✓ viewed Saddam as illegitimate ruler, ^{him, brother} father

✓ an exchange of munitions occurred to no avail

✓ clashes started, with Iran in Iraq, Grand and Qiz

✓ Month of 1980 - targeted


✓ Iraq retook most of the oil fields / territories

✓ Saddam invaded GCC - 1980 September?

✓ Said we must fight Iran

✓ TA Dep Prime Minister wrote
RCC Sept 1979 (see * later)

✓ TA didn't predict
downfall of Iran
RCC supported - no
one predicted, but not
a vote



3

✓ TA sent to ^{Moscow} Russia

✓ to remind of treaty of friendship w/ Iraq

✓ Russian said must make peace - ^{Moscow}?

✓ ~~Def. Dept~~ TA rec'd call while in Moscow
"were at war"

✓ Met w/ Deputy Foreign Minister - ^{name?}

✓ Russia said couldn't support war

✓ TA returned to Baghdad - war was on

✓ Iraq takes some Iranian territory until 1982

* ~~Bani Sadr~~ Iran / removed

✓ Iran took back some cities / territory

✓ Thereafter Iran had upper hand

✓ Soviets thought Iran could be their ally but wrong

✓ Great Satan - USA

✓ Soviets - second great Satan

✓ Then Khomani persecuted (imprisoned, executed) communists
in Iran

✓ (Israelis supported Iran at this time)

shot down an Argentine plane w/ Israeli pilots

✓ Iraq signed mtg - relations improved
from 1979, 82 forward, incl. arms



④

- ✓ Saddam H.A. visited Moscow / Baghdad - 1985
- ✓ Baghdad, Damascus
- ✓ Further ^{thru} end of war relations good w/ Soviets 1988
- ✓ provide Iraq w/ arms
- ✓ Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary etc provided weapons & money
- ✓ in years 80's was between Soviets
- ✓ Soviets "closed their eyes to this"

* RCC details

- ✓ explained minutes of RCC existed before Saddam, noted by
- ✓ according to Constitution, RCC had power to vote on issues, ^{who} ^{Franklin}
- ✓ but Saddam changed this, thus no vote ^{conceded by Saddam}
- ✓ National Assembly "voted" for ~~the~~ ^{annulment of 1975 treaty}
- ✓ "vote" was by clapping.
- ✓ final decision rested w/ Saddam for war
- ✗ RCC did not protest war, no vote took place

✓ Why did war - Saddam

✗ Minister of Defense Saddam's cousin

- ✓ Saddam act more as an ^{dictator} than a president
- ✓ went to front, pretended to be mil gen (Iraqi)



5

- ✓ He went "hundreds" of times to the front borders
- ✓ As a result, Iraq suffered huge losses
- ✓ on 6/6/86 ~ 10,000 people taken as hostages?
- ✓ It was the night Iraq had lost the world class war
- ✓ 1987 - significant talks about replacing Saddam
- ✓ in Middle East reserves, not in Iraq
- ✓ Hamas reaction after succession
- ✗ (Chief of Staff in Baghdad - Shaq?; head in Iraq)
- ambassador to KSA at time

- ✓ Iran attacked civilian areas ind. ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ Baghdad
- ✓ Iraq attacked cities also in during Desert Storm - mainly
- ✓ Iranian targeted SCUDs used 1984/85 - Baghdad
- ✓ not accurate, fall on civ. ^{targets} targets
- ✓ Iran Air strategy - limited range
- ✓ attacked places like Khafan, Basra, Humsa
- tried to destroy oil production
- ✓ Iraq had trouble reaching into Iran - ^{specific} specific
- until 1986 plane + SCUDs ¹⁹⁸⁶ considered hit Iran

✓
①
X Both sides directed war by those w/o mil. experience
thous many mistakes on both sides

✓ Saddam gradually interested more in details - trading, for example

X Revolutionary Iran

not great mil force but had lot of stamina

many when captured were angry they had then killed

✓ use of chemical weapons - significant to outside world

✓ first time since WWI

✓ Saddam's decision alone - 1980 TR Foreign minister at time

✓ RCC "informed" "it was mentioned"

✓ dire situation for Iraq "life or death"

X communication w/ France in the end? no idea

✓ "common knowledge" that chemical weapons were used

✓ do not convene until because of military action

✓ no RCC member protested because of Saddam threatening
1981 + 1988 (Iran-Iraq war)

✓ violates Geneva Convention, which Iraq signed

X remaining relations w/ US ~ 1984

it was not brought up by US or other countries diplomatically

X after battle of Al-Fao, 1988, Iraq expected to win
if Basra fell would have tremendous consequences

W

⑦

✓ Iranians, pro-military, used chem weapons at beginning War

✓ Undisputed fact that Iraq used chem weapons

✓ Decision made by Hussein & Adnan Charvallah

✓ War ended 1988

✓ Considered a victory for Iraq by many
Iraq 3 times size of Iran

✓ Military better trained/equipped

✓ Forced Iran to cease fire

✓ Iraq had adopted

✓ Sep 1980 UN ceasefire, Iran withdrew

✓ UN Res 598 in 1987, Iran in 1988 (due to Iraqi successes)

✓ War: "Most foolish decision of two countries."

✓ Said Carter, estimate Iraq - tremendous Iraq debt after
however, feeling of Iraqis in 1988 - victory

Had major supplies going into Iraq

✓ If had not devoted time, money to war, Iraq could have

✓ been very prosperous - (help UN/E)



8

✓ Kurds - 1987-88 - another serious problem

~~XX~~ secret agents

✓ Saddam sent Ali Hasan Al-Majid to north & gave "exceptional powers" including Masut

1988 after "Intifada campaign"

overflew
w/ Iran

✓ No discussion w/ RCC, Council of Ministers, etc regarding Ali

✓ Hasan and his powers "very strange"

✓ Other govt members had power/direction over region they were not used

✓ Ali not ^{even} RCC member

✓ Viewed as non-constitutional

✓ Decision "signed by Saddam" given to RCC

✓ Written on behalf of RCC, w/ consultation, signed by Saddam

✓ Printed on paper & sent copy - RCC members

✓ Put in charge of north and given power of RCC

✓ Thus, Ali reports to Saddam and no one else

✓ until after his fall in 1987 at this time

✗ Saddam said - M.G. from Masut - name? ~~XX~~ w/ authority to command

✗ brought in Nazem Nazem Khanzari later at Halabja

✓ Powers to Ali

✓ Did not answer to Chpt of State, MoD, only Saddam

14

9

- ✓ Relocation of Kurds occurred
- ✓ inside Iraq, near border Iraq/Iran
- ✓ moved by plane, 7/10/80
- ✓ RCC didn't protest
- ✓ Relocation done in harsh manner^a
- ✓ Those who did that were "idiots" ^{Wanted to do Post to show success}
- ✓ Ali Hasan Al-Majid
- ✓ { Hasan Bashi?
- ✓ Government's decision

- ✓ IAF/RCC not informed and asked opinion
- ✓ Mistreatment/abuse
- ✓ Heard details via media
- ✓ Comments provided post but far from truth (Kurd's not happy about this officially, only media)
- ✓ IAF "not his way of doing things." ^a i.e., would have done this ^{seemed}
- ✓ At time, justified for security of nation
- ✓ In retrospect, criminal in nature

✓ Halabja
~~Halabja~~



10

✓ most infamous incident May 1988

✓ first use of chemical weapons on civilians

✓ then Iraq occupied city, then Iraq justified } agreed
✓ fast-foods occupied just Iraqis

✓ UN sanctions w/ few corpses - many women, children

✓ Institute of Defense, Pentagon, 1989 report

✓ indicated Iraq used chemical weapons first at Halabja

✓ published in "limited manner"

✓ says Iraq used second

✓ Saddam admitted to UN chem weapons had been used

✓ defense - in hands of commander in chief (Saddam)

✓ Adnan Khashanah - top commander chief of MoD - and chief of staff

✓ asked for the power - Iraq - Iraqis

✓ withdrawn decision to Saddam alone in 1988 to Saddam

✓ Khashanah said "would weaken" himself

X TA advised would create "great mess"

✓ Khashanah
to them they
used at Halabja
Iraqis not after

✓ Saddam didn't order chem weapons attack



(11)

* * * Ali Hassan al-Majid

- ✓ given power in north after Iran-Iraq War
- ✓ Minister of Foreign Affairs, before
- ✓ Khairallah Khazraj - had power over Haddad & Ali

1989-1998

- ✓ still used phones (saddam)
- ✓ stopped when Gulf War broke out - Aug 2, 1990
- ✓ 1988 - regularly used phone from Iran-Iraq War

✓ Chem weapons

✓ First w/ Saddam

✓ Then w/ Khairallah, Khazraj

✓ Then Saddam

✓ Then Khairallah, Khazraj - Haddad

✓ Later Ali Hassan (Anti-Chem weapons)

disputed whether it was used

After 9/11 some came know i done

reports of Chem-used



(12)

✓ Saddam told TA "not my decision" - Halabja
✓ in hands of Khawallah / Khawarij

✓ did not punish or imprison or execute
✓ normally would punish or execute

(Did 'imply' approval
not sure.
no opinion)

✓ Saddam felt not necessary, especially due to international outcry

✓ After latter part of 1989

✓ after ceasefire, Aug 8, 1989, Iran - Iraq war

✓ Mr. Hasan al-Majid appointed

✓ put down insurgency

✓ he was violent person, everyone knew
Ali told some prisoners he was negotiating w/ Americans
TA told other prisoners "he's a liar"
could have happened

(Title)

(File No.) 315E-HQ-1448534

[illegible]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FD-340b (Rev. 8-7-97)

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 05-11-2009

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Description: ☒ Original notes re interview of

SA'DUN SHAKIR MAHMUD AL-UBANDI

FBI/DOJ

~~SECRET~~

b1

SAMIR SHAKIR MAITMOOD —

DOB

POB Baghdad

90 Tape - neg ABOUT S. re: Gulf W.

led to resign. + Retir — Advisor to Duan
EG Mar Jurd

92 fruit

CV surg. - DOR

'75 Grad Political Law - Bagh

Pers; Mar + 7

App + member of Acc After Revolution

87-90 Member R

79-87 Molt

S —→

Ali Hassan al MAJID —→

IZAT Ibrahim al DORI

Aziz Saleh al Huma

Muhamad Hamza al Zubaydi

Latif Nusayyif al JASIM al Dulaymi

Taha Yassir Ramadan

Mizban Khathar Hama

Taha Nuhie - eldar Marout

TA

H. Khat MIZBAN

FADIL Ghamb

Khairallah

72

79 - July MOT appointed

77 Eledas a member Rec Bath Pk

87 left MOT

MOT in just since '90

72-79 IES Dir

took orders Bkr on Saudi

Reports go to Pres & VP

Reason - last entry of committee - Natl Assembly

for
summons
asking
for
designation

Sit b/w Pa & Kuwait intense

My opinion was problem should be
solved peacefully, logically

and voiced that opinion

Pres SMO came to mtg.

SAD had tape recorder

conversation b/w King Fahad — Emirati
Zayid
Slewa

telling

Fahad I'm going to be talking to the Kuwaitis
Fahad meeting Hussein

THE PLAY OF
- Karamat
- Nat'l committee

SANQAM, played us an interrupted tape b/w Fahed & bolt,
trying to convince every one that there
was a conspiracy b/w SANQAM & Gulf
countries against us.

After hearing tape, he thought we
didn't need to hear it.

I commented, we don't know the
source of tape

SANQAM's Emotions when playing tape =
was trying to show people conspiracy

The day of Mtg. Khatir Hussain arrived
We all met next day at airport to
see him off.

_____ called me
to say don't go to airport —

I think President had some feelings
about my previous comments

After King left, I wrote long
a letter to SH re my position on
Kuwait and on tape:

... "There were things I didn't tell

you in meeting

I knew my history of oil problems
in Kuwait - didn't want to embarrass
you.

Two days later, called to palace & was
told to resign.

JAN 10
/ 92

For 2 yrs after that heart problems,
needed surgery - Hussein visited me
at hospital - we didn't have
facilities in Baghdad

He told me good hospital in Amman
He sent me there hospital & govt
paid for it.

Operated at King H. Hospital
in Jordan + King,
personally visited -

K. Hussein would not let
Iraq govt pay for Bill

Re: Hospital in Baghdad

Special Hospital for Elite + their families.

A daily Rpt as to which pt. in hospital.

SWH not holding a grudge.

Q After 94, what contact of SADDAM?

A I rarely saw him.

One year after that @ 93-94

I went to hospital for check-up

I had submitted a request to
leave the country for medical

reasons. He called me to his

office + he put me out secretary

to assist w/ passport so I could

go to Amman.

All trips to Amman

Except trip to France for

wife's operation re: Heart. @ 1996.

and again had to see SADDAM again.

Change valve in heart - new procedure

specialist in France. Stayed there 4 mos.

I got mail from wife in Embassy

Q. my - symbolize another advisors
on paper - a symbol of perfection
we stay in service of govt in
order to get paid - pension
only respect & to get paid

Each couple 7 mos., 0/1/2 / Pres.

Send us a Rpt. to give our opinion in my
position as a Rtd. member of Interior, this
happened 1 or 2 times. Question re Admin +
Internal Accounting issues.
Practically, they don't need my opinion.

~~Relationship SMOORAN~~ → SMOORAN
~~1965-66~~ 1966 - Met in prison as
Baath Party members

After '63, 2 brothers

Aref -

Many Baathists were arrested

Imprisoned Al Qaeda (prison^{the})

Taji

~~Al Qaeda~~

NATaji - military camp - removed soldiers
turned it into a prison.

Heard about Saddam - knew his report
as one of those to att. Assoc.

Not a friendship - but a
prison relationship.

My escape from prison was within about
Buck The DIRECTOR GEA

SADAM met w/ them.

and was restored by report on
SADAM in the prison.

BAK remember Al BAK spoke to
me

Say Saddam accurate
But the other very exaggerate

- * 1 How describe his character
- 2 Changes in STROON
- * 3 What's his greatest strength
- 4 " " " weakness

- * 5 Was he good/bad for country?
- 6 Is IA better w/o him

QUIET ARCHITECT OF ONE OF THE MOST

- 7 Role in IIs
- " Executions
- " Torture

BRUTAL
REGIMES

DID YOU EVER INFORM
ON OTHER RCC
MEMBERS

- * 8 SL and Atrocities
- 9 Vulnerability
Idiosyncrasies

15. How did you survive?

- * 10 What is the worst thing you
ever saw or heard
about STROON

- 11 Was he Butcher of Bangladesh

- * 12 Do you respect him

- 13 What would say about STRO at tribunal
- 14 Do you feel lucky to be alive?

prior to '68
Met Slt after prison + exchanges
dinner in Mansouri.

After '68, we were both busy + fewer meetings

In 70's, Slt + him hunting club
A social club - hunting
~~the~~ pheasant (PARAJ)

Drag - Iran war took a lot of
our time -

M of Int was not the most imp
post + Slt's time limited. Slt more of
Min of Def et al.

79 Corp - I was present + knew
~~Researcher~~ Sammani -
Meshanri,

1st mtg was w/ leadership + ministers
after resigning of Bakr. + we had mtg to decide
what to be. Samman stood up +
said this is a conspiracy - "I don't
agree - Baker is not sick"

SAMMAN said you are participating in a
coup, and we have info about you. He
told Samman to get out of making
Mohammad Alish was there.

Alish said it's not fair - let's discuss
this - so sent Alish out as well
saying we know about your
relationship w/ Syrian govt.

Alish, after mtg, took p.m., and few
hours later, died. per Muradagovir
Duri elected VP

_____ stood up naming names
of those in coup.

+ then SAMMAN reading list

Q Did you believe that there was a plot
A Yes

Q. Anyone explain how plot
was uncovered?

A. ^{no} Details were not known

There were rumors that
corp forming: Remos
about

• Fresh

• Adman

•

•

etc

It was later proven that
_____ was sending _____
to Syria. - ASAD held a hand in
that corp.

Denies this effort by SH
to remove threats to power.

I don't think so. - There were
people very close to him.

I think he cried.

Don't know if SH smiled again

Never thought anything would happen to me
after my opinion on Kuwait

Yes, I was afraid after I wrote
letter to SH. thought I might
lose my job

Thinks a way to settle Kuwait

I know off in Kuwait + could have negotiating

Q Anyone else advised SH not to go to Kuwait

A I don't think so

Q Realizing what situation?

A

Q ~~was~~ he a good leader?

" " " person?

He's a leader - made mistakes
Initially and in
Korea and
w/ USA

A fact of life that we should have
been dealing w/ East & West -
we should have been doing this -
no freedom to campaign against
the world.

Q Who was resp. for that?

A The Pres + leadership

Q Do you believe leadership had input?

A A combined responsibility

① No IIS - we started it
There was a internal security

Q you were ~~1st~~ IIS Director
& had sign to be in drp

A Did you create the Directorate?

(pulls out papers says it's
been since '75)

It was about prisons, Ministry Interior

Q Significant events in IIS

→ Conspiracies

→ biggest was

- protect the govt

- deter plots against govt

- counter Iranian threat

→ ~~Barragan~~ SA boss, replaced me
after 17 July

Q what steps to uncover plots

A No plan - took each case separately

Q Info was developed

+ I would take it to leadership

Q what measures steps taken to uncover plots

Watch

sources

monitor phones

getting special

abilities at time were simple.

Q How not know what is going on before?

A Details are w/ Barazani

3 BRANCHES

(1) Political Branch - Barazani


(2) technical

(3) ~~for~~

Q

A Denies any details re:

As no ~~it~~ — positions
divided into 2



local administration



his job

Q Who makes decisions in acc?

A The President

Q so what was the acc ~~that~~ able to do?

I

Quiet Architect Behind one of the most brutal regimes in World History ~~History~~

1. Minimize
2. blame others
- ~~3. not your responsibility~~
4. lapse of memory

- (A) Early fondery IIS
- (B) Torture
~~Arde~~
~~Exeute~~
Hide Bodies
Hide weapons
Information
others.
Foreknowledge
of '79 plot.

II

- You informed on others to Saddam

Spy
monitor
ran sources

code, calculating
searcher

III Atrocities

IV Saddam took care of you

(1) DID NOT agree on use of chem weapons

A wasn't asked for opinion
It's not a humanitarian thing
Acknowled. sulphur

Q As rec member, you had a voice —

A B A there was no discussion

Tremier used chem weapons 1ST

Q Response when rec rec'd word
that Shi Majid rec'd author
for Nigerian

A The Pres. gave his Authority

Q You had opport to take action re;

• To us

• And for campaign

①

1016 HRS 2/21/2004

SA'DUN SHAKIR MAHMUD AHMAD AL-
UBAIDI

7/1/1939 - BAGHDAD, IRAQ

1975 - IN POLITICAL LAW BAGHDAD - UNIV.
AFTER THE REV. APPOINTED TO RCC.

1972 - ITS DIR.

1977/REGIONAL COMM.
BATH PARTY

07/1979-87 MINST OF INTERIOR

1990 - LEFT THE LEADERSHIP REGIONAL COMM.
BEFORE THE INVASION OF KUWAIT

94 OR 95 - APPOINTED AS PRES. ADVISOR W/
RESP. TO COLLECT A SALARY

AS ITS DIR. ~~TOOK~~ ORDERS FROM BAKR
OR HUSSEIN. REPORTS WENT BACK TO BOTH

WHEN MINST. ^{SITUATION} CHANGED AS PRES. WAS ALSO
PRIME MINISTER SO ORDERS CAME FROM PRES.
ONLY.

RESP. AS LEADING TO KUWAIT WAS NONE
B. SA'DUN ASKED FOR HIS RESIGNATION FROM
HIS POSITION IN THE PARTY.

(2)

SIT'S EMOTION WHEN TAPE PLAYED - PROBABLY
HEARD THE TAPE BEFORE. ^{TRY} CONVINCE THE
CONSPIRACY & WANTED TO PLAY FOR THE
PEOPLE TO UNDERSTAND. HE SPoke OUT
AGAINST PLAYING THE TAPE.

- KING HUSSEIN WAS THERE VISITING. ALL WERE
TO GO THE AIRPORT TO SAY BYE - BUT CALLED
BY PRES. DIWAN NOT GO BECAUSE SIT ~~THINKS~~
UPSET BY HIS COMMENT.

HE WROTE A LTR 22 KUNAT & THE TAPE.
SUGGESTED KUNAT IT IS AN OLD PROBLEM ^{W/} THE
OIL DISAGREEMENTS ETC. A COUPLE DAYS
LATER CALLED THE PALACE WHERE HE WAS TOLD
~~NOT~~ TO RESIGN BY DIWAN. SAW SIT 2 WKS
LATER @ HOSPITAL (HAD HEART PROBLEM). SIT
VISITED HIM @ HOSPITAL. IRAQ DID NOT
HAVE FACILITIES FOR SUCH PROCEDURE. SIT
SENT HIM TO JORDAN, WHERE HE WAS
TREATED & VISITED BY KING & KING PAID THE
BILL.

INITIALLY @ SPECIAL HOSP. FOR JUST MINIST.
& THEIR FAMILIES AND THAT IS HOW SH FOUND
OUT.

NO OR LITTLE CONTACT AFTER THAT. YEAR LATER
93 OR 94. FOR MEDICAL CHECK UP REQUESTED.
FOR AUTHORIZATION TO TRAVEL OUTSIDE IRAQ
(WITHOUT REQ PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORIZATION)

(3)

SAW HIM IN HQS OFFICE & SPOKE TO HIM & HE GRANTED THE TRAVEL. LIMITED TRAVEL TO JORDAN ONLY w/ EXCEPTION 1 TRIP TO FRANCE AS HIS WIFE NEEDED HEART SURGERY FROM RENOWNED SPECIALISTS. PROCEDURE WAS NEW & COULD NOT BE DONE IN JORDAN OUTLET OF MOS. IN FRANCE. PAID BY AMBASSY IN PARIS ALL EXPENSES.

AS PRES. ADVISOR HE GOT A RPT EVERY 2 MOS BY OFF. OF PRESIDENCY TO GIVE OPINIONS OCCURRED 2 OR 3 TIMES. RE COUNTIES TENDERS, INTERNAL MATTERS DONE AS A CUSTODY

CHANDOTAP - 1964 MET IN PRISON FOR BEING BATHIST. DURING ABDEL RAHMAN ARE MANY " WERE ARRESTED. SECURITY FOR TATI PRISON AL RABHID. (PRISON #1) MET HIM THERE.

(SH) HE WAS KNOWN - MAINLY FROM HIS ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT. PROSECUTION WAS TELEvised. CAPTURED ONES WERE CONvICTED & SENTENCES OTHERS PLED.

THEIR RELATIONSHIP WERE DETAILED IN 3 BOOKS WHICH SIT HAD PROVIDED INFO. AND 1 OCCASION I GAVE AN INTERVIEW TO AN IRAQI NEWSPAPER.

GHANEM
BOVIA
MAJIDHADI MAJID

(4)

THE BOOKS ACCURATE DEPICTIONS OF THE
EVENTS.

WAS PRES. OF HUNTING CLUB (MORE SOCIAL
CLUB) SIT WOULD VISIT IN THE EARLY 70's
ON HUNTING TRIPS

HEARD FROM HELICOPTER BUT NOT SEEN.
HAVE DONE IT ONCE OR TWICE "NOT A
SPORT"

MINST. OF INTERIOR SPLIT INTO 2 - 1 SEC. 2-
LOCAL GOV. REDUCING THE ROLE OF MINST. OF
INT.

AGAINST SIT CAUSED
SPEAKING BUT REDUCED POSITION -
KNOWN BY BROTHER NAME AFTER THE CAMP
NAME BECAME MAJIDHADI ROOTS IN IRAN.

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 01/30/2004

TARIQ AZIZ (Blacklist #25) date of birth April 1, 1936, place of birth Mosul, Iraq, was interviewed at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Iraq. Also present at the interview was [redacted] US Army Representative. After being advised that the interviewing Agents were members of the United States Government from Washington, DC, AZIZ provided the following information in English:

b6
b7C

AZIZ' grandfather's last name was Issa, which is Arabic for Jesus. He does not now nor has he ever used the name Mikhail. AZIZ stated that Iranian/pro-Iranian factions claimed this was once part of his name in order to emphasize or point out that AZIZ is Christian. AZIZ is a Chaldean Christian by religion. His father died when he was six or seven years old. Thereafter, his mother and uncle raised AZIZ in Baghdad.

AZIZ studied English while growing up and through college, obtaining a bachelor's degree from the College of Arts and Sciences in Baghdad in 1958. He continued to study English on his own thereafter.

AZIZ worked as a journalist for two months upon graduation from college. He served in the Army for approximately one year and a half in 1958-59. Later, AZIZ worked at times as an interpreter.

AZIZ joined the Ba'ath political party in the late 1950s. Michael Aflaq founded this political movement. The stated party platforms of freedom, socialism, and Arab Unity appealed to AZIZ. He felt the Ba'ath system would be good for Iraq.

The Ba'ath came to power in Iraq in February, 1963 in a bloody coup d'etat overthrowing then President Qassem. Qassem was a military dictator who persecuted members of the Ba'ath. This Ba'ath government lasted only nine months, however, with President Abd Al-Salam Aref assuming leadership of the country in November, 1963. After dying in a helicopter crash in 1966, President Aref's brother, Abd Al-Rahman Aref, assumed leadership.

Investigation on 01/30/2004 at Baghdad, Iraq

File # 315E-HQ-1448534-22 Date dictated 01/30/2004
by George L. Piro

b6
b7C

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of TARIO AZIZ, On 01/30/2004, Page 2

After the previous government failed in November, 1963, many Ba'ath members, including AZIZ, were "chased" to Syria in 1964. AZIZ remained in Syria until 1967, having been jailed there in 1966-67. Upon release, he traveled back to Baghdad where he taught English from 1967-68. During the reign of the Aref brothers, the Ba'ath was virtually eliminated from Iraq.

In July, 1968, the Ba'ath came back to power in a bloodless coup, or "White Revolution", placing President Bakr in power. Saddam Hussein, a key Ba'ath member, enlisted the support of two of Aref's officials, the Director of Military Intelligence (Nayif) and the head of the Republican Guard (Da'ud), to effect the coup. These two individuals were promised high positions in the new government in exchange for their support. Within a matter of days after Bakr assumed the Presidency, however, both were removed from their "new" positions and given Ambassador posts outside Iraq. Nayif was later assassinated in London. AZIZ characterized his relationship with Bakr as "not strong." This was due to AZIZ' Christian beliefs.

AZIZ served as the editor of the Ba'ath newspaper in 1963 and 1969. He served three years as Minister of Information under the Ba'ath government in the 1970s. He became a Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) member in 1977. Created in 1968, the RCC was designed to be the highest policy and decision-making body in Iraq. Saddam Hussein served as Vice Chairman of the RCC beginning in 1969. AZIZ stated Hussein "liked" AZIZ and supported his membership in the Ba'ath and positions he held within the party and government.

From 1969 forward, Hussein worked to eliminate threats to the Iraqi government, both inside and outside the country. These steps include the "March Manifesto" with Kurdish leader Barzani in 1970 which stated the Kurdish population in Iraq would have an autonomous state by 1974. This move apparently appeased Kurdish dissidents within Iraq. The provisions of the agreement never came to fruition, however. In 1975, Hussein reached an agreement with the government of Iran regarding the Shatt-al-Arab Waterway. This agreement, more favorable to Iran, essentially eliminated the external threat from Iran while simultaneously eliminating Iran's support of the Kurds inside Iraq.

Hussein also eliminated threats he perceived from individuals within the government. He incriminated persons in "coups" and held fake trials. In 1973, one such victim was Abdul

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Continuation of FD-302 of TARIO AZIZ, On 01/30/2004, Page 3

Khaliq Samarra'i, the Minister of Interior. Samarra'i was "critical and outspoken" against Hussein and Bakr. He was sentenced to death, changed later to life. Ali Hasan Al-Majid, aka "Chemical Ali", stated as long as Samarra'i was alive, coups would continue. Consequently, Samarra'i was removed from prison and executed in 1979. Per AZIZ, Samarra'i was a "humble man" who had no aspirations of power. Hussein and Bakr saw him as an obstacle and a threat to "their wrongdoings." AZIZ stated the treatment of Samarra'i was "ethically and morally wrong" and "weakened the party." In AZIZ' opinion, democracy in Iraq was gone after 1979.

In 1979, Bakr stepped down due to health reasons and Hussein assumed the Presidency. Various factors contributed to Hussein's rise to power. He had served as Vice Chairman of the RCC since 1969. He also served as the Deputy Secretary General of the Ba'ath. Aflaq did not support Hussein at first, but eventually did. Hussein had the reputation of being a strong Ba'ath loyalist. This was due to his participation in the coup attempt against President Qassem in 1963 and his active role in reforming the party after 1963. AZIZ stated Hussein's true power developed after 1968.

AZIZ stated the RCC was the supreme body in Iraq prior to the new regime under Hussein. The RCC made laws and was considered higher than the cabinet. Upon assuming the Presidency, Hussein moved immediately over the next two years, to consolidate power into his hands from the RCC.

Hussein convened a Cabinet meeting in July, 1979, shortly after assuming the Presidency. During the videotaped meeting, details were relayed of a "plot" uncovered three to four days before involving a conspiracy with Syrian officials to overthrow the Iraqi government. Former President Bakr's Chief of Staff, Muhie Abd Al-Hussein Mashhadi, was brought before the group and announced his complicity in the plot. Other "conspirators" were named and taken away from the meeting. AZIZ did not believe the "plot" was true. At the time, AZIZ felt that if one voiced opposition to the proceedings, he would be arrested. Thus, AZIZ remained silent or may have clapped when others clapped so as to not appear to oppose Hussein. The videotape of this meeting was sent to various Middle Eastern leaders including the Syrian President. AZIZ stated Hussein opposed the "almost eighty percent complete" plans for an Iraq-Syria unification, similar to the United Arab Republic which previously temporarily united Egypt and Syria. Shortly thereafter, Hussein created a "fake" court to try the individuals involved in the "conspiracy." He appointed Na'im

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Continuation of FD-302 of TARIO AZIZ, On 01/30/2004, Page 4

Haddad, a Shiite and Ba'ath member, to serve as the presiding judge. AZIZ believed this was an attempt by Hussein to add credibility to the proceedings. AZIZ did not attend the trial and described the entire event as a "crime against the people and the Ba'ath Party."

Other less dramatic steps occurred pursuant to a consolidation of power into Hussein's hands. Until 1979, the RCC held regular meetings with minutes recording the details. After Hussein became President, the meetings were less frequent and no minutes were recorded. Hussein told the RCC there would be times when he would not be able to consult with them. Thus, according to Hussein, the RCC had to give him power to make decisions alone.

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015 = 114 1170 = 114

~~SECRET~~

FD-340 (Rev. 3-8-01)

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Universal Case File Number

(S)

315 E-HO-1448534-1A22

DATE: 05-11-2009

CLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/LSC

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 05-11-2034

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Field Office Acquiring Evidence

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Reference:

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Description:

☒ Original notes re interview of

TARIQ AZIZ (BL-25)

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Notes of SSA

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SSA

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1/30/04

✓ Tariq Aziz (Issa) grandfather BL # 25

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

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DATE 05-11-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/LSG

Iranian/pro-Iranian faction claimed

this was part of his name to point out
he was a Christian

✓ Born in 1936, Mosul, Iraq → moved to Baghdad, Chaldean
6-7 yrs old when father died

mother/made raised

✓ Studied English thru high school, then kept up on his own

✓ journalist first →

✓ 1958-graduated, writes journalist 2 months

✓ Army - year and a half

✓ editor of Ba'ath party newspaper

✓ "chased" to Syria → 1964 (comp in 1963)

✓ stayed until 1967

✓ jailed in Syria 1966-67; released, went to Iraq

✓ taught English - 1969-68 - Baghdad; edit Ba'ath paper in 1968-69

✓ joined Ba'ath in late 1960s

✓ broad association, Arab unity appealed to him

✓ father - Michel Atlay

✓ convinced would be good for Iraq

✓ Qassem

✓ military dictator; persecuted Ba'ath

✓ coup by Ba'ath in Feb, 1963; lasted until Nov, 1963

✓ Aref eliminated Ba'ath Party

✓ latter killed in helicopter/aircraft crash

✓ his brother became Iraq's leader

✓ Ba'ath came back in 1968 - President Ba'ath July 17

✓ not strong relationship w/ Ba'ath because of Christianity

✓ Saddam liked Aref & supported his membership in Ba'ath

✓ MoI - 3 years

✓ 1977 - RCC member

✓ 1979 - Ba'ath stopped banning, Saddam became president

✗ Saddam gradually became a dictator

✓ Became editor again of Ba'ath party newspaper - 1969

✓ ↳ Saddam supported

✓ RCC created in 1968

✓ "White" Revolution → no bloodshed assassinated in London

✓ Saddam used Nayef (Dir of Mil Intel) & for coup

? (Republican board)
(Minister of Def)

✓ then removed them made Ambassadors

3

Ba'ath - refused to join gov't
Talabani - joined gov't

All leaders of party became members of PRC

✓ Saddam became ~~the~~ chairman of PRC

✓ became Dep Secretary General of party

✓ Michael Aflaq did not support Saddam at first, eventually did

Saddam had reputation of Ba'ath loyalist

✓ participated in coup attempt on Qasim

→ reformed party after 1963 - very active
as a revolutionary

The "End Palace" used in 1963

arrested, tortured, executed many communists

Saddam not powerful at time but close to Ba'ath

because in the same tribe.

✓ his power came after 1968

✓ PRC

✓ Supreme body in new regime - made laws, higher than cabinet

✓ until Saddam came to power in 1979

✓ First 2 years consolidation of power

~ Kurds 1969?

✓ Saddam attempted to recruit Ba'ath - Marsh Militants joined

✓ Communists joined govt but not RCC in 1972

only Ba'ath were RCC

Manifesto said Kurds would be autonomous by 1974

Barzani wanted to include Kirkuk - S of the Tigris, as did RCC & Azei

Iran & US backed Barzani

Saddam reached agreement with Iran - Shatt Al-Arab waterway - divided it

Barzani revolt collapsed (Majlis Agreement)

Consolidated power in Iraq after that → 1973?

The oil of Kirkuk, associated in dusting and many modernised

And part in of Iraq (Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, Kirkuk - big cities)

→ not covered by Azei as concession

The right thing to do at the same time

security within Iraq (Kurds) and outside (Iran)

Shah had annulled 1937 Shatt Al-Arab agreement in 1969

Iran much stronger than Iraq in 70's (1975?)

later developed Umm Qasr - port

✓ Northern Iraq - Dialect of Turk? ~ 1973

✓ arrested Min of Def & Min of Int - comp plot

✓ Abdul Karim Samirani - eliminated

✓ Party became weaker, Tiberitis stronger

✓ Chemical said as long as regime, comp plots will continue
1979 - removed & executed

(Azei not
Majlis not
Editor of time only)

very critical of Barzani
Saddam
succeeded to death, then
life by Barzani then

5

✓ Abdul Karim had no aspirations of power - p. 172

✓ Saddam & Ba'ar saw him as an obstacle, threat to their wrongdoings

~~Saddam's second capital of Iraq~~

✓ Elimination of him ethically & morally wrong

& w/ cake & party, democracy welcomed, after 1990s.

✓ Became member of RCC in 1971 Minister of Interior 1974

✓ used to have mtgs & minutes

✓ after 1990s, prominent

✓ Saddam said there are times when I won't be able to consult so give me power to make decisions

✓ Meeting when Saddam came to power - July, 1979 (Wednesday) ^{Saddam} ^{the} ^{country}

✓ Abdul Mohsin Ghannam? → computer ^{Chief of Staff}

X It was known that Ba'ar wanted to step down

✓ arrested before 3rd day - confessed to conspiracy w/ Syria govt to topple Ba'ar govt

X he said Ba'ar was healthy, called Saddam traitor

① Was Ba'ar sick, delay in action? no

② Delay in believe plot? no

almost 80% complete at time

③ Did Saddam want Syria/Iraq union? no

✓ Many others arrested at meeting

✓ If you voiced opposition, you'd be arrested just kept silent - ^{clapped when} ^{others clapped}

⑥

✓ Aziz described this event as crime against party / people
he created a "fake" court; Aziz did not attend; not fair trial
✓ Niam Habbab
member of party

Qnd

TARIQ AZIZ -- father's name -- ISSA
Jeses

1/30/04
Q 1030 AM

Dob 1938 - Mosul

Father died when he was 6 or 7 yrs. old.
1950's - while in 2nd day school, joined Baath party
Journalist - they official w/ Iraq govt
After graduation
Army 1'62

Interpreter until
1958 - journalist for 2 mos

1963 - Editor of Party newspaper in Iraq

1964-67 went to Syria b/c chased by govt
b/c coup against govt
met future wife in Iraq

1967 - Released
Became teacher

1968 - Baath party came to power
became head of party newspaper

In 1950's - I joined Baath party b/c of its ideology
w/ Freedom

Socialism
Brotherhood

was attracted also by its leader Attila

our party made first coup against Regime in 1963 but
lasted @ 6 mos.

Nasser was one of the greatest leaders - lots of charisma
Nasser made lots of mistakes
e.g. over-exaggerated the influence of Egypt + Arab
world

- + Nasser built his regime gradually
- others were corrupt
- waged war w/ Israel (6-day war)
+ lost
- then he got sick + died

1963
Bloody coup
b/c of
communist
resisted

Many Arab masses loved Nasser, nevertheless

1969 - Al Bkr

At the time he was a prominent member - not a
leadership role, but

Bkr never said it, but he didn't like the
Hawthorne, Saddam had no problem w/ my
X-tivity

I eventually moved up to other positions

e 1977 -

1979 - Bkr

In 70's gradually, SADAM became a dictator

Sadams became arrogant + isolated

In 1980's, Saddam picked wrong party members for
wrong jobs.

I became known as a ~~very~~ renowned
party journalist

Al Bkr was not all that enthused about me
I wanted to be a good journalist
But Saddam asked my advice. I tried to come
and label me

RCC created and after the corp
on 12 July '68 — the corp, was viet 4
~~lots of blood~~

(1) — became 1st Prime Minister — (Head of State)

(2) — Head of Republic Guard
after 13 days

but ~~they~~ they were eliminated
by SAMAM

FARE OF THE ABOVE TWO

(1) — came to look at Bkr. — SAMAM had son, wanted him
and w/ the help of colleagues
took him to Spain

(2) #2 went to Spain

later ~~the~~ 7 members became members
of RCC & SAMAM was elected VP

SAMAM was military chief of staff
in the corp. He was Dep Sec Gen
of the PTJ — He was @ 31,
one year younger than me

After that SAMAM would be a good
Battalion but the relationship became closer later
SAMAM went to Syria the Egypt then back
in 1963 to IRAQ

1963 - Enemy b/w Communists & Bahlit

Feb 1963 - communist went to streets against

Baath - 1000's of communists arrested
& executed

During the 9 mos of Baath rule, the
communist tried many corps

Casemiyaya - prison used to torture &
execute prisoners

B/w 1963-68, Saddam moved up fast -
He played a major role in rebuilding the
pty, & became Security General

RCC became a powerful body - the supreme
powers - AI

After 1979, the RCC became a cover
for Saddam who had all the power.

(The 2 others who played a prominent
role in the corp, were removed -

At that time, I was not a member of RCC.
At that time, their main job was to control
the power of the pty.

Then negotiation w/ Ba'ath

Early 70's

Communist joined the govt but not the PCC
Baqir revolted against Baathist - Iran used
Baqir to try to topple PCC

KURDISH ISSUE + KARKUK ~~area~~
Karkuk became a very modern city
SADAM

1973 Khalid was openly critical
of Saddam was leading Fikell - Was Saddam's Lenchman
Many Iraqis members of PCC eliminated
SADAM + Tikrit's became stronger + stronger

1973 Elimination of Abdul Hada whom Saddam
thought who was planning a coup.

Hada sentenced to death - committed to 1.7e

In 1979, ~~he~~ ^{he} told Saddam that as long as
Hada is alive, there will be coup attempts.

It was very strange & against the
natural ethics of Iraq

Khalid's initial trial was fake - Al Bkr and Saddam
created a trial. Bkr & Saddam used opportunity
to get rid of those they didn't like.

My opinion is that Abdul Khdar was a very
humble person, not a power monger

but he was critical & outspoken against
SADAM

Abdul

Khalid

Samarat

Arz

Waste speech

accumulated
Said

Arz
H

Bkr + SAADAN ~~didn't~~ eliminate ~~Abd~~ Khalid
b/c he was a threat to their way of doing
SAADAN + Bkr were doing what they wanted
in the name of the party and they didn't
take Abd Khalid's own policies.

Khalid's elimination was ethically,
morally wrong. And it changed the
party. Democracy started to
weaken. By 1979,

Prior to 1979, we had weekly meetings + attendance,
read minutes + papers to sign.

After 1979, no minutes for rec meetings. SAAD
said, will you let me make some decisions on my own —
don't have time to continue meetings at the time b/c of all
of what's going on.

Then he eliminated meetings of
rec altogether.

He said the "rec" has decided but it was
really ~~SAADAN~~ not true.

Just before 17 July '79, I was asked to write
speech ^{for} Bkr who was stepping down. At Moheef
At ~~the~~ was surprised and told SAAD ^{HE} ~~HE~~ ^{was not} ~~was~~ ^{sign} Bkr +
Bkr and thought he looked fine. ^{AND} SAADAN called him a
traitor. SAADAN ordered him, guards entered + he told them to
arrest him. Later, he was accused by S, father,
of organizing a coup.

Then on 17 July a celebration on anniversary.

re: Videos of SAADAM

His many Bath members executed
we all kept our mouths shut
many were not happy w/ Saddam's execution after he stopped doing it
they are was afraid of being executed so kept mouths shut

He created the court, a fake court

These were good people - shouldn't have been executed
maybe arrested

SAADAM put HADEED in chg. of court

~~that~~ Saddam considered entrusting as treason.

Many of those ~~executed~~ executed were my friends

I was in a very difficult position at the time -
Sadam appointed me to draft an agreement between
Iraq + Syria. I felt ~~that~~ ^{SAADAM} was opposed to the union.

As to my presence at the meeting (which was videotaped),
I clapped at what Saddam said but did not
raise my hand.

Wants 100 watt bulb.

Wants a lamp so he can
write + work

to go to bed a 1000 S
I taking sleeping pills
+ go to bed

Concerned about his glasses -

VS

END

11/23/80

Agreed well discuss at
next mtg period

from 1979 →

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 01/31/2004

ALI HASAN AL-MAJID AL-TIKRITI, aka "Chemical Ali" (Blacklist #5) date of birth July 1, 1941, place of birth Tikrit, Iraq was interviewed at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Also present at the interview was [REDACTED] US Army Representative. [REDACTED] FBI Language Analyst, provided Arabic/English translation. After being advised that the interviewing Agents were members of the United States Government from Washington, DC, MAJID provided the following information:

b6
b7C

MAJID is from the Abu Nasir tribe or clan located in and around Tikrit, Iraq. Fourteen different tribes/families lived in this area. MAJID's grandfather was the Governor of Tikrit. His father was a well-known, highly respected individual in Tikrit who had "no problems with anyone." There were no major problems between the families of the area. Issues were normally solved without approaching the government for a solution.

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

Tribal thoughts and customs pervade the entire social structure in Iraq including Baghdad. As an example, MAJID described how the tribe deals with an incident such as a car accident involving a fatality. After the accident, an agreement between the families of the involved parties normally takes place regarding the punishment of the person deemed at fault. This agreement is then presented to a court and sentencing occurs based on the recommendation from the two families.

MAJID's tribe has two primary rules, one which prohibits "fighting" within the tribe and the other which prohibits a man from "flirting" with a single woman. For violation of either rule, an offender would be killed.

The oldest male member of the tribe is generally the "sheikh" or leader and tends to be the one who is most respected and fair. Sometimes, however, the oldest male may not be able to fulfill this function due to mental or physical difficulties. MAJID became "sheikh" of his tribe after the death of the third person in line. Saddam Hussein, MAJID's cousin and former

Investigation on 01/31/2004 at Baghdad, IraqFile # 315E-HQ-1448534-221 Date dictated 01/31/2004
George L. Pirob6
b7Cby [REDACTED]

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Ali Hasan Al-Majid Al-Tikriti, On 01/31/2004, Page 2

President of Iraq, later declared that he was "sheikh" of MAJID's tribe.

Concerning the Iraqi Ba'ath Party (Ba'ath), MAJID advised that from its inception the Party embraced a "democratic and humanitarian vision." MAJID still believes in these principles. The party does not believe in war, killing, mass killings, one person taking charge, oppression, or "bad behaviors." MAJID added Islam does not believe in violence or oppression.

The acts of some members of the Ba'ath, including Hussein, "brought shame to the Party." This included "bad behaviors" that were individual acts of Ba'ath members. MAJID agreed that there was a contradiction between the original tenets of the Ba'ath and the way it was practiced under Hussein's regime. This change occurred from the beginning and continued throughout Hussein's Presidency.

MAJID described a meeting which took place in July, 1979 shortly after Hussein assumed leadership of Iraq. Hussein invited all Ba'ath members to a meeting in Baghdad. MAJID was the Director of a "branch" of the Ba'ath at the time. At the meeting, Hussein provided details of a coup attempt in the Party. Over sixty members were identified and taken by security forces from the meeting hall. The investigation into this matter was headed by Barzan Ibrahim Hasan Al-Tikriti, Hussein's brother. MAJID does not know the details of the investigation and did not look at the files. Until the moment the "plot" was announced, MAJID had heard no information regarding this matter. It appeared that many people had been "marked," meaning they had been previously identified, rightly or wrongly, as being involved in a plot against Hussein. If some were wrongly accused, it was by Barzan and not Hussein. MAJID thought this "plot" might have been a continuation of one uncovered in previous years involving Abdul Khaliq Al-Samarra'i and Nathim Ghezar. In 1979, MAJID said, "If Samarra'i lives, coups will continue." MAJID was in a "sad mood" at the time of this meeting. However, he felt all persons identified were guilty.

MAJID described his views regarding Hussein. During the period twenty years ago and more, MAJID considered Hussein to be the closest person to him. They grew apart from then until a period of time about ten years ago. At that time, MAJID came to a "crossroads" in life and was thinking about leaving the Ba'ath. Hussein convinced him to remain. Without Hussein's approval, MAJID's resignation would "shame" his tribe. Thus, MAJID continued

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Continuation of FD-302 of Ali Hasan Al-Majid Al-Tikriti, On 01/31/2004, Page 3

in government service during the past ten years, though not as a volunteer.

MAJID stated that during this time he was appointed to three different Ministerial posts without first being asked or notified. He learned of these appointments from radio and television announcements. Concerning his most recent appointment as Minister of Interior, MAJID heard that Hussein was reluctant to ask MAJID to serve in this capacity for fear that MAJID would refuse and thereby embarrass Hussein.

Before the 2001 Ba'ath Conference, MAJID asked Hussein whether he would continue as a Party member. MAJID simply wanted out of the Ba'ath. Hussein denied this request. In more recent times, Hussein told MAJID that he could terminate his membership in the Party at the 2004 Conference. MAJID described the day he heard this news as "the happiest day of my life."

During the last seven to eight years, Hussein refused to accept advice or criticism from his closest advisors even if he was wrong. After Hussein Khamil, Hussein's son-in-law, fled Iraq to Jordan in 1995, Hussein did not trust anyone and appeared to change for the worse. He seemed particularly wary of individuals who were respected in the Party.

MAJID described his feelings and those of others regarding issues leading the latest war with the United States. MAJID wanted the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspectors to visit Iraq in 2003, as did the majority of the Ba'ath leadership. They felt the boycott would not be ended without certification of the termination of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program. Hussein, however, did not agree that the inspectors should be allowed to enter Iraq. Thus, MAJID and the other leaders had to support Hussein. If not, they would have been viewed as traitors and on the side of the United States.

During this period, Hussein, Izzat Ibrahim Al-Duri, Taha Ramadan, Tariq Aziz, and MAJID held a discussion regarding WMD. The four men "pressed" Hussein to tell UNSCOM and the world that Iraq has no WMD. Hussein did not agree stating that Israel would strike Iraq if they felt Iraq had no WMD. At this meeting, MAJID asked Hussein, "Do we have WMD?" Hussein asked, "Don't you know?" MAJID stated "no" to which Hussein replied "no."

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Continuation of FD-302 of Ali Hasan Al-Majid Al-Tikriti, On 01/31/2004, Page 4

Prior to the 2003 war, MAJID attended a meeting of the Iraqi leadership, including Hussein, where MAJID stated that "Iraq will lose the war." However, Hussein was convinced that Iraq would win. MAJID considered this unbelievable as Iraq had undertaken no preparations or special precautions in anticipation of the war. Additionally, no plans were made for the post-war period, especially regarding the potential needs for adjustments or changes in the leadership of Iraq. As before, MAJID wanted to resign. He did not want to take responsibility for the actions of one individual, Hussein. MAJID added, "I'm fair. Saddam is not." Hussein was a "dictatorship of one man." Hussein is "cruel in dealing with everyone including relatives."

MAJID does not believe he has a chance to "clear his name" while imprisoned. He would like to see all the former Iraqi leaders, including those currently in jail, tell the truth and "criticize" Hussein. If MAJID were to do this by himself, he believes he would be viewed as a spy. MAJID stated it would be more appropriate for him to first solicit the opinions and support of other Iraqi leaders.

At this point, interviewers asked how one could get Hussein to take responsibility for his actions. MAJID replied that Hussein would take responsibility if "faced with the facts" such as the previously discussed issue regarding UNSCOM weapons inspectors. Interviewers later asked whether MAJID and other Iraqi leaders would be willing to compile a list of advice offered to Hussein on major issues which Hussein ignored or rejected. MAJID responded that he would first need to talk to these former Iraqi leaders. Later, however, MAJID stated that this could best be accomplished if he were released from custody and had the opportunity to form his own political party.

Interviewers asked whether MAJID considered Hussein "evil." MAJID replied "there are two faces of Saddam." One face revealed a man who freely shared his wealth with those in need. MAJID once saw Hussein crying while reading the Koran. The other face of Hussein was one of "evil." He was "so cruel you could not imagine."

Hussein had no friends, either inside or outside his family. Hussein did not even trust his own sons. His personality was not stable and he was "lonesome." When presented with a problem, Hussein often made quick decisions without all the facts. His worst decision was the most recent war with the United States,

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Continuation of FD-302 of Ali Hasan Al-Majid Al-Tikriti, On 01/31/2004, Page 5

the world's greatest superpower, coming after a lengthy and unsuccessful war with Iraq and thirteen years of an economic boycott.

MAJID acknowledged the "shame" Hussein had brought upon his tribe and the Iraqi people. MAJID appeared to agree that he had a responsibility to reclaim honor for his tribe as a result of Hussein's actions while serving as leader of Iraq.

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/04/2004

ALI HASAN AL-MAJID AL-TIKRITI, aka "Chemical Ali" (Blacklist #5) date of birth July 1, 1941, place of birth Tikrit, Iraq was interviewed at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Also present at the interview was [REDACTED] US Army Representative. [REDACTED] FBI Language Analyst, provided Arabic/English translation. After being advised that the interviewing Agents were members of the United States Government from Washington, DC, MAJID provided the following information:

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MAJID described his role in Kuwait from August, 1990-January, 1991.

MAJID first provided background information leading to his appointment to duties in Kuwait. MAJID was summoned to an Iraqi leadership meeting on August 7, 1990. In attendance were Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi leaders. Hussein told MAJID that he (MAJID) needed to go to Kuwait. MAJID told Hussein "the leadership is here," and there should be someone among them who is qualified for the job. He reminded Hussein that he had previously sent the Intelligence Director on such a mission and "me going will do no good." Hussein replied, "OK. We'll see." Upon conclusion of the meeting, Hussein announced to everyone that MAJID would be going to Kuwait. At the time of this announcement, MAJID remembers Hussein was placing his handgun on his person. MAJID responded, "By your order, I go." At the time, Sabawi Hasan Ibrahim, Hussein's brother, was already in Kuwait.

Hussein's declaration to the Iraqi leadership authorized MAJID and Sabawi the responsibility of "managing" Kuwait. Aziz Saleh Al-Noman was appointed Governor of Kuwait and "included" in the security plans.

The work in Kuwait was divided into two parts, with Sabawi serving as Director of Intelligence in charge of security of Kuwait and MAJID charged with the responsibility of maintaining "organization" among the various Ministries. Sabawi was in charge of the Security Committee of Kuwait with members from various government components including intelligence, special security, the

Investigation on 02/04/2004 at Baghdad, Iraq

File # 315E-HQ-1448534-20
George L. Piro

Date dictated 02/04/2004

by [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of ALI HASAN AL-MAJID AL-TIKRITI, On 02/04/2004, Page 2

police, the military, and the militia. MAJID stated both he and Sabawi had equal overall responsibility with respect to Kuwait.

In Kuwait, MAJID interacted with various ministers including the Minister of High Education, the Minister of Trade, the Minister of Agriculture, the Minister of Transportation, the Minister of Interior, the Minister of Industry, and the Minister of Local Government.

Part of MAJID's duties and one which he was "happiest" to perform was the protection of the "belongings and finances" of the people of Kuwait. MAJID stated, "I was severe in performing my job" and "committed crimes." These "crimes" were actions directed at Iraqi military personnel who broke the law. MAJID described the details of three events or "crimes."

In one instance, a captain in the Iraqi forces told soldiers under his command to burglarize an electronics store in Kuwait. The soldiers complied, broke into the store, and took various electronic devices including televisions. When MAJID heard of this incident, he ordered the arrest of the captain. The matter was then referred to a committee for investigation. Upon conclusion, the captain was sentenced to death. Normally, the arrest of a military officer requires approval by Hussein or the Minister of Defense. In this instance, MAJID called one of Hussein's bodyguards for "approval" to carry out the sentence after the conclusion of the investigation and trial. Thereafter, Presidential Secretary Hamid Hamadi informed MAJID of the approval. The execution was carried out in Kuwait in front of a government building in the county of Al-Kathima.

In another incident, a woman in Kuwait, possibly Lebanese, was sexually assaulted by an Iraqi soldier. MAJID contacted the head of the military unit of the accused soldier and a committee was formed to investigate the attack. The soldier was found guilty and sentenced to death. With the permission of the woman, the soldier was executed at the same location the assault occurred.

The third incident involved three Iraqi military personnel who raped a Kuwaiti woman and stole items from her house. Again, an investigation took place and the three men were sentenced to death. With the permission of the woman, the men were executed in front of her house.

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Continuation of FD-302 of ALI HASAN AL-MAJID AL-TIKRITI, On 02/04/2004, Page 3

MAJID only attended executions of military personnel. He never attended executions of civilians.

MAJID denied personal knowledge of any atrocities committed in Kuwait by Iraqi military members or Iraqi citizens prior to or during the reported occurrences during the occupation of Kuwait. MAJID is aware of media reports regarding these events which came after the occupation. MAJID is not aware of the results of an international (and not Kuwaiti) investigation detailing the crimes committed. He has no knowledge of the findings of the investigation which details the atrocities including torture sites located at police stations or sports facilities, punishment including amputations of limbs, ears, noses, tongues, genitalia, and eyes, and torture via use of electric shock. Furthermore, MAJID is not aware of 500 Iraqis identified as war criminals and 1082 Kuwaiti civilian deaths, including 57 mentally handicapped individuals, which occurred as a direct result of Iraqi misconduct. MAJID denied knowledge of punishment, including execution, of individuals who failed to display pictures of Hussein, displayed pictures of the Kuwaiti royal family, or wrote anti-Iraqi graffiti. MAJID stated "If I had heard of these atrocities you detailed, I would have asked to be released from duty." He does not doubt they occurred but reiterated that he never heard such information, did not witness such events, and had no knowledge of these events at that time. If committed, these atrocities would have been carried out by the Iraqi Intelligence Service under the direction of Sabawi who reported directly to Hussein.

MAJID is aware of the destruction/sabotage of the Burgan and Al-Rumaila oil fields by the Iraqi military. This "operation" was not the responsibility or under control of MAJID but fell under the direction of the Iraqi military.

MAJID denied personal knowledge of any persecution, including executions and imprisonment, of Shia Muslims living in southern Iraq in 1991. He denied personal knowledge of the destruction of Shia villages during this or any other time.

MAJID denied personal knowledge of any persecution, including executions and imprisonment, of Kurdish individuals living in northern Iraq during the Anfal Campaign in the late 1980s. He denied personal knowledge of the destruction of Kurdish villages during this or any other time.

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Continuation of FD-302 of ALI HASAN AL-MAJID AL-TIKRITI, On 02/04/2004, Page 4

MAJID denied personal knowledge or responsibility regarding Iraqi use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War, against the Kurds, or at any other time. He stated, "I never used or saw anything about chemicals."

MAJID avoided interfering with "things that had nothing to do" with him. He felt as if Hussein was "watching" him. At one point, Hussein took some property from MAJID.

When asked whether he feared Hussein in the past, MAJID replied, "Yes. I was afraid that if I disobeyed him, he would tell our tribe that I was a coward." When asked whether he feared Hussein now, MAJID replied, "No. If given a month to talk to our tribe, I would be able to convince them and Saddam would lose to me."

MAJID wishes Hussein was dead. MAJID wishes Hussein had "martyred or killed" himself instead of being captured. Hussein's sons (Qusay and Uday) died "honorably," even though Uday was a bad person. In contrast, Hussein's ending (capture) was "lousy," displayed his cowardice, and brought shame to the tribe. Martyrdom of Hussein would have brought honor to the tribe. After Hussein's capture, MAJID offered to kill him for the US military. MAJID believes history will be the judge of Iraq and Hussein as its ruler for the past twenty-four years.

MAJID does not consider himself a failure, except that he "stayed with Hussein." MAJID feels he had no choice but to carry out Hussein's orders.

Though Hussein is no longer head of their tribe, MAJID stated that he could not testify against him because it would "shame the tribe." If given the opportunity to first talk to the tribe, MAJID feels he could explain the situation. Then, he might be able to provide information in public regarding Hussein.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/06/2004

KHALID NAJIM ABDALLAH AL-SULTAN, aka KHALID ABDUL AL-MAJID AL-TIKRITI (Blacklist # 143), date of birth June 30, 1964, place of birth Tikrit, Iraq was interviewed at a detention facility located at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Interviewing Agents were identified as members of the United States Government from Washington, DC. Also present at the interview was [redacted] British representative from the Iraqi Survey Group (ISG), Baghdad. [redacted] FBI Language Analyst, provided Arabic/English translation. Khalid provided the following information:

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In 1982, when Khalid was 18 years old and attending high school, he obtained a job with Himaya, the security force responsible for the protection of Saddam Hussein. He was able to obtain this employment through the help of a distant cousin, Hussein Kamil, who worked with the Murafiqin, Saddam Hussein's closest bodyguards. As part of his employment, he attended a 45-day preliminary course which included physical fitness and weapons training. While Khalid worked with the Himaya, he continued attending high school and graduated in 1983. The following year, he began studying for his Baccalaureate degree which he subsequently received in 1996. Khalid continued to work with Himaya for the next twenty years, until 2002.

Khalid related that the Himaya never had advanced knowledge where Hussein was going. The Murafiqin would tell Himaya where to go, and they would follow behind. When they arrived at a location where Hussein would exit his vehicle, the Himaya would form a protective circle around him. Sometimes, Hussein's personal bodyguards and members of the Republican Guard would surround Hussein as well. Typically, the Himaya consisted of two 30-man teams, each working a 48-hour shift. The Murafiqin consisted of two teams of 1-3 members. On local protection details, the Himaya and Murafiqin would be joined by approximately 100-300 Republican Guards. On overnight journeys, approximately 1000 Republican Guards would be mobilized.

Khalid noted that in the 1980's, Hussein never bad-mouthed his security detail. After the 1990's, however, he "became

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like a beast, swore and bad-mouthed them." In fact, he kept a very close watch on the Himaya, and if he saw something he did not like, he would see to it that the offending party was punished. For example, Khalid recalled an incident in which Hussein's motorcade passed a truck which was parked on the opposite side of the road from the motorcade. Rather than stopping the motorcade to determine why the truck was there, Khalid and other members of the Himaya chose to ignore the truck in order for the motorcade to continue on its way. Believing that the motorcade should have stopped to investigate the presence of this truck, Hussein directed that Khalid and two of his colleagues be imprisoned for three weeks as punishment.

Khalid advised that during his tenure with the Himaya, he observed a distinct difference in Hussein's temperament as well as his pattern of communication and mobility. For example, prior to 1990, Hussein freely used telephones. However, after 1990 and the Gulf War, Hussein avoided using telephones, fearful that U.S. satellites would intercept his communications and be able to track his whereabouts. Hussein also worried that satellites would be able to locate his motorcade, either by reading the license plate number of his vehicle or by spotting a cluster of motorcade vehicles and guards standing outside locations where Hussein was visiting. Accordingly, Hussein directed that the license plates on his vehicle be changed every few days. He further directed that both motorcade vehicles and guards remain underneath covered areas as much as possible to avoid being spotted by satellites. Those violating this edict received "big punishment." In terms of mobility, after the Gulf War, Hussein seldom traveled away from Baghdad. This stood in stark contrast to his frequent trips to northern and southern Iraq prior to 1990. It was as though Hussein chose to live in a "cocoon."

As a result of Hussein's watchful eyes over the Himaya, his growing paranoia since the Gulf War and his proclivity to punish members of the Himaya over relatively minor transgressions, Khalid described his job as "hell." He and colleagues "hated" their jobs and quietly joked about Hussein's paranoia. However, he was careful when talking about his disdain of Hussein and his antipathy toward his job. For example, when expressing criticism about Hussein to his (Khalid's) wife, Khalid would cover his telephone or leave the room as a precaution in case his conversations were being monitored by Hussein's internal security apparatus.

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Continuation of FD-302 of KHALID NAJIM ABDALLAH AL-SULTAN, On 02/05/2004, Page 3

Khalid recalled that Hussein was at his happiest when he was meeting with his girlfriends, [REDACTED] and other women as well. Whenever Hussein wanted to see [REDACTED] he would arrange for one of his protection detail to pick her up at her residence and then transport her to one of his palaces. Meeting [REDACTED] however, was easier since she worked as an engineer and could arrange for her own transportation.

Regarding Hussein's family, Khalid related that since approximately 1988-89, Hussein visited with them only infrequently. For example, he saw his wife and other members of his family, including his family, including his son, Uday, about once or twice every few months. On these occasions, he would invite them either individually or collectively to join him for dinner at one of his palaces. These visits would last approximately 1-2 hours after which the family members would return home.

Not only did Hussein appear disinterested in his family, he also appeared not to trust them. In Khalid's opinion, Hussein trusted only his son, Qusay, and certainly not his son, Uday, whom he could not control and whom Hussein appeared to fear. In contrast, Uday did not seem to be afraid or intimidated by his father.

Khalid characterized Hussein as a selfish person. He thought it unlikely that Hussein would be trying to "groom" either of his sons as his successor since Hussein appeared to be enjoying his power too much. He said that if Hussein had his choice, he would remain in power for 2000 years.

After his two sons-in-law, Hussein and Saddam Kamil, fled to Jordan in 1995 with their wives, Hussein stopped trusting everyone except Qusay, whom he trusted completely, and his personal secretary, Abd Hamid Mahmoud Al-Khattab Al-Nasiri Al-Tikriti, whom he trusted "just under 100%."

Concerning Hussein's leadership, Khalid observed that Hussein liked to consider himself as one of the greatest leaders in the world on the scale of the ancient King of Babylon, Nebuchadnezzar, and Egyptian President Gamal Abd al-Nasser. However, Hussein demonstrated very poor leadership in his ill-fated decisions to go to war with Iran and to invade Kuwait despite advice and warnings from a world coalition. Khalid placed the responsibility of Iraq's fall squarely on the shoulders of Hussein and his close advisors who were, in his view either "liars or yes

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Continuation of FD-302 of KHALID NAJIM ABDALLAH AL-SULTAN, On 02/05/2004, Page 4

men." According to Khalid, the people below Hussein and his advisors simply "had no voice."

Khalid was asked if during his twenty-year assignment to the Himaya if he ever witnessed behavior suggesting Hussein had a humanitarian side to his personality. Khalid recalled an incident in approximately 1983-84 when the Presidential motorcade came upon an auto accident on a road between Basra and Baghdad. Two vehicles had apparently collided. Hussein ordered the motorcade to stop, and he dispatched medical personnel from the motorcade to assist the victims. Hussein ordered his staff to send the victims to Europe for hospitalization and treatment if necessary. Additionally, he directed that each party be given a new vehicle to replace the ones damaged in the accident.

Anniversaries which were special to Hussein were the Western New Year and his birthday. For his birthday, Hussein would have a public celebration and then meet privately with one of his girlfriends. Khalid could not remember an occasion in which Hussein celebrated his birthday with his wife or children.

In terms of hobbies, Hussein enjoyed swimming, fishing and hunting. His idea of hunting was to shoot flocks of birds from a helicopter.

Khalid described Hussein's health as "good." He recalled that in the 1980's, Hussein stayed awake for long hours in his office or in the command post watching the news. In the 1990's, however, Hussein began retiring between 9-11pm and rising early in the morning.

At the conclusion of the interview, Khalid advised that prior to the 2003 war between the United States and Iraq, he fled to Syria. After the Americans began occupying Iraq, he decided to turn himself in even though he knew his name was not among the 55 Iraqis most wanted by U.S. forces. He added that part of his motivation was to be able to see his family again.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/04/2004

Abd Hamid Mahmoud Al-Khattab Al-Nasiri Al-Tikriti, date of birth 07/01/1956, (Black List #4), was interviewed at a detention facility located at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. The interviewing Agents were identified as representatives of the United States Government from Washington, DC. Department of Defense representative [redacted] was also present during the entire interview. [redacted] FBI Language Analyst, provided Arabic/English translation. Al-Tikriti provided the following information:

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Al-Tikriti completed his Master's thesis on the Israeli military and its influence in Israeli politics. Al-Tikriti's findings were that the Israeli military controlled the Israeli government and dictated the government's policies. In other countries, the political components of government make decisions which are then carried out by its military. However, in Israel, the military dictates the political decisions and then carries them out. Al-Tikriti based his findings on the research and texts which he read, as well as his professor who convinced him to pursue this thesis. Al-Tikriti was impressed with the Israeli military reserve capability. The Israeli military is not a large army, but because of its efficient and well trained reserve force, its capabilities are dramatically increased. Additionally, The Israeli army is very good at taking offensive actions against its enemies on its enemies' soil, protecting its own soil.

Al-Tikriti described his duties as the Presidential Secretary as overseeing the other governmental secretaries, controlling the mail flow to the President, except mail from the Presidential Diwan. In addition, Al-Tikriti served as the focal point for the President's appointments, cables from foreign ministers, the media, and Presidential appointments of ambassadors and governmental directors. Al-Tikriti did not have oversight on matters within the control of Qusay Saddam Hussein, or the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), especially if it involved Presidential taskings. Additionally, Al-Tikriti would not open confidential letters from senior government figures such as Izzat Ibrahim Al-Duri or Ali Hassan Al-Majid. Al-Tikriti assumed this post in

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Date dictated _____

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1991. Prior to that, the duties were executed by the National Security Council (NSC) Secretary.

Al-Tikriti also took over the secretarial responsibility for the NSC in 1991 from Hamid Hamadi (phonetic), who held the position from 1983 to 1991. The NSC was comprised of the President, the Vice President, the Presidential Secretary, the Minister of Interior, the Director of the IIS (Mukhabarat), the Director of the Special Security Organization (SSO) (Al Amn Al-Khas), the Directorate of General Security (DGS) (Al Amn Al-'am), and the Director of the Military Intelligence (Istakhbarat). The Minister of Defense would attend only if a military matter was to be discussed. After Al-Tikriti assumed the post of Secretary of the NSC, the President did not attend a single NSC meeting. Izzat Ibrahim Al-Duri usually presided over NSC meetings. The budget of three of the four services is approved by the NSC, while the SSO budget is approved by the Presidential Diwan. The NSC's discussions usually dealt with general internal security issues, such as border check points. The IIS and the SSO were not permitted to disclose or discuss their operations, even during meetings of the NSC. DGS was allowed to discuss issues only after approval by the President. In Al-Tikriti's opinion, the NSC did not serve a true purpose and did not have any true power.

Al-Tikriti was a member of the Himaya (Protective Unit for Hussein) in 1979. He was present during an infamous July meeting in which Hussein announced the discovery within his ranks of a coup attempt involving Iraqi governmental officials, backed by the Syrian government. At the time of this announcement, Al-Tikriti was assigned to guard duties on the second floor balcony overlooking the crowd. Hussein was on the stage with Muhie Abd Al-Hussein Mashhadi, the Secretary General of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). Hussein directed Mashhadi to detail the plans of the coup, which he did. Mashhadi described the coup attempt and identified several alleged co-conspirators among the crowd who were then ordered to stand. Hussein ordered these individuals to leave and had members of the Himaya escort them to waiting IIS officers who had vehicles ready to take them away. Al-Tikriti identified Barzan Ibrahim Hasan Al-Tikriti as the Director and Sa'dun Shakir as the Deputy Director of the IIS at that time and advised they were responsible for the investigation of the coup attempt.

Al-Tikriti is not aware of any atrocities, torture or mass executions, having taken place in Iraq. He became aware of

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the mass graves in southern Iraq from media broadcasts, and he was shocked. Al-Tikriti felt those actions were criminal and that those responsible should be punished.

Al-Tikriti previously thought of Saddam Hussein as a fair man based on how he treated others. However, approximately a year and half ago, an incident made him change his mind. There was a dispute between nephews of Hussein and nephews of Al-Tikriti. Hussein sided with his own nephews when Al-Tikriti felt he should not have. After that incident, Al-Tikriti sensed that Hussein began to distrust him and began isolating him, an early indicator that Hussein might eventually remove him from his assignment. Further indication of Al-Tikriti's isolation and potential elimination from his position occurred when Hussein named Jamal Mustafa Abdullah, Hussein's son-in-law, as Deputy Presidential Secretary. Normally, Al-Tikriti would speak out when he did not agree with Hussein or would point out differing viewpoints from the ministers. After the "nephew" incident, Hussein told him to not get involved in these issues. Al-Tikriti discussed this with Qusay Saddam Hussein, as the two were friends. Al-Tikriti did not/does not feel he was the fourth most important man in Iraq by "rank" and ranked himself below the ministers and other key figures in the government. The "nephew" incident, among other things, led Al-Tikriti to want to leave his post but he claimed he could not just resign. Al-Tikriti's two sons were attending medical schools and he had hopes of building a hospital and having his sons operate it.

According to Al-Tikriti, the most important thing to Hussein was protecting Baghdad, as it was directly linked to Hussein's own protection. By protecting Baghdad, Hussein was, in effect, protecting his position as President of Iraq. Al-Tikriti described Hussein as egotistic and gave Kuwait and the 2003 war with the United States as examples. Al-Tikriti was opposed to the war with Kuwait, as an Arab country should not attack another Arab country with arms. During all of Al-Tikriti's time with Hussein as his bodyguard and then as his Secretary, he never heard Hussein blame himself for any mistakes that occurred. Hussein claimed that he was not afraid of prison and that he could handle it, as Hussein had been previously imprisoned. Although Hussein appeared to be mentally sharp, his personality was such that he often appeared to be unbalanced, contributing to his poor decision making.

Al-Tikriti never saw Hussein kill anyone. Al-Tikriti is aware that Hussein ordered/approved the executions of a number of Iraqi military personnel, possibly five or six, in 1991 after the

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war. Al-Tikriti has never seen a film showing Hussein kill someone.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/02/2004

TARIQ AZIZ (Blacklist #25), date of birth April 1, 1936, place of birth Mosul, Iraq, was interviewed at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Also present at the interview was [redacted] US Army Representative. After being advised that the interviewing Agents were members of the United States Government from Washington, DC, AZIZ provided the following information in English:

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AZIZ detailed various events precipitating the Iran-Iraq War, fought from 1980-1988.

Beginning in 1975, relations between Iraq and Iran were "normalized" with the signing of the "Algiers Agreement." This agreement, concerning the Shatt-al-Arab Waterway, essentially eliminated the external threat to Iraq from Iran and established "friendly" relations between the two countries.

By 1978-79, however, relations between the two countries changed for the worse. This deterioration was due to the presence of exiled Iranian cleric Ayatollah Khomeini in Najaf, Iraq and the dissension towards the Iranian government resulting from his preachings.

The Shah of Iran asked Saddam Hussein to "turn over" Khomeini to Iran. Hussein refused citing tradition and Arab cultural requirements towards "guests" such as Khomeini. Khomeini remained in Iraq but refused to cease his rhetoric calling for the overthrow of the Iranian government. In AZIZ' opinion, Khomeini was a "political refugee" and was not supposed to act in this manner.

At one point, Khomeini attempted to leave Iraq and enter Kuwait. He was refused entry and returned to Iraq for a short period. Eventually, "arrangements" were made by the Iraqi government and Khomeini departed Iraq to live in Paris, France. AZIZ felt Khomeini "held a grudge" against Iraq because of these events.

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In 1979, Khomeini came to power in Iran upon the overthrow of the Shah. Khomeini attempted to proclaim himself as the "Imam" for the Shia sect of Islam. An "Imam" is supposed to be a direct descendent of Imam Hussein, which Khomeini was not. According to belief, the twelfth Imam, the last one, disappeared and Shias are awaiting his return. AZIZ described this belief as similar to the Christian belief regarding the return of Jesus Christ. Khomeini felt it was not logical to await the return of the "Imam," that it might take thousands of years. Thus, he proposed that he be proclaimed "Deputy of the Imam" and be allowed to conduct affairs as the "Imam" would until his return. He would fulfill this function first for the Shias, then for all Muslims.

For Shias, all of the important "sanctuaries" or religious sites are physically located in Iraq. Thus, in AZIZ' opinion, when Khomeini announced the concept of the "Deputy of the Imam," he was targeting Iraq. Khomeini viewed Hussein as a non-believer in Islam and therefore an illegitimate ruler.

An exchange of communications took place between the governments of Iran and Iraq in 1980, with no success in resolving tensions. Hussein later convened a meeting of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) and told members that Iraq would have to go to war with Iran. AZIZ, RCC member since 1977, served as Deputy Prime Minister at the time. He did not "protest" the decision made by Hussein. Additionally, no one else in the RCC spoke out against the war and no formal vote was taken.

AZIZ repeated and added to previous interview information regarding the decision-making process prior to and under Hussein. According to the Iraqi Constitution, the RCC had the power to vote on issues, such as the Iran-Iraq War. Before Hussein's Presidency, RCC meetings were held regularly with minutes recorded for each meeting. After Hussein assumed Iraqi leadership in 1979, he changed this practice and held RCC meetings at irregular times of his choosing, terminated RCC voting, ceased recording of minutes of meetings, and made decisions on his own.

Just prior to the Iran-Iraq War, Hussein convened a meeting of the National Assembly. Hussein presented information regarding the situation vis-a-vis Iran, his perceived "annulment" of the 1975 treaty between Iraq and Iran, and his belief that Iraq had to go to war with Iran. A "vote" took place in support of the war with a simple clap of the hands of National Assembly members. No formal votes were recorded nor was a debate held regarding the

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war. Ultimately, the final decision regarding fighting the war rested with Hussein.

Hussein sent AZIZ to Moscow just prior to the war to "remind" the Soviets of the "treaty of friendship" between Iraq and the Soviet Union. Soviet officials, including the Deputy Foreign Minister, suggested that Iraq should make peace with Iran. They stated that the Soviet Union could not/would not support Iraq in the war. In AZIZ' opinion, the Soviets thought they could ally with Iran. The Soviets were incorrect, however, as Iran viewed the Soviet Union as the "Second Great Satan" after the United States which was considered the "First Great Satan." Further complicating any Soviet-Iranian alliance was the fact that Khomeini had imprisoned and/or executed communists in Iran. While in Moscow, AZIZ received an official cable from Iraq announcing the war had begun. AZIZ then returned to Baghdad.

Clashes between the two countries began with Iran first entering Iraqi territory in September, 1980. Initially, Iraq lost control of several cities and other territory, especially in the southern portion of the country. These areas were quickly regained, however. Generally, Iraq "was winning" the war, taking some Iranian territory, through 1982. Those early successes, however, changed for the worse as a result of the actions of Hussein.

Hussein "micro-managed" military operations, acting "more like a military officer than a President." To a lesser extent, Adnan Khairallah, Hussein's cousin and Minister of Defense, also managed military operations. Although Military Chief of Staff Nazar Khazraji was a very qualified military officer, Hussein made all the decisions. Hussein traveled to the front lines "hundreds of times" pretending to be a military expert/tactician. In AZIZ' opinion, Hussein "interfered" with military operations and concerned himself with details beyond the scope of his duties and abilities. As an example, AZIZ stated Hussein would sometimes provide direction to the military regarding the preparation of trenches on the battlefield. As a consequence of Hussein's "interference" and incompetence, the Iraqi military suffered huge losses including approximately 10,000 soldiers killed in single battle at Khorramshahr.

In 1982, AZIZ participated in another meeting with Soviet officials to discuss bilateral relations and support for the war. Thereafter, the Soviets acquiesced and began providing military

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weapons to Iraq. From that point forward, AZIZ considered relations between Iraq and the Soviet Union as "improved."

Despite these Soviet arms shipments to Iraq, Iran appeared to have the "upper hand" in the war after 1982. This included taking back some territory and cities. At this time, it was generally thought that Iraq had lost/would lose the war. As a result, there was significant talk in the Middle Eastern press outside of Iraq regarding replacing Hussein with one of various individuals named as possible successors. However, no internal discussion took place within the government in Iraq regarding a change of leadership.

Iraqi leaders felt that Iran received support from Israel around this time. This assumption was based on the shooting down of an Argentinian aircraft in Iraq that carried a cargo of Israeli weapons.

In 1985, Hussein and AZIZ visited Soviet leader Gorbachev and other Soviet officials in Moscow. AZIZ served as Foreign Minister at this time. From this point through the end of the war in 1988, relations were "good" with the Soviet Union. They continued to provide arms to Iraq. During the earlier years of the war, the Soviets had "closed their eyes" to arms shipments to Iraq from Eastern bloc countries including Bulgaria, Poland, and Hungary.

During the war in 1984-85, Iran attacked civilian areas including the city of Baghdad with recently acquired SCUD missiles. Though possibly targeting military facilities, the missiles' poor guidance system caused them to fall on civilian locations. Iraq also targeted Iranian cities, including Doskhut, with missiles. In 1986, Iraq acquired SCUD missiles which were capable of reaching the Iranian capital city of Tehran.

Although strong, the Iranian Air Force had a limited range and generally attacked cities close to the border occupied by Iraqi forces including Abadan, Basra, and Amarah. One focus of these attacks was Iraqi oil production facilities. The Iraqi Air Force, on the other hand, had even greater difficulty reaching into Iran.

AZIZ commented on Iraq and Iran's use of chemical weapons during the war. Around 1984, French President Francois Mitterand sent a letter to AZIZ saying it was not appropriate for Iraq to use

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chemical weapons. Evidently, the French had learned that Iraq was considering the use of such weapons. According to AZIZ, it was common knowledge in the media that Hussein might decide to use chemical weapons.

Hussein did not convene a meeting of the RCC, National Assembly, or any other Iraqi or Ba'ath Party government entity to discuss recommendations regarding the use of or approval for the use of chemical weapons prior to their deployment. Hussein gave no official written or verbal notification of the use of the weapons after deployment. AZIZ stated the RCC was "informed" and "it was mentioned." He added it was "common knowledge" through the media that chemical weapons had been used. No RCC member protested their use because of fear of reprisals from Hussein and fear that Iraq would lose the war without such a drastic step. At the time, the situation was viewed as dire and "life or death." AZIZ agreed that Iraq, and Iran, violated provisions of Geneva Conventions of 1917 and 1948, signed by both countries, prohibiting the use of chemical weapons.

While AZIZ agreed that it is an undisputed fact that Iraq used chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War, he added that according to the Iraqi military, Iran also used chemical weapons at the onset of hostilities. AZIZ reiterated the decision for Iraq to use these weapons was made by Hussein and, at times, Khairallah in consultation with Khazraji.

The war ended in 1988. Many in the Iraqi government considered the war a victory for the country as they were not defeated by Iran, a country three times the size of Iraq with a better trained and equipped military. Many felt that Iraq "forced" Iran to agree to a cease fire. AZIZ pointed out that Iraq accepted the original United Nations cease fire in September, 1980 at the start of the war, while Iran did not. He also added that Iraq agreed in 1987 to UN Resolution 598 calling for a cease fire, while Iran did not. AZIZ feels Iran ultimately agreed to cease hostilities in 1988 due to Iraqi successes at that time in the war including the recapture of the Al-Faw Peninsula.

AZIZ stated the Iran-Iraq War was "the most foolish decision of the two countries." For Iraq, the loss in human lives as well as economic damage was catastrophic. The budget surpluses prior to the war changed to overwhelming debt after the conflict. AZIZ reiterated, despite all this, Iraqis felt victorious. AZIZ believes if Iraq had devoted as much human and financial effort

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Continuation of FD-302 of TARIO AZIZ, On 02/02/2004, Page 6

elsewhere to internal development instead of war, Iraq could have been very prosperous, on the level of other countries such as the United Arab Emirates or Switzerland.

AZIZ provided comments regarding the Kurdish situation in Iraq. He described the situation with the Kurds in 1987-88 as "another serious problem." The two most infamous events regarding the Kurds were the use of chemical weapons at Halabja and the Anfal Campaign (Anfal).

AZIZ agreed that the first confirmed use of chemical weapons in the world against a civilian population occurred at Halabja, Iraq in March, 1988. Although he agreed with speculation that the weapons may have been deployed to deter Iranian forces from occupying Halabja, he acknowledged that, in fact, the city was occupied by Kurds and not Iranians. AZIZ indicated that he learned more about the attack after watching a film on Halabja produced by the media which showed "a few corpses" of men, women, and children dead as a result of the attack. AZIZ claimed that he does not know how many people were killed during the attack.

After the attack, Hussein admitted chemical weapons had been used at Halabja. The authority to use them rested in the hands of Hussein alone at the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War. Khairallah and Khazraji asked for and were given this power by Hussein during the war. In early 1988, Hussein withdrew this authority from them. Khairallah, however, told Hussein this would "weaken" the military's ability and his power to act decisively and quickly. Thereafter, Hussein returned the authority to use chemical weapons to Khairallah and Khazraji, and the two of them used these weapons at Halabja. According to AZIZ, Hussein did not specifically order the chemical weapons attack on Halabja but was notified afterwards. Hussein told AZIZ, "Halabja was not my decision. It was in the hands of Khairallah and Khazraji." At one point afterwards, Hussein said the chemical weapons attack was not necessary. Hussein was "bothered" by the attack because of the international ramifications and "outcry" from the world community. AZIZ noted that Hussein did not punish, reprimand, or remove either Khairallah or Khazraji from their positions. Normally, this would have been his response when someone's actions reflected negatively on him. AZIZ is unsure whether the lack of punitive action on Hussein's part implied his post-event approval.

AZIZ stated there is a 1989 Institute of Defense, Pentagon report which indicates Iran used chemical weapons first at

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of TARIO AZIZ, On 02/02/2004, Page 7

Halabja and Iraq used them second. According to AZIZ, this report was published in a "limited manner."

In 1988 after the Iran-Iraq War cease fire in August, Hussein appointed Ali Hasan Al-Majid Al-Tikriti as head of the "north" including Mosul. Majid had served as Minister of Local Affairs prior to this position. This new appointment gave him "exceptional" powers and placed him in charge of Anfal, aimed at "neutralizing" the Kurdish insurgency in Iraq. The decision to appoint Majid to this position was made by Hussein without discussion with the RCC, Council of Ministers, or any other Iraqi government or Ba'ath Party entity. This appointment was viewed as "strange" as other government members already held responsibilities associated with this region. Further compounding the oddness of the decision was the fact that Majid was not even an RCC member. In AZIZ' opinion, this made the appointment unconstitutional. A document informing the RCC of this decision was provided to all members. It was written on behalf of the RCC, without consultation, and signed by Hussein. It announced that Majid was in charge of the northern part of Iraq and gave him the power of the RCC. Thus, Majid reported to Hussein and no one else, including the Military Chief of Staff or Minister of Defense.

The primary purpose of Anfal was to stop the Kurdish insurgency inside Iraq. Most of the Kurdish population lived in Iraq near the northern border with Iran. A decision was made to relocate the population, at least a significant portion, to settlements one hundred kilometers or more inside Iraq. This relocation was accomplished in a "harsh manner." Those who conducted the relocation, including Majid and the Governors of the region, were "idiots." In AZIZ' opinion, they probably felt they had to accomplish the task quickly in order to be viewed by Hussein as successful.

Neither AZIZ nor any other RCC member was informed or asked for an opinion prior to the start of Anfal. No RCC member protested the decision once the details became known, through the media. AZIZ stated, at the time, it seemed "justified for the security of the nation." In retrospect, Anfal was criminal in nature. AZIZ added he "would not have done this" and it was "not his way of doing things."

Through the media, AZIZ heard information about documentation of Anfal provided post Gulf War (1991) by Kurds from

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of TARIO AZIZ, On 02/02/2004, Page 8

Irbil. Media reports documented the mistreatment and abuse of the Kurds by the Iraqi government.

There are disputed accounts whether Majid authorized and whether the Iraqi military actually used chemical weapons during Anfal. Some reports indicated "flour" was dropped by aircraft, not chemical weapons, in order to psychologically affect the Kurds making them believe chemical weapons were used or might be used. In later years, an American team arrived and conducted an investigation but could find no evidence of the use of chemical weapons during Anfal.

AZIZ concluded by stating that Majid was "a violent person, and everyone knew it." At the detention facility where AZIZ and MAJID are currently housed, Majid told other prisoners that he (Majid) is "negotiating a settlement" with the Americans. AZIZ told the other prisoners "he is a liar." In AZIZ opinion, an agreement between Majid and the Americans will never occur because Majid has an international reputation for evil and is known throughout the world as, "Chemical Ali."

According to AZIZ, Hussein continued using telephones until August, 1990. This included regular use during the Iran-Iraq War and the Kurdish insurgency campaign previously discussed. Hussein stopped using telephones upon the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/22/2004

On February 21, 2004, Sa'dun Shakir Mahmud Ahmad Al-Ubaidi, date of birth July 1, 1939, place of birth Baghdad, Iraq, was interviewed at the military detention facility, Baghdad International Airport, Iraq. Al-Ubaidi was advised the identity of the interviewing agents as representatives of the United States Government, and the interview was observed by DOD personnel. Al-Ubaidi provided the following information:

In 1957, Al-Ubaidi graduated from Mustansiriya University, in Baghdad, having majored in political law. After the 1968 Iraqi revolution, he was appointed to a leadership position in the Ba'ath Party (Party). Al-Ubaidi first met Saddam Hussein in 1966 while the two were imprisoned at the Al-Rashid camp, Prison #1. Hussein was a known and recognized member of the Party, primarily due to his involvement in the assassination attempt on Iraqi President Abdul Karim Qassem in 1959. The assassination attempt became widely known as some of those involved in the assassination attempt were captured and their trial was televised. Others, like Hussein, fled the country.

Al-Ubaidi drove the getaway car during Hussein's escape from prison in 1966. Al-Ubaidi's relationship with Hussein, including the prison escape, has been detailed in approximately three books based on information provided by Hussein. Additionally, Al-Ubaidi was interviewed once by an Iraqi newspaper regarding their relationship. In Al-Ubaidi's opinion, the books' depictions of the events were accurate. However, as Hussein became more prominent in the government, their contact became minimal due to Hussein's professional demands. The two would occasionally see each other at the Hunting Club, which was described as a social club, where Al-Ubaidi was the president. On a few occasions, Hussein also participated in hunting trips with Al-Ubaidi and others from the Hunting Club.

In 1972, Al-Ubaidi was named the Director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS). At the time, the IIS was not very sophisticated and mostly focused on internal security and the protection of the government, especially from the Iranian threat. During Al-Ubaidi's reign as Director, the IIS was divided into

Investigation on 02/21/2004 at Baghdad, IraqFile # 315E-HQ-1448534 -16Date dictated 02/22/2004by George L. Piroby Renb6
b7C

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Sa'dun Shakir Mahmud Al-Ubaidi, On 02/21/2004, Page 2

three sections, political, administrative, and technical. The IIS eventually evolved into a broader service, which included both internal and external intelligence functions. As the IIS Director, Al-Ubaidi took his orders from both President Ahmad Hasan Al-Bakr and Vice President Hussein. Reports prepared by the IIS were provided to both Bakr and Hussein.

When questioned about the alleged coup attempt by several Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) members in 1979, Al-Ubaidi stated he was aware of the general facts of the coup attempt. However, the investigation was conducted by Barzan Ibrahim Al-Hasan, Hussein's half-brother who was the Deputy Director of the IIS at that time. Barzan Al-Hasan reported directly to Hussein and Al-Ubaidi claimed he did not know how the plot was uncovered or what investigative techniques were used in the identify the conspirators. The plot was uncovered at the time Hussein became the President, as well as Barzan Al-Hasan became the IIS Director. Al-Ubaidi did recall an RCC meeting in which Bakr's resignation and Hussein's selection as the new President were announced. During this meeting, Muhie Shamari, as he was known at the time, spoke out about Bakr's resignation and Hussein's selection as a conspiracy. Hussein responded to Muhie Shamari, stating he was aware of Muhie's own conspiracy and ordered him out of the room, where he was arrested by the Himaya (security detail). Mohammad Ayesh tried to defend Muhie, stating that he should not be treated in that fashion, and, Hussein also stated he was implicated in the conspiracy and ordered him out of the room. Al-Ubaidi claimed the Himaya advised that shortly after Ayesh's detention, Ayesh swallowed a pill and died several hours later. This caused many to believe that he committed suicide.

Al-Ubaidi attended the July 22, 1979 meeting in which the plot was described to the members of the Ba'ath Party, and the identities of the conspirators were revealed. Muhie Shamari spoke at the meeting, confessing his involvement in the plot. He was identified by the last name Mashhadi, indicating that his origins are from the city of Mashhad in Iran. Al-Ubaidi claimed he was not involved in the investigation nor the prosecution of the suspects, but believed they were guilty as reported by others.

In 1979, Al-Ubaidi was named the Minister of Interior. The Ministry originally oversaw the security of the country such as police services, internal defense and the Directorate of General Security, as well as the governing of local governments and counties. However, after Al-Ubaidi took over the Ministry, the two

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Sa'dun Shakir Mahmud Al-Ubaidi, On 02/21/2004, Page 3

duties were split, with the security aspect being retained by the Ministry of Interior and the governing of the local governments being assigned to a new Ministry. However, Al-Ubaidi claimed his oversight of the country's security was administrative and not operational.

When asked on his stances as an RCC member regarding significant events in Iraq history, such as the Iraq and Iran War, he stated he supported the President and the RCC's decision regarding the war as Iran had attacked Iraq first. Regarding the naming of Ali Hasan Al-Majid as the Governor of Northern Iraq and being provided the authority and power of the RCC body during the Anfal Campaign, Al-Ubaidi stated that the decision was not voted on by the RCC and was made solely by Hussein. Regarding the use of chemical weapons against both Iran and civilian Kurds, Al-Ubaidi stated he was unaware of these events and the decisions made regarding use of chemical weapons. He only learned of the use of these weapons later from international news reporting. Al-Ubaidi stated that the use of the chemical weapons, especially against civilians, was inhumane. When asked if Al-Ubaidi spoke out against these acts carried out by the Iraqi government, he stated no, as they were never brought up for discussion.

Al-Ubaidi was removed from his post in 1990 when he spoke out against Hussein's position regarding Kuwait. The Iraqi government obtained a tape of a conversation between King Fahd of Saudi Arabia and an unknown second Arab leader, wherein King Fahd mocked the Iraqi leadership and government during its build up on the Kuwaiti border. Saddam Hussein played the tape to the RCC in an effort to convince them, and eventually the Iraqi people, of the conspiracy against Iraq. After hearing the tape, Al-Ubaidi felt that it was something they did not need to hear, and he made his sentiments known. He recalled that on the day they listened to this tape, King Hussein of Jordan arrived for a brief visit. The following day when other RCC members went to the airport to bid farewell to the King, Al-Ubaidi was called and told not to come to the airport. He interpreted this as Saddam Hussein's disapproval of comments Al-Ubaidi had made on the previous day. Nevertheless, Al-Ubaidi claimed he drafted a long letter to Hussein reiterating his opinion regarding the tape matter and outlining his opposition to the proposed Kuwait invasion. In this letter, he offered alternatives to invading Kuwait and explained to Hussein that he had not voiced his opinion during the meeting so as not to embarrass him.

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Sa'dun Shakir Mahmud Al-Ubaidi, On 02/21/2004, Page 4

Several days later, Al-Ubaidi was summoned to the Presidential Palace by the President of the Diwan and was told that Hussein demanded his resignation. Thereafter, Al-Ubaidi submitted his resignation as instructed and was removed from the RCC.

Thereafter, Al-Ubaidi had minimal contact with Hussein. Several years later, Hussein visited Al-Ubaidi at the hospital as he was suffering from a heart condition. Hussein approved Al-Ubaidi's travel to Jordan on several occasions for heart surgery and follow-up visits. In addition, Hussein approved the travel of Al-Ubaidi's wife and Al-Ubaidi to France for both of their required medical treatments. All of these travel and medical expenses were paid by the Iraqi government, with the exception of his original heart surgery in Jordan, which was paid by King Hussein of Jordan.

Al-Ubaidi was named Presidential advisor in 1994 or 1995, a ceremonial position which provided him a salary without any true responsibility. Al-Ubaidi claimed this was done to provide retired members of the Party income, as there were no retirement benefits. Al-Ubaidi claimed he was never consulted regarding any significant political or governmental issues while serving as Presidential advisor.

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/08/2004

On 02/05/2004, while walking through the Camp Cropper Military Detention Facility, at Baghdad International Airport, SSA George L. Piro was approached by Abd Hamid Mahmoud Al-Khattab Al-Nasiri Al-Tikriti (Black List #4). Al-Tikriti advised SSA Piro that he had completed a handwritten note on Saddam Hussein as requested by SSA Piro. Al-Tikriti advised that he had provided the note to his military handler, [REDACTED] requesting he deliver it to SSA Piro.

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Thereafter the Department of Defense provided the note to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The note has been added to the files of the FBI.

Investigation on 02/05/2004 at Baghdad, IraqFile # 315E-HQ-1448534 -12 Date dictated 02/08/2004by George L. Piro *GP*

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 02/17/2004

To: Records Management

Attn: Record Mgmt. Center Unit
A/UC [REDACTED]

From: Counterterrorism

Iraq/Syria/Libya Unite Room 4383

Contact: SSA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

sas [REDACTED]

(U) Case ID #: (S) 315E-HQ-1448534-10
(S) 315E-HQ-1448534-1A-1
(S) 315E-HQ-1448534-1B-1
(S) 315E-HQ-1448534-302-1
(S) 315E-HQ-1448534-BC-1
(S) 315E-HQ-1448534-CE-1
(S) 315E-HQ-1448534-ELA-1
(S) 315E-HQ-1448534-EL1-1
(S) 315E-HQ-1448534-EL1A-1
(S) 315E-HQ-1448534-EL1B-1
(S) 315E-HQ-1448534-LAB-1
(S) 315E-HQ-1448534-NC-1

(U) Title: (S) DESERT SPIDER
IT - IRAQ

(U) Synopsis: (S) Opening of subfiles for captioned matter. AD
authority to restrict subfile 302.

(U) (S) Classified By: 11109, ITOS/CTD
Reason: 1.5(c)
Declassify On: X1

(U) Full Field Investigation Instituted: 05/04/2004 NONUSPER

(U) Administrative: (S) Per all SAC, EC from CTD dated
12/25/2002, no case restrictions in ACS or [REDACTED]

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Records Management From: Counterterrorism
(U) Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534, 02/17/2004

[redacted] may be made without the approval of the Assistant Director of the Counterterrorism Division.

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(U) Details: ~~(S)~~ The captioned investigation was opened to capture intelligence and evidence as it relates to the national security investigation targeting Saddam Hussein. This EC establishes the subfile system for capturing information regarding Hussein. The following subfiles will be established:

1A - Will be a repository for all contemporaneous notes and items which will need to be retained that are not evidentiary in nature.

1B - will document FD-192 bulky records and will be a repository for evidentiary material.

302 - will be a repository for FD-302's, inserts and classified LHM's which document interviews conducted of captioned subject and additional High Value Detainees.

BC - will be a repository for background information on captioned subject and his closest associates.

CE - will be used maintain all records regarding expenditures of case funds in captioned matter.

ELA - will be used to maintain all documents regarding the administration of electronic surveillance in captioned matter.

EL1 - will document all original elsur logs developed or maintained in captioned matter.

LAB - will be a repository for all laboratory requests, reports and findings in captioned matter.

NC - will be a repository for all pertinent newspaper clippings deemed of significant value that they will add to the overall progression of the investigation.

This EC also documents the fact that due to the sensitive nature of the interviews of captioned subject, and the request of the Department of Justice, Office of the Deputy Attorney General [noted in immediate EC from Counterterrorism to General Counsel, dated 02/06/2004] the 302 subfile will be

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~~SECRET~~

To: Records Management From: Counterterrorism

Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534, 02/17/2004

restricted in the Automated Case Management System (ACS).
Access will be granted to the following individuals:

UC

UC

SSA George Piro

SSA

SSA

SSA

SSA

IA

IA

IA

IA

IA

RO

ITOS II Deputy Section Chief

ITOS II Section Chief

D/AD Counterterrorism Division

AD Counterterrorism Division

EAD Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence Division

OSC Baghdad Operations Center

D/OSC Baghdad Operations Center

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b7C

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(U) To: Records Management From: Counterterrorism
Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534, 02/17/2004

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

RECORDS MANAGEMENT

(U) AT WASHINGTON, DC

~~(S)~~ RMD will ensure the aforementioned subfiles will be opened and that access to sub 302 will remain restricted to the above mentioned personnel.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 02/18/2004

To: All Field Offices

Attn: SACs
Iraqi Program Coordinators
FBIHQ, Manuals Desk

From: Counterterrorism

ISLU/ITOS II Room 4383

Contact: [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

sasj

(U) Case ID #: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534 - (Pending) - 7177
~~(S)~~ 66F-HQ-C1384970 (Pending) - 9
~~(U)~~ ~~66F-HQ-C1384970~~

(U) Title: ~~(S)~~ DESERT SPIDER
IT - IRAQ

(U) Synopsis: ~~(S)~~ This EC requests all FBI Field Offices to
contact logical sources for information relating to the
potential prosecution of Saddam Hussein (HVD #1).

(U) ~~(S)~~ Classified By: 11109, ITOS II/CTD
Reason : 1.5(c)
Declassify On: X1

(U) Details: ~~(S)~~ In anticipation of the potential prosecution of
Saddam Hussein for crimes against humanity and war crimes, all
FBI Field Offices should canvass logical sources for
information relating to crimes such as genocide, torture,
inhumane treatment, destruction of property and unlawful
confinement comitted by Saddam Hussein and the former Hussein
Regime.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Field Offices are directed to report to FBIHQ
positive results. FBIHQ will make an attempt to insure
sources are protected and information will be used primarily

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5304901A, EC

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(U) To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism
Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534, 02/18/2004

for lead value. In instances where FBIHQ believes that source information would be instrumental to the successful prosecution of Hussein or members of the Hussein Regime, FBIHQ will coordinate with the respective field office.

(S) ~~(S)~~ In addition to contacting sources, Field Offices should review [redacted] interview results for similar information and forward positive results to FBIHQ.

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(U) Responses should be directed to CTD/ITOS
II/ISLU, Attention, SSA [redacted]

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~~SECRET~~

To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism
(U) Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534, 02/18/2004

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Action)

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

(U) ~~(S)~~ FBI Field Offices should canvass logical sources for any information regarding potential war crimes committed by the former Hussein Regime. Positive results should be forwarded to FBIHQ.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

(S) ~~(S)~~ FBI Field Offices should [redacted] for information pertaining to potential war crimes committed by the former Hussein Regime. Field Offices should notify FBIHQ of any pertinent information.

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~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-11-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/LSC

~~SECRET//X1~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: IMMEDIATE

Date: 02/06/2004

To: General Counsel
Counterterrorism

Attn: National Security Law Branch
Attn: Baghdad Operations Center
Fly Away/Rapid Deployment

Team

From: Counterterrorism

Iraq/Syria/Libya Operations Unit Room 4383

Contact: SSA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

sas [REDACTED]

(U) Case ID #: (S) 315E-HQ-1448534 (Pending) - 8

(U) Title: (S) DESERT SPIDER
IT - IRAQ

Synopsis: (S) Department of Justice guidance regarding
dissemination of HV-1 interview information.

(U) (S)

~~Classified By: 11109, ITOS II/CTD
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: X1~~

(U) Full Field Investigation Instituted: 01/01/2004

Details: (S) For information of receiving offices, a meeting took place on Thursday, February 5, 2004 with FBI personnel and attorneys for the Deputy Attorney General. Attending the meeting were the Assistant Director, Counterterrorism, Section Chief, ITOS II, FBI Deputy General Counsel and the Director's Chief of Staff. The Deputy Attorney General's attorneys raised a concern regarding the dissemination of information from the interviews of High Value Detainee - 1 (HVD-1). The Office of the Deputy Attorney General does not want information disseminated until the Deputy Attorney General has an opportunity to review the matter.

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~~SECRET//X1~~

To: General Counsel From: Counterterrorism
(U) Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534, 02/06/2004

(U) ~~(S)~~ This EC advises that until further notice, all disseminations regarding FBI interviews of HVD-1 must receive FBIHQ approval. The approval authority will remain with the substantive unit (ISLOU), with Office of General Counsel consultation.

(S)

X

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~~SECRET//X1~~

~~SECRET//X1~~

(U) To: General Counsel From: Counterterrorism
Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534, 02/06/2004

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT BAGHDAD OPERATIONS CENTER

(U) Baghdad Operations Center will ensure that all personnel with access to information regarding the interviews of HVD-1 will adhere to the aforementioned policy. Specifically, until further notice, all disseminations regarding FBI interviews of HVD-1 must receive FBIHQ approval. The approval authority will remain with the substantive unit (ISLOU), with Office of General Counsel consultation.

♦♦

~~SECRET//X1~~

(Title)

(File No.) 315E-HQ-1448534

[illegible]

FD-340 (7-19-00)

Universal Case File Number

315E-HQ-1448534 - 1A8

Field Office Acquiring Evidence

CTD, BAGHDAD OPS CENTER

Serial # of Originating Document

Date Received

DECEMBER 27, 2003

From

(Name of Contributor)

(Address of Contributor)

(City and State)

By

SA

To Be Returned

☐

Yes

☒

No

Receipt Given

☐☒

No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐

Yes

☒

No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐

Yes

☒

No

Title:

Reference:

EC DATED 01/05/2004 BY

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description:

☐

Original notes re interview of

HANDWRITTEN LETTER OF SADDAM

HUSSEIN DATED DECEMBER 24, 2003

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b7c

ما حياتي عما المكان الذي اتي منه
والتي اتي منها ~~التي~~ فيه من المبالغ
التقريبية

(1) — 7501 — مكانة وهو ألف

(2) — 2401 — مكانة واربعون ألف دولار
في رزمة أخرى من المئتين

(3) — 301 — المئتين ألف دولار ناقصاً

بين 500 إلى 2000 ألف دولار
في حزمة واحدة

(4) عدد من الملاحظات البيضة
ذاتية مكتوب عليها فصول عن رواية
وأوراقاً أخرى مكتوبة

مكتوب

Universal Case File Number 315E-HQ-1448534 - 1A9Field Office Acquiring Evidence CTD, BAGHDAD OPS CENTER

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received DECEMBER 27, 2003

From

(Name of Contributor)

(Address of Contributor)

(City and State)

By

SA

To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☒ NoReceipt Given ☐ Yes ☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes ☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes ☒ No

Title:

Reference: EC DATED 01/05/2004 BY
(Communication Enclosing Material)Description: ☐ Original notes re interview ofHANDWRITTEN LETTER OF SADDAM
HUSSEIN DATED DECEMBER 26, 2003

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

من صدام عينا / رئيس جمهورية العراق ، الى
 بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم ... مضى عليّ في المكان الذي أنا فيه
 الآن من 3/12/83 ، حيث أشرت الى هذا
 اليوم 3/12/83 ، فعدا عن الأذى والفزع
 الذي أصابني بعد أن شرعوا عليّ في 3/12
 والى ما لم تحصى أي جزء من جسمي من الأذى
 المبرح والى ما زالت أثار البعث منه ظاهرة على جسمي الآن
 فان ما أشرت أن أجبر الجلات المعنوية الآن هو إن سألته
 اليوم بالنسبة لي في هذا المكان محدود و شبيه ناد
 ، رغم أنني مهدد في سري في أغلب الوقت ، ولكني
 تعرفوا الحقيقة مثلما هي ، فان الثلاثة أيام الأجير مثلنا
 مجموع ثومي فيها قد لا يتقوى الأريج والخمس ساعات لكل
 الأيام ، ذلك لأن المكان الذي أنا فيه ، شأنه شأن
 أماكن الاعتقال ، مع ما يبدو ، تحول الى مكان لتعذيب
 المعتقلين ليلاً بوجه عام ، ونهاية أيضاً في كثير
 الأحيان ، بالإضافة الى مؤثرات الصدمة المزمنة لها
 استنطاقه أو تعذيبه ، ولا أعتقد إن هذا كل
 عليه مرهف إنسانياً ، يستطيع أن ينال حله صياح المعتقلين
 المعتقلين ، وضربات الأبواب الكثرة وحالات أخرى

فَانْظُرُوا عَمِي هَذَا وَعَمِي غَيْرَهُ لَا ذَا لَهَا لَا يَرِيكُمْ إِلَّا مَرَّةً وَحَدًّا
فَإِنَّ اللَّهَ يَنْظُرُ وَيَرَى مَا عَلَيْكُمْ مِنْ يَوْمٍ مَنَزَلُ كُلِّ رَيْفٍ
أَمَامَهُ جَمَانُهُ عَمِي حَبَابٌ --- وَاللَّهُ أَكْبَرُ وَاللَّهُ أَكْبَرُ

عَدَامٌ عَمِي

عَمِي

2003/12/26

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Classification per OGA letter dated 08/21/2009

Precedence: IMMEDIATE

Date: 01/05/2003

To: Director's Office

Attn: Director Robert S. Mueller III
D/Director Bruce Gephardt
EAD John S. Pistole
A/AD Gary M. Bald
DAD Thomas J. Harrington
SC Frankie Battle
SC M. Chris Briese
SSA [REDACTED]

Counterterrorism

From: Counterterrorism
Baghdad Operations Center
Contact: SAC Edwin L. Worthington

b6
b7C

Approved By: Worthington Edwin L
[REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED] jag

(U) **Case ID #:** ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534-7 (Pending)

(U) **Title:** ~~(S)~~ DESERT SPIDER
IT - IRAQ

(U) **Synopsis:** ~~(S)~~ To transmit original hand-written letters of
Saddam Hussein.

(U) ~~(S)~~ ~~Derived From: G-3~~
~~Declassify On: X1~~

(U) **Enclosure(s):** ~~(S)~~ Original letters, covered by 1A envelopes,
the first undated, and the second dated December 26, 2003, hand-
written by Saddam Hussein.

(U) **Details:** ~~(S)~~ Special Agent [REDACTED] collected two
original hand-written letters of Saddam Hussein (hereinafter
"Hussein").

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~~(S)~~ The first letter was written by Hussein on December
24, 2003 (hereinafter referred to as the "December 24th letter").
Hussein delivered it to his military handlers on the 25th of
December [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1

~~SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN~~

~~SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN~~

To: Director's Office From: Counterterrorism
(U) Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-1448534, 01/05/2003

(S)

b1

[redacted]
[redacted] SA [redacted] has been in possession of the letter since that time.

(U) ~~(S)~~ The December 24th letter was removed from the packaging and placed in a protective clear plastic sleeve. LS [redacted] translated the text of the letter from Arabic to English. The text of that English translation follows:

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b7C

"My belongings from the location I was found in and captured.

- 1) 750 Seven Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars in a package.
- 2) 240 Two Hundred and Forty Thousand Dollars in another package in the same iron safe.
- 3) Less than 30 Thirty Thousand Dollars
Between 500 Five Hundred and 2000 Two Thousand Dollars in a Samsonite case...
- 4) A number of simple necessities, the most important are notebooks with chapters from a story and other written papers.

(signature) "

(U) ~~(S)~~ SA [redacted] completed an FD-182 and Chain of Custody form on the December 24th letter, both of which and the original letter are enclosed and transmitted to FBI Headquarters under cover of this EC.

(U) ~~(S)~~ The second letter was written by Hussein on December 26, 2003 (hereinafter referred to as the "December 26th letter"). Hussein provided the letter to his military handlers on December 26, 2003. Hussein's military handlers delivered it to SA [redacted] on December 27, 2003, without first placing it in any protective covering. SA [redacted] has been in possession of it since that time.

b6
b7C

(U) ~~(S)~~ The December 26th letter was placed in a clear plastic sleeve. LS [redacted] translated the text of the

~~SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN~~

~~SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN~~

To: Director's Office From: Counterterrorism
(U) Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-R 1448534, 01/05/2003

letter from Arabic to English. The text of that English translation follows:

"Page 2-1

In the name of God the Compassionate and Most Merciful

From Saddam Hussein / The President of the Republic of Iraq to whom it may concern...I have been in this place since 12/13/2003, where I was captured until this day 12/26/2003, in addition to the harm and beatings that I have received following my capture on 12/13/2003, after which not a single part of my body was spared of the severe harm that was inflicted by the detention gang, and where some of the traces are still visible on my body until now, what I wanted to inform the concerned authorities now is that my opportunity to sleep in this place is limited and almost scarce, even though I am laying down on my bed the majority of the time, so in order in order for you to know the truth as it is, for example the last three days my total hours of sleep did not exceed four to five hours during all these days, because the place I am in, is similar in its condition to all detention places, it seems, that it was transformed into a place for torturing the detainees at night in general, and also during the day most of the time, in addition to the disturbing sound effects of those who are been interrogated or tortured, and I don't think that there is anyone with a sensitive and humanitarian heart, who can sleep amidst the screams of the torturers and the ones being tortured, and the many blows of the doors and the squeaking sounds of the chairs.

Page 2-2

Look into this matter and other matters if this is of interest to you, if not God will look and see from his heaven, and look upon anyone who stands in front of him in judgement...God is great...God is great.

Saddam Hussein

(Signature)

~~SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN~~

~~SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN~~

To: Director's Office From: Counterterrorism
(U) Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-1448534, 01/05/2003

12/26/2003"

(U) ~~(S)~~ SA completed an FD-182 and Chain of Custody form on the December 24th letter, both of which and the original letter are enclosed and transmitted to FBI Headquarters under cover of this EC.

b6
b7C

~~SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN~~

~~SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN~~

To: Director's Office From: Counterterrorism
(U) Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-1448534, 01/05/2003

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

DIRECTOR'S OFFICE

AT EADCTCI, DC

(U) ~~(S)~~ For information. Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT FBI HEADQUARTERS

(U) ~~(S)~~ For information. Read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN~~

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 01/15/2004

To: Records Management

Attn: [REDACTED]

From: CTD

MEU/ITOS II/4383

Contact: [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

(U) Case ID #: (S) 315E-HQ-1448534 (Pending)

(U) Title: (S) SADDAM HUSSEIN
IT-IRAQ
OO: FBIHQ

(U) Synopsis: (S) This EC requests a title change to captioned matter.

(U) (S) ~~Classified By: 11109, ITOS II/CTD~~
~~Reason: 1.5(c)~~
~~Declassify On: X1~~

(U) Details: (S) Records Management is requested to change captioned title to the code name DESERT SPIDER. New caption to read "DESERT SPIDER; IT-IRAQ; OO: FBIHQ."

(U) (S) CTD is requesting the assignment of a code name to this investigation in order to facilitate communications between all FBI Field Offices as well as components of the USIC. The investigation will involve extensive interviews and analysis of current and previously collected information.

(U) (S) A check of FBIHQ records on 1/15/2004, indicated that DESERT SPIDER is available for use as a code name.

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

To: Records Management From: CTD
Re: (S) 315E-HQ-1448534, 01/15/2004

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

RECORDS MANAGEMENT

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) ~~(S)~~ RMD is requested to assign the code name
"DESERT SPIDER" to previously captioned "SADDAM HUSSEIN; IT-
IRAQ; OO: FBIHQ," file number 315E-HQ-1448534.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

{Title)

(File No.) 315E-240-1448534-

[illegible]

Universal Case File Number 315E-HQ-1448534- ^{1A6}Field Office Acquiring Evidence HQ

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received 02/05/2004From ABID HAMID MAHMOUD AL-TIKRITI
(Name of Contributor)DETENTION FACILITY
(Address of Contributor)BAGHDAD INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, IRAQ
(City and State)

By _____

To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☒ NoReceipt Given ☐ ☒ NoGrand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure☐ Yes ☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes ☒ NoTitle: DESERT SPIDER
IT- SPIDERReference: _____
(Communication Enclosing Material)Description: ☐ Original notes re interview ofHANDWRITTEN NOTES BY
ABID HAMID MAHMOUD AL-TIKRITI

SADDAM'S REACTION WHEN HE IS UPSET

Saddam Hussein said; it is better to be alone when I am mad, and no one to be close to me, so that I calm down. When he is upset we do not talk to him in any subject, we keep quiet until he talks to us, which means he prefer we do not say any subject waiting for him to initiate the conversation. When no one talk to him, I as the secretary keep my mouth close and if possible leave the room or the office that he is in, until he ask for me and sometimes he walks out and like to stay in outdoor get fresh air and take trips in the lakes. When he leaves I stay in the office as the secretary of the president do not accompany the president, only the protection and bodyguard accompany him . Exception for me to go with him is when he ask me to be with him in that trip. When he is upset, he react and deal with people very harshly, while he is normal when not upset.

2- When a triable dispute between my brother Dahman and sons of Sabawi and Wathban was brought to Saddam to be solved, he blamed my brother even though my brother is assigned with and official duty. At this time me, my cousins and uncles, we where upset and mad at this judgment, I decided at that time to gradually get out of the position and quit, so that I take care of my children. In fact Saddam Hussein appointed an assistant to the secretary, Lieutenant Colonel Jamal Mustapha Abdulla Al-Sultan his son in-law . I asked Uday and Qusay, why did he judge in favor of his brothers? Uday said, don't you know that he always take the side of his brothers, as they were present at that meting. Therefore my feelings were that I should gradually withdraw and leave so that I will not have direct confrontation with him. And devote my time to my family and my tripe as my uncle was the sheikh of All Al-Nassiry tripe.

3- Personal habits:

He always crack his fingers, and put on the Arabic dress. His hobby is fishing, horse riding and smoking the Cuban cigars "Chohiba" and the predictable reactions, would be such as when he is mad he would shout, attack the one close to him and grab the moustache of that person .

The crimes that he committed during this period:

1- I have told you about this previously, the first person Saddam killed was in 1959, when he was shooting to scare a person named Sadoun Himod Al-Hasan who was a an active communist party member and a member of Saddam's tripe., the bullet was deflected from the ground and hit Al-Hasan and killed him.

2- The assassination attempt of president Abdul Kareem Qasim, in 1959.

3- The mass graves that were displayed on TV, I was surprised when seeding them. The responsibility of these graves happened in 1991, to be asked from the Column that restored the government control over the Southern Provinces when they fall down in Feb., 1991, those that Saddam gave them the authority of the president of the country, because there was no communication between the provinces . The president should be included in questioning about this as he is the head of the country and at the end it is his responsibility as the man at the top.

The leaders of the column were:

1-Ezat Ibrahim Khalel Al-Douri in charge of Misan. With him was Lt. General Nazar Al-Khazraji

2-Taha Yaseen Ramathan, In charge of Hilla and Najaf .

3- Mohammed Hamza Al-Zubaidi in charge of Nasiria (Deqar), with him were , Rokan Razouqi Abdul-Ghafour and Kamal Mustapha.

4- Hussen Kamil Hassan Al-Majeed and Sadoun Hammadi, in charge of Karbala and Najaf.

5- Saddam ordered the execution of an Iraqi Lt. Colonel in Kuwait because he burglarized as store, he was executed in front of people in Al-Kreen..

6- He (Saddam) sent 5 or 6 officers to military tribunal to be executed in 1991, this happened in 1991. Lt. General Saber Al-Douri know there names.

١١
تقرئات صدام منه عندما يكون عصبي

انه صدام منه يقول أفضل انه عندما اكون عصبي انه
اكونه وهدري ولا يكونه اهد قريب منه عند
حتى الهدأ بعد فترة قليلة واذا كانه عصبي لانتد
بأي شيء وفسكت حتى اذا هو يتحدث اي
يعني يفضل انه لا يجادل له لانه لا يحب ذلك لانه
هو يتحدث عنه الموضوع الذي صار عصبي عنه
أجله وبعد صدام عندما لا اهد بجادله يسكت .
- وانا انصرف كسكرتير عندما يكونه عصبي ايسكت
واذا ضيق مجال التراجع الفرقة المكتب الذي هو
فيه هنا هو يجلبني وفي بعض الحالات عندما
يكونه عصبي يترك المكتب ويرحب انه يذهب
على الهواء والطلقة الفضاء الخارجي يكونه في حوله
في البحيرات وعند ما يخرج خارج المكتب انا اتبع
في المكتب لانه السكرتير لا يرافقه رئيس الدولة
بعض في مكتبه فقط المرافقين والحماة الا اذا
هو يقول كونه عصبا في هذا الواجب العمل
وعندما يكونه عصبي يكونه حاد المزاج والتفاصل
وليس كالحال عندما يكونه طبيعي

(٤) انه صدر ام حسنة عند ما حدثت مشكلة عشاري بينه وبينه ابنه
 افي الكبير دحالم وبينه وبينه سباعوي ووطبان انتقائي
 علماً انه ابنه افي حلف بواجب ركي وتم الكلام عند صدر ام
 حسنة بينه وبينه اعمامي واصواني واهواني وفي النهاية قال
 انه المصدق في ابنه افي وفي هذه الحالة بدأ الفضيحة على
 وجهه اعمامي واصواني وانا ايضا وقلت افضل شيء لانه
 الحالة وصلت لهذا الحد انه افكر بالانسحاب التدرجي
 والتفرغ لرعاية اطفاله وصدام حسنة ففعل وضع معاونة
 للسكرتير المحال مصطفى عبد الله السلطنة زوج ابنته الصغرى
 وسألت عدي وقصير ماذا الاثنان بجانب اهوانه لانه
 سأتاحقرون الاجتماع وقال عدي الم تعرف انه
 دائماً يضع الحق بجانب انتقائي وكانه امساي الفضل
 الانسحاب منها لانه مشكلة مباشرة معه واقوم
 بتابعة عائلتي وعشيرتي واقوم بمساعدة منهم لان
 عمي عبد الله المحمود كانه شيخ عشيرة آل الناصري

(٣) العادات الخفية يقوم دائماً بلطقة اصابع اليد

وارتداء الملابس العربية وهواياته صيد الاسماك بالسناخه
 وركوب الخيل ~~و~~ ونه حسنة السيكار الكوبي
 كوهيبا والاعمال الغير تلقائية في حالة العصبية يهجم بالحديث
 عنه القريب منه ويقوم بحسك يثواريه

الجرائم التي ارتكبت خلال هذه المدة .

(١) اني تحدثت سابقاً اول حادثة قتل قام بها صدام حسين في عام ١٩٥٩ ضرب سعدون محمود الحنك كانه مسيحي لظنه من نفسه عبدة صدام قام بتخويفه ضرباً طلقة صدر في الارض وارتفعت الية وارداه قليلاً .

(٢) محاولة اغتيال رئيس الوزراء عبد الكريم قاسم شارك مع مجموعة لغرب واصيب في كتفه عبد الكريم ولم يتوفى و كان في

١٩٥٩/١٠/٧
(٣) المقابر الجماعية التي شُيّدت على مئات القتلى انني حقيقةً تفاجئة عند ما اُخبرنا وان مسؤولية هذه المقابر التي حدثت في عام ١٩٩١ يسأل عنها مسؤولي الارشال الذين قاموا بأعادة اللقطة للمحافظات الجنوبية عند سقوطها في عام ١٩٩١ شريطاً والذين منهم صدام حسين صلاحية رئيس الجمهورية لانقطاع الاتصال بين المحافظات وعصم طبعاً رئيس الجمهورية يجب ان يسأل عنها لانها مسؤولية الشخص الاول في البلاد وحائد الركن والى

(٤) عزة ابراهيم خليل الدوري نائب رئيس مجلس قيادة الثورة مسؤول رتل صيان وفعه الفرقة الاول نزار الخزرجي رئيس اركان الجيش سابقاً .
(٥) طه ياسين رمضان نائب رئيس الجمهورية مسؤول رتل الحلة اخف .
(٦) محمد حمزة الزبيدي مسؤول مجلس قيادة الثورة مسؤول رتل الناصرية (ذوقار) وفعه روتانه رزوقي عبد الففور وكمال مصطفى
(٧) صدام حسين كاعل صفيه المجيد ود سعدونه حمادي مسؤول رتل كربلاء الخف

(٨) اصدر امر صدام بأعدام عديم في الجيش في الكويت لانه قام بسرقة احد المحلات واحام انظار الناس في الكرية
(٩) اصدر امر صدام بحلهم اعالتهم للجنة عسكرية لا يدرهم ستة اوفى صيان في ١٩٩١ يفرهم الفريق صابر الدوري

(Title)

(File No.)

315E-NQ-1448534

[illegible]

1A5
Universal File Case Number 375E-HQ-1448534Field Office Acquiring Evidence FBIHQ

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received 2/24/2004From FADII SUFAIT MUHAMMAD AZZAWI
(Name of Contributor)

(Address of Contributor)

(City and State)

By GEORGE PIRD
(Name of Special Agent)To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☒ NoReceipt Given ☐ Yes ☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes ☒ No

Title:

DESERT SPIDER
IT-IRAQReference: _____
(Communication Enclosing Material)Description: ☒ Original notes re interview ofFADII SUFAIT MUHAMMAD AZZAWIb6
b7C

(01)

2/25

JULY 1, 1944 - BAHJI

BIG FAMILY AL AZA

TRAVELED TO GREECE ^{UNDER} ~~SA~~/NAME SAMI
HIS MOTHER & SA'S MOTHER ARE SISTERS.

RECALLS KNOWING SA SINCE BO. BUT WOULD
ONLY SEE HIM OCCASIONALLY LATER BECAME CLOSER
FATHER - FARMER & WORKED FOR THE BRITISH
PETROLEUM CO. SPOKE ENGLISH WTH IN TURN
~~TEACHES~~ TAUGHT A ENGLISH.

4 BROS. 6 SISTERS.

FINISHED HS IN BAG. ^{IN} & COLLEGE IN 68 MAJORING
ENGLISH AND FRENCH. ALSO SPEAKS RUSSIAN.

WENT TO DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

1973

INSTITUTE

DID SO WELL IN SCHOOL
HE RCD SCHOLARSHIP FOR PHD
BUT FAMILY DID NOT LIKE
COMMUNISM

SUMMER COURSES IN CAMBRIDGE

1974 WENT TO NY TRAINING @ THE ON DR. ISMAEL

KHATANI WAS HIS TRAINER

APPOINTED TO CAIRO 75-78

WASHINGTON 78-80 1ST SECRETARY INTERSECTION?

GOING TO JOHN HOPKINS UNIV.

PROMOTED TO FULL EMBASSADOR

HEAD OF INTERSECTION

80-82 INDIA EMBASSADOR

82-84 MOSCOW "

CALLED BACK BY PRES. TO RE-ASSIGNMENT
TO IIS

(2)

#4 RECOMMENDED D TO PRES OF HIS CAPABILITIES & WAS SUMMONED BACK TO JOIN FIS. DUE TO SIT'S DISPUTE W/ BAZZAN

D CLAIMED TO BE THE ONLY PERSON HONEST & OPEN W/ SIT. D SAW IRAQ NOT OPEN OR DEMOCRACY.

CAME TO IIS '85 SENT TO UN W/ AZIZ RE IRAN & IRAQ. WROTE A LONG ITR W/ SUGGESTIONS & CRITICISMS.

83 1ST TIME CELEBRATED SIT HIS BIRTHDAY - D CRITICIZED HIM FOR IT & WROTE HIM A ITR TELLING THAT WHAT IS DONE BY KINGS & ETC. NOT REVOLUTIONARY

D'S BROTHERS, SISTER & HER SON WERE KILLED & D BELIEVED BY GOVT. & SIT MAY HAVE FELT OUTRAGE

SIT WAS SACRED FROM BAZZAN AS HE WAS YOUNG BAZZAN RAN THE IIS & CONTROLLED MAKING HIM POWERFUL AND THREAT. SIT WAS SUSPICIOUS.

SIT WANTED HIM TO BE DIR. BUT D SUGGESTED TO BE DEP. SO HE COULD LEARN THE GO GO GHOLUB UMAR D'S SEC.

FAHUK IHJAZI M-4 DIR.

IBRAHIM AL-ANI M-4

M-4 RECP.

ARRESTED BY SSD & INSTRUCTED THEM
TO BE WHIPPED 20 TIMES A DAY. HELD
IN SMALL CELL RESERVED FOR A HIGH
RISK. Cell secured by 5 doors w/
2 LATCHES. EXPECTED TO BE EXECUTED
FAMILY WROTE A NICE PLATTERANK POEM.
HIS SITUATION IMPROVED & 8 MOS. LATER
BEHIND ABIN SINA HOSP.

PRISONS

FOR SSD

" DIR. OF GEN SECURITY INSIDE THEIR FAC.

" AR IIS - 52

GEN PRISON "ABA G. 1 MOSUL 1 DIALA
1 BASRA."

IF THE IMPRISONED ~~THE~~ PERSON HAS A BKGRD
IN IT THEN YOU'RE SENT TO ANOTHER ONE SO
AS NOT TO BE TREATED BETTER FORMER COLLEAGUES.

12/12/84 - 1ST DAY @ IIS WANTED TO SEE PRISON
SMALL CELLS - FOUND PRISONERS HELD FOR MOS OR
YEARS W/OUT DISPOSITION. GIVEN REASON NOT
ENOUGH OFFICERS.

1 PRISONER - IRANIAN 3YRS^{PLUS} & FOR SAYING FOR
CROSSING BORDER W/OUT PASS. WIFE WAS FAVOROUS
IN WEST GERMAN PARLIAMENT, ~~AND~~ AND SPOKE TO PRES.

(4)

MINST. OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS RE THIS Guy
HIS TOLD HIM ^{SH} NOT IN CUSTODY NO QES
COULD NOT TELL HIM THEY LIED & IF
NOT RELEASED W/ DEMONSTRATE.

DESC.

NICE, BRAVE, GOOD TO HIS FRIENDS ETC

UNTIL 1988 SAW CHANGE

BECAME STUBBORN, POWER HUNGER ^{DOMINEERING} INCREASED
DUE TO WEAR LEADERSHIP

LEAD COUNTRY ALONE -

HE ADMIRER HIMSELF

2-21-04

FADIL SULFAIS MUHAMMAD - A22Aw1

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-11-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/LSC

After College
72-73 Diplomat Institute
Scholarship for 2 courses

Summer Course - COMBRIDGE
courses in

1974 - Training at Natl Assembly UN
Dr. Khatami - DQ diplomat
1. trained me
Met in NY Plaza
Met for Astoria
Studio City

75-78 - Cairo -
1st master degree

78-80 - WASH
1st Secretary
Ambassador's Office

~~80-82~~
Ambassador's Office
family sent to DQ
Head of Mission -
Head of IDQ

80-82

Dubai

82-84

USSR

Dean of Arab Leg

Abd. Hamed is behind
my name to Hussein.

85

SPR govt

No Democrats

through

Don't meet with or Ad

1

- Secretary

2

Aljaryi, Fakhri - MA

3

Phrohi Al Ani - Gen Director
3 managers
MA

MA to collect

ms

Dead to/ for Grand

63 became member of Baath Pty.

Issue re: Kuwait

95 Hydrot Bathy 7 Baath

Drank tobacco - healed mty

Spoke 42 min

I decided not talk at this mty
BLCI was told I talk too much
later on President wanted me

though UDA + It's a man

if you open your mouth I'll

break your backbone

C. Ali told me don't talk go

in neatly - from now on

write it down

At NEXT mty

SAT next Izzat Ibrahim

Ali Hassan Mawla

Q & A session

behind ↑ ~~the same door~~

LUKman AUDA - wanted war

Ali agree to support gov into Kuwait

1/2 thought to solve
our problem, we really
to make Kuwait +
inflation - chief of mission branch
of service pt

Ali + Anna very close
Mi supported Anna

Opposed Lin - Flooding pattern
Especially @ one - how
against Ali + our policy
with the vote side

Later, Ali + I started to fight

~~that he stated every hour~~
~~highly important one~~

~~I called for new leadership~~

Ali threw helmet on ground

I said leadership needs new blood
brought here from work to work

Chenier Alied

PWT near Alameda Hospital

Grand Svc

Abu Khalil -

- Masri
- Dhan
- Bassel

IED pond

Genie Search

After 84 became unstable compound
due to power
weakness

1 San

2

3 DEJ - Significant

4 Ann Rights Crisis

5 Prisoners + m7

(File No.) 315E-MQ-1448534-

[illegible]

b6
b7C
b7D



Universal File Case Number 315E-HQ-1448534- 1A7Field Office Acquiring Evidence FBI BAGHDAD

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received 2/23/04From _____
(Name of Contributor)FBI BAGHDAD OPERATIONS CENTER
(Address of Contributor)BAGHDAD, IRAQBy _____
(Name of Special Agent)To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☐ NoReceipt Given ☐ Yes ☐ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes ☐ NoTitle: DESERT SPIDER
IT-IRAQReference: _____
(Communication Enclosing Material)b6
b7C
b7DDescription: ☒ Original notes re interview of(BLACK LIST #)

2/28/09
from
Baghdad

b6
b7C
b7D

definitive

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-08-2009 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/rs

Prisoner subject to the Law of the State of Iraq

per Mi

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b7D

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

They were afraid of Saddam
Most blame will be

mostly on Regime in power before
Gulf War.


= as opposed to those who took power
after the Gulf War.

re: Geneva Convention

My understanding → 2 types of parties
powers + civilians

← released at
end of war

→ cases reviewed
each 6 mos.



b7D



.. As for the punishment or as means of
getting into out of people?
" Both -

Rumor spread is here
in women street

Notes of SSA [redacted]

SSA [redacted]

2/23/04

Interview #1

Translate [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 05-08-2009 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/rs

✓ These people are clever people
✓ if ask you this, ask so they don't know it's me
✓ I know how know your job

✓ In prison
✓ some have suspicions about others
✓ danger to him and his family

T - not just asking him, asking others
T - will [redacted] my straight

b6
b7C
b7D

✓ I'll never lie to you [redacted]
T - won't divulge names of others [redacted]

②

To who has most control/influence in prison?

✓ No one person
✓ Sometimes, at beginning,

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

He was source of their humor

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Humor that

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

3rd humor * (see next page)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

✓ People have doubts & believe
[redacted] - didn't happen

3

* 3rd Floor

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Explosion - 4-5 heard outside
T-News received here about outside

Four ways

one

when met families, they tell them - talk about roles

second

when talking to family or phone

third

MP, talk some with those who speak English

fourth

new prisoner who comes in

b6
b7C
b7D

(4)

✓ Other individuals who are leavers here?

✓ No one else truly

✓ few days ago when riot occurred

✓ closed windows, banging, God is great

✓ closed windows - guards

✓ saw new orders in exercise

[REDACTED]

✓ refused to talk to him, left in front of door

✓ closed windows - guards ^{roughly}

✓ he started to talk to him not talking to him

✓ yelling "God is great"

✓ How is rank/position determined?

✓ but like outside but similar

✓ Do high rank in time data/influence prisoners why they say?

b6
b7C
b7D

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

✓ Days ago during interview of 43, after

(5)



✓ Others?

✓ None

b6
b7C
b7D


T-



T- What about Saddam?



✓ [redacted] criticizes Saddam



T- Why?

✓ Everybody thought he would be - Saddam

✓ Saddam would praise Arab words

✓ saying would be praise would be very

6
T- you are thankful that Saddam surrendered?

✓ Ch. A. in my - why did he give up
did he have to kill himself



T- other local Saddam supporters?



with cage Saddam

T- do they think will face criminal charges?

people think differently

some say will go to court, some released,
some will stay here

✓ my opinion

✓ and my will be taken to courts

b6
b7C
b7D

T- Do think this is only prison, or taken off this island?

T- prison number Iraq control?


✓ Rumor that ^{some} would be transferred to Abu Ghraib

✱ Hatched about 3

✓ not sure where came from

✓ while ago not now

✓ Some detainees esp party leaders, thought one year at most
- all would be released



①

✓ Some detainees not cooperating, but want to
✓ How can we get them to cooperate
✓ What category - Party, low level, etc?

✓ AM categories?

✓ Really I don't know

✓ Not sure how to do. Aliar is a liar.

✓ Must have ideas? We say on with others?

✓ Heard [redacted] say

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

✓ When leave interview, they ask about what happened?

✓ Yes. He does. Abbas everybody

and details given them

✓ Any pressure from [redacted]

✓ No. Everybody who comes out, he talks to.

Asks if releasing.

[redacted]

(8)

T- Any concerned w/ the close & handed
I over to Iraqis?

✓ No. Haven't heard lately

✓ Maybe 9 months ago when in tents heard this
✓ Talk that MVD's would be given to Iraqis ←
not since then

XT- Am worried [redacted] detainees feel it's a bad decision
XT- to southern / northern part of Iraq?

here - don't think would be [redacted]

✓ some would be happy, some sad - it moved elsewhere

T- sad? who?

✓ [redacted] happy

T- Any concerns for personal safety of detainees?
✓ never talk about, don't expect

b6
b7C
b7D

T- Do detainees have misinterpret human treatment here

T- by US as well as?

✓ The opposite. Prison believes US also used ^{physical} torture.
✓ one prisoner said [redacted]

[redacted]

(10)

Q- Do they accept responsibility? the other leaders?

✓ No, I don't think so

Q- How would react if Saddam blames them?

✓ Don't know how would react

Q- Tactical process in Iraq. Cooperation is not just
Q- administrative position. It's discussing in detail?
Q- their duties, responsibilities, not anything answers.

✓ Don't know how they think.

[redacted] says it has them talking about details of interview
another they talked around subject

Q- Detainee perception v a vis. OLC?

✓ own opinion

✓ any understanding of OLC

✓ two types of prisoners

✓ POWs & civilians & cases reviewed every 6 mos?

→ released after war

other things, this, except

Leadership of Ba'ath

Thinks would have different on things

looks "fake" but don't look to be relevant

still looking for reintegration

b6
b7C
b7D

Any torture experiences of Reeves given?
No. Not has seen

(17)

Te Whalke is the known about torture?

Te Torture techniques?

-b7D

Was he tortured there?

Don't know

Don't know so

Te Torture, ^{is it} for punishment or to get information?

Both

(12)

✓ F- of people sit with her, anyone who has tortured
✓ T- ordered torture?

✓ Don't know. If I know, I would tell

✓ F- [redacted] kalg military & w/ operations?

✓ Don't know [redacted]. If I know, would tell
✓ If he tells something, I will tell you.
Through hands

✓ Where the [redacted] is? ~~Kenya~~ / Tom out of room

✓ Rumor - last room in wooden but they - for US people
people first thought court, or for vest area, or

b6
b7C
b7D

✓ [redacted] ~~last~~ address
said this

(with name)

✓
✓
[redacted]
END OF NOTES

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/23/2004

On February 23, 2004, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (Black List [REDACTED] date of birth [REDACTED] place of birth [REDACTED] Iraq, was interviewed at a military detention facility located at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Interviewing Agents were identified as members of the United States Government from Washington, DC. Also present at the interview was [REDACTED] British representative from the Iraqi Survey Group (ISG), Baghdad. [REDACTED] FBI Language Analyst, provided Arabic/English translation. [REDACTED] provided the following information:

[REDACTED] stated that the detainees currently held at the detention facility with him are "clever people." If investigators ask these other prisoners certain questions, these questions must be posed so that the detainees cannot determine that the origin of the information is [REDACTED] acknowledged that he understands investigators know how to perform their duties. In the prison, some detainees have suspicions about other detainees. These suspicions, if confirmed through discovery of certain information, can be a danger to [REDACTED] and his family. [REDACTED] added, "I will never lie to you. There is no benefit."

b6
b7C
b7D

Regarding who among the detainees has control or influence over the prison population, [REDACTED] stated there is no one person in such a position. At some point in the past, detainee [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Investigation on 02/23/2004 at Baghdad, IraqFile # 315E-HO-1448534 - 61 Date dictated 02/23/2004by [REDACTED] *PLH*b6
b7C

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 02/23/2004 , Page 2

[REDACTED][REDACTED][REDACTED]b6
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[REDACTED] stated that detainees become aware of news regarding events outside of the prison through several means. During permitted visits or telephone calls, detainee family members inform prisoners of the news. In addition, newly arrived prisoners provide detainees current information regarding events outside the facility. Finally, detainees who speak English converse with US military police who are assigned to guard them.

In [REDACTED] opinion and through his observations, there are no other leaders within the detention facility. However, the facility is segregated and all the detainees, including [REDACTED] do not have contact with all the other prisoners. They are separated into twenty-one cells per building, in blocks of seven prisoners. Several buildings exist and detainees are normally allowed outside of their cells for exercise in groups of seven corresponding to their block.

[REDACTED] provided some details regarding the detainee "riot" or protest which occurred a few days ago. Reportedly, new

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 02/23/2004 , Page 3

orders were issued to the US military guards requiring cell windows to be closed and the cessation of exercising. Thereafter, a detainee [REDACTED] (his nickname using the tribal name of the individual's mother) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] refused to accept food offered to him by the guards. [REDACTED] then began banging on his cell door and yelling "God is great." Other detainees, in a show of solidarity and/or sympathy, joined in the protest mimicking [REDACTED] actions.

[REDACTED] stated rank and respect among the detainees is determined "not like the outside, but similar." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Regarding Saddam Hussein, [REDACTED] "criticizes" him. He has stated that Hussein [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Hussein had previously praised the words of Yassir Arafat and often repeated Arafat's words saying he (Hussein) would not be taken prisoner, but would be martyred. After Hussein's capture, many prisoners questioned the reason he surrendered. They believe he should have at least used his gun to kill himself.

b6
b7C
b7D

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 02/23/2004 , Page 4

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] is not aware of any current
Hussein supporters within the prison. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Regarding the possibility of facing criminal charges, [REDACTED] stated that detainees have differences in opinion from one person to another. Some think that they will go to court, while others believe they will be released. Other detainees believe they will remain in the current facility. [REDACTED] believes many will appear before a court.

Many months ago, a rumor circulated that some of the detainees would be transferred to another facility, possibly Abu Ghraib Prison in Baghdad. [REDACTED] is unsure of the origin of this information, but such a rumor no longer exists. In addition, some detainees, particularly the Ba'ath Party leaders, thought/think they would/will be released on the one year anniversary of the liberation of Baghdad by coalition forces.

b6
b7C
b7D

[REDACTED] stated he is unsure how to enlist the assistance of detainees who have not already been cooperating, regardless of their former level within the government. He stated, "A liar is a liar." [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is unaware of any present prisoner concerns about being turned over to Iraqi custody. These concerns existed approximately nine months ago when detainees were being held in tents. At that time, there was "talk" that the high-value detainees would be given to the Iraqis. Since that time, however, there has been no discussion about this matter.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 02/23/2004 , Page 5

Regarding the possibility of transfer of detainees to another facility and prisoner reactions, [REDACTED] stated, "Some would be happy. Some would be sad." One prisoner, [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] does not believe that news of a transfer to another facility would cause detainees to riot. [REDACTED] pointed out that the possibility of a riot is diminished due to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated he is unaware of any detainee concerns for personal safety should relocation to another facility occur, including transfer to an Iraqi-controlled prison.

[REDACTED] does not believe detainees interpret their humane treatment in the current facility as a sign of the weakness of the United States. On the contrary, detainees believe the United States is an advanced and educated country which would not torture people. One prisoner commented to [REDACTED]

Despite this humane treatment by US forces in the present detention facility, [REDACTED] offered no explanation for the reluctance of prisoners to cooperate with interviewers. [REDACTED] offered that a non-cooperator is "a bad apple" and cannot be changed. In his opinion, the only way is cooperation.

Prisoners at the facility believe Hussein will "tell everything" and be taken to a tribunal. Such comments were made [REDACTED] by [REDACTED] and other detainees. [REDACTED] believes that former senior Iraqi leadership members share responsibility along with Hussein for actions committed. Some of the leaders, and [REDACTED] believe that Iraqi leaders before the Kuwaiti War share more blame than the "new leaders" after the war. [REDACTED] does not believe that any of the leaders accept responsibility for their actions. He is uncertain of their reactions should Hussein blame these leaders for actions committed during his Presidency.

[REDACTED] is not aware of the thought processes of other detainees, including leaders, after questioning by interviewers.

b6
b7C
b7D

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 02/23/2004 , Page 6

He has never heard any detainees talk about the details of an interview, including whether they admitted "talking around the subject."

[REDACTED] understanding of the Geneva Convention is that there are two types of prisoners, prisoners of war (POWs) and civilian prisoners. POWs are released after the end of a war. Civilian prisoners have their cases reviewed every six months. Other detainees believe the same facts about the Geneva Convention, except the former leaders of the Ba'ath Party. These leaders believe they will have a "different ending" that looks "dark" and does not involve release from prison. Some, including [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] has never been tortured, nor has he tortured another person or ordered the torture of another person during the previous Iraqi regime. He has never witnessed any torture. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated his belief that torture is used as both a punishment and to obtain information. [REDACTED] denied knowledge of any individual among the current detainees who has been tortured, tortured another person, or ordered the torture of another person. [REDACTED] stated, "If I knew, I would tell." [REDACTED] denied knowledge of [REDACTED] role in the military and his involvement in executions. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated there are rumors that Hussein is presently located at the same detention facility in the last row of buildings with the "wood construction." Detainees first thought this wood structure was being built as a type of courtroom for prisoners. Later, detainees assumed this was a new rest area for US workers. The latest rumor indicates that Hussein is housed in this area.

b6
b7C
b7D

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Continuation of FD-302 of , On 02/23/2004, Page 7

b6
b7C
b7D

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 315E-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence FBIHQ

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received 5/7

From TARIQ AZIZ
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

BAGHDAD, IRAQ
(Address)

(City and State)

By SA

b6
b7C

To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☐ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☐ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes ☐ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes ☐ No

Title: DESERT SPIDER
IT-IRAQ

Reference: _____
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☒ Original notes re interview of

TARIQ AZIZ

TALIQ AZIZ

10:48

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-08-2009 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/rs

1

HEALTH ↑

Date

No.

DIZZY, FELL DOWN

MAY TUNE JULY '03

I AM WELL SINCE RECOVERED

b6
b7C

WRITING BOOK? - ENCOURAGED BY INTERVIEWS TO DO SO
- DIFFICULT CAMP CONDITIONS: BAD LIGHT
'MEMOIRE' - ROOM SMALL, SHAKY TABLE, BAD GROUND
BECAUSE OF WAR, TOO BUSY, BUT NOW TIME

T.A. 'I KNOW MOST OF THE PEOPLE' TOP FORMER
MEMBERS OF LEADERSHIP, OFFICERS
- LITTLE OPPORTUNITY FOR DISCUSSIONS

POL CAREER : 1969 JOURNALIST
1974 MINISTER OF INFO & CULT
77 LEAD RCC
79 DEP PRIM MIN
83 FOR MINISTER
91 DEP PRIM MIN

(2)

BEEN THERE DONE THAT!

Date

No.

NOT EVERYTHING

- ISOLATED, NO NEWSPAPERS, ONLY OLD MAGAZINES
- RUMORS / NATIONAL HABITS OF PRISONERS TO BELIEVE ALL RUMORS
- 18th WILL BE SET FREE

MR. RAMADAN FORMER V.P.

- LET FORMER BATHI PARTY PARTICIPATE
- LATEST RUMOR: IS A NOT ACCEPTED
- JUNE $\frac{1}{2}$ RELEASED $\frac{1}{2}$ TO NEW GOV.

COUNSEL IS NOT A REAL GOVERNMENT, IT IS A COUNSEL.

- I WANT TO LIVE IN DETROIT
- WIFE HAS RELATIVES NO PEOPLE
- IRAQI COMMUNITY, LARGE CALDIAN CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY
- NOTHING HAS MATERIALIZED, STILL IN PRISON

TOOK MANY U.S. OFFICIALS: MANY PRISONERS
PSYCHO FACTS (THINGS) SADAM + RELATIVES
"YOU KNOW THEM" I LIKE BARTAN
DIRECTOR OF INTELL CHANGING AS AN AMBAS
CHANGING AS A PRISON COULD TODAY

SADAM DIDN'T LIKE (ARTICLES PUBLISHED)
BATTAN LEFT FROM THE OTHERS

- BATTAN MORE LIBERAL MINDS
- TRIED TO OPEN UP HIS BROTHERS MIND
TAKES RELATIVES OF SADAM ...

DON'T LIKE BROTHERS (ALMOST ILLITERATE)
THOUGH THEY HAVE PHD

FRANKLY

ALI IS CRIMINAL

- BATTAN WAS YOUNG MAN EARLY 20s
WHEN BATTAN CAME
- THEN FOREIGN MIN
- THEN INTEL TILL 1983 (DISCARDED)
- AM30 GENEVA ASKED TO TAKE ODEH W/
 ↳ BECAME OPEN ↑ HIM
 → GOOD CONNECTIONS THRU
 → SPOKE ABOUT BEING LIBERAL (OUTSPOKEN)

SADAM HAD DIFFERENCES

MAHMOUD IDHART

	MIN	OF	INTER	OATHMAN	SADAM SPARKED
<u>SADAM</u>	DIA	OF	SECURITY		SADAM
					SADAM RESPECT

ODEH COULDN'T LIVE IN A COUNTRY OF GEN

4

PEOPLE
OOEM REALIZED

Date

No.

↳ ATTACKED BAZIAN

FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO ATTACK T.A.

THUGS

MAHMOUD

MUST S.H. FAMILY

SOME M.I.N I.E INTERVIEW LATELY

NOT HONEST PERSON, TOOK SADAM HE WAS
A LIAR, NOT CLEAN, REAL THIEVES

- CONFISCATED MONEY, LAND

- MULTI-MILLIONERS IN IRAQI + US CURRENCY

M.K. → CPL

ALI → CPL

BECAME MAJOR GENERAL (SADAM
GAVE
HIM)

RELATIONSHIP w/ ALI

NEVER LUNCH/DINNER/ RECREATION

ALL WAS A MEMBER OF CLOTHESHIP, ONLY RELATIONSHIP

- SABOUHI

DIRECT OF INTEC

↳ WORKED ASIC T.A. ADVICE + KNOWLEDGE

→ ONE OR 2 TIMES A DRINK

HAD RELATIONSHIP WITH BAZIAN

TAID TO CHOOSE FRIENDS WHEN HAD CHOICES

MY MENTALITY DIFF FROM THEIRS

5
No common ground

NEVER

lunch / dinner ^{Date} on ^{how} f

OR

BARZAN ANG TO GENEV T.A. WENT SEV
TIMES TO SWISS FOR RED CROSS MEETINGS ETC
WENT TO RESIDENCE NEW WIFE

REAL EDUC

MORE OF SADAT'S FAMILY (SUIST + DACTERS)

BARZAN HAD REAL EDUCATION, SPEAKS ENGL + ARABIC

↳ WIFE DIED OF CANCER, GOOD PERSON

1988 MALABIA

Chm used, T.A. outside 1200 on TRIP
→ U.N.

NEW ABUT UPON RETURN,

S.H. SAID 'YES'

SH BLAMED CHIEF OF STAFF ^{ADMAN} ~~ADMAN~~ ^{ADMAN}

S.H. MADE DECISION SHOULD NOT ~~BE~~ BE WISE
UNLESS C.O.S. SAYS SO

USED IN IRAN, NOT GOOD

- ADMAN D.C.O. SAID THIS DEC

'S WEAKENING ME

USED W/ OUT HIS CONSENT

S.H. MIL MATTERS & STRATEGIC MATTERS NOT

Ask T.A.

Date

No.

T.A. was in FRANCE

S.H. AUTHORITY was S.H. FOR CHEM

S.H. AS TO T.A. HE WAS SURPRISED

- MAYBE NOT NECESSARY } WHY S.H.
- 2) BUT DISCUSSIONS } SURPRISE

CONVERSATIONS BEFORE: ATTENTION TO

BAD DISCUSSIONS

DIFFICULT TIMES 100,000 IRAQI ATTACK

CHEM USED, DID NOT AS IN AQI

OBJECT

GERM PERS

GERM MINISTER

INSHUM

GESHA

IN IRAQ, WHEN GOV ARRESTED GIRLS

MURDERED, AL KHALAF

EXECUTED, VIAGINS RABED THEN KILLED

WILL GO TO HEAVEN

CLAUDE SHIMON

FRANCE FOREIGN MINISTER

NOT JUSTIFIED IRAQI PATIENT WOULD

NOT ALLOW IRAQ TO OCCUPY IRAQ

DEPENDENT

U.S. Iran, JAPAN NOT THREATENED

ICRDS

Date

No.

T.A. was in GENEVA

Told S.H. THAT NOT TRUE

- 1.) ONLY ALI USED
- 2.) 'DAN' USING ORDINARY POWDER

AS FOR MIN, LOT OF PUBLICITY, BUT NO MATERIAL PROOF, MY ACCUSATIONS

1989 ARCHIVES, DOO IN US INSTITUTE POLITICAL THAT ACQUIRES MATERIAL, 'IRANIANS STARTED WS OF CHEN

TO BE FAIR TO HISTORY, IRAQIS DID USE
 - I DON'T THINK IT WAS HIGHLY POPULAR
 - WHEN HOSTILE PARTY PEOPLE LEAVE
 FEEL DON'T WAIT

I DON'T THINK IRAQIS WERE ENCOURAGING UNJUSTIFIABLE MURDER + PRACTICES

- JUST THOSE FEW WHO REMAINED
- IRANIAN FIRST OF ATTACK, MOST PEOPLE FLED, ONLY FEW REMAIN, IS, 20
 COMPOS men + women NOT 100,000

UNIFORM

ARMY TO ARMY NO CIVILIANS

DOV HANABIA THEN WERE COME

8

- NO MEETING AT THAT TIME, OUT OF COUNTRY, NO COMM UNTIL ^{Date} RETURNED NOT MATTERS TO TALK VIA TELEPHONE

- T.A. WAS NOT AWARE OF STRATEGIC + TACTICAL MATTERS, NOT PART OF MIL DECISIONS
MIN OF DEFENSE

- AS A MEMBER OF GOV WAS SAY SOMETHING ABOUT THIS OR THAT, IRANIAN THREAT

- DIDN'T PROTEST AGAINST SADR

- SOME OFFICERS WOULD DO MORE THAN EXTENSIVE

CHEM BAO, NOT MORAL + PRACTICAL

- LONG RANGE MISSILES AFFECTED WAR

CHEM USED ON THE FRONT, BOTH SIDES

MISSILES HIT CITIES, AFTER WAR,

RELEASING PRISONERS, 1990: 37,78,000 PRIS.

IRAN SAYS MORE P.O.W.

WHEN ~~IRAN~~ IRANIAN GOV SAID WE TOLD

FAMILIES THEY ARE PRISONERS. 354 UK P.O.W.

9
Aug 1988

ALI MAGID NOT IN CHARGE OF ^{Date} N. DEFENSE
IN FAI AFTER ANTA

GEORGE

SSNR OF COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY
EDUCATED

EMY BUS S.M. MAKE DECISIONS
- PASS OF REP ME LAW
- PRIOR TO THAT CHAIRMAN OF R.C.C.
LAW DECISION FOR THE R.C.C.

WAS TRAVELING

STIPULATION NOT DEFENSE

DECISION 160

DIDN'T HAVE VOTES TRADITION OR PRACTICE

AFTER 1979 PEOPLE COULD NOT ~~PROTEST~~
PROTEST AGAINST S.H. LIFE OR DEATH

ALI WAS MINISTER

Min of Home Affn.

NEVER IN HISTORY OF IRAQ WAS
THAT MUCH POWER GIVEN TO ONE PERSON

S.H.

Co

R.C.C. WAS A BODY THAT VOTE

SEVERAL OPINION

Date

No.

DECISION WAS MADE EVERYONE MUST COMPLY

THE

DON'T AGREE ~ PRINCIPAL ABOUT EMPOWERMENT
WHILE WHO IS NOT R.C.C. MEMBER, UNCONSTITUTIONAL

ANALYSIS 1987

WAS VIOLATION OF CONVENTION

- DIRECTED AGAINST OUR IRAQI CITIZENS

ALL MEETINGS OF R.C.C. WERE TAPED

- KUNDI FORCIBLY REMOVED TO CAMPUS

N. LEADERSHIP HASSAN ALI

CANSA

PAULIENE COUS HUNES, T.A. FIND FRIEND
IN MOHAMMAD AMIN ^{FRIND} AMB F.M., PERSONAL SEC
COMPANION ABOUT HOUSSEY NO RUNNING WATER
HASSAN SA.2 D.K. TWO SMALL

PRETEXT OF EMERGENCY →

WITHDREW MARCH 1989 BY R.C.C. DECREE

WAR w/ IRAN connection to ICND

SITUATION IN NORTH

Date

No.

1979 WAS IN PRISON

NOT INVOLVED WAS EXECUTED

RELEASE MILLIONS OF DOLLARS, THEY
ARE VILLAGERS HAVE MINDSET

MARCH 4th 1991

2 DAYS AFTER CEASEFIRE
RES # 54 RCC SIGNED

PROVISIONAL GOV, GIVEN AUTHORITY OVER

MILITARY COMMAND

ALL MAGIS

THAT

HAM ZUBAIR

SADAM'S DECISION

1977 WHEN T.A. BECAME

RCC

RECEIVE AGENTS, DECISIONS

SIGN DECISIONS

— AFTER 1979 IT DISAPPEARED

ALL WERE SIGNED AND NOT IMPLEMENTED UNTIL ALL
SUMS 1979 CHAIRMAN ONLY

NO VOTING

(12)

RCC NOT CONSULTED

MILITARY HAVE HEARD OF 17^{Date} COMMAND
ISSUE TO GIVE POWER TO THE GOVERNORS

→ FEEDBACK, ONLY SAGAM

THAT - THAT

AT LATEST

} NOT IN SAGAM

2-BA, 214

NO RCC

SUBHA

T.A.)

SAGAM HAMADI

→ STILL FOREIGN MINISTER

MET SAGAM OCCUPYING 687 + 688 REPRESENTATION

WORKING WITH GEN SABA AL DIN, M.I

LEADERS WERE REPORTING BACK TO SAGAM

[4 GOVERNORS - MEMBERS

RAMADI, SABA AL DIN

MET SAGAM DURING PERIOD FEW TIMES

CRASH FRI

P.O.V.

BUT NOT NORMAL

MEETINGS AS ALL MEMBERS OUTSIDE OF
BAGHDAD

3 THURS

- ALL KASAN MARCH

Date

No.

- BRO ABI KASAN

VERY RAINY LAYO

BOY GUNS KHALAN

- OAGALAM ABDAHAL

- MILITARY INDUSTRIAL

AMMEN MUSSIN NOT DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR
C.O.S. IN A DIFFICULT SITUATION

- CONGRS, BRAVE ENOUGH TO SAY NO

ABIS MAMBA MAMBU

CHECK MEET THUG

KAMMA

ZABAD.

PUN MAY INCAPABLE P.M. WAS
TALK OF TOWN,

1991 PARTY CONGRS, MUSSIN KAMAL
CR. 17, 25 T.A. TH RAMADAN

MUTHER ALAN MISS & INFORM

RAMADAN WON

T.A. votes were 75%.

ZABADI BSCN.

AS HE FELL S.H. DECIDED TO RESCUE HIM

14

T.A. was writing DRAFT

MEETING THE COME ON

Date

No.

HAMAS SUSPECTS TO BE STAFF,
HAMAS ZAKARI, SHIA

BECAME MEMBERS OF R.C. AS A RESULT

TAKA YASIN DAMMAN

DONT TRUST, YES - MAN' SUPPORTED
NARCISST, COUNCIL MEMBER, RUC

↓
ALL
STANDARD AND
RUC.

SAFAH AZIZ MUMAN

good guy, didn't use 1501
1st. BUT NOT VERY CAPABLE, GOVERNMENT OF
ICUATI, BUT ASAL POWER WAS IN
ALL MACIN

NOT HIGHLY EDUCATED

MASOUD RAJALI

connection with or of
MURASATIN or present

WAS IN THE OFFICE MEET IN PARIS
DRAFT WITH HIM TIL 1990S TIL STORM
CROSS TO DRAFT WITH HAZA

AND FOR ASSISTANCE, DRAFT OF INTER ONLY
RE THERE

D.O. OF INTER WITH WIFE & REPORT

RECOMMEND TO HELD M.E.I. TO STAFF

15

Wanted more and more Jul,

Intel once he arrived ~~over~~ to March

Abu Arsal

Came to Iraq, Iraq holding all
positions, T.P. did not take power

- A.P. was trying to get in PAC
- thinking of him as a case of

CAMP + FARM given by Iraq Gov.

to make money, CASIT was 4070
FARM turned profit

AKS 1 ME PROBLEM

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 05/06/2004

On 05/06/2004 TARIQ AZIZ (Black List #25) was interviewed in Iraq by Federal Bureau of Investigation Supervisory Special Agents [redacted] George L. Piro and Special Agent [redacted]

At the time of the interview, AZIZ was a detainee being held in a Coalition Forces detention camp. After remarking that he was in good health, AZIZ provided the following information:

[redacted]

AZIZ has been encouraged by some of his interrogators to write a book while he is in prison. The dim lighting, wobbly table, small room and conditions of camp life have dissuaded him from doing so. He would like to eventually write a memoir about his career that revolved around the self-described roles of journalist (1969), Minister of Information and Culture (1974), leader within the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) (1977), Deputy Prime Minister (1979), Foreign Minister (1983) and Deputy Prime Minister (1991). If given his option, AZIZ would choose to move to Detroit in the United States where there is a large Iraqi population including a Chaldean Christian community. [redacted] family has relatives in the Detroit area.

In the general isolated environment of prison, with no newspapers to read and only old magazines and rumors to consider, it is the natural habit of prisoners to believe all rumors. One of the rumors currently circulating claims that the prisoners will be released on the 18th of May. Another rumor contends that former Ba'ath Party members will be brought back to participate in the future Iraq government. Former Vice President TAHA YASIN RAMADA was promulgating this rumor by stating that some of the prisoners would be released and some would take their positions in the new government. AZIZ did not accept this idea. Firstly he wants to retire and has no interest in participating in future politics. Secondly, this rumor seemed completely unrealistic to him.

Investigation on 05/06/2004 at Iraq

File # 315E-HO-1448534-64

Date dictated _____

by

George L. Piro [redacted]

b6
b7C

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Tariq Aziz, On 05/06/2004, Page 2

Many of the prisoners in the camp are sycophants and thugs. The worst of this group are former President SADDAM HUSSEIN's family members. They are almost illiterate, yet they are in possession of PhDs. They were not honest people. They were liars, not clean and real thieves. They confiscated money and land and were multimillionaires in both U.S. and Iraqi currency. They think like villagers. Because they have millions of dollars stashed away in foreign banks, they believe life will go on for them when they get out of prison.

AZIZ liked BARZAN ABD AL-GHAFUR SULYMAN MAJID. BARZAN was a young man in his early twenties when the Ba'ath Party came to power. He served as a Foreign Minister, then as the Director of the *Mukhabarat* (intelligence service). He was discharged of this job in 1983. During his tenure as the Iraqi Ambassador to Switzerland, he became a changed person for the positive. He became liberal-minded and had good ideas. He was different from the other leaders and became outspoken. He published articles about letting others participate in the political process. He tried to open his brother's (SADDAM HUSSEIN) mind. SADDAM did not like this. BARZAN was asked to take SADDAM's son UDAY SADDAM HUSSEIN with him to Geneva. UDAY was a thug and could not live in a country like Switzerland. People realized this. UDAY attacked the reputation of BARZAN. AZIZ's assignment as the Minister of Foreign Affairs necessitated his travel to Switzerland on several occasions in order to attend Red Cross meetings and other diplomatic requirements. AZIZ would meet with BARZAN and BARZAN's very nice wife who died of cancer. BARZAN had a real education. His children all spoke English and French. Because AZIZ had a different mentality than most of the leadership, he tried to choose his government friends when he could. He did have an amicable relationship with BARZAN.

ALI HASAN AL-MAJID, frankly speaking, was a criminal and a thug. He was a Corporal in the military who was given the unearned rank of Major General. AZIZ never had lunch, dinner or recreation with ALI. Their only relationship was their interactions as part of leadership affairs. ALI was a Minister of Home Affairs. Just as the Anfal campaign was beginning, ALI was invested with unprecedented power. Never before in the history of Iraq had that much power been given to one person. AZIZ did not agree in principle about empowering someone who was not an RCC member, it was unconstitutional.

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Continuation of FD-302 of Tariq Aziz, On 05/06/2004, Page 3

SABAWI IBRAHIM HASAN AL-TIKRITI as the Director of the Intelligence Service. He would occasionally ask AZIZ about knowledge and advice. On one or two occasions they shared a drink, but never a lunch or dinner or other face to face meetings outside of work.

AHMED HUSSEIN was not directly responsible or involved in decision making. He was the Chief of Staff, but was in a difficult position. In short he was a coward, or not brave enough to say no.

ABID HAMID MAHMUD is a crook a thief and a thug.

MUHAMMAD HAMZA ZUBAYDI was a poor man and an incapable Prime Minister. He was actually the joke of the town. During the 1991 Party Congress ZUBAYDI had fallen in popularity amongst members and the predicted voting outcome was expected to show this. As he fell, SADDAM decided to bolster him. AZIZ was writing the draft of the expected voting results when he surprisingly found out that ZUBAYDI's career was spared.

TAHA YASIN RAMADAN was not trusted by AZIZ. He was described as a 'yes-man' who eagerly supported all of SADDAM's bad decisions. He was rude and narcissistic, spending the first thirty minutes of any meeting talking about himself.

AZIZ SALIH NUMAN was a good guy who did not have a bad reputation. He was not highly educated nor was he a very capable person. Although he served as the Iraqi Governor of Kuwait, the real power in that situation was invested in ALI HASAN AL-MAJID.

MASOUD RAJAVI, the founder of Mujadin el Kalq used to interact primarily with the Director of the *Mukhabarat* or the Minister of Defense. AZIZ was the first Iraqi official to meet with RAJAVI. They had met in Paris. AZIZ understood that RAJAVI would seek assistance in terms of support from the Iraqi government. The Director of the *Mukhabarat* would prepare reports for SADDAM recommending to help RAJAVI's group, Mujadin el Kalq. AZIZ believed that this group wanted more and more and advised the *Mukhabarat* director that RAJAVI was asking for too much.

ABU ABBAS came to Iraq representing himself as the great leader of a large population of Palestinians. Iraq was helping all Palestinians. But AZIZ saw ABU ABBAS as the leader of the tiniest organization in Palestine. The bad shape of the Iraqi economy prevented the Iraqi government from being able to disburse large

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Continuation of FD-302 of Tariq Aziz, On 05/06/2004, Page 4

sums of money to the Palestinian cause. ABU ABBAS was given a farm that he could run. The profits generated from the farm could support the cause. The farm evolved into a camp where ABU ABBAS would train fighters with AK-47s. The AK-47s were provided by the Iraqi government.

In 1987 AZIZ was traveling outside of Iraq, possibly in France, when the chemical attack on Halabja occurred. He asked SADDAM upon his return if the news were true. SADDAM said 'yes'. SADDAM blamed the military Chief of Staff NIZAR KHAZRAJZ, and the Minister of Defense during the Iran/Iraq war. SADDAM made a decision that chemical weapons should not be used unless the Chief of Staff says so. The Minister of Defense, ADNAN KHAIRALLAH, SADDAM's cousin, said that this decision weakened him. SADDAM reversed his decision granting power to the Minister of Defense. He used it without the proper consent. SADDAM did not consult with AZIZ when it came to military and strategic matters. SADDAM said to AZIZ that he was surprised that they were used. Firstly the use of them was maybe not necessary, and secondly the big repercussions that would follow. AZIZ had previously brought to SADDAM's attention the bad repercussions associated with the use of such weapons.

AZIZ readily acknowledged that Iraq used chemical munitions in its war against Iran. These were difficult times. Hundreds of thousands of Iranian troops were being held off from invading Iraq. AZIZ recalled confiding in the German and French Foreign Ministers at that time. He told them about Iranian fanatical fighters called the Mujadin al-Kalq, and the group's capturing of girls. The girls were executed, but not before being inspected for their virginity. Those who were virgins would first be raped before being executed. According to Mujadin al-Kalq's interpretation of the Quran, if a girl dies while still a virgin, she will go to heaven. AZIZ stated that he did not justify using the chemical weapons which was a violation of the Geneva Convention. But as an Iraqi patriot, he would not allow Iran to occupy Iraq. And if the defensive use of these munitions would prevent that from occurring, he would not protest it.

AZIZ said that to be fair to history, Iraq did use chemical weapons against Iraqi citizens. According to his belief, the Kurdish target wasn't a highly populated area. Generally, when hostilities start, people leave. They flee rather than wait. AZIZ did not believe that the Iraqi military had fully circled the Kurdish village. Just those few villagers remained. Iran first

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Continuation of FD-302 of Tariq Aziz, On 05/06/2004, Page 5

attacked, most people fled, only a few villagers remained. There were 15 or 20 corpses, from what he saw on the international television program, not hundreds of thousands. The chemical attacks against Iran was army verse army, no civilians, but Halabja there were civilian victims.

There were no meetings that took place during that time. AZIZ was out of the country and did not communicate with SADDAM while traveling. International phones were monitored and AZIZ was in the habit of meeting with SADDAM upon the return of his trip. AZIZ was not aware of the strategic and tactical matters and was not part of the military decision making. Despite his belief that some officers would use more than an extensive amount of force, AZIZ did not protest to SADDAM. AZIZ felt that the use of chemical weapons were unjustifiable not only for moral reasons but for practical reasons. They were not effective weapons. In the war with Iran, they were used only on the front, by both sides. The weapons that had the biggest affect on the war were the long range missiles. These were used against the cities.

In 1990, Iraq released thirty seven or thirty eight thousand Iranian prisoners of war(POW). The Iranian government had told the families of many of their war dead that the Iraqis had actually captured them and were holding them. When all of the Iranian POWs were returned, the Iranian government had a difficult time explaining the lessened numbers to their people. As a result, they withheld releasing all of their Iraqi POWs as a way of posturing in front of their people that more releases were being negotiated.

On 03/04/1991, two days after the Gulf War cease-fire, The RCC signed and released RCC Resolution #54 which gave Goverors control of military forces in their territories. All of the RCC members except AZIZ who remained in Baghdad, were in the south of Iraq or outside of Baghdad at this time. AZIZ was working on implementing United Nations Resolutions 687 and 688 which involved the repatriation of POWs. He met with SADDAM on occasion but spent most of his time with the Director of Military Intelligence, General SABAH AL-DURI. AZIZ believed that in actuality the RCC was not consulted on Resolution #54. They may have heard of it. It makes sense to give authority and power to the governors in the times of crisis. But there would have been no voting or feedback, only SADDAM's order.

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Continuation of FD-302 of Tariq Aziz, On 05/06/2004, Page 6

AZIZ acknowledged that in the sense of collective responsibility, he should be held answerable for what the government did in general terms. But the man who holds the full accountability is SADDAM. Originally, when AZIZ was in the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), members would receive a typed letter as to what the agenda items for each meeting would be. When decisions were agreed upon, they would be typed up and signed by each member. Each decision was signed and not implemented until all the RCC members signed it. In the early nineteen eighties, SADDAM directed that the Chairman of the RCC can decide matters on behalf of the entire RCC. Later he decided that anything decreed by the RCC would become the law. In addition to these legal measures which relegated the RCC to SADDAM's personal rubber stamp, there was the chilling affect of the July 1979 RCC meeting, where Ba'ath members were killed. This made the proposition of disagreeing with SADDAM a life or death matter.

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 315-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence FBIHQ

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received 4/29/04

From BAGHDAD, IRAQ

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

(City and State)

By

b6
b7C

To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☒ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☐ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes ☐ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes ☐ No

Title:

DESERT SPIDER
IT - IRAQ

Reference: _____

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☒ Original notes re interview of

KAMAL MUSTAFA ABDALLAH SULTAN AL-TIKRITI

4/29/04 INTERVIEW

4/29/04

@ 10³⁰A

b6
b7C

HVD#10

→

KAMAL MUSTAFA AL ABDULLAH (COUSIN OF HVD#1)

1991 - COMMANDER OF SRC IN IRAQ (CHIEF)

- PROTEST PRESIDENTIAL SITE IN

BAHRAIN, UNK. AREA, ?

- ASSASSINATED HUSSEIN KHAMMAN - (THE COMMANDER)

INVESTIGATION OF SRC → SPECIAL REPUBLICAN GUARD

- HVD#10 WAS PART IN COMMAND OF SRC.

① - ISMAEL HUSSEIN

② - HUSSEIN KHAMMAN

③ - HVD#10 (2ND LT)

- NO INTER SERVICE OR CIVILIAN ISSUES

ONLY HQ SERVING AS A MILITARY UNIT

FOR THE ARABIA.

- 4 MONTHS AS AN INTER SERVICE OFFICER.

- ULTIMATE COMMANDER OF SRC - HUSSEIN KHAMMAN

- STRUCTURE OF SRC ^{REPUBLICAN GUARD} VARIED DURING PEACETIME

AND CRISIS.

- COMMANDS ESTABLISHED IN 4 ARMS OR SECTORS

- SOUTH, NORTH, CENTRAL EUPHRATES, & EUPHRATES.

- ESTABLISHED FOR COMMUNICATIONS PURPOSES IN CASE
COMMUNICATIONS WAS SEVERED

②

1991 - ARMY was COMMANDING BASRAH

TO LEADEN COMMAND. REPUBLICAN

AND SRC was ANSWERING TO A SUPERVISOR

3/91 → 1st / 1st HESSEBIS KHAMMAM SAHUT

TO SRC. ORDERS A REZIMEN TO ^{SHAWTO TO SRC}

GO TO NASARIYA TO MEET WITH

HAMZAH ZUBEDI TO REPRESENT

AND ASSIGN THIS RESPONSIBILITY.

- TO RE-APPOINT EMPLOYEES TO ASSASSIN/SECRET
GRANDER OF NASARIYA.

- 2 DAYS LATER ORDERS WERE RECEIVED
TO ASSIGN TO ^{MUHAMMAD} HAMZAH ^{AL} ZUBEDI.

- MILITARY ORDERS WERE TO DEPART TO

NASARIYA AND REMAIN TO ZUBEDI

- DIVISIONAL COMMAND IN THE AREA
OF NASARIYA.

- ISSUED ORDERS BY HIGH RANKING CIVILIANS

TO THE MILITARY. MILITARY OBEYED AS
WAS TO EXECUTE THE ORDERS

(3)

- GOING TO NAGRIYA FOR REMAINS
OF PRISONER FOR A COMMUN
EVALUATING THEM. SCRAPED IN
RETURN IN (2) ARE

- SUPPOSED TO BE "GRABED" IN
THE HAND TO NAGRIYA.

- SEVERAL DUTY WITH TO EMBROID
STITCHES / PAYS FOR AN OIL
HAND TO NAGRIYA. (KITE)

- AFTER BEING TOLD WITH AGRAN

HAPPENS ON 3/1/51 - HUAID

ANSWERING THAT HE WAS SPECIFICALLY
DETERMINED TO PROVIDE PROTECTION

- LATER HE HAD HAD ANOTHER ONE
NEW REPORTS ABOUT THE REBELS

- SOMEONE HAD BEEN WITH THE SURVIVORS.
ACCORDING TO ^{HUA} RPB.

- WHEN THE REBELS DEPARTED A

NAGRIYA WAS TOLD ^{RPB} ~~RPB~~ LAZARE, MARRON
LAZARE 104th ARTI - WEAPONS
~~LAZARE~~, ~~LAZARE~~ TANK, AND - AIR CRAFT. WEAPONS
LONG GUNS, MORTARS, GUNS

(4)

REGIMENT CONSISTED OF:

- 4 COMPANIES OF INFANTRY
- 1 HQ COMPANY (HQS)
- 1 SUPPLY COMPANY - (ENGINEER COMPANY)

HQS #10 WAS THE REGIMENT COMMANDER

- COMMUNICATED THROUGH RADIO TO THE
ENGINE COMPANY

- MET WITH MUHAMMAD HANZAL AL-ZUBEDI,

AT 3⁰⁰ PM AND DEPARTED AT 5⁰⁰ PM

FROM WEST OF (KORT) THEN TO

MOBARRA

- ACCOMPANIED BY ^{MUHAMMAD} ~~AL~~ HANZAL - BOSS GUARD
OF SADDAM HUSSEIN.

- OCT 2003 INTERVIEW OF HQS #10

- NEVER MENTIONED REBELLION OR

UPRISING, AND ONLY TALKED OF

ARMED PROBLEMS ON THE ROAD TO

MOBARRA. REBELS WERE NEVER MENTIONED.

- NEVER TOLD TO LIVE IN AN ARMED

LIFE OR REBEL/RESISTANCE

TOLD THAT NIGHTS IN ^{11 HIGHLY} ~~ARMED~~ ROBBERIES!

FROM 1990 TO 2003 WITH NIGHTS LIKE THE PROBLEMS

(4).

- REGIMENT DEPLOYED IN THE CITY AND ONLY THEY REACHED THE OUTSKIRTS OF THE CITY THE FIGHTING STOPPED.
- ^{POLICE,} ~~MILITARY~~ AND BATH BOMB OFFICERS WERE RELEASED. LEARNED THAT A BOMB MEMBER WAS KILLED.
- LIGHT & MEDIUM MACHINE GUNS, MORTARS, AND RPG'S WERE UTILIZED IN THE ADVANCES TO THE CITY OF AL-HAT.
- TROOPS DID NOT SUSTAIN INJURIES
- WAS NOT AWARE OF ANY INDIVIDUALS KILLED OR INJURED
- DUTY OF SECURITY OFFICERS WAS IN "ROUND-UP" PERPETRATORS AND TO JAIL THEM IN BAGHDAD.
- THE TROOPS DID NOT CAPTURE/TAKE ~~ANY~~ ^{ANY} PRISONERS
- 30-40 "PARISCH" WERE TAKEN FROM NABIRIYAH AND SENT TO BAGHDAD

②

- NOT A MILITARY MAN

- LOSS AN EYE - DOES NOT KNOW MAN.

WEARING DARK GLASSES

-

- AFTER ALTHAM THEY WENT TO

THE DORM CITY AND DOWN TO

NARRATOR (AZ ~~SOME~~ SISTER)

- 15 MINUTE BREAK =

- HAD TO BRUSH BACK TO INTERVIEW ROOM.

- INTERVIEW ENDS 1²⁵/₂

10:22 4/29

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-08-2009 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/rs

(1)

ATTN: ACT

- DIFFICULT FOR ME TO SWEAR, BUT I WOULD
SWEAR ON KORAN ALL MY ANSWERS WILL BE
TRUTHFUL.

- PLEASED WE ARE SEARCHING FOR TRUTH, WHEN I STARTED
I WAS CONFIDENT THIS IS WHAT U.S. WOULD DO
- PLEASED AND HAPPY SEARCH FOR TRUTH, SALUTE THESE
EFFORTS

1991 ~ CMDR OF SP5C1 R.G.
STATIONED IN BAG.

RESPONS: PROTECT PRESS SITES THAT TAN & MOSUL
MAKHOUL

NEXT IN C.O.C. WAS MUSEIN KANAL

↳ SUPERVISOR OF A R.C.

H.K. WAS IN CHARGE OF R.G. SEARCH
THE CMDR R.G. & S.A.C. ASSG

H.K. WAS CONNECTED TO S.H.

S.H.

H.K.

10

(2)

~ I WAS HIGH RANK BUT TRULY ^{Date} ^{Command} ^{Command}
WAS H.I.R. AND ALL IRADIS ^{CONTRIBUTION}

~ SERVED COUNTDOWN WELL AS MIL FROM 2nd LT
NEVER SERVED IN THE MULTICARAT A

1ST AK BATTAL /

4 MONTHS

STAFF COLLEGE - CAREER PATH

- CURS LEVEL

- ADMIN

ALLEGEDLY

CHIEF OF S.R.G

- WOULD HAVE BEEN STATIONED IN RAC NEAR STL.

- MOST LIKELY RECEIVING ALL HIS ORDERS FROM S.H.

- WOULD HAVE REPORTED ONLY TO S.H. as chief of R.C.

TRUTH I WAS CHIEF S.R.G.

MAN WHO RECEIVED ORDERS WAS H.I.R.

STRUCTURE VARIED DURING PEACE TIME & CRISIS
SINCE ITS FORM S.R.G & R.C ALWAYS REPORTED
TO THE COMMANDER OF BATTAL

DURING PEACE

C.O.S & Min of DEFENSE

REPORTS WERE 3/4 YEARLY

COMMAND STAFFS & AREAS

MIL & CONSULTANTS ASSIGNED TO COMMAND

SECTIONS

S

C. S.F

S.F

S.F & NOOT

Commands ESTAB TO MAINTAIN CONTACT

LOCAL Comm ISSUED BETWEEN UNITS
+ SADRAN + ADJACENT COMMANDS
ALTHOUGH THEY EXISTED Army maintains control

91 NOT CLEAR THIS / Army was converted to
Gen Command

1991 MARCH 1st R.C. + S.R.C. Comm TO SPANISH
OK R.C. + S.R.C.

M.I.C. BONE ORDERS

- CAMP 1:00 AM TO R.S.C. HQ
- TO TAKE REG OR S.R.C. ANSWER TO
- R.S.C. MA AMH TUBAN,
- GO TO NASRAT
- MIZ WITH MIZAN
- AMH HANZA AL TUBAN WILL NO
HOW TO REORGANIZE A

- REORGANIZE PARTY & REASSIGN
RESPONSIBILITY

- GO REAPPOINT EMPLOYEES WITH A
SOCIETY & ASSIGN GOVERN

- ADDITION & REMOVAL MIL UNITS LR

(4)

- COMBAT

- DEPLOY NASARUA UNTIL ~~DATE?~~ w/ No.
- MAY BE DIFFICULTIES GO ONLY 20 KM
- HANUA WILL BE THERE
- DIVISIONAL COMMAND WHICH AT BAC DIVIS COMMAND

10 - OFFERS SINCE THEY WERE THERE THEY SHOULD
BUT 2 INDICES 10% WILL SHOULD GO

- MILITARY CAPABLE OF ORDERS BY HIGH
LEVEL CIV OFFICIAL

- GOING TO NASARUA

ESTAD COMMAND TO RUN THE ARMY
AT NASARUA

ONE MEET WITH HIM PROVIDE
PROTECTION FOR HIS COMMAND

- DEPLOY, PROVIDE PROTECTION FOR COMMAND &
S.F. GROUP, ~~AND~~ RESPOND ON THEM AFTER 2 DAYS

MAIN TASK, PROTECT OF COMMAND CHECK POINTS
ALONG ROAD ✓ POINTS, USE LOCAL UNITS
TO REPEAT WITHDRAW

Mohar HANZA AL-ZUBAIR

(P)

MAJOR REASON PROVIDES PROTECTION FROM WHOM

1 MARCH TODAY

Date

No.

NOT EVEN H.K. & S.H. KNEW ABOUT EXTENT OF
REBELLION AT TIME ONLY KNEW SECURITY

ADAM WAS SURPRISED (SHOCKED) BY REBELLION
IS ACTUALLY TOLD PEOPLE ADMIRER HIM

— TOOK ONE REGIMENT . LIST OF FLIES
— MEDIUM MGS

WAS REG & COMP IN TROOP - RAL 7 COMBAT

Support Company / Weapons - MOUNTAIN PLT

HO company - AIR STR PLATON
- 106 AIR TANK

Communicated by RADIO

DNCE HIC FIRST ST-15 ORDER SAT. M.H.A. will
come here, wait for him to come at
7:00 AM depart at 5:00 AM
16/7

— KHAM ALSO ATTENDING & TRAVELLING

↳ BAS "Boggy Camp" OF SAMAN HILL

— why? KHAM & MAZ ~ GALS AT SAME MEETING
guess SP ALL 2

6

Oct

NATURE NATURE WAS APPOINTED Date

No.

- SECURE HIS RELEASE
- CLEAN SOUTHERN CITIES OF UPRISES
- OPERATIONS WERE VERBAL
- TRANSPORT PRISONERS BACK TO M.I. IN SACDAS
- M HANSA AL TURABIS AT ALL MENTION WAS IN CHARGE OF SOUTHERN SECTION

NEVER MENTIONED DETAILS/RECO/UPRISES

- DIFFICULTIES ON ROAD
- SECURE AREA
- ARRIVING AT NAS
- SCHEDULE & PROUDS PROTECT--
- TURN OVER TO SF UNITS
- RETURN TO WEEK

NEVER TOOK TO CLEAN UP CITIES

MAY HAVE HIGHWAY ROBBERIES FROM IN AND ALONG THE WAY

- 100 AM IS MOUNTAIN, DAILY, EVEN PAGES TIME
- FOLLOWER CAN ALSO
- AREA IN CARAVAN
- TUESDAY MET PARTY MEMBERS
- STAY A DISTANCE IN AL HATH CITY

HEARD INJECT

- HAD PARTY MEMBERS

G

Exchange of fire between AHZ

No.

- Gov said MATON & PARTY MEMBERS KILLED
- MATON WAS MISSING (NOT NO WHEREABOUTS)
- FIRE CAME FROM OUTSIDE CITY HMTL RPT 14/4/70
SINCE 20/30 STONE WEAPONS

~ REGIMENT MOVED TO & DISCLOSED MOUNTAIN
LATER REC ENTER CITY

AH & GOVERNOR OR 16/7 RPT CITY IN
- UNDER, WHILE WE WERE ~~IN~~ THERE,
DID SO IN OUR PRESENCE

- SOME PARTY POLICE, + GOV WERE FIGHTING

LEARNED LATER, MANY INFILTRATORS FROM MOUNTAIN
AFTER DISCLOSED

AH2 DISCLOSED REC SHOULD DISCLOSE

- REC DISCLOSED + ADVANCED

- ADVANCED NOTHING LEFT, MATON CAME OUT
ASTAINES MEN CAME OUT, HEARD PARTY OFFICER
WAS KILLED

- 2 COMPANIES DISCLOSED ON LINE, PREP
TO RETALIATE

NO TARGETS FOR JUL

- GO IN MARCH WAY

CULT + MTS ML. + RPK WERE USED

- FORCES RECEIVING FIRE RETURNED FIRE

Fires didn't last long

ALL ATTACKS BY USIA, ADVANCE RECAPS
THAT RINGS FIRE, RETURNED FIRE. SOME
OFFICIALS CAME OUT

NO ENEMY RESIDUALS ' THROAT BURN WEAPONS
AND RAN

— "CAPTURED PRISONERS" BUT LOCAL SECURITY
PARTY MEMBERS, SECURITY SERVICES WOULD GIVE
INFORMATION

— SOME CAPTURED, SOME ESCAPED, SOME KILLED
GOV OF NAGIA, KILLED BURNING THE HOUSE
NAG, PER BUSH RESERVE w/ STEN - MANY
IN AN STAY OUT.

MOST OF AL - STAFF OFFICERS WERE
TAKEN AND KILLED IN VILLAGES, THIS WAS NOT
INAGIS MUST BE INAGIS.

WHenever occasion this should be held
RESPONSIBLE EQUIV IN IDUES IN RESPONSIBILITY

WHenever ISSUES THE occasion should be held
RESPONSIBILITY

MMZ memory is not secure him well

MMZ King man must say ~~about~~ his betrayal.
make people drink gasoline never innocent
this,

Mr History is known Brown & Rogers in
N.Y. City

If I ever harms any one in any such
way,

VIDEO w/ BOOT THIS MAN

Don't deny this, HE IS AVAILABLE
Group in his house finds C.C. & 2 subjects,
see blood in street.

RELATIVE OF ARID MAN

(1) PRISONER in ARID

→ HE play 2 room House on down M. H. Street
I kicked him, we took him to his house.

→ incoming fire came from direction of HIS
HOUSE

MAN in VIDEO LIVES 18

BAKMI AL-SADUIN

- NATI Command

Date

No.

I have not worked with him is just

- "he" but he had lost one eye

- hit above surge

- Active, connections w/ party, HE IS SHOWN
near SOUQAL-SHIYODKI from NASARIYAH

→ most SHIA

→ Not a military man,

JASIB MUQTAF

CHASIS

Arrived in AL-HIGH put down resistance

- STAYED OVERNIGHT AND moved on

- Division from RAHMAN ARRIVED, more fire from
RESISTANCE, then put it down

- Following day in AL-AZIZ was in village
in SHATRARI?

- 4th Corp, deployed to deal w/ them in SHATRARI
it came under them

10a

Date

No.

21 10 11 15 7

Before incision

HAFATIS^{Ref}

No.

Means of THIRAT @ _____ village or
NSAS SHAT

IV Cons deploy "We went with THEM"

- spent night at Aziz's home
- HW looked him to get Aziz from Khay
his mind

- W347 DAT used to be broken of NAKRA
incision w/ CARTON took place.

- moved out to WASMA

Bay R.G. ^{CO} Hussain JIBAL of JASOURI

Press-7 nation of THIRAT, was a common

AL-SHATRA

BAG DAD TOLK

Comm

5 prongs caught near Shatrah

ID said HE ORDERED MISO TAKEN, 'IRANIAN PRISONER

- IRAN HAS MANY IRANIAN THERE
- SE ABOUT NO ARABIC VERY WELL
- MANY IRANIS IN INT4 WORKING ON REFLECT IRAN INT4
ONE DISCOVERED 300 to 1000

IRAN ALREADY HAS AN ARABIC W347/15/1111

(12)

ONE CAPTIVE C.B.S. OF DEFENDANT NO FORCES
SAW 17 DRESSES

SABOTUS BAGGIE BLACK TROUSERS FACE COVERS
'SHAWAL'

4/29/07

Int w/ KAMAR MUSTAFA ABDULHAK SULTAN - AL TKRITI

Date

No.

Int w/ KAMAR MUSTAFA SULTAN AL TKRITI

Entered that Sam & Sr leaders will be
going to hearings by new govt

I'll be telling you the complete truth

When I surrendered, I knew men who
who do anything to find truth!

Looks scared, rigid, hands
clasped together - staring

2

1

BY: INAL


NARRATIVE needed

12
~~4/1/04~~
 4/29/04

1. As to of SR6, reppr included
 Prolet Purid SAs in Bag
 in Bag, Mosel, MakHool

2. Reported Hussain Kamel - NewAs super
 of RA & in chg of Sp. Repub
 Garm Security

3. Hussain Kamel connected to SAO.



4) I have served my country well since became a SA
 I never served in intelligence service

5. That assigned only 4 masi yagzi
 after staff college had to size

3

TH
~~1/1/64~~
8/29/64

per G.

5) Did to ~~another~~ official,

Date

No.

G,

RC + S^{hus}ICG Always reply to

Policy military in Peace time

Policy military in crisis

Before war

Communa in 4 areas =
military CO's & constabularies
assigned to the commands

Hussein came to SRG HQ
that it told me I was
and

4

TZ
~~1/29/04~~
1/29/04

A: says in Nashirya, a reorg^{anization} taking place No.
to reorganize & reappoint employees for
positions that have become vacant.

What your military orders? ~~to be~~

A: To go to NASIRYA.

A: There is a R.G. near ~~the~~ NASIRYA
But AK insisted go

Member Irq, not (MAM) me one

Q What are your orders, then?

A I must protect my soldiers

Q Why go to NASIRYA?

Primary - Protect the command → Primary object
→ Secondary

72
~~74/04~~
 8/29/04

Q: We first went to Kusht. ~~Heads~~ NASIRYA NO. 12

Q: Were you ~~accompanied~~ by anyone else?

A: A murabbi accompanied Sam to Nasirya.

A: Sam Ashi

my orders were:

- You are to go to Nasirya
- You may encounter problems on the way
- You are to provide protection for al Khayari
- Then from there to RG

I was never told to clean up any southern city
 But I was told there may be some
 highway robbers. No one could have
 foreseen

Not unusual to receive orders at 8⁰⁰ hrs
 b/c prior to March 1, 1991, we were fighting
 for 42 days.

Has Regiment in Caravani Road to Tuk
 first, then NASIRYA following Al Zuhairi

7

4/29/04

In Kut, we ran into forces who told us
~~that~~ that mayor of city was ~~dead~~ missing.

I estimated the force to be 20-30 strong.

① an hour later, the regiment was able to
enter the city.

① The governor ~~put Kut in order of~~ Kut
A In May,

ABM HAMEA thought we should
deploy our forces in order to
deal w/ them.

The regiment deployed ~~into~~ to the city.
As we reached city everything ~~was~~ all

The 1st Two companies deployed
Used R66 Y, and light weapons

NO prisoners captured.

It was not my duty to send our troops in.

8

42
~~4/29/04~~
4/29/04

Date

No.

DID you receive ~~any~~ medals
for your actions?

DID you write up anyone in your
regiment ~~for~~ for an award.

~~4/29/04~~ 4/29/04

[Excuse
Disobedience]

Don't know exact numbers, but they
killed a lot

You falsely accused me ~~of~~ of killing insurgents.
We
Most staff officers who killed in ~~the~~ outlying areas
acc'd to others.

9

72
4/29/04

Date

No.

4th corps came under fire

" " deployed to Hafayya And we went with them.

I told the brothers how to bring _____ in.

The next day the incident of the capt took place -
we continued to Alashuriga

Motul Bughald Rq led by JABOUTI & we later
make him mayor of DUKIT

Captured 5 Iraqians

spw The wearing of Iraqi UNIFORM

Black Baggy trousers

Rq Ceve

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 04/29/2004

On 04/29/2004, KAMAL MUSTAFA ABDALLAH SULTAN AL-TIKRITI (Sultan), Black List #10, was interviewed by Supervisory Special Agent George Piro. Observing the interview were Supervisory Special Agents [redacted] and Special Agent [redacted].

The interview was conducted in English and Arabic. Providing translations for the interview was Federal Bureau of Investigation Language Specialist [redacted]. Sultan provided the following information:

b6
b7C

In 1991, Sultan was posted in Baghdad as the commander of the Special Republican Guard (SRG). This was a high rank, but the person who was truly in charge of all of the Republican Guard (RG) was Husein Kamel and all Iraqis knew this. In his position as commander of the SRG, Sultan answered directly to Hussein Kamel. Hussein Kamel answered directly to President Saddam Hussein. Hussein Kamel was the "Supervisor" of the RG, which meant he was in charge of the RG, the SRG and the *al-Amn al-Khass* (Special security office). The RG units were responsible for protecting the presidential sites in Tharthar, Mosul, Makhoul and other locations.

Sultan served only four months as an officer in the Military Intelligence Unit. This administrative assignment, like other similar corps-level duties, was part of a normal career path that all officers had to follow.

Sultan was confronted with the statement of a Government of Iraq official who asserted that the commander of the SRG would have been stationed in Baghdad close to President Saddam Husein, most likely received all his orders from President Saddam Hussein and would have reported only to President Saddam Hussein. Sultan responded by affirming that he was the commander of the SRG but that Hussein Kamel was the man who received orders.

Although the command structure varied during peace or times of crisis, since its founding, the RG and SRG always answered to the commander of the guard. During peace time the Republican Guard Units fell under the Chief of Staff and the Minister of Defense. About three or four years before the war, the command established four sectors. The military and consultants were assigned to command these sectors. The areas were 1) the South, 2)

Investigation on 04/29/2004 at IraqFile # 315E-HQ-1448534

Date dictated _____

by SSA George L. Piro SA [redacted]

SSA [redacted] SSA [redacted]

b6
b7C

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of KAMAL MUSTAFA ABDALLAH SULTAN AL-TIKRITI, On 04/29/2004, Page 2

the Central Euphrates, 3) the Euphrates and 4) the North. These commands were established to maintain contact in case communication was severed between units and President Saddam Hussein, or adjacent commands. Although they existed, the Army maintained control of the situation.

1991 was not like this. The Army was connected to the general command. Sultan stated that the RG and the SRG were connected to the Supervisor of the RG and SRG. On 03/01/2004, a day after the United States stopped its offensive military operations in Iraq, Sultan received a visitor at SRG Headquarters at approximately 1:00AM. Hussein Kamel came to give Sultan orders. Sultan's orders were to take a regiment of SRG troops and go to Nasiriyah with MUHAMMAD HAMZA AL-ZUBAYDI (Hamza) (to whom Sultan would be answerable). Upon arrival, they were to reorganize the party and reassign responsibilities. This would involve reappointing employees to include selecting and assigning a governor.

Sultan was asked to clarify the role that a military unit would have in these civil service-type affairs. Sultan explained that they were to go to Nasiriyah, for two days, to meet with Hamza. His orders explained that there might be difficulties en route. There would be a Divisional Command from Baghdad's Special Forces Unit in Nasiriyah to which Sultan's unit would turn over the situation. Sultan suggested to Hussein Kamel that since this other Baghdad unit was near Nasiriyah, they could perform the duties rather than deploying both units. Hussein Kamel reiterated that Sultan's unit was to stay only two days, turn over the situation to the Divisional Command from Baghdad's special forces, and return. It is the military's duty to carry out orders by high level civilian officials. Sultan understood his instructions were to travel to Nasiriyah, establish command to run the Army at Nasiriyah. Once he met up with Hamza, Sultan was to provide protection for his command, remain two days and turn the situation over to the special forces. His main task would be to protect the command by setting up check points, securing the route of travel and use local units to replace his troops and withdraw.

During this 03/01/1991 meeting, Sultan was not told about rebels, revolution or uprising. He was never told to 'clean up the cities'. Sultan believes that at the time, even Hussein Kamel and President Saddam Hussein probably did not know that events in the south had risen to the scale of an actual uprising. President Saddam Hussein was always told that all of the people loved him.

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Continuation of FD-302 of KAMAL MUSTAFA ABDALLAH SULTAN AL-TIKRITI, On 04/29/2004, Page 3

According to Sultan, when it was revealed to the former President Saddam Hussein that there was a rebellion under way, Saddam Hussein was shocked, as he was always told that his people admired him.

When asked if getting orders to deploy at 1:00AM was something that struck him as urgent or unusual, Sultan stated that it was not, they often conducted reaction drills that required such a short notice response. In regards to the threat or troubles along the route for which he was supposed to prepare himself, Sultan speculated at that time it could have been highway robbers from Iran.

The regiment that Sultan assembled for deployment to Nasiriyah consisted of four companies of infantry troops, a support [weapons] company and a headquarters company. These companies were made up of light rifles, medium machine guns, RPGs, rocket launchers, a mortar platoon, an air defense platoon and a 106 anti-tank gun element. These units had a system of radio communication. Hussein Kamel told Sultan that Hamza would come to the SRG Headquarters and that Sultan was to wait for him. Hamza arrived at 3:00am, and they departed Baghdad at 5:00am, southbound for Kut. The regiment traveled in a caravan, with the command element, including Hamza, in the rear of the formation. Traveling with the group was a bodyguard of President Saddam Hussein's. Sultan believed that this bodyguard may have been at the original meeting with Hussein Kamel and President Saddam Hussein.

In Kut, the group received word from a party member that there was a disturbance in Al-Hayy. The Governor briefed them that the Mayor was missing and that party members were killed. When the regiment arrived outside of Al-Hayy, they came under fire. They responded with RPG and light weapons fire. Hamza decided the regiment should deploy. The regiment broke up and deployed. Two companies deployed on line and prepared to retaliate. An hour later the regiment entered the city. There were no targets for the support weapons. All of the attacks were visual. The regiment used light and medium machine guns and RPGs. The advancing forces came under fire and returned fire. The firing didn't last long as there was no resistance. The enemy had apparently thrown down their weapons and ran. Hamza and the Governor of Kut put the city in order. This happened while the regiment was still there and in the presence of Sultan. Some party members, police and some of the Governor's men were still fighting. Some people were captured, but the SRG did not deal with debriefing or transporting them. This was a matter for the local security elements. Sultan stated that

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Continuation of FD-302 of KAMAL MUSTAFA ABDALLAH SULTAN AL-TIKRITI, On 04/29/2004, Page 4

neither he nor his military units tried to collect intelligence from the captured fighters. He received intelligence from party members, security services and other sources.

When read a surviving witness account about atrocities that RG troops perpetrated against a civilian Shi'a family in Southern Iraq in 1991, Sultan stated that he believed whoever ordered that event should be held responsible. Sultan stated whoever issued the order should be held responsible.

Sultan was read a statement which Hamza gave to investigators about Sultan's involvement in abuses of civilians. Sultan responded by saying he did not know why Hamza would say something like that. Perhaps Hamza's memory is not serving him well. Hamza is a kind and compassionate man. Sultan had heard from some of the investigators about Hamza making people drink gasoline. There is no way that Sultan could ever imagine Hamza ever being involved in anything like this.

Sultan was confronted with the account of him violently putting his boot on the chest of a man who was lying on the ground. Sultan did not deny that this took place. He said that the man is available. This incident took place in Ash Shatrah. After the resistance was put down in Al Hayy, the regiment stayed overnight and moved out the next day. They turned control of the area over to a military division from Baghdad. There was word of a threat in the nearby village of Hafajeh. The IV Corps was responding and Sultan's regiment went with them. Sultan spent the night at AZIZ AL-NU'MAN's. The brothers knew how to get Aziz al-Nu'man through his in-laws. A group of people fired weapons from this man's house. Killed was a Republican Guard company commander and a soldier. Another soldier who was wounded, later died. Their blood was on the ground. Sultan saw this and reacted with anger. This man was one of the five prisoners that were caught near Ash Shatrah. All five men were later released.

Sultan was asked if he knew BAKARI AL-SADUM of the National Command. Sultan stated that he had not worked with him in the past. BAKRAI AL-SADUM has possibly lost an eye or wears sunglasses to cover a bad eye. He is above average height and has active connections to the party. With the name of 'Sadum', he must be from Nasiriya, possibly Suq al-Shiyookh. He is not a military man. Most likely he should be a Shia.

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 31SE-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence FBI BAGHDAD

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received 5/6/04

From _____

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

FBI - BAGHDAD OPERATIONS CENTER

(Address)

BAGHDAD, IRAQ

(City and State)

b6
b7C

By _____

To Be Returned ☐ Yes

☒ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes

☐ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes

☐ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes

☐ No

Title:

DESERT SPIDER;
IT - IRAQ

Reference: _____

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description:

☒

Original notes re interview of

AHMED HUSSEIN KHUDAIYIR

Hand
5/4/04

Dr. Abdul AHMAD HUSSEIN KHUDAIYIR

Date

No.

1957-58 - Heart Surgery in Jordan → Jordanian Dr.
Good Recovery? lots of Jord. Drs graduated
from med school in Baghdad

Since 91, Iraq not well equipped for surgery

Grad from Law School in Baghdad

Placed in college based on your grades - They give
you ten choices

Famous People Grad from the Law School

¹⁹⁵⁸ ~~1957~~ More rights before July 14 58 Revolution,
Communists messed up everything.

u executed leaders of a lot of parties, esp
relig. leaders. From 1958-63, Baathists
executed a lot of communists.
After 63, still no concern about individual rights

Going from being friends w/ British to being
friends w/ Soviets was difficult &
affected all of society.

At first IQ judges were very principled & fair -
The Arab League would call on IQ judges
for advice.

F/4/04

Was there a particular low point

Date

No.

Q 1991, Two Bodies resp. for issuing Laws?

(A) Revol Council - Led by Hussein - was supposed to be a committee but turned into Hussein himself

(B) The House PARLIAMENT

IN 1991, Hussein issued an amendment to the constitution giving the Pres in Exec Branch the power to issue laws + amend laws - This never happened since Hammurabi's day.

Q - WHY DIDN'T ADVISOR CONFRONT Hussein that this was bad idea?

A At time I was in Foreign Ministry
Hussein didn't respect anyone's advice
He was very difficult to deal with.

The closer you get to him, the more he distrusts you.

Thinks most people here speak freely.

All Hussein must + TAAH must now
tell others to defend themselves

3

5/4/64

I told Rumman he destroyed our country
and we preparing his sons to take
his place.

After 91 - Hussein narrowed down just
things which came to me went
to Abdul Mahmod,

good people after get sent to work for the Div. And

Internal Security do background checks


I was not authorized to fire any one

§

3a

Date

No.



- GEDAL PIR

- TRANSLATOR

AHMAD HUSSAIN KHALAFIR

Date 5/4/04

No. 11 ³⁰/_A ①

BLACKLIST #76 - CHIEF OF PRESIDENTIAL BUREAU, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER

- ATTORNEY - ATTENDED RAILWAY LAW SCHOOL - THE SYSTEM RANKS PEOPLE BY THEIR GRADES AND GIVE THEM A CHOICE OF WHAT STUDY OF DISCIPLINE TO PURSUE IN SCHOOL

- 1953-1963 - COMMUNIST PERIOD IN IRAQ. DURING THIS TIME FRANCE - OR AFTER THAT TIME FRANK THE BA'ATHI REGIME ESTABLISHED THE GOVT. AND STOPPED THE EXISTING A USURPER OF HIGH LEVEL COMMUNIST.

- HIS OPINIONS - THERE WERE NO CONCERNS FOR MODERNIZATION IDEAS RISKY.

- DISCUSSION REGARDING HADJI SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM. THE GOVT. WERE RESPONSIBLE.

- RCC AND PARLIAMENT WERE IN CHARGE OF MAKING THE LAWS. RCC HEADED BY SAADAT HUSSEIN.

- IN 1991 - HUSSEIN ISSUED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION. THIS ALLOWED THE PRESIDENT TO ISSUE LAWS AND AMEND LAWS. VERY DANGEROUS TO HAVE ONE PERSON ISSUE/MAKE THE LAWS (PERSONAL OPINION)

Date 5/4/29 No. 2

- SADDAM DID NOT REJECT ANYONE'S ADVICE, AND THAT HE WAS A VERY DIFFICULT PERSON TO DEAL WITH. THE CLOSER INDIVIDUALS GET TO THE INNER CIRCLE, THE LESS HE TRUSTED THEM.

- USED AN ASSAULT THAT WORKS HE WAS DETAINED HE LIKED IT TO THAT BEING A PIRATE THAT WAS KILLED, AND THAT SADDAM WAS THE KILLER. ALSO, SOME OF THE OTHER PEOPLE HE IS DETAINED WITH ASSISTED THE KILLER - SADDAM

- IN HIS OPINION, IF SOMEONE IS NOT TELLING THE TRUTH, THEY WILL BE TRYING TO DEFEND THEMSELVES OR PROTECT THEMSELVES

- HAS HEARD OTHERS IN THE CAMP TO ADVISE OTHERS TO TAKE CARE OF THEMSELVES FOR (HARAM ALI HASAN WASIL & RAHMAN) SELF-PRESERVATION

- HAS HEARD THAT ALI HASAN WASIL & RAHMAN ARE NEGOTIATING WITH THE AMERICANS. HE DOESN'T BELIEVE THEM.

Date 5/4/04 No. 3

- PERSONAL OPINIONS - ALI MATOIN AND RAHMANI
SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN THE LOWEST STOPS.
DOES NOT THINK THEY WILL EVER BE RELEASED.

- HE THROWS HIMSELF IN AS ONE OF THE
AMERICANS AND WAS INTERVIEWED BY THE
WHICH WERE NOT LITIGANT WITNESSES,
WHERE WAS STANLEY HESSER, AND WHO
WAS FIGHTING AGAINST THE AMERICANS

- THE INFORMANTS IS THE AREGHJIN PROVINCE
AS THE INFORMANTS ARE FROM HIS
PERSONAL EXPERIENCE AND WHAT THE'S EXPERIENCE
SIZES BEING OBTAINED.

- ALL OF THE INFO. HE HAS PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED
BUTS TRUE - LARGEST - ADAMS THAT WAS
HARD RARE THINGS IN THE PAST, BUT WITH
LIKE AS KNOWN SPECIFICALLY WHAT WAS NOT
INTERESTED IS.

PROVINCE INFO. RELATIONS

- CURRENTLY LIVED IN BUILDING #5 / NAME #5-002.

- DOES NOT HAVE A PERSONAL FRIENDSHIP WITH
BARZAN IBRAHIM HAZAY AL-TILKAT

b6
b7C

Date 5/4/04 No. 4

- WAS ALWAYS AND FAMILIAR WITH THE DEFLECTIONS
THAT WERE SENT TO IRAN TO ALLOW IRAN AS
HISST THEIR PLANS IN IRAN DURING THE FIRST
GULF WAR. DURING IRANIAN STRONG FORMS
DURING A MARTIAL. DIABOL REZAN 20/10
WINDING THE DIABOL WITH IRAN - IT WAS NOT
IRAN, SINCE HE WAS EXPELLED BY THE AMERICAN
TO IRAN @ 11-5 MONTH PRIOR TO THE FIRST
GULF WAR. POSSIBLY TRIA 1212, DURING
SADAM WINDING THE DIABOL. WITH IRAN.

- AFTER BRANCHING

- AS THE PRESIDENT OF THE DUNES, HE AND WE
HOLD THE AUTHORITY TO MAKE OR FOR INDIVIDUALS
THAT KUTAN WAS DEFENDING BY THE
SPECIAL SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS FROM 1991.

- SADAMS RELIGIOUS HAVE TOLD HIM
THAT HE IS A TRAITOR AND HAS
SENT HIS COUNTRY OUT.

- CLAIMS HE IS AN IDIOT MAN, EVEN THOUGH
HE HAS HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE
TO COMMIT THE ACTS

Date 5/4/24 No. 5

- THE IRAQI PEOPLE WERE HOSTAGES OF
SADAM. CREATED ~~THE~~ AN ENVIRONMENT
OF DISOBTED AND ANARCHY. STRUCK DOWN
THE PEOPLE.

- DURING SADAM'S REGIME, THE
OMAN ARAB CAMPAIGN AND THE LIKE HAVE
BEEN RELATED WITH IRAQ. PRIOR TO
THE REGIME IRAQ WAS GOOD RELATIONS.

- PERSONAL OPINION THAT THE OMAN ARAB
WARRIORS WOULD NOT SEE THE SADAM REGIME
ENDED.

- ATTENDED AN ARAB LEAGUE CONF. IN 1991,
HAD A SPEECH PREPARED, BUT SADAM
PRECLUDED HIS OWN SPEECH AND PRESENTED
OTHERS USING THE ARAB LEAGUE
TO THE ARAB LEAGUE LEADERS.

- AHEAD OF THE GENERAL SESSION

AND THEN HAD HIS OWN SPEECH. NORMALLY PRESENTED
A SPEECH. SADAM WAS NOT PRESENT, SADAM ASKED IF HE
WAS THE SPEECH, WITHOUT THE REPLY, NO. SADAM KNEW HE WOULD NOT
GIVE THE SPEECH

"HIS OWN SIDE OF SADAM IS DARK. HE HAS
KILLED HIS FRIENDS AND HIS BROTHERS OF POWER"

ONLY "CRAZY" PEOPLE WOULD HAVE CELEBRATED
SADAM'S BIRTHDAY LAST YEAR

Date 5/4/04 No. 6

- DISCUSSIONS INVOLVING SADDAM IN FEBRUARY 1979
MEETINGS WITH LEAD OFFICERS, SEEN AFTER HE TOOK
POWER FROM PRESIDENT BAKR. ^{THE ALLIANCE CONSISTED OF}
^{SUBSEQUENT EMERGENCY OF SADDAM}
- TRIAL OF CONSPIRACY SADDAM AS HITLER ^{MEMBERS,}
ADVISED THAT IS HITLER WIFE IS JORDAN
POVIDAS, HE WOULD NOT HAVE HAD NOBODY
WITH THE U.S. DESCRIBED ~~THE~~ HITLER IS
A SUMMER PLANNING

- HOW WITH SADDAM BE REMEMBERED?
CAME ON POWERS LAW AND MATH
OF THE JAPANESE LIVES. IF ONLY LET
BEING, THEY WOULD HAVE BEEN AT MIDDLE
SADDAM,

- HIS PERSONAL APPOINTMENT. SADDAM WITH
BE REMEMBERED AS A "BLACK MOUNTAIN
LIFE"

- SADDAM USED TO GIVE RAY GIFTS/STIPEND
FOR TRIBE LEADERS AND ARTISTS, ETC. ON A
MOUNTAIN BASE, NOW THESE PEOPLE ARE
NO LONGER GETTING MONEY

- IT WAS COMMON KNOWLEDGE AMONG THE SADDAM
RELATIVES WHOSE THE PEOPLE WERE THINGS, AND
WERE COMPROMISED.

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 05/06/2004

On 05/04/2004, Ahmad Hussein Khudaiyir (Black List #76) was interviewed at Camp Cropper Detention Camp, Baghdad, Iraq where he was being detained by the U.S. Army following his surrender to authorities in approximately April 2003. Present during this interview were Special Agent (SA) [redacted] Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) [redacted] SSA George Piro and SSA [redacted] [redacted] Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Providing translation for this interview was [redacted] a language specialist with the FBI. Also present during this interview was a military interviewer, [redacted]

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b7c

Khudaiyir advised he is currently 65 years old and in good health. In 1995 and 1998, he traveled with his brother to Jordan for heart surgery. He noted that his Jordanian physician graduated from medical school in Baghdad several years ago. At one time, Baghdad boasted the finest medical schools in the Arab world. Khudaiyir decided to have his heart surgery in Jordan because after 1991, Iraq was ill equipped to handle complex operations.

Khudaiyir has lived in Iraq for most of his life. Following completion of secondary school, he attended college in Iraq. At that time, placement in college was reserved for those who scored well on an examination which determined one's educational future. Those with good marks were allowed to choose their area of interest from among ten choices. Khudaiyir chose to study law and subsequently graduated from a prestigious law school in Baghdad. Law schools in Iraq had many distinguished alumni. In those days, the judicial system in Baghdad enjoyed an excellent reputation. Iraqi judges were considered very fair and principled, and the Arab League was known to call on them for advice.

Concerning life in Iraq, Khudaiyir recalled that prior to the Communist revolution on July 14, 1958, Iraqi citizens enjoyed more rights than they had in subsequent years. When the Communists took over Iraq, they executed the leaders of various parties, focusing particularly on religious leaders. Later, between 1958-63, the Ba'athists executed many Communists. However, after 1963, despite years of conflict, Iraq was no closer to understanding the concept of human rights. Part of this may have been due to the difficulties which the Iraqi people experienced while trying to

Investigation on 05/04/2004 at Baghdad, IraqFile # 315E-HQ-1448534 -66 Date dictated 05/06/2004by SA [redacted]
SSA [redacted] SSA George L. Piro SSA [redacted] TMAJb6
b7c

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Ahmad Hussein Khudaiyir, On 05/04/2004, Page 2

adjust from being friends with the British to becoming friends with the Soviets.

Khudaiyir identified the year 1991 as being a particular low point in Iraq. At that time, Khudaiyir was serving in the Foreign Ministry, and he recalled a particularly defining event. Prior to 1991, two bodies were responsible for issuing laws in Iraq: the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), headed by President Saddam Hussein, and the House-Parliament. The RCC was originally established to function as a committee. However, it gradually turned into a one-man operation with Saddam having total control. That same year, Saddam issued an amendment to the constitution giving the President in the Executive Branch (Saddam) the power to issue and amend laws. Such a wide grasp of power had not occurred since the ancient days of the Babylonian ruler, Hammurabi. When asked why RCC advisors did not confront Saddam and tell him that having control of both the Executive and Legislative functions was a poor idea, Khudaiyir responded that Saddam did not respect anyone's advice and that the closer anyone got to Saddam, the more he distrusted them. Saddam's control of matters extended to Khudaiyir's office in the Foreign Ministry. He recalled that after 1991, as Saddam focused on narrowing down the government, matters which would have normally been brought to Khudaiyir's attention, were instead sent to Abid Hamid Mahmoud Al-Khatib Al-Nisiri Al-Tikriti, Saddam's Presidential secretary.

Khudaiyir compared Iraq to "an airplane that was hijacked, and Saddam was the hijacker." Saddam created an environment of distrust and paranoia throughout the country. Prior to Saddam's regime, Iraq enjoyed favorable relations with other Arab countries. However, after Saddam came to power, Iraq's relations with other Arab countries deteriorated, and many wanted to see an end to his regime. According to Khudaiyir, several detainees currently housed in the detention camp occupied positions of leadership in Saddam's government, and, thus, were responsible for assisting Saddam in hijacking the country. Khudaiyir stated that if these detainees were not being completely truthful during interviews, it is because they are trying to protect themselves.

Concerning rumors circulating within the detention camp, Khudaiyir related that Ali Hassan Al-Majid and Taha Yasin Ramadan have instructed detainees to defend themselves during interviews. Both Al-Majid and Ramadan believe, and have been telling other detainees, that after June 30, 2004, all of them will be released and that many will be appointed to positions of power in the new

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Ahmad Hussein Khudaiyir, On 05/04/2004, Page 3

government. Khudaiyir has also heard rumors that Al-Majid and Ramadan have been negotiating with the Americans. However, he does not believe this. Instead, he thinks that Al-Majid and Ramadan may never be released.

Some of Saddam's relatives have told Khudaiyir that he is a traitor who sold-out his country. As to Saddam's relatives, Khudaiyir stated it was common knowledge that the ones occupying positions of power in Saddam's regime were "thieves" and corrupt.

According to Khudaiyir, the staff of the Presidential Diwan staff is comprised only of good individuals. All prospective employees had to undergo background checks by Internal Security. In his position at the Presidential Diwan, Khudaiyir was not authorized to fire anyone working under him. After 1991, the function of hiring and firing employees became the responsibility of the Special Security Organization.

Khudaiyir compared Saddam to Adolf Hitler. However, he claimed that if Hitler had been in Saddam's position, he would not have had problems with the U.S. He considered Hitler to be a smaller player than Saddam, explaining that Hitler was not known for being as ruthless a dictator. In Khudaiyir's opinion, the human side of Saddam is dead. As an example, he pointed out that Saddam ordered the executions of several people whom he had previously brought back to occupy positions of leadership in his government.

Khudaiyir was aware that Saddam's birthday was last week, but he believes that only crazy people would have celebrated it. At the conclusion of the interview, Khudaiyir acknowledged that Saddam may be regarded by history as a blood-thirsty loser.

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DATE 05-08-2009 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/rs

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 315E-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence FBHQ

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received 5/7/04

From ABID HAMID MAHMOUD
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

BLACKLIST # 4
(Address)

RAGHUSA, IRAQ
(City and State)

By

b6
b7C

To Be Returned _____

Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes ☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes ☒ No

Title: OPERATION DESERT SAND
IT-IRAQ

Reference: MAHMOUD-302.TM1 DATES 5/8/04
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☒ Original notes re interview of

- ABID HAMID MAHMOUD

CONF
- COPY OF PHOTOGRAPH VIEWED BY MAHMOUD.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-08-2009 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/rs



b6
b7C

APY of
PAGE VIEWED BY ABO HANIA MAHMOUD AL KHAYAT AL NISIRI AL TIKRITI ON 5/7/64,

... *guel*
5/7/64

315E-HQ-1448534

Back of page 100

L → R

GEORGE AIDU

HUDA

Date

No.

AZIZ SALIH AL-NUMAN

LATIE SAYYIF TASIM

MIZBAN KHAIR HADI NIDYALA

MOHAMMAD IZMAN AL-SADUN - (BASRA)

SAMIR AZIZ AL-NATIM (HATIM AL-AZAWI)

ABID BAQI AL-SADUN (BASRA) 95 Diwan

ADEL ABDEL AL-DURI

b6

b7C

UNK

RAMADI PART

MEMBER -

← BALAD

MUHSIN AL KITAFATI S.T.A

YAHYA AL ABARZI - S.T.A

[REDACTED]
- LEADERS PIRAO

[REDACTED]

- HANDLER [REDACTED]

5/7/04

ABD HAMID MAHMOUD AL-KHATTAR ADEBIRI AL-TIKRITI
DOB: 07/01/1954

- VIEWED A COLOR PHOTOGRAPH OF THE REC MEMBERS
CIRCA 2001 - IDENTIFIED MEMBERS STARTING IN
THE BACK ROW LEFT TO RIGHT.
- ADVISED ONLY 7 OF THE INDIVIDUALS DENIED IN
THE COLOR PHOTOGRAPH WERE REDEMPTIONARY COMMAND
COUNCIL MEMBERS.
- COMMITTEE OF 4 → TARID ABZ
 - ALI HASSAN MATIA
 - YASIN RAMADAN
 - 19219 LIBRARIAN M-DOR
- SECRETARIES IN IRAQ

1. - ~~GENERAL~~ COMMAND SECRETARY - ~~AMMAN~~ HUSSEIN RASHID
MILITARY AFFAIRS
2. - PRESS SECRETARY - AZI ABDEL SALEH
3. - ~~CABINET~~ ^{AFFAIRS} SECRETARY - DR. KHALID AL MAMOURI
4. - DILAS PRESIDENT - AHMED HUSSEIN
5. - GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE BA'ATH - BRIG. AMAN
PARTY AL HANISHI
6. - NATIONAL COMMAND SECRETARY
FOR THE BA'ATH PARTY - ABDEL CARTHAN MUHAMMAD
AMMAN
7. - PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARY - 3/23-24/91 BELONE
THE PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARY
AFTER THE 9/11 SHIA UPRISING

(2)

- HAMAD NAYAN was the No.
PREVIOUS PRESIDENTIAL PRESS SECRETARY

INTERVIEW

- DISCUSSING A LETTER FROM A COLONEL IN
DIAZ TOWN WITH THE SHIA SPRING DESCRIBING
THE COLONEL'S ACTIONS ~~AT~~ DURING THE SHIA
SPRING AND HIS LETTER REQUESTING FOR
THEIR PROTECT ACT. LETTER WAS DIRECTED
TO PRES. HASSAN.

- VIEWED RCC DECREE WHICH GAVE MILITARY
COUNCIL TO GOVERNORS.

- AND REMAINS OF THE DECREE THROUGH
THE DIWAN PRESIDENT. THE DECREE WAS
ISSUED THROUGH PRESIDENTIAL DIWAN OFFICE - LATER
DEPT.

- THE RCC SECRETARY IS THE DIWAN'S PRESIDENT
WITH RECORDS OF THE MINUTES FROM THE RCC
MEETINGS. THE DECREE WAS TAKEN BY
THE 7 MEMBERS OF THE RCC

- AND REMAINS WITH THEM THE RCC MEMBERS.
- PROCEDURES OF THE RCC MEETING -

THE PRESIDENT ASKS THEM TO
- SEND A RCC MEMBERS

- SENDS THEM TO ANNOUNCE MEETING TO ALL
MEMBERS. DEPENDS ON THE ISSUES THAT ARE TO
BE BROUGHT - OTHERWISE THERE WOULD BE ALREADY'S

3
SENT WITH THE NOTES AND ANSWERS FOR No.
MEMBERS.

- PRES. GEL SENDS AN ASSISTANT TO DELIVER NOTES AND DETERMINES IF THEY ARE GOOD TO BE IN ATTENDANCE FOR THE MEETING.
- THE DINAWI PRESIDENT REASONS THE ISSUES AT THE START OF THE MEETING. THUS A212 OR THE DINAWI PRESIDENT USING AREA THE ISSUES THEN IT IS DISCUSSED IN THIS ORDER -
 - 1 - 17211
 - 2 - PANAMA
 - 3 - A212
 - 4 - MARSH
 - 5 - MASHA
 - 6 - ~~MAR~~ MASHA
 - 7 - AL-ZUBAYDI
- EACH MCC MEMBER GIVES THEIR SUGGESTIONS AND THEN OF THE ISSUES.
- SADDAM WOULD TALK LAST AFTER EACH MCC MEMBER GAVE THEIR OPINION. SADDAM WOULD ALWAYS SPEAK LAST. THE MCC MEMBERS WOULD HAVE A TENDENCY TO CHANGE/GOAL ^{GOALS} THEIR OPINIONS/ANSWERS AS SADDAM'S OPINION.
- DOESN'T BELIEVE ANY CHANGED THEIR OPINION OUT OF FEAR BUT WERE "TWO-FACED"

DISCUSSION WHEN PCC CHALLENGED THE PRESIDENT

- 1997 CONSTITUTION BY-LAWS OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE PRESS
- DISCUSSING PLAN IN 1998 ^{10 ASSEMBLY} AND WENT TO 1997.
- SADDAM CALLED FOR A GAIN MEETING WITH SADDAM ~~KHAYAT~~ ^{CR. POL. COUNCIL} - AMMAN PRESIDENT AND THE PCC TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE
- THE PCC MEMBERS NEW THE ALFAND NAME AS THE MEETING.
- SADDAM TOLD THE MEMBERS THAT YOU HAVE CHIEFLY MADE DECISIONS IN THE CONSTITUTION
 - FREEDOM OF POLITICAL PARTIES
 - FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
- SADDAM TOLD THEM THAT HE WANTED TO GO AND APPROVE THEM. THE CONSTITUTION WOULD HAVE HAD A TERM LIMIT OF 7 YEARS FOR PRESIDENTS, PCC WOULD HAVE BEEN ABOLISHED AND A STATE COUNCIL WOULD HAVE BEEN FORMED
- OPENED FOR DISCUSSION -
 - (1) 12209 IN DURI - DID NOT AGREE WITH THE PASSING OF THE LAWS
 - (2) TARIQ AZIZ - WAS FOR THE PASSING OF THE ISSUES.
 - (3) OTHER COUNCIL MEMBERS SIDED WITH IZZET.

5

No.

- ARD WAS ASKED IF HE PRESENTED
HAD WAS A REASON OR A DICTATORSHIP?
ANSWER - DECISIONS WERE MADE
BECAUSE THE ALL MEMBERS WORKED
SIDE WITH THE PRESIDENT AGAIN ON
HIS FINAL EXPRESSIONS.
- ARD DEMANDS 50% AND THE PRESIDENT
AND 50% IS THE ALL MEMBERS
- BEING THAT WAS A DICTATORSHIP
~~PROPOSED~~
- SADDAM WOULD NOT AND NOT "STRESS" - OUTSPOKE
AS THE COUNCIL OF THE RELIGIOUS
COMMANDS.

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 05/08/2004

Abd Hamid Mahmoud Al-Khattab Al-Nasiri Al-Tikriti, (Black List #4), date of birth July 1, 1956, was interviewed at a detention facility located at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Interviewing Agents identified themselves as representatives of the United States Government from Washington, DC. Department of Defense representative [redacted] was also present, and observed the entire interview. [redacted] FBI Language Specialist, provided Arabic/English translation. Mahmoud provided the following information:

Mahmoud viewed a color photograph depicting members of the Iraqi Regional Command and Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), circa 2000/2001. Starting in the back row of the photograph, and proceeding from right to left, Mahmoud identified the following individuals: Huda Salih Mahdi Ammash, Aziz Salih Al Numan, Latif Sayyif Jasim, Mizban Khadir Hadi Nidyala, Mohammad Izmam Al Sadun Al Basra, Ali Hasan Al Majid, Taha Yasin Ramadan, President Saddam Hussein, Izzat Ibrahim Al Duri, Tariq Aziz, Samir Aziz Al Najim, Abid Baki Al Sadun, Adil Abdul Al Duri, First and Last Name Unknown (FNU) (LNU); front row of photograph proceeding from right to left - [redacted] Muhsim Al Khafiji, Yaha Aboudi, Qusay Saddam Hussein, (FNU) (LNU) and (FNU) (LNU). (All names are phonetically spelled.)

Seven of the individuals depicted in the photograph, Izzat Ibrahim Al Duri, Taha Yasin Ramadan Al Jizrawi, Tariq Aziz, Taha Muhyi Al Din Maruf, Ali Hasan Majid, Mizban Khadr Hadi, and Muhammad Hamza Zubaydi were RCC members. A copy of the photograph viewed by Mahmoud is enclosed in a FD-340/1(A) envelope and maintained with the interview notes.

On approximately March 23-24, 1991, Saddam Hussein appointed Mahmoud to the position of Presidential Secretary. Mahmoud started this position after the 1991 Shia uprising, and held this position of trust until the war. The previous Presidential Secretary was Hamad Hamadi. Mahmoud proceeded to identify the other Secretary positions within the Iraqi government: General Command/Military Affairs Secretary - Hussein Rashid; Press Secretary - Ali Abdul Saleh; Cabinet Affairs Secretary - Dr. Khalid Al Mamouri; Diwan President/RCC Secretary - Ahmed Hussein; General Secretary of the Ba'ath Party - Adnan Al Hadithi; and National

Investigation on 05/07/2004 at Baghdad, IraqFile # 315E-HQ-1448534-67 Date dictated 05/08/2004
by SSA George L. Piro tmi
[redacted]

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Abd Hamid Mahmoud, On 05/07/2004, Page 2

Command Secretary for the Ba'ath Party - Abdul Fattah Muhammad Ammeen.

A letter addressed to President Hussein, from a Colonel of the Iraqi military, who was located in the Southern part of Iraq during the 1991 Shia uprising was discussed with Mahmoud. The self-serving letter described the Colonel's actions during the Shia uprising indicating that he deserved some type of commendation. Mahmoud was not familiar with this particular letter, and advised he did not see, nor was he privileged to all of the correspondence addressed to the President.

Concerning an RCC decree which bestowed military control to Governors during the time frame of the 1991 Shia uprising. Mahmoud initially learned of this decree through the Diwan President, who is also the RCC Secretary. Mahmoud believed the decree was issued through the legal department of the Presidential Diwans office and was ultimately voted on by the seven RCC members.

Mahmoud discussed the flow of communications through the Presidential Secretary office and the protocol that is followed during the RCC meetings. When President Hussein needed to convene a meeting of the RCC, he would ask Mahmoud to contact the RCC members and announce the date and time. Mahmoud would send notes, via an assistant, announcing the meeting to the seven RCC members. Occasionally, an agenda would be sent to the RCC members prior to the meeting regarding the various issues that were to be discussed. Once the RCC meeting was convened, either the Presidential Diwan or RCC member Tariq Aziz would read the topics/issues for the meeting. Subsequently, each individual RCC member would have a chance to voice their opinion. The order of discussion was always the same, Izzat Ibrahim Al Duri, Taha Yasin Ramadan Al Jizrawi, Tariq Aziz, Taha Muhyi Al Din Maruf, Ali Hasan Majid, Mizban Khadr Hadi, and Muhammad Hamza Zubaydi. Once all of the RCC members had a chance to voice their opinion on a particular topic/issue, President Hussein would then give his opinion.

According to Mahmoud, while President Hussein was giving his point of view on a particular topic, RCC members would study his facial expressions which would determine if they needed to speak out and change their opinion to match his. Mahmoud believes the RCC members would change their opinions because they were two faced, and not because they were in fear of President Hussein.

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Continuation of FD-302 of Abd Hamid Mahmoud, On 05/07/2004, Page 3

Mahmoud provided an example when the RCC did not side with President Hussein. In 1997, after seven years of discussion regarding the by-laws of the political parties and the press, President Hussein assembled a joint meeting between the RCC, Regional Command, and Sardoun Hamidi (phonetic)- Parliament President. The purpose of this joint meeting was to discuss and vote on the constitution, freedom of political parties, and freedom of the press. Specifically, President Hussein was in favor of establishing a seven year term limit for the president, abolishing the RCC, and establishing a Shura council. The meeting was open for discussion, at which time RCC member Izzat Ibrahim Al Duri spoke out against the passage of the law. Other council members, with the exception of Tariq Aziz, sided with Izzat Ibrahim Al Duri. Tariq Aziz was in favor of the passage of the new laws. According to Mahmoud, the laws were never passed.

Regarding the situation that Iraq is currently facing, Mahmoud would place fifty percent of the blame on President Hussein and fifty percent of the blame on the RCC. Mahmoud advised that President Hussein would not allow for strong or outspoken individuals on the RCC or regional councils.

Mahmoud concluded by saying he believed the Saddam Hussein regime was a dictatorship.

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 315E-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence FBHQ

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received 5/8/07

From AZ12 SALIH NUMAN AL HAFASI
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

BAGHDAD, IRAQ
(City and State)

By _____

To Be Returned ☐ _____

Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes ☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes ☒ No

Title: OPERATION DESERT SPIRIT
IT-IRAQ

Reference: SALIH.302.Tm1 DATE 5/10/07
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☒ Original notes re interview of

AZ12 SALIH NUMAN AL HAFASI

100000 PIR

[REDACTED]

NOB

[REDACTED]

HANDWR

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-08-2009 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lz

b6
b7C

TRANSLATION

DAB: 7/1/1941

→ BORN 10 1945

5/2/04

AZIZ SALIH AL-NUMAN

BLACKLISTED #8

SHAW. MUSEUM

- SURRENDERED / CAPTURED ON 5/22/04

AZIZ SALIH NUMAN AL HAFASI -

- CAREER IN BA'ATH PARTY

- JOINED IN 1966, BECAME A DIVISION MEMBER
IN WASIT IN 1970

- 1975 COMMANDER OF KARBALA

- DIVISION MEMBER TRANSFERRED TO BACHMAN

- 1987 MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE

- 1988 - LEFT MINISTRY (RETIRED)

1982 - BECAME MEMBER OF BA'ATH PARTY

→ IN BACHMAN

- 1992 - ARMY ELIZABETH AND BECAME
A COMMANDER MEMBER

→ IN CHARGE OF MISAN AND WASIT PROVINCES.

1992-2002 -

1990 → BECAME GOVERNOR OF KUTLAH PROVINCE.

1998 → RESPONSIBLE FOR WASIT PROVINCE

AUG 2002 → MOVED TO BACHMAN.

→ IN CHARGE OF KARBALA → DISTRICT OF BACHMAN

- VIEWER DISSEMINATED CIRCA ²⁰⁰⁰~~1996~~ Date PHOTO of No.

INDIVIDUALS THAT WAS DESIGNATED FOR THE
REPUBLIC COMMANDS - IDENTIFIED HIMSELF
SPENDING WORK ON THE FRONTIER - HUSA AMMASH

- STATED RA'AM PARTY BECAUSE THEY BELIEVED
IN GOD AND MAN'S UNITY. ALSO BELIEVED THEY
WERE ALMOST THE COMMUNIST PARTY.

- STATED HE HAS WIFE - APPROX 1.5 MILLION
THOUS MEMBERS.

- DID NOT MENTION THE 1979 MEETING WITH
REVEALS A PLAN ALONGST SADDAM. IS AWARE
OF THE MEETING BY INFORMING THAT IS AN
VIEWER IS ON T.V.

- SADDAM RESORTS TO REP BELIEVE OF
THE WOULD BE FORGOTTEN

- STILL CLAIMS THE SUPERIOR OF THE
U.S. FORCES DISSEMINATED HIS BELIEFS
ON HIS MARCH.

- BELIEVES HE IS DESIGNATED BECAUSE HE
WAS A MEMBER OF THE REPUBLIC COMMAND
WAS THAT HE WAS GOING TO BE THAT
A MONTH A THOUS RELEASES.

(2)

- DOESN'T VIEW HIMSELF AS A
JEWEL OR A WINNER
- WAS ~~THE~~ RECALLED FROM KUWAIT IN
1990 - ^{MULTI-MILLION} LAMID ZAKKI, ARKIM HAN
DE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF NASIRIYA FOR
A 3 MONTH PERIOD. ALLOWED THE
PERIOD AND MADE HIS WAY WITH THE
TRUTH LEADERS, AND CLAIMS THE U.S. FORGOT
ALBOSZ AND RIVER.
- ARRIVED IN NASIRIYA AFTER FLEEING KUWAIT.
- ~~THE MORE BEHIND~~
- ACKNOWLEDGES THE "TRAIL" IN NASIRIYA
IN 1991. THE UPRISE PROGRESS BEHIND
NASIRIYA FROM PASSING THROUGH SOME
COUNTRIES/VILLAGES PRIOR TO REACHING NASIRIYA
- CLAIMS U.S. FORCES WERE CLOSE TO
NASIRIYA, CROSS THE RIVER DURING THAT
TIME PERIOD.
- AZI HASAN MATSIS → ARKIM FOR HIS
OPINION. SAW THAT IT IS KNOWN AS
CHIEFMAN OF THE ARKIM A MEMBER OF
THE R.C.C. AND THE REGIONAL COMMAND.

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 05/10/2004

Aziz Salih Numan Al Hafaji, (Black List #8), date of birth July 1, 1941, was interviewed at a detention facility located at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Interviewing Agents identified themselves as representatives of the United States Government from Washington, DC. Department of Defense representative [redacted] was also present, and observed the entire interview. [redacted] FBI Language Specialist, provided Arabic/English translation. Salih provided the following information:

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b7C

Salih began the interview by chronologically detailing his career within the Ba'ath Party and Iraqi government. He joined the Ba'ath Party in 1968, and became a division member in 1970, at Nasariyah. In 1975, he assumed the Governor's job in Karbala. During this time frame, his status as a division member was transferred from Nasariyah to Baghdad. In 1987, Salih became the Minister of Agriculture, and subsequently retired from the Ministry in 1988. In 1988, he became a member of the Ba'ath Party in Baghdad, and then became the Governor of the occupied Kuwait Province in 1990. In 1992, Salih was elected to become a command member. From 1992 through 2002, he was in charge of the Misan and Wajit Provinces. In August 2002, Salih moved to Baghdad and was in charge of the Karkh District of Baghdad.

In 1968, he joined the Ba'ath Party because he believed in God, Arab unity, and the struggle against the Communist Party. Salih claims he is the Sheik of his tribe, the Al Hafaji tribe, which consists of approximately 1.1 million people.

Concerning the infamous 1979 meeting which Saddam Hussein convened shortly after assuming the presidency of Iraq, which unveiled an alleged conspiracy against the president. Salih did not attend this meeting and could not provide details. Salih allegedly became aware of this meeting through watching it on television.

Salih believes that Iraq was destroyed through the wars the country has fought, and personally blames Saddam Hussein for the current situation. Salih does not view himself as a subject or a witness, and believes he is being detained merely because he was a member of the regional command. Soon after his capture by U.S.

Investigation on 05/08/2004 at Baghdad, IraqFile # 315E-HQ-1448534-68 Date dictated 05/10/2004by SSA George L. Piro
by SSA [redacted] tmib6
b7C

SALIH.302.TMI

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Aziz Salih Numan Al Hafaji, On 05/08/2004, Page 2

forces, Salih was allegedly told that he was going to be released within a month. Salih was captured by coalition forces on May 21, 2003. Salih maintains that he surrendered to occupying forces which is contrary to official reports.

Concerning the time frame of 1990-1991. Salih was the Governor of the Kuwait Province in 1990, and had to flee to the city of Nasariyah because U.S. forces were closing in. Subsequently, Hamid Muhammad Hamza Zubaydi asked him to be the Governor of Nasariyah. Salih accepted the position which was supposed to last for a three month term. Salih acknowledged there were disturbances in the outlying cities/towns of Nasariyah, and the disturbance was progressing toward the main city. Salih claims there were U.S. forces across the river from Nasariyah during the time frame of the 1991 Shia uprising. Salih did not elaborate or provide any further information regarding the events that occurred in and around Nasariyah in 1991.

Interviewers specifically asked Salih his personal opinion regarding Ali Hasan Majid. Salih responded by saying Ali Hasan Majid was known as Chemical Ali, and was a member of the RCC and regional command. Salih did not provide his personal opinion regarding Hasan.

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 315E-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence FR1 HQ

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received 05/27/04

From AZIZ SALIH NISMAN AL HAFASI
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

BAGHDAD, IRAQ
(City and State)

By _____

To Be Returned ☒ Yes ☒ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes ☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes ☒ No

Title: OPERATION DEEMING SPIDER
IT-IRAQ

Reference: SALIH.302.TMI.05272504
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☒ Original notes re interview of

AZIZ SALIH NISMAN AL HAFASI

[REDACTED] DIA.

5/27/04

-LS [REDACTED]
AZIZ SAHIL AL NISMAN - BLF ^{File}

No. 1

- PRESIDENT ASSIGNED HIM TO BE
THE GOVERNOR OF KUWAIT. RECEIVING
ORDERS FROM SADDAM.

- THE ARAB COUNTRIES WERE NOT
PLEASANT WITH SADDAM FOR OCCUPYING
KUWAIT.

- KUWAIT HAD BEEN HUNGRY IF HE REFUSED
TO ACCEPT THE GOV OF KUWAIT
OF KUWAIT.

- BELIEVES HE WAS ASSIGNED TO
BE THE GOVERNOR BECAUSE HE HAD
RELATIONS IN THE AREA OF
KUWAIT.

- IS NOT HAPPY WITH THE QJM KUWAIT
WAS FORMED IN 1991

- ORDERS CAME THROUGH SADDAM.

↓ ALL KUWAIT MEDIA & SADDAM.

DID NOT SPECIFY WHAT THE ORDERS
WERE.

- IN 1993 AMERICAN SOLDIERS WERE
IN NASIRIYAH IN 1991

- THE INTIMA WHO PROVIDED REWARDS
IN NASIRIYAH.

- WRITTEN ORDERS WOULD COME FROM
THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE.

- DID HAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
KEEPING THE PAPER, WAS
RESPONSIBLE FOR KEEPING THE SERVICES
GOING.

- VIEWED VIDEO OF 1991 SHIA UPRISING. ADVISED
PEOPLE WHO WERE RESPONSIBLE SHOULD BE
HELD ACCOUNTABLE.

- MAINTAINS HE BECAME THE GOV. OF
NASIRIYAH AFTER THE VIOLENCE.

- NEVER WITNESSED ANY PUNISHMENTS IN
NASIRIYAH.

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 05/31/2004

Aziz Salih Numan Al Hafaji, (Black List #8), date of birth July 1, 1941, was interviewed at a detention facility located at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Interviewing Agents identified themselves as representatives of the United States Government from Washington, DC. Department of Defense representative [redacted] was also present, and observed the entire interview. [redacted] FBI Language Specialist, provided Arabic/English translation. Salih provided the following information:

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Salih is the leader of the Al Hafaji tribe in Iraq which consists of over one million people. He acknowledged that in March 1991, he was appointed by Saddam Hussein to be the Governor of Kuwait. Salih acknowledged that he would have been hung if he refused to accept the Governors job in Kuwait. This was a civilian position, and he reported to Saddam's half brother, Sabawi, and to Ali Hassan Majid. He claimed that his responsibilities were extremely limited but they included acting as liaison with the people of Kuwait. He believes he was appointed as the Governor of Kuwait because he had relatives that lived in that area. Salih acknowledged there were human rights violations committed by Iraqis in Kuwait, and maintains he had nothing to do with their poor treatment. Interviewing agents asked Salih to specify information about what he had heard regarding the treatment of the Kuwaiti people, and contradicted himself by stating he did not have information. He reiterated that his position as Governor in Kuwait was merely a title, and he did not have any authority.

Salih acknowledged having held several other positions of leadership within the Ba'ath Party and Iraqi Government over his career, but he minimized his role in all of these positions. Salih advised he has never killed anyone, ordered executions or punishment, nor had he ever witnessed such activities during his lengthy career of service for the Ba'ath Party and the Government of Iraq. Salih viewed a copy of a Public Broadcasting System (PBS) documentary depicting atrocities committed by the Republican Guard and others regarding the Kurds in Northern Iraq, and the 1991 Intifada in Southern Iraq. While Salih was viewing the documentary, he was squirming in his seat, tapping his toes on the floor, and would occasionally raise his voice. After viewing the documentary, Salih adamantly denied participating in any of these

Investigation on 05/27/2004 at Baghdad, IraqFile # 315E-HO-1448534Date dictated 05/31/2004by SSA [redacted]
SSA [redacted]

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315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Aziz Salih Numan Al Hafaji, On 05/27/2004, Page 2

atrocities or having any knowledge about them. He acted as though he had never heard of such abuses and atrocities. He did acknowledge, however, that more than one person was probably involved in committing these atrocities, and he stated that those responsible should be held accountable and killed.

Salih insisted he would have received written orders regarding the situation in Nasiriyah from the Minister of Interior. Salih's responsibilities in Nasiriyah were to keep the peace, and to keep the services running throughout the city. He advised the Shia's were burning buildings within the city of Nasiriyah during the 1991 Intifada. Salih also insisted that he became the Governor of Nasiriyah after the violent activities took place.

Salih claims he does not know why he was arrested by Coalition forces, and believes that Allah will set him free.

Throughout the interview, Salih was pleasant but would not directly answer the interviewing agents questions. He only acknowledged the various positions he has held within the Ba'ath Party and government throughout his career.

~~SECRET~~

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Universal Case File Number

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By

George L. Piro

To Be Returned ☐ Yes☒ NoReceipt Given ☐ Yes☒ NoGrand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure☐ Yes☒ No

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☐ Yes☒ No

Title:

(S)

Reference:

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description:

☒ Original notes re interview ofKAMEL MUSTAPHA ABDULLAH
AL-SUCTAN AL NABRI~~SECRET~~

KAMAL MUSTAPHA ABDULLAH AL-SULTAN
AL - NASRI

BORN 15/4/1955 IN TIKRIT

SERVED APPROX 30 YRS IN IRAQ GOVT.

LAST 4 YRS SECRETARY GENERAL OF RG

77 MILITARY ACADE. GRADUATE

77 - 10/80 - CO OF BATTALION REPAIRS ANTI
AIRCRAFT BATTERIES

17 July ARMORED DIV.

TRAINER OF ARMOR DIV.

1/84 - STAFF OFFICER COLLEGE

GRADUATED 6/85

~~ARMY STAFF COLLEGE~~ 1ST BRIGADE OF RG

LATER IN 85 10TH BRIG ARMORED RG

06/87 BASE OF RG

89 SRG

93 CO RG BRIG

94 CO OF CORP OF RG

98 MOVED TO ANOTHER BRIG.

02/02 ADVISOR TO NORTHERN DISTRICT OF KIRKUK

HE WAS CALLED BY I TO BRIGHAD 10 DAYS
AFTER THE WAR STARTED TO TAKE OVER
THE RG BUT Δ REFUSED. BECAUSE THE MIL.
LEADERS DID NOT AGREE W/ BELIEVE THE WAR
WAS SOLUTION AND DID NOT WANT TO SPEND
ADDITIONAL BLOOD.

△ WANTED A PEACEFUL SOLUTION
THAN POLITICS.

A YR AGO HE EXPRESSED HIS FEELINGS TO
QUSAY FOR POLITICAL SOLUTION. Q SAID THIS
IS NOT A DEC. FOR THE MILITARY BUT A
POLITICAL DEC. FOR THE LEADERS.

DURING MILITARY GATHERING WHEN TRUSTED
PERSONS WERE PRESENT Q DISCUSSIONS OF
HOPE FOR PEACE TOOK PLACE.
FRIENDS LT GEN RA'ID MASHAD

MOST OF THE MILITARY DISCUSSED IT. IN
PRIVATE BECAUSE THEY WERE AFRAID TO
DISCUSS IT OPEN AS IT WOULD REACT SADDAM
OR QUSAY WHO WOULD TAKE AS A REVOLT
OR DISTURB BY THEM.

~~HE DID NOT~~ ~~WANTED~~ ~~TO~~ ~~EXPRESS~~ ~~OTHER~~ ~~OPINION~~
HE COULD NOT EXPRESS OTHER OPINION
AS HE (Q) WOULD NOT LISTEN ~~AND~~ AND THEY
WERE AFRAID.

NO CONTACT W/ SADDAM. CONTACT W/ Q ^{SINCE} 95
Q DID NOT CARE S SADDAM S Q WANTED
THE WAR (HIS FEELING) ~~Q~~ BUT Q WANTED
PEACE BASED ON CONTACT W/ Q
WHO SAY POLITICAL DECISIONS ARE THOSE OF
CENTERS NOT MILITARY.

RE 1 HE WAS ⁵LENIENT IN NEGOTIATIONS
& WAS STUBBORN.

HIS REACTION WHEN A REFUSED TO TAKE
OVER RG WAS NOT AS SEVERE AS
EXPECTED DUE TO THE WAR. COMMON REACTION
WAS DISMAY. THE WORSE WAS UDAY
WHO REFUSED TO ~~SHAKE~~ ^{SHAKE} HIS HANDS @ RG
FAC.

COMMON REACTION WOULD HAVE BEEN PRISON
@ THE MEETING 67 IN THE MEETING RG AIRPORT
Q, MINST. OF DEFENSE SULTAN ~~ABD~~ HASHEM
SAYIF AL-RAWI COMMDL OF RG
IBRAHIM ABD AL SATTAR CHIEF OF STATE MILITARY
STAFF CAME @ 900 W/ ABID
↓
TALKED W/ EACH PERSON INDV. ASKED QUESTIONS
DID NOT STAY LONG. GETTING UPDATES ON THE
US FORCES WERE MOVING.

AL-SATTAR TOOK CHARGE OF THE ARMY & RG
IN BAGHDAD AS HE WAS CIVILIAN OF AREA

AL-SATTAR TOLD A BEFORE THE WAR
SUGGESTED TO THE LEADERSHIP FOR A PEACEFUL
SOL. BUT WAS REFUSED.

SUGGESTIONS WERE MADE DURING MEETINGS
OF MILITARY LEADERSHIP SIMILAR TO JOINT
CHIEF OF STAFF

DID IZ IDA IGNORE MILITARY ADVICE DURING THE 1ST GULF WAR. DID NOT KNOW, BUT HIS FEELING AS A YOUNG OFFICER ^{DID NOT} WANTED TO GO TO WAR.

EVERYTHING COULD HAVE BEEN SOLVED EASILY IF ONLY UNSCOM INSPECTORS WERE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO DO THEIR JOBS.

BARZAN WROTE AN ARTICLE CRITICIZING DECIS. ^{OF OCCUPYING} KUWAIT WHICH WAS NOT ACCEPTED WARMLY BY Q. CRITICIZING BARZAN FOR WRITING IT. Q WAS YOUNG & ATTEMPTED SHOW HIMSELF AS A PERSON TO BE RECOGNIZED. IN 1991-1992

Q & HIS BROTHER TALKED BEFORE THE WAR & TOLD BRO TO TELL FATHER-IN-LAW THIS WAR WILL NOT BE AN EASY WAR LIKE THE PREVIOUS ONE. WHEN HE SAW HIS BRO IN CUSTODY TOLD HIM THAT HE TOLD HIM WHAT Q ASKED & I IGNORED HIM.

JAMAL'S OPINION #1 INSIDE WANTED PEACE BUT THE PRESSURE FROM OPPOSITION NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES THAT FORCED #1 TO SHOW HIS STRENGTH OR NOT BE SEEN AT ALL.

(5)

D's opinion the who creates war
will be remembered by what part
in history where one who seeks
peace will have a diff. place in
history

Eventually all the people will realize it
will be better for them. The hold up
is Palestine

HUSSEIN KAMAL - Did see a change in
leadership after the defection of HK. Even
though they never really took advice but
what they thought was right.

Q was going to be next president
#2 in IRAQ. Not just him all of
IRAQ.

HK was very trusted by #1

SALAH OMAR ALI - EMB. @ UN when mission
ended called back & he did not return
in mid 80s. Did MBR of party, ~~UNICEF position~~
& by not coming back would effect the
party.

HK told D he was going to the US to
convince Ali to come back based on
HK discussion that Ali was in danger.

6

Q IS IN CHARGE OF RL, COMES TO
BASE DAILY OR @ LEAST EVERY COUPLE
DAYS.

HE HAS BEEN IMPRISONED ~~BY~~. INITIALLY STATED
HE HAS NEVER BEEN TO A PRISON BUT
SAID HE VISITED PRISONS IN MILITARY
CAMPS TO SEE THE CONSTRUCTION & OR
THE SET UP.

DID NOT EVEN VISIT HIS COUSIN KHALID WHOSE
LAST IMPRISONMENT WAS DUE TO A DISPUTE
w/ UDAY. COUSIN ABU G.

RE HIS CURRENT POSITION. THIS MORNING ~~HE~~
HE THOUGHT THAT THE PLACE WAS WHERE
SADDAM WAS FREE & HAD PALACES BUT
NO THEY ARE ALL IMPRISONED DUE TO THEM
HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT THE PLACE
WAS BUT BELIEVED THIS WAS HOUSING
HIMAYA ~~AB~~ FOR SADDAM OR Q.

DEFINITION OF COOPERATION. ANSWER QUESTIONS
HE HAS INFO ON LOT OF DETAIL.

NOT CONCERNED ABOUT BEING TORTURED AS
HE KNOWS THE US IS COUNTRY OF LAWS AND
FREEDOM.

- NO TORTURE
- " MURDER
- " IMPRISONED
- " EXECUTION

7

HEARD OF

Cousin OF WIFE & HAD PROBLEMS W/ RELATIVES
I WAS EXECUTED AND BURNED. NO PUNISHMENT
DID NOT GET THE CRIME.

MOST IMPORTANT THING IS "YOU TRUST ME"
MORE THAN ANYTHING.

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b7C

HIS BIGGEST FAULT WAS ENTERING THE MILITARY
AS HE KNEW SADDAM WOULD LEAD THE
COUNTRY INTO AN UNK DESTINY

WMD

HE DOES NOT KNOW BUT IF THE INSPECTORS
DID NOT COME SADDAM WOULD HAVE OBTAINED
IT.

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9

He heard from [redacted] of a plot against
Citralabi. He and [redacted] agreed to inform
Citralabi & did so. (THE MUKITBARRA) 5 to 6
Mo. Then [redacted] with works for HMA

ARMED

Al Sultan

←→
Kamal Abdullah Mustafa al Nashiri

DOB 1955 May 4

Born in Tikrit - BA many clans in Tikrit - mihra

al Nashiri clan

Served in Army since

~~to 1984~~ since 2000, served in other
SE/Gen of Regt'l Groups.

In 1977, Grad Fm Military College

1977-2000 - Chief of Battal that repairs
anti-aircraft batteries.

then transferred on 17 July Armor Div.
took course ~~to transfer to~~ to ~~transfer to~~
became a trainer in the armor divisions

JAN 84 - went to staff officer's Academy

June '85 - graduated

↓
1st Brigade Repub Army

↓
10th Brigade to Armor Division
(Also in '85)

2-11-04

BAGHDAD

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b7C

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DATE 05-08-2009 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/rs

Done 87 - moved to base of the
Republican Guard.

'89 - moved to Special Republican Guard

'93 - Co. of ~~the~~ Repub. Guard

'94-

'98 - moved from one corps to another

'99 moved to last post

'02 (Feb) Appointed as advisor

They were putting someone in his place

10 Dys after war I was called by SATO
to come to Baghdad to take over
the Republican Guard but I refused.

As a military leader, we didn't think
that fighting was the solution.
Didn't want more blood to be
shed.

A fear of overwhelming US forces
or opposed to war

A - we wanted a peaceful solution

Was anyone in govt listening?

I told ~~Desay~~ I, hoped we could find
a political solution to this
we (trusted friends) behind in a peaceful
solution. It gathered w/ trusted friends about this.
b/c afraid SAMPAN or Desay would find out,
we would suspect a plot, etc.

Am too afraid to express & didn't do so
b/c SAMPAN wouldn't listen and
that he would not do anything
to support us.

Am no contact w/ SAMPAN himself
Am more contact w/ Desay —
This was around 1995. ^{He got it} Neither
SAMPAN + Desay wanted the war (but Desay
did not.) and neglected advice from
military leaders.

~~SAMPAN~~ said this is nothing
concerning you. This for politicians.

SAMPAN did not want to negotiate and
was stubborn.

...to me?
~~that~~ @ a year ~~ago~~ UN was here and I
approached SAMMAN.

After this SAT didn't call me again.
SAMMAN's reaction was one of dismay but
SAMMAN's reaction was not as severe b/c
war underway & mood different.

BUT, UDAY wouldn't shake his hand when
I saw him.

They normally would have put ~~him~~ ^{me} in jail.

Q - why did you do that?

SAT @ 9 April

1. OUSAY
2. Sultan Ashid - Mr. Refs
3. Sajeen - Co Rep'l Enl
4. ~~SAT~~ Abraham - AC CAS
5. SAMMAN came at 9:00 but unplanned
came w/ Abid @ 9⁰⁰pm

People giving STATUS to SAMMAN.
I didn't discuss directly w/ others - but
I don't think they wanted war.

Ibrahim told me they had ~~tried~~
suggested to the leadership that WAR WAS
not a ~~good idea~~ good idea. But leaders
not ~~listening~~ listening

1. SADR

2. Sayee Rashid

3.

4.

5. Qasbi

6.

Foreign Affairs

Air Force

NAVY

} like JCS

Not sure if meetings were regular
or not.

Re: 1st Gulf War

don't know - was young at the time
feeling of ~~wishy washy~~ however, All I say was that
we did ~~not~~ want to go to war.

Always with friends we discussed
our interest in being friends of USA.
We knew US support Iran helped to
keep Khomeini out.

Q: See difference in SAO + leadership
in 1990's after 1st Gulf War?

A: All could have been solved early
Obstacle to UN deal was only
if UN access had been granted early
to UN Inspectors, we could have avoided all this

An Article ^{written} by BARZANI was critical
of IRAQ's policy. —

He criticized his uncle for writing
article. Qasbi criticized it

2 Articles; 1991; 1992.

- Nothing happened to BARZANI
As a result of this, Barzani
had special relationship w/ SAO +
Qasbi so he could say these
things. More brave b/c of blood
relationship.

My brother was arrested.
I said tell your father in law this
war will continue until everything is gone
This time when I saw my brother

(Brother name = Jamar) As before,
Jamar ignored him

Jamal said he had feeling that
SADAM wanted peace but
the pressure he had from
opposition pressured him to
decide on combat.

In his opinion, all the problems
were created by Hussein.

* Two stubborn people clashed ~~to~~ in
(Khomeini + SADAM) And millions
of people died.)

* My opinion is the one who
creates war ~~that~~ will not
be viewed positively in history.

Most people even if they agree in
peace, react to what is happening at
the moment.

Eventually all the people will realize it
will be better for all of them & they
will want to peace & prosperity.
but the sensitive point is

Palestine.

Those who advocate violence are doing it
for show - others are saying,
Let's help Palestinians socially, etc.
i.e. build hospitals

Re: Hussein Kamran

• They never took advice from anyone
↓
SADAM
+
Ossey

Q • Did Ossey become #2 in Iraq
All Iraqis knew this & figured
Ossey would be next president.

Q: Hussein Kaman previously in a position of trust. Yes?

A: agree

Q: Became aware of plot in mid 80's
Sali Ali ^{omar} morali - Iraqi rep to UN (ing)
in USA was endangered.
He ended up not retiring to Iraq.
→ Had a unique position in the plot.

Q: What was his unique position in plot?

Rice + Booth PTJ

It was time for him to come home

Hussein Kamil told me he was going to
USA to try to convince morali to
come back home.

Q: In 1940's why did Hussein put up
obstacles to UN?

A: Asking for trouble

Spoke w/ Oesay b/c he was Head of Repub Guard

I forced myself to go to Oesay, even though I felt
some reluctance to do, in order to make my point

Agrees to pt that one who is not ready, tough discipline
the military will make him that way.

My questions / I didn't take notes during
my own questions

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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we [REDACTED] heavily agt to kill Chelabi
@ 5-6 mos before the war. our friend [REDACTED]
works for Chelabi.

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/11/2004

Kamal Mustapha Abdallah Al-Sultan Al-Nasri, born 04/04/1955 in Al-Tikrit, Iraq, was interviewed at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Department of Defense representative [redacted] was present during the entire interview. After being advised the identity of the interviewing agents as United States government representatives, he provided the following:

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Al-Nasri served in the Iraqi military for approximately 30 years. He graduated from the Military Academy in 1977 and served as the commanding officer of a anti-aircraft battery repair battalion until 1980. He was then transferred to the 17 Armored Division, where he changed his military specialty to trainer for the armored divisions. In 1984, Al-Nasri attended the Staff Officer College, graduating in June, 1985. Al-Nasri was transferred to the 1st Brigade of the Republican Guard (RG). Sometime later that year he was again transferred to the 10th Armored Brigade of the RG. In 1989, Al-Nasri joined the Special Republican Guard (SRG). In 1993, Al-Nasri became a commander of a RG brigade. In 1999, Al-Nasri assumed the Secretary General position of the RG. Additionally, in February, 2002, Al-Nasri became the presidential advisor to the Northern District of Kirkuk.

Al-Nasri claimed that ten days after the war with coalition forces began in 2003, he was summoned to Baghdad by Saddam Hussein and directed to assume command of the RG. However, Al-Nasri refused to comply with this directive. The military leaders did not believe that war was the best solution, and Al-Nasri personally did not want to shed additional blood. Al-Nasri and some of his close and trusted colleagues wanted a peaceful solution sought through political means. Approximately a year ago, Al-Nasri had approached Qusay Saddam Hussein, expressing his desire for a peaceful political solution. Qusay Hussein advised him that such matters did not pertain to him or the military but were at the discretion of the leadership. Many in the military shared Al-Nasri's sentiment but could not express it out of fear that it may reach Saddam Hussein or his son Qusay. Such opinions would most likely be interpreted as a revolt and would cause distrust by

Investigation on 02/11/2004 at Baghdad, IraqFile # 315E-HQ-1448534-69 Date dictated 02/11/2004
by George L. Pirob6
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Continuation of FD-302 of Kamal Mustapha Al-Nasri, On 02/11/2004, Page 2

Saddam or Qusay. Secondly, most felt that Saddam or Qusay would ignore or dismiss anyone's position which did not agree with them, as their position opinions were always deemed to be correct.

Al-Nasri denied having had frequent contact with Saddam, but acknowledged having almost daily contact with Qusay who oversaw the RG. Based on Al-Nasri's contact primarily with Qusay and to a lesser extent Saddam, he felt that since 1995, both Saddam and Qusay favored going to war. This conclusion was further supported by political decisions the two made. However, Uday Saddam Hussein wanted peace. None of this surprised Al-Nasri who described Saddam as stubborn, especially during negotiations.

Al-Nasri described Saddam's reaction to his refusal to assume command of the RG as less severe than he expected, and he attributed this to the immediate focus on the war effort. Saddam's reaction was one of dismay. The worst reaction was exhibited by Uday, who later refused to shake Al-Nasri's hand. Under other conditions, Al-Nasri's refusal of Saddam's order would have prompted Saddam to imprison him.

The meeting, which took place at the RG base, was initially attended by Qusay, the Minister of Defense, Sultan Hashim, the commander of the RG, Sayif Al-Rawi, the Chief of Staff of the military, Ibrahim Abd Al-Sattar, and heads of the various military branches. Later that evening at approximately 9:00 pm, Saddam arrived with Abid Hamid Mahmoud Al-Tikriti, Presidential Secretary. Al-Nasri was unaware that Saddam was coming to the base. Hussein talked to the military leaders present, receiving updates on the advancements of the United States forces. Al-Sattar took charge of the army and RG in the Baghdad area, as he was intimately familiar with the area. Saddam did not stay at the base very long.

According to Al-Nasri, Al-Sattar confided in him before the start of the war, that Al-Sattar had suggested to the Iraqi leadership that they should endeavor to seek a peaceful solution. Al-Sattar stated he made these suggestions during meetings of the various military chief of staff, but the Iraqi leadership refused. As he was a relatively young officer at the time, Al-Nasri is unsure whether the Iraqi leadership's practice of ignoring its military's advice played a role in the first Gulf War. With respect to the most recent war, Al-Nasri believed things could have been peacefully resolved if the United Nations Inspectors had been allowed to perform their inspections. Barzan Ibrahim Hasan Al-

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Continuation of FD-302 of Kamal Mustapha Al-Nasri, On 02/11/2004, Page 3

Tikriti, Saddam's half-brother wrote an article critical of Saddam's decisions. In response, Qusay was very critical of Barzan Al-Tikriti, whom Al-Nasri suspected was attempting to demonstrate his position of power despite his young age.

Recently while in custody, Al-Nasri saw his brother, Jamal Mustapha Sultan, who is also in United States custody. Jamal Sultan is the son-in-law of Saddam. Prior to the war, Al-Nasri had told Jamal Sultan to talk to his father-in-law and informed him that this war will not be an easy war and the results will be different from 1991. Jamal Sultan told Al-Nasri when the two saw each other in custody that he did speak to Saddam but he ignored Jamal Sultan. Al-Nasri felt Saddam did not have a choice, because he would have been seen as weak by neighboring countries or opposition groups.

Al-Nasri did see a change in the Iraqi leadership after the defection of Hussein Kamel, who was very trusted by Saddam. Al-Nasri had no doubt that Qusay was destined to be the next Iraqi President, and this was common knowledge throughout the country.

On one occasion, Hussein Kamel discussed with Al-Nasri concerns about Salah Omar Ali, the Iraqi Ambassador to the United Nations's, and Ali's allegiance to Iraq. Ali had not returned after completion of his assignment at the United Nations in the mid 1980s. Based on Kamel's statements, Al-Nasri believed Ali was in danger and alerted a friend of Ali to warn him. Al-Nasri also heard of a plot targeting Ahmad Chalabi by the Iraqi Moukhabarat approximately five to six months prior to start of the war. Al-Nasri claimed he and his brother warned a friend in Chalabi's camp, [] LNU, of this alleged plot.

Al-Nasri denied that he had ever visited a prison or been incarcerated in a prison in Iraq. He then stated that he visited some prisons in military camps to inspect their construction or set up. He claimed he did not even visit [] who was imprisoned several times with the most recent being in Abu Ghuraib prison due to a dispute with Uday. Al-Nasri claimed he has never tortured anyone nor ordered the torturing of anyone; he has never murdered nor ordered the murder of anyone; he has never imprisoned nor ordered the imprisonment of anyone; and he has never executed nor ordered the execution of anyone. He was aware of only one case of torture, and this involved a cousin of his wife who had problems with his relatives which resulted in his burning and execution. In

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Continuation of FD-302 of Kamal Mustapha Al-Nasri, On 02/11/2004, Page 4

this case, Al-Nasri believed that the punishment was excessive for the crime.

Al-Nasri blames his current predicament on the decisions and actions of Saddam. He recognizes that he and fellow detainees are currently being held in a facility which he believes may have been used as housing for either Saddam or Qusay's Himaya (protective detail).

Al-Nasri has never been concerned about his safety while in United States custody, as he is aware that the United States is a country of laws and freedom. He currently considers the most important thing for him is that the United States trust him. This, he claimed, was more important than his own health. Al-Nasri considers his biggest mistake in life was entering the military, for he recognized many years ago that Saddam was going to take Iraq to an unknown destiny. Al-Nasri claimed to have no information about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Nevertheless, he believes that had it not been for the United Nations inspectors, Saddam would have obtained such weapons.

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(File No.) 315E-HQ-1448534-

[illegible]

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 315E-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence FBIHQ

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received 5/11/04

From ABDUL-GHAN, ABDUL-GHAFOUR FLAYAH AL-MIDALAH
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

RAGHDA, IRAQ
(City and State)

By b6
b7C

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Description: ☒ Original notes re interview of

ABDUL-GHAN, ABDUL-GHAFOUR FLAYAH AL-MIDALAH

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GEORGE PIRB - NARA
HANSALEM - [REDACTED]

DDA CONTRACT
TRANSLATOR - [REDACTED]

①

5/11 #65

Date

No.

RELIGIOUS MAN FROM REL. FAMILY - MUST
BE HONEST AS RELIGION IS IMPORTANT.

UDAY WAS A MAJOR PROBLEM FOR D

WHEN SADDAM WAS IN POWER NO ONE COULD
STAND IN FRONT OF UDAY OR ALI - BUT
D TRIED. D WAS NOT LOYAL - AS 1ST ARGUMENT
W/ UDAY REMOVED FROM MINISTER OF [REDACTED]

AUTHOR OF 12 BOOKS IN CULTURE AND INFO
IN HIS POSITION BECAUSE OF HIS QUALIFICATIONS
NOT LOYALTY

BELIEVES WAS SENT TO BASRA BECAUSE IT
WAS A CULTURAL CENTER.

ABDUL GHANI ABDUL GHAFUR FLAYAH
AL-MIDLAG

BORN IN BAGHDAD - FAMILY ^{FROM} HANA, AMBAR

DOB - 7/1/1944 BELIEVES HE WAS BORN IN
1943

D WAS TOLD ~~HE~~ HE WOULD BE DETAINED FOR
NO LONGER THAN 3 DAYS BUT HAS BEEN
IN CUSTODY 360 -

(2)

12 MAN TOLD HIM HE WAS WANTED FOR
QUESTIONING & SHOULD NOT TAKE MORE THAN
3 DAYS. SAME MAN CONVINCED #13 TO
SURRENDER.



b6
b7C

CORRESPONDENCE W/ FAMILY LIMITED TO FAMILY
NEWS AND EVENTS.

CAMP ISOLATED COMPLETELY -

SINCE OI DID NOT HAVE INCOME. SMALL
POSITION W/ MINISTRY OF INFO FOR \$20.00

#9 - WITHIN THE CFT IN OI KEPT SALARY, CAR
PROTECTION. A 1 YR NO INCOME & SECOND YR
EARNED \$50 A MO.

DEMOTION -

1 - ~~SPREAD~~ > CLOSED UDAY'S NEWSPAPER - BECAUSE
RACIST, SPREAD HATRED BTWN SUNNI - SHIA, MUSLIM
- CHRISTIAN. HAD AUTHORITY AS MINST. OF CULTURE
AND INFO.

→ BABEL NEWSPAPER

HIS DECISION EVEN THOUGH ^{Date} HE KNEW THERE WOULD BE SERIOUS REPRECUSION. SENT UDAY A NOTICE & UDAY ANSWERED HIM VERY ANGERED.

— ARGUMENT W/ ALI HASAN AL-MASIDI.

Δ WAS OLDER AND SENIOR TO #5, BUT #5 WAS PLACED OVER HIM IN THE SOUTH (BASRA) DURING A 2001 MTC ALI SPOKE OUT AGAINST HIM, ~~HE~~ REPLIED FORCEFULLY TO #5 IN FRONT OF #1 & #6

IN 2001 Δ WAS A MBR OF REGIONAL COMMAND

TO BE REMOVED FROM PARTY, A MBR ITAS Δ BE CONFRONTED @ AT A BIG MTC & SADDAM SENT #6 & ASKED HIM TO RESIGN BUT Δ REFUSED, & WAS VOTED OUT AT WHAT EVER #1 WANTED HAPPENS.

WHEN Δ CLOSED THE NEWSPAPER, HE EXPECTED UDAY TO RESPOND W/ FORCE AS THAT WAS UDAY'S NATURE, BUT LIMITED TO Δ.

NOW WE CAN FIND OPPOSITION TO SADDAM, BUT Δ WAS ONE OF THE FEW WHO DID. MOST WERE VERY FRIGHTENED TO DO SO.

1991 BASRA -

Date

No.

PREV. SMT DECREE GIVING #5 POWER OVER SOUTHERN REGION.

A ITR FROM #1 W/ ORGANIZATIONAL CHART LISTING #5 AS IN CHARGE OF ALL THE ENTITIES. OCCURRED JUST PRIOR TO THE WAR.

DID NOT QUESTION #1 AS HE WAS HIS RELATIVE & #1 ONLY TRUSTED HIS FAMILY. BEFORE THE UPRISING, 2 DAYS BEFORE THE END OF THE WAR.

DURING UPRISING - IRANIAN INTEL OFFICERS TOOK PART IN THE PROTESTS SUPPORTED BY IRAQIS. THE SHAS (BOTH IRAQI/IRANIAN) ROSE UP W/ WPNS KILLING BATH PARTY OFFICIALS APPROX. 50 PERSONS, ~~AND~~ ^{SOME} # OF SHAS.

#5 FORMED A UNIT FROM THE IRAQI MILITARY TO QUEL THE UPRISING.

▷ HAD NO AUTHORITY OVER THE MILITARY & SECURITY SERVICE.

▷ FELT SADDAM DID NOT TRUST HIM. PERSONALLY EFFECTED BY SADDAM'S DISTRUST. BELIEVES THIS DISTRUST LED TO THE APPOINTMENT OF #5 OVER HIM.

DID NOT INTERROGATE ANYONE & WAS NOT RESPONSIBLE. Date No.

CSDV. OF BASRA ABDOULAT TALAB
SABAWI

MILITARY OFFICERS DID NOT TAKE ORDERS FROM
AR. PARTY OFFICIALS EXCEPT AT.

FEDAYKEN WERE UNDER UDAY & HAD VERY HIGH
COMPENSATION. VERY POWERFUL.
LURED BY THE MONEY & PRIVILEGES.

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 05/14/2004

Abdul Ghani Abdul Ghafour Flayah Al-Midlag, (Black List #65), date of birth July 1, 1944, was interviewed at a detention facility located at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Interviewing Agents identified themselves as representatives of the United States Government from Washington, DC. Department of Defense (DOD) representative [redacted] was also present, and observed the entire interview. [redacted] DOD translator provided Arabic/English translation. Ghafour provided the following information:

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Ghafour started by saying he is a religious man, and honesty is an important characteristic of being a religious person. Ghafour [redacted]

[redacted]

Correspondence with his family has been limited since his detention approximately one year ago, and he is not aware of current news or events within Iraq.

Ghafour has authored approximately twelve books regarding cultural issues in Iraq. He was the former Minister of Culture & Information (1996-1997) and believes he was chosen for this position because of his qualifications, and not because of his loyalty to the regime or Saddam Hussein. He was forced to resign from the Ministry of Culture & Information because he utilized his authority and closed down the offices of Babil, a newspaper formerly owned and operated by Uday Hussein. Ghafour advised it was his decision to close the newspaper because he felt the newspaper was racist and had a tendency to spread hatred amongst the Sunni, Shia, Muslims, and Christians of Iraq. Ghafour knew there would be serious repercussions for closing down the newspaper, and fully expected to lose his Ministry position. In addition, Ghafour expected Uday to retaliate by verbally chastising him, or possibly physically assaulting him. Ghafour was not worried about his family's safety because of his significant position within the government.

Regarding the 1991 Shia Uprising (Intifada) in the area of Basrah. Ghafour believes he was sent to Basrah because it was one of the cultural centers of Iraq. During this time period,

Investigation on 05/11/2004 at Baghdad, IraqFile # 315E-HQ-1448534 -70 Date dictated 05/14/2004by SSA George L. Piro
by SSA [redacted] tmib6
b7C

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Abdul Ghani Abdul Ghafour Flayah, On 05/11/2004, Page 2

Ghafour was the southern region Ba'ath Party Secretary and had responsibilities over the civilian Ba'ath Party. Ghafour acknowledged a decree from President Hussein which provided Ali Hasan Majid the authority over civilian and military Ba'ath Party members in the southern region to include Basrah. This authority was granted to Ali Hasan just prior to the first Gulf War. Ghafour did not question President Hussein regarding this decision, even though Ghafour's current position within the Ba'ath Party was senior to Ali Hasan's position.

Ghafour initially described and blamed the 1991 Shia Uprising on Iranian Intelligence Officers who were instigating the protests and violence against the Ba'ath Party officials. He then admitted there were both Iranian and Iraqi Shia's who armed themselves and killed approximately fifty Ba'ath Party officials in Basrah. Once Ali Hasan arrived in Basrah, he formed a unit from the Iraqi military to quell the uprising. Ghafour did not have responsibility or authority over the military and security service, and took orders directly from Ali Hasan. Ghafour knew that Hussein did not trust him since he was not related to him, and believes that was the primary reason he appointed Ali Hasan the Commander of the southern region. During the 1991 Shia Uprising in Basrah, Ghafour denied interrogating prisoners and did not take responsibility for any of the alleged atrocities or executions that took place. He maintained that he was responsible for the civilian Ba'ath Party and took orders from Ali Hasan.

Events surrounding Ghafour's removal from the Regional Command Council in 2001. During the course of a Regional Command Council Meeting in 2001, Ghafour spoke out and challenged Ali Hasan Majid within the presence of President Hussein. Subsequently, Hussein sent Ali Hasan to ask for his resignation. Ghafour refused to resign, and advised that in order to be removed from the regional command, a member must be confronted during a council meeting and voted out. Ultimately, the council voted Ghafour off the Regional Command Council. Ghafour advised he was the only outspoken person on the council that would challenge other council members to include Hussein. Ghafour believes that most of the council members were frightened to speak against and oppose Hussein.

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 315E-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence FBIHQ

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received 05/14/2007

From JAMAL MUSTAFA ARDALAH SULTAN AL-TIKRIT
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

BALHAMA IRAQ
(City and State)

By _____ b6
b7C

To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☒ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes ☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes ☒ No

Title: OPERATION DESERT SPIDER
FT- IRAQ

Reference: _____
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☒ Original notes re interview of

JAMAL MUSTAFA ARDALAH SULTAN AL-TIKRIT

PIRO.

HANSLER -
LINGUIST -

b6
b7C

BL#22 - SAMIR MUSTAFA ABDELLAH SULTAN AL-TIKRITI

Date 5/14/64 No.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 03-08-2009 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lr

- RUMORS THROUGHT THE CAMP THAT RAMADAN AND NAJID WERE NEGOTIATING WITH THE U.S. GOVT.
- GREAT RESPECT FOR SADDAM AND HIS BROTHER KAMIL - BECAUSE THEY ARE WITH EDUCATORS AND LIKE ENCYCLOPEDIAS.
- SADDAM - HIGH CAPACITY AS READER, HE KNOWS HE CAN CONVINCE PEOPLE THROUGH HIS INTELLIGENCE.
 - REFERS TO SADDAM AS HIS EXCELLENCY,
- AND TO ABID HAMID WITHIN
 - ABID HAS GREAT POWER AND INFLUENCE.
 - PRESIDENT IS THE LEADER OF THE MINISTERS (PRIME MINISTER)
- RESPONSIBILITIES AS ONE TO ABID HAMID.
 - ABID - CHARACTER → WORKAHOLIC, HARD WORKING
 - EDUCATED WITH A PH.D.
 - CONSIDERS PEOPLE IN HIS OWN WAY AS ABRASIVE MANNER
 - NOT VERY WITH PRESENT OF.
 - MOTIVATIONS → ENJOYS HIS WORK, WANTED THE SPOTLIGHT. ASSUMED THE ROLE BY FORCE AND NOT BY REQUEST.

- CONSIDERS ABID AS BE SPANISH

AND MADE INFORMATION ABOUT A MINISTER
~~JAMES~~ BUT ATTACHED THE MINISTERS COUNCIL MEETING
 AND NOT THE REC OR THE REGIONAL
 COUNCIL MEETING

- ABID WOULD ATTEND REC MEETINGS AND
 REGIONAL COUNCIL MEETINGS BUT WOULD
 ONLY AS LEAD IF THERE WAS A
 SPECIFIC ISSUE

- DOESN'T FEEL THE STRONG AS DETAINING
 BUT STRONG AS REFUSING. BECAUSE THE
 SERVICES IN THE COUNTRY WERE THE ATHLETIC
 PROGRAMS, PUBLIC MEALS, TRAVELING AT
 THE UNIVERSITY, ANY WORKING WITH
 THE ORPHANS.

- TRAY DOESN'T KNOW WHAT WILL
 HAPPEN IN THE FUTURE

- HE WILL DO WHATEVER THE LAW TO ASSIST
 SADDAM IN THE LEGAL SENSE. THROUGH
 AN ATTORNEY, ETC, TO LET HIM OUT.

- MARRIED HILMA SADDAM HUSSEIN
 IN 1994.

- AFTER MAY 2002, THEY ^{DEVELOPED} ^{NO.} HAD OCCASIONAL FAMILY GATHERINGS (SADAM, UDAY, QUSAY, HUSSEIN KAMIL'S FAMILY).
- UDAY MET MOST WITH SADAM MORE.
- UDAY FREQUENTLY MET WITH SADAM AT THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MEETING ONCE OR TWICE A WEEK.
- COUNCIL OF MINISTERS - NO MEMBERS - UDAY TALKED FOR UDAY ALIENATED WITH UDAY OF DISAPPOINTED AMONGST THE MINISTERS PRIOR TO THE MEETING.
- AFTER THE DISCUSSIONS UDAY WOULD BE A VOTE. SADAM WOULD GIVE HIS POINT OF VIEW THROUGHOUT THE DISCUSSION.
- SADAM WOULD MAKE THE FINAL DECISION AS THE VOTE.
- SADAM BELIEVES THERE WAS SOME FORM OF DEMOCRACY IN IRAQ.
- BELIEVES THE COUNCIL OF IRAQ WAS A VOICE.

④

- BELIEVES EMERGING A DEMOCRATIC No.
STYLE OF GOVT. WILL BE VERY
DIFFICULT IN IRAQ.

- DEFINITION OF DICTATORSHIP - ONE PERSON
RUNNING AND MAKING THE DECISIONS FOR
THE COUNTRY.

- AMERICAN MISTAKES WERE MADE WITH
EMERGING BRITISH RELATIONS WITH
THE D.C. ABOUT THE ARAB BOYCOTT
ISSUES.

- ABOUT THE INCLUSION OF KUWAIT
WAS WRONG.

- 1967-1992 ARAB CAMPAIGN - REGARDING
THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

- SAME BELIEF THAT SHOULD BE
RESPONSIBLE FROM THE TOP TO
THE BOTTOM.

- HAD A ^{WAZIR KHANSAHI} COUNCIL MEMBERS TOLD THE
MILITARY CHIEF OF STAFF ^{- NAZAR KHANSAHI} THAT THE GOVT. WAS
USED THE WEAPONS ^{AND} THAT THE PRESIDENT
WAS INVOLVED.

5

LEONARD LIND TO JONAS FILM

No.

1979 ^{5/24} MONTANA. LBJ NICHOL VIDEOS

FOR LBJ MONTANA ABOUT ONE MONTANA

7

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 05/14/2004

Jamal Mustafa Abdallah Sultan Al-Tikriti, (Black List #22), date of birth January 10, 1964, was interviewed at a detention facility located at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Interviewing Agents identified themselves as representatives of the United States Government from Washington, DC. Department of Defense (DOD) representative [redacted] was also present, and observed the entire interview. [redacted] DOD translator provided Arabic/English translation. Mustafa provided the following information:

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Throughout his detention period Mustafa has heard other detainees talking about Taha Yasin Ramadan and Ali Hasan Majid allegedly negotiating a deal with the United States Government. Mustafa has discounted these rumors since the aforementioned detainees are still in the custody of the Coalition, and doesn't believe the U.S. would enter into negotiations with these two individuals.

Mustafa has been married to Hala Saddam Hussein, daughter of Saddam Hussein, since 1994. Mustafa worked for Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Government since approximately 1983. He started out as a Himaya (protection for the President), and was promoted to various positions within the regime over the past twenty years. His most recent positions within the regime were Deputy Chief of Tribal Affairs, and Aid to the Presidential Secretary. He was expected to replace the most recent Presidential Secretary, Abid Hamid Mahmoud, had it not been for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

President Saddam Hussein, who Mustafa kept referring to as his excellency and Kamal Mustafa Abdallah (Black List #10), Mustafa's brother, are two people Mustafa has great respect for and admires the most. He respects Hussein because he is well educated, has a high capacity of knowledge, and has the ability to influence and convince people. He respects his brother, Kamal, because he is well educated and described him as having great encyclopedic knowledge.

He described Abid Hamid Mahmoud as an educated man with an advanced degree who was hardworking to the point of becoming a workaholic. Mahmoud was not very well thought of because he

Investigation on 05/14/2004 at Baghdad, IraqFile # 315E-HQ-1448534-71 Date dictated 05/14/2004by SSA George L. Piro
by SSA [redacted] tmi

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Jamal Mustafa Abdallah Sultan, On 05/14/2004, Page 2

attempted to control people by being strong and abrasive and not by earning their respect. Mahmoud was more influential than a Minister and wanted to be recognized by others within the regime. One of Mahmoud's responsibilities as Presidential Secretary was to attend the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) and the Regional Command (RC) meetings. According to Mustafa, Mahmoud would be asked to dismiss himself from those council meetings if there were particularly sensitive issues that needed to be discussed amongst the council members.

Mustafa's role as the Aid to the Presidential Secretary was to attend the Council of Ministers meetings. He did not attend the RCC or the RC. The Ministers meetings would be held approximately once or twice a week and would normally follow a set protocol. An agenda would normally be sent to each of the Ministers prior to the meeting. During the meetings, each of the Ministers would discuss relevant issues, and President Hussein would interject his opinions throughout the discussion. At the end of the discussion period, the Ministers would vote on the particular issues. Ultimately, the Prime Minister/President Hussein would make the final decision.

Mustafa never viewed the infamous video regarding the July 1979 meeting with the Ba'ath Party and other Iraqi Government officials. Interviewers explained to Mustafa the meeting was convened by President Hussein for the purposes of uncovering an alleged plot between Syria and certain Ba'ath Party and government officials to overthrow the current regime. Interviewers continued to explain that dozens of Ba'ath Party members and government officials were implicated in this alleged plot to overthrow the government and were either given lengthy prison sentences or executed. Mustafa acknowledged he has heard about this meeting/gathering but maintains he has never viewed the video. Mustafa would like to view this video the next time he meets with interviewers.

Mustafa believed that Iraq had a democratic style of government throughout Hussein's presidency, and also believed that the citizens of Iraq had a voice. Mustafa was challenged and asked for his definition of a dictatorship. He responded by saying a dictatorship was one person ruling and making decisions for the country. It was then pointed out to Mustafa that President Hussein was just reelected in 2002 for an additional seven year term, and during this past election, Hussein did not have opposition, and allegedly received one-hundred percent of the vote. Mustafa did

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Jamal Mustafa Abdallah Sultan, On 05/14/2004, Page 3

not have an answer regarding how it was possible to have one individual receive one-hundred percent of the vote. Interviewers told Mustafa about the current democratic style of government and the new constitution for Iraq. Mustafa commented that he believed it was going to be very difficult establishing that form of government in Iraq.

Interviewers engaged Mustafa in a discussion regarding the 1987-1988 Anfal Campaign against the Kurds of Northern Iraq. Mustafa believes the individuals that were responsible for using the chemical weapons against the Kurds should be held accountable. Mustafa learned at a Council of Ministers meeting that the Military Chief of Staff during that time period, Nizar Khazraji, was the individual responsible for ordering the use of chemical weapons without the president's knowledge.

Mustafa doesn't believe he should be detained, and stated he should be rewarded for his service to the Government of Iraq and its citizens. Examples of his service to the government and the people include his work with citizens public affairs, athletic programs, instructing at the University, and working with the tribes.

Mustafa admits there were mistakes made by Hussein during his reign. These mistakes include the invasion of Kuwait and the failure of the Iraqi Government to establish better relations with the United States. Mustafa advised he never had the opportunity to meet with Hussein privately and never provided Hussein with advice regarding any type of decisions. Mustafa would do anything, in the legal sense, to assist his father-in-law, Saddam Hussein, for his defense, to include hiring legal council.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 05-08-2009
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/rs
REASON: 1.4 (c)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-08-2034

~~SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

INE

Date: 05/20/2004

rism

Attn: ITOS II
SC M. Chris Briece
ASC [REDACTED]
UC [REDACTED]

rorism
Operations Center
: SSA [REDACTED]

o George L

[REDACTED] tmi

15E-HQ-1448534⁻⁷³ (Pending)

ERT SPIDER
- IRAQ

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(S)

~~Derived From : G-3
Declassify On: X1~~

b1

(S)

~~SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

DATE: 05-08-2009
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/rs
REASON: 1.4 (c)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-08-2034

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 05/20/2004

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: ITOS II
SC M. Chris Brieze
ASC [REDACTED]
UC [REDACTED]

From: Counterterrorism
Baghdad Operations Center
Contact: SSA [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Approved By: Piro George [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED] tmi

Case ID #: (U) 315E-HQ-1448534 -73 (Pending)

(U) **Title:** ~~(S)~~ DESERT SPIDER
IT - IRAQ

(S) **Synopsis:** ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]
(S) [REDACTED] (S)

(U) **Derived From:** G-3
Declassify On: X1

Details: (S/OR/NE) [REDACTED]

b1

(S/OR/NE) [REDACTED]

~~SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~/ORCON/NOFORN

To: Counterterrorism From: Counterterrorism
Re: (U) 315E-HQ-1448534, 05/20/2004

(S)

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b7C

(U)

b7E

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON DC

(U) For information.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~/ORCON/NOFORN

~~SECRET~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISEDEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
ORGANIZATIONAL MESSAGE FORMClassification per OGA letter dated
08/21/2009

TRANSMIT VIA:

☒ SAMNET
☐ NEPTUNE
☐ IIR SENT VIA ACS

PRECEDENCE:

☒ IMMEDIATE
☐ PRIORITY
☐ ROUTINE

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET
☒ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLASDate 05/27/2004

PAGE 1 OF 3

b1

DATE: 05-08-2009

CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/rs

REASON: 1.4 (c)

DECLASSIFY ON: 05-08-2034

(S) [REDACTED] /IMMEDIATE/

BT

~~SECRET~~CITE: 44-1318//

b6

b7C

(S) PASS: [REDACTED] FOR SSA [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: (S) [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED] FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SSA) GEORGE L. PIRO TO LONDON,
ENGLAND VIA AMMAN, JORDAN.

(S) SSA PIRO [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED] INTEND TO TRAVEL TO LONDON, ENGLAND VIA
AMMAN, JORDAN ON MAY 27, 2004 AND RETURN TO BAGHDAD, IRAQ ON MAY
31, 2004.(S) THE PURPOSE OF THIS TRAVEL IS FOR SSA PIRO TO CONDUCT
AN INTERVIEW [REDACTED] b1

(S) [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED] SA PIRO'S
TRAVEL TO LONDON, ENGLAND VIA AMMAN, JORDAN FOR THE PURPOSE
DESCRIBED ABOVE.

(S) IF NECESSARY, IDENTIFYING INFORMATION [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED] WILL BE FORWARDED UPON REQUEST.

(U) SA [REDACTED] BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION IS AS FOLLOWS:

b6

b7C

NAME: GEORGE L. PIRO
DOB: [REDACTED]
POB: BEIRUT, LEBANON
SSN: [REDACTED]
PPN: [REDACTED]
PPE: 12/13/2005(U) POINT OF CONTACT FOR THIS MATTER IS SUPERVISORY SPECIAL
AGENT [REDACTED] OR INTELLIGENCE ANALYST [REDACTED] b6
[REDACTED] IRAQ/SYRIA/LIBYA UNIT, ITOS II, b7C
COUNTERTERRORISM DIVISION.~~SECRET~~Approved by: [Signature]Case ID #/Serial: 315E-HQ-1448534 SERIAL 76Original Filename: TRAVEL.wpd

***** FOR SAMNET OPERATIONS USE ONLY *****

Time Received _____

SAMNET filename: JFV001S0.148Time of Transmission 1812

MAY 28 2004

MRI/JUL/ISN

1837-149-27DTG 028 1705mayor

2004 MAY 28 A 11: 16

COMMUNICATION CENTER

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
ORGANIZATIONAL MESSAGE FORM

~~^PAGE 2 OF 3 SECRET~~

~~DERIVED FROM: G-3; DECLASSIFY ON: X-1~~

BT
////

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
ORGANIZATIONAL MESSAGE FORM

^PAGE 3 OF 3 ~~SECRET~~

ADMINISTRATIVE NOTE/TICKLER COUNT:

(S) NOTE [REDACTED] FOR SSA GEORGE PIRO FROM BAGHDAD TO LONDON.

REFERENCE: 315E-HQ-1448534

DRAFTED BY: [REDACTED] JFV:JFV RM#: 4383 EXT: [REDACTED]

b1

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b7C

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 05/20/2004

To: Counterterrorism
Seattle

Attn: ISLU/ITOS II

From: Seattle

Squad 8

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

DATE: 05-08-2009

CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/rs

REASON: 1.4 (c)

DECLASSIFY ON: 05-08-2034

b6
b7C

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

(U) Case ID #: ~~(S)~~ 215E-HQ-1448534 (Pending)

(S)
(S)

(U) Title: ~~(S)~~ DESERT SPIDER;
IT - IRAQ

(S)

Synopsis: (S)

(U) ~~(S)~~

Derived From : G-3
Declassify On: X1

b1

Details: (S)

(S)

*EMAILS 3/ SE

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7C

HAVE
PROVIDE
BOC w/ ALL INFO!
E

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Seattle
Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534, 05/20/2004

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Read and clear. For additional information concerning the identity of this individual, contact SA

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140klr01.ec

◆◆

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~/ORCON,NOFORN

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Classification per OGA letter dated 08/21/2009

DATE: 05-11-2009
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/rs
REASON: 1.4 (c)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-11-2034

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 06/07/2004

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: ITOS II
SC M. Chris Brieze
UC [REDACTED]
ORS
SC Frankie Battle
UC [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

From: Baghdad Operations Center
Desert Spider Team

Contact: George L. Piro, [REDACTED]

b2

Approved By: Piro George [REDACTED]

Drafted By: Piro George L: [REDACTED] 79

(U) **Case ID #:** ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534 (Pending)

(U) **Title:** ~~(S)~~ DESERT SPIDER;
IT - IRAQ

Synopsis: ~~(S/OC,NF)~~ To report results of debriefing [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) **Derived From :** G-3
Declassify On: X1

Details: (S/OC,NF) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b1

(S/OC,NF) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~/ORCON,NOFORN

~~SECRET/ORCON,NOFORN~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Baghdad Operations Center
(U) Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534, 06/07/2004

(S)

(S/OC,NF)

(S/OC,NF)

b1

(S/OC,NF)

(S/OC,NF)

~~SECRET/ORCON,NOFORN~~

~~SECRET/ORCON,NOFORN~~

(U) To: Counterterrorism From: Baghdad Operations Center
Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534, 06/07/2004

(S)

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(S/OC.NF)

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(S/OC.NF)

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~~SECRET/ORCON,NOFORN~~

~~SECRET/ORCON,NOFORN~~

(U) To: Counterterrorism From: Baghdad Operations Center
Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534, 06/07/2004

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~~SECRET/ORCON,NOFORN~~

~~SECRET/ORCON,NOFORN~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Baghdad Operations Center
(U) Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534, 06/07/2004

(S/OC.NF)

(S/OC.NF)

(S/OC.NF)

b1

~~SECRET/ORCON,NOFORN~~

~~SECRET/ORCON,NOFORN~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Baghdad Operations Center
(U) Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534, 06/07/2004

LEAD (U):

Set Lead 1:

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT ITOS II

(U) Information provided for review.

♦♦

~~SECRET/ORCON,NOFORN~~

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 06/12/2004

Sultan Hashem Ahmed Muhammed Hamid Al Jabburi Al Tai, (Black List #27), date of birth July 1, 1945, was interviewed at a detention facility located at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Interviewing Agents identified themselves as representatives of the United States Government from Washington, DC. FBI Language Specialist [redacted] provided Arabic/English translation. Hashem provided the following information:

b6
b7C

From approximately January 1987 to July 1987, Hashem was the Commander of the VI Corps of the Iraqi Army, located in Amarah, which is in the Southern Region of Iraq. In approximately July 1987, Hashem became the Commander of the I Corps for a forty-five day period, then returned back to command the VI Corps. On February 19, 1988, Hashem was appointed to command the First Anfal Campaign. This was a temporary command position, as he still had the duties of commanding the VI Corps. The temporary headquarters for the First Anfal Campaign were located in Sulaminiyah, located in the Northern Region of Iraq. Hashem advised during the First Anfal Campaign, Jalal Talabani's group, known as the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), fled to Iran. Hashem was then appointed as the Commander of the I Corps on April 1, 1988.

Hashem was selected to become the Commander of the First Anfal Campaign by President Saddam Hussein, the Minister of Defense, and the Army Chief of Staff. The Army Chief of Staff, Nazar Khazraji (phonetic), met with Hashem and informed him the plans were already prepared for the First Anfal Campaign, and he was officially designated the temporary Commander. Khazraji provided Hashem with ten officers, maps which delineated his geographic areas of responsibility, and advised him to start preparing. The Iraqi Military Intelligence (Istikhbarat), prepared intelligence reports regarding the PUK and their relationship with the Iranian forces, and disseminated these reports to the military for purposes of strategic planning. Sabir Abd Al Aziz Husayn Al Duri (Black List #205) was the Director of the Istikhbarat during this time frame. A decision was previously made that they would concentrate their efforts during the First Anfal Campaign from East of Sulaminiyah to the Iranian border.

Investigation on 06/10/2004 at Baghdad, IraqFile # 315E-HQ-1448534-81 Date dictated 06/12/2004

by SSA [redacted] tmi

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b7C

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Sultan Hashem Ahmed Muhammed Hamid, On 06/10/2004, Page 2

During the First Anfal Campaign, Hashem was in charge of the IV Division, the 33rd Division, and approximately one-hundred National Defense Command Battalions (Jahsh), and reported directly to Khazraji. The V Corps of the Iraqi Army assisted with the Anfal Campaign, and was led by Lt. General Na'ama Faris Al-Mahyawi (phonetic). According to Hashem, the I Corps Commander, General Kamel Sachet (phonetic), developed the plan for the First Anfal Campaign. Interviewers reminded Hashem that in his previous interview on May 28, 2004, he was proud of the fact that he was the one who developed the military plan for the First Anfal Campaign. Hashem maintained it was General Sachet's plan, even though he was the one selected to command the First Anfal.

The mission for the Anfal Campaign was to remove the Kurdish population from the Northern Region of Iraq, and force them across the border to Iran. There was pressure on the Iraqi military to quickly clear the Northern Region during the First Anfal Campaign because they believed there was information to suggest the Kurdish resistance had devised a plan to encircle and take over the city of Sulaminiyah. Hashem wanted to proceed with the military plan slowly and cautiously because of the extreme winter weather conditions, and advised if they had hurried the plan, they might have been defeated.

During the Anfal Campaign, Hashem advised he was never ordered to use, nor did he order the use of chemical weapons (CW). Hypothetically speaking, Hashem stated he would have deployed CW if he was directly ordered; otherwise, if he would have refused a direct order, he would have been executed.

Hashem viewed a copy of a document in Arabic that was dated April 6, 1987. The subject of this document was "Using the Special Ammunition." Hashem claimed he had never seen this document, but did acknowledge that special ammunition was a word utilized to mean CW. Hashem initially denied the use of CW during Anfal, but then recanted, and acknowledged CW were utilized, but were not deployed by military units under his command. (A copy of the document viewed by Hashem, along with the English translation will be maintained in a FD-340/1(A) envelope).

Ali Hasan Majid was in charge of the Northern Command Bureau, however, according to Hashem, the military would only follow the orders given by the Army Chief of Staff. Hashem advised the Army Chief of Staff would normally accompany Majid. The orders

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Sultan Hashem Ahmed Muhammed Hamid, On 06/10/2004, Page 3

were delivered in written form and telephonically. Hashem did not meet Majid until after the First Anfal Campaign was over.

Hashem viewed copies of two documents in Arabic dated May 9, 1987, and May 20, 1987. The subject line in both of these documents read "Sites of Iranian Agents." Hashem advised he had never seen these documents, and believes his predecessor would have read them. (A copy of the documents viewed by Hashem along with the English translations, marked Document #7, will be maintained in a FD-340/1(A) envelope).

Hashem viewed a copy of a document in Arabic dated April 26, 1988, regarding the use of the "special ammunition" against targets that deserved punishment. Hashem acknowledged this document and advised it dealt with the Kurds. Hashem maintains that the Iraqi Army did not have, nor did it deploy CW. He believes there was another unit with CW, because it took specialized training to utilize these types of weapons, and the Army didn't go through this type of training. Hashem could not provide the name of this unit or who they may have reported to. (A copy of the document viewed by Hashem, along with the English translation, marked Document #14 will be maintained in a FD-340/1(A) envelope).

Hashem viewed a copy of a document in Arabic dated June 23, 1987, regarding "Dealing With the Villages That Are Prohibited For Security Reasons." Hashem advised he is familiar with this document, in particular paragraph number five of this document which describes captured individuals being interrogated, and those between the ages of fifteen and seventy must be executed after any useful information had been obtained from them. (A copy of the document viewed by Hashem, along with the English translation, marked Document #15, will be maintained in a FD-340/1(A) envelope).

Hashem advised the I Corps of the Iraqi Army were involved with the other Anfal Campaigns, and personnel involved with those Anfal Campaigns would file reports that were reviewed by him. During the First Anfal Campaign, when the Iraqi Air Force were needed, Hashem would request the Air Force assets through the Army Chief of Staff, or the Deputy in Charge of Operations. In the request, Hashem would provide the Air Force with targeting information. The Air Force would then review the requests/orders from the Minister of Defense, and would then carry out the orders.

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Continuation of FD-302 of Sultan Hashem Ahmed Muhammed Hamid , On 06/10/2004 , Page 4

Hashem viewed three copies of documents in Arabic dated March 22, 1988, April 1, 1988 and May 1, 1988 respectively. The three documents again describe the use of "special ammunition" and "special strikes" that occurred in the Northern Region of Iraq during the Anfal Campaign. After reviewing these documents, Hashem only responded by saying Iyad Khalid Zaki (phonetic) was the Commander in charge of the Second Anfal Campaign and subsequently became the IV Corps Division Commander. (A copy of the documents viewed by Hashem, along with the English translation, marked Document #12 will be maintained in a FD-340/1(A) envelope).

Hashem viewed two additional copies of documents in Arabic, both dated May 22, 1988. Both documents were in reference to the Anfal Campaign and the use of "special ammunition" and "special strikes." Hashem could not specifically comment on either document, however, he concluded after viewing all of the documents that another group or specialized unit must have deployed the CW. (A copy of the documents viewed by Hashem, along with the English translation, marked Document #16 will be maintained in a FD-340/1(A) envelope).

Hashem believes President Hussein, the Minister of Defense, and Army Chief of Staff should be held responsible and brought to justice for the chemical weapons attacks that occurred during the Anfal Campaign.

Hashem viewed video footage of the Anfal Campaign that was videotaped by a Kurdish film crew. The video contained footage of the aftermath of the chemical attack of Halabja. The video contained images of numerous victims of this attack. Hashem was visibly disturbed by the images; however, after viewing the video, he advised if he had been ordered to carry out a CW attack he would have followed the orders and done so.

Hashem advised the orders to utilize CW would have been communicated from President Hussein, to the Minister of Defense, to the Army Chief of Staff, and then conveyed to the special unit charged with deploying the CW. Again, Hashem advised the special unit may have been attached to the Army or possibly the Air Force, but could not provide any further details regarding this special unit.

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 315E-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence FBIHQ

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received 06/10/04

From SULTAN HASHEM AHMED MUHAMMAD HAMIA
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee) AL SARRURI AL TAI

(Address)

BAGHDAD, IRAQ
(City and State)

By _____

To Be Returned ☐

Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes ☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes ☒ No

Title: OPERATIONAL DESERT SPIDER
IT- IRAQ

Reference: HASHEM. 302. TMI. 06/10 2004
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☒ Original notes re interview of

SULTAN HASHEM AHMED MUHAMMAD HAMIA AL SARRURI

b7D

-LEAD

LS

SULTAN HASHEM AHMED MUHAMMED HAMID
AL SABER, AL TAI

Date 6/10/04 No.

BL#27 - DDB: JULY 1, 1945

SAU

1987 - COMMANDER OF VI CORPS IN THE
SOUTHERN REGION OF IRAQ. (IN AMARA).

FEB 19, 1998 - ASKED TO COMMAND AFTH I

EAST OF BUKHARA, IRAQ/IRANIAN BORDER

- SULAIMIYA - TEMP HEAD COMMANDER OF AFTH
IN ADDITION TO HIS RESPONSIBILITIES
TO COMMANDING CORPS VI,

- JALAL TAHERANI - FIRST FLAG OF IRAQ

APRIL 1998 - RELIEF COMMANDER OF
THE I CORPS.

JULY 1997 - COMMANDER OF I CORPS

FOR 45 DAYS THEN WEST BAHU

TO BE THE COMMANDER OF VI CORPS

FOR 19, 1998

COMMANDER I CORPS UNTIL SEPT 1989.

- MOVED TO BAHU AND BAHU

DDB CHIEF OF STAFF FOR THE ARMY.

- RESPONSIBILITY WITH LOGISTICS

- MAJ. KHARATI - WAS THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF
AT THE TIME.

SECRET

- HE WAS ~~CHIEF~~ BY THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE, PRESIDENT, AND CHIEF OF STAFF TO LEAD THE 5 AIRBORNE COMMAND.
- MET WITH THE CHIEF OF STAFF WHO INFORMED HIM THAT PLANS WERE SET ON THE AIRBORNE I AND HE WAS TO BE THE TEMPORARY COMMANDER. 10 OFFICERS WERE APPOINTED TO HIM.
- PROVIDED MAPS AND AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY AND TOLD HIM TO SPOT THE AREA.
- THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PROVIDED THEM WITH RECENT SAZAL TAZABAN'S LOCATIONS, AND THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE IRANIANS.
- THE FILMS WITH THE TAZABAN'S CAMP LOCATIONS APPEAR, 20 DAYS.
- CHIEF OF COMMAND FOR AIRBORNE I.
 - HE ANSWERED TO NAZAR KHA KHAN RASI - CHIEF OF STAFF.
 - ORDERS → HAD ALREADY DIVISION ON THE GROUND THAT WERE GOING TO CAVESTIMATE EAST OF SAMANIZAH TO THE IRANIAN BORDER.
 - THE 1502/1503 FOR PURPOSES OF CONCENTRATING ON SPECIFIC AREAS CAME FROM MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (IKSTABHARAS)

- THE V CORPS ASSISTANT IS IN AMMAN.

- COMMANDER OF V CORPS WAS

LT. GENERAL SA'ADAH FARIS AL-MAHYARI

- JORDANS WAS IN CHARGE OF THE 3 DIVISIONS

- IV DIVISION - INFANTRY DIV.

- 33 DIVISION - INFANTRY DIV.

- NATIONAL DEFENSE COMMAND AUTHORITY - APPAR,
100 BATTALIONS (TAMM)

SABIR

- THE ASSISTANT WAS IN REMOTE AND
KINDS AND FORCE MADE IT NO PLAN
OF IRAN.

- MILITARY INTELLIGENCE HAD BEEN IN THE
INDEX ON THE PESHAWAR SIDE
AS #S, ROUTES,

- I CORPS ^{COMMANDER GENERAL} ~~GENERAL~~ KAMER SAKET DEVELOPED
PLAN FOR AMAN. DID NOT MODIFY THE
PLAN EVEN THOUGH HE WAS IN CHARGE
OF THE SPECIAL FORCE KNOWN AS AMMAN.
MODIFIED PLAN AND CALLED IT IT HAD BEEN

- SABIR HUSSEIN - DIR. OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE.

THE HAD SOME USED PREPARE FOR
REPORTS OF WORK/INTELLIGENCE AND PROVIDE TO
THE MILITARY OF STRATEGIC PLANNING
PURPOSES.

- THAT WAS IN A PURT TO "CLEAR"
UP THE AREA BECAUSE THERE WAS
INFO TO SUGGEST THAT THERE WAS
AND DANGER A PLAIN TO EN-CIRCLE
AND TAKE OUT SUMAMWITAN.

- HASTON ADVISED HE WANTED TO TAKE
IT SLOWLY, FROM 0730H ~~800H~~ BECAUSE
OF THE HARSH WEATHER CONDITIONS TO
ENSURE VICTORY. HE ADVISED IF THE HAZARD
THEY MIGHT HAVE LOST.

(- IF HE WAS ORDERED TO UTILIZE CHEMICAL
WEAPONS HE WOULD HAVE BEEN
DISCREPANT HE WOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED,

- DENIED THAT HE NEVER KNEW ABOUT
THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS OR ABOUT
ANY OF THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

- DENIED USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

- VIEWED DOCUMENT - COM IN ARABIC
PAGE (1) → SPEAK AMMUNITION
DATED APRIL 4, 1987.

- CLAIMS HE HAD NOT SEEN THE LETTER.

- ACKNOWLEDGES THAT SPEAK AMMUNITION WAS
A CODE FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

- ACKNOWLEDGES CHEMICAL WEAPONS WERE USED
BUT NOT BY HIM UNDER HIS COMMAND.

- AZI HAZAN MASHI WAS THE HEAD OF THE NATIONAL COMMANDS BUREAU. BUT THE MILITARY USED AND FROM THE CROSS GIVEN BY THE CHIEF OF STAFF. (TELEPHONE AND WRITTEN CROSS)
- MOST OF THE TIME WITH MASHI WAS DONE AT WITH ACCOMPANIED BY THE CHIEF OF STAFF
- NEVER MET AZI HAZAN MASHI ALONE ANYTIME.
- VIEWS DUE #7 - THESE CROSS DID NOT GET ISSUED TO HIM. CLAIMS THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME HE HAD SEEN THE DOCUMENT. THE CROSS WAS CLEAR AND HE BELIEVES THAT MUST HAVE BEEN FOLLOWED BY THE DIRECTOR.
- VIEWS DUE #14 - ACKNOWLEDGE LETTER REGARDING DURING WITH ON BASIS IN THE PROHIBITED AREAS. ~~SOON~~ BY AZI HAZAN MASHI.
- CLAIMS ARMY ~~DIRECT~~ DIDN'T HAVE CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

- Army never got criticism regarding
Ozawa's report was accurate with
this was unusual with these types of
warfare, because it took specialized
training and he only didn't go through
the training.
- HE DOESN'T KNOW WHAT THE UNIT WAS OR
WHAT THEY REPORTED TO

VIEWED DOZ. #15 - PARAGRAPH #5 4/5.

- AWARE OF THE DOCUMENT IN
PARTICULAR PARAGRAPH #5.

SIGNED BY THE ARABIA NEWS AND AMERICAN
BY THE CHIEF OF STAFF

- PROHIBITED AREA

- WOMAN 2 CHILDREN AND NEW COMBATANTS
WERE ALREADY CAPTURED AND TAKEN FROM
THE AREA

- THE 1 CORPS WERE INVOLVED IN THE
OTHER ARAB CAMPAIGNS, REPORT WERE
TAKEN BY THE PERSONAL AND TO REVIEWED BY
SULTAN HASAN

Date

No. 7

- HE WOULD REQUEST, THROUGH THE CHIEF
OF STAFF AND/OR DEPUTY IN CHARGE
OF OPERATIONS TO REQUEST ASSISTANCE
FROM THE AIR FORCE. AIR FORCE
WOULD RECEIVE ORDERS FROM THE MINISTRY
OF DEFENSE. IN THE REQUEST, HE WOULD
PROVIDE TECHNICAL INFORMATION.

VIEWS DOZ #12⁺ - HAS KNOWN ZAKI WAB IS CHIEF OF
THE ARMY. WAS THE CORPS COMMANDER AFTER THAT.
VIEWS DOZ #16⁺ - ORDERS WERE UTILIZING SPECIAL
WEAPONS.

- HE CONSIDERED THAT ANOTHER GROUP
MAY HAVE UTILIZED CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

- CHIEF OF STAFF, PRESIDENT, MINISTER
OF DEFENSE SITUATION OF HAD
RESPONSE FOR UTILIZING CHEMICAL
WEAPONS. AND ORDERED TO DETECT.

- VIEWS VIDEO OF ARMY, FILMED BY
KURDISH NEWS. IF CORPS WOULD COME OUT AND THEN
CORPS CAME FROM IRAQ TO
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF
TO THE DESIGNATED UNIT.

Date

No.

8

- SPRING UNIT > OFFICIALS TO THE
ARMY OR POSSIBLE THE AIR FORCE.
- GENERAL HAMID SHABAN

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 315E-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence FR/HQ

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received 06/11/2004

From SABIR ABD AL AZIZ AL DURI
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

BAGHDAD, IRAQ
(City and State)

By _____

To Be Returned ☐ Yes

☒ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes

☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes

☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes

☒ No

Title: OPERATION DESERT SPIDER
IT-IRAQ

Reference: SABIR.302.TM1.06112004
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☒ Original notes re interview of

- SABIR ABD AL AZIZ AL DURI

SABIR ABD AL AZIZ HUSAYN AL DURI Date 6/21/54

1947 - DIRECTOR OF IKSTABART.

- COMMUNICATION.

- COLLECTED INFO FROM ALL SOURCES AVAILABLE

- SPIES, etc, SABIN EQUIPMENT, ARRESTS,

- AIRMAN RECORD.

- 5 BRANCHES / IKSTABART

1) COLLECTED INFO OF ALL OTHER COUNTRIES EXCEPT IRAQ

2) ~~IRANIAN BRANCH~~ FROM INFO

3) IRANIAN BRANCH -

3#) GENERAL SECURITY (MILITARY) - WORKING WITH

4#) TECHNICAL BRANCH.

5#) ADMINISTRATIVE.

- ARABIC CAMPAIGN - THE SECTION WAS SPECIFIC TO
THE KUWAIT. WORKING FROM
THE 1ST BRANCH TO THE SECOND
BRANCH.

- PERSON IN CHARGE OF SECTION THE
GENERAL WALID KHALID. IN
CHARGE OF THIS SECTION DURING
ARABIC.

- MISSION OF ARABIC - 4 MONTH BATTLE IN

IRAK WITH IRANIAN FORCES. IRANIAN

MILITARY WAS VICTORIOUS. ARABIC WAS 4th.

DISA, THE IRANIAN CONTINUED TO BEING
 BASRA. THE IRAQI POLICE RESOURCES
 FROM OTHER FRONT TO DEFEND BASRA.
 IRAQI DISCOVERED A LACK OF TROOPS
 AND THE SCAR, IN SUZANNIYEH AREA.

- IRAQI TOLD ADVANTAGE OF THE LACK OF
 TROOPS IN THE NORTH.

- THE KUWAITI / AMERICAN COALITION
 COOPERATED WITH THE IRANIAN

- BALANCE SHEET, THEY PROVIDED THE
 IRAQI GOVT CONCERN TO DELIVER A
 PLAN - JABOON, MINISTER OF DEFENSE,
 CHIEF OF STAFF, DR. HANAN MARI,

- HIS ROLE WAS TO CONTROL THE AND
 DRINK FROM THE THE KHALI ZUM
 OFFICIALS - JABOON, PROSECUTOR GEN,
 MOA, CHIEF OF STAFF,

- Committee - PLANNING OF THE
 - MOVEMENT OF TROOPS
 - INFORMATION

- COMMITTEE STARTED WORK FROM
 INFORMATION AND COULD UP WITH A
 PLAN AND SOLUTION. BEING THE
 RECOMMENDATION OF THE COMMITTEE

- USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS SECRETLY
WAS AT THE HEART OF THE
PRESIDENT.

→ CHAIN OF COMMUNICATIONS OF THE
CWS. SADDAM → PRESIDENTIAL SEC → ARMY CHIEF OF
STAFF / MINISTER OF DEFENSE →
(AIR FORCE)

CWS → ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF OR THE CORPS COMMANDERS
CWS → AIR FORCE → MINISTER.

" DIVISIONS "

→ SPECIAL UNIT → FOR KILLING / MURDER.
DISPERSED CWS

→ DIVISION WITHIN THE ARMY

CORPS → CHEMICAL DISBURSEMENT DIV.

FORWARD AND THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF OR
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF

- SUMMARY

DREW A DIAGRAM → (STRUCTURE OF
CWS PROGRAM IS THE
MILITARY)

ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF → CHEMICAL DISBURSEMENT DIV.
↓
BATTALION & CHEMICAL SCHOOL
↓
DIVISION (CORPS)
↓

CORA I - WOULD HAVE A
~~LEADER~~ CUS ADVISOR ATTACHED TO IT.

- AL BAKR BASE - HQ HEADS THIS IS
 THE BASE THAT SPREAD NO DISSENT
 THE CUS FROM,

- HAMID RASA SHALAH ^{PLANT} → STATIONS AT AL BAKR.

BASE. AIR FORCE SQUADRON COMMANDER,
 ORDERS FROM ^{HAMID} ~~HAMID~~ SHA'BIN IN DIRECTION →
 AIR FORCE COMMANDER.

→ COMMANDER FOR THE FIGHTS AT THE BAKR BASE,
 HAMID THROUGH SOME DETAILS ~~THE~~ ^{THE} THAT
 HE WAS THE PLANT OF DEIR CUS AND HAMARSA

- LEADERS FOR PLANT WERE FROM THE
 BAKR BASE THAT DEPOSITED THE CUS AND
 HAMARSA.

- WHEN HAMARSA FEL UNDER IRANIAN CONTROL,
 SALAMINIAH WAS OBLIVIOUS. HE AND HIS

DEPUTY WERE IN SAMARRA, WHERE THEY
 TO SALAMINIAH ^{TECHNICAL AND PERSONAL} THAT

HAMARSA HAD BEEN GROSSLY.

BELIEVES THAT LEADERS OF THE FROM
 AND NOEL OFFICER

HIS UNDERSTANDING OF POWER - TWO PERIODS
 - ANNOUNCED DEMAND - TO REFORM

THE KURDS, GIVE THEM RIGHTS
 AND WAYS TO IMPROVE THEIR LIVES,
 - HOODS DEMAND - REFORMATION OF "CLARK"
 THE AREA OF SPECIAL LAWS
 TERRORISM / TERROR.

CLARK THE AREA INFRA MODERN
 THE KURDS WANTED. DIDN'T WANT
 THE KURDS TO COMPARE WITH
 THE IRAQIANS. THEY DESERVE
 WILLING AND RESPECTS FROM
 EVERY ONE RESPECTING.

(- SADDAM HUSSEIN DOESN'T CARE ABOUT
 ANYBODY. HE WILL DO ANYTHING
 TO STAY IN POWER.)

* Punishment for Saddam - DOESN'T WANT
 HIM PUT TO DEATH, BUT WANTS HIM
 TO SUFFER. KILLS SADDAM DESERVES
 THE CONDEMNATION.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 05-11-2009 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/rs

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 315E-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence FBIHQ

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received 05/27/04

From MOHAMMAD HAMZA AL ZUBAYDI
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

BAGHDAD, IRAQ
(City and State)

By _____

To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☒ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes ☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes ☒ No

Title: OPERATION DESERT SPIDER
KT - IRAQ

Reference: HAMZA-302.tmi. 05272004
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☒ Original notes re interview of

MOHAMMAD HAMZA AL ZUBAYDI on 05/27/2004

- DOO HANDLER

(LNU)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 05-11-2009 BY 60324 uc baw/cab/rs

MUHAMMAD HAMZA AL ZAKI, - BL#9 Date 5/27/04 No.

DOR: JULY 28, 1938

POB: MAHAWIL IN RAHIL, IRAQ

b6

b7C

REBORN

- 1956 ONE OF THE ORIGINAL MEMBERS OF THE BA'ATH. USED MICHAEL ALEA.
- JOINED THE BA'ATH FOR THE ARAB UNITY.
- PRINCIPLES → ~~LIBERTY~~, FREEDOM AND EQUALITY
- DOESN'T BELIEVE IN BA'ATH PARTY
IT'S ALREADY ONE OF ITS GOALS
IT SEEMS FOR.
- SERVED IN THE IRAQI GOVT. BEFORE
HE JOINED THE BA'ATH FOR THE
PRINCIPLES IN THE BA'ATH
PARTY.
- @ 1962/1963 MET SADDAM AT A
BA'ATH PARTY CONF.

- AKA SEC. IN RELATIONSHIP WITH

No. 2

SADAM, SADIQ A DISCREET
REMARKS

- ACKNOWLEDGES HE WAS A TRUTH
FULL LEAD CASE OFFICER

- WOULD HAVE NEEDED ACHIEVED HIS
HIGH LEAD POSITION IF HE WASN'T
A BAKHT PARTY MEMBER

- FORMER PRIME MINISTER WHO
WORKED CLOSELY WITH THE PRESIDENT

- GOES TO MAKE THE POINT OF
IRAQ - ECON. ADMINISTRATION AND
ABOUT SEC. SERVICE AND LEAD CASE

- DESCRIBE SADAM HUSSEIN - STRONG MAN,
PART OF BAKHT PARTY

- THINKS SADAM'S LEAD WAS SEC. IN
SERVICE

- BIL PAGE OF IRAQ'S PROBLEM WAS THE
IRAQI IRAN WAR.

- DOESN'T KNOW WHY HE IS IN CURRENT
BECAUSE HE WAS RETIRED FOR 2 YEARS

- LEFT POSITION AS A 4 YRS AGO. @ 2000

- BILLYS PROBLEM WAS IRAN BECAUSE THEY WANTED TO DEFEAT IRAQ.
- BEFORE IRAQ WAS THE #1 ENEMY AND BILLYS IRAN WAS EXCELLENT RELATIONS WITH THE US.
- 1991 - BEFORE BILLYS HE WAS THE TRANSPORTATION MINISTER.
- HEARD OF INJURIES OF KUWAIT WITH IT WAS TRAINING IN MORRIS.
- MIKE HAD BEEN DEATH RANK MINISTER.
- * - 1991 INTIFADA - WOMEN HAD BEEN AS IRAN HESSEIN.
- REMEMBERING CONSIDERING ~~INTERVIEW~~ MEETING WITH TRIBAL LEADERS AND COMMUNITY LEADERS ON SCOT AND UPRISING.
- BILLYS IRAN WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR SHIA UPRISING.
- IRAN WAS THE CAUSE OF ALL PROBLEMS.
- SAUD ASKED HOW TO GO TO NABIRIYAH TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM IN A PEACEFUL WAY. BECAUSE IT WAS A SHIA.
- REPUBLIC GUARD AND SAUDI FORCES WERE PLACING THERE IN NABIRIYAH.

- HE WAS THE MAIN PHASE IN RITHAK AND STRIKING.
- HIS ORGANIZATIONS OF BASTARD IN NASIRIYA
- IRAQIS → STARTED TO MAKE PASSING FOR THE LOYS, LOYING, PRESENT, VIOLENCE AGAINST THE BATH OF BATH AND THE IRAQI LOYS.
- KHAMIS TO BATH BATH LOYS AND WOULD A CHANGE.
- MAINLY THAT IRAQI WOULD TO ALOFT INTO AND WITH BEING THE WARS.
- ESTABLISHED HE IS SUCH HE CAUSING HIMSELF BATH AND IRAQI.
- COMMANDER OF REPUBLICAN GROUPS IN NASIRIYA - KAMAL MUSTAFA
- COMMANDER OF BATH BATH MILITIA
- AZIZ SAHIL AL-NURAN - BATH BATH LEADER - ASSISTANT TO ANZAR
- REGULAR ARMY - COMMANDER BY KAMAL MUSTAFA
- WEAPONS → AUTOMATIC RIFLES, LIGHT WEAPONS. NO GUNS, NO HEAVY WEAPONS.
- * - NEVER WITNESSED OR HEARD ABOUT THOSE KILLING REFUGEES.

Date

No. 5

THE ENJOYER EXPENSE WAS HANDLED
IN A PROPER MANNER.

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 05/29/2004

Muhammad Hamza Al Zubaydi, (Black List #9), date of birth July 28, 1938, was interviewed at a detention facility located at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Interviewing Agents identified themselves as representatives of the United States Government from Washington, DC. Department of Defense (DOD) representatives [redacted] (LNU) were also present, and observed the entire interview. FBI Language Specialist [redacted] provided Arabic/English translation. Hamza provided the following information:

Hamza was born in Mahawil, Babil, Iraq. [redacted]

[redacted]

b6
b7C

Hamza was personally acquainted with Michael Aflaq, the originating founder of the Ba'ath Party in Syria; and in 1956 helped form and organize the Ba'ath Party in Iraq. Hamza decided to help form the Ba'ath Party in Iraq because he believed in the principles of the Party which were freedom, equality, and Arab unity. He served in the Iraqi government because he wanted to assist in achieving the goals of the Ba'ath Party. Hamza believes the Ba'ath Party fell short of achieving all of its goals, but did not specifically elaborate which goals it failed to achieve.

Hamza acknowledged he was a high level government official, and advised he would not have risen to this level if he wasn't a Ba'ath Party member. As the former Prime Minister of Iraq, Hamza worked closely with President Saddam Hussein, and was responsible for administering social justice and labor laws. Hamza believed the goal of the Iraqi government was equality for its people.

Around 1962 or 1963, Hamza first met and became acquainted with Saddam Hussein at a Ba'ath Party conference. He strictly had a professional relationship with Hussein over the years and rarely socialized with him. He described Hussein as a strong man, who was a leader of the Ba'ath Party. He believes that Hussein's goal for Iraq was social justice for the people. Hamza believes that the Iran-Iraq war, which lasted from 1980 to 1988, was one of the main problems that led to the demise of the Iraqi

Investigation on 05/27/2004 at Baghdad, Iraq

File # 315E-HQ-1448534-83 Date dictated 05/29/2004

by SSA George L. Piro
SSA [redacted] tmi

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315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Muhammad Hamza Al Zubaydi, On 05/27/2004, Page 2

government and the country. Hamza believes that Iran was Iraq's number one enemy because he believed Iran wanted to occupy Iraq. Hamza believes that Iraq, in the past, had an excellent relationship with the United States.

Hamza retired from his government position in approximately 2000, and doesn't know why he was arrested and detained by Coalition forces.

In 1991, Hamza believes he was either the Minister of Transportation, or possibly the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq. He learned of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait while he was traveling in Morocco. Hamza allegedly did not have prior knowledge of Iraq invading Kuwait.

After the United States liberated Kuwait in 1991, Hamza was telephonically contacted by President Hussein, and was directed to travel and take charge of the southern city of Nasiriyah. Hamza believes he was chosen to be in charge of Nasiriyah and resolve the 1991 Shia Intifada (Uprising) in a peaceful manner because he was a Shia. Even though he is a Shia, Hamza first considers himself to be a Ba'thist and Iraqi. He believes that Shia's from Iran were the cause of the 1991 Intifada, and had learned that they were revolting against the government. According to Hamza, there was wide spread looting and violence occurring against Iraqi government officials and Ba'ath Party members in Nasiriyah. Hamza maintained that the 1991 uprising was started by Iran because they wanted to invade and occupy Iraq. By the time Hamza arrived in Nasiriyah, the Republican Guard and Special Forces were already there to quell the uprising. Hamza remembers conducting meetings with the various tribal leaders, community leaders, and elders in Nasiriyah to help resolve the situation and quell the uprising in a peaceful manner.

During the 1991 uprising, the Commander of the Republican Guard Forces and Regular Army in Nasiriyah was Kamal Mustafa. The Ba'ath Party leader, and Hamza's assistant was Aziz Salih Al Numan. Hamza advised the Republican Guard Forces and Regular Army were equipped with light weapons, and did not have access to, or utilize armored tanks or helicopters.

Hamza maintains that he never participated, witnessed, or directed any tortures, executions, violent acts, or other atrocities during the 1991 uprising in Nasiriyah. Hamza advised the 1991 uprising was handled entirely in a peaceful manner.

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 315E-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence FR1 HQ

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received 05/28/2004

From SULTAN HASHEM AHMED MUHAMMED
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee) AL SABIRI AL TAI

(Address)

BAGHDAD, IRAQ

By _____ b6
b7C

To Be Returned ☐

Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes ☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes ☒ No

Title: OPERATION DESERT SAVER
IT-IRAQ

Reference: HASHEM, 302, TM, 05282004
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☒ Original notes re interview of

SULTAN HASHEM AHMED MUHAMMED HANIA
AL SABIRI AL TAI

BLA27

L5

SULTAN HASHEM AHMED MUHAMMED HAMUD Date 5/28/84 No.
DOA: 7/1/85 al-Tai

- DOESN'T BELIEVE HE DID ANYTHING WRONG,
AND SHOULD BE IN COURT.
- NEVER TOOK ADVANTAGE OF HIS POSITION

- DISCUSSED CRIMINAL ACTS SINCE 1979
1987-1988 DESCRIBED A SKIRMISH WITH
THE KINGS REBELS THAT WERE BEING
FIGHTING IN A LG BY THE TIME
IN SARAWAK. (MUCHIMAT, ISOTIRIPAT, SARIN
SARIN OFFICE, OFFICE)

- BECAME COMMANDER OF THE 1ST CORPS
ON MARCH 1, 1988.

- COMMANDER OF ARMY FROM MARCH 1, 1988 - MARCH 20/21ST 1988
WAS ALSO THE 6TH CORP COMMANDER.

- WHEN WAS A SPECIAL TASK HE WAS ASSIGNED

- RESPONSIBILITY IS CHARGE OF 3 DIVISIONS, 30,000 SOLDIERS

HUNDRED BROTHERS @ 50,000 KINGS

- NO DESERTERS - MARCH OF THE PUNISHMENT.

R1 #27

Date

No. 2

WITHIN THE REGION THE AFM COMMANDER
AND FIRST CORA COMMANDER THE
WRITING & VERBAL ORDERS CAME FROM
SADAM → MINISTER OF DEFENSE → ARMY CHIEF
OF STAFF → SOLDIERS.

- VERBAL ORDERS FROM NAZAR KHORRAMI

- AFM WOULD THREATEN PLANNING
AND SET UP.

- NAZAR TOLD THEM HE WOULD COME
TO BE IN CHARGE OF AFM. (2 FEB 1992)

- TOLD THEM TO BECOME FAMILIAR
WITH THE PARADOXICAL AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY

- MISSION OF AFM → KICK OUT THE
THE FORCES TO THE IRAN AREAS

- WAS TO BEGIN MARCH 1, 1992

- TEAM OF 10 OFFICERS WOULD ASSIGNED
TO DO THE PLANNING OF AFM.

MISSION { - "KICK THEM OUT AND DEPLOY THEM
SO THEY (KURDS) CAN DO THE 'PAPERWORK'" }

- WRITING ORDERS →

→ GET THE 1000 ENOUGH PERSONNEL TO

CARRY OUT THE MISSION

- EXPECTED TO OVERSIGHT KURDS

= HAD AN ARMED DIVISION AND ALL OF THE ORGANIC
WEAPONS THAT WAS WITH THESE FORCES

- UNK TO REQUEST AIR ASSETS.
- 9 DIFFERENT MODES OF ATTACK
DESIGNED TO KILL THE KURDS
TO FREE FORCE TO IRAN
- SMALL NUMBER OF CAPTURED KURDS
BY THE IRANIAN ARMY
- ESTABLISHED HIDEOUTS, MOUNTAIN, MOUNTAIN,
MOUNTAIN.
- USAN VOLUNTEER KURDS TAKEN ON
RETURN ARMY TO ISRAEL.
- NO PRISONERS CAPTURED.
- WHEN THE KURDS FLED MANY
ALLEGEDLY TOOK THEIR AMMUNITION
AND CAPTIVITIES
- BEGINNING OF MARCH 1982.
- DIDN'T SEE USAN OR CAPTURED
IN THE TOWN/VILLAGES
- USAN WAS ONLY IN CHARGE OF
THE 1ST ANKAL CAMPAIGN. ONE OF
THE 2 TOTAL CAMPAIGNS
- ALI HASSAN WASID WAS IN CHARGE
OF THE ENTIRE AREA.
- KURDS SPREAD/REMOVED THE KURDS FROM
KURDISH RANCH.
- ANY FURTHER WOULD BE TAKEN BY THE
INTELLIGENCE SERVICES ~~REMOVED~~.

STORIES → ~~THAT THE KURDS~~ ~~WERE~~ KILLED OR
DISAPPEARED. → KURDS

- SOMEONE THINKS THAT MISSING KURDS WERE
EITHER KILLED, SAVED OR FLED.

- ONLY PLACE HE HEARD THAT THOUSANDS
OF KURDS WERE MISSING WAS
THROUGH KURDISH RADIO.

- "THOUSANDS OF KURDS, WE DON'T KNOW
WHAT HAPPENED TO THEM"

- WOULD REVIEW REPORT REGARDING
CASUALTIES AND PRISONERS TAKEN.

- BELIEVES THE KURDS WERE DISAPPEARED
THE NUMBERS

5/28

BL #27

(1)

SINCE SEP 16 2000 8.5 MONTH Date

No.

b6
b7C

BEGAN MIL SERVICE 40 YEARS AGO

- ACCEPTED TO MIL SCHOOL 1963
- GRADUATED JAN 1 1964
- SERVED ALL THIS TIME SINCE THEN IN ARMY
- WAS M.O.D.
- from platoon cmdr to Chief of Staff + M.O.D.
- injured 4 TIMES, IN IRAN + KUWAIT

- SADAM WAS RESPECTED BECAUSE HE WAS COMM IN CHIEF
"BECAUSE I RESPECT MYSELF EVERYONE RESPECTS ME"

ARMY SECTOR MATES "ATMAN ASAADI" former Minister

SAAD TOMA "Tom" former M.O.D.

• GENERAL KNU

• HASEN MAGIN (BRO TO CHEM ALI)

• SOMEONE ELSE RELATED TO CHEM ALI

• PALESTINIAN

• KHALIL

• DR. ASSAM BAKI CENTRAL

DISCUSS FUTURE w/ OTHER ^{Date} DETAINEES No.

~ JAIL ATMOSPHERE PROBLEMS, "MISTAKES"

IRAN WAR, AGENT WAR

~ CONFIDENT HE DIDN'T DO ANYTHING WRONG
WRONG = STEAL / BEAT UP OTHERS / TAKE ADVANTAGE

MINISTER MAKE SIGNATURE OF POSITION

S. TWO SONS ARE TRAILOR DRIVERS w/ COUSINS

GETTING GOOD SALARY, NO NEED FOR S. TO BE
CORRUPT S. NEVER TOOK ADVANTAGE OF HIS
POSITION

NOBODY KNOWS WHAT IS HAPPENING RE: FUTURE
DIDN'T EVEN ASK DURING FAMILY VISIT AS
GUARDS WERE PRESENT. SOME RUMORS SAY
PEOPLE MAY GET OUT

who might never be set free? HYPOTHETICALLY SADDOM
HUSSEIN WOULD ADMIT ALL WRONG DOING

SADDOM SHOULD TAKE BLAME FOR

THIS IS A GOOD COUNTRY. WE HAVE MANY
RESOURCES THAT COULD ALLOW ALL TO LIVE COMFORTABLY.
I WAS UNIFORM TO EVERY WAR FOR IRAQ. Why fight
U.S. (strong w/ resources) WE WERE WEAK w/
resource. THIS MISTAKE. WAR AFTER WAR AFTER
WAR

SADAM WRING-DOING:

③

Date

No.

AGREEMENT FOR P.O.W. EXCHANGE WAS
PART OF GEN SWART MEETING RE SURRENDER
NEGOTIATION INCLUDING S. PRESENTING OF P.O.W.
LIST. S. WAS DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF.
SADI TOMA WAS M.O.D.

DID SOMEONE ACT ON THEIR OWN? NEVER.
ANYONE W/ P.G. WOULDN'T KNOW THE NAMES
WHO SHOULD BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE CAN ANSWER
QUESTION. "I DIDN'T SEE IT"

"EVERY DAY HEARS ABOUT IT W/
KUWAITI NEWS BROADCAST"

NOBODY TALKED TO ME ABOUT IT.

IRAQI GOV PUT OUT INFO SAYING

THIS ISN'T TRUE

— WHOEVER DID THIS SHOULD GO TO JAIL

— HEARD ABOUT KIDS GETTING KILLED

HEARD POLICE ARRESTED KIDNAPERS & KIDS &
PUT THEM IN JAIL; PEOPLE ^{INTEL STAFF} CONNECTED TO SADAM

A.C. AMN

M.I

INTELL

SPECIAL SECURITY FORCES

1991 + DEFENSE

1987?

SILVERMAN BETWEEN
SECURITY FORCES & PEOPLE
VERY SMALL, EXPOSED IN 1988

(4)

KUARDS CARRYING GUNS + AGAINST

IRAQI GOV., SECURITY FORCES ^{Relp} PUT THEM IN
JAIL. THIS WAS GOING ON ALL THE TIME.

M.G. SULMINEYAM

DURING WAR IF NO FOLLOW ORDERS... THEN HOW
WAR OR NO WAR

NEVER GOT AN ORDER TO RUN UP PEOPLE OR
ARREST PEOPLE

NEVER REFUSED, OR REGRET NOT REFUSING
AN ORDER, OR GIVE ONE NO, NO, NO
^{ERGO} ~~AS~~ EVERY MILITARY ORDER YOU
WERE INVOLVED IN, YOU AGREED WITH THEM.

WAR IN 87 / ARMY + RIFLE TOTING KUARDS

- GROUP TALIBANI KUARD GROUP WANTING TO FIGHT
IRAQI ARMY. SO MANY OF THESE SKIRMISHES
BOMBERS OF IRAN + INSIDE IRAQ (TWO DAYS,
FEW DAYS, WEEKS)
- A GROUP OF 20 KUARDS SEE SOFT TARGET IN
IRAQI ARMY AND ATTACK IT.
CAVES, 5 MAN TEAMS, IRANIAN ARMY HIGHER

KURNS

5

SOMETIMES FIGHTING IN ^{DE}BIGGER SCALE

ANFAL: S. WAS THE LEADER

DUKAN TO ^{Baron} ~~ANFAL~~ OF IRAN

S. WAS I CORPS COMMANDER

ANFAL WAS 'SPECIAL TASK' (1 TEAM 6)

S. WAS CORPS COMMAND. MINISTRY HEADED BY
SADDAM (OVERALL) M.O.D. + CHIEF OF M.I.

GENERAL LEADERSHIP:

SADDAM PUT S. IN CHARGE. S GOT THIS THROUGH
C.O.S. SADDAM → M.O.D. → C.O.S. → S.

3/20 → ENDS 88

WRITTEN + VERBAL

BEGAN @ BEGINNING OF MAR 88

- KAMEL SAJIT WAS IN CHARGE I CORPS.

S. TOOK OVER FOR HIM APRIL 1ST

- WAS A GOOD OFFICER, KILLED BECAUSE DEALING

WITH SADDAM'S AFFAIR IN OFFICE, "AGAINST SADDAM
+ AGAINST BATH"

U.S. 1983 RETIRED, BEFORE THAT WAS IN JAIL

↳ CAME BACK TO ARMY, HUNG AS BRIG

COMP 9/8 4TH DIVISION SALAMNAY

AFTER GOT HUNG AS DIV. CMDR. SUMMAYR

AFTER R.G. DIV COMMAND

(C)

KAME SACIT

AFTER 91 WAS ADJUTANT IN ^{Date} PRES. BATAF OFFICE
AFTER KILLED

ANFAL OVER MARCH ??

I CORPS

WHILE ANFAL C.O. VI CORPS COMMANDER BECAME
'SPECIAL TASK' C.O. AFTER 10 DAYS PART
ANFAL TOOK OVER I CORPS
20/21 MAR/ ANFAL ENDED

ANFAL C.O. DUTIES: 3 DIVISIONS + 100 BATTALION
OF ICNARS, 30,000 IRAQ DIV

30,000 TROOPS ZERO DISCIPLINE

OR DISCIPLINE PROBLEMS

1.) AFRAID OF PUNISHMENT

2.) ICNARS HAD BEEN W/ OTHER ICNARS

7

VERBAL ORDERS

Called him from VI Corps ^{D-20} Central Command
NIZAR AL HIZARI, in NIZAR'S OFFICE S.
WAS GIVEN ^{VERBAL} ORDERS (WRITTEN ORDERS FOLLOW)

↳ TALKED ABOUT ANFAC OPERATION
WE HAVE EVERYTHING PLANNED AND SET UP
FOR THE I CORPS. SINCE I CORPS WAS
ONLY FIGHTING IN MOUT, NIZAR SAID YOU
WILL BE IN CHARGE, THESE ARE YOUR TROOPS,
LOOK AT MAPS + AREA + WE WILL VISIT YOU SOON
THIS ^{WAS} MID FEB. MISSION: KILL OUT ALL KURDS TO
THE BORDER, PRIOR TO OP, LONG TO MARSH
WEATHER, WE WILL PREPARE IN ORDER TO
ADAPT TO COLD WEATHER.

Assigned TEAM OF 10 planning OFFICIAL FOR STAFF
MISS KILL THEM OUT DESTROY THEM
THEY FLEE TILL BORDER.

→ S got written orders SITUATION &
MISSION. S. DEVISED PLAN ABOUT EXECUTION.

S. CONSIDERED MARSH CONDITIONS INTO PLANNING.
- S. THOUGHT HE HAD HUGE ARMY AND KURDS
WERE SMALL (^{WAS} EASY TO OVERWHELM)
A prong thrust was planned;


- AMBITION SUPPORT ARMS ON REQUEST


- BACK DOWN TO IRAN DESIGNED SO RETREAT TO
IRAN ABLY

7a

Date

No.





Date

No.

Handwritten text along the right margin, possibly a date or page number.

SMALL CASUALTIES / FROM SABON = TWO
WAR CASUALTIES

INFANTRY :

HELICOPTER : NO FACE TO FACE ON DOON

ARTILLERY : TO DOON FIGHTING; CAVES

ARMOR : IN AREA; BEFORE USING

ON AN ARMY WOULD CREAT WITH
IC-ROD, INAD ARMY IN TRAIL
VOLUNTEERS

BEING IN MARCH → MARCH 20/21

ABOUT 5:PM BEFORE ~~WITNESS~~

IC-ROD WITH MORE GOT RID OF AMMO SO

INAD - COULD NOT USE THEM.

AFTER FIGHTERS LEFT THE AREA I WOULD
VISIT. 20 ROADS WERE OPENED, DIDN'T SEE
EVEN ONE STRAHLER STAY BEHIND

ALL MARIO WAS OVERALL COMMANDER

~~IV~~ CORPS

SPECIAL TASK TUNIS THAB

"SPECIAL TASK"

b6

b7C



AFTER: HEARD STORIES OF DEATHS NO. PULLHI,
WHERE DID THEY GO, WHAT HAPPENED TO THEM.

PEOPLE RESPONSIBLE FOR WHOLE AREA UNDER ALI HASAN
S-MACIN ARE THEY DEAD, IN JAIL.

HEARD THESE THINGS

Where are the people jail, hospital, missing,
- ESCAPED
- KILLED THOUSANDS } KURDS NEWS
- IN JAIL

ONLY NEWS OF ISSUE OF MISSING KURDS
WAS FROM RADIO

THE DIVISION WHO ARRESTED 10 CIVILIANS
WROTE UP A REPORT.

IRAQI ARMY ~~WRITES~~ UP KIA REPORT
NOT ALWAYS ACCURATE HEAD OF CORP

RADIO: EXAGGERATED NUMBERS

DIV
M.I.
C.O.-5

ANFAC | REPORTS WERE ACCURATE
RADIO WAS UNACCURATE

Now war is over with ^{Days} Kurds, before
the info was ~~was~~ inaccurate, now it
is ~~so~~ being reconciled.

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 06/01/2004

Sultan Hashem Ahmed Muhammed Hamid Al Jabburi Al Tai, (Black List #27), date of birth July 1, 1945, was interviewed at a detention facility located at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Interviewing Agents identified themselves as representatives of the United States Government from Washington, DC. FBI Language Specialist [redacted] provided Arabic/English translation. Hashem provided the following information:

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b7C

Hashem surrendered to Coalition forces in September 2003, and believes he should not be detained because he hasn't done anything that would justify his incarceration. He tried to justify this statement by saying he was respected as a career military man and never took advantage of his position. He has had the opportunity to have one family visit which occurred on January 15, 2004. [redacted]

[redacted] He does not know what the future holds for him, and is unaware of current events regarding Iraq. He has heard rumors throughout the detention facility that some of the detainees may be released.

He respected Saddam Hussein because he was the Commander in Chief and President of Iraq. However, he did not agree with all of the wars that Iraq has fought throughout the years, especially the war with the U.S. and Coalition forces. He believes Iraq is a good country, and thinks that Hussein should take responsibility for his actions. He believes that Hussein's poor decisions ultimately led to the demise of the Iraqi government.

Hashem discussed his forty year career within the Iraqi military. He was accepted into the Iraqi Military School in 1963 and successfully graduated from it on January 1, 1964. After graduating from military school, Hashem worked his way through the military ranks and held various positions from being a Platoon Commander, a Lt. General, Chief of Staff, to ultimately becoming the Minister of Defense. During the course of his military career, Hashem sustained battlefield injuries on four occasions, during the Iran-Iraq war, and conflict with the Kurds in Northern Iraq.

Hashem discussed what he described as a skirmish with the Kurds in the Northern part of Iraq between 1987 and 1988 known as

Investigation on 05/28/2004 at Baghdad, IraqFile # 315E-HQ-1448534-85 Date dictated 06/01/2004by SA [redacted]
SSA [redacted] : tmib6
b7C

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Sultan Hashem Ahmed Muhammad Hamid, On 05/28/2004, Page 2

the Anfal Campaign. During the First Anfal Campaign Hashem was a Lt. General, and commanded the VI Corps of the Iraqi Army which was based in the Sulamaniya area of Iraq. Hashem was officially selected to become the Commander of the First Anfal Campaign on March 1, 1988. There were both written and verbal orders received from Baghdad which descended through the chain of command from Saddam Hussein to the Minister of Defense to the Chief of Staff to Hashem regarding his appointment. In approximately February of 1988, Nazar Khazraji (phonetic) met with Hashem and told him that he was chosen to be the Commander of the special task known as the First Anfal Campaign. Khazraji provided Hashem with ten officers and directed him to start planning and becoming familiar with his areas of responsibility in the Northern part of Iraq. Hashem advised the mission of the Anfal Campaign was to remove the Kurdish population from the Northern area of Iraq, and either destroy them, or make them flee to Iran. Hashem commanded three (3) Army Divisions and one hundred (100) Battalions which consisted of approximately eighty thousand soldiers for the First Anfal Campaign. With the number of military personnel under his leadership, and the weaponry at his disposal, Hashem expected to overpower and defeat the Kurdish resistance.

Hashem utilized artillery, armor, infantry, and helicopters during the First Anfal which took place from March 1, 1988 until approximately March 20-21, 1988. Hashem did not have direct operational control over other air assets (Air Force), but was able to request those resources when needed. There were nine different avenues of attack utilized in the First Anfal which were designed to allow for the Kurds to flee across the border to Iran. According to Hashem, the army engaged the Kurdish resistance fighters predominantly in caves, and there was little fighting within the cities/villages. There were few casualties suffered in battle by the Iraqi Army during the First Anfal, and there were just as many casualties suffered from exposure to the cold weather conditions. He never received an order to round up people or arrest them. Hashem maintained that no prisoners were captured by the army forces he was commanding during the First Anfal, and that he never personally witnessed any women or children casualties. He advised that when the Kurdish fighters would flee a specific area, they would take their casualties and ammunition with them. Hashem stated that any prisoners taken would have been taken by the Iraqi Intelligence Services. Hashem wanted to emphasize that he was only in charge of the First Anfal Campaign, and that Ali Hasan Majid was the overall Commander, and was in charge of the entire Northern region of Iraq. He advised there were a total of eight Anfal

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Sultan Hashem Ahmed Muhammad Hamid, On 05/28/2004, Page 3

Campaigns directed against the Kurds. Subsequent to the First Anfal Campaign, Hashem became the Commander of the I Corps of the Iraqi Army on April 1, 1988.

After the Anfal Campaign was concluded, Hashem first learned of missing Kurds through Kurdish radio broadcasts. He had heard stories and rumors that there were thousands of Kurds that had seemingly disappeared. Interviewers challenged Hashem and told him that it was inconceivable and implausible that he first learned of the thousands of missing Kurds through Kurdish radio. Hashem further stated that he never discussed the issue of the missing Kurds with any of his friends, relatives, superiors, subordinates, or peers. Hashem believes the thousands of missing Kurds were either killed, jailed in Iraq, or fled to Iran. Interviewers pointed out to Hashem that earlier in the interview he advised that his troops did not capture prisoners, and thus how could he make a statement to suggest that a portion of the missing Kurds were in jail. Hashem clarified by saying that none of the troops that he commanded took prisoners, however, other troops or forces had taken prisoners during the course of the Anfal Campaign. He came to know this from reading battlefield situation reports. Hashem believed the Kurds were exaggerating the figures of the missing.

Regarding the first Gulf War in 1991, and the surrender and subsequent return of Kuwaiti POW's. Hashem was the Deputy Chief of Staff for the Iraqi Military during this time frame, and answered to the Minister of Defense, Sadi Toma (phonetic). Hashem was selected to meet with General Norman Schwartzkopf to negotiate Iraq's surrender, and turn over the list of Kuwaiti POW's. Hashem never witnessed atrocities or executions that occurred regarding the Kuwaiti POW's. Hashem learned of the missing POW's through Kuwaiti news broadcasts, but maintained that he never spoke to anybody about this particular issue. Anyone with the Republican Guard would not know the Kuwaiti POW issue. He was then asked who should be held accountable for these missing POW's, Hashem responded by saying he could not answer that question. He did not hear about it, nor did anyone talk to him about this issue. He reiterated that he heard about this issue through daily Kuwaiti news broadcasts. The Iraqi government allegedly refuted this by broadcasting their own version of the events via the radio and television. Hashem doesn't believe anyone acted on their own regarding the situation of the Kuwaiti POW's, but stated that whoever was responsible for this should be held accountable.

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Continuation of FD-302 of Sultan Hashem Ahmed Muhammad Hamid, On 05/28/2004, Page 4

Hashem was a career military man, and advised that he never refused a direct order, nor has he regretted giving a direct order. Hashem advised that if anybody refused to follow an order they would have been hung.

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 315E-SL-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence FR/MR

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received 6/3/04

From SABIR ABD AL-AZIZ HUSAYN AL DUR
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

RAGHDA, IRAQ
(City and State)

By _____


To Be Returned ☐

Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes ☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes ☒ No

Title: OPERATION DESERT SANDER
IT - IRAQ

Reference: ABD.302.tmi.06032004
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☒ Original notes re interview of

- NOTES - SABIR ABD AL-AZIZ HUSAYN AL DUR



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b7C

b7D

6/3/04

SABIR ABD AL-AZIZ HUSAYN AL DURRI - RL # 205

DOB: 5/19/1949

FORMER DIRECTOR OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE - IRAQ

- ROLE OF MI - PRE-1980

DURING 1980

POST 1980

- MI IN CHARGE IN KIRKUK & NORTHERN PART

OF IRAQ, DURING WAR WITH IRAN.

- ROLE - GET INFO ABOUT IRAN (MAIN ROLE)

- SECOND ROLE → GET INFO ON WHAT WAS HAPPENING
WITH THE KURDS IN NORTHERN IRAQ.

- TRY TO DEVELOP INFO ON THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THE KURDS AND THE IRANIAN

- NORTHERN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE - MEMBER.

HEAD OF COMMITTEE - DEP. PRIME MINISTER
AL DURRI

- LEADERS OF SECURITY SERVICES WERE MEMBERS
OF THE COMMITTEE

- SEEN UNSURE OF THE DATES, BUT TO
HIS MEMORY.

- DURING ARAB WAR @ 1987 - ALI HASAN
MAJID WAS THE HEAD OF THE NORTHERN
PART OF IRAQ. PRESIDENT SAUD MAJID
HIS AUTHORITY.

- NATIONAL DEFENSE COMMITTEE - MADE UP OF KURDISH
FILED IN THE NORTHERN "JAHSH"

- RECENTLY MODERNIZED FOR THE IRAQI GOVT
TO REPAIR ^{MUSTASHANA} ~~NET JAWA~~ → SHAKIN OF DAIR
KURDISH FIGHTING (GAMASH)

- GOVT. USED DAY THE "MUSTSHAN" FOR HIND

MAJ KURDI MAY REPORTED TO FLINT

ARMY - 1st CORP WITH IN THE KIRKUK } ~~THE~~ PLANNED STAFFS 1985/1986

- 5th CORP WAS IN MOSUL

- 2nd CORP WAS IN DAYLA

/ © 1987

- THE CORP CONSISTED OF MILITARY PERSONNEL &
WHICH CONCENTRATED ON THE WAY WITH IRAQ
AND THE JAWSH RATTAKING WERE RESPONSIBLE
FOR DEFENDING THEIR TERRITORY.

- IN KIRKUK - MASID WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
BATCH OF ARMY AND THE ENTIRE AREA. THIS

WAS DONE BY A PRC DECREE #160 MARCH 29, 1982.
MASSID AS THE PERSON IN CHARGE OF THE
ENTIRE NORTHERN REGION.

- ROLE OF ISFAHABAD DID NOT FALL UNDER
MASID'S AUTHORITY.

- MASID HAD THE AUTHORITY OF THE PRC AS
PRESIDENT TO BE AN IAS OWN.

- MASID DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO
MEET WITH THE HEADS OF THE INTER SERVICES.
HOWEVER HE USED HIS AUTHORITY OVER THEM.

- EACH CORP HAD AN OFFICE IN CHARGE OF
GATHERING INFO.

- THE INSTANT IN EXACT OF THE CORPS REPORTED TO HIM.
- ALL OF THE SECURIM/INTEL SERVICES ANSWERED TO THE SECURITY COMMITTEE WITH ANSWERS TO THE SECRETARY OF THE PRESIDENT.
- COULD BE AN THE INFO REPORTS - APPROPRIATELY SPECIFIC WOULD GET DISSEMINATED TO THE
 - PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARIAT
 - MINISTER OF DEFENSE
 - MILITARY COMMITTEE.
- HE DID NOT REPORT TO THE HAZEL MASIA.
- CHIEF OF MI FORMED THE UNIT AND IN KIRKUL THE STATE IN MOBILE REPORTED TO HIM.
- GENERAL ^{FAIRHAY} SAMBURI → IN CHARGE OF THE NORTHERN REGION MILITARY DIRECTORATE OF INTEL IN THE NORTH.
 - ANSWERED TO → NORTHERN REGION SECURITY IN BALHANS WHO WOULD REPORT TO DEPUTY WAFD AL SAMANRAI. → SECRETARY 3 COORDINATE NORTHERN REGION.

~~SECRET~~

IKSTABAT'S ROLE IN ANFAL

- ROLE WAS TO GATHER INFO FROM WITHIN THE CORA.
- MILITARY WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR FIGHTING ON THE FRONT LINES AND CLEARING THE AREAS OF RESISTANCE
- NO KNOWLEDGE OF ALI HASAN MASUD'S DEFINED AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY AND THE OTHER AREA ~~WAS~~ THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE MILITARY
- MILITARY WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR "CLEANING UP" THE AREA IN THE NORTH OF THE KURDS
- THE ROLE OF RE-LOCATING THE DISPLACED KURDS WAS UP TO THE GOVERNORS ^{WHO REPORTED TO} AND ALI HASAN MASUD.
- REVIEWED DOCUMENTS -
- DESCRIBED ALI HASAN MASUD AS THE PRESIDENT OF THE NORTHERN AREA OF IRAQ AND WAS ABLE TO ISSUE ORDERS TO CIVILIANS AND THE MILITARY.
- ~~VIEWED MAP~~
- ~~LETTER~~ FROM MASUD ORDERING BOMBING, EXECUTIONS OF PERSON BETWEEN 15-70

- HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH ANFIM AND SAID THAT ALI HASAN WAS IN CHARGE OF IT.
- VIEWED A LETTER AND VERIFIED HIS SIGNATURE AND DATE REASON OF THE DOCUMENT.
- PAGE 4 DOCUMENT - AUTHENTICATED HIS SIGNATURE
- USE OF "SPECIAL WEAPONS" AS REFERRED TO IN THE DOCUMENTS → CHEMICAL WEAPONS.
- (STARTED TO SWEAT PROFUSELY) → WHILE VIEWING DOCUMENTS
(LIP QUIMMING / EYES TEARED.)
- ISKHARAT RESP. Collect info for TARGET INFO & PROVIDE TO MILITARY IDENTIFICATION
- * DECISIONS MADE BY SAIDAM HASSEIN SPECIFICALLY LED TO THE DEATHS OF THE PEOPLE IN THE TESS VILLAGE ON APRIL 15, 1997. CW - MAN, WOMAN & CHILDREN
- DURING HIS TIME FRANK WAS SENT TO THE DIRECTION OF THE ISKHARAT UNIT TO DEFEND IRAN.

- THE IKSTASIAH SUBORDINATES PLOT
SUGGESTED THE IDEA OF UTILIZING
LITHUEN WEAPONS WAS AS BE SEEN
AGAINST THE IRANIAN'S AND NOT AGAINST
USUALLY OR CIVILIAN. - PRIMARY GOAL WAS
TO EXPEL THE IRANIAN.

- ~~THE~~ THE PLAN TO USE CW WAS ALREADY
FORMULATED IN 1934 WHEN IRAN WAS
LOSING THE WORLD AGAINST IRAN, WHICH
FEELTA AROUND THE FIVE PERCENTAGE.

- REMAINS CASSING OF HALARSA
ON MARCH 15, 1988.

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 06/04/2004

Sabir Abd Al Aziz Husayn Al Duri, (Black List #205), date of birth May 19, 1949, was interviewed at a detention facility located at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Interviewing Agents identified themselves as representatives of the United States Government from Washington, DC. Department of Defense (DOD) representatives' [redacted] (LNU) were also present, and observed the first thirty minutes of the interview. FBI Language Specialist [redacted] provided Arabic/English translation. Sabir provided the following information:

b6
b7C

Sabir was the former Director of the Istikhbarat (Directorate of Military Intelligence) and former Director of the Iraqi Intelligence Services (IIS) (Mukhabarat). In 1987, during the Iraq-Iran war, the primary role of the Istikhbarat in the Northern region of Iraq was to gather intelligence on Iranian forces. The secondary role of the Istikhbarat was to gather intelligence on the activities of the Kurds and determine their relationship with the Iranians. During this time frame, Sabir was a member of the Northern Affairs Committee and advised the Chairman of the committee, was Izzat Ibrahim Al Duri (Black List #6), Deputy Secretary General of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). Other Directors of the Iraqi security services were members of the Northern Affairs Committee.

The Iraqi government utilized tribal Sheikhs to recruit Kurdish fighters (Jahsh) in the war against Iran, and during the Anfal Campaign. The tribal Sheikhs would get paid by the Government of Iraq (GOI) by the number of Kurdish fighters they recruited. The Sheikhs who recruited the Kurdish fighters on behalf of the Iraqi government were known as Mustashars.

Sabir believes the planning stages for the Anfal Campaign occurred between approximately 1985 and 1987. Three Corps' of the Iraqi Army were positioned in the Northern Region of Iraq at this time. The I Corps was located in Kirkuk, the II Corps was located in Diyala, and the V Corps was located in Mosul. The Corps of the Iraqi Army concentrated on the war with Iran, while the Jahsh Battalions were responsible for defending the Kurdish territory. Each Corps had an Istikhbarat officer assigned to it who was responsible for gathering intelligence. The Istikhbarat officer

Investigation on 06/03/2004 at Baghdad, IraqFile # 315E-HQ-1448534 Date dictated 06/04/2004by SSA George L. Piro tmi

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Sabir Abd Al Aziz Husayn Al Duri, On 06/03/2004, Page 2

reported directly to Sabir. Sabir formed two units of the Istikhbarat in the Northern region, the first unit was located in Kirkuk, and the second unit was located in Mosul. Both units reported to Sabir. General Farhan Jaaburi (phonetic) was in charge of the Northern Region Military Directorate of Intelligence and reported to the Northern Region Section located in Baghdad. The Northern Region Section in Baghdad would report to Deputy Wafiq Al Samaarai (phonetic), who was in charge of Section/Department III, which had responsibility over the Northern region of Iraq. The Iraqi Intelligence and Security Services reported to the Security Committee, who in turn, would report to the Presidential Secretary. Copies of the operational intelligence and information reports would get disseminated to the Presidential Secretary, Minister of Defense, Chief of Staff, and Military Committee.

During this time frame, Ali Hasan Majid (Blacklist #5) was stationed in Kirkuk and was responsible for the Ba'ath Party and the Northern Region. Sabir was unsure of the exact dates, but believes it was approximately 1987 that Ali Hasan Majid was given the authority by the RCC to become the Commander of the Northern Region of Iraq. Sabir initially advised the control of the Istikhbarat did not fall under Majid's authority, and later advised that Majid had complete authority over the military and the Ba'ath Party. According to Sabir, Majid did not have the authority to meet with the Directors of the Intelligence Services, however, Majid would exert his power over them.

Interviewers refreshed Sabir's memory and told him that Majid was given the authority as Commander of the entire Northern region of Iraq as referenced in RCC decree #160 dated March 29, 1987. Sabir viewed a copy of this decree, which formally appointed command of the Northern Region of Iraq, to include the autonomous region of Kurdistan, to Ali Hasan Majid. RCC decree #160 gave Majid authority over the Foreign Intelligence Apparatus, the Internal Security Force, the Military Intelligence, the Popular Army, and the Military. (A copy of RCC decree #160 which Sabir viewed in Arabic along with the accompanying English translation will be maintained in a FD-340/1(A) envelope and marked as Document #'s 1 & 2).

During the Anfal Campaign, the military was responsible for fighting on the front lines and clearing the areas of resistance. The Istikhbarat was responsible for gathering intelligence from within each of the Corps. Sabir did not have knowledge of Majid's specific defined areas of responsibility, and

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Continuation of FD-302 of Sabir Abd Al Aziz Husayn Al Duri, On 06/03/2004, Page 3

advised areas outside of Majid's responsibilities would have been given to the military. The military was also responsible for removing the Kurdish population in the Northern Region, and the Governors in each of those areas were responsible for relocating the displaced Kurds. Each Governor was responsible for reporting directly to Majid.

Sabir viewed twenty-five pages of documents in Arabic which centered around the time frame of 1987 involving pre-Anfal and Anfal Campaign activities. The copies of documents describe correspondence between different entities within the Iraqi Government involving the use of "Special Ammunition" in the Northern Region of Iraq. Sabir acknowledged that Special Ammunition was a term used by the Iraqi government to represent Chemical Weapons (CW).

Sabir doesn't remember each and every document, however, did verify his signature on the bottom of several of the documents, and thus concluded they were authentic. (A copy of the twenty-five pages of documents viewed by Sabir, and the accompanying English translation will be maintained in a FD-340/1(A) envelope and marked as Document #'s 3 & 4).

While viewing the copies of documents, and upon verifying his signature, interviewing agents observed the following physical changes in Sabir. Sabir started to profusely perspire, his facial characteristics dramatically changed, and his lower lip began to uncontrollably quiver. Additionally, after explaining the April 16, 1987 chemical weapons attack on the villages of Balisan and Sheikh Wasan, Sabir's eyes began to tear. Sabir stated that decisions made by President Saddam Hussein to utilize CW directly led to the deaths of the men, women, and children in those villages.

The original plan to use CW was formulated in 1986 when it was perceived that Iraq was losing the war, which was due in part to the loss of the Faw Peninsula to Iranian forces. Sabir believes the general consensus was that the Iraqi forces needed a small victory to boost their confidence and continue fighting the war with Iran. The idea to utilize CW against Iran during the war was originally brought up by his subordinates within the Istikhbarat. The Istikhbarat's primary mission was to defeat and expel the Iranian forces, and not utilize the CW against innocent civilian populations which included women and children. Sabir advised the Istikhbarat was responsible for collecting information

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Continuation of FD-302 of Sabir Abd Al Aziz Husayn Al Duri, On 06/03/2004, Page 4

for target identification and providing that information to the Iraqi military in 1987.

Sabir viewed another document which was dated June 23, 1987, drafted by Ali Hasan Majid of the Northern Bureau Command, to the Commander's of the I, II, and V Corps. This memo set policy on dealing with the Kurds by turning the prohibited areas in the Northern Region of Iraq into free fire zones, and ordered the arrest, interrogation and summary execution of all those aged 15-70 who were found in the prohibited areas. In addition, it gave permission to the pro-government Kurdish militias (Jahsh), to keep everything they might seize in those prohibited areas, not only light weapons but also personal belongings. Sabir acknowledged this memo and reiterated that Majid had the authority to act on his own, and had the support of President Saddam Hussein and the RCC. (A copy of the document viewed by Sabir in Arabic, and the accompanying English translation will be maintained in a FD-340/1(A) envelope and marked as Document #'s 5 & 6).

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 315E-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence FBIHQ (BAGHDAD)

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received 5/27/04

From SA b6
b7C
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

(City and State)

By _____

To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☒ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes ☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes ☒ No

Title: DESERT SPIDER
IT - IRAQ

Reference: _____
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☒ Original notes re interview of

b6
b7C
b7D

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 05/27/04

On 05/27/04 [redacted] was interviewed at a detention facility in Baghdad, Iraq. After identifying themselves and the purpose of the interview, the investigators were provided given the following information from [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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b7DInvestigation on 05/27/2004 at Baghdad, IraqFile # 315E-HQ-1448534-84 Date dictated _____by SA George L. Piro
SA [redacted]

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

302.WS2.052704

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number

315E-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence

FR/HQ

Serial # of Originating Document

Date Received

6/5/04

From

MUHAMMAD HAMZA AL-ZURAYDI


(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

BAGHDAD, IRAQ

(City and State)

By



b6
b7C

To Be Returned

☐ Yes

☒ No

Receipt Given

☐ Yes

☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes

☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes

☒ No

Title:

OPERATION DESERT SPIDER
IT- IRAQ

Reference:

HAMZA, 302.TM1. 06052004

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description:

☒ Original notes re interview of

- MUHAMMAD HAMZA AL-ZURAYDI

- GEORGE

- FRI TRANSLATOR

6/5/84

No. 1

MUHAMMAD HAMZA AZ-ZUBAYDI RL #9

DOB: JULY 29, 1932

- DISCUSSING TIME FRAME OF 1987.

- WAS IN CHARGE OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF MILITARY AFFAIRS

- WAS REPLACED MARCH 29, 1987 BY

RCC MEMBER #14 BY AZI HAJJAN KUNDI

- REASON - PERSONAL OPINION

- DID NOT PROVIDE - STATED IT WAS A DECISION BY THE PRESIDENT.

+ BAZRANI → IRAQI, DONAK, MOSOL

KURDISH

RESPONSIBLE
AS 1987- TALABANI → SULAMNIA IBN ALI BAZRANI
OF IRAN

- BAZRANI WAS AGAINST THE IRAQI GOVT PERIOD

BAZRANI WAS THE BROTHER-IN-LAW

- TALABANI WANTED TO SEPARATE THE KURDS

SO THAT KURDS WOULD BE INDEPENDENT FROM IRAQ

- HIS ROLE WAS MAINLY AN ADMINISTRATIVE

ROLE, AND THE MAIN RESPONSIBILITY OF

TAKING CARE OF THE ARMY RESOURCES WAS

BY THE ARMY.

- PRIOR TO APRIL 1987 WHAT WERE HIS

INSTRUCTIONS FROM TALABANI IN RELATION WITH

THE PRESIDENT? - UNDER HIS SUPERVISION,

HE CLAIMS THERE WERE NO PROBLEMS

- ADMITS THERE WAS A REEF, BUT HE REEF
FIGHTING IN THE DARTMOUTH AREA
- WHEN HE WAS FIRST SENT TO LEAD THE IRA
PAPER. CONDITIONS GET WORSE WITH TIME,
AND HE WAS REPORTED WITH MASH.
MASH WAS ~~SENT~~ A RELATIVE OF SADDAM
AND WAS GIVEN UNPRECEDENTED AUTHORITY,
- CLAIMS HIS ROLE WAS THAT OF A
POLITICIAN AND DID NOT HAVE ANY MILITARY
RESPONSIBILITY.
- IRANIAN AL-DIN, WASN'T GIVE HIM ORDERS
FROM 1965-1987. IF IT WAS SOMETHING THAT
WAS IMPORTANT - SADDAM WOULD GIVE HIM
WRITTEN OR TELEPHONE ORDERS DIRECTLY
TO PRES. SECRETARY, ~~MAN~~
- ORDERS FROM 1982-1987. HIS ORDERS WERE
TO QUASH THE VIOLENCE. HIS ROLE WAS
TO BRING THE PARTIES TOGETHER AND RESOLVE
THE PROBLEM.
- DOESN'T KNOW THE REASON WHY THE GOVT USED
CHEMICAL WEAPONS. HEARD ABOUT IT THROUGH
THE RADIO.

- HE TRIED TO RESOLVE THE MANY PROBLEMS AND FAILED AND THAT'S WHY HE WAS REPLACED BY ALI HASAN WASID.
- THE PROBLEMS IN THE ARMY WERE CAUSED BY IRAQI AND TURKISH WHO WERE WORKING WITH THE IRANIS AND OVERSEEING THE IRAQI GOVT.
- AFTER HE RETURNED TO BAHRAIN, SADDAM ASSIGNED HIM TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR AN ADMINISTRATIVE ~~JOB~~. SADDAM DID NOT TALK TO HIM ABOUT HIS PERFORMANCE IN THE ARMY AND SAID IT WAS FOR THE BEST TO REPLACE HIM WITH ALI HASAN WASID.
- RECEIVED A CALL FROM THE PRESIDENCY SECRETARY AND WAJID'S ORDERS TO BE REPLACED. DID NOT QUESTION THE ORDERS AND HAD ALWAYS FOLLOWED ORDERS. IF HE DIDN'T FOLLOW ORDERS HE WOULD BE PART OF ~~THE~~ ARMY.
- DID NOT KNOW ALI HASAN WASID'S ORDERS.

1991 INITIATED → MOST LIKELY THE
MINISTER OF TRANSPORTATION.

- REASON HE WAS CHOSEN WAS BECAUSE
HE WAS ONE OF THE MINISTERS AND WAS
FAMILIAR WITH NSIRIYAH. AND BECAUSE
HE WAS A SWIA.

- MAINTAINED IT WAS SETTLED IN A
PEACEFUL MANNER.

- CHALLENGED -

- PRESIDENT SAYS HE WAS RESPONSIBLE
FOR THE VIOLENCE

- CLAIMS HE WAS SLAPPED AN INDIVIDUAL
WHILE HE WAS IN NSIRIYAH.

- NEVER KILLED ANYONE, OR CAUSED EXZEMING, NEVER
WITNESSED EXZEMING.

- DENIES NICKNAME OF "SHIA DIAL"

- BELIEVES SOMEONE SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO JUSTICE, BUT
WOUNDED/CAUSED COMFORT AS TO WHY HE SHOULD BE
BROUGHT TO JUSTICE.

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 06/07/2004

Muhammad Hamza Al Zubaydi, (Black List #9), date of birth July 28, 1938, was interviewed at a detention facility located at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Interviewing Agents identified themselves as representatives of the United States Government from Washington, DC. FBI Language Specialist [REDACTED] provided Arabic/English translation. Hamza provided the following information:

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In 1987, Hamza was in charge of the Northern Bureau of the Ba'ath Party, and claims that his role was that of a politician. He did not have control or responsibility over the Iraqi military. From approximately 1985 to 1987, Hamza received his orders from Izzat Ibrahim Al Duri, however, if there were orders that were of significant importance, President Saddam Hussein would provide them to Hamza through the Presidential Secretary. Hamza would receive his orders telephonically or in writing through the Presidential Secretary's office.

Hamza initially denied there were problems in the Northern Region of Iraq during his tenure, however, later stated there were two Kurdish factions headed by Barzani and Talabani, that were resisting against the government. Barzani's group was located in the Irbil, Dohak and Mosul areas; and Talabani's group was in the area of Sulaymaniyah to the Iranian border. Talabani's goal was to separate the Kurds from Iraq so they would gain their independence. Of the two groups, Barzani's was the more worthy adversary according to Hamza. Both Kurdish groups were working with the Iranians and threatening the sovereignty of the Iraqi Government. Hamza then admitted there was unrest in the Northern Region of Iraq but continued to deny there was a war, or fighting against the Kurds.

Conditions in the North began to deteriorate with Talabani's group, and Hamza remembers between approximately 1986 and 1987, his orders were to quell the violence, and bring the parties together to resolve the situation. Hamza's attempts to resolve the situation with the Kurds failed, and he was subsequently replaced as the Northern Bureau Commander. By Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) decree #160, dated March 29, 1987, Ali Hasan Majid became the Commander of the Northern Bureau and was given, according to Hamza, unprecedented authority over the

Investigation on 06/05/2004 at Baghdad, IraqFile # 315E-HQ-1448534 - 90 Date dictated 06/07/2004by SSA George L. Piro
by SSA [REDACTED] tmib6
b7C

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Muhammad Hamza Al Zubaydi, On 06/05/2004, Page 2

Iraqi military and Ba'ath Party. Hamza stated that Majid was a relative of President Saddam Hussein, and that was the primary reason he was given so much authority. Hamza found out he was being replaced through a telephone call and via written orders from the Presidential Secretary. He did not question the orders he received from Baghdad, and advised he would have been put to death if he hadn't followed the orders.

Hamza returned to Baghdad and was placed in an administrative position within the government. President Hussein did not speak with Hamza about his performance as the Commander in the Northern Region, however, did state that it was for the best that he was replaced by Ali Hasan Majid.

Hamza acknowledged the fact that chemical weapons (CW) were utilized in the Northern Region of Iraq during this time frame, however, doesn't know what the governments reason was to utilize them. He allegedly learned of the use of the CW through radio broadcasts.

Regarding the 1991 Shia Uprising (Intifada) in the Southern Region of Iraq. Hamza remembered that he was the Minister of Transportation during this time frame and believes he was sent to Nasiriyah because he was a Shia, and was familiar with the area. Hamza continued to maintain that the 1991 Intifada was resolved in a peaceful manner. Interviewers challenged Hamza and reminded him that he previously admitted to the fact that there were violent acts committed against the Shia population. Hamza admitted to slapping an individual in the back of the head and advised that was the extent of his physical abuse.

He vehemently denies ever killing anybody, ordering executions, or witnessing any executions or atrocities during the 1991 Intifada in Nasiriyah. Hamza responded by saying that President Saddam Hussein should be held responsible for the violence that occurred during the 1991 Intifada.

Hamza concluded by saying Saddam Hussein should be brought to justice, but failed to elaborate or articulate why he should be brought to justice.

1A Envelope

(U) Case ID: 315E-HQ-1448534 (S)

! DG 32 ! ORIGINAL NOTES RE INTERVIEW OF SADDAM HUSSEIN BY GEORGE PIRO !

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~~SECRET~~//X1



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Baghdad Operations Center
June 28, 2004

Session Number: 25
SSA George L. Piro

- (U) ~~(S)~~ While engaging SSA George L. Piro in casual conversation in his detention cell, SADDAM HUSSEIN provided the following information:
- (U) ~~(S)~~ SSA Piro discussed with HUSSEIN Iraq's relationship with Al-Qaeda. HUSSEIN provided a brief historical account of conflicts between religion, specifically Islam, and historical rulers. HUSSEIN stated that he was a believer in God but was not a zealot. HUSSEIN believed that religion and government should not mix. Additionally, the Ba'ath Party ideology was not religiously based, as its founder was a Christian. However, HUSSEIN was clear that he opposed anyone who collaborated with the West against his country.
- (U) ~~(S)~~ HUSSEIN stated USAMA BIN LADEN's ideology was no different than the many zealots that came before him. The two did not have the same belief or vision. HUSSEIN claimed he had never personally seen or met Bin Laden. SSA Piro advised HUSSEIN there is clear evidence the Iraqi Government had previously met with BIN LADEN. SSA Piro specifically cited FAROUQ HIJAZI's (BL #104), former IIS M-4 Director, meeting with BIN LADEN in Sudan in 1994, ABU HAFS AL-MAURITANI's two visits to Baghdad, and his request for financial assistance of ten million dollars. HUSSEIN replied "yes". HUSSEIN stated the Iraqi government did not cooperate with BIN LADEN. SSA Piro asked HUSSEIN "why not" since Iraq and BIN LADEN had the same enemies, United States and Saudi Arabia. SSA Piro then cited him the quote "my enemy's enemy is my brother". HUSSEIN replied that the United States was not Iraq's enemy, but that HUSSEIN opposed its politics. If he wanted to cooperate with the enemies of the United States, HUSSEIN would have with North Korea, which he claimed to have a relationship with, or China.
- (U) ~~(S)~~ HUSSEIN stated that the United States used the 9/11 attack as a justification to attack Iraq. The United States had lost sight of the cause of 9/11. SSA Piro advised HUSSEIN that due to Iraq's contradiction between its

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Baghdad Operations Center

statements and actions, many believe Iraq miscalculated the effects of the 9/11 attack on the American people and its leaders. Iraq denied having any connection with BIN LADEN or Al-Qaeda, but evidence showed continued contact between the two. HUSSEIN denied miscalculating the effects of the attack, but he did not have any options in front of him. The only choice he was given was to leave Iraq which he claimed was not an option.

(U) ~~(S)~~ SSA Piro asked HUSSEIN why was Iraq the only country to applaud the 9/11 attack, which HUSSEIN immediately denied. SSA Piro advised HUSSEIN that the Iraqi newspapers were reported to have applauded the attack. HUSSEIN stated that he wrote editorials against the attack, but also spoke of the cause which led men to commit these acts. The cause was never reviewed which could create such hatred to kill innocent people. After the attack, TARIQ AZIZ wrote personal letters denouncing the attack to two individuals, one possibly Ramsey Clarke, which AZIZ personally knew. These letters served as informal means of communications for Iraq to denounce the attack. HUSSEIN stated he could not make any formal announcement as Iraq considered itself at war with the United States. HUSSEIN was asked if that was why the request of the Iraqi Ambassador to the United Nations, MUHAMMAD AL-DURI, to attend the 9/11 memorial was denied by the Council of Four. It took the Minister of Foreign Affairs' personal request to HUSSEIN to obtain permission for the ambassador to attend the memorial. HUSSEIN stated he could not recall what transpired, but specifically remembered the ambassador attending the memorial. Again, HUSSEIN stated that the ambassador attended the memorial as a representative of the United Nations, and would not have attended as a formal representative of Iraq.

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FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 315E-HQ-1448534-1A31

Field Office Acquiring Evidence FBIHQ

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received 06/11/2004

From _____
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

(City and State)

By GEORGE L. PIRO

To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☒ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes ☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes ☒ No

Title: DESERT SPIDER
IT-IRAQ

Reference: _____
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☒ Original notes re interview of

SADDAM HUSSEIN

①

Date

No.

DISCUSSED NEW PRES. THE FOUNDATION OF NEW
GOVT. GOOD BEL. & SAID IT APPEARED A
LOT OF THOUGHT WENT INTO THE SELECTION AND
IT WAS GOOD HOPE IT DOES WELL

SPEECHES HE WRITES THEM FROM THE
HEART. DID NOT ENJOY GIVING THEM.
FELT LIKE AN EXAM.

6/2000

2 MEANINGS: 1- DEALS WITH THE REGION
AS TO MAKE SURE NOT SEEN AS WEAK IN
THE REGION, BEING THREATENED BY
OTHERS.

OPERATIONAL 2 COMPLIANCE W/ UN
DESTRUCTION OF WMD.

REC. IRAN & ISRAEL, BUT MORE SO IRAN
AS IT BORDERS IRAQ. ISRAEL WAS A
THREAT TO ALL ARAB, BUT IRAN SPECIFIC
TO IRAQ, THE OTHER NEIGHBORS COULDN'T DEFEND
OR STAND AGAINST THEM. IRAN WANTED
SAMARIN IRAQ FOR THEMSELVES.

(2)

THEIR WPNS NOW OR ^{Date} ~~THE~~ ^{AND}
IRAQ'S SANCTIONS SURPASSED IRAQ'S
CAPABILITIES & WILL BE A GATEWAY
IN THE FUTURE.

~~THE~~ DIFFICULT DECISION OF ALLOWING
INSPECTORS IN. ONE REASON, IT EXPOSES
IRAQ WEAKNESSES IDENTIFIES VULNERABILITIES
TO ITS ENEMIES MORE SO THAN TO THE
US OR UN. AS US ~~AND~~ STRIKE
IRAQ IN 1998 - MORE CONCERNED
ABOUT ENEMY ID WEAKNESSES/VIEW.

AS LDR WILL TAKE REPR ~~AND~~ SOME MEN
WILL DEFLECT THE REPR. AS IN HIS
MINISTERS.

TOLD HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT
HIS REIGN AS OVER - LDR'S CHOICE,
RECOGNIZED IT & NOTHING HE COULD DO
ABOUT IT EXCEPT IT.

SURROUNDED BY WEAK PERSONS
WHAT CAN HE DO. "YOU SHOULD SEE WHAT THEY
WANTED RELATIONSHIP w/ US
WAS NOT GIVEN A CHANCE, WOULD NOT
LISTEN).

His future - GOD'S HANDS GOD
IS Baby. Your life END -
DO YOU WANT IT TO HAVE MEANING
YES

§ WAR OF CITIES -

IRAN HAD MISSILES RANGE 250-270 KM
IRAN OBTAINED MISSILES FROM LIBYA &
STRUCK BAGDAD - HE ASKED IRAN
NOT TO TAKE IT THERE - IRAN STRUCK
AGAIN. HIS SCIENTISTS TOLD HIM THEY
COULD EXTEND THEIR MISSILES TO TEHRAN
& HE TOLD THEM TO DO IT. THEY
STRUCK IRAN & THEY WERE UP IN
AIRS, AS TEHRAN IS MORE
SUSCEPTIBLE TO MISSILE STRIKES THAN BAGDAD.

IRAN TECH / SCIENTIST FARE EXCEED
OTHER COUNTRIES & WILL TAKE STEPS
TO PROTECT OURSELVES AFTER THEMSELVES
1 - RELATIONSHIP W/ US
2 - OTHERWISE HAVE OPTIONS, WILL DO
WHAT ~~WANT~~ IS NECESSARY WHEN ASKED IF WOULD
" RE-CONSTITUTE ITS WPNS CAPABILITIES

DID NOT USE TELEPHONE ^{DATE} SINCE
MARCH/1990 EXCEPT ON 2
OCCASIONS. RECOGNIZED US TEST
CAPABILITIES.

WOULD NOT STAY @ HOME FOR
MORE THAN DAY OR 2 AS TELL
WHEREABOUTS TO BE KNOWN

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 315E-HQ-1448534-1A32

Field Office Acquiring Evidence FBIHQ

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received 06/28/2004

From _____
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

(City and State)

By GEORGE L. PIRO

To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☒ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate, Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes ☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes ☒ No

Title: DESERT SPIDER
IT- IRAQ

Reference: _____
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☒ Original notes re interview of

SADDAM HUSSEIN

6/28 MTL

STATED IS A BELIEVER IN GOD BUT NOT
A FUNDAMENTALIST (ZEALOUS)

DOES NOT BELIEVE GOVT & RELIGION
SHOULD MIX

PROVIDED A BRIEF HISTORICAL ACCOUNT
OF ISLAM/RELIGION & RULE OR GOVT.
BAA'ATHIST'S BELIEFS WERE NOT BASED
ON RELIGION. THE FOUNDER WAS
A CHRISTIAN.

UBI'S BELIEFS ARE THE SAME
AS ALL OF THE OTHER ZEAL
THAT CAME BEFORE HIM.

HAS NEVER SEEN UBI.

WHEN INFORMED ABOUT FAROUQ'S
MTG W/ UBI AUTHORIZED BY HIM,
REQ. FOR \$10 MIL. & VISIT IN 2002
HE RESPONDED "YES". DID NOT
WORK TOGETHER W/ UBI.

WHEN ASKED "MY ENEMY'S ENEMY IS
MY BROTHER" HE SAID AMERICA
IE. US / SAUDI

(2)

WAS NOT HIS ENEMY, THE
AMERICAN POLITICS. & IF
HE WANTED TO WORK W/
AMERICA'S ENEMIES, HE COULD
HAVE W/ N. KOREA WITH
THEY HAD A RELATIONSHIP
WITH OR CHINA.

SAID US, USED 9/11
OR JUSTIFICATION TO INVADE
IRAQ & LOST SIGHT OF THE
CAUSE OF 9/11. CONTRADICTIONS WORDS
ACTIONS, IRAQ MISCALCULATED
US' DETERMINATION & EFFECT OF
9/11. IGNORED PASS. SPEED IN
01/2002. HE SAID NO. THEY
HAD NO OPTIONS IN FRONT OF
THEM. THEY RECOGNIZED
US' DETERMINATION BUT WERE
NOT GIVEN ANY CHOICE EXCEPT
LEAVE IRAQ WHICH WAS NOT
A CHOICE.

DOES NOT LIKE THOSE WHO WORK/COOPERATE
W/ THE WEST AGAINST THEIR COUNTRY

I SAID

IRAQ WAS THE ONLY COUNTRY TO
APPEAR THE 9/11 ATTACKS IN
ITS NEWSPAPERS. HE DENIED IT,
SAYING HE WROTE AGAINST THE
ATTACK, BUT SPOKE OF THE
CAUSE, WHICH COULD LEAD MEN
TO COMMIT SUCH ACTS. THESE
CAUSES SHOULD HAVE BEEN
EXAMINED. TARIQ AZIZ WROTE
2 PERSONAL LTRs TO 2 AMERICANS,
OPPOSING THE ATTACKS. THESE WERE
INFORMAL MEANS OF COMMUNICATIONS
AS IRAQ WAS @ WAR W/ US
& IT COULD NOT BEAK FORMALLY.
BROUGHT UP UN EMBASSADOR'S
PARTICIPATION @ MEMORIAL &
THE COUNCIL OF U's INITIAL
REFUSAL TO ALLOW HIM TO
ATTEND. IT TOOK THE MPA
TO ASK HIM & HE ALLOWED IT.
WOULD NOT CONFIRM THIS
EXCEPT THAT EMB. DID

4
ATTEND AS PART OF THE UN
WOULD NOT HAVE ATTENDED AS
A FORMAL REP. OF IRAQ.

! DG 31 ! ORIGINAL NOTES RE INTERVIEW OF SADDAM HUSSEIN BY GEORGE PIRO !

~~SECRET~~//X1

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/rs
ON 05-07-2009



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Baghdad Operations Center
June 11, 2004

Session Number: 23
SSA George L. Piro

- (U) ~~(S)~~ While engaging SSA George L. Piro in casual conversation, Saddam Hussein providing the following information regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD):
- (U) ~~(S)~~ Saddam Hussein read SSA George Piro a poem he recently wrote. SSA Piro used this opportunity as a segue to discuss Hussein's speeches. SSA Piro advised Hussein that after hearing several poems from him, SSA Piro is now able to recognize Hussein's writing style, which was prevalent in a speech SSA Piro recently read. It was clear to SSA Piro that Hussein wrote his own speeches, which he confirmed further, stating all his writings came from the heart. Hussein claimed he did not enjoy reading his speeches, preferring instead to have his speeches read by others, such as news broadcasters. Hussein described the feeling of writing his speeches and giving them was the same as taking an exam.
- (U) ~~(S)~~ SSA Piro then asked Hussein if he wrote his own speeches and they come from the heart, then what was the meaning of his June 2000 speech. Hussein replied this speech was meant to serve a regional and an operational purpose. Regionally, the speech was meant to respond to Iraq's regional threat. Hussein believed that Iraq could not appear weak to its enemies, especially Iran. Iraq was being threatened by others in the region and must appear able to defend itself. Operationally, Hussein was demonstrating Iraq's compliance with the United Nations (UN) in its destruction of its Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).
- (U) ~~(S)~~ Hussein stated Iran was Iraq's major threat due to their common border and believed Iran intended to annex Southern Iraq into Iran. The possibility of Iran trying to annex a portion of Southern Iraq was viewed by Hussein and Iraq as the most significant threat facing Iraq. Hussein viewed the other countries in the Middle East as weak and could not defend themselves or Iraq from a attack from Iran. Hussein stated he believed Israel was a threat to the entire Arab world, not specifically Iraq.

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~~SECRET//X1~~

Baghdad Operations Center

- (U) ~~(S)~~ Hussein continued the dialogue on the issues relating to the significant threat to Iraq from Iran. Even though Hussein claimed Iraq did not have WMD, the threat from Iran was the major factor as to why he did not allow the return of the UN inspectors. Hussein stated he was more concerned about Iran discovering Iraq's weaknesses and vulnerabilities than the repercussions of the United States for his refusal to allow UN inspectors back into Iraq. In his opinion, the UN inspectors would have directly identified to the Iranians where to inflict maximum damage to Iraq. Hussein demonstrated this by pointing at his arm and stated striking someone on the forearm would not have the same effect as striking someone at the elbow or wrist, which would significantly disable the ability to use the arm. Hussein indicated he was angered when the United States struck Iraq in 1998. Hussein stated Iraq could have absorbed another United States strike for he viewed this as less of a threat than exposing themselves to Iran.
- (U) ~~(S)~~ Hussein further stated that Iran's weapons capabilities have increased dramatically, while Iraq's have been eliminated by the UN sanctions. The effects of this will be seen and felt in the future, as Iran's weapons capabilities will be a greater threat to Iraq and the region in the future. Hussein stated Iraq's weapons capabilities were a factor in the outcome of the Iraq-Iran War. Initially during the war, Iraq had missiles with a limited range of approximately 270 Kilometers (km), while Iran had no viable missile capability. The Iranians obtained long-range missiles from Libya which could strike deep into Iraq. The Iranians were the first to use the missiles, and struck Baghdad. Hussein claimed he warned the Iranians through a speech he gave, to cease these attacks. But the Iranians again attacked Baghdad. Iraq's scientists came to him and advised him that they could increase the range of Iraq's missiles to also reach deep into Iran. Hussein directed them to do so. Iraq responded to Iran's attacks by striking Iran's capital, Tehran, with its own missiles. Hussein stated the Iranians were up in arms to Iraq's strikes. Hussein stated that Tehran was more vulnerable to missile strikes due to its geographical design. Baghdad, on the other hand, was geographically spread out and broken up into districts making Iran's missile strikes less effective. Hussein identified this as the "war of the cities" and Iraqi actions were in response to Iran's. At that time,

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~~SECRET~~//X1

Baghdad Operations Center

Hussein recognized that Iran was at a disadvantage, as Iraq had the technology to design and develop its missiles, while Iran was forced to obtain its missiles from Libya. Iraq was limited only by its own production while Iran was limited by the quantity it could obtain.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Hussein recognized that Iran continued to develop its weapons capabilities, to include its WMD, while Iraq had lost its weapons capabilities due to the UN inspections and sanctions. Hussein was asked how Iraq would have dealt with the threat from Iran once the UN sanctions were lifted. Hussein replied Iraq would have been extremely vulnerable to an attack from Iran, and would have sought a security agreement with the United States to protect it from threats in the region. Hussein felt such an agreement would not only have benefitted Iraq, but its neighbors, such as Saudi Arabia. SSA Piro agreed that such an agreement would have assisted Iraq immensely. SSA Piro noted due to the history between the two countries, it would have taken some time before the United States would have entered into such an agreement with Iraq.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Further, SSA Piro advised Hussein that paragraph 14 of UN Resolution 687 states that the disarming of Iraq was part of a total disarmament of the entire region, however, that portion of the resolution was not enforceable. The threat from Iran would have loomed over Iraq, especially as Iran had continued to advance its weapons capabilities. SSA Piro commented that under those circumstances, it would appear that Iraq would have needed to reconstitute its own weapons program in response. Hussein replied that Iraq would have done what was necessary and agreed that Iraq's technical and scientific abilities exceeded others in the region.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Hussein commented he allowed the UN inspectors back into Iraq to counter allegations by the British Government. Hussein stated this was a very difficult decision to make, but the British Government had prepared a report containing inaccurate intelligence. It was this inaccurate intelligence on which the United States was making their decisions. However, Hussein admitted that when it was clear that a war with the United States was imminent, he allowed the

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~~SECRET/X1~~

Baghdad Operations Center

inspectors back into Iraq in hopes of averting war. Yet, it became clear to him four months before the war that the war was inevitable.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Hussein reiterated he had wanted to have a relationship with the United States but was not given the chance, as the United States was not listening to anything Iraq had to say. Further, he was concerned about the United State's advanced technological capabilities and resources.

(U) ~~(S)~~ On another matter, Hussein stated he only recalls using the telephone on two occasions since March 1990. Additionally, Hussein did not stay at the same location for more than a day, as he was very aware of the United States's significant technological capabilities. Hussein communicated primarily through the use of couriers to communicate or would personally meet with government officials to discuss pertinent issues. Hussein stated that a technologically under-developed country, such as Iraq, was vulnerable to the United States.

(U) ~~(S)~~ The discussion then turned to the new interim President of Iraq, Sheikh Ghazi Al-Yawar. Hussein stated Al-Yawar came from a good family and would be favored by the other countries in the region, especially Saudi Arabia. Hussein stated it appeared the United States had put a lot of thought into Al-Yawar's appointment, as Al-Yawar was a good selection. SSA Piro told Hussein the selection of Al-Yawar was not solely made by the United States, but was a joint effort by the United States and UN. The selection of the new Iraqi Government was based on the needs voiced by the Iraqi people. The new Iraqi Government has a strong foundation on which to build on as it progresses in its work to serve the Iraqi people. SSA Piro then asked Hussein how he personally felt about their discussion of a new President and Government in Iraq. Hussein began to respond in reference to Al-Yawar, but SSA Piro stopped him and asked how he personally felt. SSA Piro reminded Hussein that he had previously made it clear to SSA Piro that he still considered himself the President of Iraq. However, it is clear now to everyone that he is no longer the President, as there is a new President who is representing the country and the people of Iraq. SSA Piro told Hussein he is no longer the President of Iraq; he was done. Hussein replied yes he knows, saying what could he do as it was God's choice. SSA Piro asked him if he had any thoughts about his future and Hussein stated

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~~SECRET//X1~~

Baghdad Operations Center

that it was in God's hands. SSA Piro pointed out to Hussein that God was very busy and that God had more important issues than he and SSA Piro. Hussein agreed, at which point, SSA Piro told Hussein that his life is nearing its end, and asked him if he wanted the remainder of his life to have meaning, to which he responded yes.

(U) ~~(S)~~ SSA Piro informed Hussein that he had surrounded himself with weak individuals, who are now refusing to take any responsibility for the actions of the former government. The other High Value Detainees were putting the blame for all of Iraq's mistakes on Hussein, to which Hussein replied by saying what could he do. Hussein recognizes that he may bear the responsibility or blame while others will attempt to distance themselves.

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- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 03/21/2004

On 03/21/2004, Ali Hasan Al-Majid (Black List #5) was interviewed at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Al-Majid was advised the interviewing agents were representatives of the United States Government. The interview was monitored by a representative of the military Joint Interrogation Detainee Cell (JIDC). FBI Language Specialist (LS) [redacted] provided Arabic/English translation. Al-Majid provided the following information:

b6
b7C

During the years 1987 through 1989, Al-Majid served as Secretary General of the Ba'ath Party's Northern Bureau Command with responsibility over northern Iraq including Kurdish territory. Iraq was divided into the Northern, Central, Euphrates, and Southern Sectors. Al-Majid replaced Mohammad Hamza Zubaydi (Black List #9), former Secretary General. Saddam Hussein appointed Al-Majid to this position during a meeting of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). At the meeting, Hussein informed Al-Majid of his new responsibilities while simultaneously appointing Zubaydi as Iraqi Minister of Transportation. Al-Majid's appointment was made personally by Hussein, as he was clearly in charge, and no vote was taken by the RCC. Prior to this appointment, Al-Majid was the Deputy Commander of the Ba'ath Party's Military Organization.

Al-Majid was shown and read a copy of a document written in Arabic, described as RCC decree number 160, dated March 29, 1987, signed by Saddam Hussein, which sets forth details regarding Al-Majid's appointment as the representative of the Ba'ath Party for the northern region of Iraq, including the Autonomous Region of Kurdistan. Al-Majid acknowledged that this decree was issued and that it spelled out his authority over all civilian, military and security agencies in the region. He stated a decree is issued at the conclusion of an RCC meeting which details issues addressed by the RCC. Al-Majid denied, however, having authority over the military forces or security services in the region, as the security services are never subordinate to anyone in the government except Hussein. The security services, Fedayeen Saddam, and Saddam's Cubs answered to Hussein only and took their instructions only from Hussein. Al-Majid received a copy of decree number 160 in writing at a later time. Immediately after issuance of the decree, he also

Investigation on 03/20/2004 at Baghdad, IraqFile # 315E-HO-1448534-34 Date dictated 03/21/2004b6
b7Cby George L. Piro [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of Ali Hasan Al-Majid, On 03/20/2004, Page 2

received additional instructions in writing from the Presidential Diwan which further defined his authority.

As specified to him in the additional instructions, Al-Majid only used the authorities in the decree for the "collectivization" of the villages in the northern region located within five kilometers (km) of provinces, and areas classified as cities, zones, or suburbs. This "collectivization" consisted of moving villagers from their homes to Iraqi government housing complexes. Per the additional instructions given to Al-Majid, areas outside of five km fell within the control of the military including cities near the border between Iraq and Iran. Al-Majid noted that the Anfal Campaign in Kurdish territory in 1988 was conducted by the military under the command of Sultan Hashim Ahmad Al-Tai (Black List #27). The instructions that followed decree number 160 set the aforementioned five km parameters and restricted Al-Majid's authority. Al-Majid acknowledged that he did delegate orders to the security services as it pertained to the areas under his span of control, but the services acted independently everywhere else to include their technical work.

Al-Majid claimed to have once excused himself from a meeting where a discussion was to take place regarding the collectivization of villages outside the five km boundary. In Al-Majid's opinion at that time, such actions would have required a large budget, engineers, planners and other professionals which he did not have at his disposal. Al-Majid concluded that such tasking should have been controlled by the Minister of Housing. The Ministry of Housing had the responsibility for the construction of housing complexes for the villagers affected by the collectivization. Al-Majid's role was to inform the governors of the various provinces of the completion of the complexes to initiate the transfer of the villagers.

Al-Majid claimed each province had a security committee composed of representatives from the various security services. These committees were not, however, under his control. If Al-Majid required assistance, he would seek it from the Army Chief of Staff. The military had two major bases, one in Suleimaniyeh and the other in Kirkuk, where the 1st Army Corps headquarters was located.

Al-Majid does not hate the Kurds as they are Iraqis and his people. Just as the Arabs, the Kurds have good and bad people. Al-Majid claimed to have personal relations with many Kurds. Al-Majid had a good relationship with Jalal Talabani and claimed

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Continuation of FD-302 of Ali Hasan Al-Majid, On 03/20/2004, Page 3

they had eaten at each other's homes. Al-Majid disliked Talabani but did not hate him. He affectionately referred to him as the "sheikh of the saboteurs." Al-Majid stated "saboteurs" was the term the Iraqis used in official documents to describe Kurds who resisted Iraqi government rule. Al-Majid had only heard that the "saboteurs" had relationships with other governments such as Iran and Turkey, and eventually with the United States and other western countries. Iran entered into a relationship with the Kurds, whereby Iran not only benefitted from the relationship but also destroyed the Kurds Iraqi reputation. In 1987, Iran declared that year would be the last one of the Iran-Iraq War and sent its agents into Kurdish territories inside Iraq. Iran attempted to establish its presence in certain areas such as Halabja and others. According to Al-Majid, these actions necessitated military action by Iraq. Al-Majid agreed that it was difficult for the Iraqi government to distinguish Kurds from Iranians or good individuals from bad ones.

Al-Majid's powers in the northern region lasted approximately two years until April, 1989, but he does not recall whether an RCC decree was issued repealing his powers. Hassan Ali Al-Amiri replaced Al-Majid as the Secretary General of the Northern Bureau Command. In June, 1989, Al-Majid was appointed Minister of Local Government.

Al-Majid denied having any knowledge of executions of Kurds in Northern Iraq. Al-Majid stated his duties included the collectivization of villages within the specified five km boundary into government housing complexes. Those villages outside of the five km boundary fell under the control of Nazar Khazraji, Iraqi Army Chief of Staff. As part of the process, Al-Majid ordered Kurds within the Ba'ath Party to explain the need for collectivization to the effected Kurdish population. Additionally, Al-Majid declared that no one, not even one person, would be moved until the land was prepared and electricity was established. As part of their relocation, the affected Kurds were given 3,000 Iraqi Dinars (approximately \$10,000) to build new homes within the authorized zones. Alternatively, the Kurds were allowed to choose new living quarters within the government housing complexes. Al-Majid also coordinated the travel of those living in distant villages to their new homes by communicating with the governors of the provinces. These tasks required considerable effort from all the government services.

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Continuation of FD-302 of Ali Hasan Al-Majid, On 03/20/2004, Page 4

After the deportation or collectivization process began, Al-Majid believed that the Kurds and Iranians felt threatened. The Iranian insurgents previously would have had to walk only approximately five km in mountainous terrain to bordering villages where refuge or assistance was provided. However, because of the deportation process, this distance was increased and it became more difficult for insurgents to cross mountainous terrain without safe havens.

Al-Majid agreed that most Kurds did not want to move or leave their homes. Those that did were seeking improvements such as electricity, refrigerators, and school teachers. If Kurds refused to be relocated, they were forced into vehicles and taken with their belongings to government housing complexes. Once the villagers were deported, the villages were leveled so as not to become safe havens for saboteurs. Al-Majid stated these were not his personal orders but those of the Iraqi government as it cost millions of dinars and required the efforts of all of the government's ministries.

Interviewers played a portion of an audiotape of Al-Majid's voice in Arabic. (This tape is described in a Human Rights Watch (HRW) report titled "Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds," dated July, 1993, Appendix A, The Ali Hasan Al-Majid Tapes, as a recording of a Northern Bureau meeting to review the campaigns of 1987 and 1988. According to HRW, the tape is undated but is in a batch dated January 21 and 22, 1989.) In the tape, Al-Majid discusses the previous decision to collectivize and destroy villages. Al-Majid acknowledged that the tape contains his words and his voice. He acknowledged that he ordered the destruction of homes within the prohibited zones after the residents were removed. Al-Majid acknowledged that he held a separate meeting wherein he instructed those under his command that no house was to remain standing within the prohibited zones. Al-Majid also acknowledged that he informed his subordinates that he would tour the prohibited zones and if his orders were not carried out completely, he would hold the section commander responsible.

During a portion of the same tape, Al-Majid stated that he discussed with Nazar Khazraji, Iraqi Army Chief of Staff, the failure of Tali' Al-Duri, 5th Army Corps Commander, to carry out his orders. Al-Majid claimed that this portion of the tape demonstrates that he did not have authority over the military, as Al-Majid could only complain about military officers that failed to carry out their orders. Al-Majid claimed that if he did have

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Continuation of FD-302 of Ali Hasan Al-Majid, On 03/20/2004, Page 5

authority over the military, he would have removed Al-Duri. However, Al-Duri was allowed to finish his assignment and continued to other posts.

Al-Majid was shown and read a copy of a handwritten letter in Arabic, described as number 3324, dated May 14, 1987, from the Director of Security, Halabja Security Directorate to the Suleimaniyeh Security Directorate. The letter details an order by the Commander of the First Army Corps, as requested by Al-Majid, to execute wounded civilians, to use bulldozers to level neighborhoods, to impose a curfew, and to destroy with tanks and bulldozers any house which opens fire. Al-Majid denied knowledge of this order from the Iraqi military or any such request from him and suspects the document is a forgery. Al-Majid stated he would not have issued an order to a Corps Commander. In Al-Majid's opinion, the letter did not follow the normal chain of command. Al-Majid denied that civilians were executed after interrogations. He added that interrogations were the responsibility of the security services.

Al-Majid was shown and read a copy of a document written in Arabic, described as number 28/3650, dated June 3, 1987, signed by Al-Majid, marked "Top Secret and Personal" directed to various military, political and security commands. It orders, in part, that the armed forces kill any human being or animal present within the prohibited areas. Al-Majid admitted to issuing such an order and that it was sent to the referenced agencies including the military. Al-Majid acknowledged the authenticity of the copy of this document and confirmed the authenticity of his signature on the last page.

Al-Majid was shown and read a copy of a document written in Arabic, described as Directive 4008, dated June 20, 1987, signed by Al-Majid, addressed to various military commands. The subject of the directive is "Dealing With The Villages That Are Prohibited For Security Reasons." It lists certain actions to be effective as of June 22, 1987. Paragraph two states, "The presence of human beings and animals is completely prohibited in these areas, and these shall be regarded as operational zones in which the troops can open fire at will, without any restrictions, unless otherwise instructed by our headquarters." Paragraph four states, in part, "The Corps Commands shall carry out random special bombardments using artillery, helicopters and aircraft at all times of the day or night in order to kill the largest number of persons present in those prohibited areas." Paragraph five states, in part, "All

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Continuation of FD-302 of Ali Hasan Al-Majid, On 03/20/2004, Page 6

persons captured in those villages shall be detained because of their presence there, and they shall be interrogated by the security services and those between the ages of 15 and 70 are to be executed after any useful information has been obtained from them." Al-Majid admitted issuing the order in paragraph two. According to Al-Majid, everyone, whether civilian or military, knew that no one was allowed in those areas as it was a theater of operations. Anyone caught in those areas, including women and children, was to be killed. Al-Majid denied issuing the orders in paragraphs four and five. Al-Majid acknowledged the authenticity of the copy of this document and confirmed the authenticity of his signature on the last page.

Al-Majid was shown and read a copy of a document written in Arabic, dated November 22, 1988, from the Deputy Brigadier General of Security, Director of Security of Erbil Province to the Section Security Chiefs. This document reiterates paragraph five of Directive 4008, dated June 20, 1987, and states that this portion of the directive "is to be applied to anyone present in the prohibited areas." Al-Majid questioned the authenticity of this document stating that such an order (Directive 4008) was already in effect and did not need to be repeated.

Al-Majid stated that while he was authorized to issue orders to the military, he did not have the authority to take action against military members if they did not carry out his orders.

Copies of the documents referenced in this report are contained in the 1A section of the file.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 05-07-2009 BY 60324 uc baw/ab/rs

FD-340b (Rev. 8-7-97)

Universal Case File Number 315E-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence Baghdad Operations Center

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Baghdad Operations Center (BOC)
(Name of Contributor)

Baghdad Team
(Address of Contributor)

By SSA [Redacted]

To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☐ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☐ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant

to Rule 6 (e), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes ☐ No

Title: DESERT SPIDER

Reference: FD-302 of Ali Hasan Al-Majid

(Communication Enclosing Material)

dated 3/20/04

Description: ☐ Original notes re interview of

b6
b7C

b7E

Universal Case File Number 315E-HQ-1448534Field Office Acquiring Evidence FRENQSerial # of Originating Document 34Date Received 3/20/2001From George L. Piro
(Name of Contributor)

(Address of Contributor)

(City and State)

By George L. Piro
(Name of Special Agent)To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☒ NoReceipt Given ☐ Yes ☒ NoGrand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant
to Rule 6 (e), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure☐ Yes ☒ NoTitle: DESERT SPIDER
IT-IRAQReference: _____
(Communication Enclosing Material)Description: ☒ Original notes re interview ofALI HASAN AL-MATI

3/25 INTERVIEW OF ALI HASAN ①

AL-MATID:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 05-07-2009 BY 60324/uc baw/sab/ks

1987-1989 - HIS RESP. IN CHARGE
NORTHERN COMMAND OF BAATH PARTY.
POLITICAL APPARATUS. SEC. GEN.
NO OTHER RESP. IRAQ DIVIDED
INTO SECTOR NORTHERN, CENTRAL
EMPHATES, SOUTHERN. D REPLACED
MOHAMMAD ZUBAYDI, D WAS
APPOINTED BY SADDAM DURING
A MTG OF THE LEADERSHIP.
MBRS ARE ASSIGNED TO POSITIONS
DURING MTGST TOLD D. OF HIS
RESP. ZUBAYDI APPOINTED AS
MINST. OF TRANSP. D WAS
DEP. CMR OF MILITARY ORG.
SIN WAS IN CHARGE AND MADE
APPT.

YES DECREE WAS MADE
@ THE END OF MTG DOCUMENTING
THE MTG. NO VOTE FOR APPT.
D IN CHARGE OF BAATH PRTY
NO TO SECURITY

SH AUTHORIZED ID TO REP
THE LDRSHIP @ NTGS

SECURITY SVS ARE NEVER
SUBORDINATE TO ANYONE IN GOVT.
EXCEPT TO SH

NONE OF LDRSHIP WERE IN
CHARGE OF SECURITY FEDAYEEN
OR SADDAM'S CUBS ONLY SH.

WAS NOT IN CHARGE OF
MILITARY. WAS IN CHARGE
OF THE SECURITY THRU
PARTY, THE PEOPLE'S ARMY
AND SUPERVISE THE GOVERNORS
REGARDING SECURITY & GOVERNANCE

* SHOW COPY OF RCC DECREE
160 DATED 3/24/1987.

WAS NOT IN CHARGE OF THE ENTITIES
AND DID NOT USE THE DECREE
EXCEPT FOR COLLECTIVIZATION OF VILLAGES
~~RELEVANT~~

THIS GEN DECREE CAME TO
HIM IN WRITING. DID NOT USE
ITS IN INSTRUCTIONS IN THE
NORTH UNTIL HE LEFT.

EVEN THOUGH HE HAD THE
AUTHORITY HE DID NOT REMOVE
OR ACT AGAINST ANY MILITARY
OR CIVILIAN PERSON.

NEVER GAVE ANY ORDERS TO OFFICERS
TO DO SO. ~~AN~~ AUTHORITY RESTRICTED
TO W/IN CITY. THE MILITARY
CONDUCTED ANFAL - COLLECTIVIZATION.
DURING ATES WHEN TARGETED VILLAGES

WOULD BE TREATED IN A MANNER
THAT WERE 5 KM AWAY FROM
CITIES. NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR
ANY AREAS 5 KM AWAY FROM
CITIES. 1ST ANFAL GADL QAHM.

2ND OF SARBAOUT BARHAM, 3RD &
4TH IRBIL AND Dohuk. ^{NOV} PARTY
OF ORG ONLY ARMY ENGAGED
IN THEM.

(4)

DING MTC DISCUSSING COLLECTIVIZATION
ASKED TO BE EXECUTED AS
IT REQ BUDGET HE DID NOT
HAVE A BUDGET AS IT WOULD
REQUIRE ENGINEERS ETC
& SHOULD BE HANDLED BY MINIST.
OF HOUSING.

THE 2 MINISTRIES TOOK OVER
TO INCLUDE CONSTRUCTION, D'S ROLE
WAS TO INFORM GOVERNOR OF COMPLETION
OF HOUSING AS TO BEGIN THE
TRANSFER.

EACHT PROVINCE WOULD
HAVE A SECURITY COMMITTEE.
ENCOMPASSING ALL THE SVS.
1ST NEEDED 1 WOULD GO TO
CHIEF STAFF FOR ARMY/MILITARY
2 OFFICES SULIMINAYIT AND KIRKUK.
1ST CAMP LOCATED @ BOTH.
SULTAN HASHEM UNDER OF ANFAL
CAMPAIGN

(5)

D IN CHARGE OF PROVINCE, SUBURB & SOME ~~AREA~~^{ZONE} AREAS BUT NOT VILLAGES

↓
THOSE AREAS WERE UNDER MILITARY CONTROL AND CITIES NEAR BORDER OF IRAQ/IRAN ALSO. AND NOT PARTY'S RESPONSIBLE. ITHABUTA AMONG OTHERS WERE UNDER MILITARY.

INSTRUCTIONS THAT FOLLOWED THE DECREE GAVE THE 5KM RULE AND IN SOME AREAS EVEN LESS. THOSE INSTRUCTIONS CAME WRITTEN FROM DIWAN. IMMEDIATELY AFTER DECREE ISSUED.

THE SECURITY SYS ~~WAS~~ CARRIED OUT ONLY THE PRESIDENT'S ORDERS AND INSTRUCTIONS. IN THE CITY, D WAS ABLE TO DELEGATE ORDERS

ONLY W/IN THE CITY. EVERYTHING ⑥
ELSE THE SVS WERE INDEPENDENT.
SUCH AS TECHNICAL WORK BY THE
SVS.

THE INSTRUCTIONS THAT FOLLOWED
THE DECREE ARE WHAT HE
FOLLOWED & RESTRICTED HIS ROLE
AND DUTIES.

KURDS - IRAQIS ; DOES NOT HATE
THEM THEY ARE HIS PEOPLE. THEY
HAVE GOOD AND BAD AS ARABS.
HAS PERSONAL RELATIONS W/ MANY
EATEN AT WALAL'S HOUSE VICE
VERSA. DOES NOT LIKE, BUT
DOES NOT LIKE HIM. "SHAIKIT
OF SABOTEURS" WHAT HE CALLED
HIM. REferred to them OFFICIAL
COMMUNICATIONS. HEARD THE SABOTEURS
HAD RELATIONS W/ OTHER COUNTRIES
BUT PERSONALLY DID NOT KNOW.

A COMBATANT CALLS HIS ENEMIES

(7)

NAME BUT THAT HAPPENS DURING
WAR OR CONFLICT. IRAN WENT INTO
ITS RELATIONS W/ THESE GRPS &
BENEFITED FROM DESTROYING THE
GROUPS' IRAQI REPUTATION.

IRAN TRIED TO ESTABLISH PRESENCE
IN CERTAIN AREAS SUCH AS KUWAIT
ETC. CALLED FOR MILITARY
ACTION FROM IRAQ DURING THE
WAR. WHEN IRAN DECLARES WAR
ITS LAST YEAR & THEN SEND ITS
AGENTS INTO THESE TERRITORIES
THE MILITARY ^{MUST} RESPOND. IT IS
DIFFICULT TO DIFFER BTWN THE
KURDS & IRANIAN AS IT IS TODAY
FOR THE US MIL.

POWERS CASTED FOR APPROX. 2 YRS
RETURNED POSSIBLY 3 OR 4 IN THE
1989. DOES NOT KNOW ~~WHEN~~ IF A
DECREE WAS ISSUED REMOVING HIM
WHEN HE WAS TRANSFERRED AS
FOUGHT AS THE DECREE WAS VOID.

06/1988 - MINST. OF COAL RULE.

1 REPLACED HIM HASAN AL-AMRI
FORMER REC MBR.

PREV. DENIED ANY INFO/KNOWLEDGE
OF EXECUTION ETC. OF KURDS IN
NORTHERN IRAQ.

AS TALKED, HIS JOB WAS DELEGATE
THE COLLECTION OF THE VILLAGES
W/ ZONES ~~OUTSIDE~~ W/ 5 KM INTO
COMPLEXES. THOSE OUTSIDE 5 KM
NIZAR KAZRAJI.

GAVE ORDERS RE COLLECTIVIZATION -
TALKED KURDS W/ IN PARTY TO
EXPLAIN THE NEED.

NOT INDIV. UNTIL THE LAND IS
PREPARED & ELECTRICITY W/AS BROUGHT
IN.

WOULD GIVEN 3000 DINARS OR 10,000
TAKE HOME THE EATINGS OR
TAKE THE MONEY & BUILD THEM ^{OWN}

TRANSPORT DISTANT VILLAGERS TO VISIT THE LAND. THRU GOVERNOR WHO OVERSAW THE SECURITY SVS.

THIS REQUIRED A LOT OF EFFORT FROM ALL GOVT SVS.

WHEN THE ~~DEPORTED~~ BELAN KURD POLITICAL PARTYS & IRAN WERE THREATENED. FOR AN IRANIAN TO WALK 5K TO PARS LEAPETS OR CARRY OUT INSURGENCY IN MOUNTAINOUS AREA. THOSE VILLAGES PROVIDED ASSISTANCE & THEY OPPOSED THE MOVE.

AGREED MOST DID NOT WANT TO MOVE AND GIVE UP THEIR HOMES ETC. THOSE WHO WANTED SOUGHT THINGS LIKE ELECTRICITY FRIDGE, TEACHERS ETC.

IF THEY DID NOT WANT TO LEAVE FORCE TAKEN TO MOVE BY CARS AND PUT THEM IN THE COMPLEX THE VILLAGES WERE LEVELLED AS NOT TO BECOME SAFE HAVEN

FOR SABOTAGE. I ORDERED THE
DESTRUCTION OF VILLAGES
AFTER THE MOVING OF THE
PEOPLE AS NOT TO BE
SANCTUARY TO PERSONS WHO
COULD ATTACK THE MILITARY.

NOT PERSONAL ORDER, COST
MILLIONS OF DINARS & ALL OF
THE MINISTRIES & CARRIED IT
OUT.

MTG RE THOSE REFUSING TO
MOVE - TOLD THOSE UNDER HIS
CMD THAT NO HOUSE REMAIN
STANDING W/IN THE PROHIBITED
ZONE. WOULD TOUR THE AREA
& IF SO WOULD HOLD THE
SECTION CMDR RESPONS. BLE

X PLAYED HM AUDIO

4
TALIB AL DURI COMR OF 5TH
CORPS DID NOT CARRY OUT
HIS ORDERS

THE AUDIO WAS A DISCUSSION
W/ KHARLASI.

IF HE EXERCISED DECRET OF
160 AL-DURI WOULD HAVE
BEEN RETIRED. BUT HE
FINISHED HIS DUTY AS CORP
COMR & WENT ON TO OTHER
POSTS.

TAPE INDICATED THAT D HE
WAS NOT IN CHARGE OF MIIT.
AS HE WAS FORCED TO COMPLAIN
ON ~~THE~~ MILITARY OFFICERS WHO
FAILED TO ~~COMPLETE~~ COMPLETE HIS
TASK.

ANFAL W/IN HIS ZONE OUTSIDE
OF HIS CONTROL.

DOC #2 DIR HALABJA TO DIR
SULMENIYAH.

"HAVE NOT HEARD THUS WORDS
SUSPECTS IT IS A FORGERY"

WOULD NOT ISSUE AN ORDER TO A
CORP COMMANDER WHO WOULD THEN
INFORM COMMANDER AND SO ON
IT IS CLEAR IT DOES NOT
FOLLOW A CHAIN OF COMMAND.

WERE ~~WOUNDED~~ WOUNDED CIV.
EXECUTED AFTER INTERROGATION:
NO I DID NOT HEAR THOSE
WORDS I DID NOT AN INVEST.
BODY WHO COULD HAVE LOOKED
AT THESE. INTERROGATION
WAS THE RESP. OF THE
SEC. SVS.

SULMENIYAH GEN. FARHAN

TABOURI 1ST ARMY

LTR DATED JUN 3/198 TS 8 ~~Personnel~~
 SIGNED BY D
 JED ISSUED THIS ORDER -
 CES WENT TO MIL
 TO INTER

LTR #3 (DIR 4008)

DID ISSUE ORDER RE PERSONS/
 ANIMALS IN PROHIBITED AREA

DENIED SEC #4

" SEC #5

AGREED HIS SIGNATURE SEC #2 WAS
 HIS.
 FORBIDDEN ZONE - EVERYONE
 KNOWS, CIV. MILIT. ETC NO ONE
 CAN BE THERE AS IT WAS A
 THEATRE OF OP. ANY PERSON
 WOULD BE KILLED.

MAY ISSUE ORDER TO MILIT. BUT
~~THEY~~ DID NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO

TABE [REDACTED] ACTION AGAINST M.I.
THAT DID NOT CARRY OUT ORDERS.

DTI Chemical th

th

Piro-As

3/20/04

b6
b7c

- Is6

per Red, will discuss period 1987-91

Q I was in chg of North ~~Committee~~ ^{Bureau}

A Replaced mohammed Zubaida who became minister
Took his position when he left.

SAD on appointed me

It was during a meeting of the PM's leadership.

Q Was a decree that put you in chg.

A Yes

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

Once

DATE 05-07-2009 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/is

Q That put me in chg of both of them.

A Yes

Did it put you in chg of security
a person in the north

A No - However, SAD A changed me
↓

A: The security services
are never subordinates

None of the leaders was
in charge of security services
They were directly
subordinate to Saddam

I was in charge of the gov't in the cities
+ to supervise the governor
in the _____ area.

Q: how many chg of n. security services.
No
Didn't use any

Q: describe collectivization

Q: Baghdad #160
A: yes.

My Auth. limited to interview
of the city.

My collection was not
intentional. At the meeting
I was watching,
It was disguised

Every province there is a
secret committee

Military Intelligence

Common Salt Hayco.
was its dry, white

I am participating in
4th Vol. - I am

Those areas w/ police
stating the activities

" The instructions were ^{made} ~~given~~ made
~~at~~ and the Envo and set off.

That the cities in 5 km area

By intelligence or security aspect, I did not know what Redwood ^{Secures} ~~Secures~~ the data.

Q WAAAT one beeky ABOUT KURPS?

A my have good & bad
like any people
I don't hate Kuros

I don't Oulal Hakhani, He
may ~~hates~~ ^{hate} when

By saboteurs, ^I mean those who
destroy bridges roads etc.

See any one

I have heard but never seen that
they have cut off

They have then come they
talk to these people about

Q A combatant calls his enemy
many names.
I am not sure.

Q. Did Actions by Kurds + Iranians
Necessitate action?

A. Definitely when Iran sends
its agents into our country,

A. Agree it was difficult to
distinguish L & R for good & bad

A. There is no _____
who wants to injure his own
people.

A. The Kurdish individual is loyal.
A Kurd is trustworthy &
would be allowed in a
place where women gather,

Q. The games who had from R & L 16s,

Returned in 1998

A In June 89 I was assigned
as minister of local relations

Q. *Therapsid adacres* Ap 85

Q Who replaced you?

A Mission Statement for some ~~kind~~
RCC mission

Q In MAR 31, + APR 4,
you told us you had
no perception or exact
or approximate ~~general~~
~~for~~ + no knowledge
distinctly, kind of
enough of ~~the~~ white zone,
I appeared directly.

As tasked by leadership I
was to delegate the
North to gather
and collect news

cc - ~~Bing~~^{Bing} at top village
for another

Anything to do w/
Matters, etc

Outside the 5 miles was not
my responsibility -
I have visited these areas
~~several~~

Q Re: collection,
I gave orders
I asked levels of
in preparation
to explain the need

Mon & Linan
take over his
A. We asked the indigenous
asked Santa Rosa
to move people

The annual program
these parties, would
have ended this take
on something that is
urgent.

Q What resistance due to fact
people didn't want to move
A Yes - A large section did
not want leave.

Q If they didn't want to leave
that's when we would
force them to move -
put them on carts and
force them to move.

Heavy equip would leave,
is it can't be used by enemy as
~~weapons~~ ~~ago~~ ~~of~~ ~~a~~ ~~sanctuary~~.

I did, but that the

~~build more~~

It was a certainly ^{1950s} ~~war~~ plan.

Q What if people'd not
desert the villages?

Do you ever tell people that
no house was to be left
5th

PLAYING OFF TARE

2nd tape

This was a discussion w/ Ray
ch. 7 Staff.

I would immediately retire him
he ended up going to another
position.

Turns must be leveled
so they don't become
situation runners

I withked for this tape

The Rice resolution doesn't
address my ~~5th~~ role.

Q Rice decrees ~~my~~^{the}

Q This decree says you are
in charge.

A who issued the decree
specified how I
implemented.

A Although in Sydney zone,
they were outside my
area of responsibility.

A This was my order & I
had to enforce it.
Just as deportation

Q Other orders pre Andel -

Q Ref: Letter from
Director of
Security Int Halabja
re: ex-ante work

A: I haven't
heard of
such things
I suspect this
is a forgery

& why would I tell him

The Corps to avoid
escalating
the security

This is a forgery

A security director is not
subordinate

A Why would Tanea
order to copy
under who
work

A Administrative logs
suggests this forgery.

Q were wounded
prisoner executed

A During my specialty
of security services.

Q who was directing
Security

A don't know

A. Re...

Brig. AACTAN is here
he is a most
Intelligent man

A Abdel Rahman was of
Northern Committee

Q Ref One to a document
TOP SECRET
to

DISCUSSION re:
order to KN
animals or people
interbreeding

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 05-07-2009 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/rs

Universal Case File Number 315E-HQ-1448534Field Office Acquiring Evidence BAGHDAD OPERATIONSSerial # of Originating Document 37Date Received 3/27/04From [REDACTED]

(Name of Contributor)

BAGHDAD OPERATIONS CENTER

(Address of Contributor)

BAGHDAD, IRAQ

(City and State)

By [REDACTED]

(Name of Special Agent)

To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☐ NoReceipt Given ☐ Yes ☐ NoGrand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant
to Rule 6 (e), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure☐ Yes ☐ NoTitle: DESERT SPIDER

Reference: _____

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☒ Original notes re interview ofALI HASAN AL-MAJID

3/27/04

Don't consider myself leader here
denn

b6
b7C

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DATE 05-07-2009 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/rs

I said to my group
I should not be in any govt
entity

Before the war Sandra said
I should leave the govt
and that is my wish.

I am not decided by myself
I am not confused & unclear
you are in control of this country.

In my discussion, He talked about
how we can rebuild Iraq w/
the Americans

- Q Thus, you understand the need to be cooperative
A not against such an approach
I believe in my need to cooperate
to rebuild & better & stop bloodshed

Q You offered to kill SANDERS
Is that correct?

A Yes this is correct

Plc I ~~the~~ can't

that point

I had never had chance
to

SANDERS for his own sake does
not care about

Therefore he would come to kill me

W/o him even talking I would shoot
him

Is

~~Being~~ KILLING SADDAM - was it
something you thought about.
No, I had believed in his

I had thought about resigning

In 2001 I wish that I had
left the Leadership party
minutes before the meeting
I asked him "Am I
going to be nominated - and
SADDAM said yes.

I could do nothing but keep quiet.
If I was to object would
be perceived as a disgrace
to my own tribe.

He used to believe that
Am. Army believe Am
Army couldn't get
into Baghdad

Govt the Army by blinded him
so he couldn't see

Q Did he not care about future
of ID people?

A I did not know there facts
until now

He does not believe in anything

Q

don't know an
free only 1980
1980-2003

I was a member beginning in
1991 & we met
only twice -
to nominate the presid
{ the Republic.

Qas were members Council of Ministers
W/ Taha Ramadan, Al Duri, Aliz,

Q So what allowed Saddam to take it to
this point

A

Don't confuse me with

I Am nearest relative
When he would speak, I would
urge him to invite inspectors back

Q What ^{in him} drove Saddam to ~~become~~
the reach this point?

A

he didn't think Am. Army
would be able to get
into Baghdad

Q Previously you said

A It came to [K] him w/ permission of tribe,
I would say I did know
you loved yourself better
than that. Your sons
were better than you

I blame him now
when I was with the group

He never listened to us
& his the reason for the situation
now.

I used to speak against the war
& call for the returning
the inspectors

I used to beg him to
allow the inspectors to return
and avoid the war

SATURDAY
MAR 27, 2004

R HOW WAS PAST WEEK

PAST WEEKS WERE BETTER AFTER PUNISH
WISH THINGS TO BE BETTER

R EXPLAIN

TOLD TO BE MOVED ISOLATED AND NOT
EXERCISE WITH OTHERS

R- MORE QUESTIONS AND PROCESS HAS CHANGED
* CONSIDER YOU SELF A LEADER

I AM A PRISONER. DONT FEEL SENIOR

R- CONSIDER EQUAL AS THE OTHER SENIOR LEADER

YES I WAS BATH BUT NOW PRISONER

UNTIL REGIME FELL LOST POSITION

R- OTHER PRISONERS SEE YOU READER

SAME AS OTHERS

R- TELL OTHERS ABOUT DEAL

NO I SAID TO MY CREW I PRESENTED

RECOMMENDATIONS. I SHOULD NOT BE PART

OF... BEFORE WAR SADDAM SAID I SHOULD

LEAVE LEADERSHIP.

R- COULD EXPLAIN TO TRIBE ABOUT SADDAM
STILL A WISH

R. STILL A DESIRE TO LEAD.

I AM NOT DECIDED BY MYSELF NOT CONFUSED
YOU IN CHARGE OF COUNTRY. IF NO PERMISSION
FROM YOU IN CONTRAY ALL DISCUSSIONS
HOW TO BETTER EXIST WITH US

R- YOU SHOULD BE COMPLETELY COOPERATIVE
I AM NOT AGAINST APPROACH. BELIEVE
MY NEED TO COOP. WITH US TO END THE
IRAQI BLOODSHED

R- ONE POINT YOU OFFER TO KILL SH
YES CORRECT BE'C. UNTIL THAT POINT
TO RID OF TRIBE AND SPEAK AND THAT'S
WHY FORMING OF PARTY BE PERCEIVED
SH A THREAT. SH DOES NOT CARE ABOUT
CUSTOM TRAD. THEREFORE HE KILL ME OR
I KILL HIM. WITHOUT TALKING I SHOOT HIM
AND TRIBE WILL KILL ME. POSITION SENSITIVE
IF NOT ME THEN SONS.

R. TALK ABOUT SH IS THIS WHAT WE WANT
TO HEAR

NO I BELIEVE

R - LONG BEFORE

BEFORE US NO CHANCE

I THOUGHT BUT WOULD BE LOSS

TO ME FAMILY AND TRIBE. THINKING ABOUT
RESIGNING DURING PARTY MEETING 2004

I WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN NOMINATED

2001 DID NOT WANT NOMINATION

MINUTES BEFORE I ASK SH FOR - ANSWER

BUT SH SAID SAID HE NOMINATED

R. NOTICE DENIAL?

OBJECT WOULD HAVE BEEN DISGRACEFUL

G - WISH SH BE KILL?

YES

G - IF OPPORTUNITY WITH TRIBE

YES

G - IF GIVEN TALK TO SH SAY?

DID NOT KNOW HE LOVED HIM SELF AND
SONS BETTER.

G-

I BLAME HIM NOW HE NEVER LISTEN
AND I SPEAK AGAINST WAR AND ^{WANT} RETURN
OF INSPEL. NO WAR AGAINST EQUAL BEG
FOR RETURN OF

G COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

NO RCC

G- ONE OF FOUR MINISTER TO MAKE COUNCIL
NO

G- NO ~~AVARAGE~~ FACT. SO WHAT FORCED WAR
FOR SH DESTRUCTION PRISONMENT WHAT
IN HIM?

NO DIFFERENT OF POSITION THIS COMMITTEE
PLEASE NO MIX OF TITLES, REPLY TO ? I AM
ONE OF THE FOUR IMPORT. PEOPLE ONE OF
RCC AND BATH NATIONAL COMMAND. I AM
NEAREST RELATIVE. SOMETIMES AGREE
WITH INSPECTORS BUT SH NEVER REVIL

∴ IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO LEAD
AGAINST SH

G- WHAT DROVE SH/ WHAT IN HIM?

HE DID NOT THINK US ENTER BAGHDAD

G- NO PERSON IN UNIVERSE THAT US NOT
BE ABLE.

HE USE TO BELIEVE US NOT

G- HOW?

GOD ALMIGHTY BLINDED HIM DID NOT
REALIZE FORCE.

G- NOT CARE ABOUT PEOPLE OF IRAQ

NOT KNOW FACTS, FOR SH DOES NOT

CARE ABOUT BOYS FAMILY IRAQ OR PEOPLE

T- WHAT IS SH CHARACTER?

I DONT KNOW BUT EGO

T- WHO IN HISTORY COMPARE?

NO EQUAL

T- EXPLAIN

SUPRISED THOUGHT COURAGOUS BUT

SURRENDER WITH PISTOL NOT COURAGE

WISH SUICIDE. PEPPLED TO DESCRIBE

SONS DIED. WIFE DAUGHTER. WONDER.

IF SH (THROWN TRUTH) SHOULD HAVE SURRENDER
AND SAVE IRAQ

T- WHAT DO OTHERS SAY (PRISONERS)

I USE TO HAVE CONTACT NO CHANCE TO

DISCUSS. CANNOT MEET. THOSE IN AGREEMENT

T- YOUR ONLY MISGIVING, NOT COURAGOUS?

DURING TIME AS PROGRESS SH STARTED
AS INDIVIDUAL NOT PARTY. COMPLETELY AS
INDIVIDUAL

G- IF IRAQ CLAIM UNITED. THINGS VOTED WITH
ALL IS WHAT ^{CARRIED} CARRIED COUNTRY

NO NOT CASE

R WHAT WAS CASE

HUSSIEN PREPARE ^{RESOLUTION} DECREE. DID ALL EVER
AGREE? YOU HAVE SECRETARY? HAS RCC
MEET MORE THAN 2/3 TIMES?

G- HOW DESICION MADE?

RESOLUTION ON ORDER OF SH. PLEASE
ASK CHIEF OF DIWAN, I ASKED MEETING,
TOLD RCL RESOLUTIONS SEND COPY

Q. EXAMPLE 1991 IRAQ IN VASE KUWAIT
BASED RCL

I WAS NOT MEMBER. NO RCL NOT MEET
ON ISSUE

Q - ALL DECISION ON SH
ASK OTHERS SENIOR

Q - CLOSEST RELATIVE

YES BUT I DID NOT KNOW 1980-2003
1991-2003 RCL DID NOT MEET BUT TWICE
JUST TO NOMINATE ~~34~~ PRESIDENT.

Q - SOME SEE AS DEMOCRATIC HOW WOULD YOU
DESCRIBE

GENERAL CONCEPT. HOW ON SINGLE INDIVIDUAL

Q. YOU NOMINATE

OUR MISTAKE ALL GAVE AUTH. TO MAKE
IMMEDIATE DECISION

G - YOU ARE TO BLAME AS GROUP FOR

YES WE HAVE TO ANSWER FOR SILENCE
AND PAYING FOR IT

G - HOW DO YOU ANSWER AND SH?

OUR PRESENCE HERE IS PARTIAL. FUTURE WILL
PAY EITHER COURT AS FOR ME IF GOD ALMIGHTY
IF RELEASED I WILL NOT ENTER AN IRAQI CITY
BUT ISOLATE. HOW DO I ANSWER PEOPLE. EVEN
FAMILY UNFIT TO CARE FOR, HAD IT NOT
BE SIN WOULD HAVE SUICIDE

T - DESCRIBE SH ^{AS} FATHER?

FAILURE FATHER / LEADER EVERYTHING ~~IS~~ ^{IS}

T - DONT SAY TO MAKE ME FEEL GOOD

NO I BELIVE

T - ANY GOOD? SH

YES WHEN POOR / NEEDY INDIVIDUAL HE
WOULD GIVE / GRY

T - EXCEPT FOR ISOLATED, WORLD SAW POVERTY
WITH PALACES EXPLAIN

PRIDE / PERSONALITY

T- WHAT GOOD WITH TODD'S SUFFERING
~~YOUR EX~~ THIS IS WHAT I SAW

T- AFRAID OF SH

YES, HE CAN DISTORT MY HISTORY
LAST 3-4 YEARS I ISOLATE AFRAID SH
THINK I WANT PRES. WHY ~~I~~ WOULD YOU
THINK I WOULD WANT TO LEAD

R- YOU TOLD US THIS 2 MONTHS AGO TO
LEAD THE PEOPLE

AT TIME IT IS WHAT I SAID BUT MENTALLY
I AM TRIED AND NO DESIRE I WILL NO
BEHAVE TO LEAD.

R- GIVE UP DESIRE BECAUSE NO CHANCE ^{OPPORTUNITY}
DESIRE LESSEN. NOT COMPLETELY

T- FEAR SH CAUSE TO DO THINGS NOT NORMALLY
WOULD HAVE DONE
NO

T. ACTIONS YOUR DECISIONS

YES

T- ANY INSTRUCTIONS FROM SH YOU DONT
FEEL GOOD ABOUT

I HAVE TO IMPLEMENT NO CHOICE.

T- SUGGESTS YOU HAD CONFLICT WITH ORDERS

YES EXAMPLE- 7 AUG 1990 CALLED MEETING

CAR TAKE ME SH AND LEADERSHIP. SH

TURN TO ME AND SAID KUWAIT IS WORRY SOME

SHOULDN'T YOU GO TO CALM THINGS DOWN

I POINTED TO MOFI AND OTHERS. HE KNOWS

I HAVE NO DESIRE. WE LEAVE AT END

AND SH PLACES CARTRIDGE BELT AND PISTOL

ON. I ON GUARD FOR KUWAIT. SO IN BEGINNING

I NO DESIRE WHEN ORDER THEN I GO

T- WHO RESPONSIBLE FOR MERRY/DEATHS FOR IRAQ

US AND SH SH FIRST WE NOMINATE

T- OTHER THAN NOMINATE WHAT WOULD DO DIFF.

10 YEARS BACK?

NO PEOPLE ON EARTH STAND LIVING WAR CONDITION

NOR PERSON CHOSE 10 YEARS OF EMBARGO

AND RIGHT GREATEST POWER

T- EXPECT WHEN US LEAVES

2 WEEKS AGO I TALK I TOLD THEM WE MUST
HAVE DONE SOMETHING GOOD WITH US NOT
IRAQ NOT HAVE COUP: ~~WE~~ WOULD HAVE LONG
BEEN EXECUTED BUT I AM ALIVE AND HOPE
TO SEE FAMILY

T- WORLD VIEWS YOU AS EVIL UNLESS WORDS ARE
EMPTY, IF TRULY WANT TO ATONE YOU SHOULD
BE WILLING TO DISCLOSE TO US BEYOND WHAT
WE ASK.

WHAT INTELLIGENCE

T- WE CAN SPEND ENDLESS HOURS ON WHO
DID WHAT TO WHOM. OR YOU TELL US IN
NARRATIVE. IF YOU REALLY BELIEVE ABOUT
HEALING,

I WILL NO^{NOT KILL} KEEP INTEL BUT FOR MILITARY
WMD NO INFO IT WILL NOT BE MENTAL
PRESSURE

T- NO MENTAL PRESSURE - YOU MENTION EARLY
AN OPPORTUNITY TO REVERSE FOR HISTORY

I WISH TO APOLOGIZE

T- WE INSTRUMENT OF GODS WILL

YES THANK GOD WITH US NOT IRAQIS

NOW AS STABILIZE I WILL GO TO COURTS

MY PRESENTS REQUESTED NOT SPIT UPON

FAVOR FROM GOD LET US FEEL PAIN

R- CAPTURE OR SURRENDER

CAP

R- WAR WRONG, AND HAPPY WITH US

YES

R- WAIT OR CAPTURE?

I WISH SURRENDER AND ASK WHERE TO

SURRE. THOSE WHO DONT ARE LOSERS AND

BITTER LIFE. I HAVE GUARDED HUMAN RIGHTS

I AWAIT GOD DECISION TO COURT EXECUTED

OR RELEASE

R - WHY YOU COMMANDER WITH ANFAL/KUMAIT/
SHIA UPRISING?

I NOT LEADER OF ANFAL

R- FULL COOPERATIVE AND NO GAMES NO RESPOND

RCL 160 IN CHARGE OF NORTH AND NOT

ONLY CITIES AND LATER ORDER 4008
TO MILITARY THAT IS PRE-ANFAL DECREE
STATEMENTS YOU IN CHARGE. YOU SEEM IN
CHARGE OF ANFAL / KUWAIT / BASRAH

IT WAS NOT MY CHOOSE TO KURDS AND
5 PROVINCES. YOU HAVE COMMANDERS
AND HE TELLS YOU I WAS IN CHARGE THEN
I AM ~~NOT~~ LIAR.

ONLY 8 DAYS IN MARCH

R. YOU UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEM WE HAVE
WITH YOU TELLING US YOU NOT IN CHARGE.

SH WAS COMMANDER CHIEF IT WOULD BE
ILLOGICAL FOR ME THEREFORE DECREE I WAS
IN CHARGE OF CITIES

G- OUR DISCUSSION AT END SOMETHING TO THINK
ABOUT. THINK ABOUT WHAT WE SAID AND
YOU SAID TO US. YOU WISH TO APOLOGIZE
FOR PAST ACTIONS YOU KNOW WHO WE ARE
YOU KNOW WHAT WE REPRESENT YOU THINK
ABOUT YOUR PLACE IN HISTORY. YOU DO CARE
AND SHOULD. ~~WAY~~ YOU ARE SEEN

BUT YOUR ACTIONS AND WHAT HAPPENS
WILL BE BURDEN ON SONS AND SONS OF
SONS. I AM ARAB, THEY ARE IRAQI
AND FACE WHAT YOU HAVE DONE. WHAT
IS IN YOUR CONTROL IS HOW YOU CARRY YOURSELF
FROM NOW ON. IN PAST NOT ABLE TO
SPEAK FREELY YOU CAN CHANGE NOW.
OPPORTUNITY TO SHOW CHARACTER, CAN NOT
BLAME US OUR INVEST CONTINUES US
IS UNLESS ANY OTHER TECH EXCEEDS ANY
OTHER. WE KNOW MORE THAN YOU
THINK. AT LEAST ALLOW CHILD-CHILD-
ALLOW THEM TO LIVE IN COUNTRY

WE DONT NEED YOUR INFO WE HAVE
DOC AUDIO SAT YOU HAVE CHANCE TO
REDEEM YOURSELF. NEXT TIME I GIVE
YOU CHANCE.

AS HUMAN HAVE GO RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBOR
AND FAMILY, USE AS GUIDE.

G- PAYMENT TO IRAQ. TIME HERE PART OF IT
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN US AND IRAQ CONTROL
OUR TREATMENT DIFF FOR PRISONERS UNDER
FORMER REGIME

YOU ARE ADVANCE COUNTRY WITH HUMAN RIGHTS
YOU ARE BETTER TREATMENT, COMPARE US/IRAQ
WRONG.

G- I WATCH VIDEOS. THE TREATMENT OF IRAQ
PRISONERS TORTURE / MAINLY OF IRAQIS
BY FELLOW IRAQIS SOME IN NAME OF GOI
CORRECT

G- YOUR PAYMENT TO IRAQI PEOPLE AND OTHER
HAVE DEBT FAR EXCEEDS WHAT YOU CAN
PAY

CORRECT. IF WE NOT DONE WRONG GOI
NOT ALLOW US TO REMOVE. WE DESERVE
TO PAY HIGHER

G- FUTURE IN GODS HAND AND IRAQ
CORRECT

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

tef259a.ec

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 03/25/2004

To: ✓ Counterterrorism

Attn: ✓ ITOS II/ISLUA
SSA [redacted]

Counterterrorism

Attn: TRRS

DATE: 05-07-2009

CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/rs

REASON: 1.4 (c)

DECLASSIFY ON: 05-07-2034

b6
b7C

From: Louisville

JTTF

Contact: IOS [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

tet

(U) Case ID #: (S) ✓ 315E-HQ-1448534 (Pending) -38
(U) (S) 66F-HQ-C1384970 (Pending) -8450
(U) 221C-LS-C67849 (Pending) -47

(U) Title: (S) DESERT SPIDER
IT - IRAQ

Synopsis: (S) [redacted]

(U) (S)

Derived From : G-3
Declassify On: X1

(U) Reference: (S) 315E-HQ-1448534 Serial 9

b1

Details: (S) Referenced communication advised of anticipated prosecution of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and other members of his government for war crimes and crimes against humanity. CTD requested all field offices canvass logical assets regarding crimes of genocide (murder), torture, inhumane treatment, destruction of property and unlawful confinement committed by members of the Hussein regime. CTD also requested a review of Iraqi interviews conducted during [redacted] operations. Following are results of these efforts by Louisville Division:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Louisville
(U) Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-448534, 03/25/2004

(S) ~~(S)~~ On 03/08/2004, [redacted] a source of known reliability whose reporting has been corroborated, was contacted and provided the following information:

b1

(U) ~~(S)~~ [redacted]
[redacted]

b7D

~~(S)~~ Review of Louisville
refugee interview [redacted] revealed the following information of interest in this matter: (S)

b1

~~(S)~~ On 12/13/2002, [redacted] DOB [redacted]
[redacted] was interviewed at Louisville, KY.
[redacted] advised that [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

(S) [redacted]
(S) [redacted]

b1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Louisville
(U) Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-1-448534, 03/25/2004

~~(S)~~ On 03/20/2003, [redacted] DOB [redacted]
POB [redacted] was interviewed at Louisville, KY.
During this interview, [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

(S) [redacted] (No further details were offered or solicited).
b1

~~(S)~~ On 03/20/2003, [redacted] DOB [redacted]
[redacted] was interviewed at Louisville, KY.
[redacted] advised [redacted]

b6
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b7D

(S) [redacted] (No further details were offered or solicited). [redacted]

b1

(S) [redacted]

~~(S)~~ On 03/20/2003, [redacted] DOB [redacted]
[redacted] was interviewed at Louisville, KY.
[redacted] advised [redacted]

b6
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(S) [redacted] b1

~~(S)~~ On 03/20/2003, [redacted] DOB [redacted]
[redacted] was interviewed at Louisville, KY.
[redacted] advised [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

(S) [redacted] b1

(S) [redacted] ~~(S)~~ On 03/20/2003, [redacted] DOB [redacted]
[redacted] was interviewed at Louisville, KY.
[redacted] advised that [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

(S) [redacted] b1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterterrorism sm From: Louisville
Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-1 448534, 03/25/2004

~~(S)~~ On 03/20/2003, [redacted] DOB [redacted]
[redacted] was interviewed at Louisville, KY.

[redacted] advised [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

(S)

b1

~~(S)~~ On 03/20/2003, [redacted] DOB [redacted]
[redacted] SSAN [redacted] was interviewed at Lexington, KY.

[redacted] advised [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

(S)

b1

~~(S)~~ On 03/28/2003, [redacted] DOB [redacted]
[redacted] SSAN [redacted] was interviewed at Louisville, KY.
[redacted] advised that [redacted]

b6
b7C
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(S)

b1

~~(S)~~ On 03/24/2003, [redacted] DOB [redacted]
[redacted] was interviewed at Louisville, KY.

[redacted] advised [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

(S)

b1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(U) To: Counterterrorism From: Louisville
Re: (S) 315E-P-448534, 03/25/2004

(S) On 03/27/2003, [REDACTED]

DOB

was interviewed at Louisville, KY.

[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED]

b6
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b7D

(S)

b1

(S) On 03/20/2003, [REDACTED]

DOB [REDACTED]

SSAN [REDACTED] was interviewed at Louisville, KY.

advised [REDACTED]

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b7D

(S)

b1

(S) On 03/21/2003, [REDACTED]

DOB

was interviewed at Louisville, KY.

[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED]

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b7D

(S)

b1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Louisville
(U) Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-I-448534, 03/25/2004

~~(S)~~ On 03/24/2003, [redacted] DOB [redacted]
was interviewed at Louisville, KY. [redacted] stated that [redacted]

b6
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b7D

(S)

b1

~~(S)~~ On 03/28/2003, [redacted] DOB [redacted]
SSAN [redacted] was interviewed at Louisville, KY. [redacted]
stated that [redacted]

b6
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b7D

(S)

b1

~~(S)~~ On 03/26/2003, [redacted] DOB [redacted]
was interviewed at Louisville, KY. [redacted] advised that [redacted]

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(S)

b1

~~(S)~~ On 04/01/2003, [redacted] DOB [redacted]
[redacted] was interviewed at Louisville, KY.
[redacted] advised that [redacted]

b6
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(S)

b1

~~(S)~~ On 03/27/2003, [redacted] DOB [redacted]
[redacted] SSAN [redacted] was interviewed at Louisville, KY.

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b7D

(S)

b1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Louisville
(U) Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-1-448534, 03/25/2004

REQUEST (#1) OF CTD/TRRS

(U) ~~(S)~~ Review of the following information indicates that the two persons identified in this interview were likely

[redacted]
[redacted] CTD/TRRS is requested to prepare an IIR in order to provide this information to U.S. Army Central Command (CENTCOM) for action. [redacted]

b6
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b7D

[redacted] CTD/TRRS should characterize Louisville interviewee [redacted] (Protect) as "A source of unknown reliability who is in a position to know". The information for passage to CENTCOM follows:

~~(S)~~ On 03/20/2003, [redacted] DOB [redacted] was interviewed at Louisville, KY. [redacted] stated that [redacted]

b6
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(S)

(S)

b1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Louisville
(U) Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-H 448534, 03/25/2004

REQUEST (#2) OF CTD/TRRS

(S) ~~(S)~~ On 03/25/2004, [] a source of known reliability whose reporting has been corroborated, was debriefed by Louisville. Review of this information reveals information of value regarding the Iraqi Nuclear and Chemical Weapons programs. CTD/TRRS is requested to prepare an IIR in order to provide this information to U.S. Army Central Command (CENTCOM) and the [] for action. []

b1

S [] identified in this section [] [] have information of value which they wish to provide to U.S. authorities. This information was previously provided to CTD/ITOS II/MEU but source advised [] have not been contacted by U.S. authorities. The debriefing is as follows:

b7D

(U) ~~(S)~~ Louisville source advised []

[]

(U)

[]

(U) ~~(S)~~ Source advised that []

[]

(U) ~~(S)~~

(U) ~~(S)~~

[]

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7C
b7D

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Louisville
(U) Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-I-448534, 03/25/2004

(U) ~~(S)~~ Louisville requests CTD/ITOS II and CTD/TRRS provide feedback to Louisville regarding the two IIR disseminations. CTD/TRRS is also requested to provide copies of these IIRs to Louisville. Louisville considers this lead (Serial 9) covered.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Louisville
(U) Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-I-448534, 03/25/2004

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) ~~(S)~~ TRRS is requested (#1) to prepare an IIR to
CENTCOM regarding possible actionable intelligence regarding
[redacted] contained in instant communication.

b7D

Set Lead 2: (Action)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(S) ~~(S)~~ TRRS is requested (#2) to prepare an IIR to
CENTCOM [redacted] regarding possible actionable intelligence
regarding [redacted]
[redacted] contained in instant
communication.

b1

b7D

Set Lead 3: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) ITOS II/ISLU - For information and coordination
with TRRS.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ NOFORNALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 05-07-2009

CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/rs

REASON: 1.4 (c)

DECLASSIFY ON: 05-07-2034

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
ORGANIZATIONAL MESSAGE FORM

Classification per OGA letter dated 08/21/2009

TRANSMIT VIA:

☒ SAMNET
☐ NEPTUNE
☐ IIR SENT VIA ACS

PRECEDENCE:

☐ IMMEDIATE
☒ PRIORITY
☐ ROUTINE

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET
☒ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLASDate 01/14/2004
PAGE 1 OF 3

FM DIRECTOR FBI

(S)

BT

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

CITE: //4510:1318//

(S)

PASS: [REDACTED] SSA [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: REQUEST LODGING AND A VEHICLE FOR FBI PERSONNEL
ASSIGNED TO TRAC IN CONNECTION TO THE DEBRIEFING OF HVD-1.

(S)

(U) ~~(S)~~ THE FBI DEBRIEFING TEAM CONSISTS OF THE FOLLOWING
INDIVIDUALS:

TEAM LEADER - UNIT CHIEF [REDACTED]

(GS-15 / SSN: [REDACTED])

INTERVIEWER - SUPERVISORY SPECIAL AGENT GEORGE L PIRO

(GS-14 / SSN: [REDACTED])

INTERVIEWER - SUPERVISORY SPECIAL AGENT [REDACTED]

(GS-14 / SSN: [REDACTED])

BEHAVIORIST - SUPERVISORY SPECIAL AGENT [REDACTED]

(GS-14 / SSN: [REDACTED])

REPORTS OFFICER - REPORTS OFFICER [REDACTED]

(GS-14 / SSN: [REDACTED])

ANALYST - INTELLIGENCE ANALYST [REDACTED]

(GS-12 / SSN: [REDACTED])

LINGUIST - [REDACTED]

(GS-13 / SSN: [REDACTED])

(S)

(S)

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

Approved by: [Signature]

Case ID #/Serial: 315E-HQ-1448534/40Original Filename: LODGING.wpd

***** FOR SAMNET OPERATIONS USE ONLY *****

Time Received

SAMNET filename: JFV001S0.014Time of Transmission 0337Z JAN 14 2004MRI/JUL/ISN 5 / 12 / 01

DTG

P15 0003Z Jan 04

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
ORGANIZATIONAL MESSAGE FORM

~~^PAGE 2 OF 3 S E C R E T NOFORN~~

(U) POINT OF CONTACT FOR THIS MATTER IS SUPERVISORY SPECIAL
AGENT GEORGE PIRO, [REDACTED] OR SUPERVISORY SPECIAL AGENT
[REDACTED]

DERIVED FROM: ~~G-3~~ DECLASSIFY ON: X-1

BT
////

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b7C

~~S E C R E T NOFORN~~

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
ORGANIZATIONAL MESSAGE FORM

~~^PAGE 3 OF 3 S E C R E T NOFORN~~

ADMINISTRATIVE NOTE/TICKLER COUNT:

(S) NOTE: [REDACTED] FOR IDENTITIES AND
TIMING/ITINERARY FOR PLANNED DEPLOYMENT OF AN FBI TEAM TO BAGHDAD
TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DEBRIEF ON HVD-1.

b1

DRAFTED BY: [REDACTED] JFV: JFV RM#: 4383 EXT: [REDACTED]

COPY DESIGNATIONS:

1 -
1 -

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

~~S E C R E T NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/rs
ON 05-07-2009

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: Deadline: 04/14/2004

Date: 03/31/2004

To: Counterterrorism
Dallas

Attn: ISLU/ITOS Room 4383
SSA [REDACTED]
Attn: All Supervisors

From: Dallas

North Texas Joint Terrorism Task Force (NTJTTF), IT-1
Contact: SA [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Approved By: [REDACTED] JTB/VWM

Drafted By: [REDACTED] emw EMW

(U) Case ID #: (S) 315E-HQ-1448534 (Pending) - 43
(S) 66F-HQ-C1384970 (Pending) - 8549
(U) 66F-HQ-C1384970

(U) Title: (S) DESERT SPIDER
IT - IRAQ

(U) Synopsis: (S) This EC directs all Dallas Supervisors to ensure all logical sources are contacted for information relating to the potential prosecution of Saddam Hussein (HVD #1).

(U) (S) Classified By: 11109, ITOS II/CTD
Reason: 1.5(c)
Declassify On: X1

(U) Reference: (S) 315E-HQ-1448534 Serial 9

(U) Details: (S) Referenced EC directs all Field Offices to canvass all logical sources for any information regarding potential war crimes committed by the former Hussein Regime.

(U) (S) In anticipation of the potential prosecution of Saddam Hussein for crimes against humanity and war crimes, Dallas Supervisors are to ensure their personnel canvass logical sources for information relating to crimes such as genocide, torture, inhumane treatment, destruction of property and unlawful confinement committed by Saddam Hussein and the former Hussein Regime.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism
(U) Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534, 03/31/2004

(U) ~~(S)~~ Supervisors are directed to report negative and/or positive results via EC to SA [redacted] Dallas Iraqi Program Coordinator, IT-1, no later than 04/14/2004.

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b7C

(U) ~~(S)~~ FBIHQ/Dallas will make an attempt to ensure sources are protected and information will be used primarily for lead value. In instances where FBIHQ/Dallas believes that source information would be instrumental to the successful prosecution of Hussein or members of the Hussein Regime, FBIHQ/Dallas will coordinate with the respective field office/source handler.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism
(U) Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534, 03/31/2004

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

DALLAS

ALL RECEIVING SUPERVISORS

(U) ~~(S)~~ Dallas Supervisors will ensure their personnel canvass logical sources for any information relating to crimes such as genocide, torture, inhumane treatment, destruction of property and unlawful confinement committed by Saddam Hussein and the former Hussein Regime. Positive and negative results are to be forwarded via EC to SA [REDACTED] Dallas Iraqi Program Coordinator, IT-1, no later than 04/14/2004.

b6
b7C

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED BY uc/baw 60324
ON 06-26-2009

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 03/30/2004

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: ISLU/ITOS II Room 4383

From: Oklahoma City

Squad 4

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

msp

(U) Case ID #:

~~(S)~~

~~(S)~~

(U)

[REDACTED]

(Pending)

(Pending)

(Pending)

[REDACTED]

(U) Title:

~~(S)~~

DESERT SPIDER

IT - IRAQ

(U) Synopsis:

~~(S)~~

Provide FBI Headquarters with response regarding information which may be relevant to the potential prosecution of Saddam Hussein.

(U)

~~(S)~~

Derived From : G-3

Declassify On: X1

(U) Reference:

~~(S)~~

315E-HQ-1448534 Serial 9

(U) Details:

~~(S)~~

The following information is being submitted to FBIHQ in response to leads set forth in the referenced communication. Oklahoma City requested all agents to contact logical sources regarding any potential war crimes or crimes against humanity. A review of Oklahoma City's control file established for the war against Iraq was also conducted. A summary of positive information follows.

(U)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7A

b2
b6
b7A
b7C
b7D

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Oklahoma City
v (U) Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534, 03/30/2004

(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

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b7A
b7C
b7D

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Oklahoma City
(U) Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534, 03/30/2004

(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Oklahoma City
(U) Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534, 03/30/2004

[Redacted]

(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U)

[Redacted]

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b7A
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Oklahoma City
(U) Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534, 03/30/2004

[Redacted]

(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U)

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U)

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(U)

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b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Oklahoma City
(U) Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534, 03/30/2004

(U)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

~~(S)~~

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b2
b6
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b7C
b7D

(U) SOURCE

For information contact OC SA

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b2
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b7A
b7C
b7D

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Oklahoma City
' (U) Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534, 03/30/2004

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

(U) Read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 05-07-2009
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/rs
REASON (Rev. 01-31-2003)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-07-2034

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 04/23/2004

To: Investigative Technology
Counterterrorism

Attn: UC [REDACTED] TRU
SSA [REDACTED] TRU
SC M. Chris Briece, ITOS 2
SC Frankie Battle, ORS
UC [REDACTED] ITOS 2

From: Counterterrorism
Baghdad Operations Center
Contact: George Piro, [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED] tkf

(U) Case ID #: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534 -56 (Pending)

(U) Title: ~~(S)~~ DESERT SPIDER
IT-IRAQ

Synopsis: (S/OR,NF) [REDACTED]

(U) Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: X1

Enclosures: [REDACTED]

(S)

Details: (S/OR,NF) [REDACTED]

(S/OR,NF) [REDACTED]

~~SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN~~

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~~SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN~~

To: Investigative Technology From: Counterterrorism
(U) Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534, 04/23/2004

(S/OR.NE)

(S/OR.NE)

b1

~~SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN~~

~~SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN~~

(U) To: Investigative Technology From: Counterterrorism
Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534, 04/23/2004

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

INVESTIGATIVE TECHNOLOGY

AT TRU

(S//OR, NE

(S//OR, NE

b1

Set Lead 2: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT ITOS 2

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 3: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT ORS

(U) Read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN~~

~~SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 04/23/2004

To: Investigative Technology
Counterterrorism

Attn: UC [REDACTED] TRII
SSA [REDACTED] TRU
Attn: SC M. Chris Brieese, ITOS 2
UC [REDACTED] ITOS 2
SC Frankie Battle, ORS

From: Counterterrorism
Baghdad Operations Center
Contact: George Piro, [REDACTED]

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b7C
b2

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED] tkf

(U) Case ID #: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534 -57 (Pending)

(U) Title: ~~(S)~~ DESERT SPIDER
IT-IRAQ

(U) Synopsis: ~~(S//OR,NF)~~ Request installation of secure FBI communications capability in support of the Desert Spider investigation at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), VVIP Terminal.

(U) Derived From: ~~(S)~~ Multiple Sources
Declassify On: ~~(S)~~ X1

(U) Details: ~~(S//OR,NF)~~ The FBI Desert Spider Team (DST) is currently interrogating Saddam Hussein as part of a joint FBI/OGA operation. The Desert Spider Team works and resides separate from the FBI's main Baghdad Operations Center (BOC). With the upcoming relocation of the FBI BOC from the BIAP to a new facility located in the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) area, the ability to have secure communications capabilities will be lost to the DST. In order to be responsive to the reporting and accountability requirements of FBIHQ, it is imperative that a secure means of communication, to include FBINET, be available. Additionally, the DST conducts a large amount of research on the Internet on topics relating to this project attainable through

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~~SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN~~

To: Investigative Technology From: Counterterrorism
(U) Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534, 04/23/2004

open source reporting. Therefore, Internet capability is also critical for the analytical support of the operation.

(U) ~~(S//OR,NF)~~ In furtherance of the joint DST, OGA has allocated a designated Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) located on the BIAP. This SCIF is in a controlled, secure area, which meets or exceeds FBI requirements for a storage container for materials up to the "SECRET" level. Once the secure communications equipment has been installed, the DST will comply with all security requirements for the receipt and storage of classified information.

(U) ~~(S//OR,NF)~~ TRU conducted the required survey for the installation of this secure equipment on 03/25/2004. As discussed with TRU personnel on 03/25/2004, it is requested that TRU install the appropriate communications equipment to provide secure communications to the DST, as soon as possible.

(U) ~~(S//OR,NF)~~ POCs for this matter are Supervisory Special Agent George Piro and/or Intelligence Analyst [redacted] [redacted] at telephone [redacted]

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~~SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN~~

(U) To: Investigative Technology From: Counterterrorism
Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534, 04/23/2004

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

INVESTIGATIVE TECHNOLOGY

AT TRU

(U) ~~(S//OR,NF)~~ 1) TRU is requested to install secure communications equipment for use by the Desert Spider Team in the OGA allocated skiff located on the Baghdad International Airport.

(U) ~~(S//OR,NF)~~ 2) TRU is requested to advise POCs and the FBI Baghdad Operations Center of travel plans and any special requirements necessary to install the above described equipment.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT ITOS 2

(U) Read and clear.

Set Lead 3: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT ORS

(U) Read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN~~

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription . 04/05/2004

On April 4, 2004, Ali Hasan Al-Majid (Black List #5) was interviewed at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. The interview was monitored by a representative of the military Joint Interrogation Detainee Cell (JIDC). FBI Language Specialist (LS) [redacted] provided Arabic/English translation. Al-Majid provided the following information:

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Al-Majid was questioned regarding a letter issued by the Iraqi Ba'ath Party Northern Bureau Command, dated April 6, 1987, signed by him. Al-Majid was not shown a copy of the document as none was possessed by the interviewer. (This document is described as letter S Sh/18/2396 in the Human Rights Watch Report (HRW) report titled "Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds," dated July, 1993. It is referenced on page 13 and in footnote 41 of the Prelude to Anfal section of the report.) According to the HRW report and as read to Al-Majid by the interviewer, the letter states the following, "By the authority vested in us by the Revolutionary Command Council's decree number 160 of March 29, 1987, we have decided to authorize the chairmen of the security committees in the northern governates to confiscate the real and personal property of the saboteurs, provided that their properties are liquidated within one month of the date of the issuance of the confiscation decree."

Al-Majid acknowledged giving such authority to the security committees, but does not remember the details. The confiscation discussed applied to money as well as real property. However, Al-Majid stated the authority for this order was not based on Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) decree number 160. It was based on a separate RCC decree which authorized the confiscation of funds and property of individuals who worked against the Iraqi government as saboteurs. (Al-Majid stated in a previous interview that saboteurs was a term used by the Iraqi government to describe Kurdish rebels.) This decree also authorized the confiscation of the funds and property of individuals in the Da'wa Party. These two categories of individuals were considered to be hostile or anti-Iraqi government political forces. Al-Majid does not remember the number or date of the other RCC decree.

Investigation on 04/04/2004 at Baghdad, IraqFile # 315E-HQ-1448534 - 58 Date dictated 04/05/2004by [redacted] *Renn*b6
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Continuation of FD-302 of Ali Hasan Al-Majid, On 04/04/2004, Page 2

Al-Majid's directive regarding the confiscation and liquidation of property and money was issued to the chairmen of the security committees of each province in Northern Iraq. The liquidation of property was accomplished through auctions. Al-Majid emphasized that money and property were taken only from saboteurs who had been proven to have participated in sabotage activities against the Iraqi government. Al-Majid noted the confiscation was not limited solely to Kurds, but also applied Yezidis and Arabs as well.

Al-Majid was shown and read a portion of a copy of a document written in Arabic, described as letter number 1/2713 of the Northern Bureau Command, dated April 10, 1987, issued by Radhi Hassan Salman, Deputy Secretary General of the Northern Bureau Command. This letter was distributed to all the Directorates and the Security of Chamchamal via a cover letter signed by the Deputy Director of the Security Directorate of Suleimaniyeh Governate. The document states, in part, "His Excellency has ordered that [legal] cases of people from the villages prohibited for security reasons, or cases of the saboteurs, regardless of their nature, not be heard and to freeze the cases that have already been heard." (The copy of this document was obtained from the HRW report titled "Bureaucracy of Repression: The Iraqi Government in Its Own Words," dated February, 1994. It appears on pages 35-36 of the report.)

Al-Majid stated, "I do not remember this." He added that all Northern Bureau Command orders were issued by him and not by his deputy. Al-Majid acknowledged that Salman was the Deputy Secretary General of the Northern Bureau Command. He asserted that he would not have tasked Salman with issuing such an order and that Salman did not issue it in Al-Majid's absence. He stated that all [legal] cases are matters for courts of law and are not matters for the security committees. Al-Majid acknowledged that he did issue similar instructions to the courts in approximately June, 1987. He directed the courts not to hear cases and/or to postpone cases regarding individuals from the prohibited zones. In these zones, villages were cleared of people, their residences were demolished, and the residents were relocated to government housing complexes. Al-Majid reiterated that such an order would have been issued only by him and would have been logically directed to the courts and not to the security committees. He added that the security services were not in charge of the courts. When questioned about the authenticity of the document and whether he thought it was a forgery, Al-Majid stated, "I do not know. Maybe."

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Continuation of FD-302 of Ali Hasan Al-Majid, On 04/04/2004, Page 3

Al-Majid was questioned regarding an order issued by him to the Security Directorates of the Northern Bureau directing the execution of all "first-degree relatives of criminals." Al-Majid was not shown a copy of two documents referencing this order as neither was possessed by the interviewer. (The two documents are described as a handwritten note, dated November 20, 1989, from the Security Chief, Interrogating Officer, Amn Office in Suleimaniyeh to an Iraqi citizen and letter number 106309, dated May 1, 1987, from the Security Directorate of the Autonomous Region. These documents are referenced in the previously described HRW report dated July, 1993, Prelude to Anfal section, pages 13-14.) According to the HRW report and as noted to Al-Majid by the interviewer, the handwritten note provides a response to an Iraqi citizen's request for information regarding his missing parents and brother. The note states that the brother was executed July 12, 1987 as "a member of the group of Iranian saboteurs." The note further explains that the parents were executed May 19, 1987 "in compliance with the order from the Struggling Comrade Ali Hasan Al-Majid, member of the Regional Command [of the Ba'ath Party], that was relayed to us by letter number 106309 of the Security Directorate of the Autonomous Region, dated May 1, 1987, regarding the liquidation of first-degree relatives of criminals."

Al-Majid stated that he did not issue an order to execute the first-degree relatives of saboteurs. In July/August, 1987, he did, however, order the "deportation" of the first-degree relatives of saboteurs to the prohibited areas. Al-Majid issued this order to ensure the security of the cities. He was responsible for the security of the cities and areas within five kilometers of the cities. First-degree relatives included only the fathers of the saboteurs. It did not include the female relatives such as an individual's mother, sister, or daughter.

As previously described, prohibited areas were those regions where the Iraqi government had already removed the citizens and relocated them to government housing complexes. The order regarding deportation of first-degree relatives was intended to force fathers to control the actions of their sons. After the "gathering of people" into Iraqi government housing complexes, Al-Majid stated any acts of sabotage against the government would result in implementation of this order. Al-Majid wanted the sons who were saboteurs, and the consequences of their actions, to be a "pressuring factor" on the fathers. Al-Majid ordered first-degree relatives only to be deported to prohibited areas so that the security committees did not expand the order to include other

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Continuation of FD-302 of Ali Hasan Al-Majid, On 04/04/2004, Page 4

relatives. He acknowledged that other relatives including mothers, sisters, and daughters could have elected to join their relatives who had been ordered "deported" to the prohibited areas.

Al-Majid further acknowledged that Directive 4008 issued by him effective June 22, 1987 was still in effect at the time of his issuance of the order regarding first-degree relatives. As previously stated by Al-Majid and reiterated in this interview, anyone caught in the prohibited areas after June 22, 1987, including women and children, was to be killed. He added that Directive 4008 was modified in September, 1987 to allow farming in certain areas. When questioned whether the deportation of first-degree relatives to prohibited areas was tantamount to sentencing them to death because of Directive 4008, Al-Majid stated, "Why would we deport them to a prohibited area [so that they would be killed] when we could kill them?" When the interviewer suggested that perhaps this procedure was meant to minimize the "blood on the hands" of Al-Majid and others, Al-Majid offered no reply.

Al-Majid noted that saboteurs and first-degree relatives were given one month to decide whether they wanted to stay or leave. If they decided to remain in government housing complexes, they were required to pledge not to commit acts of sabotage against the Iraqi government.

Al-Majid denied chairing a meeting on or around September 6, 1987 of senior Ba'ath Party officials to discuss the national census of October 17, 1987. (This meeting and the national census are referenced in the previously described HRW report dated July, 1993, Prelude to Anfal section, pages 17-20.)

Al-Majid stated that he was not involved with the national census as this was a "scientific and technical matter" beyond the scope of his duties. He did, however, facilitate the work of the census takers by means of seminars and meetings which explained the census process to residents of the northern region. In the north, a Kurdish individual named Dr. Samal Majid Faraj, Iraqi Minister of Planning, was in charge of the census. According to Al-Majid, a census takes place every ten years in Iraq.

Al-Majid denied that October 17, 1987 was viewed or treated by the Iraqi government as a "cutoff date" for the saboteurs in the north. He stated that neither a discussion took place at any meeting nor was a decision made to allow "subversives to repent" and "return to the fold" up to the day of the census.

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Continuation of FD-302 of Ali Hasan Al-Majid, On 04/04/2004, Page 5

Al-Majid denied that he ordered family members of "unrepentant saboteurs" living in government-controlled areas be forced to join their "saboteur kin" in the prohibited areas after the date of the census. As previously stated, he did issue an order to deport first-degree relatives of saboteurs prior to the census. However, Al-Majid stated there was no connection between that order and the national census. Al-Majid stated there were no parameters placed on the ages of the "saboteur kin" or on the ages of the males ordered deported, including the age ranges between 12 and 50, 17 and 50, or 15 and 70.

Al-Majid characterized northern Iraq as "backward." For the census process, many translators were needed. Most residents of northern Iraq received information about the census and understood the instructions. According to Al-Majid, census takers did not travel into prohibited areas, which were under control of the Iraqi Army, and conducted their work only in cities and villages. Individuals were required to make themselves available to census takers in order to be counted. If an individual failed to participate in the census, Al-Majid stated, "He would be the loser." Without being counted, such an individual would have no citizenship and would not be allowed to send his children to school. However, other services, such as electricity and food from the government, were unaffected.

Al-Majid stated that an individual could register for the census according to their ethnicity and religion, whether Arab, Kurd, Yezidi, Christian, Jew, etc. In northern Iraq, a person was not required to register only as an Arab or as a Kurd, and no other ethnicity.

According to Al-Majid, an individual was not deemed an army deserter simply because of failing to register for the census. He noted that most Kurds neglected their military service. According to an RCC decree dated 1984/85, a Kurdish individual was required to serve only three months versus the normal three years of military service. As a result, some individuals registered themselves as Kurds during the census. Al-Majid recalled that four or five families in Mosul, whom he described as Jarjaris and as Arabs, registered as Kurds. This "error" was caught, however, and the individuals were directed to register their true ethnicity.

Al-Majid was shown and read a portion of a copy of a document written in Arabic, described as RCC decree number 10, dated January 3, 1988, signed by Saddam Hussein, which amended RCC

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Continuation of FD-302 of

Ali Hasan Al-Majid

, On 04/04/2004 , Page 6

decree number 677, dated August 26, 1987. The document states, in part, "The Party organization shall carefully examine the situation of military deserters and draft dodgers who are captured. The death sentence shall be carried out by the Party organization, after that examination, on every deserter or draft dodger who is captured if the duration of his desertion or draft evasion exceeds one year or if he has committed the crime of desertion more than once. The provisions of this Decree shall apply to all persons who evaded military service prior to its date of promulgation and who do not follow up with their recruiting departments within 30 days from the date of its publication in the Official Gazette." (The copy of this document was obtained from the previously described HRW report dated February, 1994. It appears on pages 89-91 of the report.)

Al-Majid acknowledged that he had "heard about" this decree, but stated he does not remember actually seeing it or the details contained within it. He denied that there was a connection between RCC decree number 10 and the national census. Al-Majid further denied there was a connection between registering or failing to register for the census and military service. Al-Majid reiterated that an individual was not deemed a deserter or draft dodger simply because he failed to register for the census. He added that RCC decree number 10 and its order to execute deserters and draft dodgers did not come into effect because an individual failed to register for the census. Al-Majid reiterated that those who failed to participate in the census lost their citizenship documents.

The interviewer played a portion of a copy of an audiotape of Al-Majid's voice in Arabic. The segment played is from approximately 9:55 to 16:06 of the tape. (The copy of this audiotape was obtained by the interviewer from [redacted] United Kingdom Liaison on Transitional Justice, Office of Human Rights & Transitional Justice, Coalition Provisional Authority, Baghdad, Iraq. Per FBI LS [redacted] the copy of this audiotape closely approximates the translation provided in the previously described HRW report dated July, 1993, Appendix A, The Ali Hasan Al-Majid Tapes. According to the HRW report, this recording documents a meeting Al-Majid held with members of the Northern Bureau and governors of the Autonomous Region of Iraqi Kurdistan on April 15, 1988. From context, however, it appears this recording took place in 1987.)

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Continuation of FD-302 of

Ali Hasan Al-Majid, On 04/04/2004, Page 7

Al-Majid acknowledged that the audiotape played is a recording of his voice and his words. He added that he believes this meeting took place in April, 1987 rather than in 1988. Al-Majid stated that those present included the governors and Ba'ath Party secretary generals of each province of the Autonomous Region of Iraqi Kurdistan. These provinces included Irbil, Dohuk, Suleimaniyeh, Kirkuk, and Mosul.

Al-Majid stated that in the audiotape he is speaking about the "gathering of villages" in the northern Kurdish region of Iraq. In the audiotape, he explains the difficulty with moving safely between cities in the north and the numbers of "martyrs" suffered at the hands of saboteurs. Al-Majid is encouraging those present to "speed up the process" of gathering or collectivizing the villages in the north.

The interviewer played a portion of a copy of an audiotape of Al-Majid's voice in Arabic. The segment played is from approximately 3:28 to 4:25 of the tape and states the following, "If you remember, when I was placed in charge of the Northern Bureau, I was also tasked with additional responsibilities [including] administration, the relevant Special Services, the Security and Intelligence ones, and the Army, and the civilian wing of the Party, and the military wing of the Party. These were my responsibilities, that's all. So, I was to work as I wished. Therefore, we started making our own decisions and in some instances, even in violation of the Leadership's instructions. But Comrades, this was three months ago." (The copy of this audiotape was obtained by the interviewer from [redacted] previously described. Per FBI LS [redacted] the copy of this audiotape appears to be a portion of a meeting detailed in the previously described HRW report dated July, 1993, Appendix A, The Ali Hasan Al-Majid Tapes. According to the HRW report, a recording documents a Northern Bureau meeting to review the campaigns of 1987 and 1988. Also according to the report, the audiotape is undated but is in a batch dated January 21 and 22, 1989. Per LS [redacted] the HRW translation of the audiotape of this meeting appears to begin at approximately 6:15. The recording referenced here appears to be from the same meeting and precedes the HRW translation.)

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Al-Majid acknowledged that the audiotape played is a recording of his voice and his words. He added that this audiotape recorded a meeting held by Al-Majid with Nazar Khazraji, Iraqi Army Chief of Staff, Kamil Sajid, the Army First Corps Commander, Sultan Hashem, the Commander of the Anfal Operation, Tali'a Al-Duri,

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Continuation of FD-302 of Ali Hasan Al-Majid, On 04/04/2004, Page 8

outgoing Army Fifth Corps Commander, Yunis Zareb, incoming Army Fifth Corps Commander, and the Secretary Generals of the Ba'ath Party Sections. Al-Majid believes this meeting took place in late 1988 or early 1989.

Al-Majid stated that despite the impressions which may be given to the listener of this audiotape regarding the official in charge of the meeting and the person in charge of the military, he was only responsible for the cities and "what was in between the cities." Specifically, Al-Majid stated he was in charge of the "security of the cities" and the "security committees of the cities" during the period he served as Secretary General of the Northern Bureau Command. He added that he "had nothing to do with Iranian intelligence." Al-Majid reiterated that he was only in charge of the cities and roads connecting cities in northern Iraq. The Iraqi military was in charge of all other territory within that portion of the country. Within cities, Al-Majid commanded military forces, intelligence services, security services, and all other government agencies. Al-Majid stated he was in charge of the cities of Suleimaniyeh, Bazyan, Chamchamal, Koysanjaq, Al-Rabie, Kirkuk, Alton Kopri, Erbil, Shaqlawa, Hareer, Zakho, and Khabat. He added that he was in charge of the provinces of Dokan, Mosul (except Aqra), and Kirkuk (except Qader Karam).

The interviewer played a portion of a copy of an audiotape of Al-Majid's voice in Arabic. The segment played is from approximately 8:25 to 9:28 of the tape. (The copy of this audiotape was obtained by the interviewer from [redacted] previously described. Per FBI LS [redacted] the copy of this audiotape closely approximates the translation provided in the HRW report July, 1993, Appendix A, The Ali Hasan Al-Majid Tapes. According to the HRW report, this recording documents a Northern Bureau meeting to review the campaigns of 1987 and 1988. Also according to the report, the audiotape is undated but is in a batch dated January 21 and 22, 1989. The recording referenced here appears to be from the same meeting discussed in the previous three paragraphs.)

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Al-Majid acknowledged that the audiotape played is a recording of his voice and his words. He added that this audiotape recorded the same meeting which was just previously discussed. Al-Majid stated that he met with Khazraji because "he had work" and "I had work." Al-Majid remembers complaining to Khazraji during this meeting about the delay of the military in leveling villages where residents had already been removed. According to Al-Majid,

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Continuation of FD-302 of Ali Hasan Al-Majid, On 04/04/2004, Page 9

the village buildings needed to be removed as they often served as sanctuaries for saboteurs. He added that after removal or "deportation" of villagers, the army had the responsibility to remove "what was left."

During this meeting as acknowledged by Al-Majid, he criticized Tali'a Al-Duri, Army Fifth Corps Commander, because of his failure to execute his duties regarding the destruction of villages in a timely fashion. This complaint by Al-Majid placed the responsibility for handling this matter upon Khazraji. Al-Majid stated this audiotape shows that he was not in charge of military forces in northern Iraq during this period. If he had been in charge, Al-Majid would have removed Al-Duri and not just complained to Khazraji.

Copies of the documents referenced in this report are contained in the 1A section of the file.

Universal Case File Number 35E-HQ-1448534Field Office Acquiring Evidence Bahdad Ops CenterSerial # of Originating Document 58Date Received 4/4/04From [Redacted]

(Name of Contributor)

Bahdad Operations Center

(Address of Contributor)

Bahdad, IraqBy [Redacted]To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☐ NoReceipt Given ☐ Yes ☐ NoGrand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant
to Rule 6 (e), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure☐ Yes ☐ NoTitle: DESERT SPIDERReference: FD-302 of Ali Hasan Ali-Majid 4/4/04
(Communication Enclosing Material)Description: ☐ Original notes re interview of

Universal Case File Number 315E-HQ-1448534Field Office Acquiring Evidence Bahdad Ops CenterSerial # of Originating Document 58Date Received 4/4/04From [Redacted]

(Name of Contributor)

Bahdad Operations Center (BOC)

(Address of Contributor)

Bahdad, IraqBy [Redacted]To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☐ NoReceipt Given ☐ Yes ☐ NoGrand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant
to Rule 6 (e), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure☐ Yes ☐ NoTitle: DESERT SPIDERReference: _____
(Communication Enclosing Material)Description: ☒ Original notes re interview ofAli Hasan Al-Majid (Black List #5)

Notes of SSA

5102 Rep

4/9/04 b6
b7C

Al Hasan Al-Majid

Language Specialist

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 05-07-2009 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/rs

Item 3 - April 6, 1987, Northern Bureau

I have given details

remember confiscation of cash, money & real property

liquidation by security committee

sent to security committee

not based on ILO

ICC decree issued

authorize confiscation of bank accounts who

work for or support & Ba'ath Party

Not saying wrong

think's referenced another ICC decree

all hostile political forces

of Kurds & Ba'ath Party

Don't know when decree referenced

Issued instructions through

security comm in province

authorized to confiscate/liquidate prop & money

for auctions

(2)

- ✓ Only taken from 5 abortions
- ✓ prove to have participated in sabotage
- ✓ not hands (oldy, Yegorov, or Arty)
- X strictly to those involved in sabotage

Item 4) Document

- ✓ Read to him
- ✓ all orders issued by me, not by deputy
- ✓ I won't have asked
- ✓ I don't remember this
- ✓ I issued instructions similar to
- ✓ all cases are matters of internal affairs / not security issues
- ✓ issued order to courts not to have cases / no / fine
- ✓ regarding political / not individuals
- ✓ I always closed / turned into complexes
- ~ 1989 X issued orders to give me information / Kibick and
- X said cases can be turned / not / same / assumed
- X in April 1989
- X we would not have given such a number about political
- ✓ issued to courts / not sec. comm
- ✓ should have been issued by him

- ✓ security services not in charge of courts
- ✓ in Hagen? Dan & Ann. maybe
- ✗ hadn't gathered villages yet (June 22)

✓ Itanb, Letter number 106309, May 1, 1989

✓ handwritten note regarding

✓ distribution

relating to Saboteur

✓ Jordan's deportation, first because of forbidden circus

✓ so that cities could be secure

✓ issued July/Aug, 1989

4018 - includes those w/ 5km

✓ in charge of security of cities & 5km zones

prohibited areas?

✓ all villages where we deported people from

✓ whoever commits a sabotage act in cities or complexes

✓ after gathering of people

✓ told them it was communist acts

✓ first page

✓ father & son

✓ not mother, daughter, sister

X Tried to explain to Kurds

✓ wanted some to be passing letters for letters

✓ said first before I was coming, came in with papers

X 133rd St. / 1st St. / 1st St.

✓ 1908 still in debt

✓ mentioned in September to allow farming

✓ (See Comm. in coordination with military)

✓ or cut out if beyond 5 km

✓ when we would be deported when we could be taken

✓ to go to the area

✓ given one month to decide

✓ leave or stay

✓ could pledge to not stay

Item 10 Census

✓ remember to facilitate was not census takers

✓ did not get involved in anyway

✓ it is a secret to the military

X some people listed as Arab or Kurd
in Masul

some registered as Kurds, some as Arabs

5

Mydeorin

hands will be taken care
Arabs where Arabs are

?

turn back individual in charge of census

Dr. Samal Majid Faraj

Minister of Planning

every 10 years conducted

Not actual date Oct 17, 1991

"Family members... prohibited from entry"

Nothing to do with census

we talk would be deportation if 1st degree

if don't report, date would be deportation

Justification - father would pressure sons not commit acts

we have plenty of money to

Census - nothing to do with this

Explain how to comply and secure assets

yes - no

✓ In general, north was bad news
translators needed

✓ Most, but not all, got word & understood
otherwise no incidents

✓ Census takers did not go to areas under army control
prohibited was
responsibility of army

✓ sabotage
no age put on them

X Father, daughter, son, wife would be sent
could go if wanted

X Only Jar-jar
in Mosul

✓ registered as Arabs, 4/5 families changed names

✓ person registered as Arab

✓ Is only 14 we 3 mos vs 3 yrs in military
unpleasant others to do

- ✓ Jarvis - Arab
- ✓ If failed to participate in census
- ✓ he would be the loser
- ✓ no citizenship, no school for kids
- ✓ definitely, food - not better, would still get
- ✓ already allowed
- ✓ whatever Arab, Kurd, Yezidi, Christian, Jew
- ✓ Arab/Kurd only
- ✓ no, all were allowed
- ✓ ~~census takers~~
- ✓ in cities and villages, not permitted to go
- ✓ Army doctor - he didn't register - no
- ✓ Kurds in control - most - military service
- ✓ Census - trying to do w/ military service

✓ REC done ~ 1984/85
 Baghdad report to see Iraq vs Syria

✓ REC Dec 1987 copy

✓ ACC Denver 10, Jan 3, 1998

✓ para 2 + 3 + 13th para

✓ Thompson didn't on 4v includes details

✓ with apply to census?

✓ no - no connection between 10 + census

✓ relatives reported - Jan 1975

✓ the census did not impact military service

✓ those who didn't participate - case citing document

- Autopsy WA, Apr 15, 1989 - 14 Jan 1

✓ 9:55 - 16:26

✓ 555 my voice

✓ think April

✓ In 1989, not 1988

✓ don't get the way of villages

✓ Thompson didn't know between cities + martyrs we have

✓ encouraging these great & speaking prayers

✓ present

✓ governors & secretaries of state

✓ Tulsa, Denver, Salt Lake, Kirtland, Grand

✓ Antibody B, Jan 4

✓ 3:28-4:25

✓ This is my voice.

✓ Mtg - maybe w/ Ahmad of State - (Chavez)

✓ Corps Commander - ~~Extra~~ ^{Let Kamel Sayb}
Party Section Sectional ^{son Tahmidur?}
^{1/2 Camp / small Section}

✓ I ^{was} in charge of cities and relations between
security of cities, security, committee of cities

✓ There is nothing to do w/ Transmittal of people
or other Iraqi territory other than cities

✓ Only cities & roads connected

✓ Everything in cities - I'm in charge - being in it, etc.

✓ Fakhri, Sulaiman, al-Badr

✓ all cities - ~~all~~

✓ except for Aaba & Mosul

✓ Kirkuk - Qadr - Wasan

Arbil

indicate Sulaiman, Dukan province, Basim, Chaudhury,
of Patia, Kirkuk, Atlo, Kirkuk, Sulaiman, Herin, Zaidi,
Abat, Mosul - except Aaba, Kirkuk - ~~Basim~~ ^{Qadr} Wasan
province

(10)

- Ambidago MB,

8:25-9:18

Same way as previous tape

Khavragi, Vamr / Sajih - 1st Corps, Hunis 2nd - 5th

Taladuri - 5th Corps, Hunis just to replace
to another 3 or 4 others

Sec General of Party - provinces

* we not because he had work & had not

x issues discussed

I explained about he, taken at mid/night and village
after we departed

after departed - army responsibility

army supposed to remove what is left

Chief of command of 5th Corp should be in. I wrote
things in hand of Khavragi

proof I was in charge of army

on ce departed no arrangement

same way like function as same manner for cabaretos

Thinking may take place now/under

maybe late 1984, early 1985

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 04/10/2004

On April 9, 2004, Ali Hasan Al-Majid (Black List #5) was interviewed at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. The interview was monitored by a representative of the military Joint Interrogation Detainee Cell (JIDC). FBI Language Specialist (LS) [redacted] provided Arabic/English translation. Al-Majid provided the following information:

The interviewer played a portion of a copy of an audiotape of Al-Majid's voice in Arabic. The segment played is from approximately 11:20 to 12:19 of the tape. (The copy of this audiotape was obtained by the interviewer from [redacted] United Kingdom Liaison on Transitional Justice, Office of Human Rights & Transitional Justice, Coalition Provisional Authority, Baghdad, Iraq. Per FBI LS [redacted] a translation of this audiotape closely approximates the translation provided in the Human Rights Watch Report (HRW) report titled "Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds," dated July, 1993, Appendix A, The Ali Hasan Al-Majid Tapes. According to the HRW report, this recording documents a meeting Al-Majid held with members of the Northern Bureau and directors of the Ba'ath Party headquarters in the northern governates. Also according to the HRW report, the tape is dated May 26, 1988, but from context appears to be 1987.)

Al-Majid acknowledged that the audiotape played is a recording of his voice and his words. He added that he believes this tape recorded a meeting which occurred some time during the first half of 1988. Attendees included officials of the Northern Bureau who were the Secretary Generals of the Sections of the northern provinces. They were sometimes called the Directors of the provinces. These individuals included Nazar Yunis of Mosul, Tariq Kafi of Dohuk, Soubhi Ali Al-Khalaf of Erbil, Khidhir Abdelaziz of Kirkuk, and Sayyed Aswad Ali of Suleimaniyeh.

Al-Majid acknowledged that he is discussing the success of the deportation campaign in northern Iraq during this taped session. He stated that the "gathering" of the people in the north brought them physically closer to the Iraqi government authorities,

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separated the saboteurs from the Iranians, and ended sabotage operations.

The interviewer played a segment of the same audiotape from approximately 14:49 to 16:16.

Al-Majid acknowledged that the audiotape played is a recording of his voice and his words. He added that this tape may have been recorded at the same meeting which was just previously discussed or from a meeting with Nazar Khazraji, Iraqi Army Chief of Staff, and Yunis Zareb, Fifth Corps Commander, among others, discussed during a previous interview.

During this meeting, Al-Majid is reviewing the positive results of the "gathering" of the villages. Al-Majid notes to the attendees that previous orders and decrees existed directing action against the saboteurs. However, there was "no enthusiasm regarding or execution of" these directives. In fact, some individuals, such as Army Commander Tali'a Al-Duri, did not "follow up on their work" and destroy buildings as had been directed.

Al-Majid stated that some villages had already been declared as prohibited before he was assigned as Secretary General of the Northern Bureau. These prohibited areas were specified on maps.

Regarding the statement "I know how rotten the Army is. I am its son, and its commander," Al-Majid stated that he was a civilian who was given military rank in 1991. He added that he was not the Army's "son." Al-Majid noted that he was a member of the military wing of the Party from 1968-91. Al-Majid further stated that when he said "I am its son, and its commander," he did not mean that he was, technically, a military commander. He was referring to the time during which served in the military wing of the Party.

In 1991, Izzat Ibrahim Al-Duri, Muhammad Al-Zubaidi, Mizban Hadi, and Al-Majid were all given military ranks. At the time, Al-Majid was serving as Minister of Interior. Al-Duri was given the rank of General, Al-Zubaidi and Hadi were given the ranks of Major General, and Al-Majid was made a Lieutenant General. Al-Majid reiterated that he had served as a commander in the Party's military wing, not in the professional Iraqi Army.

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The interviewer played a portion of a copy of an audiotape of Al-Majid's voice in Arabic. The segment played is from approximately 9:35 to 10:47 of the tape. (The copy of this audiotape was obtained by the interviewer from [redacted] previously described. Per FBI LS [redacted] a translation of this audiotape closely approximates the translation provided in the previously described HRW report dated July, 1993, Appendix A, The Ali Hasan Al-Majid Tapes. According to the HRW report, this recording documents a meeting Al-Majid held with members of the Northern Bureau to review the campaigns of 1987 and 1988. Also according to the HRW report, the tape is undated, but is in a batch dated January 21 and 22, 1989.)

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Al-Majid acknowledged that the audiotape played is a recording of his voice and his words. He added that this is probably the same meeting with Khazraji and Zareb, among others, discussed during a previous interview.

In the tape, Al-Majid stated that he is discussing "caring for the families of saboteurs" and is not discussing executing them. When questioned about his statement "I put his message to my head" and his seeming disregard of a message from Saddam Hussein to care for the saboteurs, Al-Majid asked, "I filed it in the back of my mind? I didn't listen to?" Al-Majid noted that if his intention had been to kill the people of the north, then why would he have "gathered" them and brought them closer to him. He stated that he would have sent the individuals to prohibited areas and the Army would have killed them. Al-Majid denied that a hypothetical act such as this is similar or identical to the actual order given by Al-Majid to "deport" the first-degree relatives of saboteurs to the prohibited zones, as discussed in a previous interview.

Al-Majid stated that he had no intention to kill the families of the saboteurs. He pointed out that there were three levels or stages of the process within the five kilometer zones around cities, the only areas for which he had responsibility. First, the gathering, then the declaration of forbidden zones, and finally, the establishment of a "certain level of trust between us and them." Al-Majid noted there was "not much trust." Neither the Army nor the administration was allowed to go into the prohibited areas. Once trust was established, however, the residents of the northern region were allowed to farm in the prohibited areas.

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Al-Majid stated that the goal of the campaign in the north was not to kill families, rather it was to end sabotage. From the five kilometer zones around the cities (Al-Majid's responsibility), he noted that no one was deported back to the prohibited areas. Al-Majid added that no one was found in a prohibited area within the five kilometer zones.

Al-Majid stated that citizens of the north who desired to move to other provinces were allowed to do so. Those moving to a different province in the Kurdish Autonomous Region were provided assistance in the form of funds from the government.

The interviewer played a portion of a copy of an audiotape of Al-Majid's voice in Arabic. The segment played is from approximately 3:30 to 5:00 of the tape. (The copy of this audiotape was obtained by the interviewer from [redacted] previously described. Per FBI LS [redacted] a translation of this audiotape closely approximates the translation provided in the previously described HRW report dated July, 1993, Appendix A, The Ali Hasan Al-Majid Tapes. According to the HRW report, this recording documents a meeting held by Al-Majid on April 15, 1989 to welcome Hassan Ali Al-Amiri as his successor as Secretary General of the Northern Bureau.)

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Al-Majid acknowledged that the audiotape played is a recording of his voice and his words. This recording took place at a meeting in April, 1989 where Al-Majid is welcoming Hassan Al-Amiri as his successor. The attendees included officials of the Northern Bureau and possibly the governors of the northern provinces. Al-Majid is describing the situation at that time as "stable" and says that Al-Amiri is "the right person to take over." Al-Majid further states that it is not suitable for him (Al-Majid) to continue in this position. He does, however, offer to serve as an advisor if needed.

The interviewer played a segment of the same audiotape from approximately 6:56 to 7:35.

Al-Majid acknowledged that the audiotape played is a recording of his voice and his words. The interviewer asked Al-Majid about the statement, "It will no longer be allowed for a member of the leadership to have power over the Army." Al-Majid stated that the extraordinary situation had ended in the north and these powers were no longer necessary. Once the transition had occurred, Jalal Talabani broadcast that Al-Amiri would not have the

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same powers as Al-Majid because he was not a relative of Saddam Hussein. In the tape, Al-Majid is not referring to his power over the Army in the entire northern region, but his power over the Army in the regions within five kilometers of the cities. As noted in a previous interview, Al-Majid stated that specific written instructions followed Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) decree number 160 delineating the responsibilities and territories of Al-Majid and the Army. These instructions were issued in writing from the office of the Presidential Diwan, signed by Ahmad Hussein on behalf of Saddam Hussein. Al-Majid received a copy of these instructions. Khazraji and Al-Majid met to determine how to best implement the orders. They discussed each others responsibilities, including Al-Majid's duties regarding areas within five kilometers of cities and the Army's responsibilities for all other territory in the northern region.

The interviewer played a segment of the same audiotape from approximately 8:00 to 10:10.

Al-Majid acknowledged that the audiotape played is a recording of his voice and his words. In this recording, Al-Majid is referring to his first meeting with the Army corps commanders, police, security services, and Party officials regarding the situation in northern Iraq. Al-Majid stated that while it is true he assembled all of these individuals for this meeting, "I was not in charge of the Anfal Operation." He stated that his responsibilities did not include the "gathering" of all the villages of the north. He reiterated his area of responsibility only included the cities and areas within five kilometers of the cities. Al-Majid opined that a "regular citizen" bearing witness to events during this time period might not have known the difference between the responsibilities of Khazraji and Al-Majid.

Regarding the statement in the tape asserting "directives which are still in force and will remain in force," Al-Majid stated that he is referring the early stages of the campaign in the north. He denied that this statement refers to Directive 4008 and added that this directive ended in September, 1987 when the Iraqi government granted permission for northern residents to farm. Al-Majid reiterated that all of his statements concern his area of responsibility at that time, cities and zones within five kilometers of the cities.

The interviewer played a segment of the same audiotape from approximately 12:00 to 13:30.

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Al-Majid acknowledged that the audiotape played is a recording of his voice and his words. Al-Majid stated that his comments about an Army commander refer to Tali'a Al-Duri, Fifth Corps Commander. According to Al-Majid, Al-Duri asked that the campaign in the north be postponed for one month. Al-Majid refused this request and described Al-Duri as "reluctant" despite having been provided everything needed by Al-Majid. Al-Majid added that he was in charge of all things owned by the provinces, including bulldozers and other equipment. Such items were provided to Al-Duri to complete his assignment, which included destruction of the villages that had been evacuated. Again, Al-Majid stated his comments refer only to areas within five kilometers of the cities.

The interviewer replayed a portion of an audiotape discussed previously during the interview. The segment replayed was from approximately 10:11 to 10:47 and included the statement, "No, I will bury them with bulldozers." (This recording is the one previously described as being in a batch dated January 21 and 22, 1989.)

Al-Majid denied that the audiotape played is a recording of his voice and his words. He stated, "Those are not my words." Al-Majid added, "I would neither bury them nor kill them. They are Iraqis." He stated that he did not bury people or order people to be buried. Al-Majid added that he has never heard or seen others doing such things. He stated, "If I had done such a thing, I would tell you I was carrying out an order."

Al-Majid acknowledged previous statements made by him during interview on February 4, 2004 including "I never used or saw anything about chemicals." Al-Majid again denied personal knowledge or responsibility regarding the Iraqi government's use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War, against the Kurds, or at any other time. He added, "I have never had any involvement with chemical weapons in my life."

Al-Majid was shown and read a portion of a copy of a handwritten document in Arabic, described as letter number ShSh/4947, dated June 11, 1987, from the Security Directorate of Erbil Governate to the Security Directorate of Shaqlawa, issued by the Director of General Security of Erbil Governate. The document states, in part, "On 5/27/1987, our aircraft attacked the villages of Malakan, Talinan, Kandor, Bileh Aliya, and Bileh Sufla in Khalifan subdistrict, which harbor some saboteurs...A number of saboteurs were killed and about (30) people lost their eyesight as

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a result of the bombing, including the family of Kamal Haji Khidr Agha, the commander of the 12th [PUK] Division..." (The copy of this document was obtained from the HRW report titled "Bureaucracy of Repression: The Iraqi Government in Its Own Words," dated February, 1994. It appears on pages 62-63 of the report.)

Al-Majid denied knowledge of this document or the events described in it. He stated, "I have no idea about this." Al-Majid added that he does not think this document is genuine. He noted that security directors would not normally write about military matters such as those discussed in this document. Al-Majid further noted that Shaqlawa was subordinate to Erbil. In his opinion, it would have been more logical for a subordinate unit such as Shaqlawa to be communicating this information to a higher one such as Erbil. However, the opposite direction of communication is shown in this document. Al-Majid noted other discrepancies he perceived in this letter including the lack of use of state letterhead, the lack of a Top Secret classification on information this important, and the discussion of a matter in paragraph two which does not fall within the scope of the duties of the Director of General Security of Erbil. According to Al-Majid, this is a military intelligence matter. Finally, he stated that the author did not ask for any action. The last section, paragraph four, is blank and would normally include the action requested or any instructions. Al-Majid stated that he does not remember the name of the Director of General Security of Erbil.

The interviewer told Al-Majid that one of the common side effects of a chemical weapons attack is loss of vision. The interviewer further noted that the individual named as a victim in the document, Agha, was contacted by independent investigators. Agha confirmed that he and his family had been temporarily blinded in a chemical attack on May 27, 1987. Al-Majid stated, "I have not heard of this attack, only one in the city of Halabja."

Al-Majid was shown and read a portion of a copy of a handwritten document in Arabic appearing on official letterhead, described as a letter, dated May 10, 1988, regarding the fourth Anfal operation from the Third Shoba (branch) to the Director of the Fifth Subdirector of Military Intelligence. The document makes recommendations for the use of "special ammunition" against the areas "Alsamagolyat-Balisan and the villages existing in the separate border zone between Corps 24 and Corps 23." The document also notes that on May 9, 1988 "...a direction was issued to

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Special Ammunition Committee to study the issue..." (The copy of this document was obtained from the US Army Criminal Investigative Division.)

Al-Majid denied knowledge of this document or the events described in it. He stated, in general, he did not know what took place between the Minister of Defense and military intelligence. According to Al-Majid, military intelligence reports directly to the President and only informs the Minister of Defense. He added that neither "special" nor regular ammunition was the responsibility of military intelligence. Al-Majid stated that the term "special" refers to chemical weapons. Any order to use chemical weapons would have come from Saddam Hussein or the Army Chief of Staff. Al-Majid believes such weapons would have been used only against Iran if, and only if, Iraq was in "a difficult situation." He stated that he does not believe it is the responsibility of military intelligence to search for saboteurs and direct strikes against them. By 1988, Al-Majid asserted that the saboteurs had "reached the end" and the use of chemical weapons was not necessary. Control of the villages in northern Iraq did not require chemical weapons and the Anfal Operation did not require chemical weapons. Al-Majid suspects that this document is a forgery, but can not say for certain.

Al-Majid was shown and read a portion of a copy of a document in Arabic, described as cover letter number M5/Sh3/Q2/9879, dated May 18, 1988, and an attached report from the Director, General Directorate of Military Intelligence, to the Subdirector of Military Intelligence, Eastern Sector. The cover letter states, in part, "Enclosed is our special report about the Northern Region for the month of April, 1988. Please be informed." On page four, paragraph c, the attached report states, "After the special strikes against the villages where the headquarters and bases of the agents were, their organization distributed a quantity of medical supplies against chemical strikes (injections and pills) among the inhabitants of those villages as well as neighboring villages." Paragraph (3) of the same page states, "The intensity of the artillery bombardments by our forces and the use of (the special ammunition) led to heavy losses among them." (The copy of this document was obtained from the previously described HRW report dated February, 1994. It appears on pages 57-61 of the report.)

Al-Majid denied knowledge of this document or the events described in it. As used in this report, he reiterated that the term "special" refers to chemical weapons. Al-Majid doubts the

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authenticity of this document. He stated that if chemical weapons had been used in Iraq, particularly in the northern region during this time, "We would have heard. No such thing can be hidden."

Al-Majid was shown and read a portion of a copy of a document in Arabic, described as cover letter number Q3/Qadissiyat Saddam/404, dated June 26, 1988, and an attached report from Captain Kifah Ali Hassan, Director of the Intelligence Center of Kalar to the Subdirector of Military Intelligence, Eastern Sector (Sh3). The cover letter states, in part, "Enclosed is the quarterly report about the saboteurs' movements within our sector during the first half of 1988. Please be informed." On page six, paragraph b, the attached report states, "During the month of March, 1988, our aircraft bombed the headquarters of the sabotage bands in the villages of Saywan (4596) and Balakajar (4294) in a chemical strike. This resulted in the death of 50 saboteurs and the wounding of 20 other saboteurs." (The copy of this document was obtained from the previously described HRW report dated February, 1994. It appears on pages 49-52 of the report. According to the HRW report, the numbers appearing in parenthesis in paragraph b are coordinates given to the villages by the military.)

Al-Majid denied knowledge of this document or the events described in it. He stated that this report should have been forwarded to the Northern Sector, Al-Majid's assigned location. Al-Majid doubts the authenticity of this document. He added, "I am certain chemical weapons were not used in the northern or southern sectors of Iraq, only in Halabja." According to Al-Majid, the Iraqi government's use of chemical weapons in Halabja was directed against Iranians. He emphasized, "If I used them, I would admit."

Al-Majid was shown and read a portion of a copy of a document in Arabic, described as cover letter number Sh3/Q1/Qadissiyat Saddam/16093, dated December 13, 1988, and an attached report from the Subdirector of Military Intelligence, Eastern Sector, to the General Directorate of Military Intelligence (Sh3). The cover letter states, in part, "The following is the information that we received from source number 202 about the sabotage movements:" Page five, paragraph 10a, states, "After the expulsion of the saboteurs of the First Section of the Barzani band in the Badinan Sector by our forces during the Final Anfal operation, six British journalists arrived in the tri-border region of Iran, Iraq and Turkey to see the saboteurs who had come from the above sector via Turkish territory and interview them about the

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chemical strike undertaken by our forces." (The copy of this document was obtained from the previously described HRW report dated February, 1994. It appears on pages 53-56 of the report.)

Al-Majid denied knowledge of this document or the events described in it. He noted that if this document is genuine, it proves that he was not in charge. Al-Majid was never informed of this matter. If he had been in charge, he would have been notified of this information. He added that he is unable judge the authenticity of this document. According to Al-Majid, the Iraqi government would not have had to use chemical weapons at that stage of the campaign in the north. The saboteurs were not stronger than the Iraqi military. Once the saboteurs were isolated from the cities, they "were weakened" due to lack of food, fuel, and other supplies. By this point in the operation, all the villages that could have provided assistance to the saboteurs had been removed. Thus, the Iraqi Army's advance into this area was not difficult so as to require the use of chemical weapons.

The interviewer played a portion of a copy of an audiotape of Al-Majid's voice in Arabic. The segment played is from approximately 21:59 to 26:44 of the tape and includes the statements "That evening, I went to Suleimaniyeh and hit them with the special ammunition," "I will attack it with chemical weapons," and "I will kill them all with chemical weapons." (The copy of this audiotape was obtained by the interviewer from [redacted] previously described. Per FBI LS [redacted] a translation of this audiotape closely approximates the translation provided in the HRW report dated July, 1993, Appendix A, The Ali Hasan Al-Majid Tapes. According to the HRW report, this recording documents a meeting Al-Majid held with members of the Northern Bureau and directors of the Ba'ath Party headquarters in the northern governates. Also according to the HRW report, the tape is dated May 26, 1988, but from context appears to be 1987.)

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Al-Majid stated that this audiotape was "assembled" from tapes of two different meetings. One meeting, in the first half of 1988, was discussed at the onset of this interview, while the other took place in Mosul on March 30, 1991.

When the cities of Suleimaniyeh, Dohuk, Erbil, and Kirkuk fell out of Iraqi government control in 1991, Al-Majid was tasked with "liberating" Dohuk. He invited Abd Jawad Thannoon, Governor of Dohuk, Nasir Said, Fifth Corps Commander, and all state and Party officials to a "reception" at the Mosul Hotel in Mosul.

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There, Al-Majid gave a speech declaring "Whoever has a friend in Dohuk, I will attack with chemical weapons tomorrow." Said attempted to interrupt Al-Majid because he did not want the timing of the operation to be revealed. Al-Majid directed him to communicate this information to Dohuk. He wanted "the illusion" of a chemical weapons attack to be imprinted in the minds of those controlling Dohuk. Al-Majid stated that the Iraqi government was weak in 1991. Thus, the chemical weapons "threat" was used as a "scare tactic" against the saboteurs in Dohuk.

Al-Majid directed the military to procure bags of flour or cement and attach them to helicopters. These aircraft were then used the following morning to spread the material over Dohuk and give the further "illusion" of a chemical weapons attack. Al-Majid used this "scare tactic" to reduce losses on "our side and their side." Al-Majid walked into Dohuk at 9:30 am the same morning. Some Iraqi military members would not enter the city, however, thinking that a chemical weapons attack had actually occurred.

Al-Majid stated, "This tape has been altered." He added that the story he related about Dohuk is the real reason he is known as "Chemical Ali" and not because of Halabja. According to Al-Majid, Khazraji once told Abbas Mahmoud or Rasool Mahmoud that Al-Majid ordered the chemical weapons attack on Halabja. This is not true, however.

A portion of this tape states, "Jalal Talabani asked me to open a special channel of communication with him. That evening, I went to Suleimaniyeh and hit them with the special ammunition. That was my answer." Al-Majid stated I inspected Suleimaniyeh and it was not hit. He added that he has never heard of such an attack, particularly with chemical weapons. He stated he did not order a chemical weapons attack on Talabani and his headquarters in the Jafati Valley near Suleimaniyeh. Al-Majid stated, "This tape is not correct." He claimed that he actually went to Suleimaniyeh to meet with Talabani and that the words "and hit them with the special ammunition" have been inserted into this tape. The remainder of the tape is a threat or scare tactic used by Al-Majid against the saboteurs in Dohuk.

The interviewer played a portion of a copy of an audiotape of Al-Majid's voice in Arabic. The segment played is from approximately 1:54 to 4:17 of the tape and includes the statements "...we will surround them in a small pocket and attack them with chemical weapons. I will not attack them with chemicals

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just one day, but I will continue to attack them with chemicals for fifteen days." (The copy of this audiotape was obtained by the interviewer from [redacted] previously described. Per FBI LS [redacted] a translation of this audiotape closely approximates the translation provided in the HRW report dated July, 1993, Appendix A, The Ali Hasan Al-Majid Tapes. According to the HRW report, this recording documents a meeting Al-Majid held with members of the Northern Bureau and directors of the Ba'ath Party headquarters in the northern governates. Also according to the HRW report, the tape is dated May 26, 1988, but from context appears to be 1987. The copy of this audiotape obtained from [redacted] though appearing to be from the same meeting, was provided to the FBI as a separate recording.)

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Al-Majid acknowledged that the audiotape played is a recording of his voice and his words. He stated that this is the same meeting with Ba'ath Party Section officials and Governors of the Autonomous Region of Kurdistan on April 15, 1987 discussed in a previous interview.

Al-Majid commented that these statements are attempts at "psychological warfare" against the enemy in the beginning of the campaign against the saboteurs in the northern region. His words were used as a scare tactic, similar to what was previously described in this interview and would later be used in Dohuk. In Al-Majid's opinion, the saboteurs would be "weakened by words." Logistically, they would later be weakened by their forced separation from the cities.

The interviewer questioned Al-Majid about the meaning of the sentences "I will not let the government get involved. I will say it is from here [the Northern Bureau]." Al-Majid stated he was simply projecting the power of the Northern Bureau and that he had not exceeded his authority.

The interviewer questioned Al-Majid about the statement "I told the expert comrades that I need guerrilla groups in Europe to kill whomever they see from them [the saboteurs]." Al-Majid admitted to making this statement but asserted that it was simply part of the "psychological operations" against the saboteurs. He added that he had neither knowledge of nor authority over Iraqi government operations or operatives in Europe. However, Al-Majid believed that such a statement would become known to Talabani and would possibly diminish the strength of the saboteurs.

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Copies of the documents referenced in this report are contained in the 1A section of the file.

Universal Case File Number 315E-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence Bahadur Singh

Serial # of Originating Document 59

Date Received 4/19/04

From [Redacted]

Bahadur Singh
(Address of Contributor)
Raj Lal Tora

By [Redacted]

(Name of Special Agent)

To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☐ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☐ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant
to Rule 6 (e), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes ☐ No

Title: DESERT SPIDER

Reference: FD-302 of Ali Hasan Ali Nadwi
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☐ Original notes re interview of

b6
b7c

b7D

Universal Case File Number 315E-112-1448534Field Office Acquiring Evidence Bahdad Appellate CenterSerial # of Originating Document 59Date Received 4/19/14From [Redacted]

(Name of Contributor)

Bahdad Appellate Center

(Address of Contributor)

Ramallah, PABy [Redacted]

(Name of Special Agent)

To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☐ NoReceipt Given ☐ Yes ☐ NoGrand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant
to Rule 6 (e), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure☐ Yes ☐ NoTitle: DESERT SPIDER

Reference: _____

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☒ Original notes re interview ofAli Hasan Al-Majid

Notes of SSN

viewed by SIOC Rep

Ali Hasan Al-Majid

b6
b7C

4/9/09

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 05-07-2009 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/rs

2A (11:20 - 12:19)

✓ My voice. In 1988, 1st half.

✓ present - officials of Northern Bureau who were

sec generals of sections of northern provinces
or referred to as Directors of provinces

names:

✓ Mosul - Nazar Ali Yunis

✓ Dohuk - Tariq Kafi

✓ Erbil - Samir Ali Al-Jadali

✓ Kirkuk - Khidhir Abdelaziz

✓ Sulaymaniyah - Sayed Aswad Ali

✓ Talking about success of deportation campaign

✓ prevented casualties / martyrs

✓ "gathering" made them closer to authorities

✓ Saboteurs cut off from Iraqis

✓ sabotage ended

Apr 1988?

(2)

2A (14.49-16.16)

✓ Answer. Possibly same unit
✓ reviewing postscript of "gathering of villages"

not there, been by
disobeying army
Foods

✓ ~~Abul Mubammad~~ ← ~~Abul Ahmad~~ was there

✓ (Dep Sec Gen of North Bureau)

✓ Rafiqi Hagan Salama

✓ orders - which are being followed

✓ many orders / decrees have - no enthusiasm or

✓ expectation of them however

✓ didn't follow up on their work

✓ villages had already been declared prohibited

✓ already specified on maps

→ waterways
as signed

✓ ~~Wahid Tahir al Duri~~

✓ "I know when the Army is."

✓ "I am its son and its commander"

✓ "I am a civilian, gives military rank."

✓ "I am not its son."

✓ given mil rank in 1991.

✓ "I was member of mil wing of party 1968-1991"

✓ "When I say I am son, I am leader not formal mil pay etc"

✓ "it's mil wing of party"

X Never talk w/ ~~her~~ ^{him} ~~mission~~
except when Mon

✓ 1991 - Great Dari, Mahmud Zubairi, Mijan Habi, Ali Bosa
(given mil rank)

✓ MoI of time when given rank major 92nd

✓ Dari - Lt Gen

✓ Mijan - BG

✓ Zubairi - BG

✓ I was a member in Party mil wing, not in political wing.

✓ TB (9:35 - 10:47) my voice. Probably same ^{thru} way?

✓ About caring for families of soldiers / not executing them

✓ message from SPT to take care of

✓ if some decided to go to other provinces

✓ would get certain amount of money there

✓ in province of Antio Region

X criticized Taliba because

didn't remove / had villages

will use to store weapons / to attack

→ filled bank of river? Didn't listen to?

✓ If into Am way to kill party would assemble & bring down from

(4)

✓ I would have sent a prohibitionary army, would be called similar to order - first degree relations? No

✓ I do not have intention to kill families of soldiers
3 stages of S. area:

① gathering

② declare zones forbidden

③ certain level of trust established between us then, not much trust

✓ Neither army nor administration allowed to go into zone
Once trust established, allowed to farm

✗ i.e. living in housing complexes, did not go back, not killed
goal not to kill families; was to end sabotage

✗ Town declared as zone of deprivation

✓ no one was deported back to prohibited areas within 5 km
no human beings ^{from} prohibited area

11B (3:30-5:00)

Mtg in Apr, 1989. My voice

✓ Situation stable; Amari right person to take care

I'm not suitable to continue

✓ was told to be honest & make

offered to continue advisor

✓ If he done, I'm not too far away?

5

✓ Sp coming to officials of Northern province Saudi
+ possibly governors of province

✓ (6:56-7:35)

✓ "I would no longer be allowed for a member of the (C) to
have power over the army."

✓ Situation had ended.

✓ Not because either not capable - Al-Majid or Al-Husseini
→ once may or may not

✓ Talabani broadcast ^{Al-Husseini} Al-Majid didn't have these powers
of Al-Husseini Al-Majid

✓ That's what declassification

✓ In effect power restricted to cities - 5 km under Al-Majid
Husseini didn't have these powers

✓ Instructions (written)

✓ written

✓ Office of Prime Minister

✓ Not signed by SA

✓ Signed by ^{Al-Husseini} Presidential Director

✓ on 14 draft 0650

✓ Ahmed Hassan (he's here)

✓ I received a copy

⑥

✓ Khunagi visited to determine how to implement
✓ told him it was clear

✓ copy also sent to Army Corp

✓ Told all Bar & B. of very on my orders

✓ discussed each's responsibility

✓ me - all of it, 5 km

✓ army - everything else

(8:00-10:10)

✓ Refers to B Party in Apr 1987 with

✓ each province had security council

Party, army, & Div. sec. services

✓ I assembled all of these officials

✓ I was not in charge of Postal Operation

✓ not able to assemble all of northern villages

only other / 5 km

✓ not my responsibility

✓ regular office - might not know difference

between Khunagi (Army) & Major (Police) duties

✓ "still in force"

✓ not in effect until 1989

✓ talking about stages in 1987

✓ when did this end? Sep, 1987

specified by instructions

Issued to extract other region

farming only within 5km

all mining, factories are about area within 5km

(13:00-13:30)

X Talking military what to do?

asked the program → yes, seek consent

→ Talked about, 1000s

valuable, despite room provided to

I was in charge of what province owned

build roads, equipment etc.

I provided him what he needed

so couldn't claim doesn't have necessary

only areas within 5km

1B (10:16-10:44)

"a bunch w/ bulldozers"

Not any words.

I wouldn't bring them nor tell them

they are troops

Don't agree this is what it says

I don't know people or order people brought

big bunch of
others driving out
5km

✓ If I had done such a thing, I would tell
you I was carrying out an order

✗ As K's actions in gov't hon.

✓ On

✓ Reiterate same FD 302s about 24/10/94

✓ There was no involvement with Ar in any of the
Document 12, Jamell, 1989

✓ no idea about this

✓ security director would not write about military matters

✓ Shapland is subordinate to Expt 1

✓ logical for Shapland to do 6/1

✓ Don't think genuine. Not denying, I believe with.

✗ forgery - maybe State uses letterhead

✓ who writes letter would write on it

① should have been Top Secret (such an important matter)

② Death of grand security not involving para 2

there is military intelligence matter

✓ ④ author didn't ask for action

✓ ⑤ para 4 blank, should have had instructions

(9)

- ✓ Director of General Security Intel - doesn't remember name
- ✓ can't read either → for him
- ✓ Tolstom of Afghan interview
- ✓ Thawerol has been except in city of Khodak
- ✓ CID Document
- ✓ In general, don't know what takes place with MOD off Mil Intel
- ✓ Mil Intel reports to President
- ✓ → into MOD
- ✓ special / regular arms not their responsibility
- ✓ it would be a specific order from S/H or Army Chief of Staff
- ✓ to use special arms & only against Iran
- ✓ a difficult situation
- ✓ don't think it's mil intel to use to search for saboteurs
- ✓ & direct situation
- ✓ In 1988 situation had been bad
- ✓ single action not necessary
- ✓ images would not have required special arms
- ✓ But Cal doesn't require
- ✓ Director of Intel here & Director of Intel of North
- ✓ → are here as the then

(10)

✓ Can't say if true document - CID
✓ Should have notified directly & address director in writing
when in same branch
✓ Suspect not correct, possibly a forgery
Document 11

✓ Eastern Sector Dig. al. to Desva
✓ Inves in northern sector
X Strange to report to Eastern Sector
about northern Region
✓ Further interview - to Whim
✓ Read para C. & para (3) to Al-Majid
✓ No information. Have not heard

✓ Spaid - CW use
✓ authenticity - doubt?
✓ If CW used in Iraq, we would have heard
as such things can be heard
X questioned authenticity of that

Document 9
✓ Read para b.

✓ Should have given to northern sector
with our sector - according to letter

✓ Not sure of authenticity

✓ please confirm authenticity

✓ I am certain CW was not used in northern or southern

✓ Iraq except in Mada'ija "

✓ "Don't know how used or was involved"

✓ "If Iraqis, would tell"

✓ Iraqi use against Iranians

✓ Document 10

✓ Read 10, a.

✓ Never heard of this

✓ If genuine, proves I was not in charge

✓ not informing him of this matter

✓ would have been in charge

✓ authenticity - can't judge

✓ would not have needed to use CW at that stage

✓ saboteurs were not strange. Many Iraqi military

✓ once isolated from allies,

✓ they were weakened

✓ lack of food, fuel, etc.

✓ all villages that assisted, were removed from that

✓ assist

X Those who came to camp, wanted in part to see the
 some even left their weapons behind
 some families left for other countries - Iran
 ∴ army's arrival at Saboteur area not
 so difficult that would be hard to see the

2A (21:59 - 26:44)

- ✓ "That evening I went to Sulaimaniyah and left them w/
- ✓ the special ammunition"
- ✓ "I will attack it with the"
- ✓ "I will kill them all with the"

✓ This tape was assembled from two different sessions

- ✓ "It was assembled"
- ✓ When taken about, in Iraq, reception in Mosul
- ✓ Mar 30, 1991

✓ after Sulaimaniyah, Mar 30, 1991, Baghdad, Iraq

✓ I was tasked w/ briefing D. H. H.

- ✓ visited governor's office & all state & party officials
- ✓ in Mosul

✓ Governor of Mosul - Abd Jassid Pashan
 ✓ Commander 5th Comp, Nasir Said

✓ addressing captian in a hall

✓ whoever was broken in Duple, Tinsat Pashan
 ✓ and the Jassid

✓ Nasir Said attempted to interrupt by speaking
 ✓ because didn't want Jassid's reputation to be revealed

✓ Told him to get in to be the one in Duple

✓ Mosul Hotel

✓ mtg to plan recapture city of Mosul / was not called
 ✓ wanted Jassid in the circumstances

✓ in 1941, we were weak

✓ used the threat to Jassid's reputation in Duple

✓ Jassid's reputation insisted to speak

✓ Jassid's reputation insisted to speak

✓ Jassid's reputation insisted to speak

✓ Jassid's reputation insisted to speak

✓ Jassid's reputation insisted to speak

✓ Jassid's reputation insisted to speak

✓ Jassid's reputation insisted to speak

✓ Jassid's reputation insisted to speak

(4)

✓ Same with Rampurwala Center

✗ said he is after disposal in
✓ Majid entered city

✗ logical to enter when CW used?
✓ This tape has been altered

✓ this is reason why known as Chem Kri
✓ vs Halabja

✓ Abbas Mamiyand or Rasol Mamiyand
✓ Wahmaji told him #5 attacked Halabja

✗ Masoud Barzani Kala Talaband

✓ Arab about 1st special arms sentence

✓ I inspected Saddam's unit, it was not that
✓ we heard of attack
✓ didn't order attack

✓ tape is not correct

✓ said I want Saddam's unit to meet

✓ they inserted CW use. Special arms

✓ very old tape is the best

✓ used by saboteurs in DShuk
against

✓ B (1954-4, 17)

✓ All my statements.

1987

getting party officials
governors & ministers

✓ People in power were against army.

✗ On that non-violence compromise

score talks & not part of D Shuk

✓ ~~What~~ all Northern Bureau area

✓ in control by war criminals

✓ in planning separation from British logistics

✓ during recording in beginning

✓ April 19, 1987

✓ "not let govt get involved" "Bun here (Northern Bureau)"

✓ protecting power of NB, didn't exceed with

✓ "It's the expert committee"

✓ I said. My authority? Just psychology not ops
law details would go to Talhani

✓ assessing in therapy?

✓ No knowledge I had no authority

✓ Psy ops only

✗ X5 and may show Rajiv in future

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 21SE-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence _____

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received 05/13/2004

From _____
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

BAGHDAD IRA
(City and State)

By SA b6
b7C

To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☒ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes ☐ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes ☐ No

Title: DESERT SPIDER
IT-IRAQ

Reference: _____
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☒ Original notes re interview of

IBRAHIM AHMAD ABD

AL SATTAR MUHAMMAD AL-TIKRITI

BL# 13 :



1

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-13-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/LSC

SADAM 'ADON ALAMI


~ CAR

Date

No.

~ How (3 kilos)

89' C.O. II Corps, HQ ~ IS Ammanati



AL MIQDADIYATI = HQ

Armi REDUCE AFTER

CENSE FRS	21 INFANTRY N
4/1110	17 AMMAN
	72 INFANTRY S

20 APRIL '91

Commander of RG + 1 Division RESERVE

in BAGDAD

all 7 Divisions of

HQ in BAGDAD SPECIAL AREA RASHID CAMP

RESPONSIBILITY, TRAINING RG

RESCUE FROM 12 TO 7 DIV RG

in 1476 BSCMS 6 DIV

#86 EYAT FATIYA

TRANSFER
OR
RETURN

← REACTIONSHIP
WITH
PUSA

How many SHIA
Killed? Muslim?
SHIA BI ARABI

CMM^{Days} AC^{No.}
IN CHARGE

HQ
MOVED TO KANSAS
AFTER UPRISING WAS
HANDLED

NO AFTER ACTION REPORT
SHIATS DIDN'T FOLLOW THAT
ORDER

(9)

KULAT invasion

Date

No.

ALL MOVES SUIT → (G) TO ZUSAIR

- C.O.S. LEADER OF ALL THE COMMS IN BATTLE
HELEN RASHID #107 4 STAR

- ALL TROOPS PULL OUT OF KULAT

- CEAL FMS IN PLACE

- 1 MARCH 1991 UPRISING START, BISHOPS CONC

(E) TROOPS WERE IN SELF DEFENSE

ATTACKED GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS

NASIRAT MOUT

NATIFA

HELEN

BI

ABOU GHIFUR IN CHARGE OF BASMAL
LEFT FOR BAGHDAD 0. 2 MARCH

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 05/13/2004

On 05/13/2004 IBRAHIM AHMAD ABD AL-SATTAR MUHAMMAD AL-TIKRITI (BL# 13), former Chief of Staff of the Iraqi Armed Forces, was interviewed at a detention facility in Baghdad, Iraq. The interview was conducted by Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agent [redacted] and Defense Intelligence Agency representative [redacted]. The interview was done in English and Arabic with translations performed by [redacted]. ABD AL-SATTAR MUHAMMAD provided the following information:

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In 1989, ABD AL-SATTAR MUHAMMAD was the commander of the Iraqi Army II Corps, serving as a Major General. The Army II Corps that he commanded served in the Iraqi Southern Region along the Iranian border from the summer of 1988 through the invasion of Kuwait in 1990. During the withdrawal of Iraqi forces, ABD AL-SATTAR MUHAMMAD deployed to Basra with his forces.

When the Iranians began their infiltration and military operations in Basra region on 03/01/2003 ABD AL-SATTAR MUHAMMAD was in the city of Basra. ALI HASSAN AL-MAJID was designated by former president SADDAM HUSSEIN to be in charge of all political and military operations in the entire Southern Region of Iraq during this time. ABD AL-SATTAR MUHAMMAD did not relinquish the command of his Corps to AL-MAJID directly. But AL-MAJID was ultimately in charge of all government affairs in the Southern Region. On 03/02/2004, AL-MAJID met with ABD AL-SATTAR MUHAMMAD in Basra and demanded to know why the insurgents had not yet been put down. The source was leading military operations to suppress the insurgents, but it was not being accomplished in the conduct and effectiveness that AL-MAJID demanded.

The command and control of this operation was originally being conducted in a part of the city near the Ba'ath Party offices. Because of the instability of the situation, the command group retrograded from this area to a military installation outside of the city.

ABD AL-SATTAR MUHAMMAD was aware that former president HUSSEIN had issued an order authorizing all Ba'ath members to exercise whatever powers necessary to suppress the uprising. Many people died during the fighting. ABD AL-SATTAR MUHAMMAD could not account for what he did not see. He, physically, was not

Investigation on 05/13/2004 at Baghdad, IraqFile # 315E-HQ-1448534 - 91

Date dictated _____

by SA [redacted] *DC*b6
b7C

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of IBRAHIM AHMAD ABD AL-TIKRITI, On 05/13/2004, Page 2

collocated with his troops and could not see or control what they were doing.

On 03/07/2004 AL-MAJID left Southern Region for Baghdad. At this time, ABD AL-SATTAR MUHAMMAD also departed the Southern Region and received his new assignment as a commander with the Republican Guard.

~~SECRET/ORCON,NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 06/16/2004

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: ITOS II
SC M. Chris Briece
UC [REDACTED]
ORS
SC Frankie Battle
UC [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

From: Baghdad Operations Center
Desert Spider Team

Contact: George L. Piro, [REDACTED]

b2

Approved By: Piro George [Signature]

Drafted By: Piro George L: [Signature]

(U) **Case ID #:** (S) 315E-HQ-1448534 (Pending) ⁹⁵

(U) **Title:** (S) DESERT SPIDER;
IT - IRAQ

(U) **Synopsis:** (S/OC,NF) To document Desert Spider's attempt to provide SSA George Piro a gift.

(U) ~~Derived From : G-3~~
~~Declassify On: X1~~

(U) **Details:** (S/OC,NF) Since the commencement of the ICRC visits, Desert Spider has received two care packages from his family. These packages have contained various items of clothing, such as pajamas, underwear and t-shirts, sandals, and personal hygiene items.

(U) (S/OC,NF) On 06/13/2004, during casual conversation between SSA Piro and Desert Spider, SSA Piro informed Desert Spider that their time together was nearing its conclusion. On 06/14/2004, Desert Spider gathered some of the items contained within both of his care packages, which he described more fitting for a young man than someone of his age, and attempted to present them to SSA Piro as a gift. SSA Piro declined Desert Spider's gift offer, advising him that SSA Piro could not accept such gift, as well as it would be a shame for SSA Piro to take items that Desert Spider's family had gone through the effort to

~~SECRET/ORCON,NOFORN~~

~~SECRET/ORCON,NOFORN~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Baghdad Operations Center
(U) Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534, 06/16/2004

purchase and send him for his use during captivity. Desert Spider became very agitated and advised SSA Piro that his conduct was insulting. Desert Spider reminded SSA Piro of the Arab culture, which SSA Piro should be very familiar with, that it was extremely offensive to Arabs for someone to refuse a gift once it has been presented. Under those circumstances, SSA Piro had no choice but to accept Desert Spider's gift and thanked him.

(U) ~~(S/OC/NF)~~ The gift consisted of two sets of new pajamas, two sandals, and undergarments. SSA Piro took the items and immediately returned them into Desert Spider's personal property inventory maintained by the military at the detention facility.

(U) ~~(S/OC/NF)~~ The items will be kept separate from Desert Spider's other personal property, which he has access through the military guards to exchange worn clothing or obtain new personal hygiene items. This is being done so that Desert Spider does not realize that SSA Piro in fact did not accept his gift which may severely effect the relationship between the two. The military will maintain the aforementioned articles and will dispose of them appropriately.

~~SECRET/ORCON,NOFORN~~

~~SECRET/ORCON,NOFORN~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Baghdad Operations Center
(U) Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534, 06/16/2004

LEAD (U) :

Set Lead 1:

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT ITOS II

(U) Information provided for review.

♦♦

~~SECRET/ORCON,NOFORN~~

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

DATE: 05-13-2009
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/LSC
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-13-2034

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 06/22/2004

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: ITOS II
SC M. Chris Brieese
ASC [REDACTED]
UC [REDACTED]

From: Counterterrorism
Baghdad Operations Center
Contact: SSA [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Approved By: Piro George [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED] tmi

Case ID #: (U) 315E-HQ-1448534 .96 (Pending)

Title: ~~(S)~~ DESERT SPIDER
IT - IRAQ

Synopsis: (S) [REDACTED]

(U)

~~Derived From : G-3
Declassify On: X1~~

b1

b7E

~~SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN~~

EC.Tml. 06222004

~~SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Counterterrorism
Re: (U) 315E-HQ-1448534, 06/22/2004

(S)

b1

(U)

b6
b7C
b7E

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON DC

(U) For information, read and clear.

◆◆

~~SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN~~

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 06/14/2004

On 06/12/2004, AHMED HUSSEIN KHUDAIYER (Black List #76) was interviewed at Camp Cropper Detention Camp, Baghdad, Iraq where he was being detained by the U.S. Army following his surrender to authorities in approximately April 2003. The interview was conducted by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Supervisory Special Agent George L. Piro, Special Agent [redacted] and Language Specialist [redacted]. After being explained the purpose of the interview, KHUDAIYER provided the following information:

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b7C

One of the roles of the Presidential Diwan was to serve as the Secretary for the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). As the Secretary of the RCC, the Diwan had the responsibility of formally promulgating any decisions that were finalized by the RCC. KHUDAIYER pointed out that most people who read the RCC results assume that they were the results of consultation and discussion. This was simply not true. SADDAM, the Head of State, who served as the Head of the RCC, assigned all decisions as a function of his own determination. No such meeting, per se, or consultations took place. If any meetings took place, it would have been limited only to SADDAM's closest two or three people. Generally, these outcomes reached KHUDAIYER through the telephone or the Presidential Secretary Abid Hamid Mahmud al-Tikriti.

When KHUDAIYER was given instructions, he would forward them to his legal section who would prepare a document. KHUDAIYER would then review the document and inspect it for typographical errors, formatting or any needed editing.

KHUDAIYER was shown a photocopy of Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) Decree Number 160, dated 03/29/1987 [this copy is in the attached 1A enveloped]. KHUDAIYER recognized it as the copy of an authentic RCC document in format and substance. RCC Decree Number 160 cited as references, two Constitutional provisions and a 03/29/1987 joint RCC and Ba'ath Party Regional Command meeting. RCC Decree Number 160 formally appointed command of the Northern Region of Iraq, (to include the Autonomous Region of Kurdistan), to ALI HASAN AL MAJID AL-TIKRITI. It outlined the full authority of ALI HASAN AL MAJID's command, to include control of the Foreign Intelligence Apparatus, the Internal Security Force,

Investigation on 06/12/2004 at Baghdad, IraqFile # 315E-HO-1448534 - 99 Date dictated 06/14/2004by SA [redacted]
SSA George L. Pirob6
b7C

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Ahmad Hussein Khudaiyer, On 06/12/2004, Page 2

the Military Intelligence, the Popular Army and the Military Commands.

KHUDAIYER did not remember attending any meeting when this information originally developed. He recalled receiving the information contained in this decree via handwritten instructions, as usual. He vaguely recollected making a correction on the original draft prepared by his legal section. KHUDAIYER was not overly surprised to see a decree like this. At that time, there were numerous Iraqi government organizations operating in the North of Iraq. Between the RCC, the army, and the Ministries all going back and forth through Baghdad, organizationally it was difficult to conduct administration and communication. By hiring an ultimate overseer of these efforts, affairs could be run much smoother.

Asked if Muhammad Hamza al-Zubaydi already served in that capacity, KHUDAIYER explained that al-Zubaydi received his position based on his Ba'ath party status, not a Decree issued through the Presidential Diwan's office. Furthermore, al-Zubaydi did not enjoy the trust from SADDAM that ALI HASAN AL-MAJID AL-TIKRITI did. When asked to define what he meant by trust, KHUDAIYER explained that everyone knew AL-MAJID 1) would never do anything against SADDAM, and 2) possessed the ruthlessness needed to quell the violence.

KHUDAIYER was asked if he ever promulgated a follow-on RCC Decree to RCC 160 which limited AL-MAJID's power to a five kilometer radius around the major cities of Northern Iraq. KHUDAIYER never published such a Decree. KHUDAIYER asked if it was possible that these five kilometer limitation instructions could have been verbal. He said that such an order, to contradict a Decree would be very big and written. The original Decree was sent to the Ministry of Interior, to governates and a variety of receivers. The Chief of Staff, the military intelligence, the party and the security services were aligned under the details of RCC 160. Even if the original Decree were to be modified, written coordination would be the only way to notify all of these groups who were responsible for adhering to the details of the original RCC Decree 160. To modify a Decree would require the same legal authority. Doing it verbally would not be lawfully feasible. If such an event occurred it would be, legally speaking, unprecedented.

KHUDAIYER was asked what he thought if AL-MAJID was claiming that the five kilometer limitation was given to him verbally. KHUDAIYER said that this instruction would only be in a

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Ahmad Hussein Khudaiyer, On 06/12/2004, Page 3

written format. If Al-Majid said it was passed verbally, he would be lying.

While serving as the commander of Northern Iraq, if AL-MAJID needed to contact the President, he would go through the Presidential Secretary's Office. From 1987 through 1989, KHUDAIYER did not ever recall receiving requests from AL-MAJID through the Presidential Diwan's Office.

KHUDAIYER was shown a photocopy of Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) Decree Number 10, dated 03/01/1988 [this copy is in the attached 1A enveloped]. KHUDAIYER recognized it as the copy of an authentic RCC document in format and substance. KHUDAIYER has never heard of a political party having the authority to punish people who serve in the military. Decree number 10 stated that those who did not serve, would be killed. The reason for this being promulgated in a Decree and Diwan's signature was because SADDAM did not trust the military. There were many deserters.

KHUDAIYER was asked about the atrocious conditions where the Kurds had been housed after their forced relocation in 1987 through 1989. This was not an oversight by the Baghdad government, but rather it was done by design. The intention was to prevent any Iranian-induced cohesion by displacing the Kurds out of their own area. He heard lots of people within the government talking about what was being done and he thought it was illegal and crazy. But it was to be expected as they had the craziest person in the regime, AL-MAJID, picked as the one to head a problem with this magnitude. AL-MAJID was a Corporal who served in Kirkuk. He rose all the way to Minister of Defense under SADDAM's patronage.

KHUDAIYER remembered the chemical attack incident in Halabja. Iranian elements had conquered and occupied the town and this was a huge shock to the Iraqi regime. Many thought that this might represent the beginning of a more expanded invasion. He did not know at the time that chemicals were used. One day in 1988 KHUDAIYER was bringing mail to the Presidential Secretary's office. SADDAM, who was on the phone at the time, saw KHUDAIYER. KHUDAIYER did not want to be impolite or eavesdrop, but SADDAM motioned him into the President's Office and summoned him to sit down. KHUDAIYER heard SADDAM saying into the phone 'Why did you do that? We cleared the area and kicked out the Iranians. There was no need to use this.' SADDAM seemed angry and uneasy during this call. When he hung up the phone he asked KHUDAIYER if he knew who he

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Continuation of FD-302 of Ahmad Hussein Khudaiyer, On 06/12/2004, Page 4

(SADDAM) was just speaking to. KHUDAIYER sensed that SADDAM was in that emotional state where one wishes to talk with somebody. SADDAM explained that he was just on the phone with Minister of Defense Adnan Khairallah. SADDAM asked KHUDAIYER if he knew what has happened? SADDAM explained that 'it appears that the military has used chemicals in HALABJA'. SADDAM asserted that this will look bad on us with the world community. SADDAM seemed surprised.

KHUDAIYER was asked to explain why SADDAM would be surprised, given the series of correspondences that SADDAM had previously sent coordinating their usage. As President, SADDAM knew that gassing people would cause a world image problem. SADDAM could accept the use of chemical weapons in an environment where he could manage the information of their usage and contain the fallout. But given that foreigners were in Halbaja, this was going to be an incident which he would not be able to manage the information. Since the Iranians had control of the area, they could manage the story. If the Iraqi forces had military control over Halbaja, then they could have prevented the foreigners from capturing the story and informing the world.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-13-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/LSC

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number SISE-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence FBIHQ

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received 6/12/04

From _____
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

AHMAD HUSSEIN KHODAIVEN
(Address)

(City and State)

By _____

To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☐ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☐ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes ☐ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes ☐ No

Title: DESERT SPIDER
IT - IRAQ

Reference: _____
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☒ Original notes re interview of
AHMAD HUSSEIN KHODAIVEN

6/12 RCC

(1)

DIWAN ISSUED RCC as SECRETARY

07 88 89

→ DECREE 160 / ALI HASSAN AL-MAGID + N. TERRITORY

EVERYONE WHO ASKS RESULTS - ASSUMES RESULTS ARE

- RESULT OF DISCUSSION, NOT TRUE

- HSAO OF RCC / HSAO OF STATE AFFAIRS DECISIONS

AND SUCH MEETING + CONSULTATION

- IF SUCH MEETING TOOK PLACE, ONLY 2 OR 3

CLOSSED PROCEED & SAOON OUTCOMES THROUGH PLANE
+ ABID MAHMOUD

- GAVE INSTRUCTIONS

LEGAL SECTIONS PREPARED DOCUMENT, THEN

ALRASHAD PAINTED OUT, EDIT MISTAKES, FORMAT

- DIWAN REMEMBER ATTENDING MEETING, BUT

WRITING RESULTS SECTION, WHICH HE FORWARDED

TO LEGAL FOR DRAFTING, MADE SOME EDITS

AUTHENTIC

2ND SS.7 OF INSTRUCTIONS: EIMINE - POWER TO

5 KILOMETERS OF MAJOR CITY. DIWAN REMEMBER

2007
DWT

HANDWRITTEN

RECEIVED

TRANS. HIS COUSIN

AS USUAL

AND ENCAPSULATED

What led to decision:

Atok it Gov only rep in N. ACC/ANAT/MINICAT
wants to MIAZ ULTIMATE SUSPENSE & DECISIONS
to cover all groups rather than just back to back

M. H. al Zuhairi

→ TRUST NOT THE SAME AS ALI MACIN

4 1986 Given 6 months to get things in control
then extended another 6 months?!

— M.H.Z. went to get some commands put bases
on his SAATH PARTY, not Dinnis' base

— ASAD BEARD AL'S BROT

→ TRUST

→ knows well that you'd do almost
anything

→ EVERYONE KNOW HE IS RUTHLESS in
order to quell the violence

- IF AL wants to call possession, goes through
SECRETARY;

→ MENTIONING THAT would NOT BE VERBAL (LIE)
must be in form of WRITTEN.

Even in order to communicate would be
very difficult and written. It would require
counselling. → Mr of Intern to Govt delegating
NOTIFY the organs.

IF AL SAYS something THEN LIE

AUTHENTICATE Docs



(3)

PARTY

MIC

INTELLIGENCE

Could not happen because 160 will have C.S.
By Attn. to Min of 1-78, SECURITY SERVICE
SO Amplifying DETAILS would require SAME THREAT
MUSKAM

DECEASE IS CATH, TO MOBILITY REQUIRES SAME
LOCAL AUTHORITY, SECURITY NOT FEASIBLE TO
MOBILITY, 12 VERTICAL.

- For sure I would assume IT would
BE UNPREDICTABLE

87-89 AU O.I.C. or N. → How communicate w/ President?
- POSSIBLE recall my REVIEWER goes there
bureau

- SECURITY, INTEL comes with go through
PRESENT SIGNATURE.

DCC

DECEASE 10

NEVER HEARD POL PART HAS AUTHORITY TO
punish proper, who since THE will
DECEASE who THOSE WHO don't will BE KILLED
- PERSON for DECEASE & ALL BECAUSE SPOON
didn't want THE MANY, MANY DECEASES

4

87-89

MIL ACTION AGAINST THE IRANIS, IRANIS WERE BEING
RELOCATED AFTER THEY WERE TO SUBMIT HANDIN

DID BAHMAN KNOW THIS?

= IRANIAN FROM PEOPLE TALKING ABOUT ALGERIA + EGYPT,
THE 'CAPTURED' PRISONER PICKED TO MEAN THE
PRISONER WITH BIG MAGNITUDE.

- EVERYONE WANNING FROM CPT TO REMAIN IN I.R.I.R.I.

WANNING, EVEN M.O.D. AT ONE TIME, FIGHT TO REMAIN.
A DOWN EVERYONE KNOW HIS

= WASN'T BY MISTAKE BUT BY DESIGN TO
PREVENT IRANIAN COHESION, DISPERSE THEM
OUT OF THE AREA.

Chen weapons?

IRANIAN WANNING IN HAWAII, IRANIAN
CONQUER + OCCUPY HAWAII, HUGE SCALE WITH
IRANIAN RESOURCES. IRANIAN DIDN'T KNOW AT THE TIME
HAWAII WAS WEAPONIZED, BANG MAIN TO PRESS
THROUGH SSC, OFFICE

OFFENSE DOWN, IRANIAN IN PHASE
2 AS PHASE 2 DIDN'T WANT TO STOP DOWN

I SURVIVED HIM IN WHILE IN PHASE
WHY DID YOU DO THAT? WE DID DISSECT
THAT WITH KILLER AND IRANIAN + WANNING
NO NEED TO USE THIS. ANGRY, EMOTIONAL

1184

(5)

S SAO I WAS SPEAKING TO
M.O.D. ASAN KANALLA

SAD SMOOTHER NAMED TO TALK TO
ONE OF THE DR. FOR KEN WHL

WIPPER? YES CHAN IN V/ALB3A

THIS WE REPEAT DAN ON US IN
WORDS COMMUNIST

AGAIN WHEN IMAAS TOOK OVER H/ALB3A, ONLY
AT THE BEGINNING OF MORE EXHAUSTIVE INVASION

President Surprised

TOWNS END OF CONVERSATION - "Why you
don't need to do that? I was busy and
he said, invited to come in sit on chair

Do you know who I was TALKING TO?

NO
KANALLA

- IT APPEARS THAT MANY MP USED CHAN

✓ H/ALB3A

- SENSE UNCOMFORTABLE AT-RISK BY US

S-REPLY

AS A PERSON HE KANS LASSAL ARE 174

WOULD GIVE WORKING WITH PROBLEM

(C)

IN ORDER TO USE CHIM WEAPONS, YOU
HAVE TO GET PERMISSION; ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES,
PASSPORT,
MY QUESTION; IRAQI CITY

REVISED DEC 8 DATED

DOES NOT CHANGE USE OF CHIM WEAPONS IN
EXAMPLES OF DUES, UNDER IRAQI CONTROL AND
MANAGEMENT OF INTEL

SINCE, IRANIANS WERE IN CONTROL THEY ONLY
MANAGE THE STAFF

IF IRAQI HAD ANYWHERE NEAR HITCHHIKERS
AND ~~THE~~ HAD CONTROL, IT WOULD NEVER HAVE
BOREDEN ON

DOWN ONE GUY TO SEE PASS, SEC
HAD TWO CHAIRS, SEC SAW THREE ~~ASAP~~
SEAT. PASS, WAS IN ACTION. SAW BILAL
SITTING BESIDES ILLUSION RIFLE THROUGH PAPER

WENT SE THROUGH PAPERS / STOOD UP

SUSPICION

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 06/14/2004

On 06/12/2004, AHMED HUSSEIN KHADAIYIR (Black List #76) was interviewed at Camp Cropper Detention Camp, Baghdad, Iraq where he was being detained by the U.S. Army following his surrender to authorities in approximately April 2003. Present during this interview were Supervisory Special Agent George L. Piro, Special Agent [redacted] and Language Specialist [redacted]. After being explained the purpose of the interview, KHADAIYIR provided the following information:

b6
b7c

Khudaiyir believed that SADDAM did not truly trust anyone. The closest thing that came to trust was the relationship he had with his children and some relatives such as Ali Hassan Al-Majid and Abid Hamid Mahmud al-Tikriti. Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri projected himself as a spiritual person. It was not this religious facet of his personality that appealed to SADDAM, but rather his obedience and loyalty. Al-Duri followed instructions and looked at every job SADDAM gave him as an opportunity to perform.

SADDAM was always emotional during meetings with Ministers. He was quick to take action without thinking. His impatience and inability to wait for anything caused him to make premature decisions. It was similar to a child who acted without thinking and planning ahead for himself.

SADDAM would cry during speeches, but these were more like stage tears. Some said that he was like his mother in this manner.

When SADDAM demonstrated kindness, it was rarely for the sake of the act itself. Usually it was not genuine, it was to showoff. In 1996 there was an Iraqi man who SADDAM had known for a very long time. They may have been associates from SADDAM's Cairo days. He pleaded for assistance from SADDAM because he had nothing these days, and was absolutely destitute. SADDAM ordered an arrangement for this man to be provided with a house a car and a salary. Over the past few years, SADDAM would meet with the needy and beggars, especially during Ramadan. He would also arrange stipends for widows.

SADDAM would become most angry when Ministers would talk back to him. He considered Ministers as having lower rank and

Investigation on 06/12/2004 at Baghdad, IraqFile # 315E-HQ-1448534 -98 Date dictated 06/14/2004by SA [redacted]
SSA George L. Pirob6
b7c

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Ahmad Hussein Khudaiyir, On 06/12/2004, Page 2

having no business arguing with him. As a result, they would never respond, even if they knew SADDAM was doing or saying something that was wrong or inaccurate.

SADDAM did not like hearing about Ministers punishing subordinates for no reason. Alternatively, he did not like it when Ministers did not take action to discipline subordinates who needed it.

When discussing fairness and justice, SADDAM used to cite Koranic hadiths which involved al-Ansar (the Prophet Muhammed's companions) and the Muhajir (those faithful who immigrated for religious reasons). In 1995 or 1996 SADDAM commissioned Ministry of Justice officials Munthar al-Shawri and Shabib al Maliki to research and produce a report. The report was to show those occasions and examples that SADDAM had demonstrated fairness. It was more of a public relations effort than a self inspection exercise.

It seemed to KHUDAIYER that since 1991, SADDAM has been very concerned about how he will be remembered. He was always working on his legacy by doing wasteful things like building palaces. This served as a source of embarrassment for KHUDAIYER when he met other members of the foreign diplomatic community. So many of these building materials were imported through Jordan. The Jordanian Prime Minister, seeing all of this, once asked KHUDAIYER how his government could import all of these extravagances, such as colored glass for windows, when so many Iraqi people did not even have bread, sugar or other staples.

KHUDAIYER hoped that SADDAM, in his detention, would say to the Iraqi people that 'I lost and I failed you, I hurt my people'. But realistically, he is too full of himself. He admires himself so much, he is conscientious of the jowls in his neck revealing his age. He is so fond of telling stories about himself as a fighter and a struggler.

The only way KHUDAIYER could see SADDAM saying something conciliatory is if he were to have some role in the future government. He is too tied to his chair when it comes to power. He never acknowledges mistakes. Once when he was making an address to an Arab conference after 1991. People were expecting him to say something contrite about his invasion of Kuwait. Instead, SADDAM used this platform to encourage the people of Kuwait to overthrow their government.

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File Number 315E-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence FBHQ

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received 6/12/04

From AHMAD HUSSEIN KHUDAIYER
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

(City and State)

By _____

To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☐ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☐ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes ☐ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes ☐ No

Title: DESERT SPIDER
IT IRAQ

Reference: _____
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☒ Original notes re interview of

AHMAD HUSSEIN KHUDAIYER

6/12

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-13-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB

show jobs in the doc

TRUST NEVER TRUSTED ANYONE (KIDS, SONS, CUSAT)
what did it take to even trust - (besides kids) relatives AL, Hassan, Modid

AND MANY OTHERS, RELATIVES

127A7 AL DUAH/HAMMAM HAMMAM

127A7 IGATHAM AL FAHMEH OBESIAN, 457cm,
projected height 1.8m - FOLLOWS INSTRUCTIONS

give him opportunity

- chosen among others even high level school

Frenchman, Doctor, Friend

TAKHATASIR RMAN

ALSPANET

73-79 NO STRAIN RELATIONSHIP / COMPROMISE

73 Samuel Lehigh, friend

79

Always emotional during MEETINGS with ministers

quick action, with 2/3 thinking impatient

doesn't wait, once decision, like 2/3 without
thinking / planning, should fix lunch

ISSUES cried a lot during speeches cry on give
some relatives say 500m - like him, mother
who cried

KINASS KUN FOR SHOWWORK GEMVINE

- citizen known MAS, NOTHING, Wore, 2/3, 2/3, 2/3

approx 1996 meet entered

know him for stay long time CAIDV INSTRUCTORS

get away

hit meetings with the ready + bigger, post for years
during summer, winter mostly stopped

ANSY | Really when minister takes back
they don't respond. Even if they know the
wrong side, doesn't like minister to
be able to answer. Don't like min to
provide substance w/ no reason.

- IF MIN DO NOT TAKE ACTION TO DISPLACE
THOSE WHO ARE BEING ABUSED
MURDER / FARNESS STRIKE

★ (ARAB PROTEST)
MURDER EXAMPLE
AL ARAB STUDY

★ TO STUDY SYDNEY FARNESS 1995-1996
MASTERS OF JUSTICE - MURDER AL SHAWAR
- SHABIB AL MALIKI

TAMAR | JUSTICE | TARIK 1980,

• AFTER 1991 WENT TO BE RENEWED, CREATING
PAGES → SYDNEY BAO, SYDNEY
SYDNEY PRIME MINISTER, PAGES BUREAU?
NO SYDNEY BAO, why colonies girls IMPRINTS THROUGH
Jordan

→ DECISION TO RECONSTRUCT HIS
FARNESS

Aras wasis

Reink asfates, stine 2 won

1991, Kinn, U.S. nll,

Hope, I lost 20 I failed you, I had
my people

full of himself, shies himself, trying to hide

his neck

strong about himself, fighter, stylist

fighter, Brown, Struckon

Stories of brave in action

Bones

escapes, own way to die so vast

one return - to power RANZ women

Optimal request 100 athletes train in Japan

- request only go to father

- estimate know in summer

Suppositions: use to say I had a long

dream, make him 98 now and

Barthony, because I am as present in many
or T.U.

Recommend

Only if not in Aras conversation

Give chance, to use but

I asking

also to his chair and starts

W MISTAKES ACKNOWLEDG

ASKED TO APOLOGIZE TO KUMANI PEOPLE

CURRENT W MESSAGE

INSTAD W APOLOGIZE, INSTALATE PEOPLE

TO NOT FORGIVE THIS CONVENTION

MAS CONFERENCES

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 315E-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence FBIHQ

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(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

(City and State)

By GEORGE L. PIRO

To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☒ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☒ No

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Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes ☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes ☒ No

Title: DESERT SPIDER
IT- IRAQ

Reference: _____
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☒ Original notes re interview of

TAMM YASIN RAMADAN

①

BL #20 06/27 0939^{hrs} HRS No.

① DOES NOT SEE A DR. CALLED FAMILY 3 WKS AGO
(1ST TIME)

② HAS NOT DONE ANYTHING WRONG/BAD *
I LOVE MY COUNTRY/ PEOPLE/ ETC.

③ UP ROLE INC OF REL. W/ ARAB COUNTRIES, DUE TO
SIT DID NOT LEAVE COUNTRY WAS FORCED TO TRAVEL
EVEN THOUGH THERE WERE 2 OTHERS, HE WAS
SELECTED OVER THEM.

④ 1994 - HAD MEETING W/ IBRAHIM SANUSI
SUDAN - NO RELATIONSHIP NOR LIKE HIS PARTY, WHICH
CONFLICTS W/ HIS BELIEFS. SANUSI IS W/ TURABI

⑤ SANUSI SENT TO IRAQ TO ^{HAVE} IRAQ
FRACTIONS POL. IN SUDAN. SANUSI WANTED TO SEE SIT
BUT HE DID NOT WANT TO, & ORDERED Δ, AS IT
WOULD BE BAD FOR HIM NOT SEE ANYONE.
Δ MET SANUSI IN HIS IRAQ. TALKED ABOUT IRAQ
ETC. SPOKE ABOUT CONFLICT W/ BASIR. PARTY.
WANTED IRAQ/ SIT TO MEDIATE BTW THE 2 PARTIES.
Δ TOLD HIM THEY ARE ONE PARTY & KNOW EACH
OTHER'S PRY. IRAQ DOES NOT KNOW ANYTHING
ABOUT THEIR INTERNAL CONFLICT.

⑥ CAME THRU ASSISTANCE OF IIS AS THEIR GUEST.
ASKED FOR HIS VIST TO BE NON-OFFICIAL

ONLY TIME TO SEE SANUSI. RECALLS THE^{DATE} BLDG, OFFICE, CLOTHING ETC. IS CLAIMING HIS MEM. IS PERFECT.

HE IS NOT AN HONEST MAN, VERIFY ANY INFO FROM IMMEDIATELY.

① OUR INFO THEY HAD RELATIONS W/ BIN LADEN WHILE HE WAS IN SUDAN - PUBLIC INFO

SIT ASSIGNED IT TO D. BECAUSE HE WAS

② A LEADER IN THE PARTY & PURPOSE OF SANUSI'S VISIT WAS PARTY RELATED NOT POLITICALLY WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN TO FOREIGN MINISTER.

③ FOR THE DIFFICULT TASKS WERE GIVEN TO HIM.

④ SANUSI TRAVELED BY HIMSELF - BROUGHT BY AN UNK. ITS OFFICER. MTC NO LONGER THAN 1 HR.

⑤ NO DISCUSSIONS RE UBI - & SUDAN KNOWS IRAQ'S VIEWS - IRAQ'S LEADERSHIP OPPOSED UBI & ITS VIEWS. BAHARI PARTY IS NOT A RELIGIOUS PARTY.

IN 1994 UBI WAS NOTHING ^{NOT DATE} A POLITICAL
 ISSUE UBI BELONGS WITHABIS WITH OPPOSED
 SAUDI -

(1) IRAQ VIEWED UBI AS ENEMY, BUT NOT A
 DIRECT ENEMY OR THREAT. BUT ~~BECAUSE~~ CONCERNED
~~ABOUT~~ WATHABIS COMING INTO IRAQ.

IN 1999 THEY DETAINED WATHABIS, FINANCED
 BY SAUDIS - STAYED IN JAIL UNTIL THE
 AMNESTY - THEY KILLED PEOPLE IN MOSQUE
 INSTILL THE BELIEFS BY FORCE.

HAD NOTHING TO DO W/ SANUSI. I DID NOT
 ASSIGN HIGAZI TO BE A CO BTWN.

(2) ONLY MTG HE REMEMBERED, NOT SURE
 IF HE MET IN SUDAN. D HE'S TRAVELED
 FOMERLY TO SUDAN SEVERAL TIMES:

^{IN 1992}
 1- MTG VISITED PRES. I TURABI WAS SICK
 I VISITED HIM SANUSI MAY HAVE BEEN
 THERE. OFFICIAL VISIT GOVT TO GOVT.

→ Δ DOES NOT BELIEVE SANUSI ASKED ITS FOR
 OTHER MATTERS, OR OTHER TASKING.

9 Δ DOES NOT KNOW AYMAN I NEVER MET HIM.
 THAT IS A US FABRICATION. ~~W/~~ HE

(4)

KNOWS A LOT OF EGYPTIANS ^{Date} 8 MAY ^{No.} 11182
BUT DOES NOT KNOW ARMAN. NOT IN
CHARGE OF BRINGING NIK OF EGYPTIAN
TO IRAQ TO WORK.

H^e READ AMERICAN PRESS REPORTS ABOUT
THIS & COMPLETELY FALSE.

HAD NO CONNECTIONS W/ UBI @ ALL !!!

I REMEMBER TALIBAN EMBASSY IN
IRAQ ASKED IRAQ TO RE-OPEN THE AFGHAN
EMBASSY

2004 6/27
SIT BROUGHT ME & TALIBAN TO DISCUSS
THE ISSUE. DECIDED NOT TO.

NOT SATISFIED W/ TALIBAN GOVT
ADVISED MR. HINSI. TO ADVISE TALIBAN
COULD NOT STATE IT AT THIS TIME.

2- RELIGIOUS POPULAR PARTY-

2- 1 ARAB POPULAR SUPPORT- AFTER WAR

CONF. - WOULD ATTEND NOT IN @, STATED (5)
IN 1983 - RUN BY

1- ATTENDEES - ARAB VIPS, PUBLISHERS, NEWS ETC.

2- ISLAMIC - (^{NO} REQUESTED ST^H TO ATTEND) ATTENDEES
WOULD ASK FOR AUDIENCE W/ PRES. A LOT OF
PEOPLE MET W/ HIM (PRES.) WOULD HAVE SOME
INFO ON TV IE MTC W/ A DELEGATION.

NO DISCUSSIONS ABOUT ARAB REFUGEES FAMILY
COMING TO IRAQ -

WAHABIS BEGAN TO APPEAR IN FALLUJAH,
ABU G, BAGHDAD AND MOSUL. IRAQIS
CONVERTED TO WAHABIS & REC'D FINANCIAL
SUPPORT FROM SAUDI. ROUNDED UP &
IMPRISONED AT SA'DDAM'S ORDERS.

NEVER MET W/ ZAWAHIRI.

MS AN EMPLOYEE IN IFS. CAME ONCE A WK TO
HIM ABOUT JORDANIAN OR ARAB DESCENT. "MS"
TALKED ABOUT THAT GUY, AN OLD BROTHER BUT
DISMISSED:

WANTED TO DISCUSS HOW ^{Date} TO ESTABLISH
II A BA'ATH PARTY IN JORDAN

SEEMED LIMITED EXPERIENCE/CAP. - ASKED
I WITH TALKING TO HIM. MS SAID WANTED TO
ESTABLISH PARTY BUT MAKING IT CLEAR
NO A THREAT / OPPOSITION TO IRAQ.

I KIND TO JORDAN ~~WAS~~ GOT AUTHORITY FOR
PARTY.

STARTED TO SEND HIM REPORTS OF INFO.
DIRECTED THESE TO IIS.

MS NEVER LEFT IRAQ UNTIL WAR.

50's SHORT DARK SKIN COLOR
MID BUILT 5-10

MS MET W/ A TWICE ONLY 1ST TO BRIEF HIM
2ND BROUGHT JORDANIAN

DOESN'T KNOW / BUT DOESN'T THINK
SO - BECAUSE HE WOULD SEE HIM
AROUND BAGHDAD. 5 MOS. BEFORE
DIF.

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 07/03/2004

TAHA YASIN RAMADAN AL-JIZRAWI, Black List #20, was interviewed at a detention facility at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq on 6/27/2004. Interviewing agents identified themselves as representatives of the United States Government from Washington, D.C. Department of Defense contract linguist [redacted] provided Arabic/English translation. RAMADAN has been the Vice President of Iraq since 1991, Ba'ath Party Revolutionary Command Council member since 1969, and former First Deputy Prime Minister from 1979-1991. The main purpose of this interview was to determine RAMADAN's knowledge regarding Iraq's links to USAMA BIN LADIN (UBL) and Al Qaeda. He provided the following information:

b6
b7C

According to RAMADAN, part of the Vice President's role included developing relationships with other Arab countries because President SADDAM HUSSEIN did not like traveling outside of Iraq. RAMADAN was chosen to travel, even though there was another Vice President. RAMADAN was chosen due to his ability to handle difficult and sensitive issues.

In 1994, RAMADAN had a meeting with Dr. IBRAHIM SANUSI, Deputy Secretary General of the National Islamic Front (NIF) in Sudan. Neither RAMADAN or the Iraqi leadership had a relationship with Sudan, nor did they like the NIF because their party line conflicted with beliefs of the Ba'ath Party. SANUSI was a senior aide to President TURABI.

SANUSI was allegedly sent to Iraq to request assistance in mediating between the political factions in Sudan. His visit was arranged with the assistance of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), who requested that his visit be unofficial. SANUSI wanted an audience with President HUSSEIN, but HUSSEIN did not want to meet with SANUSI. HUSSEIN directed RAMADAN to meet with him, since it would look bad if SANUSI did not meet with any representative from the Iraqi Government. In addition, RAMADAN was a leader in the Ba'ath Party and the purpose of SANUSI's visit was party related, not political. An official political visit would have been arranged through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and SANUSI would have met with the Foreign Minister. SANUSI spoke about

Investigation on 06/27/2004 at Baghdad, IraqFile # 315E-HQ-1448524 ¹⁸⁰ 315E-HQ-1404383 ³⁸⁵¹
George L. PiroDate dictated 07/03/2004

by [redacted]

b6
b7C

315E-HQ-1448534; 315E-HQ-1404383

Continuation of FD-302 of Taha Yasin Ramadan Al-Jizrawi, On 06/27/2004, Page 2

conflict with the rival political party headed by BASHIR. RAMADAN advised SANUSI that Iraq did not know about the internal conflicts between the parties in Sudan, nor should they intervene.

The 1994 meeting between RAMADAN and SANUSI lasted only an hour, and according to RAMADAN was the only time the two met. SANUSI traveled by himself, but brought an unknown IIS officer with him to the meeting. RAMADAN recalled the building and office where the meeting was held, and described the clothing that SANUSI wore during the meeting. RAMADAN claimed his recollection of that day and the meeting was perfect. RAMADAN described SANUSI as not an honest man, and any information from him needed to be verified immediately.

Interviewing agents advised RAMADAN that it was public information that Iraq had relations with UBL while UBL was in Sudan. RAMADAN advised there were no discussions regarding UBL at the meeting with SANUSI. Sudan knew that Iraq's leadership opposed UBL and his views. RAMADAN commented that the Ba'ath Party is not a religious party. RAMADAN advised that in 1994, UBL was a nobody and Iraq did not view him as a political issue. UBL was a Wahabist and opposed the Saudi regime and Saudi Royal family. Although Iraq viewed UBL as an enemy, he was not a direct enemy or a threat to Iraq. There was concern about Wahabists coming into Iraq, when they began to appear in Fallujah, Abu Gharib, Baghdad, and Mosul in the late 1990s. They were known to instill their beliefs by force and were known to kill people in mosques. Iraqi's were converting to Wahabism and were receiving financial support from Saudi Arabia. In 1999, SADDAM ordered Wahabists be detained and they remained in custody until the amnesty in 2002.

RAMADAN had nothing to do with SANUSI and did not assign FARUQ HIJAZI (Black List #104) to be the intermediary. RAMADAN insisted this was the only meeting he remembered. Although RAMADAN had traveled to Sudan several times, he was unsure if he had ever met SANUSI in Sudan. RAMADAN recalled in 1992, President TURABI was sick, and RAMADAN traveled to Sudan on an official visit to meet him. RAMADAN is not positive, but advised that SANUSI may have been present during this visit. RAMADAN did not believe that SANUSI requested anything else from the IIS.

RAMADAN was questioned regarding press reports that he had met with UBL advisor AYMAN AL ZAWAHIRI. RAMADAN advised he had read these press reports and said they were completely false and were fabricated by the United States. RAMADAN claimed he did not

315E-HQ-1448534; 315E-HQ-1404383

Continuation of FD-302 of Taha Yasin Ramadan Al-Jizrawi, On 06/27/2004, Page 3

know AYMAN AL ZAWAHIRI and had never personally met him. RAMADAN knows many Egyptians, but reiterated he did not know ZAWAHIRI. RAMADAN was responsible for bringing millions of Egyptians to Iraq to work. RAMADAN advised that he had no connections or relations with UBL.

RAMADAN recalled that in approximately 2000, the Taliban Ambassador in Iraq made a request to see if Iraq would reopen its Embassy in Afghanistan. President HUSSEIN convened a meeting with the Council of Four (RAMADAN, IZZAT IBRAHIM AL-DURI [BL#6], TARIQ AZIZ [BL#25], and ALI HASAN AL-MAJID [BL#5]) to discuss this issue. They decided not to reopen the Embassy because they were not satisfied with the Taliban Government. President HUSSEIN instructed the Ministers to advise the Taliban that they could not staff the Embassy at that time.

RAMADAN advised he is familiar with the name MUHAMMAD AL SALMANI and said that he was an employee of the IIS. AL SALMANI came to RAMADAN once to set up a meeting between RAMADAN and an Iraqi living in Jordan who was interested in establishing the Ba'ath Party in Jordan. RAMADAN could not recall this individual's name. In RAMADAN's view, the Iraqi who wanted to establish the Ba'ath Party in Jordan had limited political capabilities and little experience. RAMADAN met with the Iraqi, who assured him that the Ba'ath Party he was interested in forming in Jordan would not be a threat or present any opposition to Iraq. The Iraqi returned to Jordan to seek authority to establish the party in Jordan. The Iraqi then began sending RAMADAN information reports. RAMADAN directed the reports to the IIS, and had no further contact with the Iraqi.

Regarding AL SALMANI, RAMADAN believed that he never left Iraq until the war. AL SALMANI met with RAMADAN twice; the first time to brief him; the second to introduce the Iraqi to RAMADAN. RAMADAN does not believe AL SALMANI was stationed in the United States, as he would periodically see him in and around Baghdad. When questioned further, RAMADAN stated he did not officially know if AL SALMANI had been assigned to the United States, and the periods between his sightings of AL SALMANI stretched sometimes over several years. The last time RAMADAN saw AL SALMANI was several months before Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). AL SALMANI is described as in his 50's, dark complexion, medium build, approximately 5'6" height.

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 315E-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence FBIHQ

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received 06/25/2004

From HUSAYN RASHID AL MUHAMMAD AL DUKATI
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

BAGHDAD, IRAQ
(City and State)

By _____

To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☒ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes ☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes ☒ No

Title: OPERATION DESERT FINDER
IT-IRAQ

Reference: HUSAYN.302.TM1.06252004
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☒ Original notes re interview of

-HUSAYN RASHID AL MUHAMMAD AL DUKATI

[redacted] - 622106
- 45 [redacted]
HUSAYN RASHID AL MUHAMMAD AL TIKRITI Date 6/25/07 No. 1

DOB: JULY 1, 1940

1987 → DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS

2 DIRECTORATES UNDER HIM

1. PLANNING

2. MILITARY MOVEMENTS

- CHIEF OF STAFF - DURING THAT TIME FRANK NAZAR KHAZZATI

- CLAIMS HE NEVER ISSUED ORDERS DURING AMERL

- WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR MOVEMENT OF TROOPS
TO THE FRONT.

= UNDER COMMAND OF THE USE OF CUS, BY 1987

AND UNDER COMMAND OF THE USE OF CUS OF UNMOCHA

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 06/26/2004

Husayn Rashid Al Muhammad Al Tikriti, (Black List #131), date of birth July 1, 1940, was interviewed at a detention facility located at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Interviewing Agents identified themselves as representatives of the United States Government from Washington, DC. FBI Language Specialist [redacted] provided Arabic/English translation. Sabir provided the following information:

b6
b7C

In 1987, Husayn was the Deputy Chief of Operations. He was responsible for the Directorate of Planning and the Directorate of Military Movements. The Army Chief of Staff during that time frame was Nazar Khazraji (phonetic).

Interviewers told Husayn that they wanted to discuss the time frame of 1987-1988 during the Anfal Campaign. Husayn claims his only responsibilities were handling the movement of troops to the front lines, and never issued orders during Anfal. In addition, Husayn allegedly did not know about the use of chemical weapons (CW) by the Iraqi Military, nor was he aware of the use of CW at Halabja. Interviewers advised Husayn that they have reviewed many documents and conducted numerous interviews regarding the Anfal Campaign. Interviewers then questioned Husayn's credibility due to the fact he was in an important position with the Iraqi military during that time frame. Husayn became indignant at which time the interview was terminated.

Investigation on 06/25/2004 at Baghdad, IraqFile # 315E-HQ-1448534-101 Date dictated 06/26/2004by SSA George L. Piro
by SSA [redacted] tmib6
b7C

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 315E-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence FBI Baghdad (FBI-10)

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received 6/18/04

From _____

(Address)

Baghdad Iraq

(City and State)

By SSA George J Piro

To Be Returned ☐ Yes

☒ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes

☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes

☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes

☒ No

Title: Operation Desert Spider
IT - Iraq

Reference: 302 data 6/26/2004

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☐ Original notes re interview of

Handwritten notes

b6
b7C
b7D

~~SECRET~~DATE: 05-13-2009
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/LSC
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-13-2034ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 06/19/2004


On 6/18/2004, [REDACTED] was
interviewed at a military detention facility in Baghdad, Iraq, by
SSA [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] and provided the following
information:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C
b7DInvestigation on 6/18/2004 at Baghdad, IraqFile # 315E-HQ-1448534-102 Date dictated 6/19/2004by SSA George L. Piro ~~SECRET~~

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 06/28/2004

TARIQ AZIZ, (Black List # ²⁵2), Minister of Foreign Affairs (MFA) with the former Iraqi regime, was interviewed on 06/27/2004, by Supervisory Special Agent [REDACTED] and Special Agent [REDACTED] Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) at a detention facility in Baghdad, Iraq. After being explained the purpose of the interview, AZIZ provided the following information:

b6
b7C

Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait provoked the Saudi government into aligning itself with the United States in order to provide security for the Kingdom. USAMA BIN LADEN (UBL) encouraged the Royal family to rely on him, not the Americans, for their defense. UBL was the guest of the Sudanese government headed by HASSAN AL-TURABI. AL-TURABI had persecuted the Ba'athists in earlier days. The Sudanese National Islamic Front Party was a government based on Islam. The Ba'ath Party strongly believed it inappropriate to link Islam with politics. This fundamental disagreement caused a long-standing rift between Iraq and Sudan.

AZIZ was asked if Iraq used Islamic militants as a proxy army the way the Mujahadin were used in Afghanistan against the Soviets and in the Kashmir Region against Indian forces. AZIZ claimed this was not President SADDAM HUSSEIN's style and that SADDAM did not trust the Islamists. He pointed out that in a publicly disseminated video tape, UBL had called SADDAM an 'infidel.' In the Arab/Muslim world, this insult was extremely harsh and unlikely to be forgotten by SADDAM. When it was pointed out the Iraqi government, had supported the Mujahadin el-Kalq (MEK) as means of keeping Iran at bay, AZIZ noted that this was a nationalist group, not an Islamic fundamentalist organization, and that they actually had an official representative assigned to an office in Baghdad.

Following the East Africa embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salam, SADDAM issued no official response. As a dedicated anti-American, he delighted in it. The United States had bombed his country and tried to kill him. It was, therefore, no surprise, that SADDAM was pleased. AZIZ was asked if SADDAM considered al-Qaeda a more attractive option after these attacks and the bombing of the USS Cole. SADDAM thought that UBL's al-Qaeda was an effective organization.

Investigation on 06/27/2004 at BAGHDAD, IRAQFile # 315F-HQ-1448534 -103
by SSA [REDACTED]
SA [REDACTED]

Date dictated _____

b6
b7C

AZIZ. 362. WSC. 06272004

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of TARIO AZIZ, On 06/27/2004, Page 2

In AZIZ's presence, SADDAM had only expressed negative sentiments about UBL. When the Taliban was pretending to be a legitimate government in Afghanistan, Iraq deliberately avoided opening an Embassy in Kabul. During traditional times of the year on the Islamic calendar for sending greetings, such as Id al-Fitr, Taliban leader, Mullah OMAR sent congratulations to the heads of state of all the Islamic countries, including Iraq. SADDAM refused to publish the greetings from OMAR in the newspapers even though it was the custom.

UBL adopted and endorsed a Wahabist position on Islam. In the 1990s, members of the Iraqi government began seeing young men with beards and no mustaches wearing dish-dashes that did not reach all the way to their feet. This was clear evidence that Wahabists had come to Iraq. Just as Iraq had forbidden membership in Hizb'Dawa ten years earlier, they found it necessary to issue a decree aggressively outlawing Wahabism in Iraq and threatening offenders with execution.

These events led to AZIZ to conclude that SADDAM was not interested in forming a partnership with Islamists. SADDAM was not shy about expressing his opinion in front of others that he considered Wahabists to be opportunists and hypocrites. Furthermore, SADDAM had tried to rectify Iraq's relationships with the Saudis. He had exchanged correspondence with Prince ABDALLAH. During an Arab summit in Qatar in either 2002 or 2003, IZZAT IBRAHIM AL-DURI and Prince ABDALLAH kissed and embraced on television.

AZIZ agreed that heads of state and ambassadors often say things publicly to play to their domestic audiences while exchanging different messages privately. However, he contended that if this dynamic had taken place between SADDAM and any Islamist group, including al-Qaeda, it was not being done in front of AZIZ or with his knowledge. He advised he was unaware of such matters ever being discussed in open diplomatic circles. However, this would not surprise him. AZIZ's Ministry of Foreign Affairs(MFA) deals with a country's relationships with other nation states. Since al Qaeda was a non state actor with no credentialed representatives registered with the MFA, liaison with them could not take place through diplomatic institutions. Additionally, since AZIZ was a Christian, he would not be the person with whom the Iraqi government would select to interact with Islamists. With the exception of Palestine movements, where Christians and Muslims

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of TARIO AZIZ, On 06/27/2004, Page 3

live harmoniously, no Islamic group would accept a meeting with a Christian to negotiate aspects of their cause. The years between 1995 and 1996 represented the beginning of AZIZ's marginalization from a position of influence within the Regime. He lost SADDAM's special trust that so many of SADDAM's relatives enjoyed.

In discussing former regime members, AZIZ described FAROUK HIJAZI, (Black List number # 104) as a good guy. He had a prominent role and enjoyed a favorable reputation within the Muhabarat or Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS). AZIZ opined, cynically, that HIJAZI's appointment as Ambassador represented the system's way of 'kicking him up.' HIJAZI was a trusted Ba'athist, certainly deserving of an assignment to head the Muhabarat (IIS). By contrast, TAHIR HABOOSH was 'just a policeman' who lacked the capacity or sophistication to run an organization such as the Muhabarat (IIS). AZIZ was aware of the famous rumor that had been covered by the media which suggested that HIJAZI traveled to Afghanistan in order to meet with UBL. AZIZ once asked HIJAZI if this was true, but HIJAZI denied it.

Following the 09/11/2001 attack on the United States, SADDAM asked AZIZ to draft letters of condolence to Iraq's friends in the United States, including former U.S. Attorney, RAMSEY CLARK, and KATHY KELLY. U.S. President GEORGE BUSH was not mentioned.

AZIZ was unaware of any overtures to develop a mutual relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda. When informed that senior Al-Qaeda member ABU HAFS AL-MAURITANI had visited Baghdad in 1998, AZIZ replied by saying 'really?'. He was told that the Al-Qaeda member met with IZZAT IBRAHIM AL-DURI. AZIZ said it seemed natural that the regime would send 'sheik', the 'hypocrite' AL-DURI. AZIZ was further advised that ABU HAFS AL-MAURITANI had returned in 2003 to meet with the Regime. AZIZ stated that he was not aware of this. He had no recollection of being in any meeting with SADDAM or Presidential Secretary, ABID MAHMOUD (Black List # 4), in which ABU HAFS' presence in Iraq in 2003 was discussed.

AZIZ did not know of any instances where Iraqi Forces shot Iranian prisoners of war. He recalled there was a documented incident in which the Iranians shot and captured Iraqi troops. This incident was brought to the attention of the MFA by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

The principal Iraqi leaders in Kuwait during the 1990/1991 invasion were ALI HASSAN AL-MAJID (Black List # 5),

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of TARIO AZIZ, On 06/27/2004, Page 4

SABAWI AL-TIKRITI (SADDAM's half brother). AL-MAJID also killed many individuals in northern Iraq. Nobody would question this. The disposition of Kuwaiti prisoners who were taken to Iraq, however, remained a mystery. AZIZ claimed that AL-MAJID was responsible for the 'disappearance' of these Kuwaitis, but he provided no specific evidence to support this claim. He related that conventional wisdom is that the Kuwaitis were captured inside their own country Kuwait and imprisoned in Basara. When the U.S. troops began their 1991 invasion of Iraq, the Iraqis opened the prison doors and fled the area. AZIZ could not confirm the truth of this story. Nevertheless, he claimed that if the prisoners were killed, it would have been at AL-MAJID's command.

According to AZIZ, Iraq used chemical weapons against the Iranians during the Iran-Iraq war. At first, the Iraqi government publicly denied using them, but they later acknowledged it. According to UBL, however, the reported use of chemical weapons against the Kurds in Halabja was dubious. He contended that there was credible news reporting that showed that the Iranians were the ones who first used chemical weapons in that area.

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 315E-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence _____


Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received 06/23/2004

From SADIR ADD AL AZIZ HUSAYN AL DUR1
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

BAGHDAD, IRAQ
(City and State)

By _____


To Be Returned ☒ Yes

Receipt Given ☐ Yes

☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes

☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes

☒ No

Title: OPERATION DESERT SPIDER
IT- IRAQ

Reference: SADIR, 302, TM 1.06232004
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☒ Original notes re interview of

SADIR ADD AL AZIZ HUSAYN AL DUR1



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b7C

b7D



- 6/23/84

- LS ELHARIRI

SARIR ABD AL AZIZ HUSAYN AZ DURI

Date 6/23/84 No. 1

1982-1988 TIME FRAME

NAZM KHAIRASI - ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF

ADNAN IKHRAZALLAH - MINISTER OF DEFENSE

BEGINNING ^{OF 1987} → HUSSEIN RASID BL#131

- COMMANDER OF REPUBLICAN GUARDS
IN SUZANNIYAH GUARDS → DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
FOR OPERATIONS

- DUTIES AT - RESPONSIBLE TO
EXECUTE ALL ARMY OPERATIONS
2 DIRECTORATES - RESPONSIBLE FOR:
1. PLANNING - STUDYING/PLANNING

~~AND EXECUTION OF MILITARY OPS~~

2. ^{MILITARY} MOVEMENTS → ~~EXECUTION OF~~ A 155MM GUN
FOR THE EXECUTION OF THE PLAN.

- ISTIKHARAH WOULD CONTROL INFO AND

THE ENEMY - TRANSMIT, WOULD DISTRIBUTE
INFO TO ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF, MINISTER
OF DEF. INFO WOULD BE PASSED TO
HIS DEPUTY. INFO, WOULD FROM QUICKLY
BECAUSE IT WAS DURING THE WAR.

DIRECTOR OF MILITARY MOVEMENTS

YAYAD KATAYIA TC #30

KHAIRAT AL RAY

- AYAD KATAYIA BECAME THE COMMANDER OF THE REP. GUARDS, WITH KHESSIN RASHID BECAME DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF OF ARMY
- NASEM ABDULLAH TOOK AYAD'S PLACE AS THE DIR. OF MILITARY MOVEMENTS
- MUHAMMAD ABDEL KADIR → DIR. OF DEFENSE & MINISTER OF DEFENSE.

YOUSIF AL KHARAB → TOOK HIS PLACE AS
DIRECTOR OF PLANNING

DOZ #1 - SIGNATURES RECOGNITION (ARABIC)

DIRECTOR OF DOZ #3 → WALID KHALIL (ARABIC OF DOZ)

DEPUTY OF DOZ #3 → WALID SAMIR (ARABIC OF DOZ)

DIRECTOR OF DOZ #1 → SAMIR'S SIGNATURE

- PAGE #5 - AMI DOZ

- RECOGNITION WITH SAMIR'S

SIGNATURES

PAGE #7 → RECOGNITION WITH KHESSIN'S SIGNATURES

LOWER RIGHT

- LOWER LEFT → WALID SAMIR

- CENTER BOTTOM → SAMIR'S SIGNATURE

PAGE #2 Doc #1

- SALEH FAYAN - DMI SECRETARY OF DIRECTOR
- LOWER LEFT
- LOWER RIGHT - OWN SIGNATURE
- BOTTOM COLUMN - WAFID SAMARAH
DEADY OF DMI.

~~PAGE #2 Doc #1~~

PAGE #9, 10, 11, 12, 13 PAGE DOC.

LETTER FROM DAI

3rd BRANCH SECOND SECTION

INDICATING AS LAST PAGE APPROXIMATE

THE ADDRESS INDICATING WITH WITH

ON THE SECOND SECTION DIRECTOR

STAFF COLONEL (SARAH) SALEH (LNU)

- INDICATING LOWER LEFT COLUMN - WAFID SAMARAH
- INDICATING THE REVIEWER OF THE DOC.
- IDENTIFYING THE OWN SIGNATURE AS
REVIEWER OF DOC.

PAGE #12 - BRIEFING IT WAS WAZIA KHALID
SILVER. NOT POSITIVE

PAGE #13 - COMMITTEE REGARDING SPECIFIC AMMUNITION
- REPRESENTATION FROM PLANNING, ~~ARMY~~
AND MILITARY INDUSTRIES, WERE
THE COMMITTEE REFERRED TO IN THE
DOCUMENT.

AND REFS. FROM ISILKADAT

AND WERE STAFF AND INDUSTRIES

THE AIR FORCE - OR AN OTHER SERVICE
DRAWING AS THE TO INCLUDE
TO INTEREST OF USER
COW TO

COMMITTEE
MEETINGS
FROM
2 ~~WAS~~
OR IS
NECESSARY

- COMMITTEE PROVIDES ^{MILITARY} RECOMMENDATION
TO ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF, WHO
THAN ~~IS~~ PRESENTS ~~THE~~ RECOMMENDATIONS
TO UNION OF DEFENSE COMMITTEE
TO ~~THE~~ ARMY FORCES WITH SADDAM CHAIRS

- HOWEVER IN THE PAST THE
PRESIDENT HAS ORDERED IMMEDIATE
USE OF CUB BASES ON REPORT
FROM THE DUE

- WHEATLAND THE KHALID BANK
WAS CHAIR THE COMMITTEE

ARMED FORCES COMMITTEE MADE UP OF

- MINISTER OF DEFENSE
- DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE
- COMMANDER OF NAVY
- COMMANDER OF AIR FORCE
- COMMANDER OF ARMY (AVIATION)
- ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF
- 4 DEPUTY ARMY CHIEFS OF STAFF
- DIRECTOR OF PLANNING
- DIRECTOR OF MILITARY MOVEMENTS
- MINISTER OF MILITARY AFFAIRS
- MET 2 TIMES A WEEK DURING WAR
- SECRETARY OF ARMED FORCES
COMMITTEE → 'AIA DIN KATHEM AL-JANABI
- ALL REQUESTS FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS
WERE DISCUSSED IN THIS COMMITTEE.
- ~~THE~~ DOWNS WERE RECALLED AND BEING DISCUSSED
WITH THE COMMITTEE BEFORE ALL
(SECRET) MATTERS WERE DIRECTLY TO
THE PRESIDENT. SADDAM WOULD
ISSUE THE DECISION TO UNDO
C. L. THE PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARY
WOULD THEN ISSUE THE ORDERS
TO THE HEAD OF ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF.

Date

No. 6

Page #14 - DOZ #1 - 1st DIRECTORATE/DIV.

SIGNATURE OF DIRECTOR - SIMAN ABDEL SABAR
ABUL GHALIL

- THIS DIRECTORATE HAS THE
IRANIAN BRANCH, WAR ZONES BRANCH
& EXTERNAL MATTERS

Page #15 - DOZ #1 - DOESN'T RECOGNIZE SIGNATURE

Page #16 - DOZ #1 - ~~DOESN'T~~ BOSS CELESTIAL - WAFIA
SAMARAH

Page #17 - DOZ #1 - DOESN'T RECOGNIZE SIGNATURE

Page #25 - DOZ #1 - DOESN'T RECOGNIZE SIGNATURE

1991 - 1994 - DIRECTOR OF MOHAMED (IES)

TEAR DOWN FOR SABAR.

HE RETIRED IN 1994.

DOC # 15 -

Date

No.

7

PROBIE # 258 - mission - LISTENING

POB on the 12th 1941 BOMB

- HEAD OF THE PROJECT - MINISTRY

~~TRANSPORTATION~~ ^{TRANSPORTATION WITH THE 2nd DIVISION} - ~~ARMY~~ ^{ARMY} MOUNTAIN

- THE PROJECT FOR UNDER THE

RESPONSIBILITY OF THE 550.

- HERBERT KAMR REC. COMMUNICATION

AND SENT IT THROUGH THE PRESIDENTIAL

SECRETARY, AND SENT IT THROUGH

THE PART TO CONFIRM THE INFO COLLECTED

IN THE INTEREST ~~RESEARCH~~

Case ID: 315E-HQ-14485 (S) 1A Envelope

! DG 33 ! ORIGINAL NOTES RE INTERVIEW OF IBRAHIM AL ANI #277
! BY SA [REDACTED] RE 315E-HQ-1448534

b6
b7C

RE INTER
CT RE

RE INTER
CT RE

RE INTER
CT RE

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 06/30/2004

IBRAHIM SAMIR AL ANI (BL #277), was interviewed at his place of residence, a military detention camp in Baghdad, Iraq by Supervisory Special Agent [redacted] and Special Agent [redacted] Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Providing translations during this interview were FBI Language Specialist, [redacted]. After being informed of the purpose of the interview, AL ANI provided the following information:

b6
b7C

AL ANI was born in 1957 in Baghdad, Iraq. [redacted]

[redacted] While AL ANI was growing up, his family lived in Ibril, al-Ramadi and Baghdad. [redacted]

AL ANI joined the Ba'ath party when he was twelve years old. When AL ANI was 22 years old, he joined the *Muhabarat*, an organization also referred to as the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS). His initial training included six months of intelligence trade craft followed by one month of weapons training. After the completion of this training, AL ANI was assigned to the Syrian Branch (M4) of the IIS in Baghdad. He worked in this position from 1979 through 1981. At the time, M4 was directed by a former military commander named IMAD AL-DURI. AL ANI's assignment was to collect information on Syria from individuals and documents.

Beginning in 1981, AL ANI served as a Labor Attache in the Iraqi Embassy in New Delhi, India for one year and two months. This position was administrative in nature. The Iraqi Ambassador was the chief of an eight-man ISS station there. AL ANI's primary responsibility was to collect information on labor matters and feed the information back to his headquarters. To accomplish this, he reviewed open source materials and met with Indian citizens and Iraqis living in India. Among this latter group were approximately 3000 college students, many of whom were children of Ba'ath Party officials. The relationship between the two countries was substantial. Prior to the Iran-Iraq war, there were approximately 150,000 Indian nationals working in Baghdad. Because the Indian

Investigation on 06/28/2004 at Baghdad, Iraq

File # 315E-HO-1448534 *int 104*

Date dictated _____

by

SA [redacted] *sc*b6
b7C

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Ibrahim Khalid Samir AL ANI, On 06/28/2004, Page 2

people were so open and talkative, AL ANI thought that his job was easy. At times, however, he felt that he was not really engaged in meaningful intelligence gathering even though overseas assignments were prestigious, had distinct financial benefits and enabled one to gain experiences which could be parlayed into future work opportunities.

AL ANI also characterized overseas postings as 'life-changing' experiences, not just professionally, but personally. While working in New Delhi, he fell in love with an Indian woman, but was prohibited from marrying her due to IIS regulations forbidding members from marrying foreign nationals. He claimed that when he explained this to the woman, she wrote a letter to former Iraqi President, SADDAM HUSSEIN. Apparently, this letter was not well received, and AL ANI was recalled from India and sent to a prison for government officials for one year and four months. The prison, located in Baghdad, was separate from the one housing common criminals. Harsh treatment and torture were generally not employed on detainees at this facility.

In 1985, after AL ANI was released from prison, the IIS assigned him to work in Karbala where he remained until 1989. His areas of operational responsibility included the nearby areas of Najaf, Hillah and Qadisiya. His supervisor was [REDACTED]. His primary responsibility was to work on counterterrorism and espionage matters. He managed a staff of thirty IIS officers. The IIS targeted primarily communists inside Iraq. AL ANI pointed out that since Iraqi citizens seldom worked, the labor pool was comprised mainly of expatriates from Europe, China and Romania. Since the vast majority of these individuals were interested only in working and not in committing espionage, AL ANI felt there were no real security issues, and as a consequence, he had limited opportunities to excel.

In 1989, AL ANI departed Karbala for a posting in M6, the Security Office in Baghdad. At the time, M6 was being run by his friend and mentor [REDACTED] for whom he had worked in India. M6 was responsible for maintaining security over people, documents, information, physical things and buildings. AL ANI specialized in building security for the entire country of Iraq. AL ANI stated that while he worked for M6, he did not have any contact with the Security Service Organization (SSO) which was a completely different unit run by Qusay HUSSEIN, son of former Iraqi President SADDAM HUSSEIN. AL-ANI's manager while he served with M6 was [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of Ibrahim Khalid Samir AL ANI, On 06/28/2004, Page 3

According to AL ANI, in approximately May 1990, SADDAM's half-brother SABAWI HUSSEIN, replaced AL-AZAWI as the Director of the IIS. Rumors began circulating that SABAWI was unhappy with AL ANI because he thought AL ANI had received his assignment to M6 only because of his relationship with AL-AZAWI. Around this time, an IIS officer named, [REDACTED] who was previously imprisoned by SABAWI, was released upon a Presidential Pardon that set free thousands of prisoners in preparation for the Gulf War. [REDACTED] was required to turn in his gear at the IIS office. AL ANI did not think it was right that this veteran should have to wait out in the street, so AL ANI invited him into his own office for tea and hospitality. Eventually, he gave [REDACTED] a ride home. This angered SABAWI who had AL ANI imprisoned for a month. Upon his release, AL ANI was dispatched to Kuwait in December 1990 for an assignment with M-5. Considering the military build up of coalition forces, orders to Kuwait seemed tantamount to a death sentence.

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AL ANI was initially sent to Kuwait City for about a month. From there he was transferred to the city of al-Jarah. Al-Jarah was described as an insignificant town, nearly half way between Basra and Kuwait City. Many stateless Iraqis resided there. AL ANI claimed that by the time AL ANI had arrived there, it was deserted. He headed up a small eight man ISS detachment, along with 10 soldiers. Two of the IIS officers there were known to him from previous assignments, [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] Once the bombing of their position started, AL ANI and the others set out to walk back to Basra, as all of their vehicles had been bombed. AL ANI and the others walked for three days back to Iraq. They arrived in Basra and commandeered a bus. With swollen feet and the effects of walking in the desert for three days, Al-Ani led 25 others on the bus drive back to Baghdad. AL ANI asserted that the Shi'a uprising started six hours after his departure from Basra. He noted that this fighting is often incorrectly referred to as an 'intifada.' Upon his arrival in Baghdad, he stayed in his house for 15 days recovering from his ordeal in the desert and receiving visitors. During this time there was no IIS work.

Between May 1992 - January 1993, AL ANI was assigned to M-5, Asia Section which covered the countries of Thailand, Malaysia, Japan, China, Taiwan and the Philippines. Following this, he returned to M6, Security Office, in Baghdad.

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Continuation of FD-302 of Ibrahim Khalid Samir AL ANI, On 06/28/2004, Page 4

AL ANI was asked about how the IIS handled extremists in Iraq. He answered that Islamic fundamentalists, especially Wahabists, were not allowed in Iraq. According to AL ANI, they were beginning to impose themselves in mosques, talking about their ideology to poor people in need of social services. Some established a small clinic to service the poor people, and they eventually moved to the universities to preach their Wahabist ideology. These activities by the Wahabists caught the attention of the IIS and the Ba'ath Party who decided to stop this movement by arresting its adherents. Thereafter, Wahabists were gathered up and sent back to their homes and their families were informed of their activities. AL ANI stated that the IIS only dealt with Wahabists inside Iraq. He claimed that the IIS did not know much about Usama Bin Laden, and that he never really heard of Bin Laden until after the tragic events of 9/11. AL ANI advised that IIS's intelligence collection efforts against the Wahabists included monitoring Friday prayers and developing sources of information.

As an example, AL ANI explained that if the IIS were given twenty names of suspected extremists, they would check these names against those in their files and then collect personal information on them. From this list, they would choose three or four individuals and formulate a recruitment plan for each of them. Various recruitment techniques were employed, including offering inducements of sex or money, using the influence of the family, or punishment and prison. The IIS would also conduct surveillance on suspects of particular interest.

AL ANI stated he was selected for this assignment because he had a clean record, was not corrupt and because his superiors thought he was the right person for the job.

In mid-1995, AL ANI was reassigned to M6. Shortly thereafter, he was assigned to M50 for eight months. ESSAM KHUDAR AL-DULAMI was the M50 chief. AL-DULAMI had served in Kuwait with AL ANI. He was selected to be the head of M50 because he was intelligent and well read. This assignment involved targeting any activities against Iraq. The groups they focused on were purporting to be nationalistic, but in actuality they were really interested in pursuing self-serving agendas. An example was the National Alliance, an organization comprising several Ambassadors who wanted to preserve the many benefits they had enjoyed over the years.

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Continuation of FD-302 of Ibrahim Khalid Samir AL ANI, On 06/28/2004, Page 5

In 1996 AL ANI was next assigned to the Public Relations section of M5. This was some of the best times he spent in the IIS. His job was to liaison with the owners of clubs and hotels. If the IIS needed special arrangements to accommodate an operation at such venues, AL ANI would use these contacts. He often received the benefits of getting to use the health clubs and pools at these hotels. He never got free meals as food was too expensive in those days. The draw back was that if he had to slap a manager, and SADDAM's son UDAY was friends with the manager, this could cause big problems. AL ANI never saw UDAY. If AL ANI heard that UDAY was coming to a club, he would leave.

In 1997, an IIS boss told AL ANI that he had a good job for him. It was with the IIS M7 Directorate of Investigations and Inquiries. The two groups to be investigated were Arabs and foreigners. The foreigners were almost exclusively Iranian, and this represented the bulk of the work. Rarely would they investigate an occasional Jordanian, Syrian or Yemeni. If a subject was picked up, he had to be brought immediately to Baghdad for interrogation. They were not allowed to initiate an interrogation until the subject was brought to Baghdad. An M7 judge would listen to the facts and decide if there was enough evidence to hold someone or move forward with the investigation. Every fifteen days, a national list was compiled of all the subjects detained by the IIS.

In 1999, AL ANI received an assignment to the Iraqi Embassy in Prague, Czech Republic. Some members of the IIS seek a career track that will set them up to be sent outside of Iraq for international service. Since his tour in New Delhi, AL ANI never had another chance for service outside of Iraq. He had a big family and a small house. An influential IIS boss who favored him had died. He had no specialty that was needed overseas. Despite this, he was finally accepted for overseas duty. He received orders to Greece. In the end, he passed these orders onto a colleague who was more interested in this assignment, and instead accepted the assignment to Prague.

AL ANI spent time preparing for his assignment by reading files and reports for ten days. It was a one-man IIS office. The embassy had a Charge d'affaires (an actual diplomat) from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a financial officer, an administrative officer and two IIS guards whose exclusive duty was security. The guards at all Iraqi embassies are employees of the IIS. The Charge's name was KHALIL IBRAHIM HUSSEIN. The guards slept in the

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building and provided security for the Ambassador but did not conduct regular intelligence collection operations. The previous IIS chief in Prague, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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The Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared a passport in the name of AHMED KHALIL SAMIR AL-ANI. The IIS had the capability of preparing false passports, but this was a genuine diplomatic passport made with a deliberate modification in AL ANI's name.

The Czech Republic was a small, poor and weak country. AL ANI expected his assignment to be easy. There were several categories of ethnic Iraqis (non-Ba'athists) living in the country. There were the communists who left Iraq for the former Czechoslovakia who were then in their seventies or older. There were Iraqi university students who were enrolled in school. There were others, who married Czechs, returned to Iraq, but then departed the country during the days of economic sanctions and the war. Some of these individuals opened up businesses exporting Czech crystal.

AL ANI described his operational mission as having three collection components and three tiers of targets. The collection priorities were political, economic and military intelligence. Tier one targets were Iranian, Syrian and Israeli nationals. Tier two targets were the Gulf Arab countries, the United States and United Kingdom nationals. Tier three targets were those involving nationals from Asian countries such as China, Taiwan, Philippines and Thailand. AL ANI considered the collection priorities to be easy. He could gather much of his information from newspapers and off of the internet. Since IIS headquarters (HQ) was primarily concerned with information on targets from tier one countries, AL ANI chose to focus on these. He felt it important to comply with whatever HQ asked of him in order to prevent them from discontinuing his IIS position in Prague. AL ANI was concerned that if AL ANI did not produce adequate results, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs might fill his position with one of their own employees.

AL ANI liked living in the Czech Republic and enjoyed good relationships with members of the Egyptian and Syrian embassies. AL ANI considered himself to be very skillful in interacting with people, and he believes this enabled him to become successful in his job. Some of the individuals whom he met inside the embassy were ones who came to obtain passports or simply to

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visit. Occasionally, he met university students. Using his cover as a Consular Officer, he met various individuals at diplomatic functions. Sometimes, he met Syrians who had taken up residence in Prague. Coffee shops and restaurants became excellent venues for obtaining information and developing potential sources. Czech nationals were great sources of useful information. About a quarter of the individuals with whom he interacted were opposed to the Iraqi regime, and about a quarter were supportive of it. He would pass along such information to M50.

AL ANI would receive specific tasking from IIS HQ. Sometimes this tasking would require him to check on travelers passing through immigration at the airport. The most unique tasking that AL ANI received occurred after he returned from a 15-day road trip with his family from Prague to Baghdad. Upon reporting to his office, AL ANI was admonished by his supervisor for not requesting permission to make such a trip. Several weeks later, in approximately October 2000, this supervisor informed AL ANI that the Director of the IIS wanted to speak with him. During the subsequent meeting, the IIS chief requested that AL ANI transport some things to embassies in Ankara, Bucharest and Prague. He learned that these 'things' were three RPG-7s (rocket propelled grenade launchers). He realized that in transporting these weapons through several countries there would be a substantial risk. Despite this, he agreed to transport the weapons. To ensure that AL ANI fully understood the risks, his superiors asked him what he would do if he was caught. AL ANI answered that he would blame himself and lead authorities to believe that he was an independent black-market arms trafficker. Special modifications were then made to AL ANI's vehicle such as outfitting it with secret panel compartments in order to accommodate the weapons.

AL ANI was told that the reason these weapons were being delivered was to increase the weapon's inventory at the embassies. Iraqi embassies were already stocked with pistols. During the days of the Iran-Iraq war, gunfights between embassy staff and Iranians would sometimes break out. After 1987, Iraqi President, SADDAM HUSSEIN, ordered that weapons be sent by diplomatic pouch to the Iraqi embassies. AL ANI never saw any silencers at the embassies where he served or visited. As diplomats, Iraqi embassy staff members would sometimes obtain a local license to purchase weapons. When staff members completed their embassy assignments, they would often leave their weapons at the embassy.

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AL ANI was asked if he recognized that a shoulder-fired grenade launcher has only offensive purposes. He understood this even as he received his tasking. However, the only explanation he was given was that they were to be brought to augment the weapon's inventory at the embassies. No further account or plan was given. Asked if he thought this mission was designed by an overambitious manager or someone higher, AL ANI answered that this must have come for someone very high in the government. He believed that the Director of the IIS did not have the latitude to make such decisions. If the IIS wanted to kill someone in Beirut, they could not just do it at a whim. There was a process for seeking authorization and control over these actions. AL ANI knew that SADDAM sometimes made impetuous decisions. He thought that whoever ordered the delivery of these weapons was unwise.

While returning to Prague by car, AL ANI drove fast and arrived in Ankara in November 2002 and stayed at a friend's house. The IIS chief in Ankara did not know that AL ANI would be arriving or making a delivery to the embassy. During the four days that AL ANI remained in Ankara, he talked very little about the RPGs with the Ankara IIS chief. AL ANI claimed he was not interested in the weapons or how they were to be used. He presumed they would be used against specific targets, but he did not know who these targets may be. The Ankara IIS chief called AL ANI a 'donkey' for carrying the unneeded RPG-7s all the way from Baghdad to Ankara in his car. AL ANI did not telephone anyone during his brief stay in Ankara. From there, he traveled to Sophia, Bulgaria, arriving three days later. The IIS Chief in Sofia was [REDACTED]. After leaving Sofia, AL ANI traveled for five days before arriving in Bucharest. When the IIS chief there [REDACTED] learned what AL ANI had brought to Romania, he stayed away from the office for two days. Upon arrival in Prague, AL ANI unloaded the last RPG-7 and secured it in a safe in his office.

During his tour in Prague, AL ANI made more than fifty trips to the airport. On two of these occasions, he flew out himself. The first occasion was when he flew home on leave on flights through Amsterdam, Beirut and Amman. He received permission to fly home again in January 2001. His other visits to the airport were to 1) send off or receive the Iraqi Charge d'affaires or members of the Charge's family, 2) receive arriving diplomatic pouches and 3) collect official visitors. However, he could not recall any of the official visitor's names. When he made these trips to the airport, he would sign up for a security badge,

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leaving his own ID card as collateral. He was never issued a permanent airport badge.

When he first arrived in Prague, AL ANI used his embassy stipend to purchase a vehicle. Ministry of Foreign Affairs regulations allowed for overseas officials to draw \$4,000 toward the purchase of a vehicle. After a year, the vehicle could be turned in and resold. AL ANI used this vehicle to travel throughout the Czech Republic to the tourist area of Byrno. AL ANI also traveled extensively outside the Czech Republic, making more than fifty trips. Some of his travel included trips to Turkey and to Warsaw for two days (where he visited the embassy) and to Budapest for a holiday with two Iraqi male associates.

AL ANI discussed the problems he encountered as a result of his involvement in the Radio Free Europe (RFE) surveillance incident. A documentary, which aired on Al-Jazeera television network, contained footage of the entire RFE facility, including its interior and exterior. Some Iraqi dissidents worked at this station. If anyone in the Iraqi government or IIS had serious intentions about collecting targeting information at this facility, they would have found it difficult to locate or record more detailed footage than what Al-Jazeera broadcasted.

AL ANI had previously received a special tasking to take surveillance photos of this facility. At the time, he wondered why this was being requested. First, he doubted that anyone in Iraq understood how large this facility was. It was not a target which could be easily destroyed. He speculated that the initiative may have been the result of bureaucratic posturing. He explained that it was not uncommon in the IIS for managers to sound off with anti-U.S. or anti-Iran rhetoric in the presence of superiors in order to curry favor. Sometimes, these individuals would feel compelled to back up their rhetoric by assigning operational tasks. Whoever ordered the surveillance of the RFE may have done so simply to present an image that they were being operationally responsive regarding their defense of the Regime. In actuality, the mission had little utility.

Nevertheless, as a loyal member of the IIS, AL ANI delegated this assignment to one of the IIS guards. (He would later be reprimanded for this decision which was not authorized by IIS operational regulations.) Ultimately, this surveillance caused the Czech government to contact the Iraqi Charge d'Affairs and demand that Al-Ani depart the country in seventy-two hours. At the

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time of this event, AL ANI's second wife was visiting with their children. Within a few days, they were all on a plane back to Baghdad.

AL ANI was asked if he ever had any operational relationship with Islamist elements. He recalled an occasion in 1999 when the Charge d'affaires wanted AL ANI to travel to a location near Byrno in order to meet with the head of a group which was similar to an Islamic *Al-Ittihad* (Unity) or *Ih'whan* (Brotherhood). The purpose was for general posterity. Unfortunately, the head of this group was elderly, and he did not have any meaningful influence or status over the group. In the end, the meeting never took place.

While serving in Prague, AL ANI was never recruited, nor was he ever approached by Islamists. He was aware that some Chechans lived in Prague, but he never met them. His dealings with Egyptians were limited to those whom he knew from diplomatic circles. In his position as the Counselor General for Iraq, he met many individuals through his embassy connections. Prague was populated by young Egyptians, some of whom were involved in drug trafficking. The only Egyptian with whom he was friendly was an individual who sold vehicles to embassy personnel. AL ANI did not know any Egyptian university students. He never tried to recruit Europeans. AL ANI advised that as of June 2000, he was still living in Prague. He denied ever meeting anyone in a bus station.

AL ANI was asked if he had ever met an Egyptian named MUHAMMAD ATTA. This was a subject which AL ANI had spent more than thirty minutes speaking about with his previous interviewers. The first he had ever heard of this subject was when a friend called him, having seen a news story. At that time, he was very surprised to hear that a 9/11 hijacker was associated with travel to Prague. When he heard that his own name was being linked with that tragic event, he knew there would be problems. As this story began to escalate, AL ANI made several unsuccessful attempts to persuade the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to issue a statement addressing the issue and correcting the inaccuracy, especially since it had brought him much unwanted attention. To this day, AL ANI is bothered by this matter. He denied ever meeting MUHAMMAD ATTA. He claimed he never saw or heard of ATTA until after his face was shown on the news.

AL ANI recalled that in October 2002, the IIS received a request from the Jordanian Intelligence Service (GID) to locate

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five individuals suspected of being involved in the murder of an American diplomat in Amman, LAWRENCE FOLEY, and the attempted assassination of a GID officer, Colonel [REDACTED]. A written order was passed from IIS Headquarters to M-5 to locate these individuals. One of the five, [REDACTED] was thought to be living with his wife at the home of his sister-in-law in the Hathra (Green City) section of Baghdad. AL ANI knew that once [REDACTED] or others were captured, he and other M-7 officers would conduct the interrogations.

AL ANI, together with approximately twelve other M5 and M7 officials, participated in [REDACTED] arrest. When he was picked up, [REDACTED] did not have a passport and was in possession of a false identification card. He was believed to have entered Iraq through Syria. A search of his premises revealed a computer, CDS containing religious material and a Kalishnikov rifle. AL ANI was not aware if the IIS pulled any information off this computer. Before [REDACTED] was escorted away from the arrest site, he gave his wife \$700 in cash. He was then transported to an M7 detention facility where he remained for approximately 10-12 days. During that time, AL ANI and others, including the Director of M7, HAITHAM KHALIL AL-RAWI, interrogated [REDACTED] several times. Prior to conducting these interviews, however, AL ANI read through the information provided by Jordanian authorities which outlined the case against [REDACTED]. After reading it, he believed that [REDACTED] was probably guilty.

AL ANI described [REDACTED] as a tall, angry, impolite and strong-headed individual who was approximately twenty-five years old. Although [REDACTED] acknowledged that he was hiding from Jordanian authorities, he adamantly denied culpability in either the murder of LAWRENCE FOLEY or the attempted assassination of Colonel [REDACTED]. He stated that Jordanian authorities had arrested his father, and he claimed that they were now falsely accusing him of committing crimes. He believed that because his father was a well-known Salafist, the Jordanians were attempting to associate [REDACTED] with these crimes.

AL ANI discussed [REDACTED] religious beliefs and learned that [REDACTED] considered himself to be a Salafist Sunni, which is a fundamentalist offshoot of mainstream Islam. AL ANI, who has interviewed many religious extremists during his career, including Wahabists, initially thought [REDACTED] may be affiliated with Salafia Islamiya. However, after conducting several interviews of [REDACTED] AL ANI believed he had more of a political agenda than a genuine

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religious commitment. Although [] denied being affiliated with Al Qaeda or Al ZARQAWI, AL ANI was convinced that the evidence amassed by the Jordanians against [] was compelling. For this reason, he was shocked when the Director of M5 ordered that [] be released. He could not understand why this order was being issued, especially since he considered [] to be a killer. AL ANI favored returning [] to Jordan, if for no other reason than to convince critics of Iraq that the country did not support terrorists. The Director of M7, HAITHEM KHALIL AL RAWI, arranged for a meeting with the Director of the IIS, TAHIR HABBUSH, in order to discuss these concerns. During a subsequent meeting, HABBUSH informed HAITHEM and AL ANI that the President of Iraqi, SADDAM HUSSEIN, had ordered him (HABBUSH) to release []. Following this, AL ANI reluctantly released [] to M5 officers. He claimed that this was his last involvement with [].

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AL ANI could not recall the names of the four associates of [] being sought by the Jordanians. He related that M5 officers suspected they may be hiding in northern Iraq and may well have connections with AL ZARQAWI. However, the IIS were reluctant to pursue leads in a region where they had no operational control. When asked if he had any information to suggest that [] release was the result of a pay off by AL ZARQAWI, AL ANI said this was preposterous. He thought it equally ludicrous that the IIS would have had any involvement with Al Qaeda or AL ZARQAWI.

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number

315E-HQ - 1448534-1A33

Field Office Acquiring Evidence

Serial # of Originating Document

Date Received

From

IBRAHIM AL ANI

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

(City and State)

By

To Be Returned ☐ Yes

☐ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes

☐ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes

☐ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes

☐ No

Title:

DESER 7 SPIDER
I7 - HQ

Reference:

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description:

☐ Original notes re interview of

IBRAHIM AL ANI

277

Jun
6/27/04

IBRAHIM SAMIR al-AWI # 277

Not religious

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
Joined IIS at 22 yr old while in school
6 mos training in IIS matters; 1 month
training in military matters, ie: shoot guns.
m-y

Eventually got overseas postings to India
Basically being overseas had several advantages:

- Change your life
- make more \$
- prestige
- good experience
for future work

While in India, admin responsibility - not engaged
in muhabat activities. met people, other Iraqis.
HQ would send at a glance to muhabat.

We collect info, analyze - If As imp
we send it to President via Presid. Secretary
eg: we want all info re: publicly
Iran-Iraq war



left IIS

" 90%

②


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Execution near Republic Palace - At military facility
"Party Court"

Thinks only 40% of "conspirators" guilty - 60% innocent

Trinidad - worked in LABOR - got into from Indians
While in India, fell in love w/ Indian woman

She wanted to marry + he was not allowed - She wrote
letter to President -  put me in jail - b6
a white hand jail at ARMS Club - No torture b7C

After 1 yr 4 mos. I was released -

~~RA - INDIAN Section~~

Then Assigned to IIS - Indian Section

Then M-S to Khabala which included

Najaf

Hilath

Radis

my boss



b6

b7C

I ~~collected~~ worked counter-espionage
European + Communist, Chinese +
Pondian workers

Like Sander, Iraqis didn't work -

I was no screen for

no real security issues - most people
came to work -

any real work in Baghdad, Basra, etc.

~~Had~~ Had staff of 30 officers

1985 - married Um

Family left in Baghdad - lived w
Kashala + lived it

1985 Left Kashala

Amgari became head of Mukhabarat

State job to MG -

Security Office + Arg

MG - Hussein Al Juma al Duri

→ People

→ Documents

→ Information

→ Physical (Things)

→ Buildings

Specialized in Buildings.

4

• Respectfully for all building security in all
Iraq.

• We had no contact w/ Security Svc (Osama
Hussein)
worked here 1989-90

@ May '90

Sabawi replaced [redacted]
Rumors abounded that [redacted]
had hired me

Sabawi didn't like this, had
me put in prison for a month and then
sent to Kuwait.

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b7C

[redacted] was a
Muslim about 10 yrs. ends of 80s had
sided w/ Sabawi. Sent to prison.

This guy came to turn in his
gear & then I drove him home.
But then I was punished.

5

I was sent to prison for one month +
then was sent to Kuwait. -

① November 90

✱ Began working for M-5 -

Sent to an isolated Area - desert
was b/w Basra + K Al Jura

me + 7 others + 10 soldiers

Small police station

I was there @ Kuwait @ a month

1/51 Arrived Kuwait in Dec 90

Stayed only 3 mos.

In Baghdad in Aug '90

March 1992 -

6

I joined m5 - Asia - ~~I~~

Thailand
Malaysia

Japan + China

Taiwan

Philippines

I stayed 9 mos. w/ m-5.

(Jan 93) I returned to security office (M6)
in Baghdad

M6 - Jan 93 - Mar 95

From 89 - to this ~~position~~ ~~from~~ ~~1993-95~~
1993-95, I had same
title + no promotion.

Question re: extremists returning home.

7

• Islam & politics not allowed in Iraq

Q Example 7 Wahabist Activity

- Started impose themselves in mosque
- Started to talk about ideology
 - " social svcs to attract poor people - some estab a small clinic to service the people. Then they moved to the universities.

- Baath ptg and general Secy

Baath ptg made a law which had to stop this movement & arrested!

- Said Wahabists were sent back to home + told families told

- Says he only deal Huf and Araae

of Fogi's who are withabists

• We didn't deal w/ those outside
of Izg - Only within Izg
At that time we didn't know
a lot abt it, UBL etc. -

• UNT 9/11, I had heard from ~~the~~ it.

• Collection of Filigree
at Friday squares

Muhabacks

General Security

Mohitay Dinkell

9

If an Iraqi joins a group,
then he will have to drop
of his family.

~~Scout~~

Yes, agree that security keeps an eye
on these people.

we. We get 20 names - we try to
connect all the names
we collect personal info on them.

We then choose 3 or 4 of them &
make a plan for each one.

We bring to office

sex - we then have 3rd
~~stage~~ from the other group
we recruit them

mid 1995 my assignment in M6

Then to M-50 - for ~~2 1/2~~ ^{2 1/4} months

Targeting and Activities against Drug

These groups were not nationalists but they were preaching for their own cause.

ie: National Alliance

3 of them were Ambassadors from Bahrain etc.
They wanted to extend the good deal they had

ISSAAS (from Kuwait) was the head of this job? He was chosen b/c he was a very smart guy. He had read too much about - He was well read - The best IIR Intel officer. This is the one they selected to run M-50.

This is the first time IIR had so many groups

11

25 yrs ago, he was ~~proved~~ to be a
member of Ba'ath pty.

I joined Ba'ath pty ^{when I was} ~~after the 1975~~
12 yrs old -

Q: Why your service last only 8 mos.

A: ^{He} Feels he hasn't done thing wrong

He spec

We want info - ~~Intell people~~ people

we give people \$, Problem of IQ
sources wanting \$ when they
haven't done anything.

The above occurred @ ~~1975~~ (96)?

IQ, Intell ^{for} engaged in public
relations

I got to sample all the clubs
in Baghdad.

12

If a person of interests comes to a hotel, my duties are coordinately w/ the hotel The General Mgr of hotel who give us benefits like pool passes.

I stayed for five months

If I deal w/ mgr by splanning ~~the~~ a manager, I would have major problem.

We had good contacts in hotel + food. This was helpful for work + for play.

I got pitched for 3 Reasons

- 1 - I Am clean - no corruption
- 2 - changed the staff
- 3 - he thinks I Am Good for this job.

1997

13

2 Branches

Death of
Arab people

from Arab people

1999 to Czech Republic

- Some Muhabat sent outside Iraq in another country.
- I never had the chance
- I had big family
- Muhabat boss, now deceased.
- I had only small house
- They refused to let me outside Iraq
- I had no speciality and

14

Firstly offered Greece

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

arrays passport

Ahmed Khalil Samir Al Arzi

Q Can mukhabat forge passports?

A yes

Q Head, Prague & Staff
one - me

A Before ~~me~~ JASAR Khalil

He went to Germany

Had family w/ him.

Q Amba at time?

Charged Affairs, a diplomat

K. Ibrahim Hussein

5 worked at embassy

2 guards - security

2

1 Charge Affairs

5

all ~~say~~ guards in all embassies are mukhab

15

Q Preparation before going to Czech

A I read for @ 10 days before going

Q Perceptions

A A poor, weak country, very small
~~So, I'm thinking~~ it won't be an easy job
here.

A No relationship b/w Eng + Czech
300 Ig people

~~some dissidents~~

Q & Communists - @ 75 yrs.

and some students who

studied in Czech who

returned and opened

a business i.e. crystal

Q what is your job?

A My plan for

3 levels of market

1. Israel SYRIA Israel

2. Arab countries, USA, British Gulf

3. Not Industrial - Philippines Thailand
Czech Rwanda

And I have 16 cover are 3 points

- Political
- Economic
- Military

I can pull up stuff on internet
My work there is not difficult.

For Tier one, my goals was

For Dran + Israel + Syria I
must do what HQ asked me.

These were the only ones I
cared about. ~ I received
~~Receives~~ orders via mail every 2 mos
via diplomatic channels

I have friends, in Czech
Republic. If we don't produce,
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
will take over our job.

17

I would meet w/ people ^{inside or outside} and
then write reports.

LEVELS OF CONTACTS

1. People come to embassy & visit us.
2. Some ~~of people and~~ students
3. From Syria, ~~that~~

• In Czech Rep. not everyone in Baath Party.

Not all embassies

• I write to the ~~the~~ people.

After second war + embargo,
they returned to their ^{family} ~~land~~ ^{land}

I would meet ^{away from office} →
cafe shop
Restaurants

18

A: What info could these countries give you?
re: CZ Republic - I didn't much,

Q: 20-25% don't like regime of IQ
20-25 against regime

M 50

Q: Were some of them raising \$?

Q: What tasks would he give you?

Eg: He wanted me
check out people at immigration.

* Ministry of Foreign Affairs would
or not?

Q Were there other resp. besides
collecting information?

A One time in 2000
my family came to visit me
& stayed 2 mos.
mother & 2 boys

I decided to return to the
by car - good chance
for him to see country
& had to go to base of Mukhtar
I went to say hello to head
of Mukhtar.

• Trip took 15 days & I got back
no permission

After 2-3 weeks, Gen. Ngn

20

October 2000

Gen mgr said boss of Muktawat
wanted to talk w/ me



b6
b7C

• They told me, we would like to
give you some duty as long as you are
coming by ~~the~~ car.

• They said they had an assignment
for me - I said I was
ready.

I said I'm ready - They said go back to HQ,
in Turkey;

Romania;
Czech Repub.;

• They told me to take 3 RPG-7's.
~~RPG-7's~~

• I had to cross 11 borders
but I said yes.

Q. ~~They~~²¹ asked, if I am caught,
what I will do? I said
I would take blame myself

A I took all 3 for each embassy

~~In~~ last few years, too much
talking.

~~Told~~ me to take secret photos of
Israel, Saudi, Kuwait, British, US.

Mukhabarat compile ^{History of} ~~its~~ past and
accomplishments

→ This was not an ordinary duty
of mine

22

WAS THE RPG-7'S ? - was this planned ?

(1) Saddam made impetuous decision

(2)

The order comes down from Saddam based on planning or based on an impetual decision.

Was it the brainchild of a career climber?

FIS Directorate does not have the latitude to decide

(c) if we want to kill someone in Beirut, we (FIS) are allowed to do it,

• the Samir

23

- RPG-7's hidden under seats
- Deputy Murkhant Storkin knew I was bringing them.

- I drove fast in it - Arrived Nov/2000
- when I picked RPG '7
they told me they wanted
to keep in the embassy.
Lot of ppl in all embassies.
I couldn't take gun out of embassy.

~~11/2000~~

Stayed in Ankara
Stayed w/ friends
~~He~~ Head of ~~the~~ Murkhada in
Ankara did not know I had RPG '7's
He didn't know I was coming.
I stayed only 4 ~~days~~ in Ankara

After 1987 - order by Pres. not
to carry weapons by diplomatic mail

24

But we didn't talk about it.

At the time, I was not interested
in the weapons or how they were
used.

This guest said it would be
used against specific targets.

"He said are you a donkey" to bring
these RPG's to Czech.
We don't need it

Left Ankara for Bucharest.

Q WAS Boss in Bucharest Expedy pr? (100)

I didn't use telephone
at that time

Ankara - Sofia (x 3 days)

Sofia - Bucharest (5 days)


Hungary - Slovakia

to Czech BRUBURO

25

• He didn't come to the Embassy in
two days.

• Name of Chief in Cuba



b6
b7C

Q Name muchakhat ~~set~~ in Hungary
A wasn't one there

Q where did you put RFG?

A In office

I put in safe in my room in office at Prague

~~April 2051~~
I was PNG'd - I returned on airline
to Baghdad

26

Stayed at tower hotel in Prague @ 3x

I made two trips to Airport,

~~the first~~

1st trip to Airport

KLm to Amsterdam - Lebanon - Jordan

2nd trip to Airport

JAN 2001, to

I got permission to go

Guests, diplomats & carriers, I don't

can't recall names now.

I didn't a security badge permanently
issued to me. But must return badge
when work is completed.

Says he'd gone to the airport more
than 50 times.

27

Q Ever TRAVEL outside PRIME?

A YES ~~was~~ 12

A Went to Turkey
more than 30 countries

Czech Republic - ~~the~~^{the} most beautiful in world

After 3 dys I bought a car b/c

Embassy gives us \$4000 for a
car to be turned in in one year. b6
b7C

Usually I go to Borno b/c lots
of ID people -

I went to Poland by car for 2 days.
I went to Embassy.

I went to Budapest on holiday of
two Engi guys

RADIO Free Europe

DA JAZZERS wrote story about
offices there

Tragi. people working there

I know a few people work there.

28

I took some photos of the building
I have video of

Q Who took the photos?

Two guards actually took the
photos.

Guards being around other
individuals

~~Relative to Airport~~

Any relationship of Exec Intel

Syrian Emban

Egyptian Embassy

Any he enjoyed a good relationship
w/ some of them.

29

Were there any discussions ~~at~~ cocktail parties

1999 Check Islammz United

The charged Affairs wanted me to ~~go~~ go hear Borno

Q: While in Prague, were you ever approached by anyone?

A: NO

Q: Did someone approach you and say he needed help?

A: sometime Chaynig people come to her

30

Ever receive any Aish

[] From []

b6
b7C

Stayed in Germany

Came to Embassy
Bought Cars for staff

As new counsel, he came to visit me

Yes there are a number of Egyptians there
in Prague. They sometimes
die by drugs

I only know those working in Embassies

• Never met any Egyptian students

Q: Ever try to recruit anyone from Europe?

A: No

31

Q: Mohammed Atta

A: We spoke for @ 1/2 hour.
↳ (me + interviewers)

~~Someone~~ Someone called me ^{and said I}
met w/ Mohamad Atta in Prague
Furcas surprised

I

32

Q. In June 2000, what were you doing in Prague.

Q Did you travel during millennium

Feb 2000

M 2000

A 2000

M 2000

A

June/2000

Aug

} my family came to visit me

Q Did not anyone at bus station

BREAK

33

72 Hours to LV PRAGUE

CZECH'S CALLED CHAD 'D ATTORNS
and gave me 72 Hours to LV
PRAGUE

[REDACTED]

Sent A LTR TO
THE MUKHAR BOSS SAYING ~~IF~~
~~SENT~~ SOMETHING NOT GOOD ABOUT ME.

[REDACTED]

COULDN'T HELP ME
B/C IN JAIL — I WAS

SENT TO TRAINING UNIT OF

AIRPORT ROAD — BIG White Bldg —

teaching young STUDENTS

I WAS teaching security

[REDACTED]

SAID I Can't go to a
new post

I stayed a year

The project appointed a group to
investigate \$ in RM7 —
mismanaged. ~~than~~

b6
b7C

Guard [redacted] was
among this group. It had been w
me -

~~outside~~
~~2002~~

2002
in
Bagh

In his interview, he said the
problems began when I was in
M7

The Presid said they should talk
w/ me. [redacted] asked why I
was at the Training Inst. That
it was for old men.

b6
b7C

@ this time, an order from
Husseini to release all
prisoners. It was not good.

Beginning 2003, - Back to M6
[redacted] said to return to M6

b/c not enough work in M7
I work for 3 mos & then was happens
in M6

M6 work involved

35

Personal security - essentially

we help mark others who
they have problems, i.e.
too many women, or other
distractions, that keep them
from being able to work.

March '03

Grass house in Baghdad

at M7 - two parts

PART 1

Iraqis

- 250%

PART 2

Foreigners &

- 75%

other
Arabs



Jordanian named [redacted]

b6
b7C

M5 (chase spy) chased after him (can't recall name) (but thinks he's quite famous)

This fellow is one of 5 individuals who came to IQ. ~~M5~~ caught him, gave him to M7 for ~~investigation~~ and interrogation. M5 had a written order - They caught him in Green city in Baghdad

Caught him in his sister in law's house

M5 brought him + file to me - I saw the file - Re two cases in Jordan

his father a teacher in the college
He stayed w/ M7 @ 6 days

Not polite, angry guy - denied

said he was A Salafat Sunni but
Jordanian Govt put him in this case.

37

He acknowledged he was hiding from
Jordanian govt.

I said we must send him back to Jordan

I believed he was involved b/c I

needed the court + newspaper

I wrote a report to

to TATIR Habbush

and to

to HATHEN who agreed (my boss)

2 Assisted me in the interrogate

(1) HATHEN

(2)

The next day, they turned back the
paper to us not back to us.

Another said the boss of MUHH said
to release this man.

HATHEN and me refused, especially me.
I said this was a killer - I said let's send
him to Jordan so people could say I &

does something right.

My boss, Martin in m7, called
Habbus, said we want to talk w/ him.
I urged him to be sent to

Habbus said he discussed w/
the President who ordered him
to release him.

MS guys took him

Habbush said,
"I am sorry, I can't change the order
It was the President's order." A1

Haithem + I

then released this man ~~and~~ to
two MS guys who said they
would take him to his house in
The Green city in Baghdad.

Q Did you have any conversation w/
MS men?

A No, after case, it's not allowed
for us to ask Q.

Abu Yusif

410

Q: Tell us why you thought he was involved?

A: I read Jordanian report.

had a computer, religious literature + Katsinikov
more political than religious ~~books~~

Traveled to Syria

thinks he traveled from Jordan - Syria - Baghdad

tall @ 25 y old

Strong head

Denied culpability

Father was arrested by Jordanians as well

I'm sure he had some friends in DA

Said he had no contact w/ AQ
but I don't believe him

I asked him about Zargawi

The Jordanians sent over the names of

@ 4 or 5 other individuals supposedly

w/ Abu Yusuf - AA-5 said a couple

them were in northern DA + associated

of Al Zargawi

<p>W. hen arrested, ^{no} passport; a false ID card</p>	
---	--

Like one boy + wife

Q. no concern that \mathbb{A}^1 in \mathbb{A}^0

But there is no god in the north

Dort steht bei in Satisfra Islanya

I'm sure he was political in religious

42

Q I know about

NO

Before Jordanian?

Q Any Evidence Link b/w AQ or ATROAWI?

Q DID IZS have a relationship w/

?

b6
b7C

Q DID [] PLAY A Role in his release?

Q DID you know or suspect THAT when
you released him he would attack
Coalition forces?

Q WHY DIDN'T IA Notif Jordan?

A . wants [redacted] to support him

Q ~~Do you think~~ [redacted] would SAODAM Hussein do?

govt 7 to support Islamic ext
in food business

b6
b7C

[redacted] not from AQ
[redacted] French [redacted]

e Thinks that SAODAM felt,
"Don't make Islamic people
in Jordan angry by
handing [redacted] back
to them.")

e Thinks SAODAM did 7 want
Muslim thinking to turn Muslims
over.

IBRAHIM,

277

- BAGHDAD

1957

Date

No.

85'

99'

b6
b7C



FATHER


- OFFICER in POLICE / 40 years

BAGHDAD,

IBRAHIM, AL RAMADAN 6th class 12 years

1 IL IBRAHIM 1970 - BAGHDAD

b6
b7C



- Follows father; simple

- 22 single; in service

- MUHLABARAT: 79 / BARZAN WAS DEPUTY

TRAINING 1) MUHLABARAT 6 months Basic etc-

1) month patrol, gun, Baghdad

1) DEPARTMENT OF SYRIA, no choice

MY SYRIAN BRANCH

IMAD AL OUN.

1-5 years

Became from MILITARY

- TAKE INFORMATION from

PEOPLE, DOCUMENTS

②

2) NEW DELHI, good mind

STAR 80/80

understanding people

No.

style
relationship, read much, talk with
well food.



b6
b7C

- 1 year 2 months / C.O.S.
- Ambassador was station chief
- Big hotel in New Delhi, two or three weeks
8 office
- IRAQ / IRAN war 2 or 3
- LABOUR ATTACHE 150,000 Indian
- Station Administrative work
 - Embassy and ISLAMIC PEOPLE
 - INDIA [POLITICAL, MILITARY SECURITY]
 - IRAN [8000 ARAB STUDENTS]
 - TOOK MANY IRANIAN ACTIVITIES BETWEEN
ACTIVITIES?
- CHANCE TO CHANGE YOUR LIFE
- Good money
- FAMOUS in OFFICE, PASSAGE
- Good chance to do work in different
experience:
- EMBASSY RELATIONS; ^{meet} Embassy hotels, pool
MARKET
- ALL ARAB WERE OUR FRIENDS

(3)

[REDACTED]

WANTED TO BE UICC

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

of Syria ^{DELE} THE #2

PARADES in revolution

RESPONSIBLE FOR ARRESTING PEOPLE AND POWER
MISSTATION

CRUELTY / When you come to work, you
didn't know if you go home alone

90% STAYING OUT AT NIGHT [REDACTED]

10% MISTAKES SPEND ALL THE TIME IN HIS
OFFICE, DO GOOD WORK, HE GIVE YOU MONEY, DON'T
DO GOOD WORK. STRONG PUNISHMENT
24 SPEAK WITH DIPLOMATIC MAN TO BUY WORKING
CIRCLE, EVERYONE IS STRONG, NO BETTER
FOLLOWERS BY 100 DISTANCE

SHORT, 1000 BATH PARTY THAT START
HIM;

④

3/4 year 70m

1.2

1984

Date

No.

[Redacted]

ALL ARAB + FUSION / CORPANT

1985:

[Redacted]

family

1989

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

MG

1989

[Redacted]

→ BAHADAO

1990

[Redacted]

LEAVES

SABAWI HA

↓ ATMG

MAY

3 months before
invasion

4

SABAH P-7 MAN, n PR-SD

No.

PRESENT PARO

DIAGNOSIS n BAIL

[REDACTED]

10

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

M-5

1M

DECEMBER

Month (ORAL)

ACCORD

WENT AS

PUNISHMENT

- Banning state

- AC - JARAH

BASAH

KLIA 17

Small 8 man branch

10 release

→ ORAL PEOPLE, STATES

LSF7 Dessert

CAR BOMBERS WALKED INTO THREE ADJ
BASED ~~M~~ END OF FEB 1991

What they order is no. 7)

~~4 S bus~~ BASRA 12:00 pm mid day depot
Ghous Air 1st L' INF. FROM STAFF
2 S BUS BAGDAD IBRAHIM, KUTAIT

Kuwaris sent to BACHIDAN
Some subjects Abuse, MATHS HARD

1572 MAY 25 [redacted] OFFICE STOLE GOLD WATCH
[redacted] TWO DAYS, KENNETH
WRITING [redacted] CENTRAL JAIL,
KENNETH PASSED TO POLICE

300, 400 ALL RETURNED BACK TO KUNAT

CAR SUMS [redacted] DEPT. ~ AND QUESTIONS
/ AGENTS & FORMS. CHAIRS U.S. + FRANCE

NO SPECIAL ATTY -6-

b6
b7C

5

Date

No.

- STATED AT MUHARRAM HQ FOR 15 DAYS, NO
WORK, RECOVER FROM WALK; RECOVERY AT HOUSE
HOUSE VISITS, TOGS SITUATION NOT GOOD, FROM OUTSIDE BACON

MA SABAWI SENT NASARUYA

MARCH → HSAS OF 10 MAN BRANCH + SOME
EXCESS 22, 23 MARCH, UPRIKA FINISHED
8 MONTHS ONLY

1) MA. SABAWI LEFT MUHARRAM

2)

AND

BOCI

b6
b7C

1992 MARCH BACON

SOUTH

M-S ASIA BRANCH : KUNSA THAILAND

MALAYSIA, INDONESIA

QUIET, ALL LEFT AFTER WAR START CHINA

TAIWAN, PHILIPPINES

9 months

1992/1993

M/6

BACON

6

95

1975 LEAVE BUILDING SECURITY

M-6

Date

No.

[Redacted]

WARRIS 707 70 DO 57-84 BEFORE
CURRENT WAR

MOSQUES, DRESS, DISCOUNT, SOLAR SERVICES
SMALL CLINIC, UNIVERSITIES

AMN

b6
b7C

- GENERAL SS-MY

- BATH PART, MAJOR DECISION AMN

- ANNOTATED; P-7 in JAIL
- JAILERS from families
- TALK TO FAMILIES

1) [Redacted] ACCESS to MASS in MASSIC

2) [Redacted] LA-215 PRESSURE SECURITY

3) M-1

4) [Redacted]

5) [Redacted]

ESTIMATABLE

⑦

Choose someone from the ^{Date} group No.
get info from all the groups
20 names TRY to connect info from
names PARTY, SECURITY SERVICE

PERSONAL INFO

Choose 3 or 4. MAKE A PLAN FOR EACH
ONE

20, 2 months 95 min

M. SC

ESSAY

KUNGT BOSS

AC SHAT

AFTER WAR NEW groups final to see over
THROW CONGRESS

: NATIONAL IRAQI CONGRESS

:

BE AFTER ALL OF THESE GROUPS

GATHER THEM CASE FOR THEIR own INTEREST
RATHER THAN IRAQ, NOT FOR NATIONAL CAUSE

[Redacted]

8

chase him because door office

b6
b7C

Date

No.

[Redacted]

↳ M-SU too much money

Give me stamp; And more

1996

Next ASSIGNED PUBLIC RELATIONS M-S

Hotels, Clubs

1997

MUHAMMAD says I would like to
send you for gas, maintenance jobs.

~~THAT ANSWER~~

MUHAMMAD DISCREPANCY of INVESTIGATION
and inquiry

ARAB

FOREIGNERS

IRANIS

9

Mohy Idriss

Date

RAE for ISROAS

M-7

Baghdad intrusions; CENTENG PAK
small office;

MUST BRING TO BAGDAD FOR INTERVIEW
CANT KEEP HIM ON TALK TO HIM DIRECT, RIGHT TO
BAGDAD

JUDGE LISTENS AFTER ARREST

↳ GIVE PERMISSION TO ARREST

- FREE LESS THAN 10% free
- OTHER CANT FOR PROSECUTE
- BRINGS BACK TO ARREST

M-7 LEGAL OFFICE IN MUHAMMADIYAH

IRAK COMES FROM TO IRAQ

SPECIALISTS FOLLOW, build a case, make report.
make report to boss, 'Terrorist' 'Merchant' did I think I
WE WANT TO PICK HIM UP + INTERVIEW HIM.

M-7 JUDGE IS PASSENGER CASE, QSC-SS, TURN OVER
TO THE BOSS WITH M-7 JUDGE'S CONCURRENCE ON
~~M-7~~ EVIDENCE

1ST STAGE P

2nd STAGE

(18)

M-7

fig given to M-7 ^{DeBuse}, presents
evidence to judge, ~~bring~~ person picked up 2nd
bright.

INTERVIEW

All witness reports brought to Judge,
Judge interview w/out Officers, asks questions 2nd
makes an ORDER: 1) FREE
2) COURT

INVESTIGATORS send results to Head. of MEMPHIS.

- The whole case or more proceeding is legal 2nd
coming from 6th 2nd COURT

EVERY 1/2 month make list, NATIONALITY CASE
IS DATA

- IRANIAN
- YEMEN
- EGYPT
- JORDAN

ALL later people impression
BY USA & RESPECT 75%.

efforts against foreigners,

not too much contact
with IRAN people

D. Affair. with SECURITY GENERAL

↳ too much contact with
IRAN people

(12)

M. HANANAT Govt Education

100 b7D

~ELITE~

150 ^{DATE} MASTERS

No.

LIASON: Not useful, don't give full information; diplomatic benefit to individual only

- RELAY: BETTER SERVICE

JYRIAN: For ~~SECRET~~ but take but don't give

1997

- FOUSSASANS

- AREA

- HOTEL YUSUF

- ANOELS HOTEL

- RIVERSIDE

CHARLES BRIDGE

KARLOV MIST

PRAQUE CASTLE

PRAZSKET

OLD TOWN

OLD TOWN HALL

ASTORIAN MICHAS COCK

(S)

b6
b7C

PASSPORT,

TRUST FINANCE

Date

No.

DEPT

NICE: WANTS TO BE CALLED

b6
b7C

INCREASES #

TRUST

Room

SUCCESSOR

APRIL 16 2001

Date


No.

2 TRIPS

S. manta BIGOAO

Date

No.



b6
b7C

2000 / 1580
pmsl

WE

Date

No.

AL 1211100 AL-1500000

8x

NEAR 54000

b6

b7C

15

SEN

Date

No.

M-7 problems / investigate

M-7 ^{BOSS} Khalil ^{ABDULLAH} Najib

Khalil ^{ABDULLAH} Najib
2002 OCT//2002 → DEC M-6
→ M-7 JUL//2002 BAGDAD
→ RELEASE ALL PRISONER

JAN 2003 [] no more M7

come back to MC to work w/ me

3 MONTHS TILL WITH STAFF

b6
b7C

M-7 ^{BOSS}

JAN - MARCH

[]

BARDAD

Date

M-7

18 OCT

ARAB BRANCH PRINCIPAL

YEMEN

JUN

JORDAN

FADIC ACI A

b6

b7C

CAUGHT in JORDAN sent back to

↓
INNOCENT

DASH did

→ SAME CASE

Computers

AK47

Islamic CDs

Date

No.

SALEST TRY TO TAKE MONEY FROM RICH
TO BUILD MOSQUE, \$ 700

5 other

b6
b7C

M-S cooking for others

STAFF

10-12 OAS

- Political more than religious
- SYRIA

CAME BACK FROM JORDAN, NAME in
NEWSPAPER, U.S. RELATIONSHIP SOURCE

Brought to M-7, didn't help M-5 by

1 month or two weeks, as punishment. SET HIM
FREE

FROM NEAR FALLUJAH ; TALL, BLACK HAIR

Brought to M-7 cause he was MURDER in Jordan
M-5 following SAYYAN, color

b6
b7C [REDACTED] MAKE FAKS DOCUMENTS, JORDAN JAIL
SAME REASONS. THEN RELEASED
mentally unstable 30+

- Islamic party support INAQ

- If former ^{bad} guy; like ^{bad} ~~the~~ ^{scholar} ~~the~~ ^{gent}

Islamist ~~sch~~, come into MFTI station.

Date

No.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

M4 Syria Branch /

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

C.O.S. NEW DELHI /

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

6-10 quarters

77-85

Sun Muslim Brotherhood Heads

No.

OFFICE OF STRAW AFFAIRS: During
1970s, many were supporting MB. support Iran
was good relationship but during 70s Iran
USCO to support all groups and [redacted]
HSAO also in country, never not powerful

T.V. Court ^{Iran} ~~MUHAMMAD~~ ~~REARMS~~ ~~MISSIONS~~ ~~OPERATIONS~~

STRATEGIC PLANNING

MUHAMMAD

RECURRING CAUSES

b6
b7C

M-14 SPECIAL OPS / SMALL OFFICE

- 1) squad prevent kidnappings
- 2) small group

→ friends 15 years
was officer in charge of construction security

[redacted] 1994 she was commander today
came to MUHAMMAD (TASSERAT SAID, join MUHAMMAD)
SHE could like man

OFFICE M-14 -24-

1-60 questions

M-14

in camp

No.

OFFICER M-14, M.I.D.

KAOZHA DAM BOMBING

TV NEWS STORY

WASHER,

3 or 4 soldiers

General FAUZI

b6
b7C

M-14 previous director

left

93

→ MUHAMMAD TO GO TO MOSCOW

- 1 YEAR IN YEMEN, SHOCK, VERY RELIGIOUS

- 3 DAYS BEFORE END OF WAR

- MUHAMMAD WENT TO IRAN TO BRING RPG-7

- IRANIS

DEATH

ICU 17

P.O.W. CIVIC TO BAGDAD

NO GOV OFFICERS

2 months

200

CIVILIAN

M-S

SHABBA-S

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Classification per OGA letter dated 08/21/2009

Precedence: IMMEDIATE

Date: 08/23/2004

To: London
International Operations

Attn: Deputy Legat [REDACTED]

Attn: SSA [REDACTED]
IOU-1, Rm 7458

[REDACTED] CADMU,
Rm 4256

Security
Counterterrorism

Attn: [REDACTED]
Attn: SC Chris Briece
UC [REDACTED]

b6
b7C
b2

From: Counterterrorism
FARDT Unit/CTORS/LX1/G1E700

Contact: Piro George L, [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: Piro George L:glp

(U) **Case ID #:** ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534 - 109 (Pending)

Title: (U) REQUEST FOR COUNTRY CLEARANCE
GEORGE L. PIRO
TRAVEL TO LONDON, UNITED KINGDOM
08/28/2004 - 09/02/2004

Synopsis: (U) Request country clearance from and passage of
security clearances to United States Embassy, London, United
Kingdom.

(U)

~~Classified By: 11109, ITOS/CTD
Reason : 1.5(c)
Declassify On: X1~~

(S)

b1

~~SECRET~~

9/24/04
Uploaded
g.

~~SECRET~~

To: London From: Counterterrorism
(U) Re: (S) 315E-HQ-1448534, 08/23/2004

(U) Legat London is requested to obtain country clearance for SSA Piro for official travel to London, United Kingdom, as follows:

Official Name: George L. Piro
D/POB: [redacted] Lebanon
SSN: [redacted]
Official Passport #: [redacted] Expiration: 12/15/2005

b6
b7C

(S) ~~(U)~~ For information: [redacted]
[redacted] At this time, SSA does not require any additional assistance from Legat London. Flight information, lodging and conference location will be expeditiously furnished to Legat London via email upon receipt by FBIHQ.

b1

(S) ~~(U)~~ Security Division is requested to pass appropriate security clearances to US Embassy, London, United Kingdom. [redacted]

(U) CTORS very much appreciates Legats assistance with this matter.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: London From: Counterterrorism
(U) Re: (S) 315E-HQ-1448534, 08/23/2004

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Action)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

AT FBIHQ

(U) International Operations is requested to expedite country and security clearance passage for SSA Piro.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

LONDON

AT LONDON

(U) Legat London is requested to expedite the country clearance and security clearance passage for SSA Piro. Legat London is also requested to notify SSA Piro, or via email once this lead is covered.

b2

Set Lead 3: (Action)

SECURITY

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) Personnel Security Unit is requested to certify to American Embassy London the security clearances possessed by SSA Piro.

Set Lead 4: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON DC

(U) Read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

DATE: 05-13-2009

CLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/LSC

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 05-13-2034

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
ORGANIZATIONAL MESSAGE FORM

TRANSMIT VIA:

☒ SAMNET
☐ NEPTUNE
☐ IIR SENT VIA ACS

PRECEDENCE:

☐ IMMEDIATE
☒ PRIORITY
☐ ROUTINE

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET
☒ ~~SECRET~~
☐ CONFIDENTIAL

Date 01/21/2004
PAGE 1 OF 2

Classification per OGA letter dated 08/21/2009 F T O
☐ UNCLAS

(S) FM DIRECTOR FBI
TO [REDACTED] b1
BT

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

(S) CITE: //4510.1318//
PASS: [REDACTED]

(S) SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR CONFIRMATION THAT THE GENEVA CONVENTION
WILL BE ADHERED TO [REDACTED]

(S) (S/NF) THIS TELETYPE SERVES TO CONFIRM THAT THE FBI
IS AWARE OF THE OBLIGATION TO ADHERE TO GENEVA CONVENTION
PROVISIONS [REDACTED] THE FBI FULLY INTENDS TO
OBLIGE BY THESE PROVISIONS TO THE DEGREE THE FBI IS AFFORDED
PRIMARY LEAD IN THIS MATTER. b6 b7C

(S) (S/NF) THE FBI WILL CONTINUE TO COORDINATE WITH THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ON THIS MATTER TO ENSURE PROPER HANDLING
OF ALL INTERVIEWS [REDACTED] AND SUBSEQUENT DOCUMENTATION.

(U) (S) THE FBI POINTS OF CONTACT FOR THIS MATTER ARE
SSA [REDACTED] AND SSA [REDACTED] STU III [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

CLASSIFIED BY: 11109, ITOS II/CTD ; REASON: 1.5(C); DECLASSIFY
ON: X-1

BT
////

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

Approved by: [Signature]

Case ID #/Serial: _____

Original Filename: GENEVA~~CONFIDENTIAL~~.wpd

***** FOR SAMNET OPERATIONS USE ONLY *****

Time Received _____

SAMNET filename: CUX001S0.021

Time of Transmission 0750Z BN JAN 23 2004

MRI/JUL/ISN

DTG

315E-HQ-144P534-112

555/023/014
P230650Z Jan 04

3

b6
b7C

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
22 JAN 04 19 36
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION

BACK OF PAGE 202

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
ORGANIZATIONAL MESSAGE FORM

~~^PAGE 2 OF 2 S E C R E T NOFORN~~

ADMINISTRATIVE NOTE/TICKLER COUNT:

(S)

X

b1

(S)

~~(S/NF)~~ THIS TELETYPE SERVES TO CONFIRM THE FBI'S
UNDERSTANDING THAT [REDACTED] IN ACCORDANCE
WITH PROVISIONS AS SET FORTH BY THE GENEVA CONVENTION.

DRAFTED BY: [REDACTED]

CU:CU RM#: 4383 EXT: [REDACTED]

COPY DESIGNATIONS:

1 - [REDACTED]
1 - [REDACTED]
1 - [REDACTED]
1 - UNIT FOLDER

b6
b7C

~~S E C R E T NOFORN~~

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~//August 26, 2029



Classification per OGA letter dated 10/09/2009

To : Mr. James Comey
Deputy Attorney General

Date 08/26/2004

From : Mr. Gary M. Bald
Assistant Director, Counterterrorism

Subject : Desert Spider

ACTION MEMORANDUM

(S) This purpose of this memorandum is to request Deputy Attorney General authorization to disseminate the contents of interviews with Saddam Hussein to Major General Dayton of the Iraqi Survey Group (ISG). The FBI has been instructed that dissemination of information derived from the interviews of Hussein outside the Bureau required authorization from the Deputy Attorney General.

(S)

The memo contains a verbatim readout of a conversation between SSA George Piro and Saddam Hussein regarding Iraq's response to United Nations weapons inspections, culpability of individuals within Hussein's inner circle and Hussein's own assertions that Iraq did not possess Weapons of Mass Destruction.

b1

(S)

~~Classified by: G-3
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: August 26, 2029~~

Not Forwarded to DAG

(S)

~~SECRET~~//August 26, 2029

(S)

(S)

✓315E-HQ-1448534-113

Memorandum from Mr. Gary M. Bald to Mr. James Comey
Re: Desert Spider, 08/26/2004
~~SECRET~~//August 26, 2029

(S)

~~(S)~~

[Redacted]

(U)

~~(S)~~ BAGHDAD OPERATIONS CENTER
May 13 2004

X

X

(S)

b1

X

X

~~SECRET~~//August 26, 2029

Memorandum from Mr. Gary M. Bald to Mr. James Comey
Re: Desert Spider, 08/26/2004
~~SECRET~~//August 26, 2029

(S)

X

b1

~~SECRET~~//August 26, 2029

Memorandum from Mr. Gary M. Bald to Mr. James Comey

Re: Desert Spider, 08/26/2004

~~SECRET~~//August 26, 2029

NOTE: Request DAG authorization to disseminate Desert Spider information to Major General Dayton of the Iraqi Survey Group

b1

(S)

1 - Mr. Bald
1 - Mr. Briese
1 -
1 -
1 - Baghdad Ops

1 -
1 -
1 -
1 - 315E-HQ-1448534

b6
b7C

APPROVED:

Director _____
Deputy Director _____

Adm Serv. _____
CJIS _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Cntrterror _____
Finance _____

Gen. Counsel _____
Info. Res. _____
Inspection _____
Inv Serv. _____
Laboratory _____

National Sec. _____
OEEOA _____
OFCA _____
OPR _____
Training _____

WTH

ISLU *Rm 8/26/04*

ITOS II *MUSBY 8/26/04*

~~SECRET~~//August 26, 2029

~~SECRET//X1~~

Classification per OGA letter dated 08/21/2009

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 09/27/2004

To: Records Management
General Counsel

Attn: Document Classification I
Attn: National Security Law Unit

From: Counterterrorism
ITOSII/ISLU/6W-208

Contact: [REDACTED]

Approved By: Bald Gary [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED] jfv

(U) **Case ID #:** ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534 (Pending)

(U) **Title:** ~~(S)~~ DESERT SPIDER
IT - IRAQ

(U) **Synopsis:** ~~(S)~~ This communication requests Assistant Director authorization for, and the assistance of the Document Classification Unit, in the declassification of selected FBI interviews on Saddam Hussein, former president of Iraq.

~~(S)~~ **Derived From :** G-3
Declassify On: X1

(U) **Enclosure(s):** ~~(S)~~ Twenty-Five Letterhead Memorandums containing interviews conducted on Saddam Hussein by the FBI.

(S)

~~SECRET//X1~~

b6
b7C

b1

~~SECRET//X1~~

To: ?? From: Counterterrorism
(U) Re: (S) 315E-HQ-1448534, 09/27/2004

(U) ~~(S)~~ Since the conclusion of the debriefings and the hand over of legal custody of Saddam Hussein to the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG), the Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST) has begun the prosecution of Saddam Hussein and other members of the former Iraqi Regime for their part in war crimes and other atrocities. These debriefings of Saddam conducted by the FBI have been requested by the IST and the U.S. Intelligence Community for their use in the prosecution. The FBI has assessed the information and concluded there is no longer a need to maintain classification on the interviews.

~~(S)~~ The International Terrorism Operations Section II (ITOSII) and Office of the General Counsel concur that the enclosed Letterhead Memorandums can be declassified with the exception of the following:

- 1) All names of U.S. Government personnel
- 2) Locations of the debriefings
- 3) Interview Dated May 01, 2004: Remove the following paragraph on the second page:
Interviewers then started to question Hussein regarding the committee that was established in 2000 regarding the missing pilot. Hussein quickly responded by saying the "humanitarian side of this conversation has ended."
- 4) Interview Dated June 17, 2004: Remove all listings of Iraqi detainee's BLACK LIST numbers.
- 5) Interview Dated June 28, 2004: Remove the following sentences from the third paragraph on the first page:
"SSA Piro advised HUSSEIN there is clear evidence the Iraqi Government had previously met with BIN LADEN. SSA PIRO specifically cited FAROUQ HIJAZI's (BL#104), former IIS M-4 Director, meeting with BIN LADEN in Sudan in 1994, ABU HAFS AL-MAURITANI's two visits to Baghdad, and his request for financial assistance of ten million dollars. HUSSEIN replied "yes".

(U) ~~(S)~~ ITOSII request the Classification Unit to remove the above listed information from the enclosed Letterhead Memorandums prior to declassification.

(U) ~~(S)~~ The International Terrorism Operations Section II has evaluated the interviews and has determined none of the declassification of the information, with the exceptions listed above, disclose any effect of the following: 1) **No sensitive techniques will be disclosed.** 2) **No Asset or source identifying information will be disclosed.** 3) **No foreign government or other agency information will be disclosed without permission.** 4) **No**

~~SECRET//X1~~

~~SECRET//X1~~

To: ?? From: Counterterrorism
(U) Re: (S) 315E-HQ-1448534, 09/27/2004

other case equities will be affected. 5) Will not harm the national security of the United States.

(U) (S) The Iraq/Syria/Libya Operations Unit is readily available to assist in whatever manner required.

~~SECRET//X1~~

~~SECRET//X1~~

To: ?? From: Counterterrorism
(U) Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534, 09/27/2004

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

RECORDS MANAGEMENT

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) ~~(S)~~ Request that the Classification Unit review and declassify all selected FBI interviews on Saddam Hussein, former president of Iraq.

♦♦

~~SECRET//X1~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET/ORCON~~

DATE: 05-13-2009
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/LSC
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-13-2034

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Classification per OGA letter dated 08/21/2009

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 03/21/2004

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: SC M Chris Briece ITOS2
SC Frankie Battle, CTORS
UC [REDACTED] ITOS2
UC [REDACTED] CTORS
SAC Steve Tidwell
ASAC Janice Fedarcy
UC [REDACTED]

CIRG

From: Counterterrorism

HVD # 1 Team/Baghdad Operations Center

Contact: [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED] ✓

Drafted By: [REDACTED] tmm

(U) **Case ID #:** ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534 - 116 (Pending)

(U) **Title:** ~~(S)~~ DESERT SPIDER
IT-IRAQ

(U) **Synopsis:** ~~(S)~~ To provide the Counterterrorism and CIRG
Divisions with a progress report on Saddam Hussein by the (HVD
#1) Team.

(U) ~~Classified By: 11109, ITOS1/CTD
Reason : 1.5(c)
Declassify On: X1~~

(U) **Administrative:** ~~(S/OR)~~ To date, the HVD #1 Team has conducted
sixteen interviews of Saddam Hussein. All of these interviews
have been uploaded into the "Desert Spider" case file.

(U) **Enclosure(s):** ~~(S/OR)~~ One copy of FBI team "Interrogation
Strategy - Saddam Hussein," dated 02/13/2004. (Note: This report
was furnished previously via email to CTD and CIRG.)

(S)

~~SECRET/ORCON~~

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b7C

b1

~~SECRET/ORCON~~

(U) To: Counterterrorism From: Counterterrorism
Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534, 03/21/2004

(S)

[redacted]
[redacted] An FBI interview team was subsequently assembled consisting of three Supervisory Special Agents (SSAs), George Piro, FBIHQ, [redacted] Omaha Division and [redacted] Behavioral Analysis Unit; a Language Specialist, [redacted] an Arabic translator of Iraqi descent; and two Intelligence Analysts, [redacted]
[redacted]

b1

b6
b7C

(U) ~~(S/OR)~~ To date, the FBI team has conducted sixteen interviews of Hussein and approximately a dozen interviews of former Ministers, Presidential Advisors, Directors of Security and military leaders who are also in U.S. military custody. These latter interviews have been instrumental in obtaining a better understanding of the inner workings of Hussein's regime and determining how decisions were made and who implemented them.

~~(S/OR)~~ Although the primary purpose of interviewing Hussein is to obtain intelligence, [redacted]

b2
b7E

~~(S/OR)~~ When the FBI team first began interviewing Hussein, they concentrated [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

b1

~~SECRET/ORCON~~

~~SECRET/ORCON~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Counterterrorism
(U) Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534, 03/21/2004

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) For information and appropriate action.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

CIRG

AT QUANTICO, VIRGINIA

(U) For information and appropriate action.

♦♦

~~SECRET/ORCON~~

~~SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Classification per OGA letter dated 08/21/2009

Precedence: IMMEDIATE

Date: 01/06/2003

To: Director's Office

Attn: Director Robert S. Mueller III
D/Director Bruce Gephardt
EAD John S. Pistole
A/AD Gary M. Bald
DAD Thomas J. Harrington
SC Frankie Battle
ASC [REDACTED]
SC M. Chris Briese
SSA [REDACTED]

Counterterrorism

From: Counterterrorism

Baghdad Operations Center

Contact: SAC Edwin L. Worthington

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

(U) Case ID #: ~~(S)~~ 3156HQ-1448534 - 117 (Pending)

(U) Title: ~~(S)~~ SADDAM HUSSEIN
IT-IRAQ
OO:HQ

(S)

(U)

~~(S)~~

~~Derived From : G-3
Declassify On: X1~~

(S)

b1

~~SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN~~

~~SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN~~

(U) To: Director's Office From: Counterterrorism
Re: ~~(S)~~ 315-HQ-1448534, 01/06/2003

(S)

b1

~~SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN~~

~~SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN~~

To: Director's Office From: Counterterrorism
(U) Re: ~~(S)~~ 315-HQ-1448534, 01/06/2003

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

DIRECTOR'S OFFICE

AT EADCTCI, DC

(U) ~~(S)~~ For information. Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT FBI HEADQUARTERS

(U) ~~(S)~~ For information. Read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 05-14-2009
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/LSC
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-14-2034

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 11/23/2004

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: ITOS II, ISLU, SSA [REDACTED]

From: Charlotte

Squad 6

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED] *pk/lev*

Drafted By: [REDACTED] *sk*

(U) Case ID #: (S) 315E-HQ-1448534 (Pending) 119

(S)

(U) Title: (S) Desert Spider
IT - Iraq

Synopsis: (U) Lead covered by the Charlotte Division.

(U) (S)

~~Classified By: 11109, ITOS II/CTD
Reason : 1.5(c)
Declassify On: X1~~

(U) Reference: (S) 315E-HQ-1448534 Serial 9

(S) Details: (S) The above referenced EC set leads for Field
Offices to canvass sources [REDACTED]
for any information regarding potential war crimes committed by
the former Hussein Regime. The following was developed by the
Charlotte Division:

(S) (S) On March 20, 2003, Charlotte interviewed an Iraqi
male named [REDACTED]

(S) (S) On March 20, 2003, Charlotte interviewed [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] an Iraqi male. Around 1980, [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7C

b1

b6
b7C

P 1120

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
(U) Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534, 11/23/2004

(S)

b1

(U) Charlotte considers Leads 9.1 and 9.2 covered.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
(U) Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534, 11/23/2004

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT ITOS II

(U) Read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 02/14/2005

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: ISLU/ITOS II Room 4383
SSA [REDACTED]

From: Charlotte

Squad 6

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED] *ms/ya*

Drafted By: [REDACTED] dmy 7

(U) Case ID #: (S) ✓ 315E-HO-1448534 126
(S) (S) [REDACTED] 216

(U) Title: (S) DESERT SPIDER

(U) Synopsis: (S) To provide requested information regarding
alleged actions of the SADDAM HUSSEIN regime.

(U) (S) Derived From : G-3
Declassify On: X1

(U) Reference: (S) 315E-HO-1448534

(S) (S) [REDACTED]
(S) Details: (S) As part of the [REDACTED] initiative [REDACTED]

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(U) To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: (S) 315E-HQ-1448534, 02/14/2005

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Discretionary)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT ISLU

(U) Information provided for any action deemed appropriate.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 02/22/2005

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: ITOS II / ISLOU
SSA
SSA
IOS

From: Atlanta

Squad IT-1 / JTTF
Contact:

Approved By:

Drafted By:

(U) Case ID #: (S)
(S)

(U) Title: (S) DESERT SPIDER
IT-IRAQ

(U) Synopsis: (S) To report positive results of information
relating to the prosecution of SADDAM HUSSEIN.

(U) (S) ~~Derived From: G-3~~
~~Declassify On: X1~~

(U) Reference: (S) 315E-HQ-1448534 Serial 9

Enclosure(s): (U) Enclosed for FBIHQ is one FD-302 with
positive information.

(S) Details: (S) All Atlanta JTTF and FCI Agents were informed via
email and squad meetings to contact sources and review all
interviews of Iraqis, in order to
find information relating to crimes such as genocide, torture,
inhumane treatment, destruction of property and unlawful
confinement committed by SADDAM HUSSEIN and the former HUSSEIN
REGIME. Additionally, Agents were asked to canvass logical
sources for this information.

(U) There is one positive result to report to FBIHQ
from the Atlanta division being reported as an enclosure.

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7C

b1

~~SECRET~~

(U) To: Counterterrorism From: Atlanta
Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534, 02/22/2005

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

(U) Read and clear.

(S)

b1

~~SECRET~~

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/04/2005

[redacted] was interviewed at his residence, [redacted] GA [redacted] by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] on January 26, 2005. [redacted] was advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and purpose of the interview. [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted]

[redacted] now considers himself an American. [redacted] expressed his gratitude to live in freedom and stated he would give his life for this country if called upon. [redacted] is willing to assist the FBI and would be willing to provide testimony of what he experienced in Iraq.

Investigation on 01/26/2005 at Atlanta, GeorgiaFile # 315E-AT-98424Date dictated 02/04/2005

by SA [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7Db6
b7C

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 315E - HQ - 144 8538

Field Office Acquiring Evidence _____

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received _____

From _____

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

73C# 25

(Address)

(City and State)

By _____

To Be Returned ☐ Yes

☐ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes

☐ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes

☐ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes

☐ No

Title:

DESSERT SPIDER

Reference: _____

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☒ Original notes re interview of

TARLO AZIZ

①

TARIQ AZIZ

21:23

6/27

AZIZ

Date

No.

1990 JOINT INVASION, SAUDI GOV, BRINGS U.S.

USC SAW RELY ON ME NOT THEM

SUOAN / MIL COUP / ISLAMISTS

TURABI PERSECUTED ISLAMISTS

RIFT BETWEEN SUOAN - IRAQ

USC → CAUSES INFOSOC

- IN T.S. PRESSING, SADDAM WAS NEGATIVE

- DID NOT ~~NEGATIVE~~ HAVE O.P. REP IN KABUL

- MULLAH OMAR SENT MESSAGES OF CONGRATS

- 76 ARMS (SADOK) DURING RAHMANI. DID NOT

PUBLISH

BAMH

LINKING ISLAM w/ POLITICS WAS

NOT COMPATIBLE

USC

WAHABISM, NOT ACCEPTED IN IRAQ

- BEHIND BACK? NOT AWARE

- AFTER WAR? NOT AWARE TURNED BACK

- BAMH AGGRESSIVE SOUGHT (DECEASE) ~~WAHABIST~~ DATA
EXECUTED 1980

M.O. 1970s SAME DECEASE AGAINST WAHABIST

(2)

SALAFIST, ORTHODOX, CONSERVATIVE No.

AFTER SANCTIONS, GROWTH IN SUNNI IRAQ

SHORT MUSTACH, BEARD, MINI DUKAKH

SADAM KNEW TO RECTIFY SAUDI RELATIONSHIP
CORRESPONDENCE WITH PRINCE ABDOUL KADIR
FAND WAS KING BUT NOT ACTIN RULER ABDOUL
WAS

- 1277-1877 2008 QATAR: KISSED, EMBRACED
FAND → PRINCE HELPED IRAQ DURING IRAQ WAR

SADAM DID NOT KISS HASAN TURABI, FORMER
FORMER SAUDI PRIME MINISTER. OPPORTUNISTS/HYPOCRITES

IF CONTACT WITH ISLAMIC GROUPS, SADAM WOULD NOT
INCLUDE CHRISTIAN T. (EXCEPTION HAMAS,
PALESTINE)

1975/1996 LIMIT TO INVOLVEMENT

SADAM D.O NOT TALK RELIGIOUS OPPORTUNISTS.
HYPOCRITES, NOT SHY ABOUT THIS.

8

- BLUNTS, MISTAKE, TOTALLY ~~SECRET~~

DISAPPOINTED

Date

No.

SPECIAL TRUST

- Not openly discussed in diplomatic circles
- FAROUK HIZZI, good guy, M-HAMMAD prominent officer. Appointed Ambassador. Kick up

TARGET HIZZI

POLICEMAN

b6
b7C

→ Rumor, went to visit URC in AFGHAN
It. ASKED FAROUK, HE SAID NO

ABID Homero

S. AFRICA // OFFICIALLY NO RESPONSE
ANTI AMERICAN ENJOYED

- WHO WAS TARGETED SO Major at KALIC
- OFFICE IN BAGDAD

Not his style to deal w/ ISLAMISTS, NOT
TRUST, NATIONALISTS

EVO

LETTER OF CONDOLENCE TO

~~RAMSEY CLARK~~

Date

No. 

- THE VICTIMS CAME TO IRAQ, RESIDING IN
TAMIA

? REACTY

- IZZAT ISRAHIM AL DURI

? EFFICIENT ORGANIZATION A/Q


SMIFFED, INTER SERVICE WITH ISLAMISTS

TABOO

WALSH AS SUFFICIENT

Date

No.



4

~ Iraqi forces shooting Iraqi war No.
- Fugitive missing, red cross
- Contrary, Iraqis shot Iraqi
ALBIRAH HAD SHOT IRAN

- ALL HASSAN AL M
SABOWL (YASSIN) D.O. of M-HANIN
AZIZ AL HIRAFI

USSR. During Iran Iraq war
HABIBI 2 a group
RESERVED 1984

PERSONAL INSTITUTE
IRANIAN USAN TRIM
ALL HASSAN

Big mystery, "DISAPPEAR"

Impending w. Kuwait, moves
to BAKA. Open over 100 ft
can't assure that is 70-8 killed out
know, 14 killed, ALL HASSAN

MASS EXECUTION, Kuwait, not known

(5)

ALI HAJAN KILLED ALOT OF PEOPLE

NAME OF
Date

No.

NO BODY QUESTIONS I RAN

FD-340a (Rev. 1-27-03)

(File No.) _____

[illegible]

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 02/17/2004

To: Records Management

Attn: Record Mgmt. Center Unit
A/UC [REDACTED]

From: Counterterrorism

Iraq/Syria/Libya Unite Room 4383

Contact: SSA [REDACTED]

b6
b7c

Approved By: [REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED BY uc/baw 60324
ON 05-06-2009

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

ssajr

Case ID #: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534
~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534-1A
~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534-1B
~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534-302
~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534-BC
~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534-CE
~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534-ELA
~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534-EL1
~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534-EL1A
~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534-EL1B
~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534-LAB
~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534-NC

Title: ~~(S)~~ DESERT SPIDER
IT - IRAQ

Synopsis: ~~(S)~~ Opening of subfiles for captioned matter. AD
authority to restrict subfile 302.

~~(S)~~ Classified By: 11109, ITOS/CTD
Reason: 1.5(c)
Declassify On: X1

(U) Full Field Investigation Instituted: 05/04/2004 NONUSPER

Administrative: ~~(S)~~ Per all SAC, EC from CTD dated 12/25/2002, no
case restrictions in ACS or [REDACTED] may be made without the
approval of the Assistant Director of the Counterterrorism Division.

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b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Records Management From: Counterterrorism
Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534, 02/17/2004

Details: ~~(S)~~ The captioned investigation was opened to capture intelligence and evidence as it relates to the national security investigation targeting Saddam Hussein. This EC establishes the subfile system for capturing information regarding Hussein. The following subfiles will be established:

1A - Will be a repository for all contemporaneous notes and items which will need to be retained that are not evidentiary in nature.

1B - will document FD-192 bulky records and will be a repository for evidentiary material.

302 - will be a repository for FD-302's, inserts and classified LHM's which document interviews conducted of captioned subject and additional High Value Detainees.

BC - will be a repository for background information on captioned subject and his closest associates.

CE - will be used maintain all records regarding expenditures of case funds in captioned matter.

ELA - will be used to maintain all documents regarding the administration of electronic surveillance in captioned matter.

EL1 - will document all original elsur logs developed or maintained in captioned matter.

LAB - will be a repository for all laboratory requests, reports and findings in captioned matter.

NC - will be a repository for all pertinent newspaper clippings deemed of significant value that they will add to the overall progression of the investigation.

This EC also documents the fact that due to the sensitive nature of the interviews of captioned subject, and the request of the Department of Justice, Office of the Deputy Attorney General [noted in immediate EC from Counterterrorism to General Counsel, dated 02/06/2004] the 302 subfile will be restricted in the Automated Case Management System (ACS). Access will be granted to the following individuals:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Records Management From: Counterterrorism
Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534, 02/17/2004

UC

UC

SSA George Piro

SSA

SSA

SSA

SSA

IA

IA

IA

IA

IA

RO

ITOS II Deputy Section Chief

ITOS II Section Chief

D/AD Counterterrorism Division

AD Counterterrorism Division

EAD Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence Division

OSC Baghdad Operations Center

D/OSC Baghdad Operations Center

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b7c

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Records Management From: Counterterrorism
Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534, 02/17/2004

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

RECORDS MANAGEMENT

AT WASHINGTON, DC

~~(S)~~ RMD will ensure the aforementioned subfiles will be opened and that access to sub 302 will remain restricted to the above mentioned personnel.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET//X1~~

U.S. Department of Justice



Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Baghdad Operations Center
February 7, 2004

Interview Session Number: 1
Interview Conducted by: SSA George L. Piro
SSA [redacted]
Arabic/English Translation: [redacted]

b6
b7c

~~(S)~~ Saddam Hussein (High Value Detainee #1) was interviewed on February 7, 2004 at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Hussein provided the following information:

~~(S)~~ Hussein stated he has served the Iraqi people for a very long time. He considers his greatest accomplishments to be the social programs for the citizens of Iraq and improvements in other sectors of the economy including enhancements to education, the health care system, industry, agriculture, and other areas that generally enhanced the way of life for Iraqis.

~~(S)~~ In 1968, Iraqi people "barely had anything." Food was scarce, both in rural villages as well as in cities. Farmland was neglected and agricultural methods were primitive. The Iraqi economy depended entirely on oil production, with most being exported from Iraq by foreign companies and not controlled by the government. As the country of Iraq manufactured very few products, most goods had to be imported. The health care system was "primitive" and the mortality rate was very high, particularly among the poor. The infant mortality rate was very high, estimated at 40-50 percent, with many deaths occurring during pregnancy or delivery. The literacy rate was around twenty-seven percent, with those classified as "literate" often not capable of true proficiency in either skill. Roads were almost non-existent in rural areas and "very bad" in the cities of Iraq. Limited educational opportunities existed at the university level, even in Baghdad. Many cities had no college whatsoever. Generally, only wealthy individuals could afford to send their children to a university.

~~(S)~~
Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

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ON 05-06-2009

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Baghdad Operations Center

~~(S)~~ Hussein improved all of the areas previously discussed. He considers this his greatest accomplishment and "service" to the Iraqi people.

~~(S)~~ In response to a question regarding Hussein's own mistakes, Hussein agreed that all humans make mistakes, and only God is free of error. He noted that the interviewer was "smart" and it appeared he had read reports from Hussein's previous interviews. Hussein stated, "Perhaps, a conversation between two such educated people will not be useful or successful." If one says he is perfect, he is saying he is like God. Hussein added that not all of his efforts were viewed as successful in some people's eyes. Hussein compared this evaluation of himself by others and the existence of differing viewpoints to his own views about the American system of government, of which he is "not convinced." He pointed out that approximately 30 million people live in poverty in America, but US residents do not consider this a "crime." Hussein stated he would never accept that for Iraq. When prompted by the interviewer a second time regarding Hussein's own mistakes, he asked, "Do you think I would tell my enemy if I made a mistake?" Hussein said that he would not identify mistakes he had made to an enemy, like America. He pointed out that he does not consider the interviewer an enemy, nor the American people, but the American system of government.

~~(S)~~ Hussein stated it is not only important what people say or think about him now but what they think in the future, 500 or 1000 years from now. The most important thing, however, is what God thinks. If God believes something, He will convince the people to believe. If God does not agree, it does not matter what the people think. Hussein added that a "traitor" provided information which led to his capture. As a "guest" at the location and as an Iraqi, he should not have been given up to US forces. The grandchildren of this "traitor" will hold him accountable and tell this to future generations.

~~(S)~~ In the future, Hussein believes he will be known for fairness and as having "faced oppression." Ultimately, what the Iraqis think will be up to them. Hussein stated Iraqis would not compare leaders of the pre-Islamic era to the Islamic era.

~~(S)~~ Hussein believes Iraqi citizens were able to exercise their rights to self-govern as guaranteed by the interim

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Baghdad Operations Center

Constitution in 1990. This occurred because the people had a leader and a government to lead them.

~~(S)~~ Hussein believes Iraq "will not die." Iraq is a great nation now, as it has been at times throughout history. Nations generally "go to the top" only once. Iraq, however, has been there many times, before and after Islam. Iraq is the only nation like this in the history of the world. This "gift" was given to the Iraqi people by God. When Iraqi people fall, they rise again. Hussein believes the Iraqi people "will take matters into their own hands," rule themselves, and, with God, decide what is right. Hussein hopes that Iraq will advance in all areas, financial, religious, etc. He added that, as a humanitarian, he hoped the same for the American people.

~~(S)~~ Hussein was quoted a passage from the book "Zabibah and the King," commonly attributed as his writing, where the deputies shout, "Long live Zabibah. Long live the people. Long live the army." The deputies do not, however, shout "Long live the king." Hussein was asked whether the Iraqi people will forget or fail to shout for him, to which he replied no. He said, "It's in God's hands." Hussein emphasized the king is not the main subject of the book, rather the people. He stated God comes first, then the people. Hussein added Jesus Christ was considered "from the people" as Mary was of the people and Christ lived among the people. Being faithful is a cherished thing in life, being a traitor is the worst thing. Hussein stated, "God wanted to tell us don't be surprised when people are traitors to you." Hussein ended this portion of the discussion by saying "a prisoner can not do anything for the people." He said he still has to have faith in God and repeated "It's in God's hands."

~~(S)~~ Hussein stated the National Progressive Front, a political party, first existed as the National Front from 1970-1974. The National Front consisted of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the Communist Party, and the Ba'ath Party. Political parties express differences in Iraq as occurs in other countries. Some groups, including the Kurds, did not believe in socialism along the same ideological lines as the Ba'ath. In 1991, the National Progressive Front never actually came into being because of failure to pass the Constitution which was due to the first Gulf War.

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Baghdad Operations Center

~~(S)~~ Hussein considered any individual who was faithful to Iraq, and to the people, to be a part of the Ba'ath. The Ba'ath takes responsibility for successes and mistakes. In 1989 and again in 2002, Hussein attempted, unsuccessfully, to convince his "colleagues" of the need for multiple political parties in Iraq. In Hussein's opinion, one party was not good for Iraq. Hussein stated, "Life does not accept only one idea. It accepts only one God." Hussein continued saying that a political system similar to America's, with multiple parties, would cause "too much commotion" for the Iraqi people and they would have to be forced to accept it. Hussein said, "I wish there were parties other than the Ba'ath." Differences, from family through the people to the government, are good. Hussein ended this portion of the discussion by stating, "Currently, the only political parties existing in Iraq are the ones with the weapons."

~~(S)~~ Hussein was quoted another passage from "Zabibah and the King" which states, "I'm a great leader. You must obey me. Not only that, you must love me." He was then asked whether a leader can obtain greatness through his achievements for his people or demand greatness through fear. Hussein responded that fear will not make a ruler and will not make people love a ruler. Love comes through communication. The "author" of this book is comparing this King to past kings. He did not want to emphasize or advocate the idea of the monarchy to the people as the "author" does not approve of this form of government. Thus, the King died and Zabibah lived, as a symbol of the people.

~~(S)~~ Hussein believes people will love him more after he passes away than they do now. People are resisting the occupation of Iraq, now and before, under the "banners" of Hussein. Now, however, Hussein is not in power and is in prison.

~~(S)~~ Hussein stated people love someone for what they have done. During his Presidency and before, he accomplished much for Iraq. He concluded a peace agreement with Barzani (the Kurds) in the north in 1970. Hussein nationalized the Iraqi oil industry in 1972. He supported the 1973 war against Israel in Egypt and Syria. Iraq survived eight years of war with Iran from 1980-1988 and the first Gulf War shortly thereafter. Iraq lived through 13-14 years of a boycott. Hussein asked whether the boycott still existed, and was told no. Despite all the hardships and issues endured by Iraq, one hundred percent of the

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Baghdad Operations Center

people voted for Hussein in the last elections. In Hussein's opinion, they still supported their leader.

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U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Baghdad Operations Center
February 8, 2004

Interview Session Number: 2
Interview Conducted by: SSA George L. Piro
SSA [redacted]
Arabic/English Translation: [redacted]

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b7C

~~(S)~~ Saddam Hussein (High Value Detainee #1) was interviewed on February 8, 2004 at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Hussein provided the following information:

~~(S)~~ Hussein stated the farm where he was captured in December, 2003 was the same location he stayed in 1959 after fleeing Baghdad upon participating in a failed assassination attempt on then Iraqi President Qassem.

~~(S)~~ Hussein was asked whether the decision to go to war against Iran in September, 1980 was based on threats from Iran or whether the war was a means of reclaiming Arab/Iraqi territory, specifically the Shatt-al-Arab Waterway. Hussein stated, "We consider the war as having started on September 4, not September 22, as the Iranians state." Hussein then provided an example of a farmer who is your neighbor next door. Hussein prefers to use farming/rural examples as they have special meaning to him. One day, the neighbor's son beats up your son. The next day, the neighbor's son bothers your cows. Subsequently, the neighbor's son damages your farmland by disturbing the irrigation system. If all these things have occurred, eventually, after enough incidents, you approach your neighbor, tell him each transgression by event and ask him to stop. Usually, a warning or approach to the neighbor is enough to stop this behavior. With Iran, however, this approach by Iraq did not work. Iran, in Hussein's opinion, was in violation of the 1975 "Algiers Agreement" concerning the waterway. Furthermore, Iran was also deemed to have interfered in Iraqi politics, also a violation of the treaty. In Hussein's opinion, this left Iraq no choice but

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Baghdad Operations Center

to fight. Thereafter, Iraq fought the war and sacrificed so that interference by Iran in Iraq would end.

~~(S)~~ Hussein provided some thoughts about the mindset of the Iranian leadership, specifically Ayatollah Khomeini, and the Iranian decision to fight the war. When Khomeini came to power in 1979, he had two things which "interfered" with his mind. One, he was a religious fanatic who thought all leaders were like the Shah of Iran, a person easily toppled. Khomeini thought since he removed the Shah so easily he could do the same elsewhere including Iraq. Second, Khomeini had a "complex" about leaving/being kicked out of Iraq previously in the late 1970s. Khomeini, exiled from Iran, had been a "guest" of Iraq who was "given shelter" in Najaf. While there, he began speaking out against the Shah and the Iranian government. Khomeini, in Hussein's opinion, was not respecting the written agreement (Algiers Agreement) between Iraq and Iran and was interfering in internal Iranian affairs. The Iraqi government informed Khomeini of their position. They also told him "you are our guest, no one can ask you to leave or for you to be handed over." The Shah had, in fact, tried to get Hussein to turn over Khomeini to Iran. In Arab culture, one can not "give up" a guest.

~~(S)~~ Khomeini refused to cease his activities against the Shah and the Iranian government. Khomeini stated that if his practices were against Iraqi policy, he would leave. Thereafter, he attempted to depart to Kuwait but was refused entry. Iraq allowed him to return for three or four days and complied with his request for assistance in traveling to another country. Khomeini then traveled to Paris, France.

~~(S)~~ Hussein stated he does not regret Iraq's treatment of Khomeini. When asked whether Khomeini ignored the gratitude of Iraq upon return from Kuwait, a step which could have resulted in Iraq's refusal to admit him and subsequent transfer to Iran, Hussein stated, "No. It would not have changed the situation. The people did not want the Shah." Khomeini became a symbol for the people of Iran after departing Iraq because of his age and because he had been "kicked out" of Iran. Hussein only stated "maybe" when questioned whether Ayatollah Sayyid Mohammad Sadr, a prominent Shia cleric executed in Iraq in 1980, may have been such a symbol. Hussein added he himself was a symbol as one could find pictures of Hussein inside houses and elsewhere in Iraq.

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Baghdad Operations Center

~~(S)~~ Khomeini believed the Shia population in southern Iraq would follow him, especially during the war with Iraq. But, according to Hussein, "They did not welcome him." In fact, the Shia remained loyal to Iraq and fought the Iranians.

~~(S)~~ Hussein acknowledged that the Iranian military in 1980 was weak and "lacked leadership" as most of the high-ranking officers had been removed upon change of the Iranian leadership from the Shah to Khomeini. This, however, did not impact on the decision to engage in war with Iran at that moment. Hussein stated, "If the Shah's army still existed, we would have defeated them in the first month." Under Khomeini, despite lacking leadership, the Iranian military, including the army and the Revolutionary Guard, "advanced in thousands" against Iraqi forces. The Iraqi army fought bravely, especially at the borders.

~~(S)~~ Hussein was asked whether assassination attempts against Iraqi government officials prior to the conflict, allegedly at the hands of Iranian-backed groups, including Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz and Minister of Culture and Information Latif Nayyif Jasim, affected the decision to go to war with Iran. Hussein stated there were "540 assaults" on Iraq by Iran before the war. 249 of these "assaults" included air incursions or raids. Iraq presented this information to the United Nations. Iran blocked the Shatt-al-Arab Waterway and sank Iraqi and foreign ships. Before September 29, 1980, Iran bombed Iraqi oil refineries in Basra and other cities in southern Iraq. The assassination attempts against Aziz and Jasim, and others, were among the many incidents leading up to war with Iran.

~~(S)~~ When asked the objective of the war, Hussein replied, "Ask Iran. They began the war. I have explained all the reasons for the war before." Upon repeating the question, Hussein stated the objective was "to have Iran not interfere in our internal affairs." Hussein repeated some information previously provided including the fact that he believed Iran violated the treaty of 1975 (Algiers Agreement). Iran occupied the entire Shatt-al-Arab Waterway, while the agreement stated their right to only half. Iran did not respond to diplomatic communications regarding these facts.

~~(S)~~ Hussein stated Iraqi forces initially succeeded and occupied cities and territory in southern Iran just across the

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Baghdad Operations Center

border including areas in and near Muhamra, Ahwaz, and Dosful. Iraqi forces did not push further into Iran because the immediate objective was to stop artillery attacks from Iran which emanated from areas near the border.

~~(S)~~ After approximately two years, Iraqi forces were pushed back and the war became defensive for Hussein's military. When questioned why the war became defensive for Iraq, Hussein stated that "one can not plan for the Iraqi army the same as for the American army." From a military viewpoint, plans are made according to capability. The military agrees that when supply routes are lengthened, problems arise. Hussein stated, "The soldier of today is not the same as the soldier of 100 years ago." They are part of a "universal group" hearing and seeing things on the television and radio. The soldier is "part of the world" and is "affected" by this. If ordered to counterattack, the "winning" soldier will push to the objective and beyond. Hussein agreed that the later Iraqi offensive stage of the war in 1986-87 saw many successes, including the capture of three-fourths of Iranian tanks and half of the artillery and armored personnel carriers.

~~(S)~~ Hussein discussed further the reasoning behind not advancing further into Iran. He repeated that Iraq had recovered enough territory, removing the threat of Iranian artillery, in the early years of the war. Hussein said, "If we went deep inside Iran, they would think we wanted something else." He added, "We did not face a regular army, which is easier to plan against." Hussein further stated that for many Iraqi soldiers, this was their first combat experience. Many were "pumped up" especially with the early successes into Iranian territory. Within a few days, however, many soldiers thought "Why am I here?" As confirmed to Hussein by the Iraqi military leaders, many soldiers preferred to defend the borders and remain in Iraq. Withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Iranian territory should have occurred before this change in mentality took place. Some military commanders wanted to remain, others wanted to withdraw. After two years of war, some Iraqi military leaders felt Iran had "learned its lesson" and recommended withdrawal. Hussein respected information from the military commanders and ordered withdrawal of Iraqi forces.

~~(S)~~ Hussein stated, normally, defensive operations are not "good from a tactical standpoint" nor are they good for the

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Baghdad Operations Center

soldiers' morale. Hussein said, "If a soldier does not see logic, he will not perform as well or be obedient. If he accepts the task at hand as logical, he will be obedient. A soldier must be convinced, otherwise discipline is a problem." Hussein commented about the present mental state of American soldiers in Iraq. He said, "If you asked the American soldier, who came to Iraq to find weapons of mass destruction, but none could be found, and who came to remove the leaders of the Hussein dictatorship, who are all in jail now, but are replaced with other dictators, whether he wanted to stay or go, he would say go."

~~(S)~~ When asked whether the use of chemical weapons by Iraq against Iran during the defensive period of the war occurred only through necessity, i.e., Iraq would have lost the war without such use, Hussein responded, "I do not have an answer for that. I am not going to answer." When asked whether he thought Iraq was going to lose the war with Iran, particularly after 1982 and during the 1984-86 time frame, Hussein responded, "No. Not for a second. I said this on television. I said this in five letters I sent to Iran." In the letters, Hussein outlined the strengths of the Iraqi military. Hussein stated some Iraqi commanders did not like the fact that this type of information was included in letters to Iran. Iranian leaders thought Hussein was lying, while Iraqis believed him. Returning to Iraqi chemical weapons use, Hussein stated, "I will not be cornered or caught on some technicality. It will not do you any good. The United States has paid dearly for its mistakes here in Iraq and throughout the world and will continue to pay for its mistakes all over the world."

~~(S)~~ Hussein stated Iran did not "get the message" after 1982 when Iraq pulled back to its borders. He stated, "If you do not break their heads, they will not understand."

~~(S)~~ Hussein stated Iraq "did not owe much money" after the war with Iran. Iraq had received aid from Arab countries, which Hussein believed to be aid and not loans. After the war, however, these countries "changed their minds" and demanded repayment. Some countries viewed Iraq as a military threat. Iran was not viewed as a military threat, as its forces were devastated by the war. Hussein laughed at this point.

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Baghdad Operations Center

~~(S)~~ Hussein stated Iraq agreed to a United Nations resolution on September 28, 1980 calling for a cessation of hostilities with Iran. Iran, however, did not agree to this resolution. Hussein added that Iraq also agreed to UN Resolution 598 in 1987 calling for an end to the war. Iran, again, did not agree to this resolution. Iraq, in fact, attempted numerous times throughout the war to engage Iran in discussion in order to stop the fighting. Hussein stated "we did this when we did not have to" for the good of the people and for humanity. Iran only accepted terms of a cease fire in 1988 "after they lost the war."

~~(S)~~ Regarding UN findings about Iraq's use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War, Hussein stated, "History is written and will not change. No one can stop history from being written." Hussein pointed out that Iran used chemical weapons first, at Muhamra (which is Khoramshahar in Iran), in September/October, 1981. When asked whether Iraq had to use chemical weapons for defensive reasons, Hussein responded, "I am not going to answer, no matter how you put the question."

~~(S)~~ Hussein stated, "I will discuss everything unless it hurts my people, my friends, or the army." Hussein gave details of an incident in 1964 involving Ahmad Hasan Al-Bakr, General Secretary of the Ba'ath Party. Bakr and Hussein, who was chief of the military branch of the Ba'ath at that time, were arrested for plotting a coup against then Iraqi President Aref. Hussein stated he admitted full responsibility for the plot and could not have provided information against anyone else.

~~(S)~~ Hussein stated, "It is not fair for someone in charge to blame others. If someone says Saddam told me to do it, that is not a problem for me and does not hurt me."

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U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Baghdad Operations Center
February 10, 2004

Interview Session Number: 3
Interview Conducted by: SSA George L. Piro
SSA [REDACTED]
Arabic/English Translation: [REDACTED]

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b7C

~~(S)~~ Saddam Hussein (High Value Detainee #1) was interviewed on February 10, 2004 at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Hussein provided the following information:

~~(S)~~ Hussein provided his comments regarding the Palestinian situation. Any attempt to understand the roots of the problems surrounding the Palestinian issue should be made from the viewpoint of an Arab, and not just as a Palestinian. The problem is not only a Palestinian one but also an Arab one. In the 1960s, many revolutions occurred in Arab countries with the uprisings generally taking place as the result of the dissatisfaction of the people with the rulers of those times. Part of the reason leaders were removed was their failure to address the Palestinian issue adequately or ignoring it altogether. Any solution to the problem should be based on fairness and international law. International law, and its application, created the problem in 1948 upon formation of the separate Jewish state of Israel from lands previously claimed by the Palestinians. A solution, from foreigners and those "internal" to the issue, must be presented in that scope. Everyone has been looking for a solution. However, Hussein stated, "A solution that does not convince the majority of Palestinians will not be successful." The foundation of any such solution, and the final outcome, must be the establishment of a separate state of Palestine.

~~(S)~~

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~~(S)~~ When questioned about a speech he once gave regarding the 1968 revolution in Iraq, Hussein agreed that he commented in the speech "we did not revolt against a person, we revolted against the system of government." He further agreed that he stated the revolution was undertaken "to move Iraqi people, the country, the Arab world as a whole, and the Palestinians forward." Hussein added the Ba'ath Party was the only political party that demonstrated against the Iraqi government in 1967.

~~(S)~~ Regarding the Six-Day Arab-Israeli War in 1967, Hussein stated that Arabs had hoped that lands lost in 1948 would be won back. Hussein stated, "We were sad when that did not happen." Although expectations were low for success, the news was especially disheartening when details were provided about the rapid defeat of the Egyptian and Syrian military forces. People of the Arab world became "sad and depressed" and developed a feeling of revolution.

~~(S)~~ Even though the 1967 war was lost, Hussein still respected Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser after the war. In Hussein's opinion, Nasser "could represent the Arabs to the world" while others were "weak." At that time, Nasser was the only ruler with a close relationship to the "Arab masses." Despite losing the war, Nasser did not lose the respect of the people. The hopes of the people, however, were greater than the result Nasser could deliver. Losing the war showed the limits of the capabilities of Nasser and the Egyptian military forces. Hussein pointed out that the war also exposed internal issues in the Egyptian leadership. Abdul Hakim Ammer, head of the Egyptian military, would not permit Nasser's "interference" in military matters "even though Nasser was head of the country." When Nasser later resigned, millions of Egyptians protested for him to resume his duties as President. Hussein opined that it seemed "Nasser depended on international politics rather than preparation of his military and people" leading up to the war. When he died in 1970, citizens "cried for him."

~~(S)~~ Regarding the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Egyptian President Sadat, who served as Vice President under Nasser, "could not bring back the hopes of the Arabs." Sadat seemed not to have a specific cause or aim and was unable to do anything about 1948 and the "rape of Palestine." Because Sadat was not a "man of cause," Egyptian soldiers were not "motivated" by him.

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Similarly, the people of Egypt were not motivated. In fact, during this time, Egyptians mocked their own soldiers making jokes about the military saying they did not fight in 1967. Sadat did, however, through his own personality, make the United States and Israel believe he could win a war with Israel.

~~(S)~~ When questioned about Sadat's ability to ultimately do more for his people than Nasser, particularly with respect to bringing peace and reclaiming territory, Hussein stated Nasser's effect was "nominal." Hussein added, "If you tell Iraqis Kuwait will be a part of Iraq, they will be happy." The Arab nation, from poor to wealthy individuals, is one nation with the same language, common borders, and the same aims. There is one Arab world, from the "simple person to the lawmakers and thinkers." The strength of any person in a "family" comes from cooperation with and love of each other in the "family." If a member of the "family" does not understand this, he will be "weak and fall." Sadat was not faithful to "family" matters. Prior to the 1967 war, the West Bank and Jerusalem were under control of Jordan while Gaza was under control of Egypt. Sadat's peace agreement with the Israelis failed to return the territories to the rightful owners, the Palestinians. Thus, Sadat was a "traitor to the cause." Israel only willingly returned the Sinai Peninsula as it was a "military burden" and was an easy "political move."

~~(S)~~ Sadat lost honor as a result of agreements made with Israel. Additionally, the Egyptian economy worsened significantly under his leadership. In contrast, Egypt's economy flourished under Nasser with its markets opened to all Arab countries.

~~(S)~~ Hussein stated, "Being at peace is not easy." Peace without a cause will create a change in balance. Regarding a comment made to a British journalist approximately two years ago, Hussein did not mean peace could be achieved by losing faith and prestige. On the contrary, any peace should be negotiated to a "favorable position of power."

~~(S)~~ Hussein stated Iraq fought in the 1973 war on two fronts, with its air forces contributing in Egypt and Syria and ground forces fighting in Syria. When asked whether Iraq could have done more, Hussein responded, "What more could we have done? We sent all of our military to fight under Egyptian and Syrian command." Prior to the war, Egypt had sent then Vice President

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Mubarak to Iraq to request aircraft and pilots for use in attacking Israeli surface-to-air missiles sites. Iraq provided the aircraft though they were already fighting the Kurds in the north. The Syrians requested Iraq's assistance just after start of the war saying Israel would occupy Syria without Iraq's help.

~~(S)~~ Regarding the reported failure of the Syrian military to "openly welcome" Iraqi forces in 1973, Hussein stated, "No one is as generous as Iraqis." Hussein was further asked for his comments regarding the failure/refusal of the Syrian military to provide Iraqi forces with maps, communications equipment, and other assistance needed to fight the war together. Hussein replied, "A loser does not know where his head and feet are. It was a difficult situation, to come together like this." Hussein postulated, "Perhaps the Syrians did not have maps." Iraqi officers were accustomed to different treatment in their own military ranks.

~~(S)~~ Iraq has always accepted Palestinian refugees into the country, during Hussein's time and previously. These influxes of refugees include after 1948 upon formation of Israel, after September, 1970 (Black September in Jordan), and in 1991 after the first Gulf War. Hussein stated, "We welcomed them, gave them jobs, and gave them the right to own land and a house." The latter policy regarding homes was in contradiction with the doctrine of the Arab League which did not permit Palestinians to own residences. In Hussein's opinion, Arab League members assumed that Palestinians would not leave if they owned their own residences. Hussein did not agree with this policy for "humanitarian reasons." When presented by Hussein, the Iraqi leadership agreed with this position. For Palestinians in Iraq, "this helped life be normal."

~~(S)~~ Hussein acknowledged that Iraqi government built and/or rented homes for Palestinians from Iraqi landlords. Hussein stated, "We were concerned about everybody in Iraq. We would not have let them live on the streets. Things such as food, work, and a home are needed for the sake of pride." Hussein stated some people accused Iraq of trying to remove the Palestinians. Hussein added, on the contrary, we "could not kick a guest out."

~~(S)~~ Hussein does not remember whether the Iraqi government paid all or a portion of rent, for all or a certain

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amount of time, for the Palestinian housing in Iraq. Hussein has no knowledge of home owners suing the government for unpaid rent, particularly in the early to mid-1990s, and losing such a case to the government. Hussein stated, "If we promised to pay, we would have done it. If the case was lost, the government must not have promised to pay." Hussein denied there was a law permitting the government to "rent" homes without actually paying rent to the landlord. He said, "That's not true. There was no such law. That's rape or jungle law." Hussein asked to see the law on paper.

~~(S)~~ Hussein provided comments about the 1974 Rabat Summit where it is reported that the Iraqi government gave up its belief in an "armed struggle" for Palestine and accepted a "phased strategy." Hussein stated this was the first conference he had ever attended. Usually, the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs attended on behalf of the government. At the summit, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) presented a general strategy asking Jordan for the West Bank as a homeland. Previously, the West Bank and Jerusalem were under control of Jordan and its ruler King Hussein. Hussein stated, "We approved this after a speech by King Hussein." In Hussein's opinion, King Hussein did not object to the plan "but seem unconvinced." Also at this time, Iraq agreed that the PLO would be the only legal representative of Palestine.

~~(S)~~ Hussein acknowledged that Palestinian groups, including Al-Fatah, had offices in Baghdad. In 1978, however, Al-Fatah closed its offices and reportedly distributed leaflets. Hussein does not know the details of the message on the leaflets but heard it was negative towards the Iraqi government. The relationship between the Iraqi government and Al-Fatah "was not good." Regarding the objectives of other Palestinian organizations, which seemed to differ from those of the PLO and Iraq, Hussein stated friction between individuals or groups regarding the same matter often results in differing ideas being put forth. According to Hussein, the Palestinians needed "central control." The individuals comprising the leadership of the various Palestinian groups were "not on the same page." As for the Iraqis, the leadership met and decided not to interfere in the internal affairs of the PLO. Hussein stated it was decided that Iraq would "help as we can." The Palestinians were told, however, the limitations of the Iraqi government. Thereafter, direction regarding Iraqi assistance to Palestinians,

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and limitations, was provided to all Iraqi government sectors. Hussein described relations with the the PLO during the period 1978-2003 as "good."

~~(S)~~ Hussein stated representatives of the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) and Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) were present in Iraq at times. Hussein stated, "We accepted them as guests." They were directed not to conduct activities against Iraq and to refrain from terrorism. PLF and ANO members were told not to interfere in the internal affairs of the PLO. At one point, the ANO was warned to cease terrorist activities.

~~(S)~~ Hussein acknowledged the presence of Mohammed Abbas, aka Abu Abbas, in Iraq at some point. Hussein did not admit to specifically assisting Abbas. He stated, "If we accepted someone as a guest, we must help them. A guest cannot, however, demand what he wants for breakfast, lunch, and dinner." Hussein reiterated that Iraq considered the PLO as the official political organization for Palestine and all other groups were secondary.

~~(S)~~ Hussein was told the details of a videotaped meeting which took place approximately two years ago between Abbas and Tahir Jalil Habbush, Director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service. At the meeting, Abbas requested Iraqi assistance, including money, training, weapons, and transportation, to carry out missions to attack Israel. Hussein was told the videotape was seen by the interviewer. Hussein was questioned as to whether these actions planned against Israel constituted a legitimate defense of Palestine or terrorism, thereby exceeding the normal assistance provided to a guest. Hussein asked, "What did the Iraqi government do? If you have the recording, you know." Hussein stated that his position is one where attempts are made to regain all Arab lands, including those "raped and taken." He stated this is neither a secret nor is it something which brings shame. Hussein added, "If Habbush and Abbas met, that's something else. We call for a military struggle to regain Arab lands. The principles are the same as that which we have talked about before." Hussein continued, "If Abbas asked for these things, it does not mean we gave them to him. If Abbas carried out any attacks in Israel, that means we helped him. If he did not, we did not help him." When told Abbas carried out attacks in Israel, Hussein replied, "Those occurred before asking us for assistance. That was their choice." Hussein stated, "At

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any time, we have the ability and the right to help in the struggle. I'm not talking about Abbas, I'm talking about organizations in Palestine. Outsiders are not serious." Hussein asked for the answer provided by Habbush to Abbas. The interviewer told Hussein money was provided to Abbas, but not as much as requested. Hussein stated, "This is intelligence work. We have been open about Palestine."

~~(S)~~ Hussein was questioned whether assistance to Abbas would help achieve the goals of Palestinians or whether it would work against such aims. Hussein stated since he was a "young struggler" in the Ba'ath Party, he believed any organization should fight from the inside, not the outside. Per Hussein, any attempts from the outside are just "talk" and "not serious." Hussein suggested further details regarding Abbas could be obtained from Habbush or from further review of the videotape of the meeting between the two.

~~(S)~~ Regarding whether the Director of the IIS would meet without the approval of the Iraqi leadership to discuss such a matter with Abbas, Hussein replied, "Does the American Director of Intelligence call President Bush every time before meeting someone?" Hussein agreed that the President, in both the United States and Iraq, sets policy for all branches of government. Hussein stated, although Abbas reportedly asked the Iraqi IIS Director for 1-2 million dollars according to the interviewer, he would not have given him even "\$10,000." Hussein added, "Any Palestinian who wanted to train and to go fight for Palestine, I said train him. Money and weapons are different from training." Because of sanctions against Iraq, the government could not offer as much assistance as previously provided. Hussein stated, "If the IIS had the ability, it is not wrong as long as the struggle is on the inside."

~~(S)~~ Hussein was questioned whether Iraq's stated position of recognition of the PLO as the sole representative of Palestine conflicted with support provided to other groups and individuals including Abbas. Hussein responded, "I didn't say I helped Abbas. Don't put words in my mouth." Hussein added, "I think the questions should be in the context of a dialogue, not an interrogation." Hussein continued saying, "If the IIS helped Abbas, and he fought for Palestine, that is not wrong. If a person says he wants to struggle against Israel, and that person is not officially representing Palestinians, there is no conflict

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with Iraqi policy." Hussein said any such person who stated he wanted to "negotiate" would not be supported by Iraq as that is the role of Arafat and the PLO.

(S) At the end of interview, Hussein was asked about his movements when hostilities began in March, 2003. Hussein stated he remained in Baghdad until April 10 or 11, 2003, whereupon it appeared the city was about to fall. Prior to his departure from Baghdad, he held a final meeting with the senior Iraqi leadership and told them "we will struggle in secret." Thereafter, he departed Baghdad and began gradually "dispersing" his bodyguards, telling them they had completed their duty, so as not to draw attention.

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Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Baghdad Operations Center
February 13, 2004

Interview Session Number: 4
Interview Conducted by: SSA George L. Piro
Arabic/English Translation: SSA [REDACTED]

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~~(S)~~ Saddam Hussein (High Value Detainee #1) was interviewed on February 13, 2004 at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Hussein provided the following information:

~~(S)~~ The lead interviewer began the discussion by explaining that today's session would be a general dialogue regarding the United Nations (UN) and various resolutions concerning Iraq as passed by the UN.

~~(S)~~ Hussein said, "Let me ask a direct question. I want to ask where, from the beginning of this interview process until now, has the information been going? For our relationship to remain clear, I want to know." The interviewer told Hussein that he is a representative of the US Government, and that reports from these interviews are no doubt being reviewed by many US government officials. Although the interviewer denied any personal knowledge, these individuals may include the President of the United States. Hussein stated that he would have no reservations if others were "brought into" the process and that he "does not mind" if the information is published.

~~(S)~~ When questioned whether Hussein had ever used "doubles" or those resembling him as has been often discussed in books and other publications, he laughed and stated, "This is movie magic, not reality." Hussein added that it is very difficult for someone to impersonate another individual.

~~(S)~~ When questioned whether others in the Iraqi government, including his son Uday, had used "doubles" as has been described in a book by an Iraqi man, Hussein denied any information regarding these reports. He stated, "I think my sons would not do this." Hussein added they might have considered such a tactic during war, but not in peace. He never saw

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"doubles" for either of his sons, during times of war or peace. Hussein asked rhetorically, "Do not think I am getting upset when you mention my sons. I still think about them and the fact that they were martyred. They will be examples to everyone throughout the world." Both of his sons fought in the war against Iran in the 1980s, before "arriving at the normal age." They, and one other individual, are the only ones known to Hussein as having fought while "underage."

~~(S)~~ During the Iran-Iraq War in the battle for the liberation of the Al-Faw Peninsula in 1987, Hussein and all of his immediate male relatives fought. This was an important and decisive battle, a fact which was communicated by Hussein to all Iraqis. Hussein stated, "When I believe in principles, I believe in them fully, not partially, not gradually, but completely." Hussein added that God creates us, and only he decides when he is going to take us. Hussein ended this portion of the interview saying, "If you decide to publish a book, be sure to write it in English as well as Arabic."

~~(S)~~ Upon revisiting the issue whether Hussein ever used "doubles," he replied, "No, of course not."

~~(S)~~ The interview then turned to a discussion of Hussein's view/opinions vis-a-vis the UN in the 1990s, beginning with UN Resolution 687. As relayed by the interviewer, UNR 687 called for Iraq to, among other things, declare the existence, if any, or to destroy, chemical and biological weapons, and agree to make no further attempts to manufacture or acquire such weapons. The resolution also called for Iraq to reaffirm its compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. UNR 687 also detailed steps which Iraq had to undertake in order to have UN sanctions against the country lifted. Specifically, the interviewer asked about Hussein's decisions and the rationale for these decisions with respect to UNR 687.

~~(S)~~ Hussein stated UNR 661, not UNR 687, is the first resolution in the 1990s concerning Iraq which would eventually contribute to tensions and lead to the most recent war with the United States. The interviewer confirmed his familiarity with this resolution, but stated UNR 687 would be the starting point for this discussion.

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~~(S)~~ Hussein acknowledged Iraq accepted UNR 687. Hussein further acknowledged Iraq made a mistake by destroying some weapons without UN supervision. When questioned as to whether Iraq also made a mistake regarding failure to provide complete disclosure, initially and throughout the process, Hussein responded, "That's a very good question." UNR 687 was not written according to the "UN way." It followed UNR 661, issued before the first Gulf War, and similar to UNR 661, was supported by the United States. Hussein stated, "The United States started the cause and others followed. 661 was agreed upon by all parties while 687 was not."

~~(S)~~ After the first Gulf War began, the US President eventually requested a meeting in the Gulf on a ship, similar to the meeting held at the end of World War II between the United States and Japan, in order to discuss a cease-fire agreement. Iraq refused such a meeting. Ultimately, Iraq met with leaders of other countries in a location "at the borders." Iraq agreed to a cease-fire and withdrew its armies. Thereafter, UNR 687 was passed. Hussein reiterated that UNR 687 was approved at the insistence of the United States. According to Hussein, "no such decision" existed before in the history of the UN.

~~(S)~~ When the first Gulf War began, Iraqi military forces were "away from the borders." There were those who wanted to "rape" Iraq in war, since they could not do that in peace.

~~(S)~~ The Iraqi government wrote letters to the UN affirming compliance with UNR 687. Iraq did not agree with the resolution but agreed to implement it so that "people would not get hurt."

~~(S)~~ In Hussein's view, UN inspectors wanted all expenses, including their accommodations, travel, and other costs paid for by Iraq. Instead of waiting for the inspectors and bearing these expenses, Iraq commenced destruction of the weapons. Iraq did not hide these weapons. UN inspectors later requested documentation of the destruction of the weapons and visited various places taking samples for review. Hussein stated, "If it is presumed that we were mistaken in the percentage of weapons that we say we destroyed, then how many mistakes were made by the United States according to UNR 687." These "mistakes" include occupying Iraq, implementation of the "No Fly Zones" over northern and southern Iraq, and the bombing

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of Iraq which took place from the first Gulf War to the most recent one. Hussein questioned why the UN implemented UNR 687 in such a harsh manner against Iraq, while other UN resolutions, including those against Israel, were not enforced. Hussein ended this portion of the discussion saying, "If we were to bring a professor from a college in the United States to Iraq, he would agree with my observations regarding UNR 687, with the exception of the issue of the sovereignty of another country (Kuwait)."

~~(S)~~ During a lengthy dialogue with the interviewer regarding UNR 687, Hussein made several statements. He acknowledged UNR 687 passed and Iraq agreed "to deal with it." Regarding destruction of weapons, Hussein stated, "We destroyed them. We told you, with documents. That's it." When questioned about Iraqi restrictions placed on locations visited by UN inspectors, Hussein replied, "What places?" The interviewer told Hussein numerous locations including the Ministry of Agriculture, to which Hussein replied, "By God, if I had such weapons, I would have used them in the fight against the United States." The interviewer pointed out that most accused persons who are innocent agree to a full and complete examination of the details of the accusation. Once cleared, the accused party would then provide evidence of any mistreatment during the investigation. Hussein stated, "This is not a question, it is a dialogue. Good."

~~(S)~~ Hussein opined that the United States used prohibited weapons in Vietnam. He asked whether America would accept Iraqis inspecting the White House for such weapons. Hussein stated any such search would likely find nothing. He added, "A country that accepts being violated will bring dishonor to its people." Negotiation is the normal method of resolution of any disagreement, particularly among nations. Negotiation is the "way of the UN."

~~(S)~~ When emphasized to Hussein that the international community agreed that Iraq had not complied with UNR 687, he responded that Iraq believed there was something wrong with "the international way." The United States convinced the world of its position regarding Iraq. Regarding further discussion, Hussein commented, "I must prepare an answer in my mind, so that it does not come in pieces. Let's leave the past where it is, not that we agree, but to maximize our time."

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~~(S)~~ Hussein commented that in the most recent war with Iraq, the United States only ally was Britain. All other major countries, including France, China, Russia, and Germany, were against the war. The United States was "looking for a reason to do something." Now, the United States is here and did not find any weapons of mass destruction. Hussein pointed out to the interviewer that decisions were made by the Iraqi leadership and not just by Hussein. Iraqi leaders made decisions which gave the United States an "opening" and the reasons for the most recent war.

~~(S)~~ Hussein remarked that, at times, people told Jesus Christ, the Prophet Muhammad, Moses, David, and all other prophets to give up their beliefs, teachings, and principles to save their own lives. Hussein stated, "If a man gives up his principles, his life has no value. In the case of the prophets, they would have been ignoring the orders of God." Hussein added, "If Iraq had given up its principles, we would have been worthless." Hussein stated that he was elected by the people, and not "brought in by some other country or companies." Thus, he was required to comply with the principles of the people.

~~(S)~~ The interviewer stressed to Hussein that Iraq's actions led to the implementation of UN sanctions. The Iraqi leadership's actions, and in some cases failure to act, compelled the UN to continue the sanctions. Hussein responded, "This is your opinion. I answered." He continued saying that it is difficult to give up "your nationality, your country, and your traditions." Hussein pointed out that perhaps the interviewer and another American might think differently on the subject of Iraq.

~~(S)~~ Hussein said, "If I wanted to be a politician, I could. But, I do not like politicians or politics." When noted to Hussein that some people would state he played politics with the UN, Hussein stated, "We abided totally by all UN decisions." The United States should be blamed, not the UN. Hussein stated, "We are among the few remaining cavaliers."

~~(S)~~ Upon any examination of blame, the interviewer pointed out one must first look at the origins of the discord between Iraq and the world, the invasion of Kuwait. Hussein responded, "America had a plan with Kuwait to attack Iraq. We had a copy of the plan in our hands. If I had the (prohibited)

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weapons, would I have let United States forces stay in Kuwait without attacking? I wish the United States did not have the intention to attack Iraq."

~~(S)~~ When questioned whether the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, which led to war with the United States, also precipitated the sanctions against Iraq, Hussein asked, "I ask you as an American, when did the United States stop shipments of grain to Iraq? In 1989. When did the United States contact European countries to boycott sales of technological equipment to Iraq? In 1989. The United States was planning to destroy Iraq, an intention pushed by Zionism and the effect of Zionism on elections in the United States." This US "plan" was also influenced by countries located near Iraq, particularly Israel, which viewed Iraq as a dangerous military threat upon conclusion of the Iran-Iraq War. Hussein stated, "I believe this very much."

~~(S)~~ Regarding Kuwait and the war, Hussein stated, "It is difficult to avoid someone who is armed and standing outside your house unless you come out and shoot." As Iraq is a small country, it was difficult to stop the United States no matter what steps were taken.

~~(S)~~ Leading up to the most recent war, the United States provided much "history" to the world regarding Iraq. Hussein stated, "It was difficult for me, or any honorable person, not to attempt to stop the United States from entering Iraq."

~~(S)~~ Regarding providing his personal observations versus his opinions as President of Iraq, Hussein stated, "There is nothing I consider personal. I cannot forget my capacity as President. This is what I know and am convinced of. Thus, it is difficult to answer from a personal viewpoint. I cannot forget my role and principles for one second, and forget what I was."

~~(S)~~ At the end of the interview, Hussein was again asked about his movements after the beginning of the war in March, 2003. Hussein stated he was not in the Dora neighborhood of Baghdad on March 19, 2003 when it was bombed by coalition forces. Hussein added that he was not in this neighborhood in the ten days before this attack or at any time throughout the

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war. Hussein believes that coalition forces targeted this location because they mistakenly believed he was present.

(S) Regarding his method of movement before the fall of Baghdad in April, 2003, Hussein stated that success in movement of persons or equipment during war time required knowledge of enemy capabilities as well as "our own capabilities." The persons closest to Hussein (Murafiqeen) would direct him to "move this way or that way." When asked whether Hussein normally traveled in a Black Mercedes before the war, he stated, "Perhaps. We had all colors of Mercedes." Regarding whether he normally traveled in a long motorcade, Hussein stated, "I'll leave this for history."

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Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Baghdad Operations Center
February 15, 2004

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ON 05-06-2009

Interview Session Number: 5
Interview Conducted by: SSA George L. Piro
Arabic/English Translation: SSA [REDACTED]

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~~(S)~~ Saddam Hussein (High Value Detainee #1) was interviewed on February 15, 2004 at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Hussein provided the following information:

~~(S)~~ Prior to any questions being asked, Hussein stated that he wanted to ask a question. He then asked what kind of changes have taken place in the world, i.e., with China and Russia, and in international politics. The interviewer related that there has not been a lot of significant changes, that efforts are underway to rebuild Iraq and this includes support from Russia and China, and that things are moving forward rapidly.

~~(S)~~ Hussein then explained that since he has been in prison for one or two months, he does not have a picture of what is happening. He indicated that he had intended to ask the interviewer this question two days earlier. Hussein discussed a movie he saw, based on a book, A Tale of Two Cities, which he had read long ago, in which a British man imprisoned in a French jail is likewise out of touch with what is happening in the outside world. According to Hussein, the author of this book was critical of French authorities for this treatment. Hussein noted that nothing had changed since that time. The interviewer responded that "Over time, some things have changed; others have not."

~~(S)~~ The interviewer informed Hussein that today's session would be a dialogue about the 1968 takeover by the Ba'ath Party, in particular trying to distinguish fact from legend. Hussein responded by stating in effect that in 1968, Iraq was living in a primitive way and could only advance itself seriously by understanding two concepts. The first was to recognize that the country had historical precedence for change as demonstrated

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in previous ages. The second concept involved the recognition that Iraq could learn by examining the way the rest of the world operated. Accordingly, Hussein and others traveled to other Arab countries. In comparing themselves with other locales, they discovered that Cairo and Damascus were far more advanced than Baghdad. Hussein had many friends who traveled to Damascus who believed that Iraq could reach the level of development in Damascus, but they could not imagine reaching the level of development of Cairo.

~~(S)~~ Iraq's manufacturing ability at the time was limited to making blankets and to operating a canning factory in Karbala which needed to import its materials. Aside from these, there were only a few other simple attempts at manufacturing in other fields. However, Iraq was motivated and had the energy to advance itself. Early efforts resulted in mistakes, but these were corrected. As they progressed, they continued to send people to countries around them in order to gain experience. Among the countries which Hussein and others visited were the Soviet Union, France, Spain, Iran, Turkey and all the Arab countries. In all of these, Hussein believed that the Soviet Union was the closest match to Iraq in terms of the social life of its people. However, this did not mean that Hussein took sides between the East and the West. Hussein stated that while looking at the ways in which others live, we "don't forget we are Arabs and Iraqis and that Iraqis have their own way of co-existing and relating with other Arabs." Hussein added, "Looking at our aims to develop, we tried going for development in all aspects including, political, economic, technological and industrial."

~~(S)~~ Concerning the Ba'ath Party takeover, Hussein acknowledged that they had help from the military who were members of the party. He also acknowledged that Colonel Ibrahim Abd Al-Rahman Da'ud and Colonel Abd Al-Razzaq Nayif, non-Ba'ath members of the military, helped with the takeover. He added that the two had not played an important role in allowing the takeover to be undertaken without resistance or bloodshed.

~~(S)~~ Hussein stated that the decision not to have bloodshed was done at his request, that it was his belief that "we had to forget the past and not have more bloodshed." He claimed that this matter was discussed at a meeting at the home of the Minister of Health, Dr. Mustafa. A few members disagreed

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with Hussein, especially party members who had been tortured by the previous regime and wanted revenge. A dialogue ensued and Hussein said that he, too, had been tortured. Eventually, an agreement was made that there would be no bloodshed. As evidence that this decision was honored, Hussein pointed out that the Ba'athists did not harm President Abdul Rahman Aref, but just expelled him. Additionally, he advised that his party made a decision to release prisoners from all parties including nationalists and communists. Concerning Colonel Da'ud and Colonel Nayif, Hussein related that they chose not to harm them either, but simply to expel them.

~~(S)~~ When asked about Colonel Da'ud's role in the military, Hussein stated that it was Abu Haitham (Ahmad Hassan Al-Bakr) who had a stronger voice than Da'ud, who had no real voice.

~~(S)~~ Hussein advised the Presidential protection, the Republican Guard, consisted of three divisions: Armored, Infantry and Special Forces. Colonel Da'ud's responsibility was not to clash or fight with the Armored Division. This was his only role. Hussein said, "We controlled the Armored Division; I commanded a tank and fired on the Presidential Palace." He said, "Practically, we could have done without both Da'ud and Nayif."

~~(S)~~ Hussein stated, "We got news in the afternoon before the attack that Nayif was offering to join the revolution. Apparently, Da'ud had told him about our plans even though we had told Da'ud to keep our plans a secret. As a result, several members wanted to postpone our plans. At the first stage of the revolution, we discovered that Nayif and Da'ud had been planning among themselves and that they had been contacting other officers outside our line of communication. So, we took removed them on 31 July. It was me who led the operation."

~~(S)~~ According to Hussein, Da'ud was sent to Jordan on a military assignment. Hussein added, "We could have taken him anytime. I went to Nayif with a gun; I didn't have an automatic weapon. With one gun, I took all the weapons from Nayif and his staff." Since Da'ud was serving with a military corp in Jordan, Hussein sent Ba'ath members to arrest him and bring him back to Baghdad. "However, he said that Da'ud and Nayif "were like a knife in our back."

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~~(S)~~ Contrary to popular accounts of Nayif's arrest, Hussein advised that Nayif was not invited to lunch at President Al-Bakr's house. The arrest actually took place at the Presidential Palace. According to Hussein, "We had lunch at the Presidential Palace everyday during the thirteen days after the revolution because decisions had to be made. We were always in the Palace as was President Al-Bakr. Others attended when meals were served. When Nayif arrived, I pulled a gun on him. He carried a gun too. It was like a movie. I put Barzan Ibrahim Hasan, my half brother, in the room to guard Nayif. When I arrested Nayif, he said, 'I have four children,' so I told him that his children would be taken care of. I told him to sit there and then I asked him where he wanted to go for an assignment as an ambassador." At first, Nayif said he wanted to go to Lebanon. Because Hussein considered Lebanon to be a place where conspiracies are made, he told Nayif to choose another location. Nayif then asked to go to Algeria, but Hussein denied this request because Algeria was having their own revolution. Then, Nayif asked to go to Morocco, and Hussein agreed. Hussein took Nayif to the airport in a car and sat beside him. Other Ba'ath members were in the car as well. Hussein told Nayif, "When I promise something, I do it. We promised that nothing would happen to President Aref and nothing happened. Friends know I keep my word." Hussein told Nayif that "he would be in a safe place, that no one would hurt him, but that he would have to obey."

~~(S)~~ Hussein laughed as he recalled the story about Nayif and wanted to relate to the interviewer additional details. He remembered telling Nayif, "When the guards salute, you salute back. If you try to think about doing something, remember I am next to you." He told Nayif, "When you go as an ambassador, act like one. We'll notice if you are planning something or not." Hussein recalled that at the time of Nayif's departure, they (the new Ba'ath Party) failed to ask Moroccan officials for permission before dispatching Nayif as ambassador. At the time, Hussein and others were young student revolutionaries and did not know about such things.

~~(S)~~ As Nayif boarded the plane for Morocco at the Rasheed Camp (military airport), Hussein returned Nayif's gun to him. Hussein described the scene as being, "just like a movie."

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~~(S)~~ Hussein was asked why, if Nayif represented a potential threat to the Ba'ath Party, he was appointed as ambassador. Hussein repeated that they did not want bloodshed anymore. He stated that during the 1959 coup, Ba'ath Party members were tied to cars and dragged through the streets until death. Virgins were hanged on electric poles. There was killing in the streets. When the Ba'ath Party came to power in 1963, people were executed out of revenge. Hussein reiterated that it was his opinion at the time that they needed to forget about the past and prohibit revenge. Hussein stated, "As part of this thinking, we started our arrests of Da'ud and Nayif and went on. Da'ud wanted to be the Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, so we sent him there."

~~(S)~~ In the early 1960s, there was a lot of violence against Ba'athists by the communists. Hussein maintained that when the Ba'athists subsequently took control, however, they did not do to the communists or others what the communists had done to them, at least not to the same extent. He advised that they took the communists to court and acknowledged that some (approximately five or six) were executed. He advised that they released communists, Nasserites, Kurds and members of the Muslim Brotherhood who had been previously imprisoned.

~~(S)~~ Hussein acknowledged that Nayif was killed on his doorstep in London and that following this, thirteen Iraqi diplomats were expelled from the country. When Hussein was told that some people believe that Nayif was executed by members of the Iraqi Security Service, Hussein answered, "God killed Nayif. Nayif started acting in a way against the country. He gave his word that he wouldn't act against his country. He went to Iran, then met Barzani in Northern Iraq, and according to information, he met with Moshe Dayan (Israeli Defense Minister). These were all considered bad acts. As to who killed him, that's something else. Only God knows." When Hussein was asked if he knew who killed Nayif, Hussein answered, "I told you, God knows." Pressed further, Hussein said, "I told you in a very clear way." As to Da'ud's fate, Hussein stated, "maybe he's still alive, but he wasn't treasonous. There was nothing recorded against him." When asked what the Iraqi government's action was regarding Nayif, Hussein stated, "I am not sure, but I think we warned him. I cannot remember." Hussein was then asked if Nayif could have been arrested, imprisoned and punished, instead of executed, and that some people believe that an order was given to execute him.

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Hussein replied, "What people think is something else, but I gave you my answer."

~~(S)~~ Hussein acknowledged that after the revolution other key figures such as Salih Mahdi Ammash and Hardan Al-Tikriti were removed. Asked if they were removed because they were viewed by the Ba'ath Party as a threat, Hussein answered that compared with coups elsewhere in the world, fewer officials were removed from the government. Hussein stated, although positions may change, relationships do not. As an example, Ammash's daughter became a member of the leadership. His half brother, Barzan, was a revolutionary who rode in the same tank as Hussein which fired on the main gate of the Presidential Palace on the 17th of July. He took many positions but never moved up again. Hussein pointed out that other revolutionaries "ran out of gas," and fewer were able to serve for a long time.

~~(S)~~ Hussein was asked about Izzat Ibrahim Al Duri and Tariq Aziz. Hussein described Aziz as being an old-time comrade, very respected in the party, but he was not one of the revolutionaries. Hussein said, "I am talking about seventy persons who went into the Presidential palaces." Hussein identified Izzat Ibrahim Al Duri and Taha Yasin Ramadan as having been in the revolution from the beginning until now. He said they had struggled, but that they continue in leadership to this day.

~~(S)~~ Hussein brought up the subject of Sa'dun Shakir who he claimed to be his lifelong friend. Shakir helped Saddam escape from prison. He stated, "Shakir was waiting for me in the car when we fled, actually, we didn't flee; we had an agreement with the guards". Hussein stated, "Shakir was the driver. He's very dear to me". He added, "When he had nothing more to give, we kept our friendship and love and then we went on from there. It happens. The right people are picked at the right time."

~~(S)~~ Asked about his comment that some revolutionaries run out of gas and that few are able to serve the revolution for an extended period of time, Hussein replied that there were only about six or seven such individuals. When pointed out that some may consider that he, Hussein, may have "run out of gas," Hussein laughed and said, "I don't get upset at questions that go for the truth. First, I wasn't in the government from the beginning. If you were talking about me as President, then no one was saying I

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had run out of gas. I only started in 1979. Before that, there was someone above me. The two individuals within the leadership that could have told Hussein he no longer benefited the Party were Hardan Al-Tikriti and Salih Ammash.

~~(S)~~ Considering the time since Hussein was in the tank that fired on the palace through his assumption of leadership in the RCC and his presidency, Hussein was asked, "Your service has been one of the longest; Is it coincidence?" Hussein replied, "They could have said that. This subject is more deep than the details that you give. A leader is not made in a factory in Europe. Leadership is developed gradually. This was done underground." Hussein's opinion at the time was that Al-Bakr should be the President. Hussein stated that he was elected as Deputy Chairman of the Party before the revolution. Hussein said, "I don't like the government, but I like to be in the Party. Notice my speeches, I never say the government; I always say the Party."

~~(S)~~ Hussein advised that he considers himself to be a revolutionary, not a politician. In both 1968 and 1974, he asked the Party to allow him to be excused from his official position. However, the Party refused his request.

~~(S)~~ Hussein was asked about Hardan Al-Tikriti being killed in Kuwait and was told that people blamed the Iraqi Security Service. Hussein said that Hardan had not been sent to Kuwait, that he thought Hardan had been appointed as an ambassador somewhere else, perhaps Spain. In any event, Hussein denied knowing the reason why Hardan was killed nor did he acknowledge that the Security Service killed him.

~~(S)~~ Hussein was asked about Iraqi leaders being killed in different parts of the world. The interviewer asked whether these leaders posed a threat, was it merely a coincidence, was it purposeful, or did he find it strange? Hussein replied by saying, "The question should be asked of the Kuwaitis."

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U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Baghdad Operations Center
February 16, 2004

DECLASSIFIED BY uc/baw 60324
ON 05-20-2009

Interview Session Number: 6
Interview Conducted by: SSA George L. Piro
Arabic/English Translation: SSA [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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~~(S)~~ Saddam Hussein (High Value Detainee #1) was interviewed on February 16, 2004 at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Hussein provided the following information:

~~(S)~~ At the beginning of the interview, Hussein was informed that today's dialogue would be a continuation of yesterday's discussion regarding the years following the 1968 revolution and about prominent members of the Ba'ath Party.

~~(S)~~ The interviewer mentioned to Hussein that he understood that the attempted coup in 1973 was undertaken by a protege of Hussein, Nadhim Kazzar, Director of the Ba'ath Party's Security Service and a Shi'a from the city of Al-Amarah. Hussein related that at the time, the Party did not know which members were Sunni or Shi'a Muslims or Christians. As an example, he pointed out that it was not until later that he learned that one of the Party's leaders, Tariq Aziz, was a Christian. The Party was successful because it related to the people, and, thus, no distinction was made on members based on their religion or ethnicity.

~~(S)~~ Hussein related that among the Party's leadership between 1958-63, very few members were Sunni. The Secretary General was Shi'a from the city of Al-Nasiriyah. Hussein claimed that when he attempted to assassinate President Qassem in 1959, he knew nothing about the Sunnis and Shi'as. In 1963, with the exception of two or three Party members, almost all members of the Ba'ath Party were Shi'as. After the revolution, people began inquiring which members were Sunni and which were Shi'a. At the time, it was difficult to know because they were all mixed together. However, by 1968, nearly all Party members were Sunnis. Because the Party had previously operated secretly, few knew or cared about one's religion. However, after the

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revolution, people in the government began talking more frequently about this issue. Many were concerned that promotions and demotions were being decided on the basis on one's sect or religious affiliation. Hussein stated, "You would be surprised to know that the Secretary General of the Party in 1964 was Kurdish."

~~(S)~~ Hussein was asked about a perception that Nadhim Kazzar was Hussein's "right-hand man" and that at one time, he was considered a threat to take over President Bakr's regime. Hussein refuted this characterization by saying that he was not his right hand man in the government and that each person has their own duties and responsibilities. He said that although Kazzar was neither a revolutionary nor among the seventy individuals who took over the Presidential Palace, he was a good Party member and a tough individual while he was in prison.

~~(S)~~ Kazzar was not convinced that the military would be good for the Ba'ath Party. He was influenced by the thoughts of Party members who split and believed in a communist socialist philosophy. Kazzar considered the military members of the Party to be old-fashioned and a burden. Despite his perspective, however, Kazzar decided to remain with the Party. Hussein had no information whether Kazzar had met with officials in Iran. He related that when Kazzar's coup failed, Kazzar fled to Iran but was arrested before he arrived at the border. Hussein said he did not want to talk "bad" about Kazzar. He said that when Kazzar "arrested" the Minister of Defense Hammad Shihab and Minister of Interior Sa'dun Ghaydan, it was done easily and did not require a big plan.

~~(S)~~ While discussing Kazzar, Hussein digressed and characterized this period as being the best time for Iraq because "we nationalized oil, settled oil disputes with the oil companies and invested money in Thoura City," which was later renamed, Saddam City.

~~(S)~~ According to Hussein, the psychology of the Ba'ath Party was to recruit young individuals at the beginning of their schooling such as when they were in elementary and secondary school. The Party seldom recruited members from colleges. Their philosophy was that they wanted a person they could mold to "grow" into the Party. In the 1950's and 1960's, the Party accepted primarily young people and only a few older individuals.

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Some Party members such as Kazzar questioned the allegiance of newer officers to the Ba'ath Party.

~~(S)~~ The interviewer mentioned to Hussein that many people believed Kazzar's plan to kill Bakr went awry after Kazzar learned that President Bakr's plane had been delayed and then incorrectly assumed that his plot had been exposed. The interviewer continued stating that Kazzar then kidnapped Ministers Shihab and Ghaydan as hostages and fled to the border of Iran where he was captured by Hussein. Hussein responded by saying, "Your information is not specific. According to my information, President Bakr's plane was not delayed, and his guards were awaiting his arrival." Hussein waited at the airport for Bakr and after Bakr arrived, he accompanied him to the Presidential Palace where the two drank tea together. Hussein later excused himself so that Bakr could visit with his family. Hussein was then driven by his staff through Baghdad. As they were driving, they heard an announcement on the police radio that a coup had been attempted by Ministers Shihab and Ghaydan. Because of the importance of this matter, Hussein pushed his driver to the side and proceeded to drive the car himself to his residence which was located near the President's residence. Near the gate of his residence, Hussein used a telephone to call Bakr, who asked where Hussein was located because he had something very important to relate. Hussein answered that he was nearby, and that he had heard the news. Hussein met with Bakr at his residence. Bakr told Hussein that Ministers Shihab and Ghaydan had attempted a coup, saying that he had tried calling Minister Shihab, but received no answer. Hussein advised Bakr that he had an "intuition" about Kazzar and believed it was Kazzar who had attempted the coup, not the two Ministers. Hussein subsequently asked Bakr to call the Military Division and prepare to go after Kazzar and "to hit him before he crossed the border into Iran."

~~(S)~~ Near the borders of Iran were tribes where Hussein and Sa'dun Shakir used to go hunting. After the revolution, Hussein had given these tribes many rifles. An announcement was put out on the radio to arrest Kazzar and inform the nearest Ba'ath Party unit. Members of a tribe who became aware of this through the radio, saw Kazzar's caravan, surrounded it and detained him. Special Operations helicopters were then dispatched to pick up Kazzar and return him to Baghdad.

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~~(S)~~ After Bakr obtained a clear picture of what had occurred, he started crying, picked up his belongings and went from his palace to his residence. According to Hussein, Bakr said that he did not want to be President. Bakr told Hussein he wanted Hussein to remain in the government so he could "slip out." Hussein claimed to have made a similar statement to Bakr about also wanting to leave the government.

~~(S)~~ Following this, Hussein told people not to bother Bakr and to let him stay at home. Hussein then began arresting the alleged conspirators of this coup. He called Bakr to inform him that some of the conspirators were members of the Ba'ath Party leadership. Hussein then began organizing a meeting between himself, Bakr and leaders of the Ba'ath Party Central and National Committees.

~~(S)~~ Hussein was asked how he knew that Kazzar would be fleeing to Iran. He answered that when the announcement went out on the radio to look for Kazzar, people started calling in sightings of him. Gradually, it was those periodic sightings that led him to believe that Kazzar was heading towards Iran.

~~(S)~~ Hussein was asked if Kazzar called President Bakr, and he said, "No." Hussein said that apparently Kazzar's vehicle had become stuck in the mud. When he solicited the assistance of local farmers, they called for help. It was around this time that Kazzar shot Ministers Shihab and Gaydan. Shihab survived by pretending that he was dead.

~~(S)~~ Hussein was questioned whether Kazzar had called President Bakr to negotiate the release of the hostages, and at the same time selected Abd Al-Khaliq Al-Samarra'i's residence as a place to meet. Hussein denied this, stating that there was announcement on the emergency radio band that a coup had been attempted and that all party members should meet at Abd Al-Khaliq Al-Samarra'i's residence. Hussein did not know why this house was chosen as the meeting location, but suspected that the Party members were being called to one location to be arrested. When asked whether Samarra'i was implicated in the coup simply because of the meeting, Hussein answered that a "committee" took care of this. Hussein does not remember who headed the "committee," including whether it was Izzat Ibrahim Al-Duri. Hussein stated, "I do not want to make a mistake on the details regarding something which I am not one hundred percent sure." Hussein

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acknowledged that Samarra'i had been a Ba'ath member since 1968. When asked if Samarra'i spoke out on issues, Hussein said, "The Ba'ath Party talked freely. This is only a media interpretation that people could not talk." Hussein stated that there are members of the Party still available, and he suggested that the interviewers talk to them. Hussein was asked if he was surprised by the allegations against Samarra'i. He responded, "When we give someone in the Party something to do, we trust them. These and other things happen in a revolution."

~~(S)~~ Hussein then stated, "Whether I am the first person or the second person, all the questions come back to me. I am not afraid of taking responsibility in front of the law or the people. You have to put blame not just on the leadership, but also on the people who conspired such as Samarra'i." Hussein added, "I want you to understand clearly about the situation. Yesterday, we talked about the fact that Nayif and Hardan were killed overseas. Ibrahim Daud was not killed. If the Iraqi government is being accused of all this, why did they not kill Daud?"

~~(S)~~ Hussein stated, "As I recall, Bakr ruled until 1979 but was not called a dictator, but after I ruled, they called me a dictator." Hussein then asked, "After 1979, who was killed or assassinated inside or outside of Iraq? Who was executed from the Ministries or out of the leadership after 1979?"

~~(S)~~ Following these questions, the interviewer said that these are unanswered questions which needed to be clarified for the sake of history. Hussein said, "It's not enough to ask me. You should ask other leaders. I advise you to talk to others." Hussein said he was not worried about answering questions.

~~(S)~~ The interviewer told Hussein that he (Hussein) was answering the questions for the same reasons they were being asked, for the sake of history. Hussein replied, "Sometimes, you see me upset because some things are dark. During this period, we had good and bad times. We laughed and joked. Samarra'i served, and we made jokes with him. He made mistakes. We moved on. I hope you will be just in what history you (the interviewers) write."

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~~X~~ The interviewer told Hussein, "Fortunately or unfortunately, I will have a major impact on your history." Hussein agreed and replied, "Nobody can say I have no bias. People think what they want. Everyone has his own opinions. People are not a computer. We all have flesh and blood."

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Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Baghdad Operations Center
February 18, 2004

DECLASSIFIED BY uc/baw 60324
ON 05-20-2009

Interview Session Number:

7

Interview Conducted by:

SSA George L. Piro

Arabic/English Translation:

SSA [REDACTED]
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(S) Saddam Hussein (High Value Detainee #1) was interviewed on February 18, 2004 at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Hussein provided the following information:

(S) Prior to the start of interview, Hussein was informed this session would be a continuation of the two previous discussions. Topics to be covered would include a discussion of Sa'dun Shakir, among others.

(S) Hussein acknowledged that Shakir was an example of someone in the Ba'ath Party (the Party) who had "served out his abilities." Nevertheless, Shakir was someone with whom Hussein maintained contact after his departure from service to the Party.

(S) Hussein first met Shakir in the Taji Prison near Baghdad. Both Hussein and Shakir had been sentenced to prison upon change of the Iraqi government in late 1963 when a coup led by Abd Al-Salem Aref overthrew the Ba'ath government. During 1965 or 1966, Hussein and Shakir were transferred to Prison # 1 also near Baghdad. At some point, Shakir was released but continued visiting Hussein in prison. During this time, their friendship continued and developed more. Eventually, Hussein and Abd Al-Karim Al-Shaykhli escaped from prison with the assistance of Shakir, who served as their driver during the escape.

(S) After escaping from prison, Shakir was still a member of the Party and served in that capacity. During this period, Hussein continued friendly relations with him. He described Shakir as a very trusted person whom Hussein considered as a friend to him and to his children. Shakir was one of the original seventy "revolutionaries" of 1968.

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(S) When questioned regarding positions held in the Party by Shakir, Hussein commented that, like any other leader, Shakir would accept any assignment. Hussein does not remember any of these assignments and stated this was not important. He was a friend and that is what is important. Hussein suggested that the interviewer should ask Shakir in order to confirm this information.

(S) Regarding whether Shakir was Director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), Hussein replied it is well-known that he was the IIS Director. The interviewer opined that it is generally accepted that someone in charge of an organization such as an intelligence service should have certain qualifications and abilities prior to appointment to such a position. Hussein replied, "We were all young revolutionaries." As such, they did not have the necessary experience and learned "on the job." Hussein added that regarding management matters, they learned from the Party. Hussein stated leading people is the most difficult thing in life. Whoever can lead people in the Party, and the masses, will be effective in their jobs. Hussein continued saying Party members "gave it a try" with some succeeding and some failing. Party members continued in their positions until the responsibilities of their work overcame their individual abilities. At this point, they were replaced. Regarding Party members with a military background, Hussein noted this military experience was limited and did not necessarily translate into something useful for governmental affairs.

(S) Hussein acknowledged Shakir served as IIS Director at an important time of the revolution. He noted, however, that the entire history of a revolution is important. Perhaps, Shakir did not serve at the most critical time. Hussein added, "Difficulties become larger when the job becomes larger."

(S) The interview then turned to a discussion of Shaykhli. Hussein acknowledged Shaykhli was a fellow revolutionary and a friend. Hussein and Shaykhli participated in the assassination attempt against Iraqi President Qassem in 1959. Each escaped Iraq and fled to Damascus, Syria. There, Hussein and Shaykhli's friendship and brotherhood continued and grew stronger. After Syria, their friendship continued upon moving to Cairo together.

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~~(S)~~ After the first Ba'ath revolution of 1963, Hussein and Shaykhli returned to Iraq together. Upon return, Hussein worked with farmers and Shaykhli worked investigations at the Qasr Al-Nihayya (The Palace of the End). Later, Shaykhli was appointed military attache to Lebanon.

~~(S)~~ Upon overthrow of the Ba'ath government by Aref in late 1963, Hussein and Shaykhli went "underground" together. They remained "underground" until the July, 1968 revolution in Iraq and the resumption of power by the Ba'ath Party. Thereafter, Hussein and Shaykhli served in the Party leadership together until 1971.

~~(S)~~ Hussein commented that Shaykhli had a very good mind but did not concentrate and focus on the job at hand. According to Hussein, Shaykhli liked to "live and entertain himself." Hussein told Shaykhli how the Party perceived him. Later, the majority of Party leadership voted to remove Shaykhli from his position. He was later murdered in Baghdad in 1980.

~~(S)~~ The interviewer pointed out that Hussein had omitted some details of his relationship with Shaykhli including the fact that the two of them had served in prison at the same time after the 1963 overthrow of the Ba'ath government, becoming friends. As is commonly understood, the interviewer also noted Shaykhli once saved Hussein's life. Hussein responded, "In what sense?" The interviewer then relayed the details of an incident during the "underground" years of the Ba'ath between 1963 and 1968. According to the story, Hussein was at Shaykhli's apartment late one night. Hussein decided to leave the apartment and spend the night at a location where weapons for the Party were stored. However, Shaykhli convinced Hussein to remain at his place. Later, the same night, the weapons storage location was raided by the police. Some believe Hussein might have been killed, or at a minimum, arrested if he had been at the location.

~~(S)~~ Hussein acknowledged this story is true and that he was with Shaykhli at this time. However, he stated the police could not have captured or killed him. With Shaykhli driving, Hussein went to the weapons location the next morning. Upon arrival, a policeman at the location put the barrel of his machine gun in Hussein's side as he rang the bell of the house. Simultaneously, Shaykhli sped away from the location in the car.

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Hussein explained that although Shaykhli was a brave man, people react differently in different situations.

~~(S)~~ At that time, Hussein was not widely known and was someone who would not have been recognized. As such, the policeman did not recognize him. Hussein pretended not to know anything and asked whether this was "Mohammed's" residence. Hussein was not concerned about being shot or killed as the police in Iraq do not kill someone easily, unless their life is seriously threatened. Additionally, people in Iraq generally "know each other" and there are many tribal influences. Even if the law permits such conduct, tribes will seek revenge. Hussein continued his story saying he surprised the policeman by pushing his machine gun aside and pulling a pistol which he (Hussein) had concealed under his shirt. Hussein ordered the policeman to place his hands on Hussein's car, which had been previously left at the location and was likely the reason the house was discovered. Hussein did not want to kill the officer, but decided to fire a round in the air over the policeman's head. The gun malfunctioned, however, and Hussein "reloaded." He told the policeman he would fire one round over his head, and if he moved, a second round into his body. He then fired a round over the policeman's head and the officer "became like a dog." A standoff then occurred as some of Hussein's "comrades" had been arrested by the police inside the house. These "comrades" heard all the activity outside and told the police their comrade Saddam had arrived with a big group and would kill the policemen. Simultaneously, one of the men in the car with Shaykhli returned to the house with a machine gun. The police then acquiesced to the "comrades" in the house asking them for their help and to be saved from Hussein and his men. Thereafter, the standoff ended without bloodshed. Hussein ended this portion of the discussion saying there are many stories from the "underground" period, all of them like "scenes in the movies."

~~(S)~~ Hussein was told that Shaykhli was described, similar to Hussein, as a prominent and popular Party member at that time. Hussein responded there is no need and it is not important to compare one person to another. Each person is different, one is not better than the other.

~~(S)~~ Hussein acknowledged Shaykhli served as Foreign Minister until 1971, whereupon he was removed from this position by the leadership. Hussein stated that removal of any individual

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from a position requires a decision by the leadership. Not all may agree on the removal, but a majority was required. In Hussein's opinion, Shaykhli could have continued his service to the Party and the government. At that time, Hussein believed Shaykhli could have been "criticized" and given the chance to correct his behavior. Shaykhli would never have been elected as a Party member without the support of Hussein. Because of Shaykhli's lack of concentration on his work and failure to accept criticism, the Party leadership was "not convinced" of him and decided on his removal.

~~(S)~~ Regarding whether Shaykhli was viewed as a potential successor to President Bakr, Hussein did not agree and said this statement was too strong. Hussein commented that it appeared as if the interviewer was implying that he removed those from leadership viewed as a threat to Hussein's position of leadership. From the underground days, Hussein was already in charge. While in prison, the Ba'ath leadership sent a letter notifying Hussein of their recommendation that he become a member of the Ba'ath Party Central Committee. Hussein answered the letter, "What good am I in prison?" He asked the Party to find someone else, however, they did not listen to his opinion. Thereafter, Bakr and Hussein served as two members of the Central Committee, a body considered above the Regional Committee and all other Party components. Bakr served as Secretary General and Hussein served as Deputy Secretary General while "underground."

~~(S)~~ Hussein commented that it is embarrassing to talk about one's own positions. His status in the Party was known, even before the revolution. All those appointed to Party positions, dead or alive today, deserved these appointments. Basically, it came down to who was elected. Hussein stated, "It is difficult to talk about myself." Within the Party, members do not like to talk about themselves. Hussein had recommended that members not talk about themselves.

~~(S)~~ The interviewer pointed out that it is commonly believed, both inside and outside Iraq, that Hussein's potential rivals in the Party were eliminated during the period between the 1968 revolution and Hussein's ascendancy to the Presidency in 1979. Hussein denied that those on the inside of Iraq would say or believe such information. He agreed that this information could have come from outside Iraq. According to Hussein, this

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conclusion is the opinion of these people and not necessarily a fact.

~~(S)~~ Regardless of the information, Hussein stated any examination of this idea needs to be conducted logically. Hussein stated there are many examples in history throughout the world of similar ascensions to power after a revolution. In Egypt, Nasser and Sadat were the only individuals who "stayed" with the revolution, with Nasser eventually becoming leader of the country. In France, a single soldier, Napoleon, became the leader of the country after the French Revolution when others gave up. American history is also full of examples of this phenomenon. In Hussein's opinion, these are the "revolutionary ways."

~~(S)~~ According to Hussein, previous uprisings, such as the French Revolution, were tragedies when compared to the times in which we now live. Revolutions are a new step in government, not a "liberal way" where someone is chosen and groomed to be a leader. Revolutions come from the people.

~~(S)~~ The 1968 revolution in Iraq included seventy "revolutionaries." Very few of them continued in government and/or Party service after the revolution. Some were appointed to positions and performed well, some did not. All of them did not have the ability to lead and be professional. Some continued in service while others dropped out over time. Hussein stated they all were servants of the people.

~~(S)~~ When questioned whether he believed Nasser became a dictator, Hussein replied that he did not agree. Upon responding to a request from the interviewer to define dictatorship, Hussein stated this is a form of government where one person rules alone, without a parliament, council, or committee. Hussein did not agree with the characterization that Nasser's government fit this definition. Hussein stated Nasser had a parliament. However, a parliament is not possible at the beginning of a revolution. Normally, a revolutionary council is first established and is later followed by a parliament or people's committee. Hussein does not like comparing Iraq and its 1968 revolution to Nasser and Egypt. Nasser was a military person who did not have a political party. In Iraq, the Ba'ath had a Party ranging from the cells in villages all the way to the leadership as well as a

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parliament elected by the people. The leadership of the Party and the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) discussed everything.

~~(S)~~ When asked whether Hussein and Shaykhli remained friends after Shaykhli's departure from Party service, Hussein stated his friends were among those with whom he met regularly in the leadership. He did not have any friends outside of the Party and the leadership. A true friendship has "obligations." Hussein considered Shakir as the person closest to him after the 1968 revolution. Whenever Hussein needed to discuss something, he would send for Shakir and they would have lunch together and talk. After Shakir left government service, Hussein does not remember how many times they met. Hussein stated Shaykhli "kept up good relations" with his sons Qusay and Uday. Regarding Shaykhli and the period of time after his departure from government service, Hussein's feelings of friendship remained the same, but the two did not spend the same amount of time together. Due to the demands of work, Hussein did not have time to associate with those outside of work, the Party, or the leadership.

~~(S)~~ When questioned whether he had special feelings about Shaykhli, who was shot and killed in Baghdad in 1980, Hussein stated, "Yes." Regarding whether Shaykhli's killer(s) were captured, Hussein responded, "I don't think so." An investigation took place, but the crime was not solved. Hussein stated that not all crimes committed are ultimately solved. He added that other crimes, including those committed against his cousins and those involving the deaths of various Iraqi dignitaries and ministers, remain unsolved. Hussein noted that not all crimes are solved elsewhere in the world, such as in America, France, or Italy. When questioned whether it was unusual for a crime involving the murder of a former government minister, a former revolutionary, and a former friend of the President of Iraq to go unsolved, Hussein retorted, "What do you want to say. Why are you going around the subject?" There are others who were close to Hussein in the leadership who were targets of assassination attempts, including Tariq Aziz, Uday Hussein, and others. These crimes remain unsolved as well. It happens in Iraq, just as it happens elsewhere in the world.

~~(S)~~ Hussein ended the session acknowledging the possibility that some people may say Shaykhli was killed by the Iraqi government. He added that some people might say anything.

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Logically, those who would say this are probably the same people who said Shaykhli could have become President.

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U.S. Department of Justice

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In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Baghdad Operations Center
February 20, 2004

DECLASSIFIED BY uc/baw 60324
ON 05-20-2009

Interview Session Number:
Interview Conducted by:

8
SSA George L. Piro
SSA [REDACTED]
SSA [REDACTED]

Arabic/English Translation:

[REDACTED]

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~~(S)~~ Saddam Hussein (High Value Detainee #1) was interviewed on February 20, 2004 at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Hussein provided the following information:

~~(S)~~ Prior to the start of interview, Hussein was informed this session would be a continuation of the three previous discussions, focusing on Hussein's ascendancy to the Presidency.

~~(S)~~ Beginning in 1973, Iraqi President Bakr began having health problems including issues with his heart. Despite these problems, Bakr performed his duties as best as he could. Periodically, Bakr told Hussein that he should retire and that he could no longer fulfill his duties as President. Hussein is unaware whether Bakr made such comments to others within the Ba'ath Party (Party) leadership. Hussein stated Bakr felt "close to Hussein."

~~(S)~~ Around this time, Hussein seriously considered leaving the government but remaining in the Party. His main reason for wanting to leave government was linked to the overthrow of the Ba'ath government in 1963. Hussein believed this overthrow occurred because the Party leadership concentrated on the government and forgot about the Party. Hussein did not like the "power" and his position in the government. When he joined the revolution of 1968, his intention was not to stay in government. Hussein had planned to stay involved only within the cells of the Party at the lower levels. At that time, he believed it would be a "shame" to serve in the government. Until this day, Hussein still does not like government. He likes the people and the Party, but believes it is difficult for the government to judge fairly. Hussein observed individuals he

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described as "kind and gentle" before serving in the government who subsequently became the opposite after their appointments to government positions.

~~(S)~~ After the 1968 revolution, a governing Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) was formed. However, the announcement of the RCC was not made until one year later in 1969. The members of the RCC, with the exception of the military members, were not and "did not want to be known." For this reason, the announcement of the RCC was delayed. Hussein was "forced" to take a leadership position in the RCC. Party members asked Hussein whether he wanted the revolution to fail, implying it would without his participation, and that it was his responsibility to be a Party leader.

~~(S)~~ Hussein wanted Bakr to remain as President for as long as possible, describing him as a "nice person." In 1979, however, Bakr contacted Hussein and asked him to meet in Bakr's office in the Presidential Palace. At this meeting, Bakr told Hussein he no longer wanted nor felt able to serve as President. Bakr implored Hussein to assume his duties, telling Hussein if he did not accept the "normal method" of appointment as President, he would use the radio to make an announcement that Hussein was now President. Hussein told Bakr that this means of announcing a successor would not be good for the country, the people, or the Party. Outsiders, or foreigners, especially would have thought something was wrong within Iraq. Thereafter, Tariq Aziz was asked to prepare an announcement regarding the change of leadership. A meeting of the RCC was convened in July, 1979. Hussein is unsure whether he or Bakr called the meeting.

~~(S)~~ At the meeting, Bakr explained to the RCC members that he had wanted to step down since 1973. He further explained to the members that Hussein was ready to assume the Presidency. Hussein described the meeting as being "like a family gathering." There were many emotions present including sadness. The transfer of the Presidency to Hussein was conducted according to the Constitution. Hussein stated a vote was taken, but he does not remember whether it was by secret ballot or by raising hands. He was designated Secretary General of the Party and President of Iraq.

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~~(S)~~ When asked whether Hussein observed any changes in himself upon assuming the Presidency, he responded, "No." He stated he became "stronger and closer to the people."

~~(S)~~ When asked what Hussein believed would have happened to himself if he had been allowed to leave government, Hussein replied that he would have been a regular person, possibly a farmer. He would, however, have continued as a Party member and continued attending meetings of the Party.

~~(S)~~ The interviewer noted his own personal opinion that it would be difficult to imagine Hussein as a farmer. Hussein stated he was afraid to become a public figure. He stated that his situation changed as did his obligations, becoming almost personal. Hussein observed that while he served as President, thousands of people viewed themselves as being close to him. Until 1995, people did not elect him, rather Hussein stated, "The revolution brought me." After 1995 and 2002, the people did, in fact, vote for and elect Hussein. After the elections, his relationship with the people became stronger, and Hussein now felt an obligation to those who had voted for him. Hussein was not only obligated to the people by law, but also to the people "in front of God."

~~(S)~~ Hussein was questioned whether, at the meeting where Bakr announced his resignation, the entire RCC supported his becoming President. Hussein responded there was nothing or no one against him to become the leader. Morally and out of respect for Bakr, some members asked Bakr to stay. Bakr, however, did not allow their wishes to influence his final decision. Hussein viewed Bakr's decision as final because he, himself, could not convince Bakr to remain as President.

~~(S)~~ The interviewer noted reports which stated there was at least one outspoken person at the meeting who questioned Bakr's retirement and stated that Hussein's selection should be unanimous, Muhie Abd Al-Hussein Mashhadi. Hussein stated this information is not correct. There was discussion about Bakr's resignation but no talk about the process for selecting Hussein. Others offered to assume some of Bakr's duties so that he might be able to remain as President. He did not accept these offers, however. At that time, Hussein was Deputy Secretary General of the Party and Vice President of Iraq. As such, he was next in line to become President, a fact which could not have been

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questioned. Additionally, the Constitution specifically stated any selection of the President had to be made by a majority, not unanimous, vote. Some members talked about the possibility of postponing Bakr's resignation. Hussein stated there are former RCC members still alive who can be questioned regarding this matter. The interviewer stated several former RCC members generally agree on the details provided by Hussein about this event. However, some former RCC members also provided information indicating Mashhadi voiced his opposition to Bakr's resignation and Hussein's selection as President at the referenced RCC meeting. Hussein replied that he had told the interviewer all the details known to him.

~~(S)~~ The interviewer stated a plot against Hussein was discovered shortly after Hussein assumed the Presidency. An infamous meeting took place on July 22, 1979 whereupon the details of the plot were revealed to senior members of the Party. The interviewer added that the meeting was recorded on videotape, viewed by the interviewer. Hussein stated this matter was not a secret and the video was given to all Party members. Hussein does not remember whether the meeting was opened with comments by Taha Yasin Ramadan. He acknowledged that Mashhadi was brought before the assembly, admitted his participation in a plot against Hussein involving the Syrian government, and named some of the others who participated in the plot. Hussein's reaction and feelings were the same as anyone who had been betrayed by friends in the Party and the government, sadness and a feeling of being "back-stabbed." This was especially true because the plot involved Arabs outside the government and country. Hussein described these actions as treason and the participants as traitors.

~~(S)~~ Regarding when Hussein became aware of the plot, he responded, "At that time." The interviewer pointed out that Mashhadi was arrested a few days before the meeting, approximately July 15, after Hussein became President. Hussein stated he became President July 17. The interviewer responded that July 17 was the official date, although Hussein had actually assumed the Presidency almost one week prior.

~~(S)~~ The interviewer questioned Hussein as to how the plot was discovered. Hussein asked, "Did you hear the video?" He added that the information on the video should be enough. The interviewer noted the video did not provide details about how the

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plot was discovered. Hussein responded, "These are secrets of the country." He emphasized that he still considered these details secret despite the fact that the event occurred almost 25 years ago.

~~(S)~~ The interviewer then steered the discussion to the video which was not a state secret. The interviewer noted the video depicted several present and future members of the senior leadership. Among those shown were Tariq Aziz and Ali Hasan Al-Majid, who was seen standing and shouting. The video names approximately sixty-six individuals as participants in the plot, including Adnan Hussein, Deputy Prime Minister, and Ghanim Abd Al-Jalil, Director of the Office of the President. Hussein stated Adnan was the Minister of Planning and Secretary of the Committee for Oil and Agreements. Hussein acknowledged that Adnan may have already been appointed as Deputy Prime Minister after Hussein assumed the Presidency and before this meeting. Hussein acknowledged that a total of five RCC members, and none of the original seventy revolutionaries, were implicated in the plot. Hussein denied that any of the conspirators, including Adnan and Ghanim, were his friends. People who worked in the government were not his friends. Hussein stated Adnan and Ghanim were "not close to me." Like others, they were appointed to government positions. Some "made it" while some did not. When pointed out to Hussein that the interviewer saw Hussein crying in the video when Ghanim's name was announced, Hussein responded that, as a human being, he still had feelings. As the head of his office, Hussein saw Ghanim every day delivering various papers. All of the members of the plot were in the leadership. Hussein remarked that treason makes you feel "sorrowful." When noted by the interviewer that one might say Hussein had been betrayed by his closest colleagues, Hussein responded the most important thing is that they were in the government and were with Hussein in the Party.

~~(S)~~ Hussein acknowledged that over sixty people were implicated, although not all were convicted. Hussein further acknowledged that the names of the "conspirators" were announced by Mashhadi or read by Hussein from a list at the meeting. As the names were announced, the person named was asked to stand up, and, one by one, was escorted from the hall by the Himaya.

~~(S)~~ Thereafter, a tribunal was held to adjudicate the matter and to decide punishment. Hussein stated he does not

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remember the exact number or identities of persons who were found guilty and were executed or imprisoned, or who escaped, or who were found innocent and were released. He acknowledged that the entire matter, including executions, was concluded within approximately sixteen days, or by August 8, 1979. Hussein believes the amount of time used during the process was "more than enough" for an unbiased and impartial trial. Although he believes this was enough time to be fair, Hussein acknowledged there might not have been adequate time to "go deep into things." When asked to clarify this statement, Hussein responded there may have been other conspirators who were not identified. Hussein does not know whether there were other participants, but he reiterated that the information available and the time utilized for the investigation were enough to convict those who were identified. He commented that the law says it is better for one guilty person to go free than for many innocent people to go to jail without being guilty.

(S) Hussein stated he does not know the specific results of the investigation. This matter was decided by a court and the sentences were carried out thereafter. When questioned about Abd Al-Khaliq Al-Samarra'i's involvement and how it was possible for someone already in prison to be a part of such a plot, Hussein responded, "Ask those who did the investigation." When asked to provide the names of the investigators, Hussein stated he does not remember. The interviewer noted that Barzan Al-Tikriti, having just been named Director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), headed the investigation. Hussein replied that there must have been a committee, but he denied knowledge of the composition of any such committee. He further denied knowing anyone who might know the composition of this committee.

(S) Regarding the involvement of the RCC in this investigation, Hussein first denied knowledge of any details. He observed that if the matter was decided by tribunal, there must have been an official committee. The interviewer reminded Hussein of a speech he gave on August 8, 1979, wherein he stated that the RCC, formerly numbering twenty-one, now included sixteen members due to the implication of five RCC members in the plot. Hussein continued in the speech saying, of the sixteen RCC members, three conducted the investigation and seven formed the tribunal which heard the facts and decided the punishment. In the speech, Hussein added that this was the first time in the

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history of revolutionary movements and human struggle that over half of the supreme leadership of a nation took part in such a matter. Hussein responded to the interviewer, "Good, very good." According to the Constitution, members of the RCC must be tried by other RCC members, not by a tribunal outside of the RCC. When questioned regarding the fairness or neutrality of the RCC conducting a trial of its own members, Hussein replied that fairness existed within the individuals of the RCC. The plot was not against them, it was against Hussein. Additionally, the Constitution, which dictated procedure, existed well before the plot.

~~(S)~~ When questioned regarding previous statements he made saying the plot was against the Party, Hussein replied, "I did not say that. I said it was against Saddam." The conspirators plotted with another country (Syria) to prevent Hussein from coming to power. While it is true Hussein was head of the Party, the plot was against him individually. Hussein believes there were individuals who did not want him in power because he would not be "easy to control." With another person as President, who had conspired with the five members of the RCC and the other country, others would have been able to control Iraq. Hussein acknowledged that a tentative agreement regarding unification of Syria and Iraq was being worked on at the time, specifically through Tariq Aziz. However, the plot ended that discussion/agreement as "anything based on plotting has no value." When questioned what the other country hoped to gain, Hussein responded, "Ask them. We did not ask them."

~~(S)~~ Hussein denied knowledge of any reward being paid to the individual(s) who discovered the plot. When questioned as to the reason for videotaping the meeting on July 22, Hussein stated the video was made in order to inform the Party of what had occurred. He confirmed that, as seen in the video, there were many emotions present, including sadness. The interviewer pointed out that fear appeared to be the most noticeable emotion, first from audience members, and then from those who were named and shouted their innocence upon being ordered to stand. Hussein acknowledged that he, himself, ordered at least one of the named individuals to leave the hall.

~~(S)~~ The interviewer noted three things in the video which seemed to stand out, including Hussein smoking a cigar, the expression on Tariq Aziz' face, and Ali Hasan Al-Majid shouting

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about Al-Samarra'i and his belief that conspiracies would continue as long as Al-Samarra'i was alive. Hussein responded that he knows the meaning behind each example provided by the interviewer. He stated that he rarely smokes unless the "times are difficult." Hussein questioned the expression of Aziz, whether it was a happy or sad one. The interviewer responded that Aziz appeared scared. Hussein stated this "reading" by the interviewer was not correct, "we were all scared." Regarding Ali Hasan, Hussein asked the interviewer whether he was implying Al-Samarra'i was executed simply because of the words of Ali Hasan.

~~(S)~~ Hussein stated copies of the video of the July 22, 1979 meeting were sent to Iraqi ambassadors in other countries. The videos were to be used by embassy officials to present information to Iraqis living outside of the country concerning events occurring within Iraq. Hussein denied knowledge of whether the video was shown to leaders of other countries. Hussein remarked, if it was shown to such persons, that would have been "a good thing, not a bad thing." Perhaps the video would have been shown to other leaders because another Arab country was involved in the plot. Regarding whether the video was made and distributed to demonstrate that Hussein was in charge of Iraq, Hussein responded that the interviewer had seen the video and "this is your opinion, you have the right."

~~(S)~~ The interviewer provided comments reportedly made by Hussein around the time of the plot wherein he said, "With our Party methods, there is no chance for any one who disagrees with us to jump on a couple of tanks and overthrow us." Hussein stated he does not remember making such a comment, but believed he could explain as these words were a part of his thinking. This message was directed at not only the other country with whom the conspirators were plotting but also to all Party members.

~~(S)~~ Hussein was questioned about the sincerity of his reported previous statements to Bakr in the 1960s and 1970s wherein he expressed a desire to leave the government. Hussein responded by saying that after 1974, he believed he had a moral obligation to the Iraqi people. After many discussions with President Bakr, Hussein acknowledged it was "his fate." From this time forward, he decided he would accept such an appointment and planned for the Presidency.

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U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Baghdad Operations Center
February 24, 2004

Interview Session Number: 9
Interview Conducted by: SSA George L. Piro
Arabic/English Translation: SSA [redacted]
[redacted]

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~~(S)~~ Saddam Hussein (High Value Detainee #1) was interviewed on February 24, 2004 at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Hussein provided the following information:

~~(S)~~ Prior to the start of interview, Hussein was informed this session would be a continuation of the discussion of the history of Iraq. In particular, today's conversation would cover events leading up to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

~~(S)~~ Hussein stated that after the war with Iran from 1980-88, Iraq was trying to rebuild. Hussein likened the situation with Kuwait as similar to when two individuals fight, the fight ends, and the two parties go their separate ways. Thereafter, one of the previous disputing parties is bothered by someone else who also wants to fight. Then, there is no choice but to fight again.

~~(S)~~ According to Hussein, Khomeini and Iran would have occupied all of the Arab world if it had not been for Iraq. As such, Iraq expected the Arab world to support them during and after the war. However, Iraq saw the opposite regarding support, especially from Kuwait. At the end of the war as Iraq began the rebuilding process, the price of oil was approximately \$7 per barrel. In Hussein's opinion, Iraq could not possibly rebuild its infrastructure and economy with oil prices at this level. Kuwait was especially at fault regarding these low oil prices.

~~(S)~~ In an effort to solve the situation and stimulate economic recovery, Iraq sent Dr. Hammadi, Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Kuwait. Hammadi, and the Iraqi leadership's conclusion after the meeting was that the oil price situation was not just the responsibility/work of the Kuwaitis. Iraq believed

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some other entity, some larger power was behind this "conspiracy."

~~(S)~~ Iraq also sent government officials to Saudi Arabia to convince the Saudis to pressure Kuwait. In addition, the Saudi Minister of Oil came to Iraq and held talks about oil prices, the Iraqi economy, and the actions of Kuwait. Hussein claimed that a Kuwaiti official said, "We'll make the economy in Iraq so bad, one would be able to sleep with an Iraqi woman for ten dinars." Hussein told the Saudis that if Kuwait did not stop interfering in Iraqi affairs, he would make the Kuwaiti dinar worth ten fils.

~~(S)~~ Hussein stated that when Kuwait was faced with the facts regarding "stealing" Iraqi oil using the practice of slant drilling, they admitted to having taken "only two and a half billion barrels." They stated this fact as if it was not significant.

~~(S)~~ Regarding the problems with Kuwait, Iraq sent delegates to other Gulf countries which Hussein does not remember. These delegates explained the Kuwaiti situation and the Iraqi situation. The other countries promised to correct oil prices at the next meeting of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

~~(S)~~ At the next OPEC meeting, a decision was made to fix the oil price at \$16-17 per barrel, as remembered by Hussein. Kuwait concurred with this decision. Thereafter, the Kuwaiti Minister of Oil or Minister of Foreign Affairs stated Kuwait would not abide by the OPEC decision.

~~(S)~~ Regarding loan debts owed to Gulf countries as a result of support received during the Iran-Iraq War, Hussein stated these were not loans and were supposed to be free aid from these countries. The countries had originally used the word "loan" as a formality only to disguise the purpose of the funds from Iran. When Iraq was informed the money was actually from loans, Iraq held discussions with these countries, including Kuwait, in order to resolve these debts. Because the money had been "registered as loans" to Iraq, Iraq could not secure loans from other countries in order to rebuild.

~~(S)~~ Hussein stated that twice he discussed a change in oil prices to \$25 per barrel. Once, when the price per barrel

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reached \$50, Hussein dictated a letter to Tariq Aziz, which was sent to the Thoura Newspaper. In the letter, he told the oil-producing countries that they should not take advantage of the industrialized nations. Hussein asked them to reduce the price per barrel to \$25. He commented that this was strange at the time as Iraq had oil and could use the money. When the price dropped to \$7 per barrel in 1989-90, Hussein called for an increase to \$24-25 per barrel. In Hussein's opinion, this price would not burden the consumer or hurt the producer.

~~(S)~~ Regarding the kind of message Kuwait's action or lack of action sent to Iraq, Hussein stated "this confirmed our information" that there was an "conspiracy" against Iraq, the Iraqi leadership, and Iraq's economy. In Hussein's opinion, the visit of US General Schwarzkopf to Kuwait also provided further confirmation. His visit included "sand planning" or wartime preparations for the invasion of Iraq confirming what Hussein and the leadership already believed. Previous to this event, Kuwait's relationship with the United States and Great Britain was well known. When noted to Hussein that the US military visits many countries throughout the world conducting exercises which are not indicators of a "conspiracy", Hussein asked, "In what other country did Schwarzkopf do 'sand planning' like Kuwait?" Hussein further questioned which other countries Schwarzkopf conducted negotiations with in order to enter for defensive purposes. Hussein acknowledged that he understands the existence and nature of exercises conducted by the United States in Egypt and Jordan. However, when exercises or planning cast Iraq as the enemy and include ways to defend Kuwait or attack Iraq, this is a different situation than the other exercises.

~~(S)~~ Hussein discussed the perception in the West regarding Iraq in the months leading up to the war in Kuwait. After Iraq's defeat of Iran, the media discussed Iraq as a military threat to the region. Iraq, however, was not "within Soviet circles" and was attempting to rebuild its economy. Iraq was also starting to build its relations with United States.

~~(S)~~ Soon, the United States made Iraq its enemy through three means or for three reasons. First, the "Zionist" power and influence in the United States dictates foreign policy. Any country viewed as a threat to Israel, such as Iraq, becomes a target of the "conspiracy." Hussein offered proof of this position stating Israel issued an official statement saying that

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any peace agreement with Arab countries must include Iraq. Hussein claims Israel is not hoping for peace, only that other countries abide by their wishes. Israel used its influence over the West against Nasser in Egypt similar to its position vis-a-vis Iraq. This "Zionist" influence extends throughout the United States to include elections. Secondly, there were formerly two superpowers in the world, the United States and the Soviet Union. According to Hussein, the world's existence then was "better than now" as it was easier for two powers to agree rather than attempt to get many to agree. Each of the two superpowers attempted to get other countries to side with them, forging a balance of power in the world. With the collapse of this balance, however, the United States was left alone as the sole superpower. The United States is now viewed as attempting to dictate its will to the rest of the world including Iraq. When countries do not agree with United States, such as Iraq, they become enemies. The third reason the United States made Iraq its enemy is for economic purposes. Certain entities within the United States, including weapons manufacturers and elements in the military, favor war due to the financial profit which can be reaped. This is true for companies selling everything from carpets to tanks in support of a war. Hussein added that America discovered the war in Afghanistan was not enough to sustain the profit making of the military-industrial complex of America. Thus, the war began with Iraq. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, all of these internal and external reasons combined to compel the United States to make Iraq its enemy.

X6) Prior to the invasion of Kuwait, Hussein stated there was a meeting of the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) in which a discussion of the matter took place. The Iraqi leadership of the RCC had hoped the Saudis would "interfere" and have a solution. The Deputy Chairman of the RCC had traveled to Saudi Arabia to solicit their assistance but returned without success. Thereafter, the matter could only be discussed and decided upon in favor of military action. Hussein acknowledged the possibility that one or more RCC members opposed or voted against the invasion, but he does not specifically remember any such opposition. He does not remember if a majority or all of the RCC members agreed on military action. Hussein stated, "I was against attacking if a solution could be found." The last attempt at reaching a solution occurred during the previously referenced visit to Saudi Arabia in which the Deputy Chairman of the RCC met with the brother of Kuwaiti leader Sheikh Sabah.

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~~(S)~~ The final decision to invade Kuwait was made in order to "defend by attacking." Hussein further justified the invasion based upon historical facts. He stated history dictates that Kuwait is a part of Iraq.

~~(S)~~ Hussein stated the objective of the invasion was "the one announced." That is, Kuwaitis were to rule themselves and would decide what kind of relations they would have with Iraq. As for the Kuwaiti leaders, Hussein stated they were "conspirators" against Iraq, Kuwait, and all Arab countries. These leaders kept conspiring even after they left Kuwait upon invasion by Iraq. They were controlled by the United States.

~~(S)~~ Because of the country's "conspiracy" with the United States, Kuwait did not expect the "blow to them." Hussein stated Kuwait deserved "ten blows." Kuwait was not as strong militarily as Iran. Kuwait's lack of defensive positions is not indicative of the absence of plans with the United States. The plans discussed during the previously referenced "sand planning" may have been offensive in nature, not defensive. The reasons for Iraq's invasion existed, with or without the presence of American forces. As they did in the most recent war, the United States "created" the reasons to fight Iraq in Kuwait in 1991. Hussein denied creating this "conspiracy" as a justification for the invasion of Kuwait. He claimed documents discovered by Iraq in Kuwait prove the existence of the Kuwaiti "conspiracy" with the United States.

~~(S)~~ Hussein remarked, "We can discuss this for days." The United States and twenty-eight other countries took seven months to mobilize forces for the war in 1991. This mobilization occurred because of the power of Iraq and perceived military threat it posed. This threat motivated US politicians to support action against Iraq. In addition, the financial interests of companies that could profit from a war also motivated support for action against Iraq. The preemptive strike by Iraq into Kuwait was conducted so that defensive lines could not be completed. Hussein reiterated the lack of American forces in Kuwait does not mean there was not a "conspiracy."

~~(S)~~ Hussein restated that the goal of the invasion of Kuwait was to allow Kuwaitis the right to "decide the way they wanted to deal with Iraq." Hussein denied that the declaration of Kuwait as the 19th Province of Iraq contradicts his previous

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statement. According to Hussein, a Kuwaiti government was established after the invasion and included a prime minister and various other ministers. Hussein denied that Iraqi RCC member Ali Hasan Al-Majid was appointed Governor of Kuwait. He added that the Kuwaiti cabinet decided to "join the Iraqis." When questioned whether the Kuwaitis were given a choice, Hussein asked whether Iraqis were given the choice to voice their opinion regarding the recent war against Iraq. He continued that Iraq's acts with respect to Kuwait were more logical than the United States position on Iraq in the most recent war. Hussein stated the designation of Kuwait as the 19th Province was "deserved and logical." In 1961 or 1962, then Iraqi President Qassem wanted to make Kuwait a district of Iraq.

~~(S)~~ Hussein emphasized that he has already explained why no other actions were taken to avoid the invasion as well as the reasons Kuwait was designated the 19th Province. The political solutions for this matter were completely removed when America attacked. Hussein claimed Iraq "would have gone the other way" if the United States had not attacked. With political solutions exhausted, two options remained. Iraq could have withdrawn from Kuwait, with attacks against their forces not likely to stop during the withdrawal. Iraq would have been the "laughing stock" of the world. Iraqi forces would have been especially reluctant to fight if Kuwait had not been declared as the 19th Province. The other solution, and the appropriate one, was not to withdraw and to declare Kuwait as the 19th Province so that Iraqi forces would fight with greater vigor.

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U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Baghdad Operations Center
February 27, 2004

Interview Session Number: 10
Interview Conducted by: SSA George L. Piro

SSA [REDACTED]
SSA [REDACTED]

Arabic/English Translation: [REDACTED]

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b7C

(S) Saddam Hussein (High Value Detainee #1) was interviewed February 27, 2004 at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Hussein provided the following information:

(S) Prior to the start of interview, Hussein was informed this session would be a continuation of the previous discussion regarding Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. In particular, today's conversation would begin with a discussion of United Nations Resolution (UNR) 662 which did not recognize Iraq's annexation of Kuwait.

(S) Regarding the Iraqi government's reaction to UNR 662, Hussein stated, "Nothing happened." According to Hussein, when the United States decided to attack Iraq, this action made the annexation of Kuwait the only solution. At that point, there was no political solution. Hussein reiterated comments from a previous interview wherein he stated Iraqi soldiers would not have fought appropriately or "have taken care of Kuwait" were it not annexed and made part of Iraq. He again emphasized that the actions of the United States "forced our hand."

(S) When noted to Hussein that UNR 662 was issued in August, 1990, long before any US or coalition forces military action, Hussein stated that military forces opposing Iraq were already in Saudi Arabia at that time. This, coupled with various decisions and announcements made by the United States, indicated a prelude to a US attack against Iraq.

(S) Hussein noted that the UN seemed only to "watch" the Iran-Iraq War for eight years, without concern. Only near the end of the conflict, when Iraq had overcome Iranian forces, did the UN propose and Iran accept a cease fire agreement. In

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Hussein's opinion, the UN "was not honorable" during the Iran-Iraq War. During the war between the two countries, some of the major countries wanted to see "the power drained" from Iran and Iraq. He added that the UN "interferes with everybody." Hussein believes that Iraq's membership in the UN should have precluded its invasion in 1991 and its present occupation.

~~(S)~~ Hussein questioned whether legitimate efforts were made by the UN or individual countries to prevent the conflict with Kuwait or to set the terms of withdrawal after invasion. He denied there was any "initiative" from other countries. Hussein stated the Soviet Union proposed one plan for withdrawal which Iraq accepted. However, the UN did not accept this proposal. Egypt, in Hussein's opinion, "did nothing."

~~(S)~~ The initiative concerning any plan for withdrawal from Kuwait came from Iraq. On August 12, 1990, Iraq proposed a solution for "everybody in the area." This plan included enforcement of previous UN decisions regarding lands occupied by Israel. Hussein questioned why the UN did not attack Israel for failing to observe resolutions. Hussein stated that the "mistakes" of Israel are not considered by the UN. Regarding Iraqi mistakes, however, the UN is always concerned.

~~(S)~~ During Iraq's occupation of Kuwait, Hussein denied knowledge of the commission of atrocities by the Iraqi military. These atrocities include the punishment, including executions, of Kuwaiti individuals who prayed on their roofs, who failed to hang pictures of Hussein, who displayed pictures of the previous Kuwaiti royal family, or who wrote anti-Iraqi graffiti. Hussein stated, "This is the first time I have ever heard this." He added, of the mentioned punishable offenses, he particularly does not believe two of them were designated as crimes. First, the Iraqi government did not force Iraqis to display pictures of Hussein, therefore, the government would not have forced Kuwaitis to do this. In Iraq, citizens voluntarily chose to display Hussein's picture in their homes. Second, neither Iraqis, nor Kuwaitis are prohibited from praying anywhere, including their roofs. According to Hussein, the other reportedly punishable offenses are on the "conscience of whoever said this" and that person is "a liar."

~~(S)~~ Hussein acknowledged two, possibly three, incidents where Iraqi soldiers were executed in Kuwait. In one incident,

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an Iraqi soldier was executed for committing burglary during the occupation of Kuwait. In another incident, an Iraqi Lieutenant Colonel was executed, and his body hung on public display for 48 hours, for assaulting a female in Kuwait. This individual's body was left in public for all Iraqi officers and soldiers to see in order to emphasize the rules. A third incident resulting in an execution may have occurred, but Hussein does not remember the details.

~~(S)~~ Hussein denied knowledge of the number of Kuwaitis killed, military or civilian, during combat operations or during the alleged atrocities previously mentioned. Hussein stated, "It was war time." He added that Iraq is a Third World country which signed the Geneva Convention. The United States is an advanced country which supposedly would not make the same mistakes as a Third World country. Hussein questioned the statistics regarding the numbers of Iraqi civilians killed, abuses committed against Iraqis, or Iraqi prisoners tortured by United States forces.

~~(S)~~ Regarding the igniting of oil wells in Kuwait by withdrawing Iraqi forces and the subsequent environmental disaster deemed one of the worst in history, Hussein asked, "More than Chernobyl?" He requested to know the number of people who died in Kuwait because of the smoke created by the fires. Hussein denied that Iraqi forces ignited the oil wells. He acknowledged that Iraqi forces burned "oil in trenches" as they were retreating. The resulting smoke blocked target acquisition by coalition aircraft and prevented additional troops from dying. Hussein acknowledged that he was told that "a few" oil wells were ignited. He stated that even if he were shown pictures or videos of these events, he would not believe Iraqi forces committed them. He maintained that these forms of media are easy to manipulate and fabricate. Hussein stated his belief that it would not be a crime for the Iraqi military to burn oil in order to prevent planes from attacking them. If such an event took place, this would have been an act of a desperate person who had no weapons remaining with which to defend himself. When questioned if he was offered proof to show that the 150 oil well fires in Kuwait were an act of sabotage by the Iraqi military and not an act of defense, Hussein stated he would provide a response at that time.

~~(S)~~ Regarding the previously discussed execution of Iraqi soldiers in Kuwait, Hussein stated that the information

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about these matters may have been provided to him verbally or in writing. In all likelihood, a trial occurred prior to the executions. Hussein opined that without this severe and immediate action, more crimes, possibly hundreds, might have occurred in Kuwait.

~~(S)~~ Hussein stated that Ali Hasan Al-Majid was a member of the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) during the occupation of Kuwait. Al-Majid's role during the occupation was to "arrange and organize everything" in Kuwait. The decision granting Al-Majid this authority was made at an official meeting of the RCC. Al-Majid was the senior Iraqi official in Kuwait.

~~(S)~~ Regarding other Iraqi officials assigned duties in Kuwait, Hussein stated there were many of them ranging from traffic policemen to high government officials. Hussein stated he has no additional information regarding others with responsibilities in Kuwait and provided no additional names of such Iraqi officials. Hussein added that the Iraqi government attempted to provide all services, particularly the critical ones, such as electricity, to Kuwaiti citizens.

~~(S)~~ When questioned regarding the ongoing Kuwaiti resistance during the Iraqi occupation and efforts by the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) to stop it, Hussein stated, "I do not have an answer with these details." When again asked, Hussein replied that he had given his answer and "I am not a person who gives away his friends."

~~(S)~~ Hussein was asked, as the ex-President of Iraq, about Iraqi policy regarding treatment of POWs. Hussein replied, "I am not the ex-President of Iraq. I am still the President of Iraq." He added that he still respects the will of the people (their support of him as President). He continued saying that Iraq respects the Geneva Convention and that they had asked other countries to do the same. Hussein commented that in his speeches, he asked each soldier to respect the Geneva Convention and to remember and abide by the soldier's "religious principles."

~~(S)~~ Hussein denied giving orders to mistreat, abuse, or torture US POWs. According to Hussein, such a proclamation would have affected his reputation in front of the people and was, therefore, unacceptable. Others may state that Hussein issued

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such orders so that they might absolve themselves of responsibility. If these individuals say such things, Hussein will accept responsibility as commander and admit these accusations as long as such an admission will not dishonor him. He reiterated he would not have given such orders because of what religion teaches. Hussein provided a saying, "There is a well of water in Paradise. If one feeds an orphan or a prisoner, he will drink from the well." Hussein stated the proof of his beliefs is in his speeches. He made this assertion despite previously stating actions, not words, are what matters. Hussein remarked that his speeches as President are important.

~~(S)~~ Regarding the credible information that Iraq removed the Kuwaiti leadership from their country, reportedly with the agreement of the Kuwaiti citizens, only to have the Kuwaiti people welcome them back, Hussein opined that leaders (Kuwaitis) who accept foreign occupation (the United States) of their own country can be forcibly expelled. According to Hussein, the Kuwaiti leaders were not "from the people." On the contrary, they were originally brought in by the British. Hussein stated that he knew how the citizens of Kuwait felt before the invasion and after occupation by Iraqi forces. If Kuwaiti citizens accepted the former leadership after Iraqi occupation, Hussein stated that he respected their decision.

~~(S)~~ Hussein reiterated a belief provided in a previous interview that whoever "conspires against a brother" must be kicked out (Kuwait, in this case). Regarding the tradition or understanding that Arab nations should not take up arms against one another, Hussein stated that he concurred with this belief and that he affirmed so publicly in a speech long before the invasion of Kuwait. Other Arab nations, however, including Kuwait, refused to abide by this principle. Saudi Arabia confiscated land from Yemen. Syria continues to occupy territory in Lebanon. Egypt has confiscated land from Sudan and has acted aggressively towards Libya.

~~(S)~~ Returning to the subject of American POWs, Hussein again denied knowledge of torture or abuse as documented through medical examinations upon their repatriation. Hussein questioned whether such findings were made by Americans or by an independent investigative body. Hussein restated that any bad treatment is not acceptable whether against an Iraqi citizen or against the citizen of another country. He denied that information regarding

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abuse and torture of US POWs was presented to the Iraqi leadership.

(S) In the context of the discussion regarding allegations of mistreatment of US POWs by Iraq, the interviewer stated, "Both the US Government, the UN, and the Red Cross had made these allegations known to the Iraqi Government. These probably would not go to the attention of the President, but they were not addressed by anyone within the Iraqi leadership." Hussein replied, "What I was made aware of was that there was an American prisoner, not a prisoner, excuse me, but an American person. I think an officer. It was said his plane was hit above the western desert and he parachuted and the Americans were looking for him. They showed me the paperwork and I told them to facilitate the mission and to tell them they are welcome. Let them keep the information so they will not say that we reviewed it. Let them keep the information with them. As for the people that are searching, let them come here and tell us where is that pilot, I mean they do the searching."

(S) Hussein does not remember the pilot's name, including whether it was Speicher. He told Iraqi officials to allow the Americans to search for this individual. Hussein stated Iraqi officials "helped" in the search for information regarding the missing pilot's whereabouts.

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U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Baghdad Operations Center
March 3, 2004

DECLASSIFIED BY uc/baw 60324
ON 05-20-2009

Interview Session Number: 11
Interview Conducted by: SSA George L. Piro
Arabic/English Translation: SSA [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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~~(S)~~ Saddam Hussein (High Value Detainee #1) was interviewed March 3, 2004 at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Hussein provided the following information:

~~(S)~~ Prior to the start of interview, Hussein was informed this session would be a continuation of the previous discussions regarding Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

~~(S)~~ Hussein stated that he devised the plan for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Because the geography of Kuwait is essentially open land, neither specific tactical planning nor special assets was needed to effect the operation. Any person with basic military knowledge could have put together an effective invasion plan.

~~(S)~~ The invasion of Kuwait was accomplished within two and a half hours, equivalent to that previously estimated. Hussein stated it should have taken no more than one hour. He believes it should have occurred more quickly than originally estimated due to support for the invasion from the Kuwaiti people. Hussein reiterated a previous statement to the interviewers that Iraq was asked by the Kuwaiti people to invade their country in order to remove the Kuwaiti leadership. When asked to clarify how the Kuwaiti citizens communicated their desires to the Iraqi government prior to the invasion, Hussein stated some, not all, Kuwaitis felt this way. He added, "We felt they were asking."

~~(S)~~ Regarding the assault on the coastal city of Khafji and who designed this attack, Hussein stated, "Me." He added that he would not shift the blame to his friends. Hussein stated that military planning was easy after eight years of war with Iran from 1980 to 1988. Any military operation requires

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knowledge of the geography of the area and knowledge of the weapons and the capabilities of the enemy as well as one's own capabilities. Other important factors include the training, logistical support, and morale of the troops. With such knowledge, the military operation against Khafji was simple to plan. The land was open, similar to southern Iraq, and provided no "complications." The only concern was enemy air power capability.

(S) When questioned whether the purpose of the assault on Khafji was to force the coalition forces into a ground war, Hussein replied that military experts knew that any ground attack against the Iraqi Army was a difficult task. He opined that two million troops would have been needed to fight the Iraqi ground forces. Aircraft, however, could be used to strike Iraqi forces and thereafter return to base. The preliminary information available to Iraq indicated that coalition ground forces were in the vicinity of Khafji. For this reason, Iraqi forces decided to attack the location and to "force a fight." Hussein stated that it seemed that coalition forces withdrew upon attack by Iraqi forces. Thereafter, Iraqi ground forces remained in the area. As time passed, Iraq lost soldiers, ammunition, and equipment. Many Iraqi soldiers died as the result of repeated coalition air assaults without ever seeing the enemy approaching over land.

(S) Hussein denied that Iraqi forces were defeated at Khafji, forcing them to withdraw. Hussein stated Iraq did not intend to occupy the city. Iraqi ground forces went to the location to fight with coalition ground forces. Upon encountering little to no ground resistance, Iraqi forces withdrew on the second day, of their own choosing. Hussein noted that it seemed coalition forces were not aware of the Iraqi withdrawal for a few days. Hussein acknowledged that coalition forces had air supremacy.

(S) Regarding whether one of the Iraqi objectives of the assault on Khafji was to capture American prisoners of war (POWs), Hussein stated one of the principles of war is to kill or capture the enemy. After fourteen days of coalition bombardment of Iraqi forces, Iraq wanted to force casualties upon coalition forces. However, Iraq preferred to capture coalition personnel. In Hussein's opinion, this would have had a "lot of effect" on the enemy. Hussein acknowledged that the assault on Khafji may not have been effective and may have shown coalition forces

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Iraq's strengths. This may have led to prolonged coalition air strikes and a delay in the ground war.

~~(S)~~ Hussein believes Iraqi forces should have conducted their ground assault even earlier. The operation was delayed an additional week, creating an opportunity for the coalition to conduct additional air strikes which weakened the Iraqi ground forces. Hussein denied that there was a plan to capture American POWs as a method of trying to prevent continued coalition air attacks.

~~(S)~~ Hussein stated that he, and no one else in the Iraqi government or leadership, gave the orders to fire SCUD missiles at Israel. He stated, "Everything that happened to us was because of Israel." Hussein added that all the "bad things" for Arabs came as the result of Israeli actions. He opined that Israel "pushes" US politicians and "fills them with hatred." Israel first attacked Iraq in 1981 destroying the country's only nuclear reactor. As far as Iraq was concerned, the war with Israel was "still on." During the conflict in 1991, Hussein reasoned that the United States would stop the war if Israel was "hurt." He also wanted to punish the country that he considered as the source of all the problems. Hussein denied that one of his reasons for striking Israel with SCUD missiles was to cause Israeli retaliation, a collapse of the coalition, and withdrawal of Arab support for the coalition. According to Hussein, the Arab countries which supported the coalition had been "shamed." Thus, any withdrawal of their support against Iraq was inconsequential.

~~(S)~~ Hussein stated there were two reasons for the war in 1991, oil and Israel. He added that Kuwait would not have considered doing anything against Iraq unless "pushed" by another country (the United States). When the interviewer pointed out to Hussein that historians believe Iraq acted first, Hussein replied that this was the result (of Kuwait's actions) and not the reason (for the war).

~~(S)~~ Hussein denied that Iraqi forces withdrew from Kuwait following their defeat. He insisted Iraqi forces withdrew as the result of an official proclamation. This cease fire, including the Iraqi withdrawal, was negotiated by the Russians and accepted by Iraq. Coalition air attacks against Iraqi ground forces occurred while troops were retreating under official

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orders from the Iraqi leadership. Hussein denied that Iraqi forces would have been eliminated if they had not withdrawn.

~~(S)~~ Hussein stated an Iraqi plan of withdrawal existed as early as August 12, 1990. However, Iraq found no government in the international community nor in the Arab world which would agree to negotiate the terms of this plan. The President of France expressed support for the plan, but subsequently withdrew this support after receiving pressure from the United States. Thereafter, Iraqi accepted the previously discussed Russian initiative. Hussein denied that the plan was accepted because of huge Iraqi military losses.

~~(S)~~ The interview then turned to a discussion of a letter dated February 19, 1991 from Hussein Kamil, in the name of Iraqi President Hussein, to Ali Hasan Al-Majid. The letter stated, in part, that the Iraqi military should remove any and all property from Kuwait which will aid in the rebuilding of Iraq. Hussein stated the normal method of conveying directions from the President would be via letters from the Presidential Diwan. Kamil was not a secretary, but was simply one of the Iraqi Ministers. Kamil was "known for his way of doing things." Upon being read the letter by the translator, Hussein asked whether the document referred to items used by the Iraqi military in Kuwait or to things from Kuwait itself. He added that he never instructed the Iraqi military to remove items, either their own equipment or Kuwaiti items. Hussein opined that the letter may refer to equipment in Kuwait that was utilized by the various Iraqi Ministers for critical services such as electricity, water, transportation, and telephone service. He stated the letter was dated nine days before the cease fire. Hussein denied that the letter referred to Kuwaiti property. He stated it was simply a letter from one minister subordinate to another minister, asking for the return of materials taken to Kuwait by Iraqi forces. Hussein stated that he did not issue the letter. He asked what items or materials were taken from Kuwait after this letter was published.

~~(S)~~ When questioned whether members of the Iraqi leadership were allowed to issue letters in the name of the President without his knowledge, Hussein stated, "There are bad elements everywhere. He (Hussein Kamil) is dead now." Hussein denied knowledge of whether other members of the Iraqi leadership acted on authority of the President without actually having power

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delegated to them by Hussein. Hussein acknowledged that the referenced letter was not conveyed in an official manner. He reiterated that the official method of issuance of such a letter, upon orders from Hussein, would have been to send a communication from the Presidential Diwan to Ali Hasan Al-Majid, in this case. This letter would have specifically enumerated the powers to be delegated to a particular individual, in this case, Hussein Kamil.

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U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Baghdad Operations Center
March 5, 2004

DECLASSIFIED BY uc/baw 60324
ON 05-20-2009

Interview Session Number: 12
Interview Conducted by: SSA George L. Piro
SSA [REDACTED]
SSA [REDACTED]
Arabic/English Translation: LS [REDACTED]

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~~(S)~~ Saddam Hussein (High Value Detainee #1) was interviewed March 5, 2004 at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Hussein provided the following information:

~~(S)~~ Prior to the start of interview, Hussein was informed this session would be a continuation of the previous discussions regarding Kuwait.

~~(S)~~ Hussein acknowledged that Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz met with US Secretary of State James Baker in Geneva, Switzerland in January, 1991. From the perspective of the Iraqi leadership, the goal of this meeting was to exploit any chance for peace regarding the situation with Kuwait. When the opportunity was made available to discuss this matter with an American representative, Iraq decided to pursue this avenue. The Iraqi leadership believed that any results from this meeting would "carry weight" in the international community.

~~(S)~~ According to Hussein, Baker provided no solutions for the Kuwaiti situation. Instead, Baker dictated to Aziz certain steps that the United States wanted Iraq to accomplish first. Baker added, "Otherwise, we'll take you back to the pre-industrial age." Aziz told Baker that the accomplishment of these steps would not be possible.

~~(S)~~ Hussein stated that the Kuwaiti issue needed to have been placed inside the framework of international law. This matter should not have been reduced to one in which the strong side (United States) dictated to the weak side (Iraq) the terms of the agreement. Iraq sought a format which did not portray it as defeated, but rather one showing respect for the Iraqi military and its people.

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(S) Hussein stated, "We had a desire for peace." In a document dated August 12, 1990, Iraq expressed this desire through its first proposal. As stated in a previous interview, this proposal was not accepted by any member of the international community. Iraq wanted a guarantee of no further aggression directed against them and an end to the embargo against Iraq.

(S) Without existing in the framework of international law, Hussein reiterated that Iraq would have appeared as defeated with respect to the Iraq-Kuwait issue. Hussein considered the referenced Iraqi proposal for a peaceful solution regarding Kuwait as legitimate. As with any proposal, not all parts will be accepted. The Iraqi solution was never discussed, however. Hussein questioned whether the issue regarding Kuwait was more important than the Palestinian issue. He opined that Kuwait was deemed more important by the United States and the international community because Iraq was the opposing entity and because of the existence of oil in Kuwait. As stated in a previous interview, Hussein implied that Kuwait had "been taken" from Iraq. He added that the world did not "assemble and stop" when Yemen was reunited after many years of separation.

(S) Continuing the discussion of the Iraqi proposal of August 12, 1990, Hussein questioned why it was considered unusual for Iraq to have asked that United Nations (UN) resolutions be enforced with respect to lands previously seized by Israel and Syria. If these resolutions had been enforced, Iraqis would have believed that international law was being applied fairly to Iraq in 1991. Hussein stated that no one notified Iraq that certain paragraphs or sections of the Iraqi proposal needed to be changed or deleted. He stated that Iraq had seriously explored several avenues to achieve peace.

(S) Asked whether Iraqi leaders were surprised at the number of Iraqi prisoners of war (POWs), estimated at 86,743, captured by coalition forces during the 1991 war, Hussein replied, "No. This is war." According to Hussein, the Iraqi POWs were not captured in the classic sense. There were many factors leading to their capture including their loss of communications and transportation, a lack of food and a sense of disorientation. Because of these factors, many Iraqi soldiers traveled to Saudi Arabia for safe haven where they were picked up by coalition forces. In contrast, Hussein stated that the effect

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of the attacks against Iraq in 2003 was much greater than that in 1991. Despite this, fewer Iraqi POWs were captured in 2003 and he attributed this to different factors which existed in 1991.

(X) Hussein denied that the Iraqi leadership was disappointed with the large number of Iraqi POWs in 1991. Hussein stated, "Nothing would shake our determination." He advised that war has fortunes and misfortunes and that this is God's will. Hussein denied that the large number of Iraqis captured by coalition forces influenced Iraq's ability to continue fighting. He claimed that the number of POWs indicates neither the stage nor the outcome of a war. He stated that Iraq had won the war against Iran despite Iran's capture of more POWs. In Hussein's opinion, the capture of POWs in any amount does not necessarily affect one's will to fight, nor does it necessarily force certain military decisions. Hussein acknowledged that Iraqi POWs were released by coalition forces in 1991 and allowed to return home after the cease fire agreement was signed.

(X) Hussein was questioned about the 45 coalition POWs and the purpose of the apparent compulsory appearance of two British pilot POWs on Iraqi television. The interviewer noted that the pilots appeared to have been physically abused and that the featuring of them on television was a violation of the Geneva Convention. Hussein stated that the POWs, especially the pilots, would likely have provided different details about their capture. Some would say they were captured by farmers or villagers while others would say by a "group of people." These Iraqis might have celebrated the capture of the coalition combatants by hitting and pushing them around. The Iraqi military was not always in control or aware of circumstances regarding captured individuals because communications between military units had been knocked out by coalition forces.

(X) Regarding coalition POWs captured in 1991, Hussein denied knowledge of any abuse of them by those serving in the Iraqi military or the Iraqi government. However, he clarified this statement by saying that he did not deny that others may have "behaved in a bad manner" and that he was speaking only about his personal knowledge of the matter. Hussein added that he would provide such information if he were aware of it. He stated that he subscribes to a document much older than the Geneva Convention, the Koran. The Koran and Arab tradition believe that it is "noble" to treat a prisoner well. Hussein

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believes that the principles enunciated in the Geneva Convention should be respected by the entire world regardless of one's circumstances or nationality.

~~(S)~~ Regarding reports that all coalition POWs were tortured while in Iraqi custody, Hussein neither confirmed nor denied these reports. Instead, he stated this information is "on the conscience" of those who reported it and those who conducted the investigation. Hussein explained that leaders command by "communication instruments." Lower level commanders lead by "vision or voice." Without proper communication instruments, each entity behaves according to "how it sees things." Hussein reiterated that Iraqi communications systems were inoperative during the 1991 war. Accordingly, he speculated that some reported acts of physical abuse, such as the burning of a POW's hair, might have been the acts of a "simpleton." When it was pointed out that the abuse of coalition forces could reasonably lead one to believe this was a widespread practice conducted by the entire Iraqi military, Hussein replied, "I answered."

~~(S)~~ Hussein maintained that he does not question the accounts of abuse of coalition POWs and that he has no personal information to either confirm or deny these allegations. However, from a practical perspective, he does not doubt that the Iraqi people, after being attacked by coalition pilots, might have abused pilots especially if they had participated in their capture.

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U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Baghdad Operations Center
March 11, 2004

DECLASSIFIED BY uc/baw 60324
ON 05-20-2009

Interview Session Number: 13
Interview Conducted by: SSA George L. Piro
Arabic/English Translation: SSA [redacted]
LS [redacted]

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~~(S)~~ Saddam Hussein (High Value Detainee #1) was interviewed March 11, 2004 at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Hussein provided the following information:

~~(S)~~ Prior to the start of interview, Hussein was informed this session would be a continuation of the previous discussions regarding Kuwait.

~~(S)~~ Regarding information from the Kuwaiti government indicating that the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait caused \$180 billion in damages to the country, Hussein asked for the source of this information. When told the source was Kuwait, Hussein asked which neutral and legal entity questioned Kuwait regarding the basis of their conclusion. He opined that "no one" asked Kuwait for the details of their investigation of this matter. Hussein again questioned the existence of evidence supporting these Kuwaiti assertions.

~~(S)~~ Hussein reiterated information provided in a previous interview stating, "Kuwait is Iraqi." According to Hussein, Kuwait was "stolen" from Iraq by a British resolution. He added that if Kuwait had not been a country with oil, it would not have been "stolen." Hussein stated that the arrogance of the Kuwaiti rulers made them "stupid" and ignited the war. He further stated that he understands that the United States, located across the Atlantic Ocean, would want Iraq to be poor. However, he cannot understand how Kuwait would want to exist next to a "hungry country."

~~(S)~~ Hussein emphasized that he is not saying that Kuwait did not have the right to make these statements. He again questioned the identity of the neutral entity which examined this matter and whether it was discussed with Iraq. Hussein suggested

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that something similar to a court should have been formed to hear the details from both sides and to decide this matter. However, this did not happen.

~~(S)~~ Hussein stated that just prior to the latest war, American officials said all Iraqi debts would be forgiven including monies owed to Kuwait. In Hussein's opinion, this proved any amount reportedly owed to Kuwait was not a legal debt and was a "political" matter. He added that this policy was driven by the United States and not the United Nations (UN), Kuwait, or any other entity.

~~(S)~~ The interviewer told Hussein that Kuwait never asked for compensation for the damages suffered during the Iraqi invasion and occupation. Kuwait did, however, ask for the return of 605 prisoners of war (POWs). To date, these POWs have not been returned. Hussein stated these Kuwaitis were not "captives" and are missing as characterized by a UN resolution. He stated that many "stories and novels have been woven" around this issue, similar to the matter of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The Kuwaiti POW accusations have been proven to be false, however, similar to the WMD rumors. Hussein stated that individuals often become "missing" during a war. He provided as examples the one coalition individual still missing from the first Gulf War and the thousands of Iraqis and Iranians missing from the war between the two countries. As for the 605 Kuwaitis, Hussein stated that Kuwait knows their fate. Hussein denied knowledge that 605 Kuwaitis were captured in circumstances other than combat after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

~~(S)~~ Hussein acknowledged that Aziz Saleh Al-Numan was Governor of Kuwait during the Iraqi occupation. As such, he reported directly to the Iraqi Minister of Interior, a position held by Ali Hasan Al-Majid at that time. Al-Numan's duties as Governor were set forth in Iraqi provincial laws. Hussein does not remember whether Al-Numan was appointed by him or by decree of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). In Iraq, the Constitution sets forth the authority of the RCC and the President who is also the Chairman of the RCC. Some governmental appointments such as those given to high-ranking officers in the military, judges, and general directors are based on a "republican" directive. Hussein explained that the Iraqi system does not prevent the President from submitting a name for consideration of appointment and requesting subsequent feedback

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from the RCC. Decisions in Iraq are signed by the President. It is his prerogative to consult or not to consult anyone. Hussein stated "his style" was to always consult with others when the time came to make a decision. Governors were assigned based on a "republican" or Presidential directive. Hussein does not remember if he discussed the appointment of Al-Numan with the RCC.

~~(S)~~ When questioned regarding Iraq's usage of Kuwaitis, Japanese, and westerners as human shields during the first Gulf War including the positioning of them at key sites such as communications centers and military positions, Hussein denied that such individuals were taken to Iraqi military positions. He added that the Iraqi government did not, however, prevent individuals from volunteering as human shields to protect facilities such as communications centers. When questioned whether such volunteers existed in 1991, Hussein replied, "I do not remember."

~~(S)~~ The translator read to Hussein an Iraqi government communication from Qusay Hussein concerning the usage of Kuwaiti prisoners as human shields. Hussein stated that he has no information about this letter. When noted to Hussein that the document was recovered by American forces from an Iraqi government building and is deemed legitimate, Hussein stated, "I answered." He asked whether the captives discussed in this communication were ever questioned about being held in Iraqi captivity or being used as human shields. Hussein stated that Iraq released all the Kuwaiti captives. Upon being told the document was dated March 14, 2003, Hussein stated, "It is a forgery. It is impossible." He suggested that the communication should be examined closely to determine authenticity and that he had thought it was dated 1991. Hussein stated that if the date of the document is 2003, it is a forgery. He added that Iraq did not have captives at that time. Hussein stated that Qusay was not the type of person to "make up things." He reiterated that experts in the United States and in Iraq should scrutinize this document for authenticity.

~~(S)~~ Regarding chemical weapons and why Iraq did not use them in the first Gulf War, Hussein replied that he had been asked this question previously and had answered. When noted to him that the interviewer had not previously asked this question, Hussein replied that he believed it was strange that the

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interviewer or anyone else would ask this question, not just at this point but at any time. He stated that it is not Iraqi policy to use chemical weapons against coalition forces. Hussein commented that this was a discussion of history, not unrealistic hypotheticals. He asked how Iraq would have been described if it had used chemical weapons. Hussein replied to his own question, "We would have been called stupid." According to Hussein, chemical weapons, and their use, were never discussed by Iraqi officials before or during the 1991 war.

~~(S)~~ As stated during a previous interview, Hussein acknowledged a meeting in January, 1991 just before the war between US Secretary of State James Baker and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz. Hussein remembers a statement by Baker to "take Iraq back to the pre-industrial age." He stated that Iraq would not be intimidated by threats, however, especially when coming from someone in "a strong position." Hussein denied knowledge that part of this discussion concerned the position of the United States regarding Iraq's possible use of chemical weapons should hostilities occur. According to Hussein, "We decided the right thing to do." He stated that the use of chemical weapons did not "cross our mind."

~~(S)~~ Hussein stated that Sultan Hashem, Iraqi Minister of Defense, and Saleh, Second Corps Commander, represented Iraq at the cease fire talks during the first Gulf War. Their positions and viewpoints were the same as those of the Iraqi leadership, to secure a cease fire and to start the withdrawal of foreign forces from Iraq. Hussein stated Iraq had no goal of continuing the war and desired a cease fire.

~~(S)~~ When questioned about other items discussed by Iraq at the 1991 cease fire talks, Hussein stated that he does not remember any additional Iraqi requests other than the withdrawal of foreign forces from their territory. In Hussein's opinion, the fighting would have continued without this withdrawal. Hussein denied knowledge that Iraq asked for, and received, permission to continue flying helicopters. He further denied knowledge of the purpose of such an Iraqi request.

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U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Baghdad Operations Center
March 13, 2004

DECLASSIFIED BY uc/baw 60324
ON 05-21-2009

Interview Session Number: 14
Interview Conducted by: SSA George L. Piro
Arabic/English Translation: SSA [REDACTED]
LS [REDACTED]

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b7c

(S) Saddam Hussein (High Value Detainee #1) was interviewed March 13, 2004 at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Hussein provided the following information:

(S) After the cease fire of 1991, Hussein stated the goal of the Iraqi leadership was the rebuilding of the infrastructure of Iraq destroyed during the war. This included reconstituting agricultural and economic programs. Hussein stated that Iraq rebuilt "almost everything" and started new programs in the areas of agriculture, education, and health. However, Iraq's efforts were hampered by the embargo, particularly affecting the health and education sectors.

(S) When noted to Hussein that several changes were made in the Iraqi government around this time including the appointment of individuals to new positions, Hussein stated, "This is natural." In his opinion, such changes are a "regular" occurrence not only in Iraq but also in countries such as the United States. One such appointee, Abid Hamid Mahmoud, became Hussein's personal secretary at this time replacing the previous secretary who had been appointed as Iraqi Minister of Education. Hussein referred to Mahmoud as a "senior companion of mine" who had served as a member of the President's protective detail in the Himaya and Murafiheen. Another individual, Tariq Aziz, was named as Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister. Hussein described Aziz as one of the early Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) members. In Hussein's opinion, Aziz "did not gain anything" with this appointment. Hussein stated that he told the Iraqi leadership if he (Hussein) was to also have the title as Iraqi prime minister, he would need assistance from others. Thus, Aziz and Taha Yasin Ramadan were named as deputy prime ministers.

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~~(S)~~ Hussein explained that the duties of a personal secretary include arranging the schedule of the person for whom the person is working. A secretary must be precise in executing his duties. Hussein selected Mahmoud as his personal secretary because he was "suitable for the position." He added that this was his own choice and not a matter of historical significance. Hussein reiterated that Mahmoud had served in the Himaya and Murafiqeen, and that both organizations were composed of Hussein's relatives. At the beginning of the Revolution, only one of his relatives served in an Iraqi government political position. At that time, Hussein's relatives had limited education and primarily served in the Iraqi army and other military services.

~~(S)~~ Hussein pointed out that members of his protective detail did not necessarily dictate the details of his movements. He claimed that at times, he taught them ways to improve their performance and be more successful. He recalled joking with them that he could perform their job better. He felt it was very important that detail members not to be "rough" when Hussein "mingled" with the people. In his opinion, the detail would have failed in its mission if it "isolated" him from the masses. It was also important that the detail be able to alter their duties and behavior to accommodate Hussein's nature. As further evidence of his teaching abilities, Hussein stated that if requested, he could provide advice regarding the writer's interviewing duties. When asked to expound on this statement, Hussein stated, "A doctor does not chase people asking them what is wrong. They come to him."

~~(S)~~ Hussein stated the most important thing is to look at one's position, whether executing or planning, to determine how to perform duties. A person executing orders must be precise and quick. One who supervises must allow those under him to exercise initiative. The "margin for initiative" differs between civilian and military situations. Hussein stated, "The eyes in the field are different than those at headquarters." Often, the "field eyes" are more accurate in understanding a particular situation than headquarters components.

~~(S)~~ Regarding character traits he seeks in subordinates, Hussein stated, "A human being is not like merchandise." One may think an individual is suitable for a position only to later discover that he does not possess the

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desirable traits. According to Hussein, a particular situation may require the selection of a particular individual even though, under other circumstances, this individual may not be considered the best choice. This is particularly true in the context of selecting the right person for military operations.

Hussein explained that the selection or dismissal of individuals for particular military or governmental positions often involves consideration of the perception of one's family or tribe. Another factor to consider is the strength of the Iraqi psyche and sense of "individuality." Although a particular situation may necessitate the removal of an Iraqi from his position, a leader must consider how this individual's removal may be perceived. For example, relatives of an individual removed from office may question the individual's character. Some will ask "again and again" why the individual was dismissed. Others may ask, "Was he a coward?" These questions may even be asked when an individual decides to retire under normal circumstances. The families of such individuals may feel "tainted." Under some circumstances, such actions may cause families to hate the government. Hussein explained that in having to consider these feelings and attitudes, military and governmental leaders were often limited in making personnel changes, even if they were deemed necessary.

(S) When asked about the commonly reported uprisings which occurred in southern Iraq after the war in 1991, Hussein claimed that he had not heard of such uprisings. When it was pointed out that many interviews and reports had documented the uprisings, Hussein asked, "Have we not discussed this matter?" He stated, however, that within a day of the cease fire of 1991, "some elements" had initiated sabotage operations in the southern Iraq cities of Basra, Nasiriyyah, and Amarah. Later, this activity spread to the northern cities of Suleimaniyyah, Erbil, and Kirkuk. Hussein stated that the groups conducting these operations were "pushed by Iran," and that Iraq captured 68 Iranian intelligence officers who were later exchanged for Iraqi prisoners.

(S) At the time of the uprisings, most bridges in Iraq had already been destroyed. Electricity did not exist. Water service was sporadic, and food supplies were minimal. In the aftermath of the war, these factors contributed to general unrest in the country. Hussein stated the "elements" participating in

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the uprisings were a mixture of thieves, rebels, and "those from Iran." The latter group included individuals from Iranian government services, Iraqis of Iranian origin, and Iraqis who had "escaped" to Iran. Their nationalities were difficult to determine with any degree of certainty because many had intentionally destroyed their citizenship documents.

~~(S)~~ Hussein stated that after deciding to reassert government control of the country, the Iraqi leadership considered the southern area of Iraq to be a high priority. It was in this area where Iraqi forces encountered and fought primarily Iranians. After order was restored in southern Iraq, government forces focused on the northern region where Iraqi forces met little or no resistance. The fighting in northern and southern Iraq lasted approximately two months. Hussein stated, "God made us victorious." Thereafter, according to Hussein, Iran continued to insert groups of ten to fifteen people into Iraq to conduct operations against the government. However, these individuals were, for the most part, thwarted by members of the local population. Ultimately, following an agreement between Iran and Iraq, these hostile operations ceased.

~~(S)~~ Hussein characterized the uprisings in 1991 as insurgent activity conducted by "outlaws and thieves." He did not consider the insurgents to be revolutionaries. When asked what factors allowed these disturbances, Hussein answered that it was support from Iran, weakness of the Iraqi government after the war, and possibly assistance from coalition forces. He noted that all government institutions including the police and the military had been weakened as a result of the war. Gradually, however, the Iraqi military grew in strength, and they were eventually able to overcome these rebels. According to Hussein, the Iraqi military's "blade got longer and longer." He acknowledged, however, that the weakened state of the Iraqi military had been the main factor which provided the opportunity for this lawlessness in the first place.

~~(S)~~ Hussein believed the goal of the insurgent activity was to control Iraq. In his opinion, this tactic was utilized in 1991 after Iran had been unable to accomplish this goal through its previous war with Iraq. Iran had wanted to control all or at least a part of Iraq, particularly the southern portion. It was Hussein's belief that Iran also wanted to extend its power to eastern Saudi Arabia and into the entire Gulf region.

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(S) The RCC gave the Iraqi provincial governors control of the military during the uprisings in order to protect the people and the state and to re-establish security and a "normal life." The people and the nation were threatened by widespread killings, theft, arson, and general destruction, all of which had to be brought under control. Hussein denied knowledge of the methods used by the governors and the military to reassert control. Hussein stated, "They were given the authority, and they carried it out." At the time, he did not ask for details of the operation, but he did request and receive status reports regarding the progress of operations.

(S) Regarding limitations placed on the Iraqi military by the leadership during this time period, Hussein asked, "What do you mean by limits?" Hussein denied that the Geneva Convention applied to this situation, claiming it only applied to wars. Hussein claimed that with respect to internal conflict, the Geneva Convention applied only to situations when an occupying power is another country. He claimed that the Geneva Convention was applicable to attempted coups or internal unrest involving crimes such as burning and looting.

(S) The interviewer pointed out to Hussein that international law does not permit the targeting of civilians even when the location of a military objective is populated by civilians and that certain laws of humanity always apply. When asked again what restrictions were placed on the Iraqi military during the 1991 uprisings, Hussein replied that an Iraqi, whether civilian or military, knows what is acceptable as humane behavior, and there is no need for someone to have to tell them how to behave.

(S) Hussein stated, "I am responsible for what I decide." He added that he is not responsible for how an Iraqi acts. Hussein claimed that if an Iraqi wanted to use him (Hussein) as the justification for his actions, he would accept that assertion so long as it does not harm Hussein's reputation. In Hussein's opinion, a leader is responsible for the actions of a subordinate if he becomes aware of that subordinate's transgressions and confronts him about the wrongfulness of his actions. He stated that each individual is judged based on his own law and constitution.

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U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Baghdad Operations Center
March 16, 2004

Interview Session Number: 15
Interview Conducted by: SSA [redacted]
Arabic/English Translation: SSA [redacted]
LS [redacted]

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b7C

~~(S)~~ Saddam Hussein (High Value Detainee #1) was interviewed March 16, 2004 at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Hussein provided the following information:

~~(S)~~ Prior to the start of the interview, Hussein was advised that today's discussion would be a continuation of the previous conversation regarding the disturbances or uprisings in southern Iraq in 1991 after the Gulf War.

~~(S)~~ Hussein stated that he was made aware of the details regarding the situation in southern Iraq in the same fashion as any leader of a country. Whenever faced with a situation, the Iraqi leadership assembled and consulted "quickly" about the best manner in which to confront an issue.

~~(S)~~ Hussein stated that, initially, those who carried out acts during the uprisings in southern Iraq were among "those who had crossed the border from Iran." Others from Iraq committed similar acts, while some were not involved at all in the incidents. According to Hussein, if the Iraqi government response to these actions had been slow and weak, some individuals might have shown sympathy and assisted the participants in the uprisings. Without such a response, they might have acted out of fear thinking that those who caused the disturbances would ultimately rise to power in the Iraqi government. In addition, other individuals Hussein described as "greedy thieves and robbers" might have participated in the uprisings.

~~(S)~~ Hussein asserted that it was the duty of the Iraqi government to confront the individuals participating in the uprisings. Hussein stated that although the "arms of the authorities had been severed" by the 1991 war, the Iraqi

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government "picked them up and struck the enemy." He added that those who would not be deterred by words would be deterred by weapons. The Iraqi leadership ordered the army to assemble as many forces as possible in order to confront "treachery" and the disturbances. Hussein acknowledged that incidents of looting by certain individuals "got mixed in" with the actions of those participating in the uprisings.

~~(S)~~ Regarding the decision to place certain individuals in charge of areas in southern Iraq during this time period and their assigned roles, Hussein replied, "I said our decision was to confront and defeat the enemy." The participants in the uprisings were to be "put in their place," if not by word, then by weapon. Hussein stated that a lengthy discussion of this matter was not required. The individuals who had crossed the border from Iran were members of the Dawa Party. They were assisted by additional Iranian forces. Together, these individuals killed, burned, looted, and committed other crimes. According to Hussein, one does not need to ask what actions should be taken when faced with such a situation. Procedure, however, dictated that the Iraqi leadership meet to discuss the matter. All members of the leadership held the same opinion regarding the Iraqi government response required to the deal with the situation.

~~(S)~~ When asked how information was communicated to him regarding events occurring in southern Iraq and regarding subsequent responses by Iraqi government forces, Hussein asked, "With Iraq being so small, is it possible we wouldn't know what was going on?" He added that the entire population of southern Iraq began migrating to Baghdad during this time period. Information from one of the Iraqi commanders in the south, Ali Hasan Al-Majid, was "cut off" and was not reaching the Iraqi leadership. Soon after, it became clear to the leadership that Al-Majid was "resisting" in Basra.

~~(S)~~ When asked whether reports were true that Al-Majid was actually trapped in Basra at this time, Hussein responded, "In the past, Iraqis did not respect law and authority." When called to military service, Iraqis generally failed to respond. When called for "questioning," Iraqis also generally failed to respond. According to Hussein, national rule was a relatively new concept during this time period. Even though most Iraqis were Arab, they were not accustomed to being ruled by an Arab,

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King Faisal at that time. He was "installed" into power by the British. The disregard for law was particularly prevalent in rural areas at that time.

~~(S)~~ Hussein then provided details of a story about an individual named Madhi Ubaid and his son who was wanted by the government. As the result of a police operation, Ubaid was captured and interrogated regarding the whereabouts of his son. Ubaid responded, "I have no son." The police asked, "Are you Madhi?" Ubaid replied, "No, I'm Fadhi." The police slapped him and told Ubaid "You are Madhi." Thereafter, Ubaid stated, "If the government says I'm Madhi, I'm Madhi." Hussein ended the discussion of Al-Majid's situation in Basra stating, "You heard what you heard. I heard what I heard."

~~(S)~~ Hussein stated that the threat to the Iraqi government in 1991 existed in both northern and southern Iraq. An uprising was even attempted in Baghdad. Hussein opined that those "sitting on the fence" joined in the uprisings upon seeing police stations and government offices attacked with no resistance by the authorities. As the Iraqi government reasserted control, the "enemy" went to a new area or reinforced in an old one. According to Hussein, the Iraqi military strength grew over time and "the circle started tightening around the enemy."

~~(S)~~ Hussein noted that the previous period of lawlessness he discussed, during Madhi's time, was in the 1920s. He added that the attitude of the Iraqis changed completely during the last 35 years under the Ba'ath Party. In Hussein's opinion, with a political party present throughout Iraq, the Iraqi people believed in the government agenda, had faith in their leadership, and were more disciplined than ever before. This led to an improvement in the situation in Iraq, particularly in the economy. According to Hussein, no "poor person" existed in Iraq in the 1980s. Widows, orphans, and the elderly were "taken care of and secure." Commercial products were relatively inexpensive. This Iraqi lifestyle diminished, however, around the midpoint of the Iran-Iraq War and later after the 1991 Gulf War. Hussein stated, "An embargo is an embargo." After the downturn in the economy, employees, and Iraqi citizens in general, were less disciplined. However, their allegiance did not change.

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~~(S)~~ Hussein acknowledged that Iraq was on its way to becoming economically strong in the early 1980s. He added that all the positive things in Iraq had been created by the leadership. Hussein further acknowledged that the economic situation deteriorated dramatically in the 1980s. Hussein agreed that the decline in the Iraqi economy at that time and the subsequent 1991 Gulf War which led to embargos and United Nations (UN) inspections lessened the economic strength of the country. He acknowledged that this decline was felt by the Iraqi people, especially among those in rural areas and among lower income individuals such as those living in southern Iraq. Hussein added that the central and northern areas of Iraq were also affected.

~~(S)~~ Hussein acknowledged that, as a general rule, the pressures of poverty can greatly strain a society possibly leading to revolution. However, he provided several examples of situations involving revolutions in Iraq and other countries in the Arab world which did not stem from economic conditions. Hussein stated that acts of insurgency without a political goal, such as those which occurred in 1991, are not revolutions.

~~(S)~~ The interviewer noted to Hussein that various neutral non-governmental and humanitarian organizations conducted investigations of the actions of the Iraqi military during the uprisings of 1991. One such investigation conducted by Human Rights Watch (HRW), a neutral non-profit organization not associated with any government, provided details about Iraqi military actions. The interviewer read Hussein a summary of an HRW interview of a resident of Basra who witnessed one such event in 1991. According to the witness, he saw a column of Iraqi tanks approaching Basra. The lead tank had three children tied to its front being forced to act as human shields. When questioned regarding his knowledge of such actions of the Iraqi military in 1991, Hussein replied that even though he believes this information does not deserve a reply, he would answer for the benefit of the interviewer. Hussein stated, "It's a lie." He added that, in Iraq, each child has a father, a mother, and family. Iraq "does not have orphans walking the streets." Regarding these three children, Hussein asked, "Who were their parents?" He questioned why the interviewer would accept that a tank commander would act so irresponsibly. Hussein further asked why the tactic of using children as human shields would have been considered effective against those who were already killing, looting, and burning. He added that a story about using children

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in this manner may have been fabricated by westerners. Hussein reiterated that the story did not deserve an answer from him and "the lie is clear."

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Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Baghdad Operations Center
March 19, 2004

DECLASSIFIED BY uc/baw 60324
ON 05-21-2009

Interview Session Number: 16
Interview Conducted by: SSA George L. Piro
Arabic/English Translation: SSA [REDACTED]
LS [REDACTED]

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~~(S)~~ Saddam Hussein (High Value Detainee #1) was interviewed March 19, 2004 at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Hussein provided the following information:

~~(S)~~ Prior to the start of the interview, Hussein was advised that today's discussion would include the viewing of a documentary regarding the situation in southern Iraq in 1991 in the aftermath of the first Gulf War.

~~(S)~~ Hussein provided comments before viewing the documentary. He stated that each person presents information from a certain background, based upon his beliefs and life experiences. Despite having his own opinion, a person is affected by the thoughts of others. Any person presenting information on Iraq or any other country speaks from three viewpoints. The first is a "divine scale" according to his own beliefs. The second is a scale based upon his life experiences in his own country. The third and final viewpoint is based upon what is known by the person regarding information from the United Nations (UN) and international law. Hussein then asked the interviewer, "What is your scale as you show the film?" Hussein offered that this information would enable him to comment and answer questions in the best manner.

~~(S)~~ The interviewer told Hussein that one must listen to all the facts and find the truth. Hussein asked, "How will you know the truth?" He added that the interviewer would be using western media, possibly biased, to determine the truth. Hussein stated, "Your army occupies my country. You are free. I am a prisoner." He added that one who searches for the truth must directly contact the people who were involved in the matter of concern. In the instance of southern Iraq in 1991 after the war, Hussein stated one would have to speak to "those who were

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violated, such as women," by those who were sent by Iran. Those same individuals sent by Iran committed other acts in southern Iraq including looting, burning, and killing. Hussein stated that one should contact others who share his (Hussein's) opinion.

(S) Hussein opined that a documentary such as this, prepared in the west and first broadcast in America, is not a neutral film produced by neutral individuals. He added that the film is likely based upon the teachings of Christ, the laws of the United States, international law, and life in the United States. Hussein emphasized that he did not want to put the interviewer in a difficult position. He added that the interviewer must "learn the truth as it is" not as Hussein tells it, nor as the film producers tell it.

(S) The interviewer then started the approximate one hour documentary. Hussein stated that the scene showing Shias in southern Iraq "could be seen anywhere, even now." He stated that the Shias shown in Karbala in the mosque were not confined and surrounded, as depicted. In reference to the reporter's words regarding scenes showing Iraqi tanks approaching the mosque, Hussein asked, "Where are the tanks?" He added that a statement in the documentary indicating that President Bush "encouraged" the Shias to rise up against the Iraqi government is "a confession of the crime."

(S) Hussein asked various questions including the date of the documentary, the name of the commentator, and the name of the non-governmental organization for whom the reporter worked.

(S) Regarding the scene showing Shias who had fled southern Iraq and traveled to Kurdish territory in northern Iraq, Hussein stated these individuals "do not appear to be scared, they appear to be happy." He added that these individuals looked Kurdish, not Shia.

(S) After viewing approximately 23 minutes of the documentary, Hussein stated that his exercise time and prayer time had arrived. When the interviewer noted to Hussein that his exercise period could be postponed until later in the day, he replied, "I think it is enough so far." Hussein added that the documentary could be viewed another day and asked, "Why rush?"

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(S) Hussein then provided several comments without further prompting or questioning. He noted that the documentary states the Shia rose up against the Iraqi government with the encouragement of President Bush. Hussein stated that the "traitors rose up at the order of a foreign country" and declared war on their own country.

(S) Hussein stated that the interview of Shia Ayatollah Khoei demonstrates a contradiction in the truth. According to the commentator, Khoei believes in the peaceful aspect of his religion. Hussein stated Khoei's reply to commentator questioning indicates he does not agree with the mixing of politics and terror/violence. According to Hussein, this is in direct contradiction to the actions of the Shia.

(S) Regarding the film's depiction of Shia conduct, Hussein reiterated "we can see this anywhere." Hussein stated that if an insurgent does not surrender his weapon, he will be confronted with force. He added that the Shia used the Imam Hussein shrine in Karbala as a headquarters for their resistance. Hussein stated that the blood shown on the inside walls of the shrine was from Iraqi "comrades" executed in the building and not from Shias killed during an Iraqi government assault.

(S) Hussein stated that the individual shown in the film whose tongue was reportedly cut out may have simply been a mute. The documentary provided no information about why or who cut his tongue, other than Iraqi military intelligence.

(S) Hussein opined that the Kurdish individuals shown walking and departing their villages may have been "migrating." He added that they may have been moving to avoid a combat zone.

(S) Hussein asked whether the commentator questioned the Shias regarding the things they lost when the "criminals came and occupied their city." He stated that he felt sorry for someone who watches this documentary and does not know the truth. Hussein asked rhetorically, "How would someone know the Shia would act this way about something that happened 1300 years ago?"

(S) Hussein agreed to continue viewing the documentary and to provide his comments at a later date.

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U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Baghdad Operations Center
March 23, 2004

DECLASSIFIED BY uc/baw 60324
ON 05-21-2009

Interview Session Number: 17
Interview Conducted by: SSA George L. Piro
Arabic/English Translation: SSA [REDACTED]
LS [REDACTED]

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~~(S)~~ Saddam Hussein (High Value Detainee #1) was interviewed March 23, 2004 at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Hussein provided the following information:

~~(S)~~ Prior to the start of the interview, Hussein was advised that today's discussion would be a continuation of the previous meeting. He was informed this discussion would include the viewing of the remaining portion of a documentary regarding the situation in southern Iraq in 1991 in the aftermath of the first Gulf War. Made in 1993, the film is titled "Saddam Hussein's Latest War" and is narrated by British commentator Michael Wood. The interviewer began today's viewing of the documentary approximately twenty-two minutes and thirty seconds into the program.

~~(S)~~ Hussein questioned the source of the figure 300,000 provided by a speaker in the documentary as the estimated number of Shias killed in southern Iraq by the Iraqi government. The interviewer noted that this figure had been discussed during the portion of the documentary viewed in the previous session and its source was the Iraqi government. According to the film, the Iraqi government informed the Kurds that this number of Shias had been killed. The interviewer added that this message from the Iraqi government is believed to have been intended as a warning to the Kurds not to defy the government.

~~(S)~~ The film depicted scenes of Iraqi government actions against the Marsh Arabs in southern Iraq including the poisoning of water resulting in the killing of fish, the destruction of villages, and the draining of the marshes. Hussein commented that some of the scenes shown did not appear to have been filmed at the site of the marshes. As the documentary continued, one scene showed a Marsh Arab female commenting on the

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treatment of her people by the Iraqi government. She stated that they had nothing left and had to leave their homes with only a few possessions. Hussein laughed and asked, "What did she have before? Reeds?"

~~(S)~~ The documentary then showed additional scenes and provided commentary about the Iraqi government's treatment of the Shias in southern Iraq, the Kurds in northern Iraq, and the Marsh Arabs. The film discussed the possibility of placing Hussein on trial for these atrocities. Hussein stated, "Now that they have apprehended me, let them put me on trial."

~~(S)~~ The film then ended after a total of approximately fifty-five minutes and fifty seconds. Upon asking the interviewer, Hussein was informed this documentary was made in 1993.

~~(S)~~ Regarding the assignment of certain senior Iraqi leaders to positions in southern Iraq in 1991 who would bear the responsibility of dealing with the Shia uprising, Hussein stated, "We assigned responsibility to whoever was going to handle the situation." Hussein denied that he previously stated he did not want to know the details of how the uprising would be stopped and that he only wanted to know the results. Hussein asked, "Who says I did not want to know how?" Upon being informed by the interviewer that Hussein made this previous assertion, he stated that any person's main goal would have been to stop the disturbances and to end the "treason."

~~(S)~~ The interviewer noted that this documentary shows the cost, human and otherwise, of stopping the treason. Hussein stated that nothing was shown in this film. According to Hussein, it shows individuals who were apprehended by the Iraqi government and some government officials who "behaved in a wrong manner when they struck them." He acknowledged that the documentary shows scenes of other topics.

~~(S)~~ The conversation turned to a discussion about the definition of treason versus a revolution. The interviewer reminded Hussein that he had observed a portion of the film in the previous session claiming that President Bush encouraged the Shia to revolt against the Iraqi government in 1991. The interviewer further reminded him that Hussein previously stated that the Shia, after Bush's encouragement, turned against their

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own country and that Hussein previously stated he considered the Shia to be traitors. The interviewer noted that some would describe the Ba'ath Party in the same fashion regarding various coup attempts and successful coups in 1959, 1963, and 1968. The interviewer further noted to Hussein that some describe a failed uprising as treason, while a successful one is viewed as a revolution. Hussein stated, "I do not have a comment." He added that it was "beneath him" to comment about this documentary. Hussein characterized the film as not being objective and opined that it was made as further justification for "what was being done against Iraq" including the partitioning of the country.

~~(S)~~ Hussein stated that an accused individual should be allowed to defend himself. He asked whether Iraq was afforded the opportunity to defend itself regarding the information in this film. Hussein questioned the appropriateness of interviewing the President of Iraq about such a "propaganda film." He added, "We should stop this program." Hussein asserted that he had answered all of the interviewer's questions. He affirmed that he would not comment on such propaganda films.

~~(S)~~ Hussein acknowledged that Muhammad Hamza Al-Zubaidi and Kamal Mustapha Abdallah were sent to Nasiriyya in 1991 to confront the Shia uprising in that area. Similarly, Hussein Kamil was sent to Karbala, Ali Hasan Al-Majid was sent to Basra, and Izzat Ibrahim Al-Duri was sent to Al-Hilla.

~~(S)~~ Hussein described Al-Zubaidi as a "comrade in our party" who had reached the leadership position of Prime Minister. Hussein stated that he considers every Iraqi to be a good person until that person demonstrates otherwise to him. He characterized Al-Zubaidi as "good." Hussein acknowledged that Al-Zubaidi was one of the few Shia in the Iraqi senior leadership. When asked whether Al-Zubaidi was respected by his colleagues, Hussein stated, "That is another thing, something different." Hussein refused to explain this comment any further. He added, as previously stated, that he will only say good things about his comrades. Based upon Hussein's answer, the interviewer stated that one might presume that Al-Zubaidi was not in good standing with his colleagues. Hussein replied that the interviewer could presume as he wished, positively or negatively, about Al-Zubaidi. He added, "I gave my answer."

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(S) Hussein acknowledged that Abdallah was a distant cousin and member of the Ba'ath Party. He stated that Abdallah served as an officer in the Iraqi Army but was not "in the government." Abdallah assumed the same duties as any other military officer in the army. Hussein stated that he does not remember the location of Abdallah's assignments. When asked whether Abdallah held the position of Secretary General of the Republican Guard (RG) and Special Republican Guard (SRG), Hussein replied, "I thought the questions related to what happened in the South." The interviewer noted that Hussein's perspective on members of the Iraqi leadership is important. Hussein reiterated that he has faith and trust in anyone, whether in the party, the government, or the military, until that person "behaves badly." He added that if he does not describe someone as "bad" that means the person is good. Hussein further characterized a "bad" person as someone who behaves in a manner contrary to the trust existing between him and the person.

(S) Hussein stated that during the war with Iran, the RG assumed duties on the front lines leaving Baghdad and the Presidential Palace unguarded. Thus, the SRG was formed, first of companies, then with regiments. At that time, many young officers served in the SRG including Abdallah. He would later become commander of the SRG. However, the commanders of the SRG and RG were not necessarily Hussein's relatives. Abdallah was one of the many individuals in the Iraqi leadership. Hussein stated that Abdallah performed his duties as would any other officer.

(S) When questioned about the instructions given by the Iraqi leadership to Al-Zubaidi and Abdallah regarding the response necessary for the Shia uprising in southern Iraq, Hussein stated, "I explained during the last meeting." Hussein added that during the last session he also explained how information regarding the situation in southern Iraq in 1991 was communicated back to the Iraqi leadership. The interviewer noted to Hussein that Al-Zubaidi and Abdallah are in the custody of coalition forces. Hussein stated, "What do I want from them?" He asked rhetorically, "Do you think I would answer based upon who is in custody?" He added, "I am afraid of no one. I am only afraid of God." Hussein stated his answers are not based upon who is in custody but upon what he believes to be the truth. His answers are not dependent upon who is alive or dead. Hussein stated that he is not the type person who would blame someone

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because that person is dead, such as blaming the late Hussein Kamil. He added, "I will only talk about myself." Hussein recommended that the interviewer talk directly to Al-Zubaidi and Abdallah as they "know themselves better."

~~(S)~~ Hussein reiterated a statement made during a previous interview saying "any person answering you who, if it lessened their burden, and it does not harm my reputation, I will accept."

~~(S)~~ The interviewer ended the questioning telling Hussein that he did not wish to further delay his (Hussein's) prayer and meal time. Hussein stated, "Any government, if it is to lessen its sins in the eyes of God, then it should do so." He added, "The sins of a government are not few." Hussein ended the session saying that it was good that the interviewer did not prevent him from praying, as this would be one less sin.

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U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Baghdad Operations Center
March 28, 2004

DECLASSIFIED BY uc/baw 60324
ON 05-21-2009

Interview Session Number: 18
Interview Conducted by: SSA George L. Piro
Arabic/English Translation: SSA [REDACTED]
LS [REDACTED]

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(S) Saddam Hussein (High Value Detainee #1) was interviewed March 28, 2004 at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Hussein provided the following information:

(S) Prior to the start of the interview, Hussein was advised that today's discussion would be a continuation of the previous meetings regarding the Shia uprisings in southern Iraq in 1991.

(S) Hussein stated that it is natural for the leader of a political party, such as the Ba'ath, to attempt to know as many members of the party as possible. For Hussein, however, it was difficult to become acquainted with Ba'ath Party members outside of the senior leadership. Nevertheless, Hussein attempted to know as many members of the Party as possible, just as he tried to meet many individuals of the general population of Iraq.

(S) The interviewer asked about the communication system between the various levels of the Party from the local to the national level and how much information the Iraqi senior leadership actually saw. Hussein stated that the Iraqi senior leaders received information regarding their Party much in the same manner as Democrats and Republicans in America. When a directive was issued by the leadership, instructions were sent to all Party members. When a Party member desired a certain action, a request was submitted through the appropriate channels to the Iraqi leadership. Hussein was questioned about his feelings regarding the importance of Party members informing him of the local situation. He stated, "There is a difference between desire and what is possible."

(S) The interviewer stated that a number of documents describing the 1991 uprisings and Ba'ath Party activities during

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this period were recovered after the invasion of coalition forces in 2003. The translator read to Hussein portions of copies of two documents written in Arabic. One document, dated April 11, 1991, described as report number 7/1/383, signed by Hussein Hamza Abbas, Secretary General of the Saddam Section Command, was sent to the Secretary General of the Wasit Section Command. According to the document, Abbas wrote the letter to explain and clarify his conduct during the "disturbances" of March, 1991. The second document, dated April, 1991, bearing no report number, signed by Anwar Saeed Omar, Secretary General of the Wasit Section Command, was directed to an unstated, but presumably, higher command element. This document explains certain actions taken during "disturbances" in the cities of Basra and Wasit in March, 1991 including the arrest of approximately 700 military and civilian suspects in Basra. In the letter, Omar states that interrogation committees were formed and that he was put in charge of the Second Corps Committee. Omar writes that he personally executed two individuals on the same day he began interrogations. He further states that an additional forty-two individuals were executed after four more days of interrogation.

~~TS~~ When questioned about the seeming contradiction in the actions described in these documents and Iraq's justice system, Hussein asked, "Where is the contradiction?" He added that committees were formed, questioning occurred, and judgement was passed. Hussein asked, "What was the alternative?"

~~TS~~ The interviewer noted to Hussein that the documents appear to describe a situation where individuals were not investigated by a neutral entity. The necessity of a neutral investigative body was previously discussed by Hussein with respect to the situation in Kuwait and crimes reportedly committed by the Iraqi military during occupation of the country in 1991. The interviewer further noted that the individuals appeared not to have the chance to defend themselves, as also previously mentioned by Hussein as being important. Hussein stated, "I did not say anything about Kuwaitis." He commented that Kuwait and this issue are "two different things." These documents discuss acts of "treachery and sabotage." Hussein stated that it appears that the individuals did have a chance to defend themselves. The interviewer noted that it appears the two individuals mentioned were not given the opportunity to defend themselves and were executed on the spot. Hussein responded, "Possibly. Possibly not." He added that this is a report which

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may not have included all the details. Hussein stated the author may have been simply bragging to show his loyalty and ability to accomplish a task. He questioned the validity of this report. If true, Hussein stated that when the time comes and America decides to place the individuals captured for these crimes on trial and Iraqis have resumed leadership of the country, Iraqis will investigate this matter.

~~(S)~~ Hussein questioned what right the interviewer had to ask about internal Iraqi events of 1991. He asked, "Is it because you are an employee of the American government?" The interviewer noted that he is attempting to separate fact from fiction and to record history as it occurred.

~~(S)~~ Hussein stated that it was difficult to comment on the referenced documents without the full details. He questioned the interviewer's assertion that the two individuals discussed in the one document were not allowed to defend themselves. Hussein further questioned whether the individuals were even executed.

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U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Baghdad Operations Center
March 30, 2004

DECLASSIFIED BY uc/baw 60324
ON 05-21-2009

Interview Session Number: 19
Interview Conducted by: SSA George L. Piro
Arabic/English Translation: SSA [REDACTED]
LS [REDACTED]

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(S) Saddam Hussein (High Value Detainee #1) was interviewed March 30, 2004 at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Hussein provided the following information:

(S) Prior to the start of the interview, Hussein was advised that today's session would be a continuation of the discussions regarding the Marsh Arabs of southern Iraq.

(S) As stated in a previous interview, Hussein acknowledged that he had lived with the Marsh Arabs for a short period of time. When Hussein was in Egypt in the early 1960s, he hoped that it was "God's will" that he would return to Iraq. Upon returning, Hussein attempted to expand his own knowledge of Iraq through actual experience in areas of the country where he had never spent significant time including the mountains and the marshes. Hussein described life in the marshes of southern Iraq as "enchanted for any human being." The summers, however, were not pleasant due to the oppressive heat and humidity as well as the presence of insects.

(S) Regarding the drainage of the marshes conducted by the Iraqi government, Hussein stated that one was faced with the choice of preserving nature at the expense of humans or sacrificing a bit of nature for the sake of humans. Hussein noted that the water in the inhabited parts of the marshes was not always clean due to human and animal pollution. The inhabitants of the marshes drank this water and bathed in it. As a result, illness was prevalent including widespread bilharziasis, an intestinal disease. Life expectancy was relatively low. Hussein stated the Iraqi government could not simply "sit back and watch this misery." He added that the government decided to "bring them inside life" or to modernize the Marsh Arabs way of life. Hussein reiterated the difficult

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choice of the Iraqi government to preserve the simple, primitive life of the Marsh inhabitants or to bring them within the framework of modern life where a human is not "disgraced or insulted."

~~(S)~~ Hussein stated that all of Iraq is beautiful and again described the marshes as "enchanted." He added, "I slept there for days in 1981 and 1982." During that time period, Hussein stated he would travel to the front lines of the Iran-Iraq War in the morning, then return to the marshes in the evening upon completion of his duties. Hussein described this period as "the best of days." He claimed that he spent parts of each year from 1978-84 visiting the marshes.

~~(S)~~ Hussein described his visit in 1980 of a village called Baida located in the middle of the marshes. According to information, residents of Baida attacked a police station. Hussein stated this was not a matter to handle in a simple fashion. He traveled to Baida in a party of three boats, one carrying Hussein and others, one carrying his protective detail, and one carrying "news people." This event was filmed and shown on television. According to Hussein, the residents of Baida were "happy to see us." They slaughtered animals and prepared a meal thinking Hussein and his entourage would stay for dinner. However, the group only remained for a three hours then departed. Hussein never asked the residents of Baida whether they attacked a police station. At the time, Hussein was questioned by a member of his protective detail regarding the necessity for an investigation of the participation of the residents of Baida in the attack. In response, he stated, "Good people understood me. The evil ones also got the message." Hussein added that if a similar act had subsequently occurred, they would be "dealt with properly."

~~(S)~~ Hussein stated that the Iraqi government had good relations with the Marsh Arabs. However, upon entry of a foreigner into the situation, "it becomes bad." Hussein asserted that some of the Marsh Arabs were corrupted by Iran. In particular, the area of the Hweiza marshes became a smuggling route beginning during the time of the Shah of Iran. Hussein suggested that the family seen in the video previously shown by the interviewer was from Hweiza.

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(S) Hussein stated the Iraqi government chose to drain the marshes for the sake of the inhabitants and for strategic reasons for Iraq. He reiterated the Iraqi government wanted to modernize the way of life for the Marsh Arabs so that they would "not live like animals." Hussein believed it was unfit for an Iraqi to live in these conditions. The drainage of the marshes was also conducted for a strategic purpose. Only one road existed connecting Basra to Amarah to Baghdad. At points, this road was completely surrounded by the marshes. When the Iranians entered Iraq in 1984, their main goal was to cut off this road and to isolate Basra. Accordingly, the Iraqi government decided to drain the marshes and build a detour providing a secondary route.

(S) The Iraqi government studied the idea of building homes in the marshes for the inhabitants. However, research showed that this project would be too expensive and complicated particularly in the areas of sewage and electricity. As a result, the idea was abandoned and the government decided to build housing complexes on dry land for the displaced Marsh Arabs. The residents were also offered monetary allowances to build their own homes. Hussein stated that the government provided water, electricity, health care services, and schools for the inhabitants. Previously, teachers and medical professionals would refuse to enter the marshes unless paid three to four times their normal salaries.

(S) Hussein described the marshes as "nice to visit for two, three, or four days." In the summer, however, mosquitos would "eat you" and life was very harsh. Hussein acknowledged that humans have a need for primitive life, but only for a few days at a time. He added that the older man previously seen in the film commenting about the Marsh Arabs "came as a visitor, but did not live there" nor did his wife and children.

(S) Hussein suggested that the interviewer talk to personnel of the Iraqi Ministry of Irrigation in order to understand how the drainage was implemented. He added that the task was accomplished within three to four months. Regarding the individual or individuals who designed and supervised the marsh drainage, Hussein stated the Iraqi government utilized the entities with the most expertise and the necessary equipment. The project included the involvement of the Ministry of Housing, the Ministry of Irrigation and possibly the City of Baghdad. The

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"entire nation" and many of its experts participated in the drainage of the marshes. When noted to Hussein that Muhammad Hamza Al-Zubaidi claimed to be the "architect" of the marsh drainage who first proposed such a plan to the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) in 1991, Hussein responded, "Maybe." Hussein stated, however, that he received the first plan and proposal from Hussein Kamil. He is unaware whether Kamil consulted with Al-Zubaidi regarding the project. Similarly, Hussein denied knowledge whether Al-Zubaidi discussed the marsh drainage with other Iraqi leaders. He added, "If he (Al-Zubaidi) said this, he is being truthful." The interviewer told Hussein that others had also claimed to be the originators of the idea of the drainage of the marshes. Hussein replied that it is understandable that any Iraqi might attempt to take credit for such an important task that improved the lives of the Marsh Arabs while simultaneously cutting off the path of a foe such as Iran.

~~(S)~~ When questioned about reports of the presence of Iraqi army deserters and saboteurs in the marshes in 1991 and steps taken by the Iraqi government to deal with these individuals, Hussein acknowledged the existence of deserters. As typical for any protracted conflict, some individuals decide to abandon their duties. This has occurred in the past and continues to occur today during war. For a deserter, the Iraqi law is applied or the individual is pardoned by the appropriate authority. Hussein stated that the presence of deserters in the marshes of southern Iraq was not a contributing factor which led to the drainage.

~~(S)~~ Hussein stated that saboteurs began using the marshes after 1991. The response of the Iraqi government was "the same as that of any government against those who violate the law." Hussein could provide no example of a government response to saboteur activity. He denied that a military plan existed for confronting saboteurs and deserters. He stated that deserters were typically pursued by the police, local citizens, and family members. In cases of mutiny such as that which existed in 1991, Hussein stated the army would intervene. Hussein acknowledged that there were probably times when the Iraqi military had to deal with saboteurs.

~~(S)~~ When questioned whether the historical value of the marshes was considered prior to the drainage, Hussein asked

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whether similar consideration was given to the area where the High Dam was built in Egypt. He added that ruins located in the area of the dam were moved prior to construction. Hussein opined that some discussion most likely took place regarding issues concerning the movement of the stones versus saving the people from starvation. He stated that the matter of the drainage of the marshes "was studied" and "there is no historical value of the marshes."

~~(S)~~ Regarding any consideration given by the Iraqi government to the environmental impact of the drainage of the marshes, Hussein replied that he could debate this matter with experts for "the next twenty days." He noted that Americans did not allow the Indians to live as they had existed prior to colonization. He asked what laws are in place which prohibit American and European companies from destroying the jungles of the Amazon, which he described as the "lungs of the earth." Hussein asked, "Do we preserve species of birds and other animals or do we worry about the existence of Iraqis?" He further asked whether the water of the marshes should have been wasted for the sake of preserving the marshes or used for agriculture. Hussein stated, "What we did was correct." He added, if not, Americans should reopen the water now. The interviewer noted that a recent news article reported local Iraqi citizens did, in fact, recently collect money, rented a bulldozer, and opened a part of the canal in order to allow water to flow back into the marshes.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 04/29/2004

To: Records Management

Attn: [REDACTED]

From: Counterterrorism

ITOS II/ISLU/4383

Contact: [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

fv

Case ID #: ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534-302 (Pending)

Title: ~~(S)~~ DESERT SPIDER
IT - IRAQ

Synopsis: ~~(S)~~ To request that two individuals be given access to the restricted 302 sub-file under the DESERT SPIDER file, 315E-HQ-1448534.

~~(S)~~

~~Derived From: G-3~~
~~Declassify On: X1~~

DECLASSIFIED BY uc/baw 60324
ON 05-21-2009

Details: ~~(S)~~ Records Management Division is requested to grant access to the following individuals for the restricted 302 sub-file under the DESERT SPIDER file, 315E-HQ-1448534.

SSA [REDACTED]
SSA [REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ The above-noted individuals will be working with the Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST) and will therefore require access to these files.

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To: Records Management From: Counterterrorism
Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534-302, 04/29/2004

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

RECORDS MANAGEMENT

AT WASHINGTON, DC

~~(S)~~ Please grant access to the listed individuals for
the restricted 302 sub-file under the DESERT SPIDER file, 315E-
HQ-1448534.

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U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Baghdad Operations Center
May 1, 2004

Interview Session Number: 20
Interview Conducted By: SSA George L. Piro
SA [redacted]
SSA [redacted]
Arabic/English Translation: LS [redacted]

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~~(S)~~ Saddam Hussein (High Value Detainee #1) was interviewed May 1, 2004, at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Hussein provided the following information:

~~(S)~~ Interviewers told Hussein they would like to bring closure to the family of the naval aviator, Michael Scott Speicher, whose plane was shot down in Iraq during the first Gulf war. Interviewers approached this discussion with Hussein from a humanitarian, and not a political point of view. Hussein responded by asking if this was the pilot that was downed in western Iraq? He proceeded by saying the interviewers were right to investigate this from a humanitarian point of view, and wished that this humanitarian effort would spread throughout the world.

~~(S)~~ Hussein viewed a photograph of Captain Speicher. Hussein responded to the photograph by saying that if he had a chance to assist the interviewers, or the family of the pilot, he would tell them.

~~(S)~~ Hussein first became aware of the missing pilot when the Americans asked for assistance, through official channels, in recovering the remains. Hussein responded to the Americans by telling them Iraq would assist in any way they could. Hussein stated that Iraq had the right to shoot down the plane, but no one has the right to hide the remains of the pilot. Hussein believes the official communication from the Americans was passed to him through Tariq Aziz, or possibly the Foreign Affairs Ministry. Hussein then provided his concurrence to Aziz or the Foreign Affairs Minister to lend assistance to the Americans in finding the remains.

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(S) In 1995, Hussein remembered directing his subordinates to assist the Americans and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in excavating the crash site. He doesn't remember the exact details, but believes he directed Tariq Aziz, through the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), in overseeing this request. Hussein stated he would have trusted his Minister to carry out the responsibilities regarding this request, and there would not have been a need to assign anyone else.

(S) Interviewers then started to question Hussein regarding the committee that was established in 2000 regarding the missing pilot. Hussein quickly responded by saying the "humanitarian side of this conversation has ended."

(S) Interviewers asked Hussein how he would go about finding the remains of the American pilot. Hussein responded by saying he would first determine the specific area where the plane was shot down. He would then approach the Bedouin Sheik of that particular area and tell him that you spoke with him, Saddam Hussein, and ask for their assistance in finding the remains. Hussein advised that the Americans must promise the Bedouin Sheik that they are concerned with only recovering the remains of the pilot, and are not there for any other reason. Hussein prided himself in having an excellent relationship with the Bedouin people.

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U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

DECLASSIFIED BY uc/baw 60324
ON 05-21-2009

Baghdad Operations Center
May 10, 2004

~~(S)~~ While engaging SSA George L. Piro in casual conversation in his detention cell, Saddam Hussein provided the following information:

~~(S)~~ Hussein inquired on current events in Iraq. Hussein was advised of the accomplishments in Iraq, to include the signing of the new constitution, and the preparations for the turn over of sovereignty to the Iraqis. Hussein questioned the effectiveness of the Governing Council (GC), in his view the GC could agree among themselves to make decisions. Hussein was advised of the eventual elections in Iraq, in which the Iraqi people will have the opportunity to democratically elect a new leader. Hussein stated that the Iraqi people would not accept an elected leader during occupation and has experienced this in the past when King Faisal was brought to power under British power. SSA Piro described to Hussein the recent poll of Iraqis in which the Iraqi people want control over their government, but want United States forces to remain in Iraq.

~~(S)~~ While talking about the air conditioning in Hussein's cell, which was being repaired at that time, Hussein advised that he is used to living simply and personally does not like an extravagant lifestyle. Hussein was then questioned about the number of palaces and their extravagant nature. Hussein stated that the palaces belong to the nation and not to one person. Before 1968, the Iraqi homes were basically very primitive and made out of mud. As in western countries, historically architects developed their skill and designs by building castles. The palaces gave Iraqi architects the opportunity to develop their skills which could then be seen in the improvement of the design of the typical Iraqi home. Additionally, there was a threat from the United States and Israel, especially during the last ten years. For the government to function, the leadership had to meet and discuss issues prior to rendering decisions. If there were only two palaces or locations that the leadership could meet, it would have been very easy for the elimination of the Iraqi leadership. However, with twenty palaces, it was much more difficult to track or identify the location of the Iraqi leadership. Since these palaces belonged to the nation, Hussein did not live in them and

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preferred to live in a simple home. Hussein would eat what was prepared for his protection detail and did not have a lot of demands. Hussein believed the United States had a misconception that he had an extravagant lifestyle, which lead to his ability to evade capture. Hussein believes his capture was solely caused by betrayal.

(S) Hussein's work schedule was long, but he would set time aside for fictional reading, something he enjoyed very much. His days would include meetings with the other senior Ba'ath Party members. Hussein claimed he regularly met with the Iraqi people as he found them to be the best source of accurate information. Hussein would meet with citizens daily, or every other day. When asked, how could he be certain that the citizens were honest during their discussions, as most would have been afraid? Hussein replied that this could have been the case, but he had a extremely long relationship with the Iraqi people and the population knew he sought the truth. Hussein gave an example involving his half-brother, Watban Ibrahim Hasan Al-Majid, the Minister of Interior at the time. A citizen reported to Hussein that while stopped at a traffic light, Watban fired his pistol at the traffic light. Hussein contacted Watban to determine if this was true. Watban acknowledged it was. Hussein then told him to pack his things, allowing him to learn of his removal from Hussein instead of the state news radio. Hussein claimed that he held his family at a higher standard than others.

(S) Hussein indicated he was interested in understanding the American culture, and did so by watching American movies. According to Hussein, he watched numerous American films, from these he developed his opinion of the American culture.

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File No.

DECLASSIFIED BY uc/baw 60324
ON 05-21-2009

Baghdad Operations Center
May 13, 2004

(S) While engaging SSA George L. Piro in casual conversation, Saddam Hussein providing the following information regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD):

(S) Hussein stated that the United Nations' (UN) Weapons Inspections had achieved its objectives of disposing Iraq of its WMD. Iraq does not have any WMD and has not for sometime. Hussein was advised that many were of the opinion that Iraq was reluctant to cooperate with the UN Weapons Inspections process. Hussein replied that Iraq had cooperated for seven years and granted access to the entire country to the weapons inspectors, to include the Presidential Palaces. Hussein was challenged on Iraq's cooperation, one example of which was the concealment of WMD components by Hussein Kamel. Hussein stated that Hussein Kamel's true character became known to everyone. Hussein admitted there were individuals in the Iraqi government who were initially reluctant to cooperate with the weapons inspectors. Those individuals were loyal hard working people dedicated to their work. It was difficult for them to be told one day to open all of their files and turn over all of their work and government secrets to outsiders. It took time and occurred in steps. However, by 1998 Iraq had complied with the UN resolutions; yet, Iraq was attacked at that time by the United States, without justification or the UN's authorization. Hussein further stated the Iraqis would not have stored WMD in the Presidential Palaces, as the government and the Iraqi leadership would have been at risk. WMD was and would have been stored in the desert, in remote locations. The palaces represented the sovereignty of Iraq, and it was very difficult for the Iraqis to turn over access to outsiders, but did so to demonstrate their cooperation.

(S) Hussein claimed the strikes against Iraq by the United States in 1998 and in response to the alleged assassination attempt of former President George Bush were unprovoked and unjustified. The United States did not obtain or receive UN concurrence for either attack. Even though, both attacks were the decisions of the United States, Hussein felt the UN had exceeded its authority and charter in regards to Iraq. Hussein was reminded that Iraq was a signatory body of the UN. Hussein attempted to use the Iraqi strike against the USS Stark

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Baghdad Operations Center

as an example to demonstrate Iraq's ability to openly admit to mistakes. Hussein claimed Iraq acknowledged the strike and its mistake. Hussein believed the UN resolutions and sanctions on Iraq were based upon the United States' position. Hussein was advised of Libya's cooperation with the UN, including their decision to dismantle their WMD; and because of this, Libya's international standing has improved and sanctions may soon be lifted. Hussein was further advised many would place the blame on Iraq for its problems as a result of its hard-line position with the UN. Hussein stated Iraq in the past had a good relationship with the United States and Iraq always wanted to maintain that relationship which would have benefitted both countries. Hussein cited that in the late fifties, the number of Iraqis trying to obtain visas for travel to the United States far surpassed the number at other embassies, including the Russian Embassy.

~~(S)~~ Hussein stated WMD was for the defense of Iraq's sovereignty. Iraq demonstrated this with the use of WMD during the Iraq and Iran War, as Iran had threatened the sovereignty of Iraq. Yet, Iraq did not use WMD during the 1991 Gulf War as its sovereignty was not threatened. Iraq's neighboring Arab countries were frightened of Ayatollah Khomeini and Iran. During a meeting involving several Arab countries, Saudi Arabian officials voiced their fears concerning Iran. The Saudis stated even though the United States was their ally, the United States was too far away while Iran was on their border. Hussein claimed during this meeting, he suggested that they reach out to Ayatollah Khomeini with a peace offer, and then if Iran rose up against them, Iraq would be the first to confront Iran's aggressiveness. The others were too fearful of Iran, and Iraq was the only one who stood up to them.

~~(S)~~ Hussein was reminded of a speech he gave in June, 2000, where he stated that he would not disarm until the region was disarmed; and his own words could be taken as an admission that Iraq possessed WMD. Hussein claimed his intention was for the region to be fully disarmed. Hussein was advised his speech did not project that message. He requested a copy of his speech and said he would then provide clarification. Hussein was informed the Coalition had gathered information indicating that Iraq was either maintaining or re-developing its WMD capability. Hussein denied this. He was then asked if others within his country would do this without his knowledge. Hussein said no,

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Baghdad Operations Center

and claimed on several occasions he held meetings with all of his ministers and asked them specifically if Iraq had WMD that he was unaware of. All of his ministers stated no, as they cited they knew Hussein's position on WMD matters clearly. Hussein claimed his position was that Iraq did not have WMD.

~~SECRET//X1~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 06/14/2004

To: Records Management

Attn: [REDACTED]

From: Counterterrorism
ITOS II/ISLU/4383

Contact: [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

jfv

Case ID #: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534-302 (Pending)

Title: ~~(S)~~ DESERT SPIDER
IT - IRAQ

Synopsis: ~~(S)~~ To request that two individuals be given access to the restricted 302 sub-file under the DESERT SPIDER file, 315E-HQ-1448534.

~~(S)~~

Derived From : G-3
Declassify On: X1

DECLASSIFIED BY uc/baw 60324
ON 05-21-2009

Details: ~~(S)~~ Records Management Division is requested to grant access to the following individuals for the restricted 302 sub-file under the DESERT SPIDER file, 315E-HQ-1448534.

IA [REDACTED]
IA [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

~~(S)~~ The above-noted individuals will be working with the Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST) and will therefore require access to these files.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Records Management From: Counterterrorism
Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534-302, 04/29/2004

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

RECORDS MANAGEMENT

AT WASHINGTON, DC

~~(S)~~ Please grant access to the listed individuals for
the restricted 302 sub-file under the DESERT SPIDER file, 315E-
HQ-1448534.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET//X1~~



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Baghdad Operations Center
June 11, 2004

DECLASSIFIED BY uc/baw 60324
ON 05-21-2009

~~(S)~~ While engaging SSA George L. Piro in casual conversation, Saddam Hussein providing the following information regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD):

~~(S)~~ Saddam Hussein read SSA George Piro a poem he recently wrote. SSA Piro used this opportunity as a segue to discuss Hussein's speeches. SSA Piro advised Hussein that after hearing several poems from him, SSA Piro is now able to recognize Hussein's writing style, which was prevalent in a speech SSA Piro recently read. It was clear to SSA Piro that Hussein wrote his own speeches, which he confirmed further, stating all his writings came from the heart. Hussein claimed he did not enjoy reading his speeches, preferring instead to have his speeches read by others, such as news broadcasters. Hussein described the feeling of writing his speeches and giving them was the same as taking an exam.

~~(S)~~ SSA Piro then asked Hussein if he wrote his own speeches and they come from the heart, then what was the meaning of his June 2000 speech. Hussein replied this speech was meant to serve a regional and an operational purpose. Regionally, the speech was meant to respond to Iraq's regional threat. Hussein believed that Iraq could not appear weak to its enemies, especially Iran. Iraq was being threatened by others in the region and must appear able to defend itself. Operationally, Hussein was demonstrating Iraq's compliance with the United Nations (UN) in its destruction of its Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).

~~(S)~~ Hussein stated Iran was Iraq's major threat due to their common border and believed Iran intended to annex Southern Iraq into Iran. The possibility of Iran trying to annex a portion of Southern Iraq was viewed by Hussein and Iraq as the most significant threat facing Iraq. Hussein viewed the other countries in the Middle East as weak and could not defend themselves or Iraq from a attack from Iran. Hussein stated he believed Israel was a threat to the entire Arab world, not specifically Iraq.

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Baghdad Operations Center

~~(S)~~ Hussein continued the dialogue on the issues relating to the significant threat to Iraq from Iran. Even though Hussein claimed Iraq did not have WMD, the threat from Iran was the major factor as to why he did not allow the return of the UN inspectors. Hussein stated he was more concerned about Iran discovering Iraq's weaknesses and vulnerabilities than the repercussions of the United States for his refusal to allow UN inspectors back into Iraq. In his opinion, the UN inspectors would have directly identified to the Iranians where to inflict maximum damage to Iraq. Hussein demonstrated this by pointing at his arm and stated striking someone on the forearm would not have the same effect as striking someone at the elbow or wrist, which would significantly disable the ability to use the arm. Hussein indicated he was angered when the United States struck Iraq in 1998. Hussein stated Iraq could have absorbed another United States strike for he viewed this as less of a threat than exposing themselves to Iran.

~~(S)~~ Hussein further stated that Iran's weapons capabilities have increased dramatically, while Iraq's have been eliminated by the UN sanctions. The effects of this will be seen and felt in the future, as Iran's weapons capabilities will be a greater threat to Iraq and the region in the future. Hussein stated Iraq's weapons capabilities were a factor in the outcome of the Iraq-Iran War. Initially during the war, Iraq had missiles with a limited range of approximately 270 Kilometers (km), while Iran had no viable missile capability. The Iranians obtained long-range missiles from Libya which could strike deep into Iraq. The Iranians were the first to use the missiles, and struck Baghdad. Hussein claimed he warned the Iranians through a speech he gave, to cease these attacks. But the Iranians again attacked Baghdad. Iraq's scientists came to him and advised him that they could increase the range of Iraq's missiles to also reach deep into Iran. Hussein directed them to do so. Iraq responded to Iran's attacks by striking Iran's capital, Tehran, with its own missiles. Hussein stated the Iranians were up in arms to Iraq's strikes. Hussein stated that Tehran was more vulnerable to missile strikes due to its geographical design. Baghdad, on the other hand, was geographically spread out and broken up into districts making Iran's missile strikes less effective. Hussein identified this as the "war of the cities" and Iraqi actions were in response to Iran's. At that time, Hussein recognized that Iran was at a disadvantage, as Iraq had the technology to design and develop its missiles, while Iran was

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~~SECRET//X1~~

Baghdad Operations Center

forced to obtain its missiles from Libya. Iraq was limited only by its own production while Iran was limited by the quantity it could obtain.

~~(S)~~ Hussein recognized that Iran continued to develop its weapons capabilities, to include its WMD, while Iraq had lost its weapons capabilities due to the UN inspections and sanctions. Hussein was asked how Iraq would have dealt with the threat from Iran once the UN sanctions were lifted. Hussein replied Iraq would have been extremely vulnerable to an attack from Iran, and would have sought a security agreement with the United States to protect it from threats in the region. Hussein felt such an agreement would not only have benefitted Iraq, but its neighbors, such as Saudi Arabia. SSA Piro agreed that such an agreement would have assisted Iraq immensely. SSA Piro noted due to the history between the two countries, it would have taken some time before the United States would have entered into such an agreement with Iraq.

~~(S)~~ Further, SSA Piro advised Hussein that paragraph 14 of UN Resolution 687 states that the disarming of Iraq was part of a total disarmament of the entire region, however, that portion of the resolution was not enforceable. The threat from Iran would have loomed over Iraq, especially as Iran had continued to advance its weapons capabilities. SSA Piro commented that under those circumstances, it would appear that Iraq would have needed to reconstitute its own weapons program in response. Hussein replied that Iraq would have done what was necessary and agreed that Iraq's technical and scientific abilities exceeded others in the region.

~~(S)~~ Hussein commented he allowed the UN inspectors back into Iraq to counter allegations by the British Government. Hussein stated this was a very difficult decision to make, but the British Government had prepared a report containing inaccurate intelligence. It was this inaccurate intelligence on which the United States was making their decisions. However, Hussein admitted that when it was clear that a war with the United States was imminent, he allowed the inspectors back into Iraq in hopes of averting war. Yet, it became clear to him four months before the war that the war was inevitable.

~~(S)~~ Hussein reiterated he had wanted to have a relationship with the United States but was not given the chance,

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~~SECRET//X1~~

Baghdad Operations Center

as the United States was not listening to anything Iraq had to say. Further, he was concerned about the United State's advanced technological capabilities and resources.

~~(S)~~ On another matter, Hussein stated he only recalls using the telephone on two occasions since March 1990. Additionally, Hussein did not stay at the same location for more than a day, as he was very aware of the United States's significant technological capabilities. Hussein communicated primarily through the use of couriers to communicate or would personally meet with government officials to discuss pertinent issues. Hussein stated that a technologically under-developed country, such as Iraq, was vulnerable to the United States.

~~(S)~~ The discussion then turned to the new interim President of Iraq, Sheikh Ghazi Al-Yawar. Hussein stated Al-Yawar came from a good family and would be favored by the other countries in the region, especially Saudi Arabia. Hussein stated it appeared the United States had put a lot of thought into Al-Yawar's appointment, as Al-Yawar was a good selection. SSA Piro told Hussein the selection of Al-Yawar was not solely made by the United States, but was a joint effort by the United States and UN. The selection of the new Iraqi Government was based on the needs voiced by the Iraqi people. The new Iraqi Government has a strong foundation on which to build on as it progresses in its work to serve the Iraqi people. SSA Piro then asked Hussein how he personally felt about their discussion of a new President and Government in Iraq. Hussein began to respond in reference to Al-Yawar, but SSA Piro stopped him and asked how he personally felt. SSA Piro reminded Hussein that he had previously made it clear to SSA Piro that he still considered himself the President of Iraq. However, it is clear now to everyone that he is no longer the President, as there is a new President who is representing the country and the people of Iraq. SSA Piro told Hussein he is no longer the President of Iraq; he was done. Hussein replied yes he knows, saying what could he do as it was God's choice. SSA Piro asked him if he had any thoughts about his future and Hussein stated that it was in God's hands. SSA Piro pointed out to Hussein that God was very busy and that God had more important issues than he and SSA Piro. Hussein agreed, at which point, SSA Piro told Hussein that his life is nearing its end, and asked him if he wanted the remainder of his life to have meaning, to which he responded yes.

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~~SECRET//X1~~

Baghdad Operations Center

(S) SSA Piro informed Hussein that he had surrounded himself with weak individuals, who are now refusing to take any responsibility for the actions of the former government. The other High Value Detainees were putting the blame for all of Iraq's mistakes on Hussein, to which Hussein replied by saying what could he do. Hussein recognizes that he may bear the responsibility or blame while others will attempt to distance themselves.

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U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Baghdad Operations Center
June 17, 2004

DECLASSIFIED BY uc/baw 60324
ON 05-21-2009

~~(S)~~ While engaging SSA George L. Piro in casual conversation in his detention cell, Saddam Hussein provided the following information:

~~(S)~~ Saddam Hussein stated on most days his work schedule consisted of meeting ordinary Iraqi citizens. Hussein preferred to meet them where they worked or lived instead of his office. Normally, Hussein tried to schedule time between 3:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. to interact with the Iraqi citizens. Hussein preferred to drive himself and would direct his protective detail to ride as passengers, which gave him the ability to stop whenever and wherever he wanted. Hussein took advantage of this time to address individual issues with citizens, which included discussions involving medical issues, personal grievances, etc.

~~(S)~~ Hussein enjoyed exchanging ideas with those around him for purposes of developing solutions. He encouraged those around him to discuss issues and exchange ideas amongst each other as well as with him. However, Hussein did not enjoy debating others, even though he considered himself an excellent debater, and superior to those around him. Whenever there were debates, Hussein stated he normally wouldn't take part, and would remain silent.

~~(S)~~ Hussein discussed individuals either related or close to him within the former Iraqi Government. Hussein stated Tariq Aziz (Black List #25) was very intelligent, and had the most knowledge regarding the West of all the Ba'ath Party officials. Aziz was an excellent speaker, as he was a former English teacher and former editor of the Ba'ath Party newspaper.

~~(S)~~ Hussein stated Ali Hasan Al-Majid (Black List #5) thought like an Arab. SSA Piro stated Al-Majid thought like a Bedouin, and Hussein stated that is what he meant to say. Al-Majid had limited experience outside of his tribe and his decisions were based on that limited experience. However, Al-Majid followed orders and carried out his duties as instructed.

~~(S)~~ Hussein described former Vice President, Taha Yasin Ramadan's (Black List #20) personality as open. Ramadan was the

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Baghdad Operations Center

type of individual who continually talked about himself, which Hussein allowed him to do.

~~(S)~~ Hussein then discussed his two half brothers, Barzan Ibrahim Hasan (Black List #38) and Watban Ibrahim Hasan (Black List #37). Hussein stated Barzan was very intelligent, but had a closed personality. SSA Piro told Hussein that Barzan was not very friendly, and would not be the type of person with whom SSA Piro could develop a friendship. Hussein laughed, and stated that SSA Piro knew Barzan's personality. Hussein then stated Watban was the opposite of Barzan, friendly but simple. According to Hussein, Watban could not carry out his Ministerial duties and was not capable of handling political positions or issues.

~~(S)~~ SSA Piro inquired about Abid Hamid Mahmoud (Black List #4), Hussein's Presidential Secretary. Hussein stated Abid was a good and loyal employee who carried out his duties and orders well. Hussein then asked SSA Piro his opinion of Abid. SSA Piro described to Hussein the meaning of a "used car salesman." Hussein again laughed and stated SSA Piro was correct in his description of Abid.

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~~SECRET//X1~~



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Baghdad Operations Center
June 28, 2004

DECLASSIFIED BY uc/baw 60324
ON 05-21-2009

~~(S)~~ While engaging SSA George L. Piro in casual conversation in his detention cell, SADDAM HUSSEIN provided the following information:

~~(S)~~ SSA Piro discussed with HUSSEIN Iraq's relationship with Al-Qaeda. HUSSEIN provided a brief historical account of conflicts between religion, specifically Islam, and historical rulers. HUSSEIN stated that he was a believer in God but was not a zealot. HUSSEIN believed that religion and government should not mix. Additionally, the Ba'ath Party ideology was not religiously based, as its founder was a Christian. However, HUSSEIN was clear that he opposed anyone who collaborated with the West against his country.

~~(S)~~ HUSSEIN stated USAMA BIN LADEN's ideology was no different than the many zealots that came before him. The two did not have the same belief or vision. HUSSEIN claimed he had never personally seen or met Bin Laden. SSA Piro advised HUSSEIN there is clear evidence the Iraqi Government had previously met with BIN LADEN. SSA Piro specifically cited FAROUQ HIJAZI's (BL #104), former IIS M-4 Director, meeting with BIN LADEN in Sudan in 1994, ABU HAFS AL-MAURITANI's two visits to Baghdad, and his request for financial assistance of ten million dollars. HUSSEIN replied "yes". HUSSEIN stated the Iraqi government did not cooperate with BIN LADEN. SSA Piro asked HUSSEIN "why not" since Iraq and BIN LADEN had the same enemies, United States and Saudi Arabia. SSA Piro then cited him the quote "my enemy's enemy is my brother". HUSSEIN replied that the United States was not Iraq's enemy, but that HUSSEIN opposed its politics. If he wanted to cooperate with the enemies of the United States, HUSSEIN would have with North Korea, which he claimed to have a relationship with, or China.

~~(S)~~ HUSSEIN stated that the United States used the 9/11 attack as a justification to attack Iraq. The United States had lost sight of the cause of 9/11. SSA Piro advised HUSSEIN that due to Iraq's contradiction between its statements and actions, many believe Iraq miscalculated the effects of the 9/11 attack on the American people and its leaders. Iraq denied having any connection with BIN LADEN or Al-Qaeda, but evidence showed

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Baghdad Operations Center

continued contact between the two. HUSSEIN denied miscalculating the effects of the attack, but he did not have any options in front of him. The only choice he was given was to leave Iraq which he claimed was not an option.

~~DS~~ SSA Piro asked HUSSEIN why was Iraq the only country to applaud the 9/11 attack, which HUSSEIN immediately denied. SSA Piro advised HUSSEIN that the Iraqi newspapers were reported to have applauded the attack. HUSSEIN stated that he wrote editorials against the attack, but also spoke of the cause which led men to commit these acts. The cause was never reviewed which could create such hatred to kill innocent people. After the attack, TARIQ AZIZ wrote personal letters denouncing the attack to two individuals, one possibly Ramsey Clarke, which AZIZ personally knew. These letters served as informal means of communications for Iraq to denounce the attack. HUSSEIN stated he could not make any formal announcement as Iraq considered itself at war with the United States. HUSSEIN was asked if that was why the request of the Iraqi Ambassador to the United Nations, MUHAMMAD AL-DURI, to attend the 9/11 memorial was denied by the Council of Four. It took the Minister of Foreign Affairs' personal request to HUSSEIN to obtain permission for the ambassador to attend the memorial. HUSSEIN stated he could not recall what transpired, but specifically remembered the ambassador attending the memorial. Again, HUSSEIN stated that the ambassador attended the memorial as a representative of the United Nations, and would not have attended as a formal representative of Iraq.

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~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 01/19/2006

To: Records Management

Attn: [REDACTED]

From: Counterterrorism

ITOSII/Iraq Unit/6S-200

Contact: SSA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

jfv

Case ID #: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534-302 (Pending)

Title: ~~(S)~~ DESERT SPIDER
IT - IRAQ

Synopsis: ~~(S)~~ Provide AD Authority to remove the restriction from subfile 302.

~~(S)~~

~~Derived From: G-3~~
~~Declassify On: X1~~

Reference: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534-302 Serial 1

Administrative: ~~(S)~~ Per all SAC, EC from CTD dated 12/25/2002, no case restrictions in ACS or [REDACTED] may be made without the approval of the Assistant Director of the Counterterrorism Division.

b2
b7E

Details: ~~(S)~~ The captioned investigation was opened to capture intelligence and evidence as it relates to the national security investigation targeting Saddam Hussein.

~~(S)~~ As a result of the current international tribunal of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein and since the information is no longer considered sensitive in nature, the 302 subfile's restriction can be removed from ACS.

~~SECRET~~ ~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Records Management From: Counterterrorism
Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534-302 , 01/19/2006

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Action)

RECORDS MANAGEMENT

AT WASHINGTON, DC

~~(S)~~ RMD will ensure the access to subfile 302
restriction be removed from ACS.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~



Federal Bureau of Investigation

Prosecutive Report of Investigation Concerning

SADDAM HUSSEIN

IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL

Article 11 - GENOCIDE
Article 12 - CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
Article 13 - WAR CRIMES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-11-2009 BY uc/baw 60324

Copy to: Regime Crimes Liaison Office

Report of: SADDAM HUSSEIN

Date: March 10, 2005

Office: FBIHQ

Case ID # 163I-HQ-1462938

Narrative of Offense:

BACKGROUND

Introduction

From 1980 to 1988, Iraq was involved in a full-scale war with its neighbor, Iran. The Iraq-Iran war was fought on several fronts, including the Northern Region of Iraq which borders Iran. This region, sometimes called Kurdistan or the Autonomous Region, was home to the Kurds. Two major parties represented the Kurdish population: the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) headed by MAS'UD AL-BARZANI, the son of MULLAH MUSTAFA BARZANI (hereinafter MULLAH BARZANI), and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) headed by JALAL TALABANI (hereinafter TALABANI). The Kurds had been seeking governmental autonomy for years.

On or about approximately February 12, 1987, the Iranian Armed



Forces (IAF) initiated a series of military offensives in Northern Iraq against the Iraqi government. On March 4, 1987, the IAF, with the assistance of Kurdish guerrilla fighters known as *Peshmergas* from both PUK and KDP, launched its most alarming offensive of the series. Code named Karbala 7, the IAF penetrated eight miles into Iraqi territory east of Rawanduz.

Indeed, SADDAM HUSSEIN and his officers in the Iraqi regime regularly referred to MULLAH BARZANI, his sons, and the KDP as the "offsprings of treason," and to TALABANI and the PUK as "Iranian agents."

During Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), hundreds of Iraqi documents detailing HUSSEIN and his regime's offensive and retaliatory actions against the Kurds were recovered, and relevant documents are summarized in this report. This report also relies upon Iraqi documents Kurdish Rebel Parties had seized from various Iraqi government offices during the 1991 Uprising had given to the Human Rights Watch (HRW). HRW has published those documents in their reports, most notably in "Bureaucracy of Repression, the Iraq Government in its Own Words," February 1994.

The charging proposal detailed in this report also relies upon relevant statements and admissions made by various high-level Iraqi government officials, including SADDAM HUSSEIN. These statements were made to United States investigators while in United States custody in Iraq. All interviews were voluntary in compliance with Geneva Conventions.

Iraq's Governmental Structure

According to the Iraqi Constitution in effect prior to HUSSEIN assuming the Presidency in 1979, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) was the supreme law-making body in Iraq and was Iraq's highest authoritative body and was superior to the Cabinet. RCC decrees held the full force and effect of national law. Prior to OIF, the RCC was comprised of the following high level Ba'ath Party officials: SADDAM HUSSEIN, Chairman; IZZAT IBRAHIM AL-DURI (hereinafter AL-DURI), Vice-Chairman; TARIQ AZIZ (hereinafter AZIZ); TAHA YASIN RAMADAN (hereinafter RAMADAN); ALI HASAN AL-MAJID (hereinafter AL-MAJID); TAHA MUHYI AL-DIN MARUF (hereinafter MARUF); and MIZBAN KHADR HADI (hereinafter HADI).

Immediately upon his assumption of the Presidency, HUSSEIN successfully eliminated the RCC's power and consolidated

it into his own hands. AZIZ stated that between 1979 and 1981, HUSSEIN took other, less dramatic steps to consolidate governmental power into his own hands. For example, until 1979, the RCC held regular meetings and recorded the minutes of those meetings. However, after HUSSEIN became President, meetings were less frequent and were not formally recorded. HUSSEIN told the RCC there would be times when he would not be able to consult with them and therefore, the RCC had to give him power to make unilateral decisions, which it did. [TARIQ AZIZ January 30, 2004 interview].

HAMED YOUSEF AL-HUMMADI (hereinafter AL-HUMMADI), HUSSEIN's Presidential Secretary, stated that he was responsible for assembling and presenting all reports and letters to HUSSEIN, and for preparing and disseminating all reports, letters and orders drafted by HUSSEIN. AL-HUMMADI's role as Presidential Secretary was purely administrative and AL-HUMMADI held no authority whatsoever.

Similarly, the Presidential Diwan performed the same role for the RCC Secretary; that is, the Presidential Diwan facilitated correspondence to and from the RCC and was purely administrative in role and was without authority. [AL-HUMMADI interview June 2, 2004]

AHMED HUSSEIN KHUDAIYER (hereinafter KHUDAIYER), the Presidential Diwan, stated that as the Secretary of the RCC, the Diwan issued all finalized RCC decisions. KHUDAIYER stated that most Iraqis who read the RCC decisions assumed that they were promulgated after debate and consultation which simply was not true. The RCC rarely met as a governing body. Rather, HUSSEIN, the Head of State and therefore the Head of the RCC, assigned all decisions as a function of his own determination; that is, HUSSEIN made nearly all RCC decisions unilaterally without RCC input or debate. If meetings occurred at all, only HUSSEIN's closest two or three advisors would have been involved. KHUDAIYER generally learned of the RCC's "decisions" via a telephone from SADDAM HUSSEIN or from Presidential Secretary ABID HAMID MAHMUD AL-TIKRITI.

KHUDAIYER forwarded HUSSEIN/RCC's instructions to his legal section which prepared the ordered document. KHUDAIYER reviewed the document, inspecting it for typographical errors and formatting, and editing as needed. [KHUDAIYER interview, June 12, 2004]

In early 1987, MOHAMMAD HAMZA AL-ZUBAYDI (hereinafter

AL-ZUBAYDI) was the senior Ba'ath Party official in the Northern Region. AL-ZUBAYDI admitted during an interview that he failed to control the on-going Kurdish activity within his jurisdiction. In approximately March, 1987, HUSSEIN relieved AL-ZUBAYDI of his position in the Northern Region and ordered AL- ZUBAYDI back to Baghdad.

On March 29, 1987, HUSSEIN, through RCC Decree 160, appointed AL-MAJID as the RCC and the Ba'ath Party Regional Command representative who was empowered to implement their policies in the Northern Region which included the Autonomous Region of Kurdistan. This decree gave AL-MAJID control of the state's civil, military, and security apparatuses in the Northern Region, including the Autonomous Region. AL-MAJID's authority and special power far exceeded AL-ZUBAYDI's. AZIZ, a longtime RCC member, stated that HUSSEIN unilaterally chose AL-MAJID and defined the scope of the authority RCC Decree 160 granted AL-MAJID. AZIZ stated that HUSSEIN successfully seized the RCC's authority and decision-making ability from its members in the early 1980s. The RCC did not discuss or vote on the appointment of AL-MAJID. [AZIZ interview, February 2, 2004] [RCC Decree 160 attached as document XX].

KHUDAIYER examined a photocopy of RCC Decree 160 and recognized it as the copy of an authentic RCC document in format and substance. KHUDAIYER did not remember attending any meeting at which the contents of RCC Decree 160 was discussed. Rather, he recalled receiving the information via handwritten instructions as usual. He vaguely recalled making a non-substantive correction on the original draft that his legal section had prepared.

KHUDAIYER stated the difference between AL-MAJID's appointment and AL-ZUBAYDI's was that AL-ZUBAYDI received his position based on his Ba'ath party status, not a Decree issued through the Presidential Diwan's office. Furthermore, AL-ZUBAYDI did not enjoy the trust from HUSSEIN that AL-MAJID did. When asked to define what he meant by trust, KHUDAIYER explained that everyone knew AL-MAJID would never do anything against SADDAM, and that he possessed the ruthlessness needed to quell the violence. [KHUDAIYER interview, June 12, 2004]

PRE-ANFAL (1987)

On March 10, 1987, the Iraqi Directorate of Military

Intelligence (DMI) submitted a Top Secret and Confidential intelligence report, M1/sh3/Q2/5809, to the Army Chief of Staff regarding Kurdish insurgent activity. The report identified the location of many of AL-BARZANI's bases, the cooperation and mutual assistance between AL-BARZANI's group and Iranian forces, and detailed acts of sabotage by AL-BARZANI's group. The report also noted that previous Iraqi aerial strikes had been ineffective because of the geography and size of the bases. [attached as document #XX]

The intelligence report was signed by Staff Major General SABIR ABD AL AZIZ HUSAYN AL-DURI (hereinafter SABIR), Director of the *Istkhbarat* or Iraqi DMI. Copies of the report were provided to the Presidential Secretary, the Secretary Bureau of the General Command of the Armed Forces, the RCC Committee of Northern Affairs, the RCC Deputy Bureau, the Office of the Ministry of Defense, and the Fifth Corps Headquarters.

On March 11, 1987, based on DMI Intelligence Report 5809, the Army Chief of Staff, through Staff Major General TAREQ HUSSEIN NAJIB (hereinafter NAJIB), the Senior Secretary, directed the Fifth Corps Headquarters through memo Number 2786 to take measures necessary to limit the activities of saboteurs by destroying their essential bases. Copies of this memo were provided to the RCC Committee of Northern Affairs, Office of Ministry of Defense, and the DMI. [attached as document #XX].

On March 12, 1987, HUSSEIN responded to DMI's Intelligence Report 5809. In a Presidential Memo to the DMI, Number 7/G2/808/K, authored by Presidential Secretary AL-HUMMADI, HUSSEIN ordered the DMI and specialists to conduct a joint study for the use of "special ammunition" in a direct strike by the air force, army air assets, or artillery against the bases of Khomeini Guards and the First Branch of the AL-BARZANI Group. HUSSEIN's letter instructed the DMI "to do the necessary" and notify the President's office. [attached as document #XX]

SABIR stated that in 1987, the primary role of the DMI in the Northern Region of Iraq was to gather intelligence on Iranian forces. A secondary role was gathering intelligence on the Kurds and determining their relationship with the Iranians. SABIR believed the planning stages for the *Anfal* campaign occurred between 1985 and 1987. SABIR acknowledged that "special ammunition" was a term the President and other high level Iraqi Government Officials, including himself, used to represent chemical weapons (CW). [SABIR interview, June 4, 2004].

AL-HUMMADI examined a photocopy of HUSSEIN's memorandum responding to the DMI, recognized it as a copy of an authentic document in format and substance, and verified his signature on the document as the Presidential Secretary. Because Generals are not Ministers, they could not correspond directly with HUSSEIN but rather sent correspondence through the Presidential Secretary's Office. Hence, the DMI submitted the referenced March 10, 1987 correspondence to Presidential Secretary AL-HUMMADI. AL-HUMMADI, in turn, presented it to HUSSEIN.

HUSSEIN normally wrote his responses or directives on the margins or bottoms of the incoming correspondence. If the matter were urgent and time sensitive, AL-HUMMADI made a photocopy of the correspondence with HUSSEIN's original notes on it, filed the original, and sent the photocopy to the author of the correspondence. On more routine correspondence, AL-HUMMADI transcribed verbatim HUSSEIN's written remarks into a Presidential Secretary Office letter. Such was the case with this March 12, 1987, letter to the DMI. HUSSEIN read the DMI letter, accepted it and authorized the DMI's proposed use of "special ammunition." AL-HUMMADI then prepared HUSSEIN's March 12, 1987 official response memorandum and sent it to the DMI.

AL-HUMMADI stated that the phrase "special ammunition" meant chemical weapons, and that HUSSEIN's order that the DMI conduct a study of special ammunition usage, coupled with the order to, "Do the necessary, and notify us", indicated HUSSEIN knew of and authorized his military commanders' proposed use of chemical weapons. AL-HUMMADI reiterated his certainty that the document and his signature were authentic. [AL-HUMMADI interview, June 2, 2004]

The DMI Third Department, or Sh3, was responsible for handling the Kurdish insurgency. On March 13, 1987, the Director of the Sh3 responded to HUSSEIN's orders. The Director recommended the use of the air force to carry out the strikes because air strikes would be:

- ▶ more accurate and effective,
- ▶ achieves the surprise attack objectives, since using artillery would reveal our intentions,
- ▶ no doubt, some targets are beyond the artillery and helicopter ranges. [attached as document #XX]

In the same report, the Sh3 Director also enumerated "the conditions and requirements for directing the [Special] Aerial Assault to inflict the required damage and make it more

effective:

- ▶ Provide the Air Force with detailed and accurate information about the targets.
- ▶ It is necessary to brief the pilots about the targets descriptions and to make use of the aerial images.
- ▶ Execute the strike at day break or a little later.
- ▶ Dedicate the maximum effort (more than one airplane per target) and repeat air strikes with follow up airplanes, or make it a compound strike (The Special Ammunition, high explosive bombs, and surface to air missiles) using integrated or follow up bombing.
- ▶ Strike all targets simultaneously with the most effective effort.
- ▶ Use the artillery after a suitable time (a few days) to strike the targets within the range.
[attached as document #XX]

On March 13, 1987, Iraqi Cabinet Minister HASHIM HASSAN AL-'AQRAWI (hereinafter AL-'AQRAWI) stated during a media interview, "The Iranians are trying to use these people [the Kurds] to carry out dirty missions, and since they know the geography of the area and its ins and outs, the Iranians use them merely as guides for the Khomeini Guards and the Iranian forces."

On March 18, 1987, the DMI responded to the Presidential Office through Memo, Number M1/Sh3/Q2/6414. The subject of the memo is, "Use of Special Ammunition" and contains the following:

1. The following are the available capabilities to us for the use of the Special Ammunition directed at Khomeini Guard Bases and the bases of the saboteurs, AL-BARZANI Group - The First Branch.
2. The climate conditions do not permit the use of the (Sarin) agent at the present time because the target locations are covered with snow, which causes the agent to dissolve and transform into a non-poisonous substance. The same conditions apply to the (Tabun) agent.
3. We possess adequate (Mustard) agent. The

predicted effect will be a (miracle) in these conditions unless a large, concentrated dose is received, and that it evaporates slowly in snow covered areas.

4. We are capable of using the Air Force, tube launchers, and helicopters at night.

5. We suggest the following:

a. The postponement of the strike against the Khomeini Guard Bases and the bases of the AL-BARZANI Group until next June. We prefer selected target locations outside the range of the Iraq-Turkey boundary line. We have selected targets that are located away from the probable effect of the forces along the Turkish border or Turkish villages.

b. Start off with similar plans to execute limited operations toward the Iranian agents' bases.

6. Please review and inform us of the assignment... with respect, Walid

On March 19, 1987, in Presidential Memo Number 7/G2/877/K, HUSSEIN approved the DMI's suggestions. [attached as document #XX]

On March 25, 1987, the DMI concluded its study as directed by HUSSEIN and reported its finding in report Number S3/Q2/6885 titled, "Use of Special Ammunition" which SABIR signed. The report identified the locations of the Iranian agents' bases, and selected targets according to enemy size and their effect on the internal security in the Northern Region. The Report listed suitable and available capabilities of the "special ammunition" and the launching means. (attached as document #XX)

The report identified Iranian agents' bases in the region of Balisan Basin (Balisan villages, Tutemeh, Khatti, and Sheikh Wasan) located near the main road between Chuwa'r Qurna-Khalifan, and the region of Qaradagh Basin (Tekyah, Belkjar, and Siosenan) "as important to both Iranian agents and enemy personnel. Their size effected the internal security to the Northern Region and were far enough from Iraqi forces, making them more suitable than other targets, for 'special ammunition'."

Because limited amounts of "special ammunition" were available to the Iraqis at the time, SABIR described the following options:

- ▶ Directing a strike to the selected targets during this period by using two thirds of what is available of the "special ammunition" (Sarin agent). In addition, one third of what is available of the "special ammunition" (Mustard agent), and keeping the rest for emergency situations in the operating sector.
- ▶ Postpone strike until mid-April 1987, until there is enough "special ammunition" available, after improvements will be made in the production.

AL-HUMMADI examined a photocopy of the above correspondence sent from the DMI to the Presidential Secretary's Office. AL-HUMMADI recognized it as a copy of the authentic document in format and substance and would have given it to Huessin in the normal course of his duties.

On March 29, 1987, AL-HUMMADI authored the Presidential Office's response to SABIR's DMI correspondence which is numbered Presidential Memo 953/965/K. This memorandum relayed HUSSEIN's approval for the chemical weapons strike and emphasized that his approval was conditioned upon "exploiting the results of the strike as the purpose is not to simply hurt the sabatours." HUSSEIN directed SABIR and the DMI to coordinate with the intended Corps and inform the Presidential Office before initiating the strike. [attached as document #XX]

AL-HUMMADI examined a photocopy of HUSSEIN's March 29, 1987 memorandum. AL-HUMMADI stated that it was an accurate copy of the authentic document in format and substance, and verified his signature.

AL-HUMMADI explained that HUSSEIN himself did not correspond directly with his officers and advisors; rather, pursuant to normal communication protocol, the Presidential Secretary's Office issued all of HUSSEIN's communications and orders. Hence, AL-HUMMADI communicating HUSSEIN's orders to the intended recipients. Based upon his daily contact with HUSSEIN, it was clear to AL-HUMMADI that HUSSEIN was, in this series of communications, approving and authorizing SABIR and the DMI to begin chemical weapon strikes near Turkey.

On March 31, 1987, SABIR advised the Army Chief of Staff in Memorandum 7371 that HUSSEIN had ordered a study of the use of "special ammunition," and made the same suggestions he had made for HUSSEIN. SABIR, who signed the report, also detailed

the results of the DMI study and its recommendation of which bases to strike, and advised that the DMI had Presidential authority to proceed. [attached as document #XX]

On April 5, 1987, in response to DMI Memorandum 7371, the Army Chief of Staff, Staff General SA'AD AL-DIN AZIZ MUSTAFA (hereinafter MUSTAFA), drafted Memorandum 3656 titled "Using Special Ammunition" which directed the First Corps and Special Corps to conduct counter-operations against saboteurs, Iranian agents, and Khomeini Guards by using "special ammunition" against Iranian agents' bases in the region of Balisan Basin (Balisan villages, Tutemeh, Khatti, and Sheikh Wasan), located near the main road between Chuwa'r Qurna-Khalifan and in Qaradagh Basin villages (Tekyah, Belkjar, and Siosenan). [attached as document #XX]

The Army Chief of Staff MUSTAFA instructed the First Corps to prepare a joint plan to complete the strikes against the first group of targets and forward the plan to him by courier for approval and coordination. MUSTAFA also ordered the preparation of a plan regarding the second group of targets listed above, to be presented during a visit to the First Corps Headquarters on April 9, 1987.

This memo was also sent to the Presidential Office and advised that the Army Chief of Staff MUSTAFA would inform the Presidential Office of the plan in detail and would "exploit" the results. Additionally, this memo was forwarded to the Operations Department of the Ministry of Defense. The memo referenced a previously-convened meeting on April 5, 1987, and asked that the Special Ammunition Group be sent to the First Corps Headquarters on April 7, 1987 to consult with the Corps and put in place an executable plan.

SABIR reviewed, in Arabic, the above-described series of memorandums between HUSSEIN and the various military entities regarding the use of "special ammunition" in the Northern Region of Iraq. SABIR admitted that "special ammunition" was a term used by HUSSEIN and the Iraq Government to mean chemical weapons. SABIR did not remember each and every document; however, he did verify his signature on the bottom of several previously identified documents, and thus concluded they were authentic.

While examining the copies and verifying his signature, interviewing agents observed the following physical changes in SABIR; he started to perspire profusely, his facial characteristics dramatically changed, and his lower lip began to

uncontrollably quiver. Additionally, SABIR's eyes began to tear after he described the April 16, 1987, chemical weapons attack on the villages of Balisan and Sheikh Wasan. SABIR stated that HUSSEIN's decision to utilize chemical weapons directly caused the deaths of the men, women, and children in those villages.

The idea of using chemical weapons first arose in approximately 1986 after the loss of the Faw Peninsula to Iranian forces which lead the Iraqi government worry that Iraq was losing the war with Iran. SABIR believed the general consensus was that Iraqi forces needed a small victory to boost their confidence and commitment to the war with Iran. SABIR's subordinates within the DMI initially proposed the use of chemical weapons against Iran to provide such a moral and commitment boost. However, the DMI's primary mission was to defeat and expel Iranian forces and not to utilize chemical weapons against the innocent women and children in the civilian population. SABIR advised that in 1987, the DMI was responsible for collecting information for target identification and providing that information to the Iraqi military. [SABIR interview, June 3, 2004]

SABIR stated that during the *Anfal* Campaign, the DMI was responsible for gathering intelligence from within each of the Corps. The military was responsible for fighting on the front lines and clearing areas of resistance. The military was also responsible for removing Kurdish populations from the Northern Region, and the Governors in each of those areas were responsible for relocating the displaced Kurds. Each Governor was responsible for reporting directly to AL-MAJID. SABIR did not know the full extent of AL-MAJID's responsibility and advised that areas outside of AL-MAJID's responsibility would have been assigned to the military. [SABIR interview, June 3, 2004]


April 16, 1987 Chemical Attack
on Balisan and Sheikh Wasan

During an interview with *Le Monde* in April 1987, PUK representative NAYWSHIRWAN MUSTAFA AMIN commented that one option under consideration by the PUK was the "severance of Iraq into a number of small states: Shia, Kurdish and Sunni."

In early April 1987, PUK *Peshmergas* launched an assault in the Jafati Valley, overrunning dozens of small Iraqi military posts and taking hundreds of prisoners. The Jafati Valley was home to the PUK's national headquarters. The Iraq Government responded on April 15, 1987 by launching chemical artillery

shells in the Jafati and Shahr-bazar Valleys.

Balisan and Sheikh Wasan lay scarcely a mile and a half apart in a steep-sided valley south of the town of Rawanduz. The Balisan Valley was home to the PUK's Third Regional Command. Balisan was described as a sizeable village containing approximately 250 households, with an approximate population of 1,750 from the Khoshnaw Tribe. The village had four mosques, one primary school and one intermediate school. Sheikh Wasan was a smaller settlement of approximately 150 homes.



In July 1993, the Human Rights Watch (HRW), a non-governmental organization, published the report, "Genocide In Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds" which documented the Iraqi Government's use of chemical weapons against the Kurds during operations known as the "Anfal Campaign" in 1987 and 1988. HRW reported that its findings were based on interviews of survivors, examination of seized Iraqi documents, and examination of massacre sites.

According to HRW, the following is an account of the attack on Balisan and Sheikh Wasan:

During the evening hours of April 16, 1987, the villagers of Balisan and Sheikh Wasan heard the sound of approaching aircraft. Some villagers stayed in their homes, while others fled to air-raid shelters when a dozen aircraft came into sight, flying low over the villages. There were a number of muffled explosions. Witnesses and survivors, describing the effects of the attack to HRW stated, "It was all dark, covered with darkness, we could not see anything, and were not able to see each

other. It was like fog, and then everyone became blind." Some vomited. Faces turned black; people experienced painful swelling under the arms, and women under the breasts. Later, a yellow watery discharge oozed from the eyes and nose. Many of those who survived suffered severe vision disturbances, or total blindness, for up to a month. In Sheikh Wasan, survivors watched as a woman staggered blindly, clutching her dead child, and not realizing the baby was dead. Some villagers ran into the mountains and died there. Others, who had been close to the impact points of the bombs, died where they stood.

The following morning, ground troops and pro-regime Kurdish militia entered Balisan, looted the villagers' deserted homes and razed them to the ground. Sometime later, army engineers dynamited and bulldozed Sheikh Wasan. The surviving inhabitants had already fled during the night of the attack. Some made their way to the city of Suleimaniyeh, and a few to Shaqlawa. But most headed southeast to the town of Raiya where there was a hospital. They were helped on their way by people from neighboring villages, including Barukawa, Kaniberd, and Tutma, which had also suffered from the effects of the wind-born gas. The people of Beiro sent tractor-drawn carts to Sheikh Wasan, and 10 of these vehicles, each carrying 50 or 60 people, left for Raniya. At the complex of Seruchawa, just outside the town, the tractors stopped to bury the bodies of 50 people who were already dead. The refugees who reached Raniya spent one night there. Local doctors washed their wounds and gave them eye-drops, but that did nothing to ease the effect of the gas on their vision.

The next morning, agents from Amn [Directorate of General Security, or DGS] and possibly from military intelligence arrived at the hospital. They ordered everyone out of bed and into a number of waiting vehicles,

consisting of 21 passenger vans, pickup trucks and cars. The villagers were told these vehicles would take them to the city Erbil for medical care. However, they were later warned their medical care was contingent on them reporting that their injuries were the result of an attack by Iranian airplanes.

At about 9:00 that morning, people in Kurdish dress began to stream into the emergency room of the Republic Hospital in Erbil. Approximately 200 unarmed civilian men, women and children arrived at the hospital. Four were dead on arrival. The survivors arriving from Ranya told doctors that they had been attacked with chemical weapons. Despite their burns, their blindness, and other, more superficial injuries, those who had survived the journey from the Balisan Valley were generally still able to work, although some were unconscious. Even with the assistance of doctors who rushed across from the nearby Maternity and Pediatric Hospital, the facilities were not sufficient to deal with a large-scale emergency. There were far from enough beds to deal with so many victims; many of the patients were laid on the floors, and the occupants of the vans were obliged to wait in the parking lot while the preliminary triage was done and the first treatment carried out. On examination, the doctors found that the victims' eyes were dried out and glued shut. Having some rudimentary notion of how to treat chemicals, the doctors applied eye drops, washed their burns and administered injections of atropine, a powerful antidote to nerve agents.

The doctors had been at work on their patients for about an hour when HASSAN NADURI, the head of the local branch office of Amn, arrived. When NADURI arrived on the morning of April 4, 1987, every doctor in the hospital was busy dealing with the emergency. NADURI was accompanied by two other Amn

officers, and, possibly IBRAHIM ZANGANA, the governor of Erbil, and a second local Ba'ath Party official, ABD-AL-MON'EM. The Amn officers questioned the hospital guards, demanding to know where the new patients were from and who the doctors were who were treating them. They then repeated these questions to the medical staff, and demanded to know what treatment was being given. As these questions were answered, NADURI telephoned the Amn office for instructions. After hanging up, he ordered that all treatment cease immediately. He told the doctors to remove the dressings from the patients' wounds. When the doctors asked why, NADURI stated that he had received orders from his superiors to transfer all the patients to the city's military hospital. At first, the hospital staff demurred, but the three Amn officers drew their pistols and ordered them to stop what they were doing at once. Otherwise, they would be taken to Amn headquarters themselves. After a second telephone call, this time ostensibly to the military hospital, a number of ambulances or trucks arrived and took the patients away, together with those who remained, for a full hour now, in the three parked vans.

Later that day, the doctors telephoned the military hospital to check on the condition of their patients. They had never arrived there. The doctors never saw any of the survivors of the Balisan Valley chemical attack again. They later heard that loaded military ambulances had been seen driving off in the direction of Makhmour, to the southwest of Erbil.

A handful of survivors told Middle East Watch that the Balisan Valley victims were taken to a former police station that was now an Amn detention center, a stark white cement building in the Arab quarter of the city, near the Baiz casino. There was a chaotic scene on arrival, as Amn officers attempted to sort out detainees by age and sex, and, in the confusion, several people managed to

escape. At least one woman fled leaving her children behind. Those who remained were thrown into locked cells, and guarded by uniformed agents; some dressed all in the green and others in blue. Here, they were held for several days without food, blankets or medical attention.

HAMOUD SA'ID AHMAD, an employee of the municipal morgue attached to Erbil's Republic Hospital, was summoned on a number of occasions over the next few days to the Amn jail in the city's Teirawa quarter and ordered to pick up bodies to be prepared for burial. Over a three day period, AHMAD counted 64 bodies. Arriving to collect them, AHMAD saw other prisoners wandering around the in the prison courtyard. Some had clear fluid oozing from their mouths; others had dark, burn-like marks on their bodies, especially the throat and hands. AHMAD saw men, women, and children in detention, including several nursing babies in their mother's arms. The bodies, kept in a separate cell, bore the same marks. None showed any signs of gunshot wounds. Most of the dead appeared to be children and elderly people. An Amn official told AHMAD that "they are saboteurs, all saboteurs we attack with chemical weapons." An ambulance driver told AHMAD that he recognized one of the dead as a Republic Hospital employee from Sheikh Wasan.

Family members waiting outside the jail for news said that the detainees were being held as hostages to compel their *peshmerga* relatives to surrender. On the last of his three visits, AHMAD saw two large buses pull up outside the prison, their windows sealed with cloth. Later that day, a female prisoner managed to whisper to him "do you know what the buses were doing here? They took all the men away, to the south, like the Barzanis." The men were never seen alive again.

After the mass disappearance of the men, the surviving women and children were taken out during the night and driven off in the direction of Khalifan, three hours to the northeast of Erbil. At a place called Alana, they were dumped in an open plain on the banks of the river, and left to fend for themselves. They were reunited here with the Balisan Valley villagers who had fled to Suleimaniyeh.

At Alana, the mother who had escaped from the Amn jail in Erbil was reunited with her children. She recognized families from the villages of Kaniberd, Tutma, Sheikh Wasa, and Balisan, who told her that many children had died in place from hunger, thirst, and exposure.

On the basis of interviews with four survivors, and with a number of medical and morgue personnel in Erbil, HRW determined a rough estimate of the numbers who died as a result of exposure to chemical weapons.

There were 24 deaths in Balisan as a direct result of exposure to chemical weapons; these people were buried in a mass grave in the village.

There were 103 deaths in Sheikh Wasan, including approximately 50 buried in a mass grave in the government complex in Seruchawa. The dead included:

- 33 children under the age of four
- 28 children between the ages of 5-14
- 9 elderly people aged 60-85
- 8-9 dead at the hospital at Raniya
- 4 dead on arrival at the Erbil
Emergency Hospital
- 64 -142 deaths in the Amn jail in
Erbil.

The deaths in the Amn jail were the result of untreated injuries sustained in the chemical bombing, aggravated by starvation and neglect. The victims included two

elderly women identified as SELMA MUSTAFA HAMID and ADILA SHINKO, and a nine-year old girl identified as HOWSAT ABDULLAH KHIDR.

The number of adult men and teenage boys taken by two busloads from the Amn jail and presumed to be executed later is estimated at 70 to 75. Twenty two are believed to be from Balisan, 50 from Sheikh Wasan, and four from nearby villages. Among those that disappeared were MOHAMMAD IBRAHIM KHIDR, age 18, and MOHSEN IBRAHIM KHIDR, age 12, the two youngest sons of the Mullah of Balisan.

Allowing for some overlap, the Middle East Watch calculated that at least 225 and perhaps as many as 400 civilians from the Balisan Valley died as a result of the April 16, 1987 Iraqi Air Force's chemical strike on their villages.

[redacted] (hereinafter [redacted] also witnessed the April 16, 1987, attack on Balisan. According to [redacted] the Iraqi military attacked the villages of Sheikh Wasan and Balisan during the evening hours of April 16, 1987. The aerial attack was the first night attack conducted by the Iraqi military against the Kurds. [redacted] believed the Iraqi military used chemical weapons against the villages at night because the highest concentration of villagers would be in their homes and the villages at night; the men who remained in the villages were the toughest in the valley; and it gave the Iraqi military the opportunity to attack the rear of the *Peshmaga* front lines. At the time of the attack, [redacted] estimated there were 200 to 300 civilians and *Peshmegas* in Balisan and approximately 400 in Sheikh Wasan. .

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On April 16, 1987, [redacted] who lived in Balisan, was in the village of Tutma, located within the Balisan Valley. [redacted] saw Iraqi aircraft over the villages of Balisan and Sheikh Wasan. While over the villages, the aircraft conducted dive runs but [redacted] did not hear any explosions. Approximately an hour later, [redacted] heard the sound of helicopters, followed by dull explosions, and he saw large, high flames coming from the villages and knew that it had been a chemical attack. [redacted] later learned through the PUK that the helicopters had taken off earlier from Kirkuk. The PUK has estimated that approximately 36 helicopters were involved in the attack.

[redacted] immediately began walking to Balisan because his

brother, [] was there. The journey took him approximately an hour. Upon arrival at the village, [] saw villagers acting normally and going about their normal routine. [] learned that his brother had fled the village because he had been injured in the attack. After some time, [] began to see the effects of the attack on some of the villagers. The most common symptoms were pain to the eyes and loss of vision. People began to flee the village as word of the injuries spread throughout the village.

[] went to the PUK field hospital in the village of Khati to search for his brother. Because [] face was so badly burned, [] did not initially recognize his brother and found him only after his brother called out upon hearing [] voice. [] face was dark from the burn and appeared sunken, as if dehydrated. All the patients at the hospital were victims of that evening's chemical attack.

On April 17, 1987, at approximately 6:30 am, [] heard the sound of artillery approaching the village of Khati. The Iraqi military had started a ground offensive in the Balisan Valley. The Iraqi military began clearing the valley one village at a time. The Iraqi military first fired artillery at the village, and then cleared it with tanks. When [] heard the artillery fire approaching Khati, he knew that village would soon be the next target.

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[] along with his brother and four other injured Kurds, fled the valley to hide in a cave in the mountain. [] identified the others as two civilians from Balisan, a civilian from Sheikh Wasan, and a fighter from [] hometown. When they arrived at the cave, [] saw other victims from the chemical attack, captured Iraqi soldiers and civilians hiding. [] estimated their number to be approximately 40. [] interview, December 15, 2004).

On April 19, 1987, [] led his brother and the remaining injured to the village of Sheikh Wasan. Although the Iraqi chemical attacks had concentrated on Sheikh Wasan and Balisan, the gasses had dissipated from a section of Sheikh Wasan because of the topography of the area. As a result, [] and his group stayed the night of April 19 on that relatively safe side of the village.

The next morning, [] and his small group traveled from Sheikh Wasan to Balisan. He gathered the food he had previously hidden on April 18, 1987. Although the food had been

contaminated with chemicals, the group was so hungry that they had no choice but to eat it. By nightfall, approximately 10 people had gathered around [redacted]. Most of the homes in the village had been burned by the Iraqi troops, but they managed to find a house at the edge of the village to spend the night. [redacted] noted that although approximately 2,000 people lived in Balisan, only 10 or 12 people had returned after the attack.

On April 21, 1987, [redacted] intended to travel with his brother to Shaqlawa to locate medical supplies. At approximately 9:00 am, [redacted] was still in Balisan when two Iraqi Gazelle helicopters flew over the village. [redacted] recognized them by sight and knew they carried 20mm machine guns. [redacted] soon heard machine gun bursts as the helicopters traveled northwest from Balisan. He and another raced to the sound of the guns and found seven people, five males and two females, shot dead on the government road northwest of Balisan. One of the woman had been carrying an infant who had not been shot and was trying to breast feed from its dead mother.

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
[redacted] estimated that the total populations of all of the villages in the Balisan Valley ranged from 400 to 2,000 (Balisan). Most were located within a mile or two of each other. Although the Iraqi military attacked and burned all 42 villages in the valley, the Iraqi government forces seemed to concentrate on the villages of Balisan, Sheikh Wasan, Tutemeh, Balanukawa, Kanibard, Berawa, and Khati which are all located within three miles of each other. The chemical attacks were most concentrated on Balisan and Sheikh Wasan, but other villages not directly attacked were indirectly affected by the gas as well. It appeared that Berawa, Khatti, and Kanibard were attacked by artillery or airplanes employing conventional weapons only. [redacted] interview, January 27, 2005].

The following declassified satellite imagery, illustrating Sheikh Wasan on May 27, 1987, depicts the impact

craters in and near the villages.

The FBI obtained several audiotapes, consolidated onto — one CD, from Philip Trewhitt, United Kingdom Liaison on Transitional Justice, Office of Human Rights & Transitional Justice, Coalition Provisional Authority, Baghdad, Iraq. These tapes are referenced in the HRW report dated July, 1993, Appendix A, "The ALI HASAN AL-MAJID Tapes." These tapes contain recordings of Al Majid during Northern Command meetings held between approximately 1987 to 1989. Portions of the tapes were played for AL-MAJID.

We said that at that date we will start to implement the deportation campaign. And we did it everywhere, with the help of God. The same day they captured Qara Dagh in retaliation. JALAL TALABANI asked me to open



a special channel of communication with him. That evening I went to Suleimaniyeh and hit them with the special ammunition. That was my answer. 'I will attack it with chemical weapons.' and 'I will kill them all with chemical weapons!' Who is going to say anything? The international community? Fuck them! The international community and those who listen to them. [Tape 2A segment marked approximately 21:59 to 26:44]

AL-MAJID is presumably referring to the April, 1987 chemical attack on the PUK headquarters in the Jafati Valley. AL-MAJID also listened to the following portion of Tape 2B:

I will not attack them with chemicals just one day, but I will continue to attack them with chemical weapons for fifteen days.
[Tape 2B]

We will surround them in a small pocket and attack them with chemical weapons. I will not attack them with chemicals just one day, but I will continue to attack them with chemicals for 15 days.

After listening to Tape A, AL-MAJID stated, "This tape has been altered" and that "this tape is not correct." He claimed the audiotape had been "assembled" from tapes of two different meetings; one meeting in the first half of 1988 and the other in Mosul on March 30, 1991.

AL-MAJID admitted that the audiotape A was a recording of his voice and his words at a meeting with Ba'ath Party Section officials and Governors of the Autonomous Region of Kurdistan on April 15, 1987. AL-MAJID stated that his statements were attempts at "psychological warfare" against the enemy in the beginning of the campaign against the saboteurs in the Northern Region. His words were meant as a scare tactic similar to what was later used in Dohuk. In AL-MAJID's opinion, the saboteurs would be "weakened by words." Logistically, they would later be weakened by their forced separation from the cities. [AL-MAJID interview, April 9, 2004]

AL-MAJID said he personally inspected Suleimaniyeh and it had not been hit. He added that he never heard of such an attack, particularly with chemical weapons. He stated he did not order a chemical weapons attack on TALABANI and his headquarters in the Jafati Valley near Suleimaniyeh. He claimed he actually went to Suleimaniyeh to meet with TALABANI, and that the words

"and hit them with the special ammunition" have been inserted into this tape. The remainder of the tape is a threat or scare tactic AL-MAJID used against the saboteurs in Dohuk.

According to AL-MAJID, when the Iraq Government lost control of the cities of Suleimaniyeh, Dohuk, Erbil, and Kirkuk in 1991, HUSSEIN tasked AL-MAJID with "liberating" Dohuk. He invited ABD JAWAD THANNON, Governor of Dohuk, NASIR SAID (hereinafter SAID), Fifth Corps Commander, and all state and Party officials to a "reception" at the Mosul Hotel in Mosul. There, AL-MAJID gave a speech declaring, "Whoever has a friend in Dohuk, I will attack with chemical weapons tomorrow." SAID attempted to interrupt AL-MAJID because he did not want the timing of the operation to be revealed. AL-MAJID directed him to communicate this information to those in Dohuk. He wanted "the illusion" of a chemical weapons attack to be imprinted in the minds of those controlling Dohuk. AL-MAJID stated the Iraq Government was weak in 1991. Thus, he used the chemical weapons "threat" as a "scare tactic" to control the saboteurs in Dohuk.

AL-MAJID directed the military to procure bags of flour or cement and attach them to helicopters. The helicopters were then used the following morning to spread the material over Dohuk to further "illusion" of a chemical weapons attack. AL-MAJID used this "scare tactic" to reduce losses on "our side and their side." AL-MAJID walked into Dohuk at 9:30 a.m. the same morning. Some Iraqi military members would not enter the city however, thinking that it had been contaminated with chemical weapons.

According to AL-MAJID, NIZAR AL-KHAZRAJI (hereinafter AL-KHAZRAJI), Army Chief of Staff, once told ABBAS MAHMOUD (NFI) or RASOOL MAHMOUD (NFI) that AL-MAJID ordered the chemical weapon attack on Halabja which was not true. AL-MAJID is known as "Chemical Ali" because of the events at Dohuk and not at Halabja.

During his interview, TARIQ AZIZ confirmed that HUSSEIN's decision to deploy chemical weapons against the Kurds was a unilateral one; that is, HUSSEIN did not convene a meeting of the RCC, National Assembly, or any other Iraqi or Ba'ath Party government entity to discuss the use of chemical weapons in the April, 1987 attacks. Moreover, HUSSEIN gave no official written or verbal notification to these entities that he had authorized, or that chemical weapons had been used, in the attacks. AZIZ stated the RCC was "informed" and "it was mentioned." He added it was "common knowledge" through the media that chemical weapons had been used. No RCC member protested their use for fear of reprisals from HUSSEIN and fear that Iraq would lose the war.

without such a drastic step. At the time, the situation was viewed as dire and "life or death." AZIZ admitted that Iraq and Iran had each violated provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1917 and 1948, of which each was a signator, which prohibited the use of chemical weapons. [AZIZ interview, February 2, 2004].

May 25, 1987 Chemical Attack on the Malakan Valley

Pursuant to the authorization to use chemical weapons that HUSSEIN had given to the military in the series of previously identified letters, the Iraqi military attacked the Malakan Valley with chemical weapons on May 25, 1987. Specifically, based on an April 24, 1987 DMI report, Number 28357, the Secretary General for the Ministry of Defense, Staff General MAHMOOD SHOKER SHAHEEN, sent letter Number D/A/51/1/10374 to the Headquarters of the Army Chief of Staff. The letter, dated May 1, 1987, advised that the Deputy to the Minister of Defense had ordered:

All agents' sites should be struck with aerial weapons, traditional and special, and all weapons within range. (Attached as document #XX)

This letter prompted the Senior Secretary of the Army Chief of Staff, Staff General TAREQ HUSSEIN MAJEED, to direct the DMI via letter Number RAG/1/15787, dated May 2, 1987, to:

Please take the necessary procedure and provide the Headquarters of the Air Force and Air Defense with the Agents' sites in order to destroy them. (Attached as document #XX)

On May 3, 1987, the DMI informed the Headquarters of the Army Chief of Staff via report Number M1/Sh3/Q2/9819 that it had provided the locations of the Iranian Agents' sites to the Headquarters of the Air Force and Air Defense. The DMI identified 17 villages by name and by what appears to have been grid coordinates. Additionally, the DMI suggested "ordering a study on the issue of striking the Iranian Agents's sites with special ammunition by the authorized committee." SABIR AL-DURI signed the report as the Director of the DMI. (Attached as document #XX)

On May 9, 1987, the Headquarters of the Air Force and Air Defense notified the Ministry of Defense via letter Number Sh1/QD/690 that based on SABIR's report Number 9819, and Army

Chief of Staff letter Number 15787, "air strikes were launched with traditional ammunition by (20) aircrafts, and with special ammunition by (44) aircrafts against the Agents' sites mentioned in the DMI's report, except for Shadlah Alolya, due to its nearness to the troop line." The letter was signed by Lieutenant General HUMAID SHABAAN, Commander of the Air Force and Air Defense. (Attached as document #XX)

On May 12, 1987, the Headquarters of the Air Force and Air Defense identified for the DMI in letter Number SH/QS/707 the locations of sites struck by traditional ammunition and those struck by special ammunition. The ten sites struck by traditional ammunition on May 4 and May 8, 1987 and listed by name and grid coordinates were among the 17 sites the DMI had previously identified in report Number 9819. The sites struck by special ammunition on May 7, 1987 were identified only by grid coordinates. The letter was signed by Staff Pilot General HASSAN KHADER ALHAJ AHMED, the Director of Air Movements. (Attached as document #XX).

On May 20, 1987, the DMI summarized the strikes directed at the Iranian Agents' sites as reported by the Air Force and Air Defense in report number M1/Sh3/Q2/11144 addressed to the Ministry of Defense. The report identified the ten sites struck with traditional ammunition and further reported:

2. As for the other targets, which were hit by air strikes (44) aircrafts using special ammunition (mentioned in the above Air Force and Air Defense letter), were groups of Iranian Agents existing North and East of Gowarta. (Attached as document #XX)

A handwritten memorandum, Number 4947 (attached as document #XX), dated June 11, 1987, from the Director of General Security of the Erbil Governate to the Security Directorate of Shaqlawa, provided information about attacks on "saboteurs" that resulted in their blindness. The document stated, in part:

On 5/27/87, our aircraft attacked the villages of Malakan, Talinan, Kandor, Bileh Aliya and Bileh Sufla in the Khalifan subdistrict, which harbor some saboteurs. As a result of the bombing, [REDACTED]...lost his eyesight....A number of saboteurs were killed and about 30 people lost their eyesight as a result of the bombing,

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including the family of KAMAL HAJI KHIDR AGHA, the commander of the 12th [PUK] division.

Temporary blindness is a common side-effect of a chemical attack. HRW interviewed KAMAL AGHA in March, 1993, who confirmed that he and his family had been temporarily blinded in a chemical attack on May 27, 1987.

On May 26, 1987, [] was part of a *Peshmerga* group that arrived in the Malakan Valley. In the late afternoon of May 26th, 1987, [] witnessed a MIG-25 flying slowly over the Malakan Valley. Approximately five or six miles long, the Malakan Valley was home to the villages of Malakan, Talinan, Bila-Zohri, and Bila-Zehri. [] believed the airplane was taking surveillance photographs for an upcoming attack. [] later learned from an Iraqi deserter that it was common for the Iraqi Air Force to send a MIG-25 to an area that it planned to attack. The MIG-25 would fly to the area of interest to take pictures of the villages and areas where people lived. The next day, the area would be attacked with chemical weapons.

As [] and his group prepared to depart Malakan shortly after 6 a.m. on May 27, 1987, Iraqi government forces attacked the top of the Malakan Valley with chemical weapons. A spring at the top of the valley which was the villages' water source channeled the heavy chemical gas through the valley and down towards the villages. Believing the attack was part of a larger operation that might include an attack on the Balisan Valley, HASSAN SHUSTANI, the PUK Third *Malaband* Commander, ordered his group of *Pershmergas* to leave immediately for Balisan. On the way out of Malakan which is on the north side of the valley, the group had to head down into the valley and through the gas. However, no one in GOZEH's group was severely effected by the chemical gases. The villagers in the area were left to deal with the chemical attack themselves.

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[] believed this attack was in retaliation for an entire *Jahsh* regiment's (Kurdish pro-regime militia) recent defection and relocation to the Malakan Valley. According to [] a total of fifteen died from the chemical attack, four of whom were members of the defected *Jahsh* regiment. [] interview, February 3, 2005].

June 6, 1987 Chemical Attack on the Zewa Valley

A handwritten note by the Director of Sh3 (DMI) dated

June 5, 1987, was attached to the DMI study, Number Sh3/Q2/6885, which was submitted to the Presidential Secretary for HUSSEIN's review and information. [Enclosure #8]. The note stated:

Regarding obtaining approval of the Presidency's Office on the said suggestion, and in paragraph A under item 2 of the attached letter which stipulates postponing the strike of Khomeini Guards in Barzani's First Division till June, therefore:

1. On June 4, a study was completed on directing a severe strike against these quarters and against Barzani's First Division quarters in (Zewa, Barzan, Katirash, and Lakirash), and this study was completed by participants from the General Staff, Planning Department, Army, Air Force, our Directorate, and the Chemical Division.
2. Support for the Strike on Zewa Village was obtained despite of its close proximity to the Turkish border, but striking the targets listed hereunder were not supported for the following reasons:
 - a. Katirash - it's too close to the Turkish border.
 - b. Lakirash - its close proximity to our army units in Jabal Kuwait.
 - c. Barzan, where the Khomeini Guards are few and disbursed in the Barzan Basin, does not constitute a viable target.

In June, 1987, [redacted] (hereinafter [redacted]) was living at an Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) compound in the Zewa Valley which is located in the top part of Kurdistan above Dohuk near Kani Masi. The compound housed the ICP leadership including HAMID MUSA, aka ABU MUSA, currently a member of the interim Iraqi Government, SLAYMAN YOUSEF, aka ABU AMIL, head of the military committee, TOMA TOMAS, aka ABU JAMEEL, head of the Bahdinan area, and ABU ADEL, political advisor for the Bahdinan area.

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The Zewa Valley is surrounded by mountains and was home to approximately 1,000 *Peshmergas* from the various Kurdish parties. The ICP compound was located near two civilian villages. The valley was protected by *doshkas*, Russian anti-aircraft missiles.

On approximately June 5 or 6, 1987, between 6:00 or 7:00 p.m., 12 grey Iraqi MIG aircrafts attacked the valley while most residents were preparing for dinner. The aircraft came in very low at approximately 1,000 feet. The aircraft circled the

valley and conducted two bombing runs which lasted a total of approximately 10 minutes. There were approximately six to eight explosions. One bomb landed approximately 50 feet from [redacted]. Everyone in the compound ran for the bomb shelters. According to [redacted] this was the first time the Iraqis attacked with so many aircraft at such a low altitude and so close to homes and structures. [redacted] described the explosions as a dull noise accompanied by heavy white smoke. Initially, there was no smell, but then [redacted] noted a garlicky smell associated with the explosions.

Initially, [redacted] did not notice any injuries except for [redacted] (NFI), who sustained a leg injury as a result of the attack. No one in the compound initially realized that the attack had been a chemical attack. After approximately one half-hour, however, [redacted] heard someone call for the doctor as symptoms of the chemical attack began to appear. [redacted] friend, ABU RAZKAR, began vomiting, which alarmed her. He told her he believed he had inhaled sulfur.

Most people in the compound went to sleep at approximately 9:00 or 9:30 pm that evening. At that time, it was common for people to sleep on the roof of the homes. However, that night, [redacted] decided to sleep inside. At approximately midnight or 12:30 am, [redacted] was awoken and informed that the attack had been a chemical one. [redacted] was instructed to go to the support detachment (isnad). When [redacted] arrived, she saw hundreds of men, women and children from the compound and nearby villages standing around a large bonfire. Most were suffering from some effects of the chemical attacks and were in a great deal of pain. [redacted] stated that "no artist could paint, no writer could write, or no cinematographer could film the suffering." Many were complaining of a burning pain to the eyes and tearing. [redacted] also began to experience a burning pain to her eyes. Everyone believed that fire would counter the effects of chemical attack, hence the large bonfire. Approximately 400 to 500 *Peshmergas* and civilians, to include approximately 50 children, were effected by this attack.

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The *Peshmerga* leadership ordered everyone to evacuate the area and head to high ground. *Peshmergas* and civilians from the nearby effected villages began to make their way, on foot, to the top of the mountain through a small foot path, leaving everything behind. By this time, many of the victims were going blind and were unable to make their way up the path. Others complained of stomach pains. Many were unable to complete the journey. [redacted] helped a blind man up the foot path, arriving

to a safe haven at approximately 3:00 am.

It was very cold at the top of the mountain and many suffered. They had no food, water or blankets. Those who reached the top were forced to eat berries from nearby trees. The victims went without food for three days until help finally arrived. Blisters began to appear on everyone's body which varied in size based upon the individual's proximity to the explosions. Those nearer to impact point blistered and suffered more. Three days after the attack, ABU EUAD died as a result of exposure to the chemical weapons. ABU EUAD (NFI) was very close to the point of impact of one of the bombs. On the fifth day, ABU RAZKAR (NFI) died as well.

As a result of the attack, the victims were forcibly removed from their homes and forced to live in the mountains for a month without shelter. Animals died. Trees in the surrounding area lost their leaves. It was not until September, 1987, that villagers were able to return to Zewa Valley. The valley had experienced heavy rain fall, which [] believed helped clear the valley of the chemical residue. Some victims were blind for 40 days. To this day, [] still suffers from her exposure. [] hands still shake, and she has breathing difficulties.

[] stated that at one point, all the Kurdish parties had joined efforts in resisting Iraqi forces and were referred to as the United Front. Prior to the attack, the Parties were planning a large scale offensive against the Iraqis in the area. The plan developed over a period of time at large planning meetings. On the day of the attack, a planning meeting had been scheduled to take place with representatives from all of the Kurdish parties at the Iraqi Communist Party compound. It was known that the *Peshmerga* had been infiltrated by Iraqi spies or double agents. [] believed the attack was meant to thwart the Kurdish offensive.

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DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY AND FORCIBLE DEPORTATION

AL-MAJID read a copy of RCC Decree 160, dated March 29, 1987, which was written in Arabic and signed by HUSSEIN. AL-MAJID acknowledged that this decree had been issued and that granted him authority over all civilian, military and security agencies in the Northern region. He explained that a Decree is issued at the conclusion of an RCC meeting and details issues addressed by the RCC during the meeting. AL-MAJID stated that he received a written copy of Decree #160 at a later time. Immediately after the RCC issued the Decree, he also received

additional written instructions from the Presidential Diwan which further defined his authority. The Presidential Diwan's instructions restricted AL-MAJID's authority to villages in the Northern Region located within five kilometers of provinces and areas classified as cities, zones, or suburbs.

AL-MAJID denied however, having authority over the military forces or security services in the region as the security services were never subordinate to anyone in the government except HUSSEIN. The Security Services, Fedayeen Saddam and Saddam's Cubs, answered only to HUSSEIN and took their instructions only from HUSSEIN. Pursuant to the additional instructions, AL-MAJID claimed he only used the powers granted to him by the Decree for the "collectivization" of the villages within the defined parameters in the Northern Region. This "collectivization" consisted of moving Kurdish villagers from their homes to Iraq Government housing complexes. Per the additional instructions, areas beyond five kilometers fell within the control of the military, including cities near the border between Iraq and Iran.

AL-MAJID stated that the *Anfal* Campaign in Kurdish territory in 1988 was conducted by the military under the command of SULTAN HASHEM AHMAD AL-TAI (hereinafter HASHEM). AL-MAJID admitted delegating orders to the Security Services as it pertained to areas within his control, but the Services acted independently everywhere else, to include their technical work.

During his interview, Presidential Diwan KHUDAIYER was asked if he ever drafted a follow-up to RCC Decree 160 which limited AL-MAJID's authority to a five kilometer radius around the major cities of Northern Iraq. KHUDAIYER stated that he never published such a Decree. KHUDAIYER was asked whether it was possible that the limiting instruction could have been given verbally. KHUDAIYER stated that such an order which contradicts a Decree would be very big and written. The original RCC Decree 160 was sent to the Ministry of Interior, to governates and to a variety of receivers. The Chief of Staff, the Military Intelligence, the Party and the Security Services were all aligned under the details of RCC Decree 160. Therefore, if the original Decree were to be modified, written coordination would be the only way to notify all of these groups who were required to abide by the details of the original RCC Decree 160. To modify a Decree would require the same legal authority. Doing it verbally would not be lawfully feasible. If such an event occurred it would be, legally speaking, unprecedented according to KHUDAIYER.

KHUDAIYER was asked what he thought about AL-MAJID's claim that he received the five kilometer limitation verbally. KHUDAIYER said that this instruction would only be in a written format. If AL-MAJID said it was passed verbally, he was lying.

AL-MAJID admitted that he supervised the implementation of the Iraqi Government's plan to control the activities of the *Peshmergas* whom the government labeled saboteurs. AL-MAJID explained that "saboteurs" was the term Iraqis used in official documents to describe Kurds who resisted Iraq Government rule, and that TALABANI was the "Sheikh of the Saboteurs." AL-MAJID stated that because Iran continuously attempted to establish its presence and take control of areas like Halabja, the Iraqi Government devised a plan which created security zones along the northern Iraq-Iran border. Mere presence in these areas was prohibited. The residents of Kurdish farming villages within the targeted areas were forcefully relocated from their homes to government complexes known as *mujamma'at* in a process that became known as "village collectivization." AL-MAJID stated that it was difficult for the Iraq Government to distinguish Kurds from Iranians or good individuals from bad ones.

AL-MAJID denied knowledge of any executions of Kurds in Northern Iraq. AL-MAJID stated his duties included collectivization of Kurdish villagers within the specified five kilometer boundary into government housing complexes. According to AL-MAJID, villages outside the five kilometer radius were controlled by KHAZRAJI.

AL-MAJID stated that most Kurds did not want to move from or leave their homes. Those who did were seeking improvements such as electricity, refrigerators, and school teachers. If Kurds refused to be relocated, they were forced into vehicles and taken, along with their belongings, to government housing complexes. Once the villagers were deported, the villages were leveled to avoid becoming safe havens for saboteurs. AL-MAJID stated that was merely following HUSSEIN'S orders and that he did not develop this plan himself because its implementation cost millions of dinars and required the efforts of all the government's ministries. [AL-MAJID interview, March 21, 2004].

AL-MAJID's statements are inconsistent with known facts provided by former Iraqi regime members and seized Iraqi memorandums. These memorandum, detailed below, document AL-MAJID's use of the broad authority delegated to him by Hussein to commit crimes against humanity and genocide against the Kurdish

population.

AL-MAJID isolated the Kurdish population by issuing decrees and administrative orders depriving them of basic rights. AL-MAJID signed an Iraqi Ba'ath Party letter dated April 6, 1987, #S Sh/18/2396, which ordered the confiscation of the "saboteurs" property:

By the authority vested in us by the RCC decree #160 of March 29, 1987, we decided to authorize the chairman of the security committees in the northern governorates to confiscate the real and personal property of the saboteurs, provided that the their properties are liquidated within one month of the date of issuance of the confiscation decree.

(This document is described in the HRW report titled, "Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds," dated July, 1993, and referenced on page 13 and in footnote 41 of the Prelude to Anfal section of the report.)

AL-MAJID was questioned regarding this letter and admitted giving this authority to the security committees, but did not remember the details. He stated that the confiscation discussed applied to money as well as real property. AL-MAJID stated the authority for this order was not based on RCC decree #160, but on a separate RCC decree authorizing confiscation of funds and property of individuals who worked against the Iraq Government as saboteurs, and the confiscation of funds and property of individuals in the Da'wa Party. These two categories of individuals were considered to be hostile or anti-Iraq Government political forces. AL-MAJID does not remember the number or date of the RCC decree he referenced. [AL-MAJID interview, April 4, 2004].

On April 10, 1987, RADHI HASSAN SALMAN (hereinafter SALMAN), Deputy Secretary of the Northern Bureau Command, suspended the legal rights of residents in villages within the prohibited-security zone. In Northern Bureau letter Number 1/2713, SALMAN wrote:

His excellency has ordered that [legal] cases of people from the villages prohibited for security reasons or cases of the saboteurs,

regardless of their nature not be heard, and to freeze the cases that have already been heard. [attached as document #XX]

When questioned regarding this document, AL-MAJID stated, "I do not remember this." He added that all Northern Bureau Command orders were issued by him and not by his Deputy. AL-MAJID acknowledged SALMAN was the Deputy Secretary General of the Northern Bureau Command but asserted that he would not have tasked SALMAN with issuing such an order and SALMAN did not issue it in AL-MAJID's absence. He stated that all legal cases are matters for courts of law and not for security committees. AL-MAJID acknowledged, however, that he issued similar instructions to the courts in approximately June, 1987 when he directed the courts not to hear cases and/or to postpone cases involving individuals from prohibited zones. Villages in these zones were cleared of people, their residences demolished, and the residents relocated to government housing complexes. AL-MAJID reiterated that such an order would have been issued only by him and would have been logically directed to the courts and not to the security committees. He added security services were not in charge of the courts. When questioned about the authenticity of the document and whether he thought it was a forgery, AL-MAJID stated, "I do not know. Maybe." [AL-MAJID interview, April 4, 2004].

The government's plan to eliminate the Kurds is further corroborated in letter Number 28/573 to the Command of the Iraqi Fifth Corps, dated April 13, 1987, classified "Top Secret and Confidential," and written by the Special National Defense Forces General Staff, a pro-regime Kurdish militia. This document is referenced on page 4 and in footnote 14 of the HRW report dated July, 1993, "Prelude to Anfal" section. The letter appeared to be in response to a verbal order from the Fifth Corps Commander and detailed the "final obligations in winding up {illegible} procedures for the termination of sabotage in the Northern Region, [and] the manner and the priorities of implementing the evacuation and demolition of the security-prohibited villages." [attached as document #XX].

On May 14, 1987, AL-MAJID issued letter Number 106309 regarding the execution of first-degree relatives of "saboteurs." This document is referenced on pages 13-14 of the HRW report dated July, 1993, "Prelude to Anfal" section. A handwritten note dated November 20, 1989, from the Security Chief, Interrogating Officer, Amn Office in Suleimaniyeh, refers to AL-MAJID's letter Number 106309. The document is referenced on page 13 of the HRW

report dated July, 1993, "Prelude to Anfal" section. The note provides details about an Iraqi citizen who petitioned for information about his missing parents and brother. It states the brother was executed July 12, 1987, as "a member of the group of Iranian saboteurs." The note further explains that the parents were executed May 19, 1987:

in compliance with the order from the Struggling Comrade ALI HASAN AL-MAJID, member of the Regional Command that was relayed to us by letter number 106309 of the Security Directorate of the Autonomous Region, marked 'Secret and to be Opened Personally,' and dated May 1, 1987, regarding the liquidation of first-degree relatives of criminals. [attached as document #xx].

A hand-written communication, Number 3324, dated May 14, 1987, from the Security Director of the City of Halabja to Amn Suliemaniyeh regarding the execution of wounded civilians referenced cable Number 945 from the Command of the Fifth Army Corps and dated the previous day. Number 3324 stated, in pertinent part:

The Commander of the First Army Corps issued an order as requested by Comrade ALI HASAN AL-MAJID to execute the wounded civilians after the Party Organization, the Security and Police Departments and the Intelligence Center have confirmed their hostility toward the authorities; to use earth movers and bulldozers to raze the neighborhood of Kani Ashqan. [Attached as document #XX].

According to HRW/Middle East Watch (MSW) interview of a former resident, as documented in footnote 44, "Prelude to Anfal" section, this action and the reported destruction of some 1,500 homes was punishment for an anti-government demonstration.

AL-MAJID issued two significant and brutal directives that detailed the regime's intentions regarding the Kurds. AL-MAJID personally signed the first directive, Number 28/3650, dated 06/03/1987, was issued to the Commanders of the First, Second, and Fifth Army Corps, the Security Directorate of the Autonomous Region, the DMI, and the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS). The directive detailed the protocols for prohibited areas and included orders to kill all humans and animals. Paragraph

one states:

It is totally prohibited for any foodstuffs or persons or machinery to reach the villages that have been prohibited for security reasons that are included in the second stage of collecting the villages. Anyone who so desires is permitted to return to the national ranks. It is not allowed for relatives to contact them except with the knowledge of the security agencies. [attached as document #XX].

This directive was repeated word for word in communications between receiving entities and lower level units as, for example, in letter Number 4754, dated June 8, 1987, from Amn Erbil to all its departments and local offices. Letter Number 4754 is referenced on page 15 of the HRW report dated July, 1993, "Prelude to Anfal" section.

AL-MAJID examined a copy of the letter written in Arabic. AL-MAJID admitted such an order was issued and sent to the referenced agencies and the military. AL-MAJID acknowledged the authenticity of the copy of this document and confirmed the authenticity of his signature on the last page. [AL-MAJID interview, March 21, 2004].

The second and most significant directive AL-MAJID issued was SF/4008 on June 20, 1987. The directive was issued by the Northern Bureau Command, signed by AL-MAJID, and stamped with the seal of the RCC's Northern Affairs Committee. The directive was conveyed to the First, Second, and Fifth Corps Command and provided procedures on how to deal with prohibited villages. The directive stated:

In view of the fact that the officially announced deadline for the amalgamation of these villages expires June 21, 1987, we have decided that the following action should be taken with effect from June 22, 1987:

1. All the villages in which subversives, agents of Iran and similar traitors to Iraq are still to be found shall be regarded as out of bounds for security reasons;
2. They shall be regarded as operational zones that are strictly out of bounds to all persons and animals and in which the troops

- can open fire at will, without any restrictions, unless otherwise instructed by our bureau;
3. Travel to and from these zones, as well as agricultural, animal husbandry, and industrial activities shall be prohibited and carefully monitored by all the competent agencies within their respective fields of jurisdiction;
4. The corps commanders shall carry out random bombardments using artillery, helicopters, and aircraft at all times of the day or night in order to kill the largest number of persons present in those prohibited zones, keeping us informed of the results;
5. All persons captured in those villages shall be detained and interrogated by the security services and those between the ages of 15 and 70 shall be executed after any useful information has been obtained from them, of which we should be duly notified;
6. Those who surrender to the governmental or Party authorities shall be interrogated by the competent agencies for maximum period of three days, which may be extended to ten days if necessary, provided that we are notified of such cases. If the interrogation requires a longer period of time, approval must be obtained from us by telephone or telegraph or through comrade TAHER AL-ANI;
7. Everything seized by the advisers and troops of the National Defense Battalions shall be retained by them, with the exception of heavy, mounted and medium weapons. They can keep the light weapons, notifying us only of the number of these weapons. The Corps commanders shall promptly bring this to the attention of all the advisors, company commanders and platoon leaders, and shall provide us with detailed information concerning their activities in the National Defense Battalions. [attached as document #XX].

AL-MAJID examined a copy of this document written in Arabic. AL-MAJID admitted issuing the order listed as item two. According to AL-MAJID, everyone, civilian and military, knew that

no one was allowed in those areas as it was a theater of operations. Anyone caught in those areas, including women and children, was to be killed. AL-MAJID denied issuing the orders listed as items four and five. AL-MAJID acknowledged the authenticity of the copy of this document and confirmed the authenticity of his signature on the last page. [AL-MAJID interview, March 21, 2004].

When questioned about his orders to execute first-degree relatives of saboteurs and wounded civilians, AL-MAJID stated he did not issue an order to execute first-degree relatives of saboteurs. He admitted, however, that in July/August 1987 he did order the "deportation" of first-degree relatives of saboteurs from prohibited areas. AL-MAJID issued this order to ensure the security of the cities. He was responsible for the security of the cities and areas within five kilometers of the cities. First-degree relatives included only the fathers of saboteurs. It did not include the female relatives such as an individual's mother, sister, or daughter.

AL-MAJID reiterated that prohibited areas were those regions from which the Iraq Government had removed the citizens and relocated them to government housing complexes. The order regarding deportation of first-degree relatives was intended to force fathers to control the actions of their sons. After the "gathering of people" into Iraq Government housing complexes, AL-MAJID stated that any acts of sabotage against the government would result in implementation of this order. AL-MAJID wanted the consequences of the actions of the sons who were saboteurs to be a "pressuring factor" on their fathers. AL-MAJID ordered only first-degree relatives be deported from prohibited areas so that the security committees did not expand the order to include other relatives. He acknowledged other relatives, including mothers, sisters, and daughters, could have elected to join relatives who had been ordered "deported" from prohibited areas.

AL-MAJID admitted that Directive 4008 which he issued effective June 22, 1987, was still in effect at the time of his issuance of the order regarding first-degree relatives. AL-MAJID reiterated that anyone caught in the prohibited areas after June 22, 1987, including women and children, was to be killed. Directive 4008 was modified in September, 1987 to allow farming in certain areas. When questioned whether deportation of first-degree relatives to prohibited areas was tantamount to sentencing them to death because of Directive 4008, AL-MAJID stated, "Why would we deport them to a prohibited area [so that they would be killed] when we could kill them?" When the interviewer suggested

that perhaps this procedure was meant to minimize the "blood on the hands" of AL-MAJID and others, AL-MAJID offered no reply.

AL-MAJID noted saboteurs and first-degree relatives were given one month to decide whether they wanted to stay or leave. If they decided to remain in government housing complexes, they were required to pledge not to commit acts of sabotage against the Iraq Government. [al-MAJID interview, April 4, 2004].

AMN repeatedly referred to this Directive 4008 throughout 1988. For example, a letter from Amn Suleimaniyeh, dated October 29, 1988, referenced the directive as the basis for "the execution of 19 accused, executed by this directorate because of their presence in the security-prohibited villages." This document is referenced on page 15 of the HRW report dated July, 1993, "Prelude to Anfal" section, and pages 1-2 of "The Camps" section.

The Iraq Government's plan is further corroborated by AL-MAJID's own words as he discussed the Iraq Government's campaigns in the Northern Region in 1987 and 1988. On April 15, 1988, AL-MAJID attended a meeting with members of the Northern Bureau and governors of the Autonomous Region of Iraqi Kurdistan during which he discussed Kurdish territory and prohibited areas. According to audiotapes of that meeting, AL-MAJID stated, in pertinent part:

I will prohibit large areas; I will prohibit any presence in them. ...Now you can't go from Kirkuk to Erbil any more without an armored vehicle. All of this basin, from Koysinjaq to here (Kirkuk)...I'm going to evacuate it. I will evacuate it as far as Gweir and Mosul. No human beings except on the main roads. For five years, I won't allow any human existence there. ...If we don't act in this way, the saboteurs' activities will never end, not for a million years. ...In the summer, nothing will be left. [reference audiotape #xx].

On July 22, 1987, TAHER AL-ANI (hereinafter AL-ANI), Secretary of the Northern Affairs Committee, sent letter Number 5083 to the First Corps Headquarters, entitled, "Executing Criminals." The letter stated:

The struggler comrade ALI HASAN AL-MAJID, the head of the Northern Bureau, commented regarding your mentioned letter. We have no objection to the cutting of the heads of the betrayers, but it would be better to send them to Amn for interrogation, as they may have useful information prior to their execution. [attached as document #XX]

On September 8, 1987, the DMI submitted a report Number M1/Sh3//Q2/19330 to the Northern Bureau Headquarters summarizing current Kurdish activity. The report stated:

1. At 1600 hours, on September 3, 1987, centralized artillery strikes (using special ammunition) had been launched against three sites of the Iranian Agents along the Dokan-Beera Macroon line, which included the site where the criminal JALAL TALABANI would be located. Their casualties were two killed and 12 injured from their leadership, in addition to a number of their saboteurs killed and wounded, and residents of the neighboring villages of the above mentioned sites.
4. Commentary: After the air strikes (with special ammunition) launched against of the Iranian Agents' sites in April 1987, the mentioned group's headquarters received a number of chemical protective equipment from the Iranian regime, in addition to the issue of a special booklet by mentioned group. [attached as document #XX]

The report was signed by SABIR AL-DURI, Director of the DMI, and copies were forwarded to the Presidential Secretary for HUSSEIN, the headquarters of the Chief of Staff of the Army, the RCC Northern Affairs Committee, Armed Forces Headquarters, and the Ministry of Defense Diwan.

The April, 1987 air strikes referred to in the above-mentioned DMI report are very likely the April 15, 1987 strikes against the villages of Bergalou and Sergalou, and the April 16, 1987 strikes against Sheikh Wasan and Balisan.

A cable, reference number 4350, dated September 7, 1987, from the Northern Bureau to all regional security committees memorialized the details and instructions regarding the national census that were issued during a September 6, 1987 meeting of senior Ba'ath Party officials which AL-MAJID chaired. A second version of this document is letter Number 2/237, dated

September 19, 1987, from Shaqlawa District Security Committee to a number of local party and police agencies. These documents are referenced in footnote 51 of the HRW report dated July, 1993, "Prelude to Anfal" section. At the meeting, preparations for the national census were discussed. "Subversives who repent" were to be allowed to return to the fold right up to the day of the census. No returnees would be accepted after October 17, 1987, however, "even if they surrender their weapons." Furthermore, family members of "unrepentant saboteurs" could not remain in government-controlled areas and were to be physically removed and forced to join "saboteur kin" in prohibited areas. Upon completion of an AL-MAJID ordered inventory of cases, "the families in question should be expelled to the regions where their subversive relatives are, with the sole exception of males aged between 12 and 50 inclusive, who should be detained." One of the documents list the ages as 17 to 50.

According to pages 18-19 of the HRW report dated July, 1993, "Prelude to Anfal" Section, the Northern Bureau ordered mass seminars and meetings to discuss the importance of the census scheduled for October 17, 1987. Those who failed to participate in the census without a valid excuse would lose their Iraqi citizenship and would be regarded as army deserters, and as such, subject to RCC decree #677, dated August 26, 1987. Additionally, those not participating in the census were no longer eligible for government services and food rations as they would no longer be considered Iraqis. With respect to identifying ethnicity in the census, individuals could only choose one of two options, Arab or Kurd. Furthermore, people could only be counted if they made themselves available to the census takers. For anyone living in a prohibited area, this meant abandoning their home and registering and living as a resident of a government-controlled town or *mujama'a*.

On October 18, 1987, the Northern Bureau Command issued letter Number 1216 to remind all Security Committees and Security Directorates, in the Governates of the Autonomous Zone and the Governates of Diyala and Salah Al-Din of Directive 4008. AL-ANI signed this letter which is referenced on page 19 and footnote 58 of the HRW report dated July, 1993, "Prelude to Anfal" section.

HRW described the letter, issued the day after the census, as a stern memo to all security committees in Kurdistan, reminding them that aerial inspection would ensure that Directive 4008 of June 20, 1987, was being carried out "to the letter." Any committee that failed to comply would "bear full

responsibility before the Comrade Bureau Chief." AL-MAJID signed this letter.

On January 3, 1988, RCC Decree Number 10, signed by HUSSEIN, modified some aspects of RCC Decree 677 but retained the following paragraphs:

Paragraph one: The Party organizations shall carefully examine the situation of military deserters and draft dodgers who are captured. Paragraph two: The death sentence shall be carried out by the Party organization, after that examination, on every deserter or draft dodger who is captured if the duration of his desertion or draft evasion exceeds one year or if he had committed the crime of desertion more than once. [attached as document #XX].

On November 22, 1988, Directive 4008 was again reinforced, this time in report Number Sh.2/17983, by (name illegible), Deputy Brigadier-General of Security, Director of Security of Erbil Governate, and addressed to the Directors of Security Branches. The report reminded the Security Branches that Northern Bureau Directive SF/4008 was still in effect:

In accordance with the directives of senior authorities, it has been decided to apply Paragraph 5 of the message of Northern Bureau Command, reference 4008 of June 20, 1987, to anyone present in the prohibited 'no-man's land' areas (*muharram*) and the areas banned for security reasons (*mahdour*), without exception. Please be informed, take the necessary measures, and carry out. Let us know. [Attached as document #XX].

Muharram referred to the border zones cleared of all population in the late 1970s and denotes the empty land between two warring forces. *Mahdour* refers to the vast areas demarcated during the 1980s where all human presence was prohibited.

AL-MAJID, during a meeting with the Northern Bureau, summarized his actions in the Northern Region. The undated tape was is in a batch dated January 21 and 22, 1989. AL-MAJID stated, in part:

If you remember, when I was placed in charge

of the Northern Bureau, I was also tasked with additional responsibilities-- administration, the relevant special services, the security and intelligence ones, the Army, and the civilian wing of the Party, and the military wing of the Party. These were my responsibilities, that's all. So, I was to work as I wished. Therefore, we started making our own decisions, and in some instances, even in violation of the Leadership's instructions. But Comrades, this was three months ago... When we made the decision to destroy and collectivize the villages and draw a dividing line [i.e., the so-called "red line"] between us and the saboteurs, the first one to express his doubts to me and before the President was TALI'A AL-DURI. The first one who alarmed me was TALI'A AL-DURI. To this day, the impact of TALI'A is evident. He didn't destroy all the villages that I asked him to at that time. And this is the longest-standing member of the Ba'ath Party. What about the other people then? How were we to convince them to solve the Kurdish problem and slaughter the saboteurs?

So we started to show these senior commanders on TV that [the saboteurs] had surrendered. Am I supposed to keep them in good shape? What am I supposed to do with them, these [people]. Then a message reaches me from that great man, the father [SADDAM HUSSEIN], saying take good care of the families of the saboteurs and this and that. The general command brings it to me. I put his message to my head. But take good care of them? No, I will bury them with bulldozers....

Interviewers played AL-MAJID a portion of this audiotape. AL-MAJID acknowledged that the tape contains his words and his voice. He admitted that he ordered the destruction of homes within the prohibited zones after the residents were removed. AL-MAJID admitted that he held a separate meeting and instructed those under his command that no house was to remain standing within the prohibited zones. AL-MAJID also admitted that he told his subordinates that he would tour the prohibited

zones and if his orders were not carried out completely, he would hold the section commander responsible. [AL-MAJID interview, March 21, 2004].

AL-MAJID also admitted that the second segment of the tape, from approximately 9:55 to 16:06, was his voice and his words. AL-MAJID stated he believed this meeting took place in April, 1987, rather than in 1988. AL-MAJID stated that those present included the Governors and Ba'ath Party Secretary Generals of each province of the Autonomous Region of Iraqi Kurdistan. These provinces included Irbil, Dohuk, Suleimaniyeh, Kirkuk, and Mosul.

AL-MAJID stated that in the audiotape he is speaking about the "gathering of villages" in the northern Kurdish region of Iraq. In the audiotape, he explains the difficulty with moving safely between cities in the north and the numbers of "martyrs" who suffered at the hands of saboteurs. AL-MAJID encouraged those present to "speed up the process" of gathering or collectivizing the villages in the north.

An audiotape segment from approximately 3:28 to 4:25 was played for AL-MAJID and contained the following:

If you remember, when I was placed in charge of the Northern Bureau, I was also tasked with additional responsibilities [including] administration, the relevant Special Services, the Security and Intelligence ones, and the Army, and the civilian wing of the Party, and the military wing of the Party. These were my responsibilities, that's all. So, I was to work as I wished. Therefore, we started making our own decisions and in some instances, even in violation of the Leadership's instructions. But Comrades, this was three months ago.

AL-MAJID acknowledged the recording was his voice and his words and identified the content as a meeting held by AL-MAJID with KHAZRAJI, KAMIL SAJID (hereinafter SAJID), the Army First Corps Commander, HASHEM, the Commander of the Anfal Operation, TALI'A AL-DURI, outgoing Army Fifth Corps Commander, YUNIS ZAREB, incoming Army Fifth Corps Commander, and the Secretary Generals of the Ba'ath Party Sections. AL-MAJID believes this meeting took place in late 1988 or early 1989.

AL-MAJID stated despite the impression given on the audiotape that he was the official in charge of the meeting and in charge of the military, he was only responsible for the cities and "what was in between the cities." Specifically, AL-MAJID stated he was in charge of the "security of the cities" and the "security committees of the cities" during the period he served as Secretary General of the Northern Bureau Command. He added that he "had nothing to do with Iranian intelligence." AL-MAJID reiterated he was only in charge of cities and roads connecting cities in Northern Iraq. The Iraqi military was in charge of all other territory within that portion of the country. Within cities, AL-MAJID commanded military forces, intelligence services, security services, and all other government agencies. AL-MAJID stated he was in charge of the cities of Suleimaniyeh, Bazyan, Chamchamal, Koysanjaq, Al-Rabie, Kirkuk, Alton Kopri, Erbil, Shaqlawa, Hareer, Zakho, and Khabat. He added that he was in charge of the provinces of Dokan, Mosul (except Agra), and Kirkuk (except Qader Karam).

AL-MAJID again acknowledged his voice and his words on a segment of the same audiotape beginning approximately at 8:25 and concluding approximately at 9:28. AL-MAJID confirmed the tape was recorded at the same meeting with KHAZRAJI. AL-MAJID explained he met with KHAZRAJI because "he had work" and "I had work." AL-MAJID remembers complaining to KHAZRAJI during this meeting about the delay by the military in leveling villages where residents had already been removed. According to AL-MAJID, the village buildings needed to be removed as they often served as sanctuaries for saboteurs. He added that after removal or "deportation" of villagers, the army was responsible for removing "what was left."

AL-MAJID acknowledged criticizing TALI'A AL-DURI, for failing to destroy the villages in a timely manner. AL-MAJID's complaint placed the responsibility for handling this matter upon KHAZRAJI. AL-MAJID stated this audiotape shows he was not in charge of military forces in Northern Iraq during this period. If he had been in charge, AL-MAJID would have removed AL-DURI and not just complained to KHAZRAJI. [AL-MAJID interview, April 4, 2004].

ANFAL CAMPAIGN (1988)

Anfal is the term used by the Iraq Government to describe its military campaign against the Kurds. *Anfal*, meaning "spoils," referred to the first battle in 624 A.D. between Muslims and non-Muslims. The *Anfal* campaign had eight stages of which

the first seven were directed at the PUK's territory and the last at KDP's territory.

The first *Anfal* targeted PUK strongholds Bergalou and Sergalou from February 23, 1988, to March 19, 1988. The second *Anfal* targeted the Qara Dagħ region from March 22, 1988, to April 1, 1988. The third *Anfal* targeted the hilly plain known as Germain from April 7, 1988, to April 20, 1988. The fourth *Anfal* targeted the Valley of Lesser Zab River from May 3, 1988, to May 8, 1988. The fifth *Anfal* targeted the mountainous region Northeast of Erbil from May 15, 1988 until operations halted on June 7, 1988. Operations were re-initiated as the sixth and seventh *Anfals* in July and August 1988, respectively. On August 26, 1988, the PUK controlled area was declared clean of saboteurs. The final *Anfal* targeted the Badinan area and began on August 25, 1988. On September 6, 1988, the Iraq Government declared victory by declaring general amnesty for all Kurds.

Anfal 1

SULTAN HASHEM, who at the time was the 1st Corp Commander, advised the mission of the *Anfal* Campaign was to remove the Kurdish population from the Northern area of Iraq, and either destroy them or make them flee to Iran. HASHEM commanded three Army Divisions and 100 Battalions in the First *Anfal* Campaign which consisted of approximately 80,000 soldiers. With the number of military personnel under his leadership and weaponry at his disposal, HASHEM expected to overpower and defeat the Kurdish resistance.

HASHEM utilized artillery, armor, infantry, and helicopters during the First *Anfal*, which took place from March 1, 1988, until approximately March 20-21, 1988. HASHEM did not have direct operational control over other air assets (Air Force), but could request those resources when needed. There were nine different avenues of attack utilized in the First *Anfal* which were designed to allow for the Kurds to flee across the border to Iran. (HASHEM interview, June 1, 2004).

Anfal 3

[redacted] (hereinafter [redacted] age 12 at the time, resided in the village of Kulaio (Southern Germain) with his father, [redacted] his mother, [redacted] and his three younger sisters [redacted] (eleven), [redacted] (ten), and [redacted] (nine). One morning in April, 1988, Iraqi Special Forces and *Jahsh* surrounded his village. The villagers were told they

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were being taken to the city where they would then live. The villagers were loaded into carts pulled by the villagers' own tractors, and were driven away. When the caravan got to the city, they continued to drive through to a fort in Qoratu where they were detained for ten days with very little food and water. People died from starvation, and women were raped and killed. During their detention at Qoratu, [] observed Iraqi officials from military, Military Intelligence (*Istikhbarat*), and Directorate of General Security (*Amn AL-'Am*).

From Qoratu they were taken in large trucks with no windows to the Army Camp at Topzawa. At this point, the men were separated from the women and children and were housed in another building. [] could see the building where his father was kept, but never saw his father again. They stayed in the camp in Topzawa for approximately thirty days.

While at the camp in Topzawa, [] stated that the guards teased the children with food. The guards placed food at a distance and told the children that whomever ran the fastest and got to the food first could eat it. When the children ran to the food, the guards kicked it over and spill it.

One early morning, thirty large, windowless trucks arrived at the camp. [] and the others were herded onto the trucks and rode all day with no food and very little water. [] stated that three children on his truck between the ages of approximately six and seven died during the ride. Also on the truck was a woman who went into labor. She was foaming at the mouth from dehydration and [] was able to sneak her a small bit of water that was meant for him.

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When the trucks stopped, everyone got out and was given some water. Their hands were then tied behind their backs and they were blindfolded. They were then forced back into the trucks. [] was able to get his hands untied and removed his blindfold once he was in the truck.

When the trucks stopped for what turned out to be the last time, the back doors were opened. [] saw pits which had been dug into the ground. The dirt that was removed to make the pits was piled behind each pit. Standing by each pit were two soldiers, each of whom wore camouflage uniforms and red berets and was armed with AK-47s. There were as many pits as there were trucks. [] and the others were forced out of their truck and fell into a pit where they laid, tired and starving. No one was screaming or fighting which led []

to believe that the water they had previously been given had been drugged. Once they were all in the pits, the soldiers started shooting them. [] looked around and that saw the woman who had gone into labor while on the truck riddled with bullets in her head and stomach. [] stated that her brains were coming out of her head, and that her stomach was torn apart by the bullets and he could see the unborn baby.

[] was shot in his left shoulder. At this point, he ran toward the soldier who shot him, grabbed him by the legs, and pleaded with him in Kurdish. [] could tell by the look in the soldier's eyes that he did not want to be doing what he had been ordered to do. The other soldier became angry and yelled in Arabic. The angry soldier then threw [] back into the pit and began shooting again hitting [] in his lower back on his right side. At that point, [] played dead.

The shooting finally stopped and the soldiers gathered together and talked in Arabic. [] saw bulldozers beginning to cover up the holes. [] was in the pit furthest from the bulldozers and decided to escape. [] saw a young girl who had not been hit by a single bullet and he told her they needed to escape. She told [] that she was scared of the soldiers and that she would not leave.

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[] crawled out of the pit and laid on the pile of dirt next to it. He made a space for himself so that his outline could not be seen by the Toyota Landcruisers that were patrolling the area with their headlights looking for survivors and shooting them. [] moved from one dirt pile to the next until he eventually passed out. By the time he awoke, everyone had been buried. [] walked for several hours and encountered a group of dogs which began barking. The dogs surrounded him and barked until their owner came outside. The man spoke Arabic and [] was unable to understand him; however, the man took [] in and gave him food and water. [] stayed with this man for a night or two, but was then moved to town in order to get medical attention for his wounds. [] was taken in by an Iraqi family and stayed with them for nearly two years before being reunited with an uncle. [] interview, March 8, 2005].

The following seized documents and statements detail some of the Iraqi Government's actions during the *Anfal* campaign. According to AZIZ and AL-DURI, only HUSSEIN could authorize the use of chemical weapons. As previously demonstrated, HUSSEIN

either personally authorized or delegated the power to authorize the use of chemical weapons.

The April, 1988, monthly report for the Northern Region, Number 9879, dated May 18, 1988, from Brigadier General (signature illegible), Deputy Director, General DMI to the Subdirector of Military Intelligence, Eastern Sector, referenced special strikes and "special ammunition." Paragraph c of the report states,

After the special strikes against the villages where the headquarters and bases of the agents were, their organization distributed a quantity of medical supplies against chemical strikes (injections and pills) among the inhabitants of those villages as well as neighboring villages.
[attached as document #XX]

The report also provided a number of reasons for the defeat of the agents and/or saboteurs by Iraqi forces including "the intensity of the artillery bombardment by our forces and the use of 'special ammunition' led to heavy losses among them."

On April 26, 1988, the Ministry of Defense (MoD) issued letter Number D/A/51 to the Army Chief of Staff Headquarters entitled, "Procedure." The letter, by Staff Navy General ABED MOHAMMAD ABDULLAH (hereinafter ABDULLAH), the Secretary General of the MoD, noted:

The Deputy to the General Commander Minister of Defense has read the DMI letter, marked Secret, personal and Immediate, #8368, dated April 23, 1988, and commented as follows:

1. To create more of a psychological impact than what has been established, no objection regarding directing special ammunition strikes if there is a target which deserves punishment.
2. It is requested that operations be renewed, and I believe it is being discussed now with Comrade ALI HASAN, today April 26, 1988. [attached as document #XX]

On May 12, 1988, the DMI submitted report Number M5/Sh3/Q2/9540 to the Army Chief of Staff Headquarters

summarizing the results of *Anfal* operations from February 26, 1988, to May 10, 1988. The report detailed casualties sustained by the sabotage groups, and identified the Iranian agent group, PUK, as sustaining the heaviest casualties because operations were focused in their territories. According to the report, an estimated 1,200 agents were killed or wounded. That estimate included casualties resulting from Special Strikes. The report also listed sites and bases of the sabotage groups, infiltration routes of the sabotage groups within their territories, and results of a meeting between representatives of the sabotage groups in which they agreed to integrate their offices. The report was signed by AL-DURI. [attached as document #XX].

On May 15, 1998, HUSSEIN responded to the DMI via Office of the President report #9540 which stated, "It is necessary to keep momentum and chasing them, and not allowing them to reorganize themselves." [attached as document #XX] The report was addressed to the Chief of Staff of the Army, and signed by Presidential Secretary AL-HUMMADI. Copies were forwarded to the MoD, the Northern Bureau Headquarters, and the DMI.

The DMI began to document measures the *Peshmergas* took to defend against chemical weapons strikes. These Iraqi reports not only confirm Iraqi's use of chemical weapons, but also document the measures the Iraqi military took to increase the effectiveness of its chemical weapons strikes.

On March 7, 1988, the DMI submitted letter #M5/Sh3/Q2/4797 to the Special Security Organization (SSO) which noted the instructions Iranian agents' leadership gave to "saboteurs" when exposed to chemical weapons. [attached as document #XX]

On April 28, 1988, the Presidential Secretary forwarded a memo from the Military Industrialization Institution (MII) to the DMI regarding the *Peshmerga's* activities, and requesting the DMI's opinion on the subject. The MII had obtained the following information on the net of the 21st Turkish Border Brigade:

2. The Iraqi military units will attack the site of the First Branch in the next two or three coming days with chemical weapons.
3. *Peshmerga* members are attempting to move closer to Iraqi military units in the zone, to protect themselves against chemical attacks. [attached as document #XX]

On April 30, 1988, the DMI submitted a response #M5/Sh3/Q2/8859 to the Presidential Secretary for presentation to HUSSEIN which stated:

1. After Anfal operations carried out by our troops to (traditionally) strike the sites and bases of the sabotage groups, and special strike the site and bases, the majority of the sabotage groups in the Northern zone became aware of these operations, and were expecting our troops to carry out similar operations.
2. The sites and bases of the first branch of the Descendants of Treason - BARZANI Group - who exist on the Iraqi border zone, are highly aware of being struck by our troops (including the Patriotic Defense Regiments) with special ammunition as in the Anfal operations. They have taken some procedures to deal with that, and they have evacuated part of the site and some of their bases near the Turkish territories. We are not sure yet if the saboteurs have moved closer to our units in the mentioned zone. [attached as document #XX]

Anfal 5

On May 22, 1988, the Secretary General for the MoD submitted letter #D/A/51/8 entitled, "Results of Anfal Operation" to Army Chief of Staff Headquarters. The letter contained comments of the Deputy to the Minister of Defense based on a letter from HUSSEIN:

1. After ending the operations in the Suran sector, operations should be carried on with momentum in the Bahdinan sector.
2. It is useful to gather intelligence on the locations of the saboteurs there, and special strikes should precede our wide action. Please take the necessary procedures. [attached as document #XX]

On May 22, 1988, the Senior Secretary to the Army Chief of Staff, Staff General NABIL ABDULKADER HUSSEIN (hereinafter NABIL HUSSEIN), submitted memo #R A G/30/6545 to the MoD Diwan

entitled, "Anfal 5 Operation." The letter stated:

- b. Strikes with special ammunition were launched on May 15, 1988, against sabotage groups in the Fifth Corps sector....
- 2. Operations of chasing and destroying sabotage groups are continuing in the First Corps and Fifth Corps sectors according to the plans prepared for this purpose (Operation Anfal), and Anfal 5 operation will be carried out in the Fifth Corps sector in the following phase. [attached as document #XX]

On June 2, 1988, the Northern office of the DMI submitted report #Sh3/Q3/1041 to the DMI (Sh3) entitled, "Fifth Anfal Operation." The report included the following:

- 2. The Iranian agents and other sabotage groups have made use of lessons learned from previous battles with our troops during operations in the First Corps' sector (Anfal 1,2,3,4), and they had the time to enable them to take the following procedure:
 - e. Completing distribution of chemical protective masks, individual decontamination equipment, and training on the use of the equipment. [attached as document #XX]

On June 10, 1988, the DMI submitted report #M5/Sh3/Q2/11325 entitled, "Anfal Operation" to the Army Chief of Staff Headquarters. The report noted initiation of the fifth Anfal in which Iraq troops were to hit and destroy sabotage groups' sites and bases in the Fifth Corps' sector. The report also included the following casualty summaries:

- a. (58) killed, (72) injured from the saboteurs and their families as a result of special strikes.
- b. (42) killed and a number of wounded as a result of our troops' activities. [attached as document #XX]

The report was signed by AL-DURI and copies were forwarded to the Presidential Secretary for HUSSEIN, the MoD Diwan, the Northern Bureau Headquarters, Secretary General of the Armed Forces Headquarters, Operations Department, and the Fifth

Corps Headquarters.

On June 11, 1988, HUSSEIN responded to the DMI report via letter #K/2305 from the Office of the President:

Under no circumstance, we must not permit the saboteurs to regain their morale, therefore striking them in sector 45 is imperative. Do the necessary. [attached as document #XX]

The letter was signed by Presidential Secretary, AL-HUMMADI, and copies were sent to the MoD Diwan and the DMI. As previously documented in this report, AL-HUMMADI prepared letters that contained HUSSEIN's orders.

A cover letter and excerpt of a quarterly report dated June 27, 1988, from Captain KIFAH ALI HASSAN, Director of the Intelligence Center of Kalar, to the Subdirector of the DMI, Eastern Sector, gave details of a chemical attack against the Kurds. It stated, in part,

During the month of March 1988, our aircraft bombed the headquarters of the sabotage bands in the villages of Saywan and Balakajar in a chemical strike. This resulted in the death of 50 saboteurs and the wounding of 20 other saboteurs. [attached as document #XX]

HRW/MEW interviews indicate that the referenced attack occurred on March 22, 1988. Local inhabitants stated casualties ranging from 78 to 87 were almost all civilian. The rebel bases were located outside of the two villages mentioned in the report. Saywan is referred to as Sayw Senan by the Kurds.

On July 10, 1988, MoD sent letter D/A/51/1/14179, entitled, "Sabotage Groups in Balisan Basin and Alsamaqoleyyat area" to the Army Chief of Staff. The letter, based on DMI report #13081 dated July 7, 1988, stated:

1. It is necessary to exhaust them with aerial weapons and anti-personnel weapons prior to starting the mission.
2. Hold the area, prevent cooperation and supplies to and from the area.
3. Special ammunition might be needed if there is a collection of saboteurs. [attached as document #XX]

On July 12, 1988, Army Chief of Staff Headquarters forward the above-described instructions to the Fifth Corps Headquarters via letter #RAG/22/804 and advised them to take the necessary procedure. [attached as document #XX]

Declassified satellite imagery from the *Anfal* period, listed as evidence in support of this Prosecutive Report, illustrate impact craters, the use of multiple rocket launchers and towed artillery, as wellq the complete razing of Kurdish villages.

Final Anfal

Report #16093, dated December 13, 1988, from Branch 3, Section 1, Qadissiyat Saddam (operational name for the Iran-Iraq War) to the General DMI, Branch 3, provided Iraqi source information and made direct reference to chemical attacks conducted by Iraqi forces in Badinan during the Final *Anfal* from August 25, 1988, to September 6, 1988. The document stated, in pertinent part:

...six British journalists arrived in the triangular border region of Iran, Iraq and Turkey to see the saboteurs who had come from the above sector via Turkish territory and interview them about the chemical strike undertaken by our forces. [attached as document #XX]

Badinan, the traditional mountainous heartland of MULLAH BARZANI and his sons, is located in the Dohuk Governate along the Iraq-Turkey border. KDP Headquarters was located at Zewa Shkan, an abandoned village on the border. Brigadier General ZAREB commanded the Iraqi Fifth Corps which battled against the KDP in the Badinan region.

In 1985, the family of [redacted] (hereinafter [redacted]) was arrested by the Iraqi government and deported from Ba'shiqa to a make-shift house in Maraneh (near Sosya), Kurdistan. All of his family's possessions were seized and sold, and his family was forced to leave with nothing more than the clothes on their backs.

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[redacted] family was just one of several families deported and relocated by the Iraqi Government. The reasons for the deportations varied: members of their family may have been

military deserters or, as with [] family, they were related to members of the political opposition. Although the Iraqi Government's intention was to force those who opposed the regime (like [] to surrender, the relocations failed to produce the desired effect. Instead of succumbing to the pressure, [] family and others adapted to their surrounding and simply started over.

Other members of [] family were also relocated. Between 1985 and 1987, [] mother, his sister-in-law and her children, and finally his sister were all deported. [] sister was deported because she was accused of providing assistance to the Peshmerga by working as a seamstress.

On August 18, 1988, immediately after the end of the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqi government began massing its forces in Badinan. In the following days, word spread from the surrounding villages that the Iraqi army was on the move.

On August 23, 1988, Iraqi forces attacked Avoke, a small village on the south side of Gara Mountain near Spindar, with chemical weapons. [] and his family were in Maraneh, about three or four kilometers east of Avoke. As Maraneh was situated at a higher elevation than Avoke, [] witnessed the Iraqi planes attack Avoke first-hand. He saw the bombs fall and the smoke rise from the explosions. Although initially black, the smoke dissipated into white and yellow tints as it rose.

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[] heard from people who returned from Avoke shortly after the attacks that the Iraqi forces had used chemical weapons. Although most of the residents had fled to caves prior to the attack, the chemical gas killed two villagers and affected nearly everyone. Some had difficulty breathing and most had blisters on their faces, arms, and genital areas. The gas attack also killed some sheep and wild turkeys in the area. Even the landscape was affected. Everything appeared as if it had been burned. Although they did not show signs of an actual fire, the trees and leaves appeared dried up.

The gas attack spread over a large area. About thirty minutes after the attack started, the wind, which was blowing from the direction of Avoke, carried with it an unnatural, rotten smell. In addition, later in the day on August 24, [] noticed that the tops of the trees near Maraneh took on the same dried appearance as those in Avoke as a result of the drifting chemical gas. Some of the people with [] also began to experience difficulty breathing.

Once the attack on Avoke began, [] saw fixed-wing planes and helicopters continuously overflying the Avoke area. [] saw thousands of troops and tanks advancing from all directions. [] family, along with the others living in or near Maraneh, decided to head north to higher elevations and in the direction of Turkey. They left Maraneh on the night of August 24, 1988.

On August 25, 1988, Iraqi forces attacked villages throughout Badinan with artillery and aircraft, delivering both conventional and chemical weapons. As Iraqi forces quickly occupied most of the routes north, [] and several families traveling with him were forced to travel through Zebar in the direction of Kafia, east of Gara Mountain. The group occasionally came under fire from the Iraqi troops, but it seemed the Iraqis were targeting the general area as opposed to [] specific group.

By the time [] reached Kafia, the Iraqi forces was already preparing to surround the village. Hundreds of families from several neighboring villages had already fled to the area, and supplies were scarce. Some considered surrendering to the Iraqi forces, but both Kurdish collaborators and Iraqi officers advised against it. [] heard from the families of the Kurdish collaborators that one Iraqi officer said, "I may not kill you, but I don't know what Saddam will do."

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Fearing capture, [] and his group retreated to the higher elevations of the Gara Mountain. They waited there for two days, but conditions were harsh and the group had no food or water. They decided to return to Maraneh and were almost there when they heard the amnesty announcement over the radio on September 6, 1988. Even as he announced the amnesty, however, SADDAM HUSSEIN showed no compassion. [] recalled HUSSEIN referring to them as "insects."

[] evaluated his situation: in addition to his children, he had to worry about his elderly mother, his pregnant wife who was in her third trimester, and a handicapped nephew. Not seeing any alternative, [] decided that his family stood the best chance of surviving if they surrendered. They were to rest in Maraneh for two days and then turn themselves over to the Iraqi forces. Concerned with the humiliation and poor treatment she would suffer at the hands of the Iraqi troops, [] wife begged him to shoot her. In the end, however, because she was his wife and because she was pregnant, he could not bring himself to do it.

On September 8, 1988, [redacted] and two others, an Arab and an Assyrian who were also not going to surrender, hid themselves among the trees while the families walked in the direction of the Iraqi lines. [redacted] watched as the Iraqi helicopters trained their guns on the surrendering villagers as the group walked toward them. A member of the surrendering party raised his white shirt to emphasize that they were, in fact, surrendering. [redacted] feared the helicopters would shoot them right there; however they herded the villagers down the mountain in the direction of Kani Masi. [redacted] never saw or heard from his mother [redacted] (date of birth 1917); wife [redacted] (1950); his sons,

[redacted] ((1973)), [redacted] (1975), [redacted] (1978), [redacted] (1987); his daughters, [redacted] (1977), infant daughter, [redacted] (1988); his sister, [redacted] and his brother's [redacted] wife [redacted] (1937), and sons [redacted] (1969) [redacted] (handicapped) (1968), and [redacted] (1967).

After his family surrendered, [redacted] and the two others traveled north over the Gara Mountain. The group was forced to travel very slowly and cautiously due to the large number of



Iraqi troops. Normally only a two hour journey, the trip took two days. Many times, they were within an arm's length of Iraqi soldiers, but they managed to avoid capture.

On September 12, 1988, [redacted] reached the outskirts of Spindar (on the north side of Gara Mountain). The concentration of troops in the area forced the group to remain on the hills overlooking the village for approximately six days. They

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survived by scavenging provisions and some medicines from homes on the outskirts of the abandoned village that had not yet been attacked. By the items left behind (a single baby sock, a half-filled tea cup, a single shoe), it appeared that the occupants had little warning before fleeing.

By the time [] reached Spindar on September 12, the village had already been burned. While living on the hills overlooking the village, [] and his group watched Iraqi bulldozers enter the area each day and topple structures. Each night they would retreat due to the threat of *Peshmerga* counterattacks. Sometimes the army would use explosives to destroy the buildings. The destruction, which took six days, was very slow and deliberate. In all, [] watched them destroy twenty to thirty buildings, and it appeared as if they were trying to erase any sign that the village existed.

[] and the others in his group eventually made their way to Turkey. [] never saw or heard from his family again. [] interview, February 17, 2005].

In addition to providing pictures of his missing family members, [] provided a list of 193 names and in some cases, photographs, of Kurds who surrendered to the Iraqi forces and disappeared. All 193 Kurds, including [] family, are presumed dead. [Attached as Enclosure # XX]

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HRW documented 13 primary sites of chemical attacks in Badinan from which the exact number of deaths is unknown. Page 4 of the HRW report, Final *Anfal* Section, states that 49 villages were "exposed" to chemical weapons, including those affected by wind-borne dispersal.

Eyewitness Account of the Attack
on the Villiage of Kane Balau

In approximately August 1988, [] was staying in an Assyrian village, Kane Balavi, in the Barwari Balla area north of Dohuk. She stated that villagers were warned by the pro-regime Kurdish militia, *Jahsh*, that the Iraqi military was approaching and they should leave the village. The villagers, including [] knew that when the Iraqi military arrived, their villages were going to be destroyed and everyone would either be arrested or killed, as had been the case throughout the *Anfal* campaign. Kurds were told that SADDAM HUSSEIN had said, "Let's finish with one, and we'll start the second group." The Kurds interpreted this statement to mean once

the war with Iran had ended, HUSSEIN would divert all of his attention and military efforts toward the Kurds.

One evening, at approximately 10:00 pm, the people in the village packed essential items and food on mules and left, walking toward Turkey. More than a thousand men, women, children, the elderly, and their animals, walked all night and hid in the valleys during the day to avoid detection by Iraqi aircraft. The journey took approximately two weeks. The villagers ran out of food and were forced to purchase wheat from Turkish smugglers operating in the mountains.

When the villagers finally arrived at the border, they were stopped by the Turkish military and were refused entry into Turkey. A sympathetic Turkish soldier told [] to cross the border at night. The villagers were forced to remain at the border until nightfall, at which time they crossed into Turkey. Once inside, they felt safe and slept for the first time in four or five days. The villagers were out of food and went without anything to eat for more than a day, while awaiting Turkish smugglers. The next day, the villagers spent two days searching for water. The villagers stayed in the valley for 10 days.

The conditions were very harsh. The villagers did not have blankets, tents, beds, food, or clean water and suffered from starvation. During this period, [] estimated that hundreds of children and elderly people died as a result of diarrhea. The deceased were buried in the valley. After 10 days, the Red Cross and Red Crescent arrived, set up tents, and provided minimal medical care. When the Red Cross began to hand out bread, people were so hungry, they swarmed them like animals.

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The Turkish Government brought approximately 17 trucks to relocate the villagers from the valley. They piled in the back of the trucks and were crammed together like "sheep." The trucks drove for 36 hours, passing several Kurdish villages along the way. The villagers in the trucks begged for food from Kurdish passers-by, who threw bread into the trucks to help them.

Finally, the trucks arrived at a refugee camp in Slopia, Turkey, and the villagers were placed in tents. They were placed approximately 15 to a tent. Everyone was forced to share soup and bread and eat without utensils. [] estimated that there were approximately 17,000 refugees at the camp. [] saw people who suffered from severe burns as a result of a chemical weapons attack, while others had difficulty breathing. Like [] all had fled their homes as a result of the Iraqi

military campaign. Soon after [] arrived, the burn victims were taken away by the Turkish government.

The refugees began to suffer from severe diarrhea. Hundreds died every day as a result of the sickness. A rumor circulated around the camp that the Iraqis had poisoned the food. According to [] the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) looked into the cause and determined that the bread given to the refugees had been poisoned. [] interview, January 21, 2005].

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The Iraq Government appeared to become more secretive about its chemical weapons production after the end of the Iraq-Iran War. Letter #Sh 5/19299, dated December 17, 1988, from the Amn Director of the Governorate of Erbil to all branches, regarding the secrecy of documentation regarding chemical weapons notes:

Pursuant to the memorandum from the Honorable Office of the Presidency, number 4/4/11/44154 of December 4, 1988, a decision has been taken to give all letters (memoranda) which contain information about the production of chemical weapons the highest degree of secrecy. Take all necessary measures, keep this memorandum to yourself, and sign for its receipt.


This document is referenced in footnote 20 of the HRW Report dated July, 1993, "Final Anfal" section.

According to AZIZ, the primary purpose of Anfal was to stop the Kurdish insurgency inside Iraq. Most of the Kurdish population lived in Iraq near the northern border with Iran. A decision was made to relocate the population, at least a significant portion, to settlements 100 or more miles inside Iraq. This relocation was accomplished in a "harsh manner." Those who conducted the relocation, including AL-MAJID and the Governors of the region, were "idiots." In AZIZ's opinion, they probably felt they had to accomplish the task quickly in order to be viewed by HUSSEIN as successful.

Neither AZIZ nor any other RCC member was informed or asked for an opinion prior to the start of Anfal. No RCC member protested the decision once the details became known through the media. AZIZ stated that at the time, it seemed "justified for the security of the nation." In retrospect, AZIZ admitted that

the Anfal was criminal in nature. AZIZ added he "would not have done this" and it was "not his way of doing things." [AZIZ interview, February 2, 2004].

AZIZ acknowledged that, in the sense of collective responsibility, he should be held answerable for what the government did in general terms, but the man who holds the full accountability is HUSSEIN. Originally, when AZIZ was in the RCC, members received a typed letter with the agenda items for each meeting. Once decisions were made, they were typed up and signed by each member. The decisions were not implemented until all the RCC members signed. In the early 1980s, HUSSEIN decreed the Chairman of the RCC could decide matters on behalf of the entire RCC. Later, he decided anything decreed by the RCC would become law. In addition to these legal measures which essentially turned the RCC into HUSSEIN'S personal "rubber stamp," there was the chilling effect of the July, 1979 meeting where Ba'ath members were killed. This made the proposition of disagreeing with HUSSEIN a life or death matter. [AZIZ interview, May 6, 2004].



SABIR provided a historical account of the events that eventually led to the Anfal Campaign. The Iraq-Iran War was ongoing, and the Iraqi military successfully concluded a four month battle in Basrah. After the battle, the Iranian military continued to shell Basrah, causing the Iraqi military to draw forces from other battle fronts to defend the city. Iran discovered an Iraqi troop shortage in the Northern Region of Iraq, particularly in the area of Suleimaniyeh. Iran took advantage of the situation in the Northern Region and conspired with Kurdish opposition groups led by BARZANI and TALABANI. The momentum of the war shifted toward Iran, prompting Iraqi Government officials to develop a new strategy. According to

SABIR, President HUSSEIN, AL-MAJID, ADNAN KHAIRALLAH (hereinafter KHAIRALLAH), and KHAZRAJI, developed the strategy for the Northern Region. SABIR stated that his role as Director of the DMI was to gather intelligence and disseminate that intelligence to high-level Iraq Government officials consisting of President HUSSEIN, the Minister of Defense, Army Chief of Staff, and the Presidential Secretary. The intelligence was studied by these officials and a recommendation for a plan of action was subsequently implemented.

The deployment of chemical weapons during the *Anfal* Campaign was at the sole direction of President HUSSEIN. The chain of communication to utilize chemical weapons during the *Anfal* Campaign flowed from President HUSSEIN to the Presidential Secretary and then to the Army Chief of Staff or Minister of Defense, depending on the delivery method of the chemical weapons. If the chemical weapons was to be deployed via the Air Force, orders would have been passed through the Minister of Defense. If the CW was to be deployed via artillery or other conventional means, orders would have been passed through the Army Chief of Staff to the Corps Commander. SABIR admitted that there was a special division within the Iraqi Army known as the Chemical Disbursement Division (CDD) which was responsible for manufacturing, housing, and distributing the chemical weapons. The Army Chief of Staff or the Deputy Chief of Staff was responsible for the CDD which was located at the Al Bakr Base. SABIR stated that a chemical weapons advisor was attached to the I Corps of the Iraqi Army during the *Anfal* Campaign.

SABIR understood that the *Anfal* Campaign had an announced purpose and a hidden purpose. The announced purpose was to relocate the Kurds from the Northern Region of Iraq, provide them adequate housing, and improve their quality of life. The hidden purpose of the *Anfal* Campaign was to relocate the Kurds toward the interior of Iraq, away from the border of Iran, and clear the Northern Region of the opposition groups that were led by BARZANI and TALABANI. There was concern the Kurds were going to conspire with these opposition groups and this was why Kurdish villages were razed. The Iraq Government believed destruction of the Kurdish villages would deter and prevent Kurds from returning to the area.

SABIR concluded the interview by stating HUSSEIN did not care about anybody and would have done anything to stay in power. In addition, SABIR that stated that HUSSEIN destroyed Iraq, and that he does not want HUSSEIN put to death, but wants him to suffer. [SABIR interview, June 11, 2004].

In welcoming HASSAN ALI AL-AMIRI (hereinafter AL-AMIRI) as his successor as Secretary General of the Northern Bureau on April 15, 1989, AL-MAJID discussed the reduction of powers associated with this position and the disposition of people in the prohibited areas:

It will no longer be allowed for a member of the leadership to have power over the army, because the exceptional situation is over. These powers are not being withdrawn from Comrade Hassan Ali because he is not up to the task, but because that stage is now finished.

From June 22 (1987), anyone who was arrested in those areas was to be killed immediately without any hesitation, according to the directives which are still in force.

RCC Decree #272, dated April 23, 1989, amended RCC Decree #160 and ended AL-MAJID'S extraordinary powers. This document is referenced on page 65 of the HRW report dated February, 1994.

HALABJA

TARIQ AZIZ admitted during an interview that the first confirmed use of chemical weapons against a civilian population, anywhere in the world, occurred at Halabja, Iraq, in March, 1988. Although he agreed with speculation that the weapons may have been deployed to deter Iranian forces from occupying Halabja, he acknowledged that in fact the city was occupied by Kurds and not Iranians. AZIZ stated that he learned more about the attack after watching a film on Halabja produced by the media which showed "a few corpses" of men, women, and children who died as a result of the attack. AZIZ claimed not to know how many people were killed during the attack.

After the attack, HUSSEIN admitted to AZIZ that chemical weapons had been used at Halabja. At the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War, only HUSSEIN held the authority to order the use of chemical weapons. KHAIRALLAH and KHAZRAJI asked for and received this power from HUSSEIN during the war. However, in early 1988, HUSSEIN withdrew this authority from them. KHAIRALLAH told HUSSEIN this would "weaken" the military's ability and his power to act decisively and quickly. Thereafter, HUSSEIN returned the authority to order the use of chemical

weapons to KHAIRALLAH and KHAZRAJI, and they used these weapons at Halabja. According to AZIZ, HUSSEIN did not specifically order the chemical weapons attack on Halabja, but was notified afterwards. HUSSEIN told AZIZ, "Halabja was not my decision. It was in the hands of KHAIRALLAH and KHAZRAJI." At one point afterwards, HUSSEIN said the chemical weapons attack was not necessary. HUSSEIN was "bothered" by the attack because of the international ramifications and "outcry" from the world community. AZIZ noted HUSSEIN did not punish, reprimand, or remove either KHAIRALLAH or KHAZRAJI from their positions. Normally, this would have been his response when someone's actions reflected negatively on him. AZIZ is unsure whether the lack of punitive action by HUSSEIN implied his post-event approval. [AZIZ interview, February 2, 2004].

According to SABIR, Halabja fell under Iranian control and the city of Suleimaniyeh was being threatened. SABIR and his Deputy, WAFIQ AL SAMARAI (phonetic), were traveling to the Suleimaniyeh area to check on their military positions when an intelligence officer advised them of the chemical weapons attack on Halabja. Once he learned of the attack, SABIR traveled to the city of Kirkuk and met with KHAZRAJI. During this meeting, KHAZRAJI told SABIR that KHAIRALLAH, who was in Kirkuk with KHAZRAJI, had just received orders from President HUSSEIN to launch a chemical weapons attack on Halabja. Once KHAIRALLAH received the orders, he telephoned the Commander of the Air Force, HAMEED SHA'ABIN AL-TIKRITI (hereinafter AL-TIKRITI), and ordered him to launch the chemical weapons attack on Halabja. SABIR advised that the Air Force planes that conducted the CW attack on Halabja were from the Al Bakr Base. SABIR learned from the other detainees that detainee HAMID RAJA SHALAH AL-TIKRITI was the Air Force Squadron Commander stationed at the Al Bakr Base who led the Air Force planes that conducted the CW attack on Halabja. [SABIR interview, June 11, 2004].


SABIR was under the impression Halabja was under Iranian control, and was not aware of a number of Iraqi citizens still residing within the city during the chemical weapons attack. SABIR claimed the decision to utilize chemical weapons on Halabja came quickly, and the DMI was not consulted.

163I-HQ-1462938

The FBI obtained a copy of the video footage of the chemical attack on the village of Halabja. The footage, which appears to have been recorded by an Iranian film crew, depicted events leading up to the attack, and the aftermath of the attack.

1991 INVASION OF KUWAIT

Iraq and Kuwait are parties to the 1925 Geneva



Protocol, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and the 1954 Hague Convention. Specifically, Iraq was a party to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 which protect noncombatants, such as civilians living in occupied territory, and prisoners of war.

HUMMADI stated the fiasco of invading Kuwait was a decision completed in 30 minutes. During an RCC meeting, HUSSEIN recited an old farmer's proverb that claimed it is better to cut our necks than to cut our sustenance. HUSSEIN listed the reasons for invading Kuwait and then canvassed the committee members. He asked AL-DURI what he thought and AL-DURI sarcastically protested that Kuwait was a country. HUSSEIN asked AZIZ, who was wise enough to convey a subtle, indirect warning without openly opposing HUSSEIN's judgment. AZIZ explained if an invasion were conducted, predictable consequences would follow. At this point, AZIZ took 10 minutes to lay out the sure-to-follow adversarial responses of the Arab League, the United Nations (UN), the United States, and the rest of the Western world. But, AZIZ knew that if he did not approve HUSSEIN's plan, he would be thrown out. When AL-MAJID was asked his opinion, he shouted, 'Crush them!' [HUMMADI interview, May 27, 2004].

While in United States' custody, HUSSEIN stated that after the 1980-88 war with Iran, Iraq was trying to rebuild. HUSSEIN likened the situation with Kuwait as similar to two individuals fighting. The fight ends and the two parties go their separate ways. Thereafter, one of the previous disputing parties is bothered by someone else who also wants to fight. Then, there is no choice but to fight again.

According to HUSSEIN, Khomeini and Iran would have occupied the entire Arab world if it had not been for Iraq. As such, Iraq expected the Arab world to support them during and after the war. However, Iraq saw the opposite regarding support, especially from Kuwait. At the end of the war, as Iraq began the rebuilding process, the price of oil was approximately \$7 per barrel. In HUSSEIN's opinion, Iraq could not possibly rebuild its infrastructure and economy with oil prices at this level, and he believed that Kuwait was especially to blame for these low oil prices.

In an effort to solve the situation and stimulate economic recovery, Iraq sent DR. HAMMADI, Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Kuwait. HAMMADI's conclusion, and that of the Iraqi leadership after the meeting, was that the oil price situation was not just the responsibility/work of the Kuwaitis. Iraq believed some other entity, some larger power, was behind this "conspiracy."

Iraq also sent government officials to Saudi Arabia to convince the Saudis to pressure Kuwait. There, the Deputy Chairman of the RCC met with the brother of Kuwaiti leader Prince

Sabah. In addition, the Saudi Minister of Oil came to Iraq and held talks about oil prices, the Iraqi economy, and the actions of Kuwait. HUSSEIN claimed that a Kuwaiti official said, "We'll make the economy in Iraq so bad, an Iraqi woman will sleep with you for 10 dinars." HUSSEIN told the Saudis that if Kuwait did not stop interfering in Iraqi affairs, he would make the Kuwaiti dinar worth 10 fils.

HUSSEIN stated when Kuwait was faced with facts regarding "stealing" Iraqi oil by slant drilling, they admitted to having taken "only two and a half billion barrels." They stated this fact "as if it were nothing."

Regarding problems with Kuwait, Iraq sent delegates to other Gulf countries, the names of which HUSSEIN does not remember. These delegates explained the Kuwaiti and Iraqi situation. The other countries promised to correct oil prices at the next Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) meeting.

At that meeting, HUSSEIN recalled a decision was made to fix oil prices at \$16-17 per barrel. Kuwait concurred with this decision. Thereafter, the Kuwaiti Minister of Oil or Minister of Foreign Affairs stated Kuwait would not abide by the OPEC decision.

Regarding loan debts owed to Gulf countries as a result of support received during the Iran-Iraq War, HUSSEIN stated these were not loans and were supposed to be free aid from these countries. The countries originally used the word "loan" as a formality to disguise the purpose of the funds. When Iraq was informed the money were actually loans, Iraq held discussions with these countries, including Kuwait, to resolve these debts. Because the money had been "registered as loans" to Iraq, Iraq could not secure loans from other countries in order to rebuild.

HUSSEIN stated he twice discussed a change in oil prices to \$25 per barrel. Once, when the price per barrel reached \$50, HUSSEIN wrote a letter, dictated to AZIZ, which was sent to the Thoura newspaper. In the letter, he told the oil-producing countries they should not take advantage of industrialized nations. HUSSEIN asked them to reduce the price per barrel to \$25. He commented this was strange at that time as Iraq had oil and could use the money. When the price dropped to \$7 per barrel in 1989-90, HUSSEIN called for an increase to \$24-25 per barrel. In HUSSEIN's opinion, this price would not burden the consumer or hurt the producer.

HUSSEIN stated there was a meeting of the RCC prior to the invasion of Kuwait where the matter was discussed. The RCC leadership had hoped the Saudis would "interfere" and have a solution. The Deputy Chairman of the RCC traveled to Saudi Arabia, but returned unsuccessful. Thereafter, the matter could only be discussed and decided upon in favor of military action. HUSSEIN acknowledged the possibility that one or more RCC members opposed or voted against invasion, but does not specifically remember any such opposition. He does not remember if a majority or all the RCC members agreed on military action. HUSSEIN stated, "I was against attacking if a solution could be found.

The final decision to invade Kuwait was made in order to "defend by attacking." HUSSEIN further justified the invasion based upon historical facts, stating that history dictates that Kuwait is a part of Iraq.

HUSSEIN stated the objective of invasion was "the one announced." That is, Kuwaitis were to rule themselves and would decide what kind of relations they would have with Iraq. As for the Kuwaiti leaders, HUSSEIN stated they were "conspirators" against Iraq, Kuwait, and all Arab countries. These leaders continued to conspire even after leaving Kuwait upon the Iraqi invasion. They were controlled by the United States.

HUSSEIN remarked, "We can discuss this for days." The United States and 28 other countries took seven months to mobilize forces for war in 1991. This mobilization occurred because of the perceived military threat posed by Iraq's power. This threat motivated US politicians to support action against Iraq. In addition, the ability of companies to earn financial profit from war also motivated support for action against Iraq. The preemptive strike by Iraq into Kuwait was conducted so that defensive lines could not be completed. HUSSEIN reiterated the lack of American forces in Kuwait does not mean there was not a "conspiracy."

HUSSEIN repeated the goal of invading Kuwait was to allow Kuwaitis the right to "decide the way they wanted to deal with Iraq." HUSSEIN denied the declaration of Kuwait as the 19th Province of Iraq contradicts his previous statement. According to HUSSEIN, a Kuwaiti government was established after invasion, which included a Prime Minister and various other ministers. HUSSEIN denied Iraqi RCC member, AL-MAJID, was appointed Governor of Kuwait. He added the Kuwaiti cabinet decided to "join the Iraqis." When questioned whether they were given a choice, HUSSEIN replied, "Did Iraqis agree to join the United States in

the recent war against Iraq?" He continued that Iraq's acts with respect to Kuwait were more logical than the United States' position on Iraq in the most recent war. HUSSEIN stated the designation of Kuwait as the 19th Province was "deserved and logical." In 1961 or 1962, Kuwait was a Province of Iraq under President Qassem.

When noted to HUSSEIN that Kuwaiti citizens voted 100 percent after withdrawal of Iraqi forces not to become a part of Iraq, he questioned whether this was the "respected opinion of world." HUSSEIN further asked, "What is the opinion of the Iraqi people now?" The forces of other countries have remained in Iraq longer than Iraq occupied Kuwait. These countries have no right to this as they are not Arab. HUSSEIN finished this portion of discussion saying "we will not come to a conclusion" and "days are needed to discuss" this matter.

On November 19, 1992, The Department of the Army, Judge Advocate General (JAG) published an unclassified report detailing Iraqi war crimes during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The report was based on investigations conducted by the 199th (JAG), St. Petersburg, Florida, and the 208th JAG, Washington, D.C. [The report is attached as document #XX]

According to the report, the 199th JAG collected evidence of Iraqi war crimes committed against citizens and residents of Kuwait. Evidence included written and videotaped accounts of victims who were raped and tortured, photographs of murdered Kuwaitis, and videotapes of burial sites and torture implements.

Documents collected authorized the "re-education" of Kuwaitis and the deportation of Kuwaiti citizens to Iraq. Summary executions were authorized for Kuwaiti civilians found praying on their roofs, and other Iraqi mandated offenses, such as failing to display pictures of HUSSEIN, refusing to serve Iraqi soldiers in stores and markets, possessing pictures of members of the Kuwaiti royal family, and writing "anti-Iraqi" graffiti.

The 199th JAG confirmed through its investigation of Kuwaiti medical records, that for the period of Iraqi occupation of Kuwait from August 2, 1990, to March 3, 1991, a total of 1,082 Kuwaiti deaths could be directly attributed to Iraqi criminal conduct. The deaths included 120 babies left to die after being removed from incubators taken to Iraq and 57 mentally ill individuals killed simply because of their handicap.

HUSSEIN was questioned regarding his decision directing the withdrawal of Iraqi forces to ignite Kuwaiti oil wells. HUSSEIN denied Iraqi forces ignited oil wells. He admitted that Iraqi forces burned "oil in trenches" as they retreated. The resulting smoke blocked target acquisition by coalition aircraft and prevented additional Iraqi troops from dying. HUSSEIN admitted that he was told "a few" oil wells had been ignited. He stated that even if he were shown pictures or videos of these events, he would not believe Iraqi forces committed them because these forms of media are easy to manipulate and fabricate. HUSSEIN believes that it would not be a crime for the Iraqi military to burn oil in order to prevent planes from attacking them. If such an event took place, this would have been an act of a desperate person who had no weapons remaining with which to defend himself. When questioned as to how he would respond if he was offered proof that the 150 oil well fires in Kuwait were an act of sabotage by the Iraqi military and not an act of defense, HUSSEIN stated he would provide a response at that time.

When questioned regarding ongoing Kuwaiti resistance during the Iraqi occupation and efforts by the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) to stop it, HUSSEIN stated, "I do not have an answer with these details." When again asked, HUSSEIN replied he had given his answer and, "I am not a person who gives away his friends."

HUSSEIN was questioned regarding a letter dated February 19, 1991, from HUSSEIN KAMIL (hereinafter KAMIL) in the name of Iraqi President HUSSEIN to AL-MAJID. The letter stated, in part, that the Iraqi military should remove any and all property from Kuwait which will aid in the rebuilding of Iraq. HUSSEIN stated the normal method of conveying directions from the President was via letters from the Presidential Diwan. KAMIL was not a secretary but one of the Iraqi Ministers. KAMIL was "known for his way of doing things." HUSSEIN was read the letter by the translator and asked whether the letter referred to items used by the Iraqi military in Kuwait or to things from Kuwait itself. HUSSEIN stated that he never instructed the Iraqi military to remove items, either their own equipment or Kuwaiti items. HUSSEIN opined that the letter may refer to equipment in Kuwait utilized by the various Iraqi Ministers for critical services such as electricity, water, transportation, and telephone service. He stated the letter was dated nine days before the cease fire. HUSSEIN denied the letter referred to Kuwaiti property. He stated it was simply a letter from one minister subordinate to another minister, asking for return of materials taken to Kuwait by Iraqi forces. HUSSEIN stated he did not issue

the letter. He asked what items or materials were taken from Kuwait after this letter was published.

When questioned whether members of the Iraqi leadership were allowed to issue letters in the name of the President without his knowledge, HUSSEIN stated, "There are bad elements everywhere. He (KAMIL) is dead now." HUSSEIN denied knowledge of other members of the Iraqi leadership who might have acted on authority of the President without actually having power delegated to them by HUSSEIN. HUSSEIN acknowledged the referenced letter was not conveyed in an official manner. He reiterated the official method of issuance of such a letter, upon orders from HUSSEIN, would have been to send a communication from the Presidential Diwan to, in this case, AL-MAJID. This letter would have specifically enumerated the powers being delegated to the recipient, in this case, KAMIL. [HUSSEIN interview, March 3, 2004].

HUSSEIN was questioned about the 45 coalition POWs and the purpose of the apparent compulsory appearance of two British pilot POWs on Iraqi television. The interviewer noted the pilots appeared to have been physically abused and that featuring them on television violated the Geneva Convention. HUSSEIN stated the POWs, especially the pilots, would likely have provided different details about their capture. Some would say they were captured by farmers or villagers while others would say by a "group of people." These Iraqis might have celebrated the capture of the coalition combatants by hitting and pushing them around. The Iraqi military was not always in control or aware of circumstances regarding captured individuals because communications between military units had been knocked out by coalition forces.

Regarding coalition POWs captured in 1991, HUSSEIN claimed not to know that the POWs had been abused by anyone in the Iraqi military or the Iraq Government. But admitted that others may have "behaved in a bad manner" and that he was speaking only about his personal knowledge of the matter. HUSSEIN added he would provide such information if he were aware of it. He stated he subscribes to the Koran, a document much older than the Geneva Convention. The Koran and Arab tradition teach that it is "noble" to treat a prisoner well. HUSSEIN believed the principles enunciated in the Geneva Convention should be respected by the entire world regardless of one's circumstances or nationality.

HUSSEIN neither confirmed nor denied that all coalition

POWs were tortured while in Iraqi custody but stated that this information is "on the conscience" of those who reported it and those who conducted the investigation. HUSSEIN explained that leaders command by "communication instruments." Lower level commanders lead by "vision or voice." Without proper communication instruments, each entity behaves according to "how it sees things." HUSSEIN reiterated that Iraqi communications systems were inoperative during the 1991 war. Accordingly, he speculated that some reported acts of physical abuse, such as the burning of a POW's hair, might have been acts of a "simpleton." Regarding whether the abuse of coalition forces could reasonably lead one to believe that it was a widespread practice conducted by the entire Iraqi military, HUSSEIN replied, "I answered."

HUSSEIN maintained that he did not question the accounts of abuse of coalition POWs and that he had no personal information to either confirm or deny these allegations. However, from a practical perspective, he did not doubt the Iraqi people, after being attacked by coalition pilots, might have abused the pilots, especially if they had participated in their capture. [HUSSEIN interview, March 5, 2004].

HUSSEIN was informed the Kuwaiti Government claimed the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait caused \$180 billion in damages to the country. HUSSEIN asked for the source of this information. When told the source was Kuwait, HUSSEIN asked which neutral and legal entity questioned Kuwait regarding the basis of their conclusion, and opined that "no one" asked Kuwait for details of their investigation of this matter. HUSSEIN again questioned whether evidence supported these Kuwaiti assertions.

HUSSEIN reiterated that "Kuwait is Iraqi" but was "stolen" from Iraq by a British resolution. He added that if Kuwait had not been a country with oil, it would not have been "stolen." HUSSEIN stated that the arrogance of the Kuwaiti rulers made them "stupid" and ignited the war. He stated his belief that the United States, located across the Atlantic Ocean, wanted Iraq to be poor. However, he could not understand how Kuwait would want to exist next to a "hungry country."

HUSSEIN emphasized he was not saying Kuwait did not have the right to make these statements; rather, he was questioning the identity of the neutral entity which examined this matter and whether it was discussed with Iraq. HUSSEIN suggested something similar to a court should have been formed to hear the details from both sides and to decide this matter. However, this did not happen.

The interviewer told HUSSEIN Kuwait never asked for compensation for the damages suffered during the Iraqi invasion and occupation. Kuwait did, however, ask for the return of 605 POWs who have not, to date, been returned. HUSSEIN stated these Kuwaitis were not "captives" and are missing as characterized by a UN resolution. He stated that many "stories and novels have been woven" around this issue, similar to the matter of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) but that the Kuwaiti POW accusations have been proven false, similar to the WMD rumors. HUSSEIN stated that individuals often become "missing" during a war and provided, as an example, the one coalition individual still missing from the first Gulf War and the thousands of Iraqis and Iranians missing from the Iran-Iraq War. As for the 605 Kuwaitis, HUSSEIN stated that Kuwait knows their fate. HUSSEIN denied knowing that 605 Kuwaitis were captured in circumstances other than combat after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

HUSSEIN acknowledged AZIZ SALEH AL-NUMAN was Governor of Kuwait during the Iraqi occupation and reported directly to AL-MAJID, the Iraqi Minister of Interior at that time. Iraqi provincial laws enumerated AL-NUMAN's duties as Governor. HUSSEIN does not remember whether he appointed AL-NUMAN or whether the RCC appointed him by decree.

In Iraq, the Constitution enumerated the RCC's and the President's, who is also the Chairman of the RCC, authority. Some governmental appointments like those given to high-ranking officers in the military, to judges, and to general directors, were based on a "republican" directive. HUSSEIN explained that the Iraqi system did not prevent the President from submitting a name for appointment consideration and requesting subsequent feedback from the RCC. Decisions in Iraq were signed by the President, and it was his prerogative whether to consult with anyone. HUSSEIN stated "his style" was to always consult with others when the time came to make a decision. Governors were assigned based on a "republican" or Presidential directive. HUSSEIN did not remember if he discussed the appointment of AL-NUMAN with the RCC.

HUSSEIN was questioned regarding Iraq's use of Kuwaitis, Japanese, and westerners as human shields during the first Gulf War, positioning them at key sites like communications centers and military positions. HUSSEIN denied that such individuals were taken to Iraqi military positions but added that the Iraq Government did not prevent individuals from volunteering as human shields to protect facilities such as communications centers. HUSSEIN claimed that he did not remember whether such

volunteers existed in 1991. The translator read HUSSEIN an Iraq Government communication from QUSAY HUSSEIN concerning the usage of Kuwaiti prisoners as human shields. HUSSEIN stated that he had no information about this letter, and answered only, "I answered" when informed that American forces had recovered the document from an Iraq Government building. HUSSEIN asked whether the captives discussed in this communication were ever questioned about being held in Iraqi captivity or being used as human shields. HUSSEIN stated that Iraq released all the Kuwaiti captives. When informed that the document was dated March 14, 2003, HUSSEIN stated, "It is a forgery. It is impossible." He suggested the communication be examined closely to determine authenticity, and added that he thought it was dated 1991. HUSSEIN stated if the document is truly dated 2003, it is a forgery, and added that Iraq did not have captives in 2003. HUSSEIN stated QUSAY HUSSEIN was not the type of person to "make up things." He reiterated that experts in the United States and in Iraq should scrutinize this document for authenticity. [HUSSEIN interview, March 11, 2004, interview].

HUSSEIN stated that HASHEM, and SALEH, Second Corps Commander, represented Iraq at the cease fire talks during the first Gulf War. Their positions and viewpoints were the same as those of the Iraqi leadership: to secure a cease fire and to start the withdrawal of foreign forces from Iraq. HUSSEIN stated Iraq had no goal of continuing the war and desired a cease fire.

When questioned about other items discussed by Iraq at the 1991 cease fire talks, HUSSEIN stated he did not remember any additional Iraqi requests other than the withdrawal of foreign forces from their territory. In HUSSEIN's opinion, the fighting would have continued without this withdrawal. HUSSEIN denied knowing that Iraq asked for and received permission to continue flying helicopters. He further denied knowing the purpose of such an Iraqi request.

AL-MAJID claimed he was summoned to an Iraqi leadership meeting on August 7, 1990 with HUSSEIN and other Iraqi leaders. At the conclusion of the meeting, HUSSEIN announced to everyone that AL-MAJID would go to Kuwait. At the time, SABAWI HASAN IBRAHIM AL-TIKRITI (hereinafter SABAWI), HUSSEIN's brother, was already in Kuwait. HUSSEIN's declaration to the Iraqi leadership authorized AL-MAJID and SABAWI to "manage" Kuwait. AL-NUMAN was appointed Governor of Kuwait and was "included" in the security plans.

The work in Kuwait was divided into two parts; SABAWI

served as Director of Intelligence in charge of security of Kuwait and AL-MAJID was responsible for maintaining "organization" among the various Ministries. SABAWI was in charge of the Security Committee of Kuwait which included members from various government components including intelligence, special security, the police, the military, and the militia. AL-MAJID stated that he and SABAWI had equal overall responsibility over Kuwait.

AL-MAJID knew of the destruction/sabotage of the Burgan and Al-Rumaila oil fields by the Iraqi military. AL-MAJID claimed that this "operation" was neither his responsibility nor under his control, but rather fell under the direction of the Iraqi military. [AL-MAJID interview, February 4, 2004].

THE 1991 UPRISING

On March 1, 1991, one day after the Gulf War ceasefire, rebellion began in Basra. Within days, the rebellion extended to Karbala, Najaf, Hilla, Al-Nasiriyah, Al-Amrah, Samawah, Kut and Diwaniyya. At one point, all but two of Iraq's provinces were in open revolt.

The RCC issued decree #64, dated March 9, 1991, which granted the following powers to Ba'ath Party officials [Enclosure #]:

1. To grant comrades, members of the Regional Command of the Socialist Arab Ba'ath Party, or members of the Revolutionary Command Council who directly supervise the forces and columns that face resistance from the groups of traitors and agents who are supported by Iran, the power of the President of the Republic to reward and punish.
2. To grant the Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council the powers of the Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council for the purposes mentioned in paragraph 1 of this decree.
3. To grant the Minister of Industry and Military Industrialization the powers stated in paragraph 1 of this decree.
4. This decree shall be in force from the day it is issued until the end of the crisis.
5. The Ministers and pertinent authorities must implement this decree.

TARIQ AZIZ stated that on March 4, 1991, two days after the Gulf War cease-fire, the RCC signed and released RCC Resolution #64 which gave governors control of military forces in their territories. All of the RCC members except AZIZ, who remained in Baghdad, were in the south of Iraq or outside of Baghdad at this time. AZIZ was working on implementing UN Resolutions 687 and 688 which involved the repatriation of POWs. He met with HUSSEIN on occasion, but spent most of his time with the Director of Military Intelligence, General SABIR AL-DURI. AZIZ believed that in actuality, the RCC was not consulted on Resolution #64 although they may have heard of it. AZIZ believed that it made sense to give authority and power to the governors in a time of crisis, but there would have been no voting or feedback, only HUSSEIN's order. [AZIZ interview, May 6, 2004].

AL-ZUBAYDI stated after the United States liberated Kuwait in 1991, HUSSEIN telephoned him and directed him to travel and take charge of the southern city of Nasiriyah. AL-ZUBAYDI believed HUSSEIN chose him to resolve the 1991 Shia Intifada (Uprising) in a peaceful manner because he was a Shia. Even though he is a Shia, AL-ZUBAYDI considered himself a Ba'thist and an Iraqi first. He believed that Shia's from Iran caused the 1991 Intifada, and learned that they were revolting against the government. According to AL-ZUBAYDI, there was wide-spread looting and violence aimed at Iraqi government officials and Ba'ath Party members in Nasiriyah. AL-ZUBAYDI maintained that Iran started the 1991 uprising because they wanted to invade and occupy Iraq. The Republican Guard and Special Forces were already in Nasiriyah trying to quell the uprising when AL-ZUBAYDI arrived. AL-ZUBAYDI remembered conducting meetings with various tribal leaders, community leaders, and elders in Nasiriyah in an attempt to resolve the situation in a peaceful manner.

KAMAL MUSTAFA ABDALLAH SULTAN AL-TIKRITI (hereinafter KAMAL MUSTAFA) was the Commander of the Republican Guard Forces and Regular Army in Nasiriyah during the 1991 uprising. The Ba'ath Party leader, AL-ZUBAYDI's assistant, was AZIZ SALIH AL-NUMAN. AL-ZUBAYDI stated that the Republican Guard Forces and Regular Army were equipped with light weapons and did not have access to or use armored tanks or helicopters. [AL-ZUBAYDI interview, May 27, 2004].

AL-ZUBAYDI adamantly denied ever killing anyone, ordering executions, or witnessing any executions or atrocities during the 1991 Intifada in Nasiriyah. AL-ZUBAYDI stated that President Saddam Hussein should be held responsible for the violence that occurred during the 1991 Intifada. [AL-ZUBAYDI

interview, June 5, 2004].

AL-ZUBAYDI's statements are inconsistent with media video footage showing the Iraqi forces use of helicopters and tanks to regain control in Southern Iraq. Additionally, there is video footage of AL-ZUBAYDI physically assaulting a detainee which contradicts his statement that he resolved the uprising in a peaceful manner.

On March 1, 2004, a day after the United States ended its offensive military operations in Iraq, KAMAL MUSTAFA received orders from HUSSEIN KAMEL to take a regiment of Special Republican Guard (SRG) troops to Nasiriyah with AL-ZUBAYDI, reorganize the party and reassign responsibilities. This involved reappointing employees and selecting and assigning a new Governor. KAMAL MUSTAFA understood his instructions were to travel to Nasiriyah and establish command to run the Army at Nasiriyah. Once he met up with AL-ZUBAYDI, KAMAL MUSTAFA was to provide protection for AL-ZUBAYDI's command, remain two days and turn the situation over to the special forces. His main task was to protect the command by setting up check points and securing the route of travel. Once secure, he was to use local units to replace his troops and withdraw. KAMAL MUSTAFA was not told about rebels, revolution or uprising. He was never told to "clean up the cities."

The regiment that KAMAL MUSTAFA assembled to deploy to Nasiriyah consisted of four companies of infantry troops, a support company and a headquarters company. These companies were made armed with light rifles, medium machine guns, RPGs, rocket launchers, and were accompanied by a mortar platoon, an air defense platoon and a 106 anti-tank gun element. Each company had a radio communication system. AL-ZUBAYDI arrived at the SRG Headquarters at 3:00 a.m., and the entire regiment departed Baghdad at 5:00a.m., southbound for Kut. The regiment traveled in a caravan. AL-ZUBAYDI and the command element traveled in the rear of the formation. One of HUSSEIN's bodyguards traveled with the group.

In Kut, the group learned from a party member that there was a disturbance in Al-Hayy. The Governor informed them that the Mayor was missing and that party members had been killed. The regiment came under fire as they arrived outside of Al-Hayy. They responded with RPG and light weapons fire. AL-ZUBAYDI decided the regiment should deploy. The regiment broke up and deployed, with two companies deployed on line and prepared to retaliate. An hour later, the regiment entered the city.

There were no targets for the support weapons, rather, the regiment used light and medium machine guns and RPGs. All of the attacks were visual. The advancing forces came under fire and returned fire, although it did not last long as there was no resistance. The enemy had apparently thrown down their weapons and retreated. AL-ZUBAYDI and the Governor of Kut put the city in order. This happened while KAMAL MUSTAFA and the regiment were still there. Some party members, police and some of the Governor's men were still fighting. Some people were captured, but the SRG did not debrief or transport them. [KAMAL MUSTAFA interview, April 29, 2004].

AL-MAJID denied personal knowledge of any persecution, including executions and imprisonment, of Shia Muslims living in southern Iraq in 1991, and denied personal knowledge of the destruction of Shia villages during this or any other time. [February 4, 2004 interview]. However, on January 2, 2004, AL-MAJID stated that he and other military commanders had received orders from HUSSEIN to execute any Iraqi civilians who were uprising against the Iraqi regime. On March 2, 1991, AL-MAJID arrived in Basra where approximately 200 Iraqi civilians were being detained by the 51st Division under the command of SAIF ALDIN AL-RAWI. Of the 200 civilians detained, 36 were being held at Saad Circle, in Basra, for committing crimes against the Iraqi Government. Of the 36, all but two had admitted to the crimes. However, the two were implicated by the other 34. AL-MAJID executed the two by shooting them with a rifle to make an example out of them. AL-MAJID claimed he released the other 34. [Attached as Enclosure #]

Regarding the 1991 Uprising, HUSSEIN stated that within a day of the cease fire of 1991, "some elements" had initiated sabotage operations in the southern Iraq cities of Basrah, Nasiriyah, and Amarah. Later, this activity spread to the northern cities of Suleimaniyyah, Erbil, and Kirkuk. HUSSEIN stated the groups conducting these operations were "pushed by Iran," and Iraq captured 68 Iranian intelligence officers who were later exchanged for Iraqi prisoners.

At the time of the uprisings, most bridges in Iraq had already been destroyed, electricity was unavailable, water service was sporadic, and food supplies were minimal. In the aftermath of the war, these factors contributed to general unrest in the country. HUSSEIN stated that "elements" participating in the uprisings were a mixture of thieves, rebels and "those from Iran," whom HUSSEIN described as individuals from Iranian government services, Iraqis of Iranian origin, and Iraqis who had

"escaped" to Iran. Their nationalities were difficult to determine with any degree of certainty because many had intentionally destroyed their citizenship documents.

HUSSEIN stated that in reasserting government control of the country, Iraqi leadership considered the southern area of Iraq a high priority as Iraqi forces primarily encountered and fought Iranians in this area. After order was restored in Southern Iraq, government forces focused on the Northern Region where Iraqi forces met little or no resistance. The fighting in Northern and Southern Iraq lasted approximately two months. HUSSEIN stated, "God made us victorious." Thereafter, according to HUSSEIN, Iran continued to insert groups of 10 to 15 people into Iraq to conduct operations against the government. However, these individuals were, for the most part, thwarted by members of the local population. Ultimately, following an agreement between Iran and Iraq, these hostile operations ceased.

HUSSEIN characterized the uprisings in 1991 as insurgent activity conducted by "outlaws and thieves." He did not consider the insurgents to be revolutionaries. When asked what factors allowed these disturbances, HUSSEIN answered that it was support from Iran, weakness of the Iraq Government after the war, and possibly assistance from coalition forces. He noted that the war had weakened all government institutions, including the police and the military. Gradually, however, the Iraqi military grew in strength and eventually overcome these rebels. According to HUSSEIN, the Iraqi military's "blade got longer and longer." He acknowledged, however, that the Iraqi military's weakened state created the opportunity for this "lawlessness" in the first place.

HUSSEIN believed the goal of the insurgent activity was to gain control of Iraq. In his opinion, Iran supported insurgent activity in 1991 after Iran failed to gain control of Iraq through the previous war with Iraq. Iran wanted to control all, or at least a part, of Iraq, and particularly the southern portion. HUSSEIN believed Iran also wanted to extend its power to eastern Saudi Arabia and the entire Gulf region.

The RCC gave the Iraqi Provincial Governors control of the military during the Uprisings to protect the people and the state and to re-establish security and a "normal life." The people and the nation were threatened by widespread killings, theft, arson, and general destruction, all of which had to be brought under control. HUSSEIN denied knowing the specific methods that the Governors and the military used to reassert

control. HUSSEIN stated, "They were given the authority, and they carried it out." HUSSEIN claimed that he did not ask for details of the operation but did request and receive status reports regarding the progress of operations.

HUSSEIN denied that the Geneva Convention applied to this situation, claiming it only applied to wars; that is, only to situations when a foreign country is an occupying power. He claimed the Geneva Convention was applicable to attempted coups or internal unrest involving crimes like burning and looting. When asked again what restrictions were placed on the Iraqi military during the 1991 Uprisings, HUSSEIN replied that an Iraqi, whether civilian or military, knew what was acceptable as humane behavior and that there is no need for someone to have to tell them how to behave.

HUSSEIN stated, "I am responsible for what I decide" and added that he was not responsible for how an Iraqi acts. HUSSEIN claimed that if an Iraqi wanted to use him as the justification for his actions, he would accept that assertion so long as it did not harm his (HUSSEIN'S) reputation. In HUSSEIN's opinion, a leader is responsible for a subordinate's actions if the leader learns of the subordinate's transgressions and confronts the subordinate with the wrongfulness of those actions. He stated that each individual is judged based on his own law and constitution. [HUSSEIN interview, March 13, 2004].

HUSSEIN stated that he learned about the Southern Iraq situation the same way as any leader of a country. Whenever faced with a situation, the Iraqi leadership assembled and consulted "quickly" about the best way to confront an issue.

HUSSEIN stated that initially, those involved in the uprisings in Southern Iraq were among "those who had crossed the border from Iran." Others in Iraq committed similar acts, while some were not involved at all in the incidents. According to HUSSEIN, if the Iraqi Government's reaction had been slow and weak, some might have shown sympathy and assisted the Uprising participants out of fear that those who caused the disturbances would ultimately take over power in Iraq. HUSSEIN speculated that some participated because they were simply "greedy thieves and robbers."

HUSSEIN asserted it was the duty of the Iraq Government to confront individuals participating in the Uprisings. HUSSEIN stated that the "arms of the authorities had been severed" but the Iraq Government "picked them up and struck the enemy." He

stated that those who would not be deterred by words would be deterred by weapons. Therefore, the Iraqi leadership ordered the army to assemble as many forces as possible to confront "treachery" and the disturbances. HUSSEIN acknowledged that incidents of looting by certain individuals "got mixed in" with the actions of those participating in the uprisings.

Regarding the decisions regarding whom to place in charge of areas in Southern Iraq during that time and what authority and powers to delegate, HUSSEIN replied, "I said our decision was to confront and defeat the enemy." The participants in the Uprisings were to be "put in their place," if not by word, then by weapon. HUSSEIN stated that a lengthy discussion of this matter was not required. The individuals who had crossed the border from Iran were members of the Dawa Party who were assisted by additional Iranian forces. Together, these individuals killed, burned, looted, and committed other crimes. According to HUSSEIN, when faced with this situation, one does not need to ask one's self what action to take. Procedure, however, dictated that the Iraqi leadership meet to discuss the matter. All members agreed regarding the necessary Iraq Government response to the situation.

HUSSEIN stated the threat to the Iraq Government in 1991 existed in both Northern and Southern Iraq. An uprising was even attempted in Baghdad. HUSSEIN stated that those "sitting on the fence" joined the uprisings after witnessing police stations or government offices attacked and seeing no response by the authorities. As the Iraq Government reasserted control, the "enemy" went to a new area or reinforced in an old one. According to HUSSEIN, the Iraqi military strength grew over time and "the circle started tightening around the enemy." [HUSSEIN interview, March 16, 2004].

Regarding the senior Iraqi leaders assigned in 1991 to Southern Iraq to deal with the Shia uprising, HUSSEIN stated, "We assigned responsibility to whoever was going to handle the situation." AL-ZUBAIDI and KAMAL MUSTAPHA ABDALLAH were sent to Nasiriyah, KAMIL was sent to Karbala, AL-MAJID was sent to Basrah, and AL-DURI was sent to Al-Hillah to confront the Shia uprisings in those areas. During this interview, HUSSEIN denied that he had previously stated that in 1991, he was only interested in results and did not want to know the details of how his commanders would stop the Uprising. HUSSEIN asked, "Who says I did not want to know how?" When informed by the interviewer that HUSSEIN himself had previously made this statement, he stated that any person's main goal would have been to stop the

disturbances and to end the "treason." [HUSSEIN interview, March 23, 2004].

1991 Chemical Weapons Use

In the early morning of March 7, 1991, an unidentified Iraqi Government Official requested authority to use "liquids" against rebels in and around An Najaf. Regime forces intended to use the "liquid" to defeat dug in forces as part of a larger assault.

KAMIL, then Director of MIC, ordered senior officials in the CW program to ready CW for use against the revolt. His initial instruction was to use VX. When informed that no VX was available, he ordered mustard be used instead. However, mustard was ruled out because of its detectable persistence and Sarin selected.

On or about March 7, 1991, R-400 aerial bombs stored at the Tamuz Airbase were readied for use. Al Muthanna State Establishment (MSE) technicians mixed the two components of the Iraqi "binary" nerve agent system inside the R-400s. Explosive burster charges were loaded into the bombs and the weapons assembled near the runway. Helicopters from nearby bases flew to Tamuz where they were armed with Sarin-laden R-400s and other conventional ordnance. As of March 1991, about a dozen MI-8 helicopters were staged at Tamuz Airbase.

The helicopters were used to fly dozens of sorties against Shia rebels in Karbala and the surrounding areas. A senior participant from the CW program estimates that 10 to 20 R-400s were dropped. Other reporting suggests as many as 32 R-400s may have been dropped. According to an Iraqi helicopter pilot, MI-8 helicopters were also used during the Iran-Iraq war to drop chemical munitions.

Following the initial helicopter sorties over Karbala, the Senior Chemical Weapons Program Officer overseeing the operation received an angry call from KAMIL's office. The caller said the attacks had been unsuccessful and that further measures were required. The R-400s, which are designed for high-speed delivery from higher altitude, likely did not activate properly when dropped from a slow-moving helicopter.

As an alternative to the R-400s, the MSE filled large aerial bombs with CS (tear gas). Over the next two weeks,

helicopters departed Tamuz Air Base loaded with CS-filled bombs. One participant estimated that more than 200 CS-filled aerial bombs were dropped on rebel targets in and around Karbala and Najaf.

Trailers loaded with mustard-filled aerial bombs were also transported to the Tamuz Air Base. A participant in the operation stated that mustard gas was not used on the rebels because of the likelihood of discovery by the Coalition. According to the source, the mustard-filled bombs were never unloaded and were not used.

Refugees and Iraqi military deserters' reports of the 1991 attacks include descriptions of a range of CW and improvised poisons that were used in the areas around Karbala, Najaf, Nasiriyah, and Basrahh.

AL-MAHAWIL MASS GRAVE SITE

According to the HRW Report of May 2003, Vol. 15, No. 5, while many of those buried in the Al-Mahawil mass graves remain unidentified, remains that have been identified by relatives establish that the bodies are those of Iraqis arrested during the 1991 uprisings and killed while in Iraq Government custody. HRW interviewed many of the relatives of those identified in the mass grave, making the crucial link between their disappearance in 1991 and the discovery of their remains in the Al-Mahawil mass graves.

KAMIL MUHAMMAD DAWUD (hereinafter DAWUD), a Baghdad lawyer, age 74 (all ages are given as of the time of their disappearance), and his son KHALID, a 29 year-old university student, drove from Baghdad to Al-Hillah around March 9 or 10, 1991, searching for DAWUD'S older son, then a soldier in the Iraqi army. While the older brother soon returned home, KAMIL and KHALID disappeared. Their family found KAMIL'S half-looted car near the Al-Mahawil Army Base sometime later, but received no information regarding their fate. On May 17, 2003, their family identified their bodies at the large Al-Mahawil mass grave site based on the presence of DAWUD's watch and Khalid's identification document. DAWUD was blindfolded and both men had their hands bound. [HRW interview with RASHID KAMIL MUHAMMAD, Baghdad, May 18, 2003]

[redacted] (hereinafter [redacted] age 42, was at the Al-Mahawil grave site looking for five relatives who were

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missing from a rural village in the Al-Madhatiyya district located approximately 20 kilometers southwest of Al-Hillah. According to [redacted] three of his brothers were arrested on March 23, 1991, when local Ba'ath officials demanded that all local villagers attend a meeting at the local Ba'ath party headquarters and arrested approximately fifteen people. His brothers, SUBHAN, age 54, [redacted] age 44, and [redacted] age 36, all farmers, were arrested and never seen again. [redacted] himself was briefly arrested with the other three but was released just as they were taken to Al-Mahawil military base because he was a soldier on active military duty who had not abandoned his post during the war. [redacted] identified the remains of his brother, SUBHAN, among the bodies recovered from the Al-Mahawil mass grave based upon the identity documents he found on the remains. Two other relatives of [redacted] were also arrested around the same time. [redacted] the 21 year-old son of his brother [redacted] and [redacted] age 22, were soldiers returning to duty. A person who said he was an eyewitness to their arrest told [redacted] that the two were arrested at a Ba'ath Party operated checkpoint on their way to their military division. [HRW interview with [redacted] Mahawil, May 16, 2003.]

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[redacted] two cousins remain missing, but as they were arrested around the same time as relatives whose remains have been identified in the mass grave, the family believes they were likely executed and buried around the same time.

[redacted] a 40 year-old teacher, described for HRW what happened when loyalist Iraqi forces entered his district in March, 1991: the military entered Al-Shamali [the northern part] on March 15 and the cleansing operation started in the villages. They destroyed many houses in the villages using bulldozers. They cut down the palm trees and the orchards. They chased and traced all the sons of my tribe. They arrested many people who were on the street, even people just passing through the area. They distributed checkpoints all over and controlled all the roads. [HRW interview with [redacted] May 16, 2003]

Nine relatives of [redacted] were arrested on the same day in March, 1991. His only brother, [redacted] a 25 year-old army deserter, was arrested at his home by a group of Ba'ath party members, security officials, and police officers; his 31 year-old cousin [redacted] an army officer, was also arrested at his home; his father's uncle, MUHAMMAD OBAID HUSSEIN, age 54, was arrested at his home along with his three sons, 23 year-old [redacted] a soldier,

27 year-old ABBAS MUHAMMAD OBAID, an agricultural worker, and 29 year-old [REDACTED] a soldier. [REDACTED] age 67, another uncle of his father, was arrested as he came home from his shop. [REDACTED] a 30 year-old teacher, and [REDACTED] a farmer cousin whose age he did not know, were also arrested. At the Al-Mahawil mass grave, [REDACTED] identified the remains of ABBAS MUHAMMAD OBAID and HADI OBAID HUSSEIN based on the identity documents found on their remains. He believed that his other relatives were also buried in the same mass grave because they all were arrested and "disappeared" on the same day.

[REDACTED], a 46 year-old worker, and his son, a soldier, were arrested and "disappeared" on March 12, 1991, as they came home from his shop in Al-Hillah. A second son, [REDACTED] 16 at the time of the arrest, told HRW that he was in the car with his father and brother when they were stopped at a checkpoint operated by the General Security (al-Amn al-`Am): "the Amn had the names of my father and brother, and said they needed to investigate them." [REDACTED] identified the remains of his father at the Al-Mahawil mass grave based on identity documents found on his remains and was still searching for his brother's remains at the time of the HRW interview. [HRW interview with [REDACTED] May 14, 2003]

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KHALID HASSAN KHUDAYYIR, age 13, and his 33 year-old cousin, FUAD `ABD AL-HUSSEIN KADHIM, left their native village of Albu Alwan and walked toward the nearby city of Al-Hillah to purchase food on March 4, 1991. FUAD `ABD AL-HUSSEIN KADHIM had been a soldier two years before the 1991 Uprising but had returned to civilian life. The two young men disappeared and for years the family had no information about their fate. Their bodies were found at the Al-Mahawil mass grave with their identity documents. [HRW interview with [REDACTED] May 15, 2003]

Many more families still searching for their missing relatives told HRW similar stories of unresolved "disappearances." [REDACTED] a 45 year-old woman, was typical. Her 14 year-old son, [REDACTED] went missing on March 7, 1991, after she had asked him to go fetch some water from the river in Al-Hillah's Bab Al-Hussein neighborhood. When she asked the soldiers stationed on a nearby bridge about him, they threatened to shoot her and ordered her to leave. She never heard again of her son and failed to locate his remains after looking through hundreds of bags containing human remains at the

Al-Mahawil mass grave site. [HRW interview with [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Mahawil, May 14, 2003]

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HRW was given a list that, according to local officials, contained more than 1,200 names of identified victims from the two Al-Mahawil mass graves. However, the list appears limited in its usefulness and reliability: the actual numbering of the victims was sloppy; the numbering jumps suddenly from victim 830 to victim 931; many victims take up more than one number; and some victims are listed multiple times. A closer examination of the list suggests that relatives have claimed slightly less than 1,000 of the victims from the mass grave. These identifications were made in a variety of ways and some are of dubious reliability. While some relatives were fortunate to find remains containing identity papers, in other cases family members guessed as to identity based on much more circumstantial criteria such as items of clothing, medications, and cigarettes found with the corpses.

It is similarly difficult to estimate the total number of unidentified persons exhumed from the two Al-Mahawil mass graves as no records appear to have been kept. Local officials gave widely varying figures, but a HRW count of the unidentified bodies just before their reburial concluded that approximately 1,200 bodies remained at the large Al-Mahawil mass grave and just over 100 bodies remained at the Al-Mahawil brick factory mass grave. It appears, moreover, that some of the bodies from the brick factory mass grave were moved to the large Al-Mahawil mass grave site. Taken together, it appears that no more than approximately 2,300 bodies were recovered from the two Al-Mahawil mass graves.

Although the list of claimed victims provided by local authorities is of limited reliability in terms of the total number of victims, it does provide some crucial information about the likely identity and residence of the victims. The vast majority of the victims appear to have been young men from the general area around Al-Hillah, indicating that the mass grave was a result of a localized campaign of arrests and executions in the Al-Hillah area. The relatively small number of victims from Karbala, Ad-Diwaniyah, An-Najaf, and Baghdad in the mass grave appear to have been traveling through the Al-Hillah area at the time of their detention and therefore, were probably not arrested elsewhere and transferred to the area. Among the victims are more than a dozen Egyptian nationals who were working and living in the Al-Hillah area.

According to local officials in Al-Hillah, several persons who were taken to the Al-Mahawil mass grave sites survived the executions at the Al-Mahawil brick factory mass grave site. HRW located one such survivor and his remarkable story provides important information about the manner in which the mass execution campaign was conducted in Al-Mahawil.

[redacted] (hereinafter [redacted]) was only 12 years old at the time of the 1991 mass arrest campaign. On March 16, 1991, his 28 year-old mother, KHULUD `ABUD NAJI, took [redacted] and two other 13 year old relatives, his uncle, MUHANAD `ABUD NAJI, and his cousin, MUHAMMAD YASSIN MUHAMMAD, from their home in the Al-Sa`da neighborhood to their grandfather's house in the Sha'awi neighborhood. On their way, a soldier stopped the group, asked them where they were going, and accused them of being looters. [redacted] mother explained that they were just going to their grandfather's house, but the soldier arrested all of them and took them to a nearby school building. According to [redacted] "they put us in a school in a classroom. By the evening, the classroom was filled with people because they kept arresting people." As evening fell, the people detained in the classroom were taken to the Al-Mahawil military base where:

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they blindfolded us and bound our hands, and then they put us in landcruisers with shaded windows and a bus. We were about 25 to 30 people [detained].... They took us to the Al-Mahawil military base. Some of us were taken to another area [of the Al-Mahawil base]. They put me, my mother, my cousin, and my uncle in a tiny room. In the night of the same day, they brought a 14 year-old girl and a 30 year-old woman to the same room.

The family spent the night in the tiny room without food. The next morning they were questioned by high-ranking officers, including a lieutenant-colonel, who noted their names, the neighborhood they came from, and similar details. Following the perfunctory questioning, they were taken to a large hall at the Al-Mahawil military base where they were again joined by other detainees:

They took us to a big hall [and] started bringing in people now and then. We stayed there for two days. There were so many people.... They were children, women, and

men. We were sitting in [family] groups, me with my relatives and the others with their relatives. No one dared to speak to the other groups.

Toward the end of the second day, the evening of March 18, 1991, the detainees in the big hall were taken outside and lined up in the yard of the compound. "They brought some blankets which they ripped and they tied our hands and blindfolded us with those," [redacted] recalled. "They covered our eyes and put us inside some TATA buses looted from Kuwait. We were between 45 and 50 people on each bus. It was very crowded, there were two people on each chair." [HRW interview with [redacted] May 16, 2003]

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After the detainees were loaded on the buses, they were told that there were some checkpoints on the road, and that if asked, they should say they were going to Baghdad. [redacted] who could see a bit through the blanket covering his eyes, recounted the route taken by the bus:

There was an asphalt road from the door of the military camp. Then we turned off into a remote, dusty dirt road, an agricultural road. We turned off the main road, and I didn't know where we were going. I was sitting on the bus at the chair near the window. There was an abandoned canal, I was sitting on that side of the bus....I couldn't see clearly, but there was a building--later, when I looked [after the executions], it was a brick factory.

Almost as soon as the buses stopped, the executions began. People were pulled off the buses, thrown in a pre-dug pit, machine-gunned, and then buried with a bulldozer. AL-HUSSEINI told HRW how he survived:

When they started taking us off the bus, some of us began reciting the *shahada* [Muslim declaration of faith]. My mother told me, "Repeat the *shahada*, because we are about to die." I heard the shouting of the children. We grabbed each other's hands, me, my mother, my cousin, and my uncle. They pulled us, we were all together. They threw us into the dug-out grave. When I fell down, there were

so many bodies underneath me. I lay down on top of them. They started to shoot on us. There were two [groups of] men. One was taking the people off the bus, and others were shooting at people in the hole. One of them pulled at my clothes and said, "That one isn't dead, shoot him." They shot again, but still I was not shot. So they gave an order to the bulldozer driver to bury the grave. I was at the edge of the grave. When the shovel came, I spontaneously tried to crawl out. It was sundown now. I crawled to the edge of the grave, and got to a place where the bamboo was on my face and I was able to breathe through it. I heard the man who was standing on the hill instruct the shovel driver to bury us more—he had seen that I was not yet buried—but the driver left the place and didn't do it.

After he heard the noises of the vehicles fade away, [redacted] crawled out of the mass grave, leaving his dead relatives behind. He made his way to the main Al-Hillah-Baghdad road, and met four sympathetic Shi'a Iraqi soldiers who helped him return home.

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Witnesses to the Al-Mahawil Arrests and Detentions

There are many others in the Al-Hillah area who witnessed the mass detentions and executions. Their testimonies provide further evidence of the mass detentions at Al-Mahawil military base and the subsequent executions of thousands. ISKANDAR JAWAD WITWIT, the newly-appointed Mayor, was a high-ranking Air Force officer based at Al-Mahawil at the time. He said that the Iraqi government crushed the uprising in Al-Hillah by March 11, 1991, and immediately began a massive arrest campaign throughout the area:

They arrested everyone they saw [and took them to Al-Mahawil military base]. If they found men, women, or children, they took them. People were brought from Al-Hillah, An-Najaf, and Karbala for execution. The executions happened every day; they killed thousands of people. [HRW interview with ISKANDAR JAWAD WITWIT, Hillah, May 17, 2003]

[redacted] who was himself arrested on March 16, 1991, on suspicion of supporting the uprising, explained part of the massive Al-Mahawil military base had been taken over by individuals and organizations directly involved in the arrests and the killings. These people included high-ranking Ba'ath party members, General Security, Special Security (*al-Amn al-Khas*), the intelligence services (*mukhabarat*), and leading members of the pro-government Albu Alwan tribe, including its head shaikh, MUHAMMAD JAWAD ONAIFIS, who is in U.S. custody on suspicion of involvement in the Al-Mahawil executions.

Another eyewitness, himself a soldier at the time of the mass executions, provided detailed information to HRW about the involvement of Special Republican Guard troops in the detentions and executions. [redacted]

[redacted] drove from An-Najaf to Babel on March 8, 1991, together with his cousin KARIM 'ABD AL-SADIQ HITBAN, age 35 and also a soldier. The two men had just completed a three-day leave and were returning to their



military base when they were stopped outside Al-Hillah by Special Republican Guard troops, whom they identified by the red triangular badges on their uniforms. The Special Republican Guards, he said, detained everyone who came to their checkpoint, loading more than 100 persons into their trucks, and took them to the Al-Mahawil military base:

They took us directly to prison. The prison was in the territory of Al-Mahawil military training camp near Babel [Babylon], 30 kilometers from the place where we were detained. There were many people in the track, like one hundred or 150, both servicemen and civilians. They blindfolded us

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and tied our hands behind our backs. In the prison they took away the blindfolds and untied our hands.

The conditions in the Al-Mahawil detention camp were very abusive:

We were all herded to a hall where we could hardly stand. We were not allowed to use the toilet and we used a corner of the hall for our necessities. It was very dirty, stuffy, and smelly there. From time to time three or four Special Republican Guards came in to the hall and began beating us with their rifles, sticks, or iron bars. They picked out people in groups of three or four, blindfolded them, tied up their hands again and took away from the hall. These people would never return. They also took away my cousin.

[redacted] was fortunate. His former military commander whom he had served under in Mosul, MAJOR HUSSEIN ABDALLAH, was one of the Special Republican Guard officers at the Al-Mahawil military base. MAJOR HUSSEIN ABDALLAH recognized his former soldier and released him to return to his military unit. According to [redacted] MAJOR HUSSEIN ABDALLAH was one of three members of an "execution committee" that decided who would die and who would live:

I know about the execution committee from the Special Republican Guards themselves. When I went out of the hall I saw a group of them at the door of the next building. They told me the execution committee behind that door decided who will be executed. The door was open and I saw a big room, a table and the members of the execution committee, sitting at the table. [HRW interview with [redacted] [redacted] Mahawil, May 16, 2003]

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Witnesses to the Executions

The executions carried out near the Al-Mahawil military base, at the site where the large mass grave was discovered in an open field in May, 2003, were also witnessed by local farmers in the area. The farmers were threatened with death, and remained silent about the killings until the fall of the government of

HUSSEIN. [REDACTED] a farmer who lives close to the mass grave site, described a month of almost daily executions that he witnessed from his home:

They started to bring groups of innocent people to this graveyard and began executing them here. Every day, those criminals started executing people at 9:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m. They brought people here in buses—each group was between 120 and 150 people. They would bring three groups of this size each day. Before they brought these people, they would bring a bulldozer to dig holes.

Military members surrounded the area so no one would come near the place. When they brought the people, they pushed them into the holes with their hands tied and their eyes covered. When they pushed them into the

holes, they would start shooting massively. Afterwards, they would bring the bulldozers to bury the people. Then the criminals would prepare for the second and third groups [of victims.] This operation lasted from March 7 until April 6, 1991. [HRW interview with

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] May 16, 2003]

His brother, [REDACTED] had also had witnessed the executions:

They used to bring people from Al-Mahawil military base to this site. Their hands and



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eyes were bound. They would bring them here in Kuwaiti buses that carried about 45 passengers and a Toyota Coaster bus that carried about 21 passengers....They brought a full army division and surrounded the area. Most [non-military at the site] were Ba'ath party members, the others were from pro-government tribes. The military were in uniform, the Ba'ath and the tribal people were in civilian clothes with red kaffiyas....I heard the sound of the shooting and heard the executed people shout. I would hear this several times each day. They used a bulldozer shovel to bury the graves--after they finished their work, they took it with them.... would go to the roof and watch the executions--when they shot them and buried them in the holes. They used to take them from the cars and push them inside the holes. Their hands were tied and their eyes covered, sometimes two people were bound together. They put them inside the holes. They used to hit them, they had no mercy. The victims were unable to do anything--they would just start to shoot at them. After they were killed, they buried them using the bulldozer shovels. Every day, they used to dig three holes. Those were the holes they would use for that day. [HRW interview with [redacted] May 16, 2003]

Shortly after the executions at Al-Mahawil, the authorities appropriated the land of local farmers on which the mass grave was located and gave it to [redacted], a member of the pro-government Albu Alwan tribe--according to many witnesses, members of the Albu Alwan tribe were directly involved in the arrest and execution campaign.

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The farmers who had witnessed the killings were regularly harassed, threatened, and arrested by Iraqi officials who accused them of trying to leak information about the mass grave to the international community. On June 6, 1993, Iraqi officials arrested the entire farming community in the area, and took them to the police station in Iskandriyya city. There, [redacted] accused the farmers of digging up the mass graves and photographing the sites and smuggling the information to foreign journalists, but the men were ultimately released.

On April 5, 1991, the RCC announced "the complete crushing of acts of sedition, sabotage, and rioting in all towns of Iraq."

Additionally on April 5, 1991, the United Nations issued resolution 688, which:

Gravely concerned by the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish-populated areas, which led to a massive flow of refugees towards and across international frontiers and to cross-border incursions which threatens international peace and security in the region,

Deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering involved...

condemns the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish-populated areas, the consequences of which threaten international peace and security in the region.... [Attached as Enclosure #]

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Iraqis Still Defying Arms Ban, Departing U.N. Official Says

By BARBARA CROSSETTE

UNITED NATIONS, June 24.— Six years after the Security Council imposed its extraordinarily intrusive inspections on Iraq, that country's scientists are still under orders to keep the nation ready to make lethal chemical weapons at short notice, even if existing stocks are destroyed, according to a United Nations official.

"We have documentary evidence about orders from the leadership to preserve a strategic capability," said Rolf Ekeus, the Swedish arms control expert who has directed the disarmament of Iraq since 1991. "That means to keep the production equipment ready to produce at any given moment."

The commission headed by Mr. Ekeus feels that it is closing in on Iraq's missile programs, and the International Atomic Energy Agency is optimistic that it has shut down potentially dangerous nuclear projects.

But United Nations inspectors are focusing special concern on the less visible but very perilous chemical and biological weapons and the delivery systems Baghdad may be planning for them.

Denied contracts in the West, Iraq has turned to Eastern Europe and

Asia in search of prohibited equipment, said Mr. Ekeus in an interview a week before he steps down at the end of the month to become Sweden's Ambassador to the United States.

In six years, Mr. Ekeus said, the Iraqis have resolutely refused to cooperate in good faith, apparently believing that they could fool inspectors who would then go away. His comments echoed reports he and his inspectors have often made about Iraq in those years, and frustration that nothing has seemed to change.

"They come up with a new expla-

Continued on Page A3

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

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NEW YORK TIMES, NYC
Section A, pages 1 & 3

Date: 6/25/97

Edition: Late edition

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Iraq Still Defies Arms Ban, Official Says

SCOTT RITTER, JR.

Continued From Page A1

nation every time," he said. "They are very, very innovative. This is frustrating and irritating some times, but also amusing, highly amusing. They tell the most incredible stories. It is like the 'Thousand and One Nights,' where every night they tell a different story to save themselves."

He said the Iraqis fabricated declarations about destroying weapons, manipulated evidence, interfered with inspections and routinely lied to monitors until confronted with documents, after which they simply changed their stories.

The concern about shadowy biological and chemical projects intensifies the urgency of stripping Iraq of the ability to build or assemble missiles, said Mr. Ekeus, who will be succeeded as executive chairman of the United Nations Special Commission by Richard Butler, an Australian arms control expert who is now that nation's representative at the United Nations.

Mr. Ekeus said he was aware that with his departure the Iraqis might be tempted to change the rules in their relations with the inspections team, or that they would try to test the will of a new team chief. It is important, he said, that the Security Council, and the world at large, keep pressure on Baghdad. A number of Middle Eastern and European countries have begun to urge a relaxation in sanctions.

The special commission, armed with the most advanced equipment, has the authority to inspect Iraqi sites, destroy weapons and confiscate documents. By Security Council order, Iraq must comply if President Saddam Hussein has any hope of easing or ending the sanctions imposed on his Government after its 1990 invasion of Kuwait.

The commission has a total staff of about 150, most of them based in Iraq or moving regularly in and out of the country, to conduct investigations. The commission has also cast a net of monitoring devices over much of the country, including air samplers

that could detect secret chemical production, and some 130 tamper-resistant surveillance cameras that provide live pictures and make tapes for later study, and are connected to the Baghdad center by microwave radio links under international control. The commission also has the use of an American U-2 spy plane and satellite imagery, helicopters with high-powered cameras and ground-penetrating radar.

On Saturday, the Security Council threatened to tighten the sanctions in the fall if Iraq blocked or delayed investigations, as it has begun to do again in recent weeks. Among other measures, Iraqi officials could be denied visas to travel abroad.

"They blocked us at three locations," Mr. Ekeus said, describing his recent attempts to enter politically sensitive sites, which required the presence of an Iraqi official. "They delayed us once seven hours, once five. When the high Iraqi official arrived, he waited until the site commander cleaned out the place and

investigate," he continued. "We have to go at odd times. Sometimes on night inspections, sometimes on Fridays, a holiday. We have accounted for all such production equipment we can find, and we tag them and follow them."

Among the chemical agents Iraq has already produced on a large scale are mustard gases and an exceptionally deadly nerve gas known as VX, which Iraqis first denied they had, then admitted they had experimented with in 1994-95.

"Of course we had found documents and had investigated, so they couldn't deny it," Mr. Ekeus said. "Then we managed to detect a huge amount of imports of certain chemicals, so-called precursors, which could not be used, really, for anything but VX production."

"Why did you import these?" we asked. "Where are they now?"

"They said, 'We destroyed them secretly.'"

"Then comes this matter of secret destruction, which is large-scale," Mr. Ekeus said. "When did the secret destruction take place? Who decided? Who gave the order? Who carried out the order?"

Mr. Ekeus said his team interviewed people all the way down the line until they found someone who had carried out the destruction of material that Iraq denied having. But was it all destroyed? Mr. Ekeus said that lingering questions about chemical weapons stocks remain.

Iraq proved in the 1980's, in attacks meant to suppress rebellious Kurds, that it was willing to use chemical weapons. It had supplies in storage during the Persian Gulf war but was apparently dissuaded from unleashing them, at least on a clearly detectable scale, by warnings of catastrophic retaliation.

After the war, Mr. Ekeus's international team of scientists and weapons experts destroyed stocks of these agents and passed on the information to the United States, where questions persist about possible links between chemical agents and the illness known as gulf war syndrome.

Evidence persists of a capacity for chemical weapons.

then said, "You can go in."

On Monday, Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister, Tariq Aziz, called the charges of noncooperation "an American fabrication in which Rolf Ekeus took part."

Mr. Ekeus said, "Iraq has not yet been able to give us an acceptable explanation of what they are doing." Chemical weapons "are the most difficult because Iraq, with its food situation, necessarily must be allowed to produce pesticides for bugs and rats," he said. "But from there, the same type of equipment and certain chemical compounds can also be manipulated into making chemical poisons for humans. We have to monitor these dual-capability sites."

"To some, we go once a week to

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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[REDACTED]

.c The Associated Press

BAGHDAD, Iraq (AP) - Iraq's deputy prime minister led foreign reporters on a tour of Saddam Hussein's presidential palaces Friday, showing off lawns as big as several soccer fields and ornate sitting rooms that he declared U.N. inspectors will never see.

In New York, U.S. diplomats asked the U.N. Security Council to condemn Iraq's continuing refusal to open all sites to inspection for illegal weapons.

Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz toured about a dozen palaces with reporters, insisting Iraq is hiding nothing.

Arms monitors have demanded access to the presidential compounds to determine whether Iraq has met U.N. orders to destroy its weapons of mass destruction - a condition required to end sanctions imposed after Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, setting off the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

"They shall never be allowed in," Aziz told the reporters. "Their inspection injures the dignity and sovereignty of the nation."

Iraq wanted reporters to see the palaces "where a lot of mystery has been fabricated," Aziz said, "so that you can see yourselves that these are normal presidential sites."

Reporters saw five palaces in the presidential complex on the western bank of the Tigris River in Baghdad, which is off-limits to civilians.

One building featured a huge domed hall tiled with Italian marble. Another had bronze statues of soldiers and paintings of Saddam leading his army into victory.

There were two palaces under construction in the sprawling compound, which was large enough that journalists had to take buses from one site to the next.

Staring down from the tops of the palaces were four huge bronze busts of Saddam.

Reporters also toured the presidential complex outside Baghdad, where huge man-made lakes were filled with wild ducks and birds. One palace there featured a wall filled by a huge Italian marble mosaic of a falcon.

Aziz said the main palace in Baghdad, which was built in the 1950s, was bombed during the Gulf War. A mural shows Saddam helping the builders during its reconstruction.

Some of the palaces were vacant of furniture and staff. A few sentries stood guard at their entrances.

~~SADDAM HUSSEIN'S~~
~~Saddam's personal secretary, Lt. Gen. Abed Hamoud,~~ greeted journalists at one site and restated Iraq's opposition to opening that palace.

The inspectors "will never be allowed to enter these places even if all are bombed and turned into ruins," Hamoud said.

Aziz was asked why he was opening these premises to journalists but not to the inspectors.

"You are guests. You are not inspectors," he replied. "Guests are allowed, inspectors are not allowed. Very simple."

Aziz took journalists to one multi-story building, which he said was the building where Iraq turned away an inspection team led by an American, Scott Ritter, three months ago - sparking a showdown with the United Nations.

"This is the notorious building which Mr. Ritter wanted to inspect in his last leg of inspections in September. And our refusal for that led to a fury at the Security Council," he said.

The U.N. inspectors, meanwhile, visited four sites Friday, the official Iraqi News Agency reported. Ritter's team inspected two military areas, including an air force base.

AP-NY-12-19-97 1710EST

.c The Associated Press

BAGHDAD, Iraq (AP) - A U.N. arms inspector singled out for criticism by Iraq shrugged off the government's attacks as an effort to divert attention from its refusal to provide access to all suspected weapons sites.

"Instead of addressing this issue, it appears the Iraqi authorities have chosen to vilify an individual inspector," Scott Ritter, of the United States, told The Associated Press on Saturday. "Such vilification in no way moves the process forward."

In the past few days, Baghdad repeatedly has lashed out at Ritter.

Deputy Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz told reporters Friday that Ritter was "a troublemaker."

Iraqi newspapers condemned him for carrying out a surprise inspection Thursday of a tourist resort where President Saddam Hussein is known to stay.

Iraqi officials also accused him of being an agent of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

"It is absolutely untrue. ... I have never been employed or affiliated with the CIA," Ritter told the AP. "I find it disturbing and even insulting that Iraqi authorities with whom I have worked in the past six years would undertake such tactics."

Ritter, a U.N. weapons inspector for six years, currently leads a team of 18 inspectors in Iraq.

The U.N. Security Council has warned Baghdad it will not lift the sweeping trade sanctions imposed after its 1990 invasion of Kuwait until Iraq proves it has eliminated its weapons of mass destruction.

Iraq says it has nothing left to hide. It maintains that there are no more banned weapons or documents in its possession.

But Ritter said the Iraqi authorities had adopted a sophisticated "concealment mechanism" that allows them to keep a step ahead of the inspectors and foil their surprise visits.

He declined to elaborate, but said part of this mechanism was the denial of access to presidential sites.

Baghdad has ruled 60 sites, including about 40 presidential palaces, off-limits to the U.N. inspectors on grounds of national sovereignty.

In one high-profile incident, Ritter, 36, was turned away in September, when he tried to enter the presidential compound on the west bank of the Tigris River in Baghdad.

Iraqi authorities said the site was out of bounds and his attempt was provocative.

"We do not focus on a site as being presidential or otherwise labeled," Ritter said. "If Iraq has declared a given site presidential, this is their prerogative. But it in no way gives them the right to deny access to that site."

Ritter said he had spent the past 18 months keeping tabs on the means by which Iraq "systematically conceals its proscribed material and activities."

"This is an extremely difficult task which requires perseverance over an extended period of time," he said.

Since he first started work in Iraq in December 1991, Ritter has taken part in more than 30 inspection missions, 12 of them as chief inspector.

In 1995, Ritter's team discovered the missile guidance and control equipment that Iraq had bought through Palestinian business agent Wiam Ghafieh.

AP-NY-12-20-97 2113EST

BAGHDAD, Dec 22 (Reuters) - An Iraqi newspaper on Monday urged the government to expel U.N. arms inspectors again and suspend cooperation with them if the United States launched a military attack on Iraq.

"Iraq should respond to any further U.S. aggression on its people by expelling all politically motivated personnel within UNSCOM (U.N. Special Commission) and refrain from cooperating with this commission," the daily English-language Baghdad Observer said in a commentary.

The United States on Sunday stepped up its campaign to put diplomatic pressure on Iraq to allow U.N. inspectors access to suspected weapons sites.

U.S. Defence Secretary William Cohen said on the CBS television programme "Face the Nation": "We hope to pursue this in diplomatic channels and see if we can't exhaust all reasonable opportunities to do that."

But neither Cohen nor U.S. National Security Adviser Sandy Berger, speaking on ABC's "This Week" television programme, ruled out military options to force Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to comply.

The United States has assembled a strong military force in the Gulf region.

Iraq briefly expelled American members of the U.N. inspection teams in November, sparking a standoff with the United Nations and the United States.

UNSCOM chairman Richard Butler then withdrew almost all arms inspectors from Baghdad and Washington sent military forces to the Gulf.

Iraq let the inspectors including Americans back in after winning pledges from mediator Russia to push for an end to U.N. sanctions imposed on Baghdad after it invaded Kuwait in 1990. But it has declared that so-called "presidential sites" are off-limits to UNSCOM.

"Butler is trying to serve U.S. interests by creating a crisis between Iraq and the United Nations that could be used by the Clinton administration as a pretext to launch aggression on Iraq," the paper said.

The government newspaper al-Jumhuriya accused UNSCOM of recruiting officers from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

"The commission is depending mainly on officers from the American intelligence," it said.

The paper also said the commission was relying on hostile intelligence services for information concerning Iraq's weapons programmes and called for setting a neutral committee to check the data.

The ruling Baath party newspaper al-Thawra said that even if Iraq allowed U.N. inspectors into the disputed sites, Washington would find an excuse to create another crisis.

"No one should think that if Iraq accepts the inspection of presidential sites, America would agree to implement paragraph 22 (of the U.N. resolution 687)," the paper said.

The paragraph would allow Iraq free oil exports if UNSCOM certified that Baghdad was clear of weapons of mass destruction.

The paper repeated a statement issued by Iraqi leaders on Saturday saying that Iraq would not remain idle in the face of the "American game" aiming at prolonging sanctions.

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SADDAM'S BEST FRIEND

How the C.I.A. made it a lot easier for the Iraqi leader to rearm.

BY SEYMOUR M. HERSH

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LAST December, after Saddam Hussein threatened to end seven years of United Nations arms-control inspections, President Clinton ordered American attacks on Iraq. Once again, the world watched, on television, as missiles fell on carefully picked targets. The purpose of the attacks, Clinton

itary targets." That, too, was a misstatement, for two of the targets were sites where Saddam was known to entertain mistresses, and they were specifically struck in the hope of assassinating him.

① Saddam responded to the bombing—and the bungled assassination attempt—by formally ousting UNSCOM and turning



When the C.I.A. trampled the U.N.'s turf, Saddam survived, arms control didn't.

told reporters, was to "degrade" Iraq's capacity for waging war, and he added, "I gave the order because I believe we cannot allow Saddam Hussein to dismantle UNSCOM and resume the production of weapons of mass destruction with impunity." The President was mistaken. The United Nations Special Commission for Iraq, known as UNSCOM, had already been effectively dismantled, by the shortsighted policies of his own Administration. Then, a few hours after Clinton spoke, William Cohen, the Secretary of Defense, appeared on television. "One thing should be absolutely clear," he told reporters. "We are concentrating on mil-

anew to Russia, historically his most important trading partner. Today, eight years after the Gulf War, American policy has collapsed in Iraq, and a Cold War mentality has returned. Saddam is unchecked by U.N. inspectors as he pursues his goal of becoming a nuclear power, with the aid of Russian strategic materials. Saddam's ally in these efforts is Yevgeny Primakov, the Russian Prime Minister, a longtime friend who, according to highly classified communications intelligence, received at least one large payment from Iraq—by wire transfer—in November of 1997. The distrust of Primakov throughout the American intelligence commu-

nity is acute. One former C.I.A. operative told me, "I don't know how many times we had to say this to Strobe"—Strobe Talbott, the Deputy Secretary of State—"but Primakov is just not a good guy."

THE targeting of Saddam had grown, in part, out of an extraordinary intelligence coup by a team of UNSCOM arms inspectors. The team—headed by Scott Ritter, a former U.S. Marine Corps intelligence officer—had been trying for two years to unscramble the encrypted communications system that Saddam has used since the end of the Gulf War to hide the full extent of his strategic stockpile. Ritter and his UNSCOM colleagues knew that there were missiles and warheads to be found. They also knew that Saddam, who travelled frequently in and around Baghdad, lived in constant fear of attacks on his life—from both inside and outside Iraq—and had surrounded himself with a huge apparatus of bodyguards, known as the Special Security Organization. Saddam frequently communicated, through aides, with his entourage from secure telephones scattered around Baghdad and from a radio telephone in his car. UNSCOM also knew (from a high-level Iraqi defector) that these forces had orders to do more than protect Saddam: they were also responsible for safeguarding Iraq's hidden weapons.

The encryption system on Saddam's telephones, made in Sweden, was as sophisticated as any on the international market. The phones had a series of channels, and on each channel were algorithms that chopped the signals into hundreds of bits as the channels were switched. To get at the signals, Ritter's people took the extreme risk of operating, under the cover of the U.N. flag, an interception station in UNSCOM's offices in Baghdad and in a mobile unit.

Early in the spring of 1998, the gamble paid off. The algorithms were unscrambled, and Saddam's most closely protected communications were suddenly pouring into UNSCOM. "It was one of the most valuable operations since the Cold War," one informed U.N. adviser told me. But UNSCOM's mission was to uncover Iraq's complex system of concealing its weapons program; the mechanics of Saddam's personal security were a benefit only if they could lead to hidden arms caches.

The Central Intelligence Agency, which had been helping UNSCOM inter-

① Saddam turned to Russia long before the 1999 bombing.

② Saddam is working to rearm Iraq the program is possible.

②

pret its intelligence findings since 1991, had a different agenda. Its goal, authorized by President Clinton, was to work with Iraqi dissidents, in Saddam's Special Security Organization and elsewhere, to overthrow the regime, by any means possible. In the C.I.A.'s view, Ritter's intelligence unit was always in the way—and, in any case, could not be trusted with sensitive information; the C.I.A. felt that any important intelligence it might supply to UNSCOM would inevitably find its way back to the Iraqi regime. "There were killer fights about getting involved with the U.N.," one former C.I.A. official told me. "We don't get involved with international organizations."

In March of 1998, a high-tech team from the National Security Agency, which is responsible for American communications intelligence, flew to Bahrain to review the telephone intercepts. One official recalled that when the intercepts had been decrypted and translated, the Americans told themselves, "Here's the best intelligence that we've ever had!" The official went on, "Saddam is suddenly exposed for the first time. He's the Godfather! He gets drunk, starts raving like a madman, and his secretary will get on and say he's lost his mind—ordering murders. We never had him on this level before." Like Mafia leaders, Saddam rarely, if ever, uses the telephone himself, but relies on aides to relay his commands. The overheard "secretary" was Presidential Secretary Abid Hamid Mahmoud, Saddam's closest aide, who was much feared by Iraqis. At the same time, the official said, senior N.S.A. managers were "panicked," because the information from the telephone intercepts was "controlled by the United Nations."

The Americans felt that Ritter's intelligence was too important to be left to arms controllers. For the first time, with the aid of intercepts, Saddam's hour-to-hour whereabouts could conceivably be tracked—and even anticipated. Within a few months, the Clinton Administration persuaded Richard Butler, an Australian who in the summer of 1997 had been appointed the executive chairman of UNSCOM, to tell Ritter and his men in Baghdad that they would have to get out of the signals-intelligence business: Washington, and not UNSCOM, would now decide whom and what to listen to. (Butler disputes this account.)

Thus, in April of 1998, operational control of the Saddam intercepts shifted

to one of America's least publicized intelligence units, the Special Collection Service. The S.C.S., which is jointly operated by the C.I.A. and the N.S.A., is responsible for, among other things, deploying highly trained teams of electronics specialists in sensitive areas around the world to monitor diplomatic and other kinds of communications. Its operations are often run from secure sites inside American embassies.

The UNSCOM team in Baghdad felt betrayed, and believed that it would now be vulnerable to capture and prosecution by Iraq on espionage charges. The team's equipment was still intercepting crucial telephone calls, but the United States was controlling the "take." Ritter, desperate to keep the operation under U.N. control, asked the Israelis to process the telephone intercepts. (Israeli intelligence had been the first group to tell UNSCOM about the importance of Saddam's Special Security Organization.) The Israelis refused (under pressure from Washington), and the UNSCOM operation was shut down until July, when the Americans unilaterally installed their own collection devices in the UNSCOM offices in Baghdad.

Ritter was reluctant to discuss the specifics of the UNSCOM intelligence program with me, but in a series of interviews recently he stressed that there was an enormous difference between accumulating information on behalf of the United Nations and accumulating it on behalf of the United States. "Stuff was being collected"—by the Americans—"without our knowledge and without Butler's knowledge," Ritter said. "That's espionage. My team was worried. I told Butler about it—the American operation—and said we have to shut it down. It didn't happen."

Once the American technicians were in control, they focussed on Saddam—and not on his missiles and warheads. They eventually found a pattern in Saddam's movements, as tracked by intercepts, which they believed might lead to a successful attempt to eliminate him. Saddam regularly saw his mistresses in two sites—one a retreat at Auja, near his ancestral home, Tikrit, and the other at his daughter's villa in Babil, in suburban Baghdad. When the American forces

attacked Iraq in December, cruise missiles destroyed both targets.

Saddam, of course, survived. One senior Clinton Administration intelligence official acknowledged the failure, but he added, "In our business, you never have one-hundred-per-cent assurance. Let's assume you know he's there. You've got a time delay. How do you know a guy doesn't finish the business with his mistress and go on his way, or to the bathroom. It may be a double"—someone posing as Saddam—or he may have changed locations. There's so much potential for a slip between cup and lip."

A Republican who served at a high level in the Reagan and Bush Administrations told me that he had learned before the December raid that the Administration had "a fix" on Saddam's whereabouts. Administration officials, he said, "were touting" the fact that they had good intelligence. "People treat Saddam as an idiot," he said, referring to Clinton and his senior aides. He added that the failure of the bombing was evidence that Saddam had been aware of the penetration of his telephones. In his opinion, the man said, "He was doubling or tripling on the coms"—intelligence jargon meaning that Saddam was deliberately generating misleading or incorrect statements.

Other high-level intelligence officials spoke with had reservations about the Administration's eagerness to eliminate Saddam in the absence of any long-term strategic plan for dealing with the region. "I'm not against nailing the guy," one fully informed military officer said to me, "but then what do you do?" Assassination, he added, "is not a policy. It's a tool of policy." (Officially, of course, "assassination," which is barred by Executive Order, was not the purpose of the raids.) A former intelligence official who still consults at a high level in the Clinton Administration told me, "Eventually, they'll succeed. And then what do we get?"

The result of the American hijacking of the U.N.'s intelligence activities was that Saddam survived but UNSCOM did not. "The American government walked on its dick—and with golf shoes," a dispirited U.N. official told me. "They just goofed us."

IN retrospect, given the inherent conflict between the C.I.A. and UNSCOM, the remarkable fact is that UNSCOM lasted as long as it did. In early 1991, during the Gulf War, the member



(4) So, according to R, the SIGHT collection is OK

if you're OK but it's not OK

AP (3)

is a loss to the intelligence community

states of the United Nations had helped the United States roll back the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The spirit of post-Cold War cooperation promised a miracle: UNSCOM, operating on behalf of the U.N. Security Council, would utilize the secret intelligence agencies of its member states, Communist and non-Communist alike, to investigate the Iraqi arsenal. Dozens of nations joined Washington in providing intelligence support—and their most sophisticated intelligence operatives—to the early UNSCOM inspections.

The first executive chairman of UNSCOM, Rolf Ekeus, of Sweden, was a diplomat and arms-control expert with an amiable personality that masked a determination to run UNSCOM as an independent U.N. operation, and not as an adjunct of American foreign policy. Ekeus did turn to an American, however, for help in setting up an intelligence unit. He chose Scott Ritter, who had served as an intelligence officer in the Gulf War. In the security-conscious world of intelligence, Ritter arrived at the U.N. with high-risk baggage: earlier, while serving in a top-secret Pentagon arms-control job in the Soviet Union, he had been suspected of being romantically involved with a Georgian national. (He subsequently married the woman.) With this shaky security file, he was nobody's choice in Washington for the UNSCOM job, and some C.I.A. officials "chose" to be skeptical of his bona fides. Initially, the agency insisted that Ritter be excluded from its own intelligence briefings to UNSCOM, although Nikita Smidovich, a former Russian diplomat and arms-control expert, who was also assigned to UNSCOM's intelligence unit, was allowed to attend them. An internal C.I.A. review by a senior intelligence official named Samuel Hoskinson, however, quickly concluded that Ritter was not a security risk, and the agency dropped its restriction. "I never thought Ritter was going to give anything away," Hoskinson told me. "Anyway, we're not stupid. We don't share everything with the U.N."

The proposed sharing of intelligence had some American proponents. "It was the first time we ever turned over [intelligence] assets to a group like the United Nations," recalled David C. Underwood, a retired Air Force colonel who in 1991 was assigned to serve as a State Department liaison to UNSCOM. "I'm a twenty-

six-year veteran—a Cold War warrior," he told me. "We had the greatest scientists and the great intelligence analysts of forty countries working together, with all hands on top of the table." He then described a dramatic early meeting of UNSCOM at which a Russian military expert briefed his counterparts from the Defense Department on how the Iraqis had camouflaged their fleet of mobile Scud missile launchers, with Russian help, before the Gulf War. (Only a few of the Scuds were destroyed by Allied bombing during the war.) "I had a colonel from Russian intelligence and one from the C.I.A. at the same table," Underwood said.


Not everyone in Washington shared Underwood's enthusiasm. "Some people in our government could not stand it," he explained, referring to the senior officers of the C.I.A.'s Directorate of Operations. "You have to understand the culture. People in the C.I.A. are a mixture of professionals and careerists overlaid with a Cold War mentality. The impulse is to spy." In the months before Iraq's August, 1990, invasion of Kuwait, however, Saddam had been relentless in driving potential American spies out of his government and military. "His counter-intelligence blew them away," I was told by a former C.I.A. operations officer. "All the significant assets we had in Iraq died in 1989. The agency had zilch." The operators in the C.I.A. inevitably saw UNSCOM—if such an agency had to be tolerated—as a vehicle for collecting intelligence on Iraq. The U.N. inspectors were on the ground in Iraq, where the C.I.A. could not be.

THE struggle between UNSCOM and Washington intensified in September of 1991, when a U.N. inspection team was detained by Iraqi forces in a Baghdad parking lot for four days, after its leaders refused to return newly discovered documents dealing with efforts by Iraq to obtain nuclear weapons. To Ekeus's surprise, some details of the parking-lot standoff were made public by the Bush Administration—an American member of the UNSCOM delegation had been "signalling privately" to the United States via a secure satellite-telephone link. Ekeus upbraided the American for his back-channel reporting to Washington, and soon received an

angry telephone call from Richard Clarke, the director of the State Department's office of political-military affairs. "He said they"—the American inspectors—"should report to him and not to the United Nations," Ekeus recalled, adding dryly, "We had a nasty conversation." Ekeus held his ground, and refused to authorize any independent reporting from his inspection teams to Washington. "The Americans were irritated at us, because they could not control the flow of information," he said.

Before leaving office, President Bush, politically embarrassed by Saddam's defiance after the Gulf War, secretly authorized the C.I.A. to begin plotting a coup. When Clinton succeeded Bush, he and his national-security adviser, Anthony Lake, renewed that authorization. But the new President and his aides wanted to keep Iraq off the front page. Ekeus recalled, "Lake used to say to me, 'Don't give us sweaty palms'—that is, don't create any crises. Dealing with Iraq became a secondary issue for the Washington bureaucracy, and the day-to-day management was left to junior officers in the Pentagon and the State Department—and, of course, to the C.I.A. Lake and one of his senior aides on the National Security Council, George Tenet (who was named C.I.A. director in 1996), became fervent supporters of a quick fix—the elimination of Saddam Hussein by a bloody coup d'état. At various times, they suggested that it was to be triggered by the Iraqi exile movement or from within Saddam's immediate circle of advisers. The failure of the White House to understand the severe limitations of the C.I.A.'s Directorate of Operations—only a few officers in the Near East Division spoke Arabic, for example—would mar Iraqi policy and create enormous difficulties for UNSCOM.

One agency officer in particular, Steven Richter, who eventually took over Iraqi operations as head of the Near East Division, opposed UNSCOM's independence. Renowned inside the agency as a territorial and single-minded manager, Richter had grown up in the Directorate of Operations, and had served two decades abroad, much of it in the Middle East. Before he was recalled to Washington to run the Near East Division, he had been chief of station in Amman, Jordan, which was the overseas center for the C.I.A.'s coup plotting inside Iraq. Just before his promotion, Richter had been



the dichotomy between people & Iraq
the last time intel meeting & change

Spring 1999
CIA

deeply involved in the machinations of a group of high-level Iraqi defectors who he and his superiors thought provided the best hope of eliminating Saddam.

Richter was a controversial, and intimidating, manager—brilliant, but, as even his defenders acknowledge, with considerable faults. "Steven really knows his business," one colleague told me. "He's probably one of the savviest operational guys. But he's still dealing with a deck from the Cold War era. It's the D.O. mentality—very turfish." Another colleague said that Richter's insistence on making all decisions himself had been extremely destructive to the Near East Division. "He's in control, and you don't question him," the intelligence officer told me. "He's driven off the talented core of Arabists." A former White House official similarly depicted Richter as consistently letting "his ego get in his way on the job," and explained, "He takes any person with independence and says, 'Get out of here.' Everybody who has any clue—it's 'Out of here.'" The result, the former official added, was that Richter ended up surrounded by "tail-wagging idiots" and found himself constantly being outmaneuvered by Saddam.

The Near East Division was internally polarized as the result of an earlier Richter assignment, as the director of a secret operations center in Germany in the late nineteen-eighties. The center's mission had been to collect intelligence from Iranians who were spying, at great personal risk, inside Iran. The operation was primitive. From Iran, the agents mailed their intelligence reports to a seemingly innocent private home or a mailbox in Germany—known in the trade as an "accommodation address"—to which the C.I.A. had access. "There were only two accommodation addresses" for Iran inside Germany, one of Richter's former associates told me. "It was assumed that Iranian counter-intelligence was locked onto them and saw them." Richter discounted the warnings of colleagues and ordered the agents to double their reporting. (At the time, as everyone involved understood, a basic measure of a station chief's success was sheer volume of intelligence reports.) Astonishingly, as a subsequent internal C.I.A. counter-intelligence investigation showed, letters sent to Richter's agents in Iran were often addressed in the same hand and mailed in batches that in-

cluded the return accommodation addresses. The Iranians quickly became suspicious and blew the network apart. More than thirty Iranian informants were seized and put to death. Many of Richter's associates remain convinced that the requirement for more message traffic was their un-doing. One associate told me, "Everybody in the organization who has a memory of this knows that Richter was guilty of the worst sin a senior operations officer could be accused of—being sloppy."

In early 1994, Rolf Ekeus was privately approached by an Israeli intelligence official, and he agreed to open discussions with Israel on the sharing of UNSCOM information. The first meeting, in New York, provided an electric moment. The Israelis had turned over a stack of intelligence reports, and the UNSCOM staff began rapidly flipping through the pages. At first, the documents seemed humdrum—"mostly an account of Iraqi stockpiles," Scott Ritter recalled. But one paragraph revealed the existence of the Iraqi weapons-concealment operation and the elite units in Saddam's Special Security Organization that were assigned to it.

Ritter now saw an opportunity, and envisaged a joint Israeli-United Nations signals-intelligence (SIGINT) operation aimed at Saddam's Special Security Organization. This prospect triggered acute anxiety at the C.I.A. What's more, Ritter and his colleagues wanted Washington's permission to share U-2 reconnaissance photographs of Iraq with the Israelis, whose photo interpreters were highly regarded. That was a hard sell, and it took more than six months. Ekeus himself had to intervene with John M. Deutch, who became C.I.A. director in May of 1995. Ekeus had enormous leverage in the dispute, for the U-2 flights were under the direct control of UNSCOM and could not be challenged by Saddam. If Washington rejected Ekeus's request and insisted that the U-2 film not be shared with Israel, all parties understood that Ekeus would simply stop the U-2 flights. Ekeus got his way, but only after a bitter struggle.

The Directorate of Operations resisted the move. "I can't tell you how much the D.O. sandbagged UNSCOM on the U-2 dispute," one former C.I.A. official told me. "They used to spin Deutch up"—that is, raise constant

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complaints about UNSCOM's intentions—"and get him to call Ekeus and Lake" with complaints. The D.O. also did not want UNSCOM to get involved with SIGINT at all. "Basically, they went to the Israelis and said, 'Don't help the United Nations'" with signals intelligence. "Why?" The C.I.A. man answered his own question in a bully's tone: "Iraq is my country. What in the hell are you doing in my country?"

Ritter and his colleagues in the Near East Division had a special reason for resenting UNSCOM's efforts to collect intelligence from within the Special Security Organization. Ritter had his own ambitions for Saddam's bodyguard and a second elite Iraqi unit, the Special Republican Guards: he hoped to persuade their leaders to mount, with his help, a coup against Saddam. Scott Ritter's targeting of both groups would inevitably attract the attention of Iraq's relentless counter-intelligence service, and make the C.I.A.'s recruiting job all the more difficult. Ritter and Richter, and the two agencies, were in each other's way.

ANOTHER open conflict between Ritter and Richter began with an August, 1993 Israeli intelligence report, provided to Ritter, which revealed that a Russian export company had been bringing Iraq sophisticated gyroscopes—guidance devices, salvaged from ballistic missiles in decommissioned Russian submarines, that could dramatically improve the accuracy of the Iraqi missile fleet. The report, based on intercepted telephone calls and other forms of intelligence, also provided additional evidence that Saddam had managed, despite UNSCOM's efforts, to hide advanced missiles somewhere in Iraq. The gyroscopes had been flown from Russia to Amman, and were picked up there by a Jordanian trucking company, operating on behalf of the Russian merchants, and driven across the border to Baghdad.

"The Israeli SIGINT was hot stuff" and provided invaluable specifics, Ritter recalled—"which flights, which shipments, which crates." At least one shipment of the Russian gyroscopes had been trucked to Baghdad by the time he got the intelligence, Ritter said, and another shipment was en route. UNSCOM had no operational capability inside Jordan, so Ritter turned to the C.I.A. His immediate goal was to get C.I.A. operatives

to open the gyroscopes in Jordan and implant beacons—homing devices—that would enable UNSCOM to find the secret site of a long-suspected major missile-assembly plant. The plant could then be targeted for a surprise inspection.

"I went to Richter's people first, and they turned it down," Ritter told me. The stated reason was security: UNSCOM could not be trusted. A former C.I.A. official, asked later about Richter's attitude, confirmed that the Directorate of Operations believed that "any use of Israeli SIGINT"—by Ritter—"was espionage," because Ritter was acting on intelligence supplied by a foreign entity. Ritter had a different explanation for the C.I.A.'s stance. "They were gunning for me," he said, because of his role in getting the U-2 photography into Israeli hands. "From then on, it was war," Ritter said of Richter. "He was always moving in on the UNSCOM intelligence, and I was always beating him back."

Nothing further happened until November, when the Israelis informed Ritter that two shipments of Russian gyroscopes had made their way to Iraq and that several shipments were sitting in a warehouse in Amman, awaiting delivery. Ekeus did more than approve an operation: he sent a fax to one of King Hussein's top advisers, asking for his support. Ritter was then put into the hands of a Jordanian officer who was responsible for the King's secret relations with Israel. A hundred and eighty sets of gyroscopes and test equipment were seized on the eve of their shipment to Baghdad. "It was our 'big victory,'" Ritter told me, recalling that he and his Jordanian colleagues celebrated by prying open one of the gyroscopes and marveling at its complexity. Ritter's goal, he said, was to persuade UNSCOM's newfound allies in Jordan to permit the next shipment to go into Iraq, but only after at least one beacon had been implanted.

Ritter left Jordan the next morning, and the operation fell apart. A C.I.A. team, Ritter says, claimed the gyroscopes and told the Jordanians that Ritter was untrustworthy. The gyroscopes ended up being shipped to a government labora-

tory in Suitland, Maryland. In the last weeks of 1995, Ritter said, he returned to his Jordanian contact with a list of Iraqi front companies operating out of Amman and was met with the accusation that he was "crooked." Ritter said he was told that Steven Richter had gone to his contacts in King Hussein's court "and sabotaged the whole thing"—that Richter "lied to the Jordanians." Ritter was subsequently approached by an operative who worked for the C.I.A.'s Non-Proliferation Center, whose mission is to monitor the spread of strategic weapons, and was given an apology for the alleged lies that had been told. In an interview for this article, a former high-level C.I.A. official with direct knowledge of the incident confirmed the gist of Ritter's account. Richter, who had excellent sources in Amman, had learned of Ritter's activity and had been eager "to get Scott out of it," the former official told me. "You have to understand," he added, "the D.O. thinks it can tell people to 'get the hell out of my country.'" Ritter himself says that the C.I.A.'s meddling "killed the use of beacons in gyroscopes."

Ritter struck back. He decided that the moment had come to debrief Iraqi defectors in Jordan on Saddam's weapons-concealment techniques. C.I.A. coup plotting, Ritter knew, was at its peak. "We asked for defector support"—the right to interview defectors—"and the C.I.A. said no," Ritter told me. "But the Jordanian government let us do it. The C.I.A. was pissed, because some of these guys were being used for coup plotting. I asked the defectors to report on organization—how they communicated, their covert cells, the family ties." Ritter understood, he said, that the requests were provocative and poorly timed. "Richter was very angry," he said.

BY early 1996, the UNSCOM office in Baghdad had begun running a burgeoning SIGINT operation in the hope of learning how Saddam's special security apparatus was concealing his weapons program. Ritter and Nikita Smidovich, the Russian arms-control expert in UNSCOM's intelligence unit, fashioned, with Ekeus's approval, an aggressive approach: they would lead a team on a series of surprise inspections and monitor every frequency in the area to "see who's talking to whom." The goal was to find a frequency full of encrypted traffic that was specifically reacting to the

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UNSCOM inspectors. Once the frequency was found—itself an extremely difficult task—the signal could be recorded and sent off to N.S.A. headquarters, in Fort Meade, Maryland, for decryption and translation. Signals intelligence, if processed quickly and accurately, could help to unravel the Iraqi patterns of concealment and deception, and so make it possible to find the missiles and warheads that the UNSCOM inspectors sensed were being hidden. Eventually, after a few months of collection, Ritter recalled, UNSCOM was presented with the "take" from the intercepts, but much of it consisted of partial transcripts and summaries of Iraqi conversations "in the clear"—that is, unscrambled. There was little evidence of the encrypted conversations.

"It was crap," Ritter said. Washington was keeping the good stuff to itself.

UNSCOM's response to the lack of cooperation, Ritter said, was to say, in essence, "Screw the Americans," and to hand over its reels of tapes for processing to the Israelis and to British intelligence, with whom Ritter had established a working relationship. He went on, "I told the Brits, 'You have to understand that the Israelis are players and would share the take.' The Brits said it was up to Rolf." Ekeus gave his approval, Ritter said, but UNSCOM's SIGINT operation—not yet able to decipher encrypted telephone talk—merely "pissed along" until the breakthrough in the spring of 1998. The intelligence being collected, of high quality or not, was doing little to help UNSCOM keep Saddam from amassing a nuclear arsenal.

Ekeus initially refused to discuss details of electronic intelligence with me and warned me that Ritter often "fantasizes" about past events. But when I repeated Ritter's account to him he acknowledged that "much of what Ritter says is true. We had the technology to get Saddam, and we did all the work. We asked the Americans to process it, and they gave us very little—chicken feed. The United States was not prepared to go out on a limb for us."

SOMETIME in 1996, the C.I.A.'s Near East Division, with approval from a high-level authority, had begun a separate, illicit SIGINT operation inside Iraq, sending in teams disguised as UNSCOM inspectors, to install listening devices aimed at Iraqi military movements. The highly secret operation, which was published

disclosed early this month by Barton Gellman, of the Washington Post, used UNSCOM equipment throughout Iraq and UNSCOM office space in Baghdad.

Ritter's operation, revolving around a group of defectors from the ruling Bathist Party in Iraq, was apparently tied to its efforts to bring about the long-awaited coup, which was scheduled to take place that summer. The plan ended in spectacular failure when one of Saddam's loyal officers contacted the C.I.A. station chief in Amman on a supposedly secure agency communications link and informed him that Saddam knew all the detailed plans of the coup and had rounded up and executed scores of those involved.

Ritter told me that he had eventually learned of the C.I.A.'s spying and had formally notified Charles Duelfer, the senior American in the UNSCOM chain of command. Ritter understood the seriousness of the issue: the C.I.A.'s intelligence-gathering, if it should be uncovered and made public by the Iraqis, would seriously erode UNSCOM's standing inside Iraq and among members of the international arms-control community. Ritter, who had been sharing everything he knew with Ekeus, did not share this discovery with him, and he acknowledges that it was not his finest moment.

"I was walking the line between being a good American, which I place above all else, and doing my UNSCOM duties with

full integrity," he told me. "I knew that Charles was probably not going to tell Ekeus, but I—perhaps cowardly so—had washed my hands of the affair."

When I talked to Ekeus, he derided "the stupidity of the C.I.A." in using a U.N. arms-control mission as a shield for collecting intelligence. "The political judgment is beyond contempt." He said he feared that the illicit unilateral intelligence-gathering in Iraq would damage future multilateral arms inspection. "How can arms inspectors be trusted?" Ekeus asked. "It makes it difficult to reestablish arms control."

The collapse of UNSCOM has freed Russia, now the largest purchaser of Iraqi oil, from any constraints on the sale of arms and technology to Iraq. Saddam, with help from Moscow, is once again building up his strategic capabilities and his grandiose plans for domination of the Middle East. One U.S. arms-control expert says of him, "We're looking at a guy whose ambition is not defined by the Manhattan Project"—which produced the two atomic bombs used during the Second World War. Saddam, he said, "wants to match the American and Russian bomb projects" of the Cold War era.

ROLF EKEUS and Scott Ritter are not alone in their complaints about the C.I.A.'s operations in Iraq. The agency's inability to organize an effective coup against Saddam Hussein—Steven Rich-



"But that was long ago, before we dipped our bread in olive oil."

(3) The confessions - CIA what

(7)

ter's failure—is an open secret in Washington's foreign-affairs community. The major newspapers and the congressional intelligence committees are traditionally chary about publicly identifying senior officials of the Directorate of Operations, but Richter, in part because of his quarrel with Scott Ritter, has become a public figure.

Last October, Richard Perle, a foreign-affairs analyst who served as a high-level Defense Department official during the Reagan Administration, broke with tradition and publicly named Richter during a speech at the American Enterprise Institute, a conservative Washington think tank. "Steve Richter," Perle said, "has an unbroken record of mismanagement and incompetence, and yet as far as I can tell there has been no effort whatsoever, with failure following failure, to examine the internal effectiveness of Richter's organization. Perle concluded that Richter, 'the head of the Near East Division at the Central Intelligence Agency, unless he's got a story to tell that justifies his continuation in that job, should be removed on grounds of incompetence and lack of fundamental qualification to hold that position.'"

Similarly harsh criticism was voiced in interviews with past and present White House and C.I.A. officials. "There is no line drawn in the D.O.," one retired intelligence officer told me. "I've been lied to by Steve Richter." Arms-control concerns about Iraq's having nuclear bombs, he said, "are lost on the D.O." He added, "And we needed their support. It was in our interest to take whatever information came along and get it to UNSCOM." The underlying issue is institutional, he said.

He urged that an effort be made by the agency's leadership to instill "some ethics" in the Directorate of Operations, "so other people"—in the C.I.A.—"can deal with issues on a basis of knowledge and trust."

Richter refused a request for an interview, but two of his superiors at C.I.A. headquarters agreed to meet with me to defend their subordinate. "Steve's a tough, no-nonsense officer who does his job well," one official said. "We have a lot of driven people here." The official criticized Perle, saying, "I don't think we should have Richard Perle talking about what he thinks about Richter. Everybody thinks he can do our job better than most." The second official had praise for Scott Ritter, depicting him as a "folk hero" to many in the C.I.A. and described the dispute between Ritter and Richter as being equivalent to "two bulls in a pen." He said he wished that people could "get along or not get along, without it having international ramifications."


SADDAM HUSSEIN, confident after easily outmaneuvering the C.I.A.'s coup plotting, sought in the late summer of 1996 to derail the UNSCOM inspection schedule. Scott Ritter's unit, guided by its electronic intelligence, had targeted a cluster of Hussein's Special Republican Guard facilities that were believed to be shielding strategic materials. UNSCOM was getting close to the real thing, and Saddam provoked another crisis. Ritter's group refused to leave the entrances to inspection sites, and Iraqi guards refused to let them in. Ekeus flew to Baghdad. The White House had told him to get tough: Bill Clinton was ready

to bomb. Ritter, in his recently published book "Endgame," depicts the trip as Ekeus's finest moment. Washington "might have intended for Ekeus to be a messenger," Ritter writes, "but Ekeus was his own man and knew that he had a choice: be tough and lose the inspection process altogether, or seek a compromise and keep the inspection regime in place and functioning, even if flawed." He chose compromise, and bombs did not fall. "Ekeus saw a fatal flaw in the Clinton Iraqi policy," Ritter goes on to say. "Like the Bush Administration policy, it had no endgame. The Clinton team was willing to confront Iraq, but to what purpose?"

In an interview, Ekeus told me that one of his major concerns at the time was continued Russian cooperation with the U.N. disarmament process. The Soviet Union and Iraq had been trading partners since the early days of the Cold War, and Iraq owed Moscow at least seven billion dollars for its arms support during the eight-year war with Iran. It was understood by all that if Moscow lost faith in the integrity of UNSCOM it would begin to rearm Saddam. "Of course we had to have Russia satisfied," Ekeus said. "They had to be part of the process."

As head of UNSCOM, Ekeus had successfully balanced concern about Russia, the unceasing pressure from the Clinton Administration, and the inherent risks in the ongoing SIGINT program. Then, in July, 1997, Ekeus resigned from the U.N. to become Sweden's Ambassador to the United States. He says he left behind one urgent recommendation: that UNSCOM "should not continue the SIGINT, because the return was not worth it."

Ekeus was among those who had enthusiastically endorsed Australia's Richard Butler as the new UNSCOM executive chairman. It was, Ekeus told me later, a terrible misjudgment. "Butler lost control," he said. "He did not go into operations, and he wasn't interested in keeping the Iraqis on the defensive." Butler also failed to "see the warning signals" from Russia, Ekeus said. "If the Russians complain, he had to take it seriously." One of Butler's first acts was to formally create a Concealment and Investigations Unit—Ekeus had left matters informal—and put Ritter in charge. Butler also moved Charles Duelfer, the senior American UNSCOM



Chazworth

"Oh, definitely, I feel there's a reason I was given a second chance."

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A REPORTER AT LARGE

SCOTT RITTER'S PRIVATE WAR

Saddam Hussein charged that the aggressive U.N. arms inspector Scott Ritter was a spy. C.I.A. polygraph experts had their own doubts about Ritter. How did one marine, operating by his own rules, make himself the architect and enforcer of the effort to uncover Saddam's secret weapons?

BY PETER J. BOYER

LIKE many in Washington, Scott Ritter spent the weeks of late summer and early fall publicly questioning the truthfulness of the President, but Ritter's complaints had nothing to do with sex. Ritter is the Marine Corps reserve major who in late August quit his job as a United Nations arms inspector to protest the Administration's unspoken shift in policy toward Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Ritter's assertion—and it has not been refuted—is that in the last year the United States has furtively retreated from its stated policy of ridding Iraq, under threat of force, of its capacity to develop and employ chemical weapons, biological weapons, and nuclear weapons.

Since his resignation, Ritter has been praised by supporters, in the media and in congressional hearings, as a modest herald of the square-jawed truth. He is in fact a great deal more: someone who saw himself as the instrument of a radically new concept in disarmament—peacekeeping as a different kind of warfare. Within the United Nations special commission charged with disarming Iraq, Ritter helped to form and operate what amounted to a discrete intelligence operation, applying tradecraft to a task whose tools had always been a pen and a clipboard. His operation was not bound by the usual protocols of national security or, for that matter, by U.N. precedent. In the national-security offices of the White House, Ritter was sometimes referred to as Darth Ritter, and though the Administration denied charges by Saddam that he was a spy, some people at the Central Intelligence Agency apparently were not so sure. Polygraph experts there raised the prospect, after running extensive tests, that Ritter

might have been working for Israel—or, at least, that he had inappropriately handed American secrets to Israeli intelligence agents. The degree to which these suspicions may have influenced policy decisions in Washington, if at all, is not known.

What is known is that back in January, after Saddam had accused Ritter of being a spy and blocked his team from a key site, President Clinton brushed the accusation aside and dispatched ships and troops to the Persian Gulf. War seemed imminent. "We have the authority to use military force," Secretary of State Madeleine Albright warned, referring to Iraq's obligation, under U.N. Resolution 687, to allow free, unfettered weapons inspections. "We are prepared to go unilaterally."

Then, in February, the crisis suddenly passed; the U.N. Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, made an agreement with Iraq that allowed inspections to resume. But Clinton continued to talk tough. In April, he declared that the standoff had ended only because of American and international "resolve to both use military force and impose the severest consequences on Iraq for any further Iraqi transgressions."

Despite the brawny posturing, Ritter and his fellow-inspectors began to suspect that American policy had secretly changed. On six occasions, plans for aggressive U.N. inspections in Iraq were judged too combative by the United States and were modified or cancelled. Ritter's suspicion was borne out when, in August, Saddam once again refused to allow inspectors to carry out their task. This time, the United States hardly bothered to protest. Ritter, in a widely publicized letter of resignation, declared,

"The illusion of arms control is more dangerous than no arms control at all."

Ritter's gesture struck a chord. Such individual moral certainty seemed almost startlingly out of time at a moment when Washington was focus-grouping the fate of a Presidency and the White House was opinion-polling contrition posture. Ritter now finds himself becoming a celebrity. Although he has no job (as his wife, Marina, has reminded him), he has a lecture agent, and his literary agent is entertaining offers for a book contract. Limousines pick him up for network morning news shows. The *Washington Post* published a series of articles, by Barton Gellman, focussing on Ritter's activities in Iraq, and last month he was flown to Aspen for the annual Forstmann Little & Company retreat, where Colin Powell, Sam Nunn, Henry Kissinger, and others took turns anointing him a "great American."


Just after Ritter resigned, he agreed to be interviewed for this account. We met several times during the following weeks, mostly in the modest home in the Westchester County village of Hastings-on-Hudson where he lives with Marina, their twin daughters, and his in-laws. Ritter is a big man (six feet four, two hundred and ten pounds), and is polite in a military manner. His eyeglasses and easy smile suggest an ingenuousness that is more than balanced by an intensity that lies just beneath the surface. The intensity flares when conversation turns to his strained relationship with his government, which he insists has less to do with his own deeds than with the Administration's policy muddle regarding Iraq. "It's not a Scott Ritter issue," he says.

Perhaps, but it is certainly true that Ritter came to embody this country's

ILLUSTRATIONS BY DAVID LEVINE



Ritter on inspection protocol: "I am the alpha dog. I'm going in tail high. Gonna spray urine all over their walls."



"Why are they always pushing quality on us?"

hard-line policy toward Saddam's weapons programs, and that Washington grew wary of the policy and of the man at once. By dint of his extraordinary resourcefulness, fervor, and willingness to stretch the rules, Ritter came to play a role that was, as Senator Joseph Biden sarcastically told him, "above your pay grade." The war that this country almost found itself plunging into at the beginning of the year was, to some real degree, Scott Ritter's war. By the time the Administration backed off, America's Iraq policy had become no policy at all.

I. RIGHTEOUS ZEAL

THE Gulf War did not end on a battlefield in Iraq. It ended in New York, at the United Nations Building, with the passage, in April of 1991, of Resolution 687, which allowed Saddam Hussein to remain in power, still heading an Army and a host of elite security forces. In exchange, the economic sanctions that the U.N. had imposed on Iraq before the Gulf War would largely stay in place, insuring that Saddam could not raise money for new militaristic ventures by selling oil abroad. In addition, Saddam agreed to accept the destruction of Iraq's long-range missiles and of its nuclear, biological, and chemical arsenals, and to allow all facilities involved in the research and development of these

weapons to be rendered harmless. A special U.N. commission—UNSCOM—was created to conduct the disarmament.

Although Iraq filed a disclosure report on its missile program within a few weeks of signing the U.N. resolution, this was revealed, over the next five years, to be mostly a fiction. Iraq vowed that it had no interest in germ warfare, but it has turned out that the country developed a pharmacopoeia's worth of killer biology. In addition to a micro-organism called *Clostridium perfringens*, which causes gas gangrene (Iraq had produced ninety gallons of the stuff), Saddam's forces also had more than two thousand gallons of anthrax (enough to kill millions); 5,125 gallons of botulinum toxin, a biological poison that paralyzes and strangles its victims (enough to kill the world's population several times over); and 2.7 gallons of ricin, a pesticide that causes death in humans within two days. And that is just the biological arsenal that Baghdad finally admitted to; UNSCOM suspects there is much more still hidden.

As for its chemical-warfare arsenal, Iraq reluctantly admitted that it had produced VX, the nerve gas infamous for its lethality—one drop kills—and had amassed four hundred metric tons of the chemicals needed to make it. Iraq also admitted producing between a hundred and a hundred and fifty metric tons

of sarin gas, which causes spasmodic frenzy and then death, and five hundred metric tons of mustard gas.

Iraq steadfastly claimed that it had never had a nuclear program, or any ambition to develop one. Rolf Ekeus, UNSCOM's first executive chairman, says, "We soon detected that the nuclear file was a complete falsification." Iraq's nuclear program is now believed to be lacking only highly enriched uranium in order to detonate a twenty-kiloton bomb.

In September of 1991, a high-level Iraqi defector confirmed what was already becoming apparent to the disarmament team: Iraq had a vast program of illegal-weapons development, the documentation and components of which were hidden throughout the country. "I would say it was the equivalent to war, in arms control," Ekeus says. "They were really not only denying but aggressively blocking and misleading and using all the tricks in the book to thwart us."

It was obvious that if UNSCOM was going to succeed it would have to do more than try to verify passively that Iraqi declarations were provably untrue. In a noteworthy philosophical departure for the U.N., UNSCOM decided that if Iraq was going to wage the arms-control equivalent of war UNSCOM would do the same. A new tactic was conceived: the "inspection of discovery," whereby an UNSCOM team would conduct inspections, often by surprise, at sites of its own choosing. This was an inherently confrontational approach, and—depending, as it did, upon logistics and intelligence—it was more like a military mission than like a traditional arms-verification exercise. An UNSCOM official suggested the recruitment of someone perfectly suited to the arms-control equivalent of war—a Marine Corps captain he'd known in Russia. One senior American official, looking back, says, "If there wasn't a Ritter, he'd have to be invented."

THE quality that Scott Ritter brought to UNSCOM, in the early autumn of 1991, was righteous zeal. It was his defining characteristic, and always had been. Ritter was born in 1961, at the tail end of the baby boom, but he and three sisters managed to pass through adolescence nearly oblivious of the convulsions of the youth culture that

shaped their generation. Theirs was a military family, which for the children meant a life of relocation, sudden mid-term transfers into and out of schools with names like Chester Nimitz Elementary and George C. Marshall High. William Scott Ritter, Sr., was an Air Force mechanic who went back to school to get an officer's commission. He married an Air Force nurse, Patricia Folkmire, and they reared their family on military bases from Florida to Hawaii to Ankara. It was a life with its own cadence and rhythms—a culture apart from the civilian America that was noisily remaking itself beyond the gates of the base. When Scott's older sister, Shirley, attended Brown, in the nineteen-seventies, she was nonplussed after a friend asked her whether she had ever participated in the antiwar movement. "I had no idea about the peace movement," she recalls. "We just knew that our friends' dads were going to war."

As a boy, Scott showed a talent for drawing and design, enough to encourage his mother's hope that he might become an artist. The thought repelled him. "He wanted to go into the military ever since I can remember," his father says. "He was very red-white-and-blue." Scott's sisters knew that if they really wanted to annoy their brother they could move the pieces of his carefully assembled toy-soldier battlefields, whose tiny infantrymen and cannons he spent hours deploying. Scott devoured history, especially the great military campaigns, and, even within the context of a military family, his obsessiveness seemed a little weird. "I was worried about that, to be honest with you," the senior Ritter recalls. Many of the men Scott knew—his father and his father's friends and colleagues—were attached to NATO, and Scott fashioned himself as a fierce junior Cold Warrior. He would talk of growing up to kill Russians, and when he embraced the jokey phrase "Kill a Commie for Mommy" it was not for its irony.

He was an indifferent student, but the United States Military Academy, at West Point, ran a prep school in New Jersey that offered a yearlong program of intensive study designed to help promising students reach the admissions standards. The price of the school was a service commitment to the Army. In 1979, Ritter jumped at it, signing a six-year enlistment obligation. "We ran a pretty

tough program," says Colonel Calvin DeWitt (Ret.), who was the commandant of the school when Ritter attended it. Scott adapted to barracks life at the school, but by the end of the year he had second thoughts about West Point: It wasn't gung-ho enough for him. At the basic camp required by the prep school, Scott had met a young marine, a Semper Parvulus, who spoke of the corps in rhapsodic language derived from "The Sands of Iwo Jima." Despite the six-year commitment to the Army, Scott, in a youthful display of the persuasive power that would shape his professional life, managed to talk his way into an "honorable discharge for the good of the service" by promising Colonel DeWitt that he would become a Marine officer.

In the winter of 1981, Scott enrolled at Franklin and Marshall College, in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, much to the relief of his father. The senior Ritter thought that life on a civilian campus would temper Scott's fixation on the military—a career choice he considered beneath his son's potential. But on the Lancaster campus, which didn't even have an R.O.T.C. program, Scott's military identity blossomed. A classmate named Bob Murphy recalls returning to school from Christmas break and seeing Ritter for the first time—a huge figure with a military haircut, curled on his dorm-room floor counting off a thousand situps. Ritter had enrolled in

a summer Marine officer-training program. On the campus, he was called Sarge, and he played on the Franklin and Marshall football team. He wasn't as talented as he was enthusiastic—voluntarily running extra wind sprints at practice—and he was made captain of the special-teams unit, also known in football as the "suicide squad," for the head-on abandon required of its participants. Ritter studied Russian history and language ("Russia's a threat, so I want to study 'em," he told his parents. "Gotta know your enemy") and became his department's honors student. After graduation, he married his college sweetheart, Heidi Evans, and headed for the corps.

As a newly commissioned second lieutenant in 1984, Ritter was a marine in a hurry. At the basic-training school, in Quantico, Virginia, new officers are given pep talks by representatives of the service's various specialties—artillery, logistics, and so on—and are asked to select a field of concentration. Toward the end of the presentation to Ritter's class, the officer from Marine intelligence told the young men that an intelligence officer had to understand each of the disciplines, and Ritter decided that he'd found his calling. The standard route to intelligence required candidates to first complete a three-year tour learning to command a combat platoon. But Ritter had no patience for standard procedure. He wrote directly to the commandant



"Not tonight—I have the legal definition of a headache."

of the Marine Corps telling him that the corps was wasting a valuable intelligence asset by keeping Second Lieutenant Scott Ritter from his calling. "I speak Russian," Ritter recalls writing, "and I want to be an intelligence officer. That's what I want to do for the Marine Corps and I think it would be a waste of your time to put me through combat-officer training just so I can be an intelligence officer. I need to start now." Somehow, Ritter's request was granted: he was dispatched to Twenty-nine Palms, California, where he became the 7th Marine Amphibious Brigade's junior intelligence officer.

Ritter's superiors there gave him some books, pointed the way to the brigade's various units, and told him to go forth and become an intelligence officer. His captain, Dan Button, gave him one piece of advice: Learn to think "outside the box." It turned out that thinking outside the box was Ritter's default mode. The command staff had never seen anything like it from any junior officer. "Since his arrival... Lt. Ritter has shown non-stop initiative and desire," an early report from one of Ritter's superiors read. "His unbridled desire to learn and contribute... was exceeded only by his positive 'can-do' attitude." Before long, he was editing and producing the brigade's weekly intelligence summary. By the time the Marine Corps got around to sending Ritter to intelligence school, in 1986, he had been

awarded the Navy Achievement medal.

As Ritter was promoted through the ranks, he would perform his assigned tasks reliably and then dream up new projects and go off on his own. Occasionally, this tendency to independence caused problems, as when he contrived a plan to create a sort of spymobile for his unit. With the help of a staff sergeant, Ritter acquired a receiver, radios, and other gizmos from a Defense Logistics Agency warehouse in the California desert and transformed a standard-issue Humvee, with guidance from the vehicle's manufacturer, into an intelligence-downloading unit on wheels. When it came to light that Ritter had broken various laws and regulations (including a ban on direct contact with a defense contractor), he was chided by his superiors, but only gently. Ritter's bosses found the young officer's ingenuity impressive, and his fitness reports—a marine's equivalent of a report card—were unfailingly glowing. In January of 1988, just two years out of intelligence school, Ritter got the job of his dreams—a ticket to Russia.

THE Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty, signed by Ronald Reagan in 1987, called for reductions in United States and Soviet arsenals of certain missiles, and led to the creation of the On-Site Inspection Agency (O.S.I.A.), a creature of the Department of Defense, to monitor the reductions. The agency

allotted positions to each of the military branches, and Ritter—his candidacy no doubt enhanced by his background in Russian—was selected for one of the Marine slots, becoming the only lieutenant among a collection of majors and colonels. Before he got out of Washington, though, he was halted in the hallway at the agency's headquarters by a Marine colonel, who, Ritter recalls, began barking at him in a foreign language. Ritter scarcely understood a word of what he was saying, which was not good, because the colonel was the agency's Russian-language expert. The colonel declared Ritter's "fluency" in Russian a fraud, and kicked him off the team. But Ritter didn't give up. Having persuaded the officer in charge of monitoring missiles of the need for a counter-intelligence program, he found himself named the team's counter-intelligence officer.

So Ritter got to Votkinsk, a closed city in the heart of Russia, up against the foothills of the Urals. At the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, Soviet technicians had formerly assembled SS-20s, intermediate-range nuclear missiles now banned by the treaty, and were continuing to assemble SS-25s, a type of ICBM. On paper, Ritter had a mundane monitoring job, but his secret task, the source of his enthusiasm, was intelligence. In this capacity, Ritter decided that his first mission was to figure out how, exactly, the Soviets were monitoring his teams. This was a challenge for a novice American spy in a closed Soviet city—especially for one trying to get by with his limited Russian. "So I hang around Votkinsk and just observe," he recalls. "O.K., we're at the hotel. What kind of people live at this hotel? Not too many people but Americans. But what about that guy who keeps going up to the fifth floor with the big briefcase? Well, I'm going to write that down and see what he does. And he has a friend—they meet. Well, I saw that guy downtown. He was over here with another guy. What kind of car does he drive? What's the license plate of the car? And you start putting it together and suddenly you realize there's a surveillance mechanism out there watching what you do. What I basically



THE TENAFLY INTERNATIONAL FILM FESTIVAL

did was start putting together a picture of how the Russians monitored us."

Ritter also discovered that the Russian escorts—university girls, who spoke flawless English—reported every conversation directly to the plant's First Department, a security unit associated with the K.G.B. The young women were attractive and intelligent, which to Ritter meant only one thing. "I wrote a report for the C.I.A.," he recalls. "I said, 'Look, we've got a problem here. These girls are so smart, they speak English so well, and they interact with Americans so effectively that they have to be spies.'" It was an assessment that Ritter one day had reason to regret, but for the moment his characteristic self-certainty ruled.

Ritter found himself bridling against the O.S.I.A. chief, Army General Roland Lajoie, who insisted that Ritter limit his efforts to the passive collection of information. Ritter was disappointed. "I had put in a whole bunch of aggressive plans on how to really rape the Russians, in terms of intelligence," he recalls. "Like building a desk that really is a radio antenna. I actually designed it, and had a plan on getting it in, but Lajoie said no." Even constrained, Ritter was able to produce results. Ritter suspected that the facility was developing follow-on missiles to the SS-20 and the SS-25, which he believed the Russians were slipping past the inspectors. Devising an elaborate surveillance formula, derived from observing railcars that were used to bring parts into the plant and to transport completed missiles out, he was able to demonstrate his assertion. Such work—which in many respects prefigured his subsequent efforts in Iraq—won him notice in the intelligence community, and an invitation to a counter-intelligence conference at which his voluminous reports out of Votkinsk were roundly praised. His biggest reward was one that he was allowed to see but not to keep—a letter of commendation from the director of the C.I.A.

In 1990, after two years with O.S.I.A., Ritter became concerned about his marriage, which had suffered from his extended absence, and asked for some time to repair things at home. In September, he submitted his resignation to the Marine Corps. But that summer Saddam Hussein had invaded Kuwait, and to a marine, as Ritter puts it, "war is a good thing." He wrote another letter

to the Marine Corps asking it to put a hold on his resignation, and the corps, building for war, agreed.

DESERT STORM was the perfect test for Ritter's "outside the box" orientation, and he landed in the perfect spot to demonstrate it. He was assigned to Central Command Headquarters, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, where he was placed in the battle-damage-assessment unit, charged with the task of measuring the damage that coalition forces were inflicting upon Iraq's war machine. Mostly, that meant hunting for Scuds. If Iraq's Scud missiles hurtling toward Tel Aviv succeeded in drawing Israel into the war, Arab support for the coalition would be seriously weakened. For the coalition command, the finding and destroying of Scud-missile launchers became an important task, and one that seemed achievable.

Ritter felt otherwise. He had become familiar with mobile missiles in Russia, and knew that their portability made them difficult, if not impossible, targets. As reports came in from coalition fighter pilots claiming a mounting record of Scud "kills," he was skeptical, and he began writing analysis reports asserting that the bombing raids couldn't be destroying as many Scud launchers as had been claimed, if any were being destroyed at all. "The fact was that Iraq had only a limited number of Scud launchers," Ritter recalls, "and we'd already killed four times more Scud launchers than they had, and they were still firing missiles." Ritter theorized that the Iraqis were sending decoy Scud launchers into the field, and that the decoys were absorbing tons of coalition matériel. He wrote report after report saying so, but General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the coalition's commander-in-chief, needed to show that the Scud problem was being handled, and he had videotape from F-15 gun cameras that seemed to prove it. On January 30, 1991, Schwarzkopf held a press conference and played a tape of a Scud raid for a worldwide television audience, saying, "We knocked out as many as seven mobile erector-launchers in just that one strike."

The next morning, when Ritter was filling out the battle-damage report and came to the section for confirmed kills,

he wrote "Zero." His superiors reminded him that Schwarzkopf had just announced seven Scud hits. "And I said, 'Well, the General's wrong,'" Ritter recollects. "They said, 'Who the hell are you to tell the General that he's wrong?' I said, 'I'm the battle-damage-assessment officer, and I'm telling you that there aren't seven kills, and I'm not going to falsify a report.'" A panel of military analysts was assembled to settle the dispute. Not surprisingly, they decided for the General and against the Captain, and Ritter's tenure as battle-damage-assessment officer effectively ended.

Nevertheless, Ritter held to his theory that Scuds weren't being hit and, characteristically, he devised a bold scheme to test it. In Saudi Arabia, he had met some members of the Delta Force team—the elite American special-operations squad. When they didn't scoff at his idea that there were decoy Scud launchers in the desert, he told them his plan: a small force could slip into Iraq under cover of darkness, carve up a so-called Scud launcher with a power saw, and slip it back into Saudi Arabia. Then, if it was a decoy, the launcher could be shipped to the United States, and there its dimensions could be measured and a computerized profile could be programmed into allied radar, allowing bombers to recognize fake Scud launchers. The Delta Force team members considered Ritter's plan and told him to forget the power saw—they could lift the whole launcher with a helicopter.

With the plan now in place, Ritter flew out to the Delta Force's staging base, near the Iraqi border. But just before the mission was launched an emissary from command headquarters arrived and said that Ritter was under orders to return to Riyadh immediately. "Schwarzkopf had me detained," Ritter says. "He sent word down that 'Ritter is a defeatist. We're killing Scuds, and he's down there spreading bad juju with the boys. Put him in isolation. He can't talk to any of these people. Get him on the first airplane out of there, back to Riyadh.' That's it. No more contact with Ritter." Schwarzkopf denies that he had any conflict with Ritter and says that he didn't know Ritter by name at the time. Ritter's theory about the Scuds eventually proved to be correct. (Schwarzkopf's





"We have the authority to use military force," Madeleine Albright declared. But she wouldn't go to war over Scott Ritter.

"launchers" were decoys and Jordanian oil tankers.) But, Ritter says, "I spent the rest of the war watching the ground war unfold—watching Scuds still landing on Israel, watching Scuds still hitting Saudi Arabia. Very frustrating."

II. ALPHA DOG

RITTER's dustup with the hero-general of Desert Storm was obviously not a good career move, and he was convinced that his earlier letter of resignation had hurt his chances for advancement as well. And so, after the war, he left the Marine Corps, and in the summer of 1991 he was plotting his uncertain future. While Ritter was considering a job offer from H. J. Heinz, which wanted to open a food-processing plant in the Caucasus, he got a call from Doug Englund, his supervisor from the Votkinsk days, offering him a chance to return to the Middle East.

Englund was a former Army colonel who had been in charge of the monitoring teams in Votkinsk, and now he was the operations officer at UNSCOM. Ritter found Englund's offer—a chance to help rid Saddam Hussein of his deadly arsenals—enormously appealing. He saw it as a mission of thrilling absolutes: Saddam was the villain, the UNSCOM inspectors were the heroes, and if Iraq tried to stop them it would get hammered by a wrathful world, whose military might (led by American warships and planes) was ever at the ready. "It's the purity of the mission," Ritter says. "That's one of the things that made this so attractive. It's so black-and-white."

In hiring Ritter, UNSCOM confirmed its commitment to the arms-control "equivalent to war," as Ekeus, its former chairman, calls it, and took a long first step toward creating something that the United Nations had never before attempted—its own intelligence operation. This was an extremely difficult course, full of serious diplomatic risk. For good reason, the United Nations had never got involved in intelligence gathering: the U.N. depends for its resources upon member nations that have competing national interests. Israel, which is within a Scud-launch of Iraq, and Russia, which, because of the imposition of sanctions, hasn't been able to collect the billions it loaned Iraq, have each helped UNSCOM, but toward distinctly different

ends. The United States energetically supported UNSCOM—indeed, helped to direct it, to a considerable degree—but the country had to protect its own intelligence secrets and also avoid appearing to make UNSCOM nothing more than an American cover operation. Intelligence is such a foreign concept to the U.N. culture that the word is not even spoken. "Information" is the preferred term for the commodity in which UNSCOM had now begun to trade.

The diplomatic difficulties inherent in mixing arms control with intelligence gathering became apparent early. In the summer of 1991, United States aerial imagery had helped lead to the discovery of Iraq's nuclear program, and Ekeus knew that such information could be critical to UNSCOM's mission. What he wanted was the sort of information that can be obtained by a U-2 spy plane. Only the United States has the U-2, and that fact posed two problems. One was that every U-2 photograph is classified as an American secret; the other problem was a sensitivity inside the Security Council to American influence over UNSCOM's activities. Ekeus's solution was to get the United States to "lend" UNSCOM a U-2 plane, technically making it a piece of U.N. equipment while maintaining American control over the actual operation of the craft and over the image development, thus protecting American secrets (the photographs).

No one really knew who should direct a U.N. intelligence unit. Initially, UNSCOM's intelligence activities were supervised by a special multinational task force that had been created in Washington after the defection of the high-level Iraqi, in September. According to Ritter, who had joined a special UNSCOM team called the Information Assessment Unit—"U.N.-ese for intelligence unit," as Ritter puts it—the Washington group took charge. "The United States would come in and they'd say, 'Here's the target, here's the people you need to use, here's the kind of expertise you need, we recommend you have this many nationalities, you'll use helicopters this day, drive this day,'" Ritter recalls. "And UNSCOM just sort of grabbed the folder and said, 'Oh, O.K.' And, basically, we were the tool of the United States." (Ekeus vehemently disputes this account of UNSCOM's origins, as he must—in his view, UNSCOM was always an independent entity.)

Ritter bristled at what he perceived as the U.N.'s subservience, and he lobbied Ekeus and Englund for more independence. He finally won that independence, Ritter believes, because he won the trust of Rolf Ekeus. "Once I established my credibility and credentials with Rolf, anything I wanted to do I got to do," Ritter says. "Anything."

What Ritter wanted first was more control over the U-2 operation. He wanted to have a say in directing it—"tasking" the plane, as the parlance had it—which had been one of his chores during the Gulf War. "It is meant to be the U.N.'s aircraft," Roger Hill, an Australian commander who worked with Ritter at UNSCOM, says. "So we should be directing its activities and targeting that aircraft in areas where we, the U.N., want to target it." In time, Ritter and his team did get greater responsibility for the U-2 missions, and gradually they gained more latitude in other areas.

The UNSCOM teams drafted specialists from around the world for their inspections. Over time, the team Ritter worked with included linguists, who could interpret documents; commandos, who specialized in rapid assessment; computer enhancers, who could resurrect deleted files from Iraqi hard drives; and even a specialist who was so adept at opening locked security boxes and doors he was given the nickname Frankie the Felon. On one occasion, when the team was told by the Iraqis that a locked door could not be opened, because no one had the key, Frankie took out his tools and produced a key on the spot, then offered to give it to his hosts.

Nevertheless, disarming Iraq became an exquisitely frustrating cat-and-mouse game, which inevitably worked in favor of Iraq's strategy of outlasting the world's will to continue economic sanctions. Ritter believed that UNSCOM had to have some new advantage, and it struck him that the likeliest sources of useful information about Saddam were Saddam's most practiced enemies, Israel and Iran. In 1992, Ritter says, he asked Ekeus's permission to make contact with those two governments, and at first Ekeus said no. By the spring of 1994, though, Ekeus had made contact, through another channel, with Israel's military-intelligence service, Aman, and soon a stream of new information was flowing to Ritter and to Nikita Smi-

UNSCOM
United Nations
Special Committee

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dovich, a Russian former arms negotiator who had become Ritter's superior and partner at UNSCOM.

But then, just as Ritter began to glimpse the prospect of victory, there arose a complication of the most unexpected sort—one that would undermine his effectiveness, eventually to a crippling degree. His own government had begun to suspect that he was a spy.

By the time Ritter began dealing directly with the Israelis, in September of 1994, he was back on the payroll of the Marine Corps, detailed to UNSCOM. He had returned to the Marines in March, partly as a means of regaining his United States-government security clearance, which he had surrendered when he left the corps in 1991. But he eventually learned that he would not get a security clearance, and that was no small impediment for an intelligence officer. Ritter was angered by the denial—he felt he had been promised the clearance—but he should not have been surprised. He had set the trap for himself, in Russia.

By the end of his stay in Votkinsk, Ritter had decided that he'd been wrong about the young female translators whom he had reported to be spies. As he spent more time with them, he came to see them as guileless souls who were being used by the K.G.B. Later, when he heard that the women were on a C.I.A. list of suspected K.G.B. agents, he tried to persuade the agency to take their names off, but to no avail.

Ritter had developed a friendship with one of the young women, Marina Khatiasvili, of whom he says, "She is the smartest woman I ever met in my life." She was beautiful, too—a pale, dark-eyed Georgian, whose English was impeccable. Ritter insists that there was no romance between him and Marina in Votkinsk, but he could hardly claim otherwise. American policy strictly forbade fraternization by Americans with Russians; indeed, inspectors were obliged to adhere to a "two-man rule," which prohibited anyone from venturing around Votkinsk alone. Ritter often obtained permission to ignore it—a fact that did not go unnoticed by an F.B.I. agent who visited the Votkinsk operation on a routine security check. The agent, Robert Sligh,

sent a memorandum to Washington noting that Ritter had inappropriate contact with Russians. Ritter protested the memorandum, and so did his superiors, whose fitness reports on his performance contained the usual high praise. But the seed had been planted and a Ritter file begun. Just before leaving the Marines in 1991, Ritter mentioned to an acquaintance in the F.B.I. that he intended to return to Russia after he left the corps. He mentioned, too, that his marriage to Heidi had ended, and he implied that part of the reason for his return might be to court Marina Khatiasvili. The agent warned Ritter, "Be careful." But Ritter figured that he was leaving the Marines, and that what he did as a civilian was nobody's business but his own.

Marina says that she took the job of translator-escort in Votkinsk because it seemed exciting—she'd get to meet Americans. And, as Marina tells it, when she arrived in Votkinsk the First Department, the factory's security arm, told the new translators that they were expected to file a report after every contact with an American; later, some of the escorts, including Marina, were offered the chance to undertake more active intelligence work, for the K.G.B., for money. Marina says she refused the offer. Instead, she returned to Georgia, where she became an English professor at a university.

That is where she was in June, 1991, when Scott Ritter arrived. At that point, Ritter had just completed service in the Gulf War, and was a civilian. His interest in Marina was obvious, and she agreed to his proposal that she visit the United States with him that summer, to meet his parents. In July, she and Scott went to New Mexico, where Ritter's parents were then living. In August, they were married.

Only later did Ritter begin to discover the degree to which his government questioned its faith in him. At some point after he left Votkinsk, the O.S.I.A. disassembled the counter-intelligence program he had erected there. "They did away with it after I left, because I married Marina," Ritter says. "Immediately, they went into a defensive mode, saying, 'Well, hell, here's this guy sitting there with all his reports, and now he marries this Russian. The

Russians must have had him the whole time.'" Ritter's view is that what really annoyed people in the intelligence establishment was that he had operated beyond their ken, and that made them nervous. "I was a cowboy," he says. "And when I left they killed the cowboy."

IN April, 1995, the Office of Naval Intelligence informed Ritter that his marriage to Marina Khatiasvili posed "an unacceptable risk," which disqualified him from holding a security clearance. "The fact that this relationship developed despite strong cautions creates serious doubt about your dependability and trustworthiness," a Defense Investigative Service report said. Ritter strenuously objected, to no avail. Without security clearances Ritter could no longer be an intelligence officer, although he was welcome to remain with the Marines. The corps suggested a career in logistics. "I said, 'That's not gonna happen, that's disgrace,'" Ritter recalls. "I'm not going to allow the Marine Corps that I love to disgrace me like this." Soon after, Ritter resigned from the corps a second time.

Meanwhile, at the U.N., he had turned all his energies to exploiting the link to Israeli intelligence that Rolf Ekeus had created—a course that would, for the first time, give UNSCOM the advantage. Israel's first small gift of intelligence was a transforming one—a key that opened the door to a secret Iraq, which Ritter and UNSCOM hadn't even known existed. The Israelis hinted that UNSCOM should pay attention to something called the Special Security Organization, part of a coterie of intensely loyal and reflexively obedient forces that made up Saddam Hussein's personal security structure. At first, Ritter had no notion what to make of the information. He had always likened intelligence analysis to the process of writing, a task of making a coherent story of disordered facts, but what was the story of the S.S.O.? How did it relate to other units, the Special Republican Guards and the Special Presidential Guards? Ritter went home, turned down the lights, and sat alone in a room with his notes until the story came to him: Saddam's personal guards, trusted experts in the brute efficiencies of survival, had the dual mission of protecting Saddam and hiding Iraq's arsenal from UNSCOM.




UNSCOM eventually identified what came to be known as Iraq's "concealment mechanism"—clunky jargon for what was in fact a brilliantly executed game of hide-and-seek. UNSCOM was failing to find Iraq's vast array of weapons and components because they were always on the move. The special security forces, directed by Saddam's son and his personal secretary, ran this game of large-scale prestidigitation, commanding a fleet of Mercedes trucks via a coded system of communications. More than once, the trucks and their illicit cargo—coolers of deadly germs, components of nuclear weapons, reinforcement rings for missile warheads, and the like—slipped away from a storage site's rear exit as an UNSCOM team approached the front gate. "I said, 'Well, these are the guys who are hiding stuff,'" Ritter recalls. "We need to start going after them."

The discovery of the concealment mechanism inspired new tactics: UNSCOM didn't have to find buried Scuds scattered somewhere beneath the desert sands; it had only to discover proof of Iraq's secret plan to retain its weapons program. That evidence would insure that the international community would continue to support UNSCOM's inspections and keep up the economic sanctions against Iraq. The new tactics meant a heightened emphasis on intelligence, and to Ritter, who directed the concealment-mechanism team, that meant going to Israel. "This was a new kind of warfare that we're fighting," Ritter says. "And I equated it with counter-terrorism. . . . And the best counter-terrorist thinkers in the world are the Israelis."

In late 1994, accompanied by Nikita Smidovich and a second UNSCOM colleague, Ritter flew to Tel Aviv and was granted a meeting with Uri Saguy, then the chief of Israeli military intelligence, and his top aides. Ritter had big ideas about how to use Israeli intelligence against Iraq, and he wanted to start on them right away, but the Israelis told him to slow down, saying that their own security interests prevented them from simply opening their files to UNSCOM. The Israelis told Ritter that he needed to present his requests "in a context," and then, perhaps, they could help.

Ritter thought of a context: What if he brought U-2 film to Israel? Could



"I'm not worrying. I've got most of my money in handbaskets."

the Israelis then process it and, applying their own information, help him to identify inspection targets in Iraq? "That we can help you with," Ritter recounts the Israelis as saying. "And I said O.K."

From one perspective, Ritter's deal with the Israelis could be seen as a naked intelligence tradeout—American secrets (the photographs) for Israeli intelligence (photographic interpretation). But could Scott Ritter, who didn't even have a United States security clearance, pass along secret American imagery to Israel? Ritter knew that this was a problem, and he was also aware that his boss, Rolf Ekeus, had made a deal with the C.I.A. director when the U.N. received use of the U-2. "Our deal with the United States was that its photographs could be used only for the purpose of the monitoring and inspection of Iraq," Ekeus says. Ekeus had promised that the plane's imagery would not leave New York, much less be sent to another country.

Ritter went to Ekeus with his Israel proposal. "I said, 'Here's the deal, boss,'" Ritter recalls. "I'm going to start doing intelligence with cooperation that is going to give us a whole new capability in terms of gathering information. We're going to get it from the Israelis. But in order to do this we have to go to Israel with the U-2 photographs." Ekeus says he will not confirm "anything about any country that we worked with," but according to Ritter he, Ekeus, and the UNSCOM deputy executive

chairman, Charles Duelfer, met at the Princeton Club, in New York, to discuss the Israel idea with one of their C.I.A. contacts, who did not object and specifically approved Ritter's role. There had to be safeguards, the agency man said, and an elaborate system was devised for the handling of the film. It was to be kept in a safe behind a locked door that could be opened only by a dual key that required the presence of Ritter and the Israelis. As Ritter describes it, the actual handoff of the film was borrowed from a compendium of spy-novel clichés. "You had these C.I.A. guys walking around the U.N. with a bag of film with them," he says. "And Charles went down the staircase and they came up the staircase, and they sort of stopped and they put the suitcase down and they walked away. And Charles picked up the suitcase and walked upstairs and gave me the material."

Giving American photographic imagery of Iraq to Israel was, of course, a highly sensitive matter. Theoretically, Israel could use the photographs for targeting purposes. But the undertaking had an aspect of farce, too. After the first exchange with the Israelis, Ritter returned the bag, which contained the original positive images, to the safe in New York, according to plan, and then flew to Washington with a bag of negatives, which were created when prints were made in Israel. He tried to turn in the negatives to the C.I.A. But no one at the agency wanted to accept them, because, Ritter says, that hadn't been

HP 11

planned for. According to Ritter, he was told only, "Do the right thing." He went home and stuffed the bag of negatives under his bed.

RITTER says that during his inspections he always formally respected the "dignity of Iraq's sovereignty," but his approach also had a leatherneck quality. "It was certainly not routine," Chris Cobb-Smith, a former British artillery commando, who was one of Ritter's closest associates on the concealment-mechanism team, recalls. "You cannot go in acting, well, politically correct. You can't walk in dithering around."

This was an attitude that Ritter tried to instill in his team before every inspection. On a typical mission, about thirty team members would assemble early in the morning, and Ritter, wearing a light-blue UNSCOM baseball cap, would give them his "alpha dog" speech, an example of which he recently recounted:

The Iraqis, they're like sharks. Fear is like blood. They smell it and they'll come in at you, and they'll intimidate you. Once that game of intimidation starts, you're never going to win. . . .

When I go into a site I am going to be polite, I am going to shake their hand, but I am the alpha dog. I'm going in tail held high. If they growl at me, I'm gonna jump on 'em, I'm gonna let 'em know who the boss is here. I'm in charge. They report to me, they do what I say.

You work for me, so every one of you are alpha dogs. When we go to a site, they're gonna know we're there, we're gonna raise our tails and we're gonna spray urine all over their walls—that's the equivalent of what we're doing. So when we leave a site they know they've been inspected.

"You should see some of the guys when they hear this thing," Ritter says, with a smile. "Especially the French. But they love it. It's called 'team building.'"

One of the curious aspects of Iraq's concealment mechanism was that Saddam's regime, although it denied having a secret-weapons program, maintained meticulous records of the program that it was denying it had. This vast archive, situated in factories and government offices across Baghdad, became an obvious UNSCOM target, and the object of much to-ing and fro-ing between UNSCOM and Iraqi authorities. In one case, UNSCOM knew that although it had found no contraband missiles, Iraq did have records of a ballistic-missile program, which was called Project 144. Rit-

CHIFFON MORNING

I

I am lying in bed with my mother, where my father seldom lay. Little poem, help me to say all I need to say, better. Hair dyed, combed; nails polished; necklacelike scar ear to ear; stocky peasant's bulk hidden under an unfeminine nightgown; sour-milk breaths rehearsing death—she faces me, her room a pill museum where orange tea bags draining on napkins almost pass for art. Even the Christmas amaryllis sags under the weight of its blood-red petals, unfolding like a handkerchief. From the television screen, a beauty-pageant queen waves serenely at me.

II

In the oily black barbecue smoke, in our blue Chevrolet station wagon, in a cottage at the sea, no one spoke but me to the nerveless God who never once stopped their loveless act: the cursing mouths, the shoving and choking, the violent pulse, the wrecked hair, the hunchbacked reprisal, the suddenly inverted sky, the fiendish gasping, the blade that cuts all understanding, the white knuckles, the fly remarkably poised on a blue throat. I try to pity them. Perhaps God did on those occasions when battle was a prelude to sex; and peace, like an arrow, found us.

ter figured that one way of finding missiles was by going after the guidance systems needed to operate them, and that the archives probably held clues. He planned inspections at a series of electronics plants, including one that inspectors believed was involved in the production or acquisition of components used in missile computer simulations. When the team arrived at the plant, officials there, of course, denied knowledge of Project 144. But the team's computer expert scanned one of the plant's hard drives and recovered a trove of data pertaining to the project. "It was a very successful inspection—considered to be the most successful," Ritter says. "We got computer data, documents—we just collected a whole bunch of information about the Iraqi ballistic-missile program, which Iraq had not declared to us."

But no single factor was as valuable to UNSCOM's mission as the assistance

provided by Israel. By the summer of 1995, the range of the Israelis' assistance to UNSCOM had moved well beyond interpretation of U-2 photographs. "I'd start asking more detailed questions, and they'd put me in touch with their analysts," Ritter says. "So now it's not just photo interpreters—I'm getting access to their intelligence community."

The Israeli connection was directly responsible for an event that may have been the UNSCOM intelligence unit's biggest coup, and also its most bitter disappointment. The team discovered through an Israeli tip that Iraq had contracted for the purchase of a shipment of gyroscopes, used in missile guidance, and that this would be the first solid evidence of an ongoing effort to reconstitute Iraq's missile program. The shipment was to be delivered through Jordan by a Palestinian go-between. Acting on that information, UNSCOM

III

As the cuckoo clock crows in the kitchen,
 on her nightstand others as bluntly chime,
 but cannot break her drugged oblivion.
 Please wake up, Mother, and wet your cotton mouth.
 "She was agitated," nurses whispered
 when we found her tied to the bed, knocked out.
 Demerol blocked the pain, entering through the eyes,
 while the mind, crushed like a wineglass, healed.
 "I'll bury you all," she gloated, at home again.
 Months later, they stitched her throat in surgery.
 The voice that had been on the radio
 when the war was on plunged a tragic octave.
 More pills crowded her daily glass of milk.
 My guilt seemed vain compared to what she felt.

IV

Mother is naked and holding me up
 above her as soap streams from my face
 (I'm wearing a dumb ape's frown) into the tub
 where she is seated: the mind replays
 what nurtures it. The black months when she
 would lie assassinated like our Siamese cat
 are still far off. Yet, tranced by a lush light,
 which no one else sees, like a leaden bee
 shackled to a poppy, I am not free.
 Each time I am dunked in the green, green
 sacramental water, I glare shamelessly
 as she shrieks and kisses me, gripped in air;
 I do not know if she loves me or cares,
 if it's suffering or joy behind her tears.

—HENRI COLE

planned to intercept the shipment, and Ritter approached the United States intelligence community for help. He was turned down. He then returned to Israel and, he says, told the Israelis that with some key additional information UNSCOM could arrange the interception itself. That November, Israel provided the necessary information, and Ritter made his move. He travelled to Amman and met with Ali Shukri, a key aide to King Hussein, told him about the shipment of gyroscopes, and asked for help in the intercept. The Jordanian agreed. "That night, we got them," Ritter says.

However, Ritter says, the C.I.A., having refused to help him, suddenly arranged to have the gyros intercepted a second time, by the agency in Jordan; the shipment never reached UNSCOM analysts in New York. Ritter, who had allies in the C.I.A. in both New York and Washington, blames the incident on ter-

ritorial imperative. The C.I.A. official who directs Mideast operations, Ritter says, was "starting to view me as competition. He's pissed off at me because I'm getting better access to Israel than he is."

Government officials decline to comment on the matter. Ritter does note that the C.I.A. later provided a report on the haul to UNSCOM.

III. SHAKING THE TREE

PERHAPS the ultimate expression of UNSCOM's intelligence operation was a program conceived by Ritter in 1995 that he called Shake the Tree. The concept was simple, but its execution and its political implications were not. Intelligence-gathering mechanisms provided by Israel, Great Britain, and, eventually, the United States allowed UNSCOM to penetrate the operational command center of the Iraqis' concealment mecha-

nism by monitoring their concealment efforts almost as they occurred. On one occasion this year, for example, the UNSCOM team scheduled an inspection and, as usual, met its Iraqi escorts at the team's Baghdad headquarters, the Monitoring and Verification Center. But instead of proceeding to an announced inspection site the team headed around the corner and entered an adjacent building. Ritter told the startled Iraqis that he knew they were using electronic-surveillance methods to eavesdrop on the UNSCOM staff, and his team began to search the room for bugs. It found none, but the real purpose of the surprise was to excite the people who were running the concealment mechanism, so that their responses could be observed, and learned from. "This is to shake the Iraqis," Ritter recalled of the surprise mission. "And that makes them paranoid. Hopefully, they'll react to that paranoia and we can detect their reaction. As I say, it's very unconventional arms control. But people have to understand that this is the enemy. It's not a cooperative venture here. These are people who will do anything to keep us away from these weapons."

Shake the Tree was Ritter-style arms control at its most effective, but from its inception it put UNSCOM on a collision course with the American-led policy of the time: backing inspections with the threat of force. It helped to draw UNSCOM toward the secret corners of Iraq which Saddam most wanted to protect. This was, of course, its purpose, but the inevitable result was a series of crises that led to last winter's militarized showdown, when the resolve to force inspections was finally spent.

The trouble began with the very first test of the system—an inspection called UNSCOM 143, in March of 1996. The Iraqis partially blocked the inspection, prompting Washington to push the Security Council for a resolution denouncing the action as a "material breach" of Iraq's obligation to allow inspections. In U.N. diplospeak, "material breach" is a verbal trigger, meaning there are grounds for military action. But France and Russia did not yet want to pull the trigger, so a weaker resolution was passed. The United States, however, did win the promise for material-breach language the next time Iraq blocked an important inspection.

That occasion came in June, with an operation called UNSCOM 150, which

tried to probe what Iraq said was a "sensitive site." The inspection was blocked, and the inspectors left Iraq. En route to Bahrain, the inspectors felt certain that they knew what was coming next. "As we're flying out, we were all waiting for the cruise missiles to come by us on their way in," Ritter recalls. "We knew for certain. I mean, this is the deal that we made: if they block us, they'd die." Indeed, when UNSCOM 150 was blocked, Madeleine Albright, then the United States Ambassador to the U.N., with the promise of material-breach language in her back pocket, tried to marshal support for military action, but France and Russia balked again. They insisted upon giving Iraq still another chance to comply, and Rolf Ekeus intervened personally. After a long negotiation, Ekeus won an Iraqi agreement to allow the inspection, but only, according to Ritter, after granting Baghdad a significant concession: the number of inspectors allowed to enter a sensitive site would be limited to four.

Ritter saw the agreement as a clear defeat, but he and his team looked for a way to find some advantage in it. UNSCOM believed that Iraq's concealment operation was run by the same security units that protected Saddam, and Ritter assumed that if they were pressed they would follow procedures similar to those designed to protect Saddam in an emergency. Israeli intelligence sources had told UNSCOM that when Saddam felt threatened his strategy was to move first from his Baghdad headquarters to a stronghold near the Saddam Hussein International Airport and, after that, to a Presidential complex north of Tikrit, his home town and sanctuary of last resort. Part of the purpose of UNSCOM 150, in June, had been to test that theory, and in this respect UNSCOM 150 had not been a total loss. Using the observation mechanisms of Shake the Tree, UNSCOM discovered that the 2nd Company of the 1st Battalion of the Special Republican Guards was moving vehicles—and, presumably, key weapons materials—to a Republican Guard facility just south of Saddam Hussein airport. On the basis of this information, and as a test of the deal that the Iraqis had made with Ekeus in June, Ritter planned a July inspection at the airport facility. He knew that it would probably be provocative. The inspection was blocked

at gunpoint. After a few days' delay, the team was finally allowed into the "sensitive site," but by then, not surprisingly, it had been swept of its contraband.

The course was thus set toward retreat, although this was not yet obvious. Within the Security Council, member nations began to question the new confrontational thrust of UNSCOM, and wondered what had happened to the more conventional approach, of reckoning Iraq's actual weapons of mass destruction. "Many members of the council said they had never authorized an UNSCOM that had a concealment team," a senior Administration official says, and that theme was sounded at every opportunity. Iraqi diplomats worked the Security Council skillfully and to great effect. Whether it was the product of statecraft or of other, less lofty motivations, the gathering consensus within the Security Council, beginning in the summer of 1996, was that UNSCOM's mission should start moving toward some conclusion.

In November of 1997, Iraq accused Ritter and his team of provocation, and Saddam expelled the American inspectors. In response, the entire force of UNSCOM inspectors withdrew, and the United States military buildup began. By the end of the month, a Russian-brokered deal allowed the inspectors back in, but only with more concessions to Baghdad, and the crisis smoldered. Then, last January, Iraq halted inspections again, and again Baghdad was candid about its reason. "Our only problem right now," Iraq's U.N. Ambassador, Nizar Hamdoun, told American television, "is with the current team of Mr. Ritter."

The Administration stiffened, and sent reinforcements to the Persian Gulf. President Clinton said that the latest Iraqi outrage warranted "strong and unambiguous action," and he even addressed the Iraqi complaints about Ritter: "Certainly Saddam Hussein shouldn't be able to pick and choose who does this work." Secretary of State Albright and other Administration officials were equally outspoken in their public pronouncements. But privately American policymakers were deeply ambivalent about the Iraq policy, and had been since the start of the crisis, in the fall.

Since 1991, American policy had been to insist that Iraq comply with the U.N. resolution requiring complete dis-


armament under the threat of force. Now Saddam had obliged Washington to confront the root implication of that policy—a commitment to go to war over UNSCOM. That raised the question of degree: What offense against UNSCOM would trigger war? The shutdown of UNSCOM? The expulsion of American inspectors? The blocking of one inspection? "It was never really clearly established," says the senior official, who was involved in the debate, because until then "the President didn't have to make that decision."

This process of reductive reasoning eventually led to a bracing bottom line: America could find itself at war over Scott Ritter. By degrees, and quietly, American policy changed.

For a time, Washington tried to guide UNSCOM away from confrontation, weighing in on specific inspections. "In a couple of instances, we gave tactical advice," the Administration official allows, but the official also argued that at least on one occasion the Administration's position was more hard-line than Ritter's. Whatever it was, Ritter called it "interference." Last November, after the Russian compromise put UNSCOM's inspectors back in Iraq, Ritter got approval for a surprise inspection at the headquarters of the Iraqi Republican Guards' 3rd Battalion—the heart of the concealment mechanism. Ritter says that the Americans intervened at the last minute, saying, "It would be too confrontational, and we shouldn't do it. Find another target." In December, UNSCOM planned a series of inspections at the Special Security Organization's Baghdad headquarters, at the Presidential complex near Tikrit, and at other sensitive sites. According to Ritter, after the first inspection excited Iraqi indignation, Washington pressed UNSCOM to cancel the other controversial inspections, and it did. "They said if we confronted Iraq now the U.S. didn't have the domestic support for a war during Christmas," Ritter says.

Personally and symbolically, Ritter had become a handy device in Iraq's effort to isolate the United States in the Security Council. France, Russia, and China began to question the value of confrontational inspections. "Scott became a lightning rod for that," says the American official familiar with the Security Council debates. President Clinton may have proclaimed in the midst of

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Ritter finally grasped Saddam's secret: The Iraqi leader had entrusted his deadly-weapons program to his personal guards, who moved coolers of germs and components of nuclear weapons from site to site in a brilliantly executed game of hide-and-seek.

the January crisis that Saddam Hussein had no veto power over Scott Ritter, but as he spoke those words the United States itself was about to veto Ritter.

By January, Ritter was pursuing what he hoped would be an explosive UNSCOM discovery—evidence that Iraq had conducted biological experiments on political prisoners. On January 12th, he directed two portions of his team to prisons outside Baghdad, and he himself led the rest of the team into the day's big target: the General Security Directorate, Iraq's secret-police headquarters, in Baghdad. Once inside, Ritter went into his alpha-dog routine, saying to the Iraqis, "Look, I'm going to tell you right up front: you guys tested biological agents on humans in 1995—this is the organization that was involved." Ritter wanted to scour the office of the minister of the directorate, but the Iraqis warned him that doing so might spark a crisis. "I'm dealing with the people who are responsible for killing these prisoners and doing these horrible biological experiments," Ritter recalls. "But I'm walking a thin line, because I have to be really careful not to overextend myself and hurt the executive chairman by opening UNSCOM to charges of not respecting sovereignty. So what I'm trying to do is talk to them and get a story from them that I can then compare with the data I get out of the prisons from my two teams. And, if I get a contradiction, then I'm going up to the minister's office and I'm going to basically rape his office. No, rape's a horrible thing. I'm going to take down his office and not be too circumspect about it."

Ritter never got inside the minister's office. Officials at the directorate explained to him that it was the evening before a holy day, and their families were expecting them home for a feast. They implored him to resume the inspection in the morning. Ritter agreed. "I have to admit that I fell into a trap," he says now, still plainly stung. "It's something that an alpha dog wouldn't have done." ("The bottom line is that the depiction of Scott Ritter as a trigger-happy guy is wrong," Bill Richardson, the former United States Ambassador to the U.N., says. "In a way, he was a diplomat.") When Ritter returned to the Baghdad Monitoring

and Verification Center, the place was abuzz. The Iraqis had announced that they were suspending inspections.

According to Ritter, he telephoned Richard Butler, who had succeeded Ekeus as UNSCOM's executive chairman in July, 1997. Ritter suggested that they try to profit from the standoff. He said he would gather his team the next morning and report to the directorate,



as he had agreed, and if he and his team were refused entry the world press would be there to record Baghdad's recalcitrance. Butler agreed, and the next day Ritter's group made the journey to the directorate, and pictures of the Iraqi rebuff were transmitted around the world. (In Washington, the national-security team watched the lat-

est adventure of the man they'd come to call Darth Ritter with interest.) Ritter repeated the routine again the following day, and then he decided on a bold move. Assuming that the directorate had by this time been cleansed of incriminating evidence, he proposed to Butler a surprise inspection at the headquarters of the Special Security Organization itself. "I said, 'Let's just skip an echelon here and go straight to the top, we'll go for the throat.'" Ritter's plan was to surround the entire neighborhood with inspectors and conduct a building-to-building search for documents. Butler approved the plan for January 16th. Both men were certain that Iraq would block the inspection, and Ritter got what he believed was a clear signal that Washington intended to respond at last with "serious consequences." The warships were in place, the fighter pilots were on alert, the missiles were poised. Ritter recalls being told by an UNSCOM colleague that "the national-security adviser to the President of the United States said, 'If they stop this inspection, bring the hammer on down.'" But on January 15th, the night before the inspection, Ritter got a call from Butler ordering Ritter's withdrawal. Butler had heard from Ambassador Richardson, and now he was ordering Ritter back to Bahrain. Butler himself was coming to Baghdad in the hope of averting a crisis. A member of the American national-security team prepared a statement for Ritter to read to the press before leaving Baghdad, and he agreed to do it.

But, as a sign of protest, he wore a black sweater and refused to appear before cameras wearing his UNSCOM cap. He read the statement, an innocuous recital of UNSCOM's mission, and then ad-libbed, "We will be back."

In fact, when Ritter left Baghdad he had no idea whether he would ever return, or why he had been withdrawn.

In Bahrain, Ritter ran into Charles Duelfer, the UNSCOM deputy executive chairman, who had some disturbing news. "He pulled me aside," Ritter recalls, "and he said, 'Scott, you won't believe what's going on. You have no idea. Washington is going crazy, they're insane. When you get back to New York, some bad things might start happening.'"

When Ritter got to New York, he went to one of his sources in the intelligence community, who bent a rule and told Ritter what he'd heard. While the President's national-security team was in the midst of a fevered session about the implications of Ritter's planned inspection of the S.S.O. headquarters, debating when and how to strike if the inspection was blocked, someone dropped a bombshell: news that Ritter was under investigation by the F.B.I. "For what?" Ritter wanted to know. "Espionage," his source told him.

Ritter's first thought was about Marina. While Scott was out of the country on assignment, Marina, who speaks five languages, applied for a translating job at the F.B.I. After an interview, she was asked to take a polygraph test, and she agreed. She answered every question, but the agent administering the test kept returning to two queries, posing them in different phrasings: Had she ever shoplifted? And had her move to the United States been sponsored by any agency of another country's government? Marina firmly said no to the questions, but she later came to understand that the F.B.I. had not been satisfied by the results of her polygraph, and that she would not be getting the job.

But the espionage investigation wasn't about Marina, Ritter's source told him. It was about Israel. Then the pieces came together. In the summer of 1996, when Shake the Tree really got going, Ritter had been approached by one of the covert types he'd been working with from the C.I.A., who suggested that he apply for a job at the

agency. There would soon be a position open, and Ritter could quickly make his way into the covert directorate. Ritter applied for the agency's elite career-training program and was selected to go to C.I.A. headquarters, in northern Virginia, for an interview. Afterward, there was a polygraph examination.

According to Ritter (who is the sole source for this description), the C.I.A. interviewer asked him mostly about Israel. He was surprised by the detailed nature of the questions and by the degree of knowledge about his activities which they implied. The interviewer kept returning to three questions, asking Ritter whether he had ever passed classified United States information to another government, whether he had received money or other compensation for doing so, and whether he had ever had secret, unauthorized meetings with Israeli intelligence agents. Ritter had passed what was ordinarily classified information—the U-2 photographs—to Israel, and he had secretly met with Israeli agents in Manhattan bars and in other sites in connection with his UNSCOM work. "I really didn't want to get into it, because it's really none of their business," Ritter says. "It has nothing to do with United States classified information. It has everything to do with Israeli operational security and protecting lives." But the interviewer persisted, and Ritter reluctantly answered the questions. A couple of hours into the session, Ritter says, the interviewer stopped and said, "Look, I'm afraid I have to tell you that if we stopped this polygraph right now, if you walked out, I want you to know I'm going to have to turn this over as an espionage case. . . . What you're telling me disturbs me greatly."


Ritter says he asked the interviewer to turn off the polygraph machine and he then explained his relationship with Israel, and why he was sensitive about fully answering questions regarding every detail. After a break for lunch, another interviewer came in, a man identified to Ritter as a senior polygrapher, and the process started again. Ritter says he told the man everything—including the part about stuffing the bag of U-2 negatives under his bed. But it wasn't enough, and the polygrapher asked Ritter to "think about it overnight and come back tomorrow." Ritter did so. Again there were more questions, again

Ritter was told that the machine indicated he was holding back. After a time, the interviewer stopped and told Ritter to disengage himself from the polygraph monitors. "He says, 'Scott, look, we're wasting our time here. You've got problems, big problems,'" Ritter recalls. "The machine says you're not being forthcoming to us, you're not telling us the whole truth. This is serious, because we're talking about espionage." A month or two later, Ritter was notified that he did not get the job. Ritter says he thought, No big deal, and he returned to his work with UNSCOM and Shake the Tree.

Ritter's quandary was a perhaps inevitable result of his unique position—U.N. spy. His contacts at the C.I.A. knew about his work for UNSCOM and his dealings with Israel and other governments,

and he was reassured by two sources at the agency that the interrogation was just routine. It was "bullshit," one said, and would be over in six months.

The investigation did not end in six months. The agency turned over the results of his polygraph to the counter-intelligence division of the F.B.I., which opened an investigation in 1997. That investigation was still under way during the crisis last January, when the national-security team gathered to consider the possibility of launching a war because Scott Ritter had been blocked from an inspection. No one at the bureau or at the C.I.A. would comment for this story. A senior Administration official said that he could not specifically verify the events, or comment on the impact that the investigation of Ritter had had on



"Let's be reasonable. Just approve my client, and we'll all be spared a lot of nasty litigation."



"Don't overdo it, dear."

the decision to withdraw him in January. This official did say, however, "What mattered to us in the fall and winter on this specific area is that if it were true... then one consideration for a responsible decision-maker would have to be 'How exposed is he personally to risk? And how exposed are we to criticism for a decision that we would otherwise like to make?' Those calculations would have to be made." Ritter says that in this context he "absolutely" understands the concern in Washington over his Israeli connections. Bill Richardson, whose intelligence sources vouched for Ritter, carried Ritter's brief in the Administration, and remained a consistently strong advocate of punishing Saddam. But for others the Ritter allegations seemed to crystallize anxieties inherent in the policy of forcing strict Iraqi compliance with Resolution 687. Saddam was accusing Ritter of being a provocateur. America could not go to war over Ritter unless it was sure that he wasn't.

IV. ANYBODY BUT RITTER

WHEN Kofi Annan averted war last February, Ritter claims, Annan secretly promised Iraq that the confrontational inspections Saddam most re-

sented—the intrusions into the Presidential sites—would occur only once, and that they would all be conducted within four months. Timetables, in matters big and small, are Iraq's abiding desire in diplomacy, and those in the Administration who most forcefully favored the policy of compliance considered the Annan agreement little more than appeasement. If Ritter was right about Annan's secret deal, it couldn't have been good for UNSCOM, because it had the effect of creating untouchable sanctuaries for weapons components and documents once the sites had been inspected. But the Memorandum of Understanding brokered by Annan with Iraq provided the conveyance by which American policy moved from enforcing Iraqi compliance to mere "containment"—maintaining the status quo—and in political terms it was a godsend for the Clinton Administration. The compliance policy had, in its final throes, brought the United States to the edge of a war that wasn't selling, internationally or at home. The President's personal scandal, the Lewinsky affair, was still new and vital at that moment, and made it extremely difficult for the White House to offer a case for Gulf War II even if it wanted to. (Protesters were already calling it "Monica's war.")

This was made painfully clear on February 18th, when Madeleine Albright, Secretary of Defense William Cohen, and Samuel R. (Sandy) Berger, the national-security adviser, were dispatched to Ohio State University for an international "town hall" meeting on Iraq, which was televised by CNN. Although Albright argued passionately for an America that was "the indispensable nation," willing to make the world safe—the language of the muscular compliance policy—the story of the event was the disruptive protests it inspired from some members of the audience, which led the Administration to a politics of retreat. Five days later, Annan announced his agreement with Saddam. The Administration dearly wanted Annan's peace to hold.

Annan's agreement brought the inspectors back into Iraq, and that raised the question of Scott Ritter again. He was already planning an all-new "real in-your-face inspection," as he puts it. Ritter's idea for

UNSCOM's return, in March, was to go right back to the concealment mechanism, with a series of inspections at sensitive S.S.O. sites. Washington had its own suggestion—an inspection of the Iraqi Defense Ministry. Richard Butler approved it. But the real debate was over Ritter. The March inspections, which were called UNSCOM 227-B, would be a test of the Annan agreement, and Albright, reflecting the Administration's new turn, didn't want it derailed by Ritter's becoming an issue. On March 2nd, the Security Council passed Resolution 1154, vowing the "severest consequences" if Iraq blocked the inspections, and that same day Albright urged Butler to put anybody but Ritter at the head of the inspection team. The next day, Butler conveyed this message to Ritter, and asked him to step aside as chief inspector and to suggest other leadership options. Ritter wrote Butler a seven-page memorandum on what he called "the Ritter factor," which, not surprisingly, concluded that there was no reasonable leadership option for UNSCOM 227-B except Scott Ritter. More convincingly, the other leaders of the inspection team revolted over Butler's removal of Ritter. In an "Eyes Only" memorandum to the chairman on March 4th, the leaders said

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that they could not lead the inspections. "Only Scott Ritter has the in-depth knowledge... of the personalities and organizations that this inspection was to pursue," the memo read.

In New York, Ambassador Richardson argued that Ritter should conduct the inspections in the manner he saw fit and that the burden of comity should be placed on Saddam. To bolster his position, Richardson operated furiously behind the scenes to shift the political balance inside the Administration. Richardson planned to attend *Time's* seventy-fifth-anniversary gala at Radio City Music Hall, on March 3rd—an event to which both the President and Richard Butler were invited. Inside the clamorous hall, Richardson maneuvered President Clinton into a brief meeting with Butler, which Richardson was able to portray as an enthusiastic Presidential endorsement of Ritter and his inspection. Albright relented, and Ritter was allowed to lead UNSCOM 227-B.

But Scott Ritter's war was effectively over. Although he believed that his March inspections had brought UNSCOM closer than ever to breaking through the concealment mechanism (they were monitoring the subsequent movements of the Iraqi participants); he soon found himself out in the cold. In April, Israel and Britain stopped providing the highly sensitive intelligence support that had been so critical to Shake the Tree. "One day I was getting reports, the next day I stopped getting reports," Ritter says. "And then I travel overseas and ask what's going on and I find out that the Americans have put pressure on the people who were supporting us to withdraw their support—London and Israel."

American officials say that intelligence support stopped flowing not to UNSCOM but only to Scott Ritter, who, they felt, was in so many ways unnecessarily complicating a situation that was difficult enough without him. Ritter, whose view tended toward the absolute, saw only that the threat of force had effectively been taken off the table, and that without it UNSCOM was impotent. In Washington, some officials involved in national-security matters had wearied of Ritter's apparent impression that he knew which policy was best for the United States. "Who's in charge here?" the senior Administration official said to me. "Scott didn't go to the Ohio State

event, and he doesn't have to mobilize the United States Congress, and he doesn't have to look over his shoulder at the Security Council. And he doesn't have to pay attention to Iraq's neighbors, who, after all, constitute an important part of our national interest in maintaining all this. That's all the President's job."

Despite the trend toward retreat, the U.N. still won a few skirmishes. A team led by the Russian inspector Nikita Smidovich discovered a dump full of destroyed Iraqi missiles. The team suspected that an analysis of the missile parts would prove that Iraq had made a weapon of the chemical poison VX, despite its claim that it hadn't, and subsequent tests proved the team right.

Finally, in August, the breaking point arrived for Ritter. UNSCOM planned to inspect two "sensitive sites" that were believed to be hiding places for ballistic-missile components and related documents. It was generally agreed that the inspections might provoke a crisis, and Albright, fearing as much, urged that they be postponed. Butler agreed, and eventually cancelled the inspections. On August 5th, Iraq declared that it would no longer cooperate with such "inspections of discovery." Diplomatically, Iraq pressed for a timetable on sanctions, and supported a proposal by the Secretary-General for a "comprehensive review" of Iraq's relationship with UNSCOM.


On August 25th, Ritter says, Butler, in the tortured middle, asked Ritter to consider "redefining" his team. Instead, Ritter submitted his resignation the next day, saying he would not be part of an American-endorsed U.N. policy that "constitutes a surrender to the Iraqi leadership."

Ritter, a man given to the dramatic gesture, hoped that his resignation might somehow reverse a policy trend. In the short run, it certainly has had some effect. It made America's changed Iraqi policy the subject of open debate in Congress and in the press. One high-ranking Administration official said that Ritter's resignation may even have "put force

back on the table," at least as an option. This official said that, in the days after Ritter quit, the implications of his action were the subject at a meeting of Albright, Richardson, Cohen, Sandy Berger, and the C.I.A. director, George Tenet, and that the result was a policy paper sent to the President which proposed again considering force in seeking Saddam's compliance. And the Security Council, at America's urging, suspended the periodic reviews of sanctions against Iraq.

But Ritter's final volley will not change history, as he had hoped. Last month, Tariq Aziz, the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister, travelled from New York to Baghdad bearing Kofi Annan's latest offer to Saddam Hussein. It promised the comprehensive review of UNSCOM, which Ritter had opposed as being an invitation to investigate the investigators. That review, which may take place this month, would be followed by a review of the U.N.'s economic sanctions against Iraq, the last leverage (excluding the use of force) obliging Saddam to yield to the UNSCOM intrusions he finds so odious. There is also talk of attaching a timetable to the sanctions—the first step toward ending them altogether, Saddam's dearest wish. The United States is expected to oppose that proposal, but cannot rely on undivided Security Council support.

The manner of Ritter's leave-taking caused much displeasure within the Administration, particularly at the State Department, where Madeleine Albright took Ritter's allegations of American duplicity personally. "He doesn't have a clue about what our over-all policy has been," Albright said of Ritter. Asked about Albright's words, Ritter bristled. "I not only had a clue," he said. "I might have had a better clue than she does." But this swagger missed the point. Ritter did once have a special insight into American policy, and in a sense he *was* American policy, reduced to its elemental form: the alpha-dog inspector, who assumed there would be incoming missiles if his mission was frustrated. That policy changed. Scott Ritter didn't. In a more reflective moment, at his home a few days after he resigned, Ritter observed, "I have become a problem for the Americans." No one will dispute that. On the question of Scott Ritter, at least, the United States and Saddam Hussein have finally achieved accord. ♦



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
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● A Futile Game of Hide and Seek; *Ritter*, UNSCOM Foiled by Saddam's Concealment Strategy

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By Barton Gellman

Washington Post Staff Writer

First of two articles

Scott Ritter had some experience with erased magnetic disks, and he knew what kinds of traces deleted files leave for skillful operatives to exploit. He had no intention of letting such clues survive on his laptop computer, and he devoted some thought to the best way of demolishing its hard drive.

He planned to remove the drive and smash the storage platters beyond repair. But that would amount, he decided, to unlawful destruction of government property. Like so much equipment in use by United Nations arms inspectors, the Dell machine belonged to the U.S. Defense Department. *Ritter* settled for erasing it with a large industrial magnet.

It was nearly 9 p.m. on Aug. 25. The following morning, *Ritter* planned to resign his *post* with the U.N. Special Commission, or UNSCOM, where he had helped lead the hunt for Iraq's forbidden weapons since 1991. Alone in the commission's nerve center on the 30th floor of the United Nations tower, crouching over files beneath a pin-studded street map of Baghdad, he made a final sweep for the most sensitive secrets of a job no person had held before: United Nations intelligence operative.

Ritter meant to take some of those secrets with him. He had kept U.N. superiors apprised, as best anyone knew, of everything he did. Still, much of his work was improvised and his most sensitive relationships built on personal trust. He did not feel free to share all his leads or sources with any one government, including his own, and certainly not with every member of the world body on whose behalf they had been collected.

The 37-year-old reserve Marine had cause to worry about the security of any records he left behind. The FBI had warned of Iraqi agents on the U.N. janitorial staff, and the panel's leaders routinely left the building for their most confidential talks. Some of *Ritter's* ostensible colleagues reported covertly to home capitals that were ambivalent at best about his work. In his heart of hearts, as he cleared his desk, *Ritter* did not believe the intricate system he had devised amid all this could long survive without him.

WP (2)

Into Iraq

No international arms control agency had ever tried to disarm a country against its will, but that is what the U.N. Security Council created UNSCOM to do under the terms that ended the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Other such bodies, like the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency, worked on the basis of treaties and consent.

From the start, the inspectors -- a tightknit group of chemists and rocket scientists, computer sleuths and biologists, trade experts and soldiers borrowed from contributing states -- were hated and harassed by the Iraqi government. But they made progress. They examined and verified Iraqi disclosures, on paper and in field expeditions that took them through bombed-out chemical bunkers in 120-degree desert heat. They demolished forbidden weapons with dynamite, or by cutting them to pieces with acetylene torches, or by burying them in pits of hardened concrete. They rid Iraq of far more unconventional weapons, as Western officials often recounted, than the allies had managed to destroy by ground or air in the war itself.

But UNSCOM soon discovered that Iraq ran shell games within shell games to hide the most deadly and sensitive weapons it was obliged to surrender. By 1994, the panel's active leads dried up with enormous gaps still remaining in its investigation. If the commission was to complete the work of the war, ridding a regional hegemonist of a biological and chemical arsenal and a nuclear program on the brink of success, its leaders concluded they would have to pierce what *Ritter* dubbed "the concealment mechanism" of the Baghdad regime.

With a few close colleagues in 1994 and 1995, *Ritter* led ~~Rolf Ekeus~~, the commission's first executive chairman, to the unwelcome conclusion that he had no choice but to confront and defeat Iraq's secret services. Ekeus told CIA Director John M. Deutch in writing, while requesting assistance in September 1996, that "the best hope for the commission" to uncover stocks of illegal arms was a "concerted program . . . targeted against the Iraqi safeguarding mechanism."

Ekeus's decision meant UNSCOM was to play at a game of spy versus spy -- inspector versus spy, in legal terms -- that is normally the province of governments.

Ritter became the main figure in this risky enterprise, which he would call by a code name, "Shake the Tree." Its conception reflected his own outsized personality, skills and values. His own long journey into Iraq, which began before UNSCOM even existed and deepened as he rose from a junior UNSCOM hire to chief of its anti-concealment team, therefore became deeply entwined with the commission's.

Ritter brought skills to the job he had refined as a Marine "0202," an intelligence officer. Born in Gainesville, Fla., and schooled in Turkey and Germany during his father's Air Force career, he had helped police one of the last Cold War pacts as a 27-year-old lieutenant assigned to monitor intermediate-range nuclear forces in the former Soviet Union. According to Marine Corps records, *Ritter* received a classified commendation from the Central Intelligence Agency for his work in Votkinsk, the kind of letter that is presented to a young officer for perusal and returned to a vault at Langley.

Largely on the strength of that experience, government sources said, the CIA twice recruited him for employment, in 1991 and 1996. The agency rebuffed him in the end each time when questions arose about his marriage to a former Soviet interpreter.

Yet a Marine who once had and then lost the highest U.S. security clearances became entangled, at UNSCOM, in some of the more sensitive work of the U.S. intelligence community. And as much as he and UNSCOM came to rely on national governments -- above all the United States, Israel, United Kingdom and Netherlands -- they also struggled with some of those governments to maintain control of the information they needed to act.

Reliance on secret services, made inevitable by Iraq's resistance to full disclosure, held the keys to some of UNSCOM's success but also to its undoing. It raised in the end a subtle question that had gone largely unexplored save in unsubtle Iraqi propaganda over the years: Who was really running the commission, and with what aims?

The diplomatic ripples from that question, and the effectiveness of Iraqi spy craft in holding inspectors at bay, combined by this summer to bring UNSCOM's remaining program to the brink of defeat. On Aug. 3, Iraq announced the end of its cooperation with the inspectors. More than two months later, despite protests by the Security Council and warnings from *Washington*, there is no prospect in view of the unrestricted access for inspectors that the council demanded of Iraq, on pain of "the gravest consequences," as recently as March.

The Clinton administration saw itself as fighting valiantly, and with skill, to stave off UNSCOM's defeat. *Ritter*, disillusioned, read acquiescence in *Washington's* policy choices. His angry departure from the job made him a celebrity, wooed by congressional Republicans and talk show hosts and a speaker's bureau now trying to market his public appearances.

To others, his behavior harmed his reputation and his cause. Stung by criticism she thought unjust, Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright charged that *Ritter* "doesn't have a clue" about the broader horizons of American policy, and she speculated privately that he must be planning to run for office, like Oliver North. His former boss, ~~Richard Butler~~, accused him of unspecified errors of fact and of breaking the law by revealing confidential UNSCOM data.

Scud Hunter

UNSCOM was a product of the uneven conclusion of the Gulf War, which left the Iraqi regime defeated but still in power. The war also shaped *Ritter's* eventual role.

Ritter spent the conflict fixed on Iraq's special weapons as an intelligence analyst for the U.S. Central Command, responsible for watching Scud missiles. Like everything *Ritter* does, he took it personally. As a lowly captain, his stubborn intensity led him into career-endangering disputes with the allies' commander in chief, Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf. These foreshadowed later battles in UNSCOM with the French armed services chief, a senior British defense official, the director of the CIA's Near East operations and National Security Adviser Samuel R. "Sandy" Berger.

Ritter "was a man who had not always toed the line," Ekeus said with a smile in the wood-toned office where he now holds court as Sweden's ambassador to *Washington*. When Ekeus first began recruiting for UNSCOM, he heard about a young Marine who stuck to wartime judgments "that I don't think were popular at the time. I knew he was a man of his own opinions. I liked that. We wanted to have strong personalities, but the very best talent."

Ritter had been on his way out of the Marines when war came. He resigned in 1990 to try to save a

troubled first marriage to the former Heidi Evans, politely rebuffing a phone call to reconsider from the commandant, Gen. Alfred Gray. But ~~Ritter~~ changed his mind when President Bush began dispatching troops. "I can't leave the Marine Corps when my country's getting ready to go to war," Ritter said. "That's a dishonorable thing to do."

As the war began, Schwarzkopf was eager to claim success in the Scud hunt, for fear that Israel, the missile's main target, would enter the conflict. At a Jan. 30, 1991, news conference, the general displayed gun camera tape from an F-15E attack. "We knocked out as many as seven mobile erector-launchers in just that one strike," he declared.

(MORE)


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- 4 A Futile Game of Hide and Seek; Ritter, UNSCOM -4-

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■ A Futile Game of Hide and Seek; *Ritter*, UNSCOM -2-

Source: WP - Washington Post

Oct 11 05:23

Alarms rang immediately for *Ritter*, who was bomb damage assessment officer in Centcom's J-2, or intelligence directorate. He told his colleagues -- in Centcom and at the Defense Intelligence Agency -- that the targets looked like fuel trucks. Frantic work ensued among analysts at the CIA and the Joint Imagery Production Center. Before long, Rear Adm. Mike McConnell walked into Gen. Colin Powell's Pentagon office and told the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff he had a problem.

"We don't think those were Scuds," McConnell said, according to Powell's memoirs. When Powell asked his source, McConnell replied, "A captain, an analyst, on Schwarzkopf's staff."

The following morning, when he prepared the daily bomb damage report for Schwarzkopf, *Ritter* refused to mark the Scuds as "confirmed kills." According to Brig. Gen. John A. Leide, Centcom's intelligence chief, Schwarzkopf "didn't want to hear" he had made a mistake. Three members of the intelligence staff said in interviews that Schwarzkopf sent word down the chain he wanted *Ritter* to rewrite his report.

"I said, 'I'm BDA [bomb damage assessment] officer, and there is no criteria that says if the commanding officer says it's so, it's so,' " *Ritter* recalled. "They took it back, and Schwarzkopf blew up and they came back again and said, 'You have to change it.' I said I couldn't do that."

Ritter, meanwhile, had written a memorandum arguing that the allies were consistently striking decoys and not real Scuds. Even Delta Force commandos, running risky but, they thought, productive Scud hunts behind Iraqi lines, were blowing up the wrong targets, he wrote. Postwar analysis proved he was right. But when Maj. Gen. Wayne A. Downing heard the report, the former joint special forces commander said, "it made me irate."

"It probably took some personal courage, some intellectual courage and moral courage, to stand up and take that on because it certainly wasn't popular with the Air Force, it wasn't popular with General Schwarzkopf and it sure as hell wasn't popular with me," he said.

In another foreshadowing of his later role -- combining intelligence with secret operations and, some critics argue, overreaching -- wartime sources recounted that *Ritter* traveled to Ar Ar, a commando staging base in western Saudi Arabia. He proposed a plan to Col. Jesse Johnson, Centcom's special forces commander, for a covert team to infiltrate southwestern Iraq. *Ritter* would come along to select the debris of a bombed decoy, in hopes of developing a radar "signature" that could be used by Air Force bombardiers to distinguish fake Scuds from real ones.

Ritter refused to discuss Ar Ar or special operations in an interview. But he acknowledged that he was out of Riyadh one night, planning a reconnaissance mission, when an officer from Centcom headquarters arrived with a direct order from Schwarzkopf to abort his work and depart. "He said I was a defeatist, trying to ruin the morale of the operators, and two, I was trying to start my own war," *Ritter*

6

recalled.

The Cabbage Patch

Ritter got his own war at UNSCOM, or part of one. Hired in September 1991 as a U.N. employee and paid for his UNSCOM work at various stages by the Marine Corps and the Pentagon's On-Site Inspection Agency, he received the assignment of writing a complete history of Iraqi ballistic missile development.

Like other experts on the commission, *Ritter* found gaps and inconsistencies in Iraq's "full, final and complete disclosure" of capabilities. Using his wartime training and his recent knowledge of highly classified intelligence techniques, he began thinking of methods to test doubtful claims and alternate theories. With permission from superiors he began to play an entrepreneurial role with contributing governments, bluffing and bargaining for access to their most expensive and secret resources.

This kind of work was already beyond the broad consensus that created UNSCOM by a vote of the Security Council. France and Russia, which had supplied Iraq with many of its nonconventional weapons components and had aspirations for future diplomatic and commercial relations with the Baghdad regime, played important roles inside the commission but did not fully support the Anglo-American hard line. Although Ekeus inspired a team spirit that transcended some of these concerns, UNSCOM evolved into a fractious and internally distrustful coalition.

Protecting secrets was difficult at UNSCOM, whose headquarters resided in a 185-nation world body accustomed to access for all. To match and outmaneuver Iraq, with its own layers of secrets behind each public event, UNSCOM gradually came to mimic the Baghdad regime in one respect: It had compartments within compartments to obscure the details of what it knew and how.

In particular, *Ritter* distrusted the French, whom he came to regard as playing a double game: professing support for the commission, but positioning themselves for future influence in Iraq. Tim Trevan, a close British adviser to Ekeus who admired *Ritter*, said, "*Scott* is a Francophobe, beyond the reasonable." But he also acknowledged it was "well understood that the senior French officer always" -- against UNSCOM's rules -- "reported to his embassy. If you bar all Frenchmen from the commission, you'd lose a permanent member of the Security Council's support." *Ritter* had back channels of his own, but he and his superiors said they were authorized and therefore different from those he criticized.

His suspicion boiled over in the spring of 1993, during planning for a high-technology surprise for Iraq. Based on a CIA estimate and UNSCOM's previous inspection results, the commission suspected Iraq had a hoard of Scud missile engines buried in desert weapons graveyards. *Ritter* helped lead the planning for Operation Cabbage Patch, which would fly over the suspected sites with ground-penetrating radar, a device Iraq did not know UNSCOM had available to it. The name came from the translation of the Russian town of Kapustin Yar, where UNSCOM hoped the Moscow government would help stage a rehearsal, burying missile components in the manner it had once taught to Iraq.

Cabbage Patch was a closely held secret in UNSCOM, but a French photo interpreter on staff could tell something was up and demanded to know. *Ritter* reluctantly filled him in but secured his word that he would report to no one. Soon afterward, he came across a letter in French briefing the Defense Ministry in Paris about "le Cabbage Patch."

"I got in his face," *Ritter* said, in what he described as a loud drill-field voice. "I started using every four-letter word I could think of, called him a coward, called him a dishonorable man, and I told him if he was in the American military he'd be court-martialed."

The secret out, Ekeus asked *Ritter* to fly to France and request support for Cabbage Patch. *Ritter* was characteristically blunt: He needed Puma helicopters, he told the French military chiefs, and if Paris would not supply them -- in the end, they did not -- he would ask for their equivalents from *Washington*.

Adm. Jacques Lanxade, the French chief of staff, complained afterward about "this young American who behaved like a general," according to a French account. And there was worse. Lanxade and his fellow four-stars hosted *Ritter* for lunch in a linen-and-silver Paris dining room, each selecting a wine and cheese from his home region. *Ritter*, no gastronome, flagged down a waiter and asked for Diet Coke.

"I just fill up the glass and I chug it and I say, 'Could I get another?' " *Ritter* said. "I think I drank four in a row, to try to get a caffeine boost. Well, you would have thought I had blown up the Eiffel Tower, these generals were so aghast."

Cabbage Patch went forward in November 1993, after rehearsals staged from Edwards Air Force Base, Calif., over a test site in Yuma, Ariz., on American Bell 412 helicopters nicknamed Beavis and Butt-Head. The operation learned a great deal, mostly in the negative. UNSCOM's estimates for Iraq's remaining operational ballistic missile force shrank from about 200 to two dozen or fewer. But finding the missiles themselves was another matter.

Rare Victories

For some years UNSCOM's leaders fought a paradox: The only doors Iraq would open were the ones that led inspectors to dead ends. Delays and refusals of entry became routine, and intelligence from defectors and signals intercepts disclosed that Iraq developed a 15-minute standard for evacuating evidence from a site or, if necessary, destroying it.

As Ekeus, the panel's first executive chairman, told a closed-door session of foreign policy experts on June 17, 1997, two weeks before he left his *post*, the inspectors had to halt when confronted by armed force. "We are nothing in Baghdad," he said. "We are at their complete mercy. They can just stop our work at any time."

Good luck and audacity sometimes gave UNSCOM a break. Diane Seaman, a University of Minnesota microbiologist, decided to go in the back door instead of the front at a Baghdad food laboratory on Sept. 25, 1997. One of two men holding briefcases literally ran into her on his way out. When he fled back inside and the scientist gave chase, the man was so flummoxed that he handed over his bag. Inside were documents on the letterhead of the SSO -- the service protecting the innermost secrets of the regime -- discussing Iraq's biological weapons program.

Such victories were unusual. More often the Iraqis succeeded, literally or figuratively, in taking the object of inspectors' interest out a back door. From its earliest days, UNSCOM tried to observe the methods of concealment at work.

7P (A)

In the beginning the efforts could be as simple as scaling a ladder. When ~~David Kay~~, who worked jointly for UNSCOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency, showed up for a surprise search at the Al Fallujah army depot on June 28, 1991, the gate guard would not let him in but made what Kay called "a fatal mistake": The guard did not stop three of Kay's men from climbing a 50-meter water tower with cameras in hand.

(MORE)


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- 4 A Futile Game of Hide and Seek; Ritter, UNSCOM -4-

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■ A Futile Game of Hide and Seek; *Ritter*, UNSCOM -3-

Source: WP - Washington Post

Oct 11 05:23

When the men spotted tank transporters beating a hurried exit from a side gate, one of the observers, Maj. Richard Lally, descended to a car. Driving alongside the convoy until Iraqis fired warning shots, he photographed doughnut-shaped machines that proved to be calutrons -- 20-foot electromagnets used to enrich uranium for an atom bomb. Before Iraqi soldiers pulled him over, Lally stuffed the film in his underwear.

As time went on, nerve and fast thinking seldom sufficed to bring such advances. And borrowed technology like the Cabbage Patch radar -- as well as FLIRs, or forward-looking infrared sensors, and high-altitude photographs taken by U-2 surveillance planes piloted by Air Force aviators -- could only take inspectors only so far.

Iraq's shell game relied on movement and stealth -- a network of hiding places, fleets of trucks, and early warning of where inspectors meant to go. Frustration among the inspectors led to dawning recognition of what they were up against, and the appearance of a major break in 1995 shocked the commission with proof of its massive failures.

The shock came with the defection of Hussein Kamel, ~~Saddam Hussein's son-in-law~~. Kamel's revelations forced Iraq to "discover" 1.5 million new pages of weapons research documents at a chicken farm owned by Kamel. Still, the disclosures did not lead to the core of what UNSCOM sought. Internal evidence showed that Iraq had removed the most important documents. In ballistic missile files, for example, Iraq turned over component drawings made during development but not the "integration drawings" -- the only ones necessary to resume production.

In a grim Baghdad headquarters of Iraq's National Monitoring Directorate, the bureaucracy set up to shadow UNSCOM's inspections, *Ritter* tried to question Iraqi officials about the missing documents on May 5, 1996. Hossam Amin, a top official, read him a prepared statement. All he knew was that a girlfriend of Hussein Kamel -- Kamel was married to Saddam Hussein's daughter, Raghda -- had phoned Amin after Kamel's defection to say some boxes of "important things" were stored at the chicken farm. She hung up without giving her name. Iraq, Amin said, had now told everything it knew about the documents and would not answer further questions.

The "girlfriend story," as it came to be known in UNSCOM, was seen as preposterous. A few months later, on Aug. 16, Amin told *Ritter* to "forget this, as it never happened," according to notes made by another participant in the interview. Amin had been under instruction to terminate the conversation, he admitted, so he made the story up. He then provided a new explanation, more complex but equally implausible.

"It became blindingly obvious that not only were we missing a little bit, we were missing a lot," said ~~Charles Duelfer~~, UNSCOM's deputy chief. "We decided we had to take an active approach to go after their methods of concealment, and we turned our most creative minds to that task."

The inspectors became more convinced they had to pierce the secret services themselves, instead of discrediting their cover stories one by one. Here *Ritter* had an important partner -- ironically, under the circumstances, a Russian.

~~Nikita Smidovich~~ was another of Ekeus's early recruits, a chain-smoking Soviet diplomat Ekeus first met when Smidovich helped represent his country at the Geneva talks on the Chemical Weapons Convention. Smidovich contributed impassivity to *Ritter's* passion, tact and composure to *Ritter's* hard charge, but instead of clashing "they just totally complemented each other," said David Underwood, a retired Air Force colonel who was chief of the State Department's UNSCOM support office and later director of operations for UNSCOM in Bahrain.

"While *Ritter* is Mr. Energy and Mr. Drive, Nikita has the patience of the millenia," Underwood said. "*Ritter* is not a great politician or diplomat. Well, I'll tell you what: Nikita Smidovich is the ultimate diplomat."

The two of them worked hand in hand to win over Ekeus, and Smidovich smoothed feathers ruffled by his younger colleague, as when *Ritter* summarily fired a French colonel 10 years his senior. In Baghdad, Smidovich often served as chief interlocutor with Iraqi counterparts such as Lt. Gen. Amer Rashid, while *Ritter* ran the complex operations intended to expose the Iraqi's words as lies. *Ritter*

Weapons and Power

In the early summer of 1994, Smidovich and *Ritter* received their first strong indications of who was behind Iraq's systematic plan to thwart the commission's work. It came from Israel's Military Intelligence organization, which is known by its Hebrew acronym, Aman.

Trevan, Ekeus's British political adviser, had made a chance contact with Israel at a January conference that year in Delphi, Greece. After a public argument with David Ivri, a senior Israeli defense official, a mutual acquaintance pulled Trevan aside and introduced him to a broad man in civilian clothes, wearing a beard and skullcap. The man was Yakov Amidror, at the time the only strictly Orthodox Jew in Israel's general officer corps, and, as it happened, the deputy director of Aman. *ISRAELI MILITARY INTELLIGENCE*

Amidror flew to New York in April for a meeting with Ekeus. By June, and again in August, his analysts began passing to Smidovich and *Ritter* early descriptions of an Iraqi secret agency that the inspectors had known nothing about.

From the Arabic, it was called the Apparatus of Special Security. Saddam Hussein's younger son, Qusay, directed it. Reporting to the umbrella group were the inner core of the president's protective agencies: the Special Security Organization, the Special Presidential Guard Unit and the Special Republican Guard. Saddam Hussein had long relied on this apparatus to maintain power. Now, the inspectors began to discover, he relied on it to help him preserve the special weapons he valued over all other national priorities.

As Ekeus would put it much later, in a June 1997 talk at *Washington's* Carnegie Endowment, the weapons gave Saddam Hussein "this sweet, wonderful, fantastic power, and that is why Iraq won't give them up."

"These guys are great systems analysts and they have thoroughly studied the way we operate, and they can build a reactive model to that," Duelfer said. "We're outnumbered. There's a lot of Iraqis and there are not many of us. They've got thousands of motivated people, and it turns out they are not motivated to help us but to fool us."

Extraordinary challenges called for an extraordinary response. *Ritter* and Smidovich came to Ekeus in September 1994 with a proposal to travel to Tel Aviv and learn about Qusay Hussein's apparatus in further detail. They did so in October and December, bringing UNSCOM scientist Norbert Reinecke along. The Israelis responded warily, receiving the unusual trio -- a young Marine, a German and a one-time Soviet diplomat -- in a facility north of Herzliya instead of the inner sanctum of the defense establishment, the Kirya.

Before the inspectors left, however, they had secured a meeting with Maj. Gen. Uri Saguy, the military intelligence chief. When *Ritter* came back, Ekeus put him in charge of an UNSCOM team that would think about Iraqi secret services as its central mission.

The new team, given the deliberately bland name of Capable Sites/Concealment Investigation, attracted political attack from its early days. Few nations on the Security Council looked with equanimity at probes into such sensitive territory -- as if, they sometimes argued, someone delved in the inner workings of the U.S. Secret Service and FBI. UNSCOM, with its American and British diplomatic backers, argued that it had no choice.

By this year, with Russia and China pressing attacks, France used its swing vote in the Security Council to force UNSCOM to scale back the team and accept a French intelligence officer, Patrick Haimzadeh, as one of its members.

"This meant," *Ritter* said, "that we had to compartmentalize inside the team. We basically had to live a cover story in front of the Frenchman so he wouldn't know the full extent of what we were doing." In the files available to Haimzadeh, *Ritter* and his trusted lieutenants placed "fake mission requests." The real details of their plans were "handwritten on plain white paper and kept in a special folder that we would carry with ourselves." There was no special code name used for this information, he said; "we just called it 'NO FRENCH.'"

The phenomenon was hardly new, nor confined to France. Another senior inspector described it as UNSCOM's "ongoing problem of being eaten away from within." At one point UNSCOM received a specific warning that Russian eavesdroppers were listening to UNSCOM's telephone calls and passing some of the information gleaned to Iraq.

Another time, Duelfer arranged to meet Ahmed Chalaby, an Iraqi resistance leader, to receive information. Chalaby, who heads the Iraqi National Congress, said Duelfer described his own office as insecure and insisted on meeting across First Avenue, in a corner of the U.N. Plaza Hotel lobby. "One of my men notices these two Russians lurking behind a pillar, trying to listen," Chalaby said. Duelfer, Chalaby added, "recognized them and immediately bolted."

As far back as 1992, Roger Hill, an Australian inspector, had caught a French military attache helping himself to the commission's files and bringing them to the copy machine. He and *Ritter* complained to Jeff St. John, the Canadian chief of the Information Assessment Unit, UNSCOM's euphemism for an intelligence section. St. John replied they could not afford a diplomatic incident. "That's when both

Roger and I made the decision," *Ritter* said, "that anything we considered sensitive was not going in the file."

On the laptop computer he kept at home, *Ritter* maintained data he believed too sensitive to leave at the office, such as a complete log of his foreign contacts and notes describing evolution of the plan he called Shake the Tree. His deepest secrets lived inside a battered canvas briefcase, the olive drab model from Lands' End, that came as a 35th birthday present from his parents in 1996.

(MORE)


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A Futile Game of Hide and Seek; *Ritter*, UNSCOM -4-

Source: WP - Washington Post

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"The really sensitive information was carried in my green bag, twenty four hours a day, with me," *Ritter* said. "I carried it around everywhere I went. I took it home at night, put it under the bed, woke up in the morning and carried it back with me into work."

The habit, if not the contents, persisted. Last month, when *Ritter* testified in Congress, a careful observer would have noted the bag on all three occasions, never once beyond the witness's reach.

Tomorrow: The confrontation with Iraq.

ig; ph,,ap/JASSIM MOHAMMED; ph,,afp; ph,,REUTER/FALEH KHEIBER; ph,,ap CAPTION: Shaking the Tree (This graphic was not available) CAPTION: *Scott Ritter*, who had worked with the U.N. Special Commission since 1991, resigned in August. CAPTION: An unnamed U.N. inspection official, left, is turned away from compound by Iraqi official last November. It was the ninth time in 10 days that inspectors had been denied access to weapons sites. CAPTION: In photo at left, *Scott Ritter*, center, team leader of U.N. arms inspection team, and assistants withdraw into U.N. headquarters in Baghdad in January after waiting half an hour for Iraqi officials to accompany them on inspections. Above, in undated photo released by Britain's Ministry of Defense in February, U.N. workers seal leaking Iraqi rockets for destruction. CAPTION: In this UNSCOM photo from 1996, workers under supervision of U.N. inspectors destroy growth media, which can be used to produce biological weapons.

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Arms Inspectors 'Shake the Tree'; UNSCOM Adds Covert Tactic
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Second of two articles

In the last stage of the contest between U.N. arms inspectors and Iraq, the Iraqi secret services hardly bothered to disguise the nature of the game.

That became clear with the spectacle that met the U.N. Special Commission on March 7. Chief inspector Scott Ritter arrived that day on the first search for clues to Iraq's illegal arsenal since a crisis over access to "sensitive" and "presidential" sites had nearly led to war. He and his team drove to a field headquarters of the feared Special Security Organization, or SSO, a complex forbidden to them in the past.

The building went dark in an unexplained power failure, the kind that often marked the arrival of U.N. inspectors. Ritter and his inspection team moved by flashlight from room to room. In each one they found empty shelves, a bare desk and a man with a mustache. One after one, when asked, the men said they worked as marriage registrars.

"It almost showed a sense of humor," said Chris Cobb-Smith, a former British army major who took part in the inspection. "Each desk had its piece of paper and its sharpened pencil and five empty files, and every office was the same. They'd done a very efficient job of sanitizing, and they'd obviously made it obvious that they were sanitizing. Enraging? Yes, absolutely. They're no fools."

But there was another level of the game that day, and there the advantage was UNSCOM's. Ritter called it "Shake the Tree," an image meant to suggest falling fruit from branches too high to reach.

Ritter shook the tree at a second site, the SSO's transportation directorate, where Iraq did not expect him. There, according to accounts from UNSCOM and the U.S. government, inspectors deliberately triggered Iraq's defenses against a surprise search and used a new synthesis of intelligence techniques to look and listen as the Baghdad government moved contraband from the site.

It was the culmination of more than three years of work -- conceived by Ritter, executed episodically

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from 1996, and relying at various stages on American, British and Israeli intelligence agencies. "Something very sensitive had been done to Iraq" without the knowledge of even most inspectors, as one senior U.S. official put it.

The inspectors believed Iraq held a technical reference library and some of the critical components to build or rebuild its nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, along with the ballistic missiles to carry them. Iraq had usually managed to move this material a step or two ahead of the inspectors. The ability to track Iraq's movements in "real time," the U.N. panel believed, set the stage for an accelerating campaign that would finally overtake the concealment efforts and put the hidden arms and documents in UNSCOM's hands.

That campaign did not take place and now appears unlikely. A struggle for control arose over the new intelligence technique, involving which country would conduct the most sensitive work and which individuals would have access to the results.

More fundamentally, UNSCOM's covert plan provoked diplomatic and military crises that passed the breaking point of its support on the U.N. Security Council. After attempting to back UNSCOM in this losing battle -- even pushing it, in 1996, more aggressively than Executive Chairman Rolf Ekeus wished -- the Clinton administration shifted course. By April of this year, high-ranking U.S. officials said, an interagency review decided that Washington could no longer support the threat of war to compel UNSCOM's access to the inner sanctums of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's secret services.

Iraq halted all new inspections on Aug. 3.

In interviews, Ritter would not discuss the mechanics of the operation he created. The Washington Post agreed to U.S. government requests to withhold publication of operational details on national security grounds. But the broader story of Shake the Tree explains not only Ritter's angry resignation on Aug. 26 but the unraveling of what UNSCOM's leadership regarded as their best hope to complete Iraq's disarmament.

Weaving a Network

By late 1994, as the U.N. inspectors learned the extent of the Iraqi apparatus deployed to thwart their work, each of UNSCOM's subject teams -- chemical, biological, missile, import-export -- was working overtime to devise new methods of catching deception. One team, formed around Ritter, gave exclusive attention to what he called "the concealment mechanism."

UNSCOM had long relied on intelligence provided by sympathetic governments and even dissidents who sought the overthrow of the Baghdad regime. It had an international mandate to find Iraqi weapons under the terms that ended the Persian Gulf War, and it regarded assistance from any quarter as welcome.

"One of Rolf's great strengths and one of his brilliant insights was that from the very first American intelligence brief he realized UNSCOM could not afford to be totally dependent on one source -- or in those days two sources, the U.S. and the U.K. -- because it could be vulnerable to being manipulated on the basis of intelligence handed to it," said Tim Trevan, who was Ekeus's political adviser until late 1995.

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Ekeus, who now serves as Sweden's ambassador to Washington, said in an interview that UNSCOM preserved its independence in part by combining information from many countries, not all of which spoke to one another or were willing to have their contributions known. In doing so, UNSCOM took on a role in consuming and acquiring intelligence that was unprecedented for an international organization.

"In the end we became the top guy on the block, knowing about Iraq's weapons, because we could investigate personnel, we could do physical inspection and control the results," he said.

But the story was not quite as simple as that, because mutually escalating efforts -- by Iraq to obstruct UNSCOM and by UNSCOM to pierce the obstruction -- led to growing demands by the U.N. panel on the most sensitive capabilities of its contributing governments. The means UNSCOM embraced to perform its mission entangled it in the agendas -- sometimes overlapping, sometimes not, and often opaque -- of others.

Vanishing Gyroscopes

In August 1995, UNSCOM learned from Israel's Military Intelligence organization, Aman, that Iraq was expecting delivery of Russian-made precision gyroscopes and accelerometers. Salvaged from decommissioned submarine missiles, the components were among the few essentials for ballistic missile guidance that Iraq could not manufacture itself.

The tip was of some importance, if true, because it represented the first demonstrated Iraqi effort to acquire forbidden weapons during the period of U.N. disarmament inspections. The Central Intelligence Agency's Nonproliferation Center, according to U.S. officials, passed a similar tip to the commission.

Ritter and ~~Nikita Smidovich~~, a Russian diplomat who led UNSCOM's ballistic missile team, worked with Israel to track the whereabouts of a Palestinian middleman and his shipment of gyroscopes through Jordan.

In November, Ritter flew to Amman and met with Ali Shukri, private secretary to King Hussein. He set up a secure telephone link, and Ekeus asked the king's confidant to find and seize the gyroscopes on UNSCOM's behalf. Jordan did so the same night. In New York, the U.N. panel's weapon scientists prepared for a treasure trove.

Accounts diverge on some of what happened next, but U.S. and UNSCOM officials agree that the CIA's Near East division chief dispatched a team to Amman to take the gyroscopes. Ritter later accused the agents of giving Jordan the impression they worked for UNSCOM. Ekeus, in an interview, said only that he never received the gyroscopes as expected. He professed to have no idea why.

U.S. government officials described the CIA and UNSCOM efforts on the gyroscopes as parallel and essentially complementary. One knowledgeable official said Washington feared Iraq would steal the shipment back. "We wanted to get those gyroscopes out of Jordan as quickly as possible, and as I remember at that time we were in a better position to get them out than the UNSCOM people were," he said. A second official said the results of the U.S. government's "exploitation" -- or analysis -- were conveyed to the disarmament panel.

That raised the question of who did the exploiting and for what purposes. American analysts certainly shared an interest in disarming Iraq, but they may have had other interests as well, such as enhancing

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their knowledge of Russian missile guidance or black market military sales. Ritter always -- and his supervisors usually -- took the position that UNSCOM should control the analysis of information acquired on its behalf.

"Ritter feuded with virtually everyone in the intelligence community," Trevan said, "because he's so passionate about things. He doesn't always know when to give up. If he's managed well, he's entirely a positive."

Over corn muffins and seven Diet Cokes, Ritter put it differently in a long interview last month at a coffee shop near Rockefeller Center.

"If somebody puts a roadblock in my way, I'll try to talk my way around the roadblock, but if I can't move the roadblock I'm going to run right through it," he said. "Now if that's a bull in a china shop, tough luck. It's about getting the job done. It's about mission accomplishment. I won't apologize for it."

Colliding Interests

By all accounts, the U.S. government gave unsurpassed support -- financial, technical, military and otherwise -- to UNSCOM. But there were also conflicts, and the gyroscope episode set the tone for what some people who know both men called a running feud between Ritter and his CIA Near East counterpart. By policy, The Post does not name covert agents.

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Ritter told colleagues at UNSCOM and confidants in the U.S. government that the CIA's operations directorate seemed to fear he would get in the way of efforts to foment a coup against Saddam Hussein, which came to a failed crescendo in 1996. The same secret services protected the president and his weapons programs, and Shake the Tree amounted to a competing operation.

A senior official with knowledge of both programs denied this, saying Ritter's analysis had "only a passing plausibility." There was "no perception of conflict in any part of the U.S. government between whatever else the U.S. government was doing and what UNSCOM was doing."

Another source of tension was a misplaced or withheld -- piece of intelligence. It described an underground storage facility at Jabal Mokhul, one of Saddam Hussein's presidential complexes on the west bank of the Tigris River north of Tikrit. In the summer of 1994, the opposition Iraqi National Congress received a defector who had been site engineer at Jabal Mokhul. The defector said Iraq had built an underground hiding place at the junction of two tunnels there, and great quantities of weapons parts and documents in crates had arrived.

Sources at the Iraqi National Congress said the INC's intelligence chief, Ahmed Allawi, passed the tip soon after to the CIA's Near East division.

More than three years later, in November 1997, Ritter paid a call on the INC's president, Ahmed Chalabi, at his home in London's Mayfair district. "I mentioned Jabal Mokhul," Chalabi recalled in an interview. "He lighted up and said, 'What do you know about Jabal Mokhul?' I said, 'Didn't you get our report?' He said, 'What report?' I said, 'The report we gave Washington in '94.'" Ritter's reply, Chalabi said, was angry profanity about the Near East division chief.

American officials said any failure to pass the tip was "strictly an accident," one of "the vagaries of the business." For UNSCOM, it was a missed opportunity. In June 1997, inspectors had tried to inspect the 4th battalion headquarters of the Special Republican Guard at the same complex in Jabal Mokhul. The inspectors knew at the time, from an early exercise of Shake the Tree, that they were being held in place while material was evacuated to an adjacent hiding spot. Had they known of the underground facility, they could have moved there next.

More Than Ice Cream

UNSCOM's pursuit of Iraq's security system led it in some surprising directions. There was the trail, for instance, of the Baghdad ice cream trucks.

"The big thing with concealment was movement," Ekeus recalled. "Ritter excelled at his ability to penetrate organizational structures."

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What he found, initially with Israeli help, was that the SSO used two dedicated fleets of vehicles to move weapons contraband. By day it used red-and-white refrigerator trucks painted with markings of the Tip Top ice cream company. At night, it used unmarked green Mercedes tractor-trailers from the fleet of Segada Transportation Co., named for the wife of Saddam Hussein.

The essence of the Iraqi shell game was this: The trucks shuttled from "storage sites," which were changed every 90 days in the early years and every 30 days after 1997, to a network of temporary "hide sites" when U.N. inspectors approached. Physical security for the hiding places fell to the 2nd and 4th Brigades of the Special Republican Guard, while other units performed related functions.

Shake the Tree was premised on the assumption that Iraqi guards would never let inspectors into storage sites until the trucks were gone, if at all. Inspectors wanted to put stress on the concealment system, forcing it to react in ways that could be observed. Those observations, in turn, would feed an accelerating campaign of subsequent inspections. Eventually, one UNSCOM official said, "you might get lucky. We tried to design something that would allow us to catch them on the rebound."

But just as UNSCOM tried to penetrate Iraq, Iraq tried to penetrate UNSCOM. Ritter and his superiors learned, to their disquiet, that the Baghdad government showed signs of having six to ten days notice of most surprise inspections. They responded by compartmentalizing information ever more tightly, inventing classifications like "Code Green" to limit access to information.

Shaking the Tree

As early as 1994, after Ritter and Smidovich made informal proposals on Shake the Tree, the United States offered to provide the needed support in what one official called a "U.S. eyes only" operation. Apart from Ekeus, only security-cleared Americans would know of its existence. Ekeus broke that condition immediately in a U.N. rose garden stroll with two of his closest advisers, Trevan and fellow Briton John Scott. The three men considered the plan, but let it die.

What resurrected the idea was the 1995 defection of ~~Saddam Hussein's son-in-law, Hussein Kamel Hassan Majeed~~. His debriefings, and the 1.5 million ~~pages~~ of new documents Iraq released in response, shocked Ekeus and UNSCOM with the enormity of what they had missed.

The first experiment with Shake the Tree began in March 1996, with the team designated UNSCOM 143. Thereafter UNSCOM began attaching a second designation to some of its inspections, in a numbered series beginning ASS-1 for the Apparatus of State Security, the organization run by Saddam Hussein's son, Qusay. Asked about the acronym, Ritter replied, "I loved it. Like, 'Kick your ass.' "

The experiment failed at first. The United States collected and processed a great deal of information about Iraq's reactions to the inspectors, but it reported back to UNSCOM that it picked up nothing that helped. Again in June, and still again in July, the results were roughly the same.

Two crises of confidence ensued between Ekeus and Washington.

The first came over a compromise Ekeus agreed to make in the July inspection. Because of UNSCOM's new interest in its security services, Iraq had invented a new designation, and new restrictions, on what it called "sensitive sites." UNSCOM's position was that it could go anywhere it liked, but Ekeus agreed to special procedures. When Ritter tried to test them in July, he was turned away.

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An atmosphere of military menace built in Washington, which had previously punished Iraqi defiance with cruise missile attacks. Ekeus later told confidants he was convinced the United States was looking for a showdown. The Clinton administration was busy lining up Security Council support for a resolution finding Iraq in "material breach" of its obligations, a legal justification for use of force to secure compliance.

Ekeus believed an American attack would be fatal to UNSCOM's long-term diplomatic support. Washington's strategy, he told aides, was deeply wrong. Against the advice of the administration -- and of Ritter, who was stewing in Baghdad -- Ekeus cut a deal by telephone with Iraqi Lt. Gen. Amir Mohammad Rasheed: Ritter would give Rasheed advance notice of the site he wished to visit, and Rasheed would escort him there.

In August, then-deputy national security adviser Samuel R. "Sandy" Berger and others conveyed their disappointment to senior UNSCOM officials. Madeleine K. Albright, then U.N. ambassador, also protested. The administration was angry with Ekeus, and it wanted to know whether he planned to press ahead with the effort to probe Iraq's sensitive sites. After internal consultations, UNSCOM's answer was yes.

But there was another problem to resolve. Ekeus and his senior deputies were not convinced they were learning all they should from Shake the Tree. They were synchronizing their inspections with American collection efforts, and they expected to obtain detailed results.

In September 1996, Ekeus met with ~~CIA Director John M. Deutch~~ and complained to him in writing that "to date the Commission has been ~~denied access to the data collected~~" in the operation. American officials were reluctant to discuss this dispute, but they said the commission's top leaders eventually were convinced that they were getting all the relevant "nuggets" that fell in Shake the Tree.


During the same meeting with Deutch, Ekeus emphasized the difficulty of cracking Iraq's concealment efforts and asked for new forms of technical help: the Predator surveillance drone and better sensors for the U-2 -- which the United States had publicly loaned the United Nations for overflights of Iraq -- including the high-resolution camera, infrared lense for night operations, synthetic aperture radar to track truck movement, and electro-optical imaging for real-time transmission of pictures. UNSCOM got some, but not all, of what he asked for, the exceptions being explained by scarcity.

With Ekeus's blessing, Ritter meanwhile went to London and Tel Aviv in an effort to secure more independence for UNSCOM on Shake the Tree. In effect, he displaced the United States as sole sponsor, and three sources said the commission got much more access to information as a result.

A Revealing Exchange

In June 1997, during an inspection in Baghdad, Ritter received a summons to the oil ministry. For nearly an hour, he held a stunningly frank verbal sparring match with Lt. Gen. Rasheed, the oil minister and, UNSCOM believed, a central figure in Iraq's weapons concealment.

"We are very concerned about exposing our security organizations to experts from outside of Iraq," Rasheed said. When Ritter justified the intrusion by alleging a coverup, Rasheed accused Ritter of "McCarthyism" and said, "I could say that I know your links to intelligence."

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Ritter, according to notes taken by another participant, shot back: "I deal with governments for information. I deal with the people who handle this kind of sensitive information, not a bunch of tea-drinkers." Iraq had lied repeatedly about its weapons programs, Ritter said: "As such, we have no choice but to use the tools which we have available. . . . You brought this on yourselves."

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
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
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Rasheed demanded to know what Ritter thought he was hiding. Ritter replied in detail: VX nerve toxins in salt form for long-term storage; a mobile biological weapons production facility, including fermenters and a drying and grinding apparatus; dried anthrax; five to seven operational ballistic missiles and up to 25 in disassembled form; and possibly a nuclear weapon "minus the core of HEU," or highly enriched uranium that would make it a bomb.

"I'm sorry, I have to run," Rasheed replied, finally. "I would love to stay and talk to you for hours about your flawed concepts. However, I thank you for explaining the pretext for your inspection."

UNSCOM knew it was playing a very dangerous game. In February 1996, Ekeus received what he regarded as a credible intelligence tip that Iraq planned to kill him with slow-acting poison. The Swedish diplomat's family was frightened, and Ekeus confronted Nizar Hamdoon, Iraq's U.N. ambassador, with the report. Hamdoon replied that the notion was absurd, as Ekeus's murder would delay the lifting of economic sanctions. Ekeus found the answer somehow flattering, comparing the price on his head to a year's oil revenue.

Adding to the commission's anxiety was knowledge that should Iraq decide to take inspectors hostage or kill them there was no rescue force immediately at hand. For nearly two years after a September 1991 parking lot incident, in which inspector David Kay and his team were held at gunpoint for four days, the Army's Delta Force had deployed to Kuwait during UNSCOM inspections. When Shake the Tree began in 1996, it did so one last time, even staging an inspector rescue exercise first in Utah. But the U.S. military halted that support, and inspectors knew they were exposed.

Change of Commanders

When Ekeus left the commission on July 1, 1997, the political and operational questions around UNSCOM's use of intelligence were beginning to come to a head. The man who inherited them was a voluble Australian of large charms but blunt affect, little loved among the guardians of U.N. protocol.

~~Richard Butler~~, Ekeus's replacement, is the subject of several unadmiring stories told by confidants of U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan. One has it that Butler attended a dinner party hosted by then-U.S. Ambassador Bill Richardson, packed with ambassadors and international civil servants. The pleasant buzz of conversation ground to a halt at Butler's loud interjection: "Are you out of your bloody mind?" After an awkward silence, Annan's confidant recounted, someone piped in: "That's Australian for diplomacy."

But the real source of unease about Butler within the U.N. secretariat and Security Council was UNSCOM's provocative probing of Iraqi secret services. Annan -- his special envoy to Iraq, ~~Prakash Shah~~, told Butler -- wants "peace at any cost."

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On Aug. 4, barely a month after taking office as executive chairman, Butler called a 90-minute meeting to put his stamp on the commission's most sensitive work. Three others attended: Charles Duelfer, the deputy chairman; Rachel Davies, who leads the Information Assessment Unit, UNSCOM's euphemism for intelligence; and Ritter.

Butler knew there was nothing more controversial for UNSCOM than Ritter's efforts to probe Iraq's special security organs. But those organs were the center, he said, of "the defeat UNSCOM industry." The commission was entitled to "take a lively interest" in any activity aimed at thwarting its work. He put Ritter in charge of a new Special Investigations Unit, repackaging the team Ritter already ran, and gave his blessing to continued use of the Shake the Tree channels from London and Tel Aviv.

The Clinton administration was more and more worried about Ritter, and about Israel. During a polygraph examination in late 1996, taken as part of his application for a job at the CIA, Ritter was asked about his overseas work. "They ask, 'Have you ever had contact with a foreign intelligence agency?'" said one U.S. official. "You say yes and it sends these guys . . . into orbit. Scott came in with a list."

Ritter's answers were referred to the **FBI**, which began a counterintelligence investigation. Among the concerns was his August 1991 marriage to Marina Khatiasvili, a former Soviet Georgian interpreter for the American team that had monitored an arms control pact in Votkinsk. Ritter had been married when they met, and he and colleagues insist that his romance with Khatiasvili began after he left Votkinsk. But her job had required her to report to the KGB, and Ritter knew he was imperiling his security clearance by marrying her, even afterward. "I was in love with Marina," Ritter said.

Troublesome Link

The bigger problem for Clinton administration policymakers was Ritter's connection to Israel. Present and former officials at UNSCOM insisted that Ritter had authority for all he did there, and several U.S. officials agreed. But they said the mere fact of an **FBI** investigation involving Ritter and Israel raised unacceptable diplomatic risks if exposed.


"What you don't want is what the Iraqis are doing now, which is charging UNSCOM with having a secret Israeli connection," said one high-ranking official.

Twice this year, as Shake the Tree progressed, the Clinton administration asked Butler to remove Ritter from the spotlight. On Jan. 15, as a crisis over access to suspected weapons sites began to swell, and the administration oversaw a military buildup in the gulf, Washington asked Butler to withdraw Ritter from Baghdad and abort his planned search of the SSO headquarters the next day. And in March, when it came time to test an inspections deal by Annan that had narrowly averted massive U.S. airstrikes a month earlier, Albright and Berger, by this time respectively the secretary of state and national security adviser, pushed for UNSCOM to send anyone but Ritter for the job.

One U.S. official, explaining the efforts, said, "it could be in the national interest, to make UNSCOM work, but not in Scott Ritter's personal interest."

Richardson, who generally supported UNSCOM's arguments that Ritter was uniquely qualified, successfully outflanked efforts by Albright in the first days of March to persuade Butler otherwise. Butler had wrestled with the decision, finally permitting Ritter to fly to Baghdad for the inspections that

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would bring him face to face with the marriage registrars. But on March 3, as the inspectors assembled, Butler telephoned to relieve Ritter of command.

At the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Center, UNSCOM's forward headquarters, the remaining leaders of the team revolted. Cobb-Smith, ~~Gabriele Kraatz-Wadsack, Cees Wolterbeek and Bill McLaughlin~~ sent a "chairman's eyes only" fax back to Butler urging him to call off the whole inspection because, without Ritter, it would be a failure. They argued that Iraq, which had loudly accused Ritter of being a spy, would also see his removal as a victory for its approach of launching propaganda attacks on individual inspectors.

Richardson, in New York, got wind of the rebellion and set out frantically to find Butler at Time magazine's 75th anniversary dinner. He was determined to speak to him before Albright did, according to witnesses, and rushed through Radio City Music Hall past such celebrities as Mikhail Gorbachev and Lauren Bacall. Finally he found Butler and urged him to let Ritter keep the job. Then he flagged down President Clinton, who knew nothing about the dispute, and arranged for a congratulatory compliment for Butler on UNSCOM's work.

"I've talked to the president himself, and you're on," Ritter remembers hearing Butler say by telephone not long afterward.

The March exercise of Shake the Tree proved the richest haul yet of evidence on the manner in which Iraq moved its contraband, according to knowledgeable officials. Soon afterward, for reasons that remain hard to assess, the United States resumed its principal role in support of Shake the Tree and Israel and the United Kingdom withdrew.

Four people with knowledge of those events gave four different accounts of the reasons -- attributing the change, variously, to Butler's anxieties about the previous arrangement, the unwillingness of London and Tel Aviv to continue, American wishes to remove the risk of an Israeli role, and mere substitution of a superior technical approach.

Washington got much of the control it wanted in 1994: An operation supported under U.S. classification rules. Duelfer, the deputy chairman, has American security clearances. Butler is cleared through CANUKAUS, the intelligence-sharing arrangement among Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia and the United States. One result of the change, intended or not, is that Ritter was left out of the information loop.

In the shell within a shell that UNSCOM had become, Ritter had no way to be sure who had cut off his information supply. Some American officials said it was Butler. Butler, in an interview, said: "It was not my decision. It's an American one. I never lost confidence in Scott."

A Hero, to Some

In Ritter's celebrity since his resignation, he has been heralded as a hero and mocked as "Scotty boy," trying to make decisions "above your pay grade," as Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-Del.) put it last month. Biden apologized afterward in private, but critics continue to doubt Ritter's motives and speculate about what drives the former Marine in his public campaign.

"Unfortunately, if UNSCOM is to succeed, it must, among other things, both be and be perceived to be

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independent," Assistant Secretary of State Martin Indyk testified last month. "It is ironic that Scott Ritter and Saddam Hussein both argue that UNSCOM's independence is being compromised by the United States."

Ritter knows he is speaking aloud of things UNSCOM has long kept unspoken. He said he decided to do so because the commission was "terminal if something was not done," and "to go public you have to go all the way."

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"I feel very strongly about the concealment mechanism," he said. "You can't find the weapons without defeating the concealment mechanism. One reason I feel comfortable talking about these [intelligence] liaisons is that it legitimizes the concealment investigation. If UNSCOM survives this, and I think they can, then it will add credibility to the charges and put the focus back on Iraq."

Those who know Ritter best, in and out of UNSCOM, are fiercely loyal, even if they are discomfited by impolitic talk of the commission's inner workings. Others, who like his stand in principle, see hubris. "Wouldn't you hate to share an office with him, though?" asked one pro-Ritter congressional staff member. "He's totally driven, he's self-righteous, and his way is the only way."

David Underwood, a retired Air Force colonel who was chief of the State Department's UNSCOM support office, said Ritter is simply "red, white and blue, and it's his culture. . . . His agenda, if I could speak for him, is that Saddam Hussein lives up to that [Security Council resolution], and that's it."

At the state dinner for Czech leader Vaclav Havel on Sept. 16, Albright had another view in a conversation with former national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, according to someone at the dinner.

"Is he going to run for office?" Brzezinski asked.

"I assume so. It certainly looks that way. It's another Ollie North," Albright replied.

North, ironically, has left a number of unanswered phone messages for Ritter at the office of his lawyer, New York's Matthew Lifflander. He wants Ritter on his radio show. Ritter was reluctant to explain why he will not appear.

"I won't go on his radio show because I don't identify with his politics," he said finally, when pressed. "The man was a Marine Corps officer, testified in front of the Congress wearing his uniform, and pleaded the Fifth Amendment. And I just find something very wrong with that."

A New Strategy

In the policy review that came last spring, the Clinton administration concluded that a loss of diplomatic support left little room to back intrusive searches by threat of U.S. force. The best the government believed it could do for now is to maintain a broad consensus for economic sanctions. Without saying so much, Indyk acknowledged in his Sept. 9 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that U.S. policy in Iraq cannot be effective without the Security Council and "this fact has an influence on the tactical decisions we have to make."

A high-ranking U.S. official said the "conscious policy decision" in April was to "take the trigger out of

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Butler's hands for going to war" by slowing the pace of the commission's most controversial work. "It wasn't Ritter. Ritter thinks it was him. It was more Butler."

With inspections stopped since Aug. 3 and no prospect in view for their resumption, the administration now plays down their significance.

Defense Secretary William S. Cohen praised the inspectors in Senate testimony last Tuesday but counseled "not to overstate what their role is": "If you take a group of 20 or 30 people, and you put them in a country the size of all of New England, plus New York, plus Pennsylvania, plus New Jersey, and say, 'Go find evidence of chemical weapons,' you are asking a great deal of those inspectors."

One American official said as long as UNSCOM continues to function at all, "and as long as [the inspectors] don't report positively" that their work is done, "that's all we need" to keep the sanctions in place. In New York, one inspector said Iraq might yet overreach enough to swing world opinion back in UNSCOM's favor, perhaps by tearing down cameras or by expelling the last passive monitoring teams.

"I still think there's a beat in this body," the inspector said. "The Iraqis could save us, depending on what they do."

PH,,REUTER; PHM,,FRANK JOHNSTON; PHM,,AP; MAP,,LOUIS SPIRITO CAPTION: At left, in September 1991 a bulldozer crushes cylinders of bombs that were designed to carry chemical weapons. Below, an UNSCOM photo from February 1998 shows the destruction of Iraqi rockets containing the chemical nerve agent Sarin. CAPTION: Ahmed Chalabi is president of the opposition Iraqi National Congress. CAPTION: Hussein Kamel Hassan Majeed, a defector, was killed in 1996. CAPTION: Iraqi U.N. envoy Nizar Hamdoon denied plot against UNSCOM chief. CAPTION: Above are four inspection targets for UNSCOM Mission 182, which focused on ballistic missiles and went forward after months of planning in March 1997. The Tip Top ice cream company, inspectors believed, was a front whose red-and-white trucks carried contraband arms between Special Security Organization hiding places. CAPTION: As a general method of operation, inspectors say, Iraq would move materials from the Baghdad Presidential Zone west to the Radwanayah Presidential Zone then north to the Tikrit Presidential Zone to hide them from UNSCOM.

(END)

05:14 EDT October 12, 1998

Related Items

- 1 Arms Inspectors 'Shake the Tree'; UNSCOM Adds Covert Tactic
- 2 Arms Inspectors 'Shake the Tree'; UNSCOM Adds -2-
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THE WASHINGTON POST

Richard Butler

Guess Who's Back

So you thought Saddam Hussein was out of your life? Sorry—he's back, manufacturing the weapons of mass destruction with which he threatens the Iraqi people, his neighbors and, by extension, the safety of the world.

Two separate developments have returned Saddam Hussein to the headlines. Earlier this month the administration revealed that its satellites had detected Iraq test-firing Al-Samoud missiles, home-grown, smaller versions of the Scuds last used against Israel during the 1990 Gulf War. The chief of U.S. Central Command, Gen. Tony Zinni, said that the range of the Al-Samoud easily could be increased.

The administration also revealed that Saddam Hussein has been hiding between 20 and 30 Russian Scuds as well as working through front companies outside Iraq to acquire the machine tools needed to build more missiles.

None of this is new. In my last report as executive chairman of UNSCOM, the agency charged with disarming Saddam, I warned the U.N. Security Council about Iraq's missile-development activities. That was almost two years ago, just before Iraq shut down all international arms control and monitoring efforts. I've also publicly detailed Iraq's refusal to yield or account for its holdings of at least 500 tons of fuel usable only by Scud-type missiles. Iraqi officials told me that a complete accounting for this fuel was unnecessary because, after all, Iraq had no Scud missiles. I disagreed, stating that the reverse was true: As long as Iraq refused to yield the fuel, it clearly had concealed Scuds or planned to acquire or build them.

Presumably unconnected with the administration's revelation but simultaneous with it, former UNSCOM inspector Scott Ritter in an article in *Arms Control Today*, claimed that Iraq is "qualitatively disarmed." He failed to offer any new information or evidence to support this dubious concept.

There were two levels of deception in Iraqi dealings with UNSCOM: concealment and false declarations on the weapons Iraq was prepared to put in play in the disarmament process. When Ritter worked for me, he was in charge of the UNSCOM unit responsible for finding and destroying the concealed weapons, and he was vilified by Iraqi leaders as their major persecutor. Now he says he has had private conversations with unspecified Iraqi officials that have persuaded him they are "qualitatively disarmed" and will accept a new monitoring program if the Security Council first lifts all sanctions against Iraq.

The facts are clear and alarming, and they do not support this assertion. Iraq has been free of any arms control or monitoring regime for almost two years, a consequence of the breakdown of consensus among the permanent members of the Security Council. Now Saddam Hussein is reconstituting his capability to deploy weapons of mass destruction. I've seen evi-



"Saddam Hussein is
reconstituting his capability to
deploy weapons of mass
destruction."

dence of Iraqi attempts to acquire missile-related tools and, even more chilling, of steps the Iraqis have taken to reassemble their nuclear weapons design team. After the Gulf War, experts assessed Iraq was only six months from testing an atomic bomb. It retains that know-how. It also has rebuilt its chemical and biological weapons manufacturing facilities.

If the United States is serious about addressing the threat current developments raise, it should insist to its fellow permanent members of the Security Council that there be a new consensus on enforcing arms control in Iraq. Selective revelations such as those recently issued by the administration need to be accompanied by a robust policy within the Security Council, making clear particularly to Russia and France that the United States is not prepared to accept their patronage of Saddam Hussein.

The writer, diplomat in residence at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, was chairman of UNSCOM from 1997 to 1999.

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FILE PHOTO/RYAN HALEY FOR THE WASHINGTON POST

Former U.N. inspector Scott Ritter, who aggressively pursued hidden Iraqi weapons, says he now believes "Iraq is qualitatively disarmed."

Ex-U.N. Inspector Ritter to Tour Iraq, Make Documentary

Invitation Offered by Saddam Hussein

By COLUM LYNCH
Special to The Washington Post

WASHINGTON POST

7/28/00 PA-18

UNITED NATIONS, July 27 — ~~Scott Ritter~~ the former U.N. arms inspector who badgered Iraq with his aggressive pursuit of hidden weapons, said he will return to Baghdad on Saturday at the invitation of President Saddam Hussein.

(12A01) The Iraqi leader has agreed to provide Ritter and a documentary film crew access to weapons facilities throughout the country so that Ritter can judge whether Iraq has rebuilt its arsenal since U.N. inspectors left 19 months ago. Ritter said he is also hoping to get an interview with the Iraqi leader.

The trip comes weeks after Ritter published an article in an arms control magazine asserting Iraq has essentially disarmed and challenging speculation by the Clinton administration that Baghdad has the capacity to reconstitute its chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs.

"My personal feeling is that Iraq is qualitatively disarmed and the Security Council should reassess its position," Ritter said in an interview.

This marks a bizarre turnaround for Ritter, who resigned from the United Nations almost two years ago in protest over the U.S. failure to support even tougher U.N. inspections. Iraqi leaders, having frequently accused Ritter of spying on Iraq for the CIA, seem to view their erstwhile enemy as an asset in their propaganda war against the United States.

12P (2)

Ritter said his reassessment of the danger posed by Iraq's weapon programs was brought about by a change in his own job title. As a U.N. inspector, he was under orders from the U.N. Security Council to achieve 100 percent disarmament regarding prohibited weapons in Iraq, a standard Baghdad never met. As an independent observer, Ritter said he believes that Iraq's military has been sufficiently degraded by the U.N. inspectors to prevent Saddam Hussein from threatening his neighbors. However, Ritter has not articulated a persuasive explanation of why he is convinced Iraq will not present a future threat to the region.

Under terms of the 1991 Persian Gulf War cease-fire, Iraq is required to forgo the development of medium- and long-range missiles, and all chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. But U.N. inspectors have not been allowed into Iraq to test whether the government has met its obligation since they left in December 1998, on the verge of a U.S. and British bombardment.

U.S. officials contend Ritter is naively allowing himself to be used by Baghdad to further its efforts to reconstitute its weapon programs and say his visit will be used to support Baghdad's claim that it has abandoned its illegal programs.

"Having Iraq host Scott Ritter for a 'thanks for the memories' documentary is lovely, but it doesn't substitute for full cooperation with the U.N. inspection regime," said national security spokesman P. J. Crowley. "They had the opportunity to cooperate with Ritter when he was actually an inspector and didn't."

The documentary project has aroused the interest of federal law enforcement authorities. Ritter said that FBI agents have followed and questioned him and the film's producer, Tom Osborne, about their contacts with Iraqi officials and warned that Baghdad would seek to manipulate them into joining the Iraqi cause or at least into presenting a more favorable portrait of the regime.

U.S. citizens are prohibited from traveling to Iraq under an embargo imposed after Iraq invaded Kuwait. Violators face up to 12 years in prison and \$1 million in fines, though there is an exemption for journalists, which Ritter maintains he meets.

Ritter said he intends to interview Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz and Oil Minister Amer Rashid, and visit existing and destroyed weapon facilities where he will investigate claims by Western intelligence sources that Iraq is developing new viral warfare agents in an underground installation.

"I thought a documentary that went in and actually gained access to these sites and interviewed the Iraqis would go a long way toward dispelling some of the rumors about Iraq's arsenal," Ritter said. "But this isn't going to be a patsy rollover thing."

Ritter said he was first invited to Baghdad last year by the Iraqi government after the publication of his book "Endgame," which argued that the continuation of economic sanctions on Iraq was more "evil" than doing business with Saddam Hussein. "They were shocked by my position in the book," Ritter said.

Ritter said that several months later, at a hearing on Capitol Hill, he met Iraqi-born American businessman Shakir Alkafaji, who had heard Ritter attack U.S. policy toward Iraq. Alkafaji asked what Ritter could do to end the sanctions and break the impasse in relations between the United States and Iraq. "I said I could do a documentary," Ritter answered.

Alkafaji, who is accompanying Ritter as a "translator and cultural adviser," secured the travel visas for the crew and agreed to put up a \$400,000 line of credit to finance the documentary.

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The Case for Iraq's Qualitative Disarmament

Scott Ritter

Efforts to resume weapons inspections in Iraq have long been at an impasse. It has been 18 months since inspectors from the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) were withdrawn from Iraq and six months since the Security Council created a successor organization to assume UNSCOM's mantle. Resolution 1284 established the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). In December 1999 and tasked with verifying Iraq's elimination of its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers.

Resolution 687, which had originally spelled out this obligation, was viewed by many in the Security Council (including Russia, France, and China) as no longer viable given UNSCOM's untidy link to Operation Desert Fox, the 72-hour aerial bombardment of Iraq conducted in December 1998. At that time, the United States and the United Kingdom had used an UNSCOM report to the Security Council that laid out the record of Iraqi non-compliance with inspections as justification for the bombing—before the Security Council had any chance to deliberate on the report and without any authorization from that body. The unfortunate fallout from this military action was that Iraq not only refused to allow the UNSCOM inspectors to return, but also rejected any future cooperation with the organization. The inspection process was dead.

In April 2000, the Security Council approved the organizational plan for the new inspectorate, in theory setting the stage for the return of weapons inspectors to Iraq. However, Iraq refuses to cooperate with either UNMOVIC or its executive chairman, Hans Blix, on the grounds that this new inspection regime is merely a repackaged version of UNSCOM. Furthermore,

Scott Ritter, former weapons inspector and chief of the concealment unit for UNSCOM, is the author of *Endgame: Solving the Iraq Problem—Once and for All*.

If the Security Council were to redefine Iraq's disarmament obligation along qualitative standards, UNMOVIC should be able to come to closure on all outstanding disarmament issues.

Resolution 1284 reduced Iraq's incentive to cooperate, stating that the Security Council would only suspend sanctions once Baghdad had complied with inspections, rather than lift them as agreed in Resolution 687. Iraq has made clear that it will never agree to anything less than the lifting of sanctions.

As the situation stands today, Iraq and the Security Council are deadlocked. There is no hope for the return of inspectors to Iraq anytime soon. With each passing day, concern increases over the status of Iraq's WMD programs because there are no inspectors in place to monitor them. Unless the Security Council can come up with a compromise, the situation will only continue to deteriorate.

What is often overlooked in the debate over how to proceed with Iraq's disarmament is the fact that from 1994 to 1998 Iraq was subjected to a strenuous program of ongoing monitoring of industrial and research facilities that could be used to reconstitute proscribed activities. This monitoring provided weapons inspectors with detailed insight into the capabilities, both present and future, of Iraq's industrial infrastructure. It allowed UNSCOM to ascertain, with a high level of confidence, that Iraq was not rebuilding its prohibited weapons programs and that it lacked the

means to do so without an infusion of advanced technology and a significant investment of time and money.

Given the comprehensive nature of the monitoring regime put in place by UNSCOM, which included a strict export-import control regime, it was possible as early as 1997 to determine that, from a qualitative standpoint, Iraq had been disarmed. Iraq no longer possessed any meaningful quantities of chemical or biological agent, if it possessed any at all, and the industrial means to produce these agents had either been eliminated or were subject to stringent monitoring. The same was true of Iraq's nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities. As long as monitoring inspections remained in place, Iraq presented a WMD-based threat to no one.

The success of the UNSCOM monitoring regime may hold the key to unlocking the current stalemate between Iraq and the Security Council. The absolute nature of the disarmament obligation set forth in Resolution 687 meant that anything less than 100 percent disarmament precluded a finding of compliance. There was no latitude for qualitative judgments. As such, the world found itself in a situation where the considerable accomplishments of the UNSCOM weapons inspectors—the elimination of entire categories of WMD and their means of production—were ignored in light of UNSCOM's inability to verify that every aspect of these programs was fully accounted for. Quantitative disarmament (the accounting of every last weapon, component, or bit of related material) took precedence over qualitative disarmament (the elimination of a meaningful, viable capability to produce or employ weapons of mass destruction).

If the Security Council were to redefine Iraq's disarmament obligation along more meaningful—and politically and technically viable—qualitative standards, UNMOVIC should be able to reconstitute UNSCOM's monitoring program and rapidly come to closure on all outstanding disarmament issues. If such a disarmament program is

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linked with the lifting of economic sanctions upon a finding of compliance, Iraq will almost certainly agree to cooperate.¹

Disarming Iraq: 1991-1998

Verifying Iraq's complete disarmament was complicated by the fact that in the summer of 1991 Iraq, disregarding its obligation to submit a complete declaration of its WMD programs, undertook a systematic program of "unilateral destruction," disposing of munitions, components, and production equipment related to all categories of WMD. When Iraq admitted this to UNSCOM, it claimed it had no documentation to prove its professed destruction.

While UNSCOM was able to verify that Iraq had in fact destroyed significant quantities of WMD-related material, without any documents or other hard evidence, it was impossible to confirm Iraq's assertions that it had disposed of all its weapons. UNSCOM's quantitative mandate had become a trap. However, through its extensive investigations, UNSCOM was able to ensure that the vast majority of Iraq's WMD arsenal, along with the means to produce such weaponry, was eliminated. Through monitoring, UNSCOM was able to guarantee that Iraq was not reconstituting that capability in any meaningful way.

Ballistic Missiles

UNSCOM achieved its most dramatic success in the field of ballistic missiles. In his December 1992 report to the Security Council, then-Executive Chairman Rolf Ekeus noted,

All ballistic missiles and items related to their production and development, identified as requiring destruction...have been destroyed...considerable progress has been made in obtaining information from Iraq about its operational use of missiles since 1980 and the importation of missile components, and hence in establishing a material balance for these missiles. If analysis of this data does not reveal inconsistencies and if the information provided is not refuted by new evidence from reliable sources, the Commission would appear to have a practically complete picture of Iraq's past SCUD-derivative missile programs.

Over the next six years, UNSCOM continued to investigate Iraq's proscribed missile programs, and while much new information was obtained, nothing ever altered the final conclusion of Ekeus' report.

Because of its success in tracking down Iraq's proscribed missile program, UNSCOM was able to turn its attention toward monitoring Iraq's indigenous missile research, development, and manufacturing capabilities a full year before any of the other weapons disciplines. As a direct result of this early foray into monitoring, UNSCOM was able to fully assess Iraq's capabilities in the field. The March 1993 inspection report of the first monitoring team spelled out the true extent of Iraq's capabilities:

There is no capability to mass produce missiles at the Centre and very little capability to produce prototypes...lack of missile design and testing experience, qualified personnel, raw materials and equipment will significantly delay the near-term development of an Iraqi produced missile system. The Team predicts that even under conditions in which they would have sufficient amount of raw material and necessary equipment it will take several years for the Centre to successfully design, produce and test a prototype missile system (solid-unguided rocket) in preparation for mass production.²

Over the years, Iraq made several efforts to acquire the additional technology needed to improve its ballistic missile capabilities. Secret deals with Russia on guidance and control equipment, with Ukraine on rocket-propulsion technology, and with Romania on guidance and control and rocket-propulsion technology were all uncovered by UNSCOM before reaching fruition. All of these covert procurement efforts, although illegal, were in support of a permitted missile system, the 150-kilometer-range *Al Samoud*, rather than a reconstitution of Iraq's prohibited long-range missile programs.³ UNSCOM's ability to detect and interdict these transactions only underscores the viability of its monitoring regime. Of note is the fact that once sanctions were lifted, such transactions would be legal as long as they were declared under the provisions of the export-import control regime set forth in Security Council Resolution 1051. Iraq would then have no reason to continue to pursue such covert (and illegal) procurement routes.

Chemical Weapons

Through its inspection activities, UNSCOM obtained reasonable information concerning Iraq's chemical weapons (CW) activities from 1981 to 1987, with the exception of data on the use of CW against Iran. Iraq consistently refused to provide details to UNSCOM regarding such use, probably because of the political fallout that such an admission would cause. While this refusal prevented a full accounting of Iraqi CW, Iraq could not still have viable CW from that period because the chemical agent would have long since deteriorated. As an internal UNSCOM working paper noted, an Iraqi declaration of CW use during the war with Iran was not required for any meaningful verification: "Taking into consideration the conditions and the quality of CW-agents and munitions produced by Iraq at that time, there is no possibility of weapons remaining from the mid-1980's."⁴

The same level of confidence did not exist concerning Iraq's CW activities during the final three years of its chemical weapons program, 1988-1991. The Iraqi leadership took a strategic decision in 1988 to improve its CW capabilities, resulting in the reorganization of the CW program. Iraq transferred precursor-chemical and CW-agent production capability from its premier production site, the Muthanna State Establishment, to alternative civilian sites in an effort to conceal its continued CW activities within Iraq's legitimate civilian chemical industry.

At the inception of the UNSCOM weapons inspection regime, Iraq put forward inaccurate and misleading declarations concerning this latter phase of CW activity. These false declarations were designed to understate the actual level of CW activity that transpired in Iraq from 1988 to 1991 and enable Iraq to retain a significant CW production capability regardless of its disarmament obligation.

UNSCOM inspectors were eventually able to uncover Iraq's incomplete declarations and track down much of the missing information regarding this critical period of Iraq's CW program. However, according to an UNSCOM presentation to the Security Council in early June 1998, there remained several priority issues that needed to be addressed before UNSCOM could issue a judgment on Iraqi compliance:

- the accounting for CW warheads for the Scud missile;
- the material balance for other Iraqi CW munitions;

- 6/24/00
- a full accounting of Iraq's attempt to produce VX nerve agent; and
 - the material balance for equipment used to produce CW agent.⁴

These were technically valid issues that needed to be addressed in order to declare a full, quantitative disarmament. But given the Iraqi record of half-truths and outright false statements, UNSCOM had difficulty accepting any declaration by

The Iraq argument appears to be solid

scale, it never weaponized stabilized VX. Producing significant stocks of VX for use on weapons that would still be viable today would have required an advance in CW technology that Iraq did not demonstrate.

Indeed, the glass-lined production equipment turned over to UNSCOM by Iraq in 1996 was intended for large-scale VX production, but it had never been used. In addition, the fact that UNSCOM conducted numerous inspections of ammuni-

UNSCOM document laid out all the possible ways Iraq could conceal a CW production capability.⁷ The document noted that Iraq could either bury precursor chemicals or distribute them throughout its commercial chemical industry to disguise their true use. Likewise, it could distribute empty dual-use munitions to depots under the cover of legitimate use, bury them, or continuously move them around in trucks. The documents required to resume CW activity could, if micro-filmed, be stored in a single briefcase.

Even more disturbing, the 1998 UNSCOM document noted that Iraq could readily distribute the main pieces of equipment needed for CW production throughout its commercial facilities, meaning that equipment that had a legitimate use in commercial chemical-related activity could also be used for CW manufacture. As long as this equipment was maintained at legitimate facilities, any hidden intent by Iraq to use it for illicit purposes would go undetected. "There is no single-use CW equipment, all pieces are dual use and could be justified at different locations," the document noted.

There was absolutely no evidence that Iraq was trying to hide CW production equipment. In its monitoring capacity, UNSCOM carried out extensive inspections of all of Iraq's civilian chemical manufacturing infrastructure and found no evidence of illicit stores of CW precursor chemicals. Precursor chemicals are difficult to hide from inspectors because the minimum amount required for any viable CW-agent production run is several hundred tons. Inspections of dozens of Iraqi munitions depots by UNSCOM also failed to turn up any illicit unfilled munitions.

However, the key to the qualitative argument is that individual pieces of CW production equipment are worthless unless they are assembled in a specific configuration, a unique combination that would be readily discernible to weapons inspectors. "Only the proper combination of different pieces of equipment in a particular configuration gives to...these pieces of equipment the status of a CW production facility," the UNSCOM document noted. The point is that all of UNSCOM's speculative fears concerning reconstitution of an Iraqi CW capability can be laid to rest as long as a viable monitoring inspection regime, one that would detect any specialized configuration of dual-use equipment, is in place—the kind of regime that existed prior to the withdrawal of inspectors in December 1998.

The key to the qualitative argument is that individual pieces of CW production equipment are worthless unless they are assembled in a specific configuration, a unique combination that would be readily discernible to weapons inspectors.

Iraq that was not backed up with documents or other verifiable evidence. The fact that Iraq maintained it did not have such documents meant that UNSCOM was faced with trying to prove a negative, which in and of itself is an almost impossible task.

What was overlooked in 1998 was the extent to which UNSCOM had actually eliminated Iraq's CW capability. The Muthanna State Establishment and most of Iraq's associated production equipment had been destroyed, either through aerial bombardment during Operation Desert Storm or under the supervision of UNSCOM inspectors. Iraq's stockpiles of CW agent had either been destroyed in the same manner or could be assumed to have deteriorated.

The two potential exceptions were VX nerve agent and mustard agent that had been loaded into 155 mm artillery shells. Iraq lied to UNSCOM about having a VX program until confronted in 1995 with irrefutable evidence that it had developed a capability to produce VX. In 1996, Iraq turned over specialized glass-lined production equipment associated with its VX program, which UNSCOM then destroyed.

The remaining question over Iraq's VX program hinges on the discovery of chemical traces unique to stabilized VX on several destroyed Scud warhead fragments that were excavated by UNSCOM in early 1998. Iraq disputes this finding, admitting that while it did succeed in producing stabilized VX on a laboratory

tion depots, chemical production plants, and potential storage areas, using some of the most sensitive chemical detection technology available, and found no trace of CW agent minimizes the likelihood that Iraq maintains any significant stockpile of VX weapons.

The other issue is the mustard-filled artillery shells. Iraq declared to UNSCOM that it had a stockpile of 13,500 such shells on the eve of the Persian Gulf War. UNSCOM supervised the destruction of 12,747 of these shells, and Iraq declared that the remaining shells had been destroyed by aerial bombardment of two storage sites during Desert Storm. UNSCOM could find no evidence of any destroyed 155 mm shells at the main storage area, but it did discover four intact artillery shells lying on the ground in one of the storage sites. The mustard was tested and found to be 94-97 percent pure—a viable weapon. Given the purity of the mustard, UNSCOM made finding the remaining shells a priority.

Iraq denies having retained these shells; but regardless a few hundred 155 mm mustard shells have little military value on the modern battlefield. A meaningful CW attack using artillery requires thousands of rounds. Retention of such a limited number of shells makes no sense and cannot be viewed as a serious threat.

Far more important to assuring Iraq's qualitative disarmament is disabling its production capability—a task that at first glance seems almost impossible. A 1998

Biological Weapons

Perhaps the most misunderstood member of Iraq's WMD family, the biological weapons (BW) program has been described by Richard Butler, UNSCOM's executive chairman from July 1997 to June 1999, as "a black hole." One of the principal reasons for such a bleak assessment is the prevailing atmosphere of mistrust that has clouded the issue from the start. Iraq denied having a BW program until June 1995, when UNSCOM confronted Baghdad with evidence of massive procurement of growth media that could not otherwise be explained. Even so, Iraq refused to admit it had an offensive BW program until after the 1995 defection of Hussein Kamal, the son-in-law of Saddam Hussein and former head of Iraq's WMD programs. At that time, Iraq admitted to having weaponized 25 Scud warheads and 157 bombs.

Despite the fact that UNSCOM destroyed the totality of Iraq's declared production facilities, equipment, and raw material associated with BW in 1996, UNSCOM experts, backed up by panels of qualified scientists from around the world, found Iraq's declarations regarding BW to be inadequate "scientifically, technically, militarily, and managerially." The primary point of contention was the inability of the experts to verify, based upon the available documentation, most of the declarations made by Iraq concerning both the scope of the Iraqi BW program and what the Iraqis maintained they unilaterally destroyed in 1991. Inspectors could not account for the material balance for supplies, equipment, and material for the BW program, the production of BW agent, and the production of munitions (i.e., the filling of empty munitions with BW agent). The most frustrating aspect of this issue was that unlike the CW inspectors, who had hard facts contradicting the Iraqi position on VX, the BW inspectors had no evidence of Iraqi non-compliance; they simply refused to accept the Iraqi declaration as valid without records, documents, and physical evidence.

Because of this lack of substantive information, the BW inspection group implemented the most intensive of all UNSCOM's monitoring regimes, drawing in dozens of sites ranging from those involved in vaccine and pharmaceutical work to university-level research laboratories to beer-brewing factories and animal-feed production plants (which could conceivably be converted to mass-produce BW agent). Detailed protocols for each site were developed, and teams of highly

trained biologists combed these sites repeatedly for any sign of wrongdoing by Iraq. But while UNSCOM and Iraq faced off over the inadequacies of the Iraqi BW declaration, the biologists responsible for monitoring Iraqi compliance found exactly that—compliance. In all of their inspections, the monitors could find no meaningful evidence of Iraqi circumvention of its commitment not to reconstitute its BW program.

Even "spectacular" finds, such as the widely publicized surprise inspection of the National Food and Drug Examination Laboratory in September 1998, which resulted in exposing the existence of "Staff 7" (also known as the Biological Activities Staff) of the Special Security Organization, turned out to be more ordinary than originally thought. "Staff 7" was responsible for testing the food and other material brought in contact with Saddam Hussein and other senior government officials, nothing more.

One of the conclusions drawn from the extensive monitoring of Iraq's biological capabilities carried out by UNSCOM was that the overall level of Iraq's biological capability, in terms of available infrastructure, was very low. Vaccine and pharmaceutical development and manufacture had deteriorated dramatically because of the continued economic sanctions, and without a massive infusion of money and technology, they would continue to do so. The reality of the situation was that, regardless of UNSCOM's ability to verify Iraq's declarations regarding its past BW

programs, the major BW production facility at Al Hakum had been destroyed, together with its associated equipment, and extensive monitoring of Iraq's biological infrastructure could find no evidence of continued proscribed activity. If weapons inspectors were once again allowed back into Iraq to resume monitoring along the lines carried out by UNSCOM, there is no reason to doubt that similar findings would be had, with the same level of confidence.

Nuclear Weapons

Under the arrangements set forth in Resolution 687, responsibility for overseeing the disarmament of Iraq's nuclear weapons capability was given to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Often overlooked in the debate about Iraq's nuclear capabilities is just how effective the IAEA was at destroying, dismantling, or rendering harmless Iraq's nuclear weapons capability. Despite every attempt by Iraq to retain some level of nuclear weapons capability, the massive infrastructure Baghdad had assembled by 1991 to produce a nuclear bomb had been eliminated by 1995. Al Atheer, the nuclear weaponization facility, had been destroyed—blown up under IAEA supervision—and all other major facilities related to Iraq's nuclear weapons program had either been dismantled or were subjected to one of the most stringent forms of ongoing monitoring and verification inspections ever implemented under a disarmament accord.



An UNSCOM inspector is decontaminated with water after taking samples from 155 mm mustard shells. UNSCOM made CW destruction a priority because of Iraq's highly sophisticated CW agent.

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By 1996, the IAEA had established a seamless monitoring-based inspection regime that provided absolute certainty Iraq would not be able to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program short of acquiring a complete nuclear weapon abroad. While black-market transactions relating to the proliferation of nuclear weapons material is a serious issue, it is well beyond the mandate of IAEA inspections inside

possessed in
tinued posses by Iraq of "a 20-kiloton nuclear bomb." UNSCOM had no choice but to take the allegation seriously. According to the defector, Iraqi security forces maintained a fleet of some 150 Mercedes trucks that were dedicated to transporting material associated with the Iraqi nuclear weapons program. These trucks were maintained in at least five depots around the Baghdad area. The defector provided

Coordination between UNSCOM and the IAEA on this issue during the summer of 1997 resulted in the dismissal of the basic premise that Iraq had a "20-kiloton nuclear bomb." All evidence, including testimony from Hussein Kamal, clearly established that Iraq had not manufactured a nuclear weapon by the time of the Gulf War. In response to a question from the IAEA as to whether Iraq had tried to produce a bomb and whether such efforts were ongoing, Hussein Kamal replied,

No one knows for sure what has transpired in Iraq since the last inspectors were withdrawn. Conjecture aside, however, there is absolutely no reason to believe Iraq could have meaningfully reconstituted any element of its WMD capabilities in the past 18 months.

Yes, but not now, before the Gulf War. First they studied 12 ton, then 9 ton and then 5 ton. These are weights of a device which they would make suitable for delivery. These were only studies.... All the time they worked to make it smaller but had never reached a point close to testing."

Iraq. There has been no evidence provided of any attempt by Iraq to acquire a nuclear weapon or major related components since 1991. (Iraq has attempted to acquire some dual-use items, fueling speculation about its intent, but all items were minor and would not have had any meaningful impact on a full-scale nuclear weapons effort.) Furthermore, given the high quality of the IAEA monitoring approach in Iraq, any such items, if not detected outright by IAEA inspectors, would have to be hidden by the Iraqis in a fashion that would preclude their use in any covert rearmament activity because any such attempt at rearmament would be discovered by the monitoring inspections.

Despite the effectiveness of the IAEA at eliminating Iraq's nuclear capabilities, rumors of Iraq possessing a nuclear device persist. The main cause of such speculation is information provided by an Iraqi defector from the security services who fled Iraq in 1995 and came to the attention of UNSCOM in early 1997. The defector, to whom UNSCOM gained access through cooperation with supporting governments, possessed information pertaining to the methods and units used by Iraq to conceal its retained proscribed weapons from UNSCOM and the IAEA.

This information, especially as pertaining to the Military Industrial Commission Security Service, proved to be unerringly accurate and established the defector as a valid and potentially valuable source.¹⁹ Based upon the defector's proven credibility, when he later provided UNSCOM with secondhand information about Iraq's con-

detailed descriptions of the vehicles, including color schemes and license plate numbers, as well as information on convoy movement and the vehicle makeup of convoys associated with the movement of the "bomb."

Rolf Ekens decided the defector's report should be thoroughly investigated. At the same time, the IAEA was involved in ongoing technical discussions with their Iraqi counterparts about gaps in the information provided by Iraq concerning its nuclear program. It was thought that the defector's report might also help answer some of the IAEA's remaining questions.

Of particular concern was incomplete information concerning the status of the final Iraqi design for a nuclear bomb and the disposition of design drawings and molds for the manufacture of the high-explosive lenses needed for an implosion device. The IAEA noted that several critical drawings were missing and that there was an inconsistency in the Iraqi story about the lens program. Iraqi authorities at first stated that, because their final nuclear weapon design called for the outer dimensions of the device to be reduced from 120 centimeters to less than 80 centimeters (in order to fit in the warhead of a Scud-type missile), the effort never went beyond the design stage as Iraqi engineers struggled to shrink the weapon. The Iraqis then conceded that they had in fact cast some lenses for testing purposes, and the IAEA and UNSCOM speculated that it was possible Iraq had manufactured three or four sets of high-explosive lenses.

Nevertheless, continued inconsistencies in the Iraqi story, combined with the refusal of the Iraqi side to provide the IAEA with an overall design concept of the nuclear device, made it prudent to examine every report that hinted at continued concealment activities on the part of Iraq. However, both UNSCOM and the IAEA were in agreement that for the defector's report to be credible, the material in question could only be components of a 20-kiloton device, not an actual bomb. Since 1998, the IAEA has gained access to additional documentation, in the form of log books pertaining to the production of high-explosive lenses, that further clarifies the issue of high-explosive lens manufacture by Iraq, thus eliminating one of the main concerns fueling speculation that Iraq continued to possess major nuclear weapon components.²⁰

In conclusion, it is highly unlikely that the defector's claims concerning an Iraqi nuclear bomb are accurate. Unfortunately, speculation that Iraq has retained some nuclear capability simply will not go away. It is conceivable that Iraq could have retained certain components of a nuclear device. However, there is no credible evidence of this, and even if such material were retained, it would be of no use to Iraq, given the extent to which Iraq's nuclear program was dismantled by the IAEA. The best way to ensure that Iraq does not reconstitute its nuclear weapons program is to get IAEA inspectors back into Iraq, where they can resume their task of monitoring Iraqi compliance.

Iraq Today

The absence of weapons inspectors in Iraq since December 1998 has created a vacuum of available data on which to base an assessment of Iraq's current activities. Rushing to fill this void have been a series of speculative reports that have attributed certain capabilities to Iraq that are incompatible with what UNSCOM learned from eight years of experience with Iraq's WMD programs. The truth of the matter is, devoid of weapons inspections, no one knows for sure what has transpired in Iraq since the last inspectors were withdrawn. Conjecture aside, however, there is absolutely no reason to believe that Iraq could have meaningfully reconstituted any element of its WMD capabilities in the past 18 months.

From a WMD perspective, Iraq today is not the Iraq of 1991. What took Iraq decades to build through the expenditure of billions of dollars could not, under any rational analysis, have been reconstituted since December 1998. Iraq's nuclear enrichment infrastructure has been reduced to zero, and Iraq lacks the funding, technology, and time required to reconstitute it. In theory, some practical work could have been carried out in the field of high-explosive lens development, but any serious effort would require the diversion of controlled stocks of specialized explosives that had been used for manufacturing the lenses, something that would be readily discerned once IAEA inspectors return to work.

In addition to the fact that UNSCOM was thoroughly monitoring all activity related to the Al Samoud missile project, the major facilities related to the development efforts of this permitted missile system were bombed and either destroyed or heavily damaged during Operation Desert Fox. When, in the summer of 1999, the CIA detected signs of reconstruction at these facilities, the Clinton administration immediately warned of an imminent threat. However, such assessments were not shared by the scientists and technicians of UNSCOM, who knew Iraq's capabilities better than anyone. One study, prepared in July 1996 by a British missile expert, set the tone for all reports that followed:

Even given a relaxation of the sanctions program, if there are no quantum jumps in the level of technology available to [Iraq], it should be many years before an indigenously designed, 150 kilo-

meter range, Iraqi missile has the integrated range/payload/accuracy to militarily threaten even the immediate region.¹³

Nothing has transpired since 1996 that could remotely be construed as a "quantum jump" in Iraq's ballistic missiles capabilities.

Some U.S. government officials, media pundits, and former UNSCOM staff (including Rolf Ekroos and Richard Butler) fear that Iraq ~~if it indeed retained all the~~ material that some in UNSCOM believe possible, could readily reconstitute its chemical and biological agent production capabilities. However, manufacturing CW would require assembling production equipment into a single integrated facility, creating an infrastructure readily detectable by the strategic intelligence capabilities of the United States. The CIA has clearly stated on several occasions since the termination of inspections in December 1998 that no such activity has been detected. The Iraqis do have enough equipment to carry out laboratory-scale production of BW agent. However, without an infusion of money and technology, expanding such a capability into a viable weapons program is a virtual impossibility. Contrary to popular belief, BW cannot simply be cooked up in the basement; it requires a large and sophisticated infrastructure, especially if the agent is to be filled into munitions. As with CW, the CIA

has not detected any such activity concerning BW since UNSCOM inspectors left Iraq.

CIA assessments alone cannot certify that Iraq has no weapons of mass destruction; national intelligence systems have failed to detect WMD efforts in Iraq in the past. But because of the work carried out by UNSCOM, it can be fairly stated that Iraq was qualitatively disarmed at the time inspectors were withdrawn. While no one can say for certain what has transpired inside Iraq since then, the resumption of monitoring-based inspections would easily determine if Iraq had made any effort to reconstitute its WMD programs.

Moving Forward

Iraq has not fully complied with the provisions of Security Council Resolution 687. On this there is no debate. However, this failure to comply does not automatically translate into a finding that Iraq continues to possess weapons of mass destruction and the means to produce them. Resolution 687 demanded far more than the dismantling of viable weapons and weapons-production capabilities. Most of UNSCOM's findings of Iraqi non-compliance concerned either the inability to verify an Iraqi declaration or peripheral matters, such as components and documentation, which by and of themselves do



UNSCOM inspectors verify the declared number of 155 mm CW artillery projectiles in an Iraqi storage area. Iraq often refused to provide UNSCOM inspectors with information about its CW program.

UNSCOM was unable to verify many aspects of Iraq's CW program
13P (7)

not constitute a weapon or program. By the end of 1998, Iraq had, in fact, been disarmed to a level unprecedented in modern history, but UNSCOM and the Security Council were unable—and in some instances unwilling—to acknowledge this accomplishment.

Unfortunately, the quantitative standards for Iraqi compliance set forth in Resolution 687 are still in place today in the form of Resolution 1284, which emphasizes verifying material balance over resuming viable monitoring activities. This is a formula for disaster, perpetuating the cycle of conflict with Iraq that led to the discrediting of UNSCOM. UNMOVIC will meet the same fate unless the Security Council takes measures to refocus the inspection regime on disarmament issues related to viable weapons and weapons-production capability, instead of engaging in a never-ending effort to account for every last vestige of Iraq's former WMD programs. UNMOVIC should move rapidly to the more important task of monitoring Iraq to ensure that its dismantled weapons programs are not reconstituted.

In this vein, ~~Hann~~ Blix should target his inspections carefully. Blix has made clear his desire to continue the same inspection tactics employed by UNSCOM, including no-notice inspections and aerial surveillance. While such rights are at the core of any credible on-site inspection regime, UNMOVIC's no-notice inspections should focus on facilities that have a legitimate bearing on WMD research, development, and manufacture. Blix should avoid pressure to continue aggressive inspections aimed at Iraqi presidential and security sites. Such inspections have historically produced little to do with disarmament, and given the misuse of sensitive information gathered by UNSCOM from such sites in the past, they would be viewed with mistrust not only by Iraq, but also by many members of the Security Council.¹⁴

One serious obstacle to the reformulation of Iraq's disarmament obligation by the Security Council is the current U.S. policy of removing Saddam Hussein from power, codified in the Iraqi Liberation Act of 1998. That law has so far failed to threaten Saddam Hussein in any meaningful way, but it has succeeded in precluding any meaningful diplomatic initiative by locking the United States into a unilateral policy that makes cooperation with Iraq impossible. If the United States is serious about disarming Iraq, it should repeal the Iraqi Liberation Act and work

within the framework of the Security Council to formulate a policy that results in the rapid reintroduction of meaningful, monitoring-based weapons inspections into Iraq.

That will require the lifting, not simply the suspension, of sanctions. While it is true that the sanctions have retarded Iraq's ability to acquire technology that could aid any WMD reconstitution effort, Resolution 687 stated that a finding of compliance would trigger the lifting of sanctions. Sanctions are thus not an open-ended option. At some point, they will need to be lifted, and if a finding of qualitative disarmament backed with the implementation of viable monitoring-based inspections, can be had, then there is no reason to keep sanctions in place.

The Security Council must also follow through on the promise it made in paragraph 14 of Resolution 687, which speaks of regional disarmament. While monitoring-based inspections in Iraq must be expected to last indefinitely, they cannot be expected to last in a vacuum. Unless arrangements are made to address WMD programs in Iran and Israel, as well as the regional proliferation of advanced conventional weaponry, Iraq will never accept perpetual disarmament.

What is needed is a Security Council resolution that concludes Resolution 687, supersedes Resolution 1284, and redefines the disarmament obligations of Iraq to meet more realistic qualitative benchmarks. In addition to verifying Iraqi compliance with these new benchmarks, the resulting inspectorate, whether a revamped UNMOVIC or a new agency, would be tasked with implementing a monitoring regime similar to the one UNSCOM had in place prior to its withdrawal from Iraq. Once Iraq's disarmament along clearly defined qualitative standards had been verified by weapons inspectors, and after a viable monitoring regime was in place to detect and deter any attempt at reconstituting its WMD programs, the Security Council would lift, not suspend, economic sanctions.

Refocusing inspection goals and objectives would not only capitalize on UNSCOM's many accomplishments in rooting out and disposing of Iraq's prohibited weapons, it would also help the Security Council regain some of its lost credibility and resume its role as a viable overseer of international peace and security. It also meets the original intent of the Security Council to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs, not its leadership. Such a policy, built on the precepts

of diplomatic engagement, would promote peace and security more than any other alternative policy currently being considered. And that, of course, is what arms control and disarmament are all about.

NOTES

1. Author conversations with Iraqi government officials in 1999 and 2000.
2. The Non Al Haytham Missile Research and Design Center, which took over responsibility for Iraq's permitted ballistic missile programs in the aftermath of the Gulf War.
3. Azad Velday, "TMT-1 Monitoring Inspection Report," 14 March 1993, UNSCOM internal document.
4. Resolution 687 permits Iraq to possess ballistic missiles with a range of 150 kilometers or less, as well as the means to produce them.
5. Igor Mitrokhin, "Concealment Aspect—Chemical Weapons—20 January 1998," UNSCOM internal document.
6. Presentation by UNSCOM to the Security Council, June 3, 1998.
7. Mitrokhin, *op. cit.*
8. Richard Butler, *The Greatest Threat: Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Growing Crisis in Global Security*, Public Affairs: New York, 2000, p. 81.
9. Richard Spertzel, "Presentation of Biological Weapons Related Issues to the Security Council, 3 June 1998," p. 1.
10. The Military Industrial Commission Security Service, also known as the *Amn al-Tasnia*, is responsible for military-industrial facility and personnel security.
11. "Conversation *à la tête* with Lieutenant General Hussein Kamal Hassan al-Majid, 22 August 1995, 1:00-3:00 p.m., Amman, Jordan," UNSCOM internal document, p. 4.
12. A separate investigation concerning the existence of a hide site near the Iraqi city of Najaf used to store materials relating to Iraq's dismantled centrifuge enrichment program was carried out by the IAEA and UNSCOM using information from the same defector—information that was, if anything, more detailed than that of the truck convoys. This investigation refuted the defector's information, casting a shadow over the viability of his other information.
13. UNSCOM ballistic missile team, "A Note on the Capabilities of Iraqi Machine Tools and Production Processes," Internal UNSCOM document, July 8, 1996, p. 6.
14. Operation Desert Fox made extensive use of information gleaned from UNSCOM inspections in targeting presidential palaces and security and military facilities throughout Iraq.

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 12/15/2004

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302
Ser. 2

On December 11, 2004, JACK KEMP was interviewed at his residence in Bethesda, Maryland. In attendance were Special Agents [redacted] and Assistant United States Attorneys of the Southern District of New York, [redacted] and [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents, KEMP voluntarily provided the following information.

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KEMP wrote a column in 1997 or 1998 about the situation in Iraq where he suggested that the weapons inspectors should be allowed back in to conduct a robust mission of unencumbered spot checks. If nothing was found in six months, the sanctions against Iraq could be lifted. KEMP "covered his butt" by also suggesting that if the Iraqis did anything negative towards another country, the sanctions would be back on.

KEMP reported that [redacted] knew [redacted] and [redacted] KEMP might have met [redacted] several times after he wrote the column but had no meetings of any importance with [redacted]. The idea of a trip to Iraq was brought up by [redacted] and [redacted] told KEMP to "back off the idea" and "do not touch this with a ten foot pole."

As far as how KEMP initially became aware of [redacted] KEMP stated that [redacted] told KEMP that he knew a businessman who agreed with him on Iraq. KEMP learned that [redacted] knew [redacted] [redacted] contacted KEMP after seeing his column and the two met for coffee in New York. The meeting was not arranged by [redacted].

In late 1999, [redacted] asked KEMP if he wanted to go to Iraq. [redacted] also spoke with [redacted] and [redacted] about the trip. KEMP responded that he would love to go and went to [redacted] with the idea. About three months later, [redacted] and [redacted] turned the trip down. KEMP told [redacted] that the trip was not a good idea and it was not right to go against the Clinton administration. [redacted] was aware that KEMP knew a lot of people in the US government. [redacted] traveled back and forth to Iraq and KEMP knew that [redacted] would take his letter to TARIQ AZIZ. KEMP went to [redacted] before writing the letter to AZIZ. The purpose of the letter, as encouraged by [redacted] was to

Investigation on 12/11/2004 at Bethesda, MDFile # 97A-NY-290079Date dictated 12/15/2004

by SA [redacted]

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97A-NY-290079

Continuation of FD-302 of Jack Kemp, On 12/11/2004, Page 2

see if there was any interest by the Iraqis in allowing the inspectors back in with the ultimate goal of having the embargo lifted and implementing KEMP's idea of an Islamic Marshall Plan.

[redacted] mentioned that AZIZ would be interested in this move and was more moderate than SADDAM HUSSEIN. AZIZ might be the one who could convince Baghdad to make foreign policy changes. KEMP told

[redacted] "if they are interested, I'll take it to [redacted] and [redacted]. Opinion leaders such as [redacted] and [redacted] wanted to avert war with Iraq but [redacted] told KEMP, "Drop it!" KEMP met AZIZ in New York and took a picture with him but did not have much time to engage AZIZ in conversation.

When questioned about a document previously provided to the interviewing agents by KEMP, KEMP stated that when he wrote "one opportunity," he was referring to the new Bush administration and the new approach on foreign policy. When KEMP wrote, "godspeed," he stated that he always used that term when anyone would be traveling.

When questioned about a letter from [redacted] to [redacted] dated February 29, 2000, KEMP stated that he never told [redacted] any names of individuals with whom he discussed the Iraq issue; he did not name drop. KEMP told [redacted] that "my friends" said that it was not a good idea to travel to Iraq. [redacted] knew KEMP had friends in the government. KEMP was concerned about having discussions concerning Baghdad and US government officials over an international telephone line.

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When questioned about KEMP telling [redacted] "Do not give up," KEMP responded that this was a typical comment by KEMP and he continued to say that talking was better than war.

When questioned about a timeline of calls and meetings with [redacted] KEMP stated that the entry of a 1:00 A.M. telephone call must be a typographical error on the part of his secretary for he might have spoken with [redacted] while [redacted] was in Iraq but KEMP reiterated that he was careful not to speak with [redacted] on an overseas line for fear of being monitored by the NSA. KEMP did not recall a telephone call from [redacted] about how his trip to Baghdad was going.

When questioned about [redacted] notes from a February 22, 2000 meeting with KEMP, KEMP stated that CSIS does not refer to the Canadian Secret Intelligence Service but the Center for Strategic

[redacted] knew that KEMP communicated with people in the US government but KEMP did not tell [redacted] with whom he met. KEMP simply stated that the trip to Iraq was not a good idea. KEMP stated that [redacted] and [redacted] did not know [redacted] name and believes that they, nor [redacted] ever met [redacted] KEMP never mentioned [redacted] name to [redacted] in an overt, official way but might have. [redacted] never asked KEMP to send a message to [redacted] Before [redacted] told KEMP to drop the idea of a trip to Iraq, KEMP told [redacted] that he had a friend who traveled back and forth between Baghdad and the US and asked if there was any attempt or would it be a good idea if we could find out if the Iraqis would let the inspectors in without a carrot at the end. [redacted] told KEMP that he would check and one or two months later, telephoned KEMP and told him to drop the idea. During that time, between the conversations with [redacted] KEMP never told [redacted] about talking with [redacted] but was sure that [redacted] told people about KEMP's connection to the US government.

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Continuation of FD-302 of Jack Kemp, On 12/11/2004, Page 5

During an October 2001 meeting with [REDACTED] KEMP had no recollection and added that it was not possible that he told [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] asked about him [REDACTED] probably surmised that KEMP was talking to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and KEMP knew that [REDACTED] was talking to AZIZ. KEMP never wanted his name discussed on the telephone and thought that [REDACTED] exaggerated regarding his contacts in Iraq. KEMP reiterated that he would not mention [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] to [REDACTED]

Regarding notes from a November 2001 meeting, KEMP stated that he never said to [REDACTED] that Iraq was in no danger, never referred to "people who count" and did not provide a "rebuttal letter" to [REDACTED] KEMP also stated that he never delivered meeting notes to [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] but might have to [REDACTED]

When questioned about whether KEMP considered writing an op-ed article to the New York Times in response to comments made by JAMES WOOLSEY about Iraq's connection to the September 11th terrorist attacks, KEMP stated that he had no recollection of this and added that he would not attack WOOLSEY.

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In the time leading up to war with Iraq, KEMP had fewer discussions with [REDACTED] told KEMP that he had a request from high levels in Baghdad to find out if there was anything they could do to avert war. KEMP did not deliver the response he had received because he thought it was too sensitive to share. The response had been that there was nothing the Iraqis could do short of SADDAM HUSSEIN stepping down. [REDACTED] never gave KEMP an understanding of the US policy towards Iraq; he was simply not privy to this information.

When asked if [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that KEMP was speaking with [REDACTED] KEMP responded that he might have. KEMP was leery because he did not want [REDACTED] to give [REDACTED] the impression that KEMP's messages came from the US government.

KEMP saw and article about the United Nations (UN) Oil-for-Food (OFF) program [REDACTED] and reported that [REDACTED] said the Iraqis asked [REDACTED] to do something, grease somebody's palms, and then he would get an oil allocation. [REDACTED] told KEMP that [REDACTED] never did this "something." When KEMP asked [REDACTED] if [REDACTED] had registered with the Department of Treasury, [REDACTED] told KEMP that [REDACTED] had.

(Rev. 08-28-2000)

~~SECRET~~ / ~~NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: [REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: SSA [REDACTED]

Attn: IOS [REDACTED]

Attn: SSA [REDACTED]

NS15

b1
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b7C
b7D
b7E
b3

From: [REDACTED]

I-22

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

dkk

Case ID #: [REDACTED]

Title: [REDACTED]

Synopsis: [REDACTED] To provide reporting on [REDACTED]

Derived From: G-3

Declassify On: X1

Administrative:

ASSET: [REDACTED]

DATE OF CONTACT: [REDACTED]

CONTACTED BY: SA [REDACTED] and SA [REDACTED]

RELIABILITY: [REDACTED]

Has provided reliable
information in the past

Details: [REDACTED] IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME
CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~ / ~~NOFORN~~

UPLOADED

TEXT

OUTTEXT

14/21/04

DEC 1 2004

FBI

(S)

~~SECRET / NOFORN~~

b1
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b3

To: Counterterrorism From: [REDACTED]
Re: (S) [REDACTED]

ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOURCE. RECIPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO
ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF
THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE
COORDINATED WITH FBI [REDACTED]

X

X

X

X

X

X

~~SECRET / NOFORN~~

~~SECRET / NOFORN~~

(S) To: Counterterrorism From: [redacted]
Re: (S) [redacted]

b1
b7D
b7E
b3

Set Lead 1:

[redacted]

(U)

AT [redacted]

(S) Information is being provided to [redacted] for whatever investigative merit [redacted] deems appropriate.

Set Lead 2:

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U)

(S)

Read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET / NOFORN~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-02-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Iraqi President Warns Of Intervention in War

BAGHDAD, Iraq, June 26 (Reuters) — President Saddam Hussein called today for new moves to end Iraq's war with Iran, saying there was a risk of foreign intervention in the conflict.

Mr. Hussein, in a message to a Soviet-sponsored antinuclear conference in Prague, said, "The war provides pretexts for armed foreign intervention, which may turn the Gulf into an area of confrontation and collision."

He appealed for "any new initiative or proposal that would bring a speedy end to the war."

199M-N44

1427-

209

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

PAGE A9

NEW YORK TIMES

N.Y., N.Y.

Date: 6/27/83

Edition: LATE ED.

Title: IRAQI PRESIDENT WARNS
OF INTERVENTION IN WAR.

Character:

or

Classification:

Submitting Office:

199-1427(SUB.A)

NYO

Indexing:

199-1427(SUB.A)-2

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED

JUN 27 1983

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b7C

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 09/14/2005

To: New York

Attn: SA [REDACTED]
Squad CD-20

From: [REDACTED]

T1

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED] vca

Case ID #: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

(S)

Title: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

00 [REDACTED]

b1
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b7D
b3

(U) Synopsis: ~~(S)~~ Lead covered.

(U)

~~(S)~~

~~Derived From : G-3
Declassify On: X1~~

(S)

(S)

(S)

SADDAM HUSSEIN.

still in power in Iraq.

HUSSEIN while HUSSEIN was

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 05-02-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-02-2036

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 09/22/1997

To: FBIHQ

Attn: NSD, NS-3A

SSA [REDACTED]

New York

Attn: Newburgh R/A, I-5

SA [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]

NSD-4

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Ext [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

(S)

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

ae

(S) Case ID #: [REDACTED]

Title: (S) [REDACTED]

OO: [REDACTED]

(S) Synopsis: (S) [REDACTED]

Classification: This Document is ~~classified SECRET~~ in its
~~entirety~~ unless otherwise marked.

(U) Details: (S) CAVEAT: Part of the information set forth in this
communication was furnished by highly sensitive, reliable and
singular in nature source reporting. Extreme caution should be
utilized in the reporting of this information to protect and
maintain the continued operation of the source. Dissemination

~~Classified by: G-3~~

~~Reason: 1.5c~~

~~Declassify on: X-1~~

~~SECRET~~

b1
b6
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b7E
b3

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
(01/26/1998) WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 05-02-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-02-2036

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 04/27/2000

To: [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]

I-40

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

:lkb

Case ID #:

~~(SECRET)~~

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(S)

Title: (SECRET)

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 05/05/2000

To: [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]

I-40

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]: lkb

Case ID #: ~~(SECRET)~~

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(S)

Title: ~~(SECRET)~~

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(S)

To:

[REDACTED]

From:

[REDACTED]

Re:

~~(SECRET)~~

[REDACTED]

(S)

[REDACTED]

(U)

~~(S)~~ The source advised that the IMUN will host a celebration in honor of SADDAM HUSSEIN's birthday on Friday, 4/28/2000, at 8:00 p.m. Many members of the Iraqi community in the New York area are invited to attend.

(S)

[REDACTED]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 01/16/2001

To:

From:

I-40

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

akk

Case ID #:

(S)

Title: (~~S~~)

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(Rev. 08-28-2000)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 05-02-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-02-2036

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 01/18/2001

To:

From:

Squad I-40

Contact: SA

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Approved By:

Drafted By:

Case ID #:

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Title:

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(S) To: [redacted] From: [redacted]
Re: (S) [redacted]

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(S) [redacted]

(U) Synopsis: (S) Results of asset contact [redacted]

(U) (S) ~~Derived From : G-3~~
~~Declassify On: X1~~

Administrative: (S)

ASSET: [redacted]

DATE OF CONTACT: [redacted]

CONTACTED BY: SA [redacted]

SA [redacted]

RELIABILITY:

Has provided reliable
information in the
past.

(U) Details: (S) IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTE TO THE SOURCE. RECIPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH FBI [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

[redacted] the latest offer by SADDAM HUSSEIN
of 100 million Euros to Americans living below the poverty level.

(S) [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 09/15/2000

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [REDACTED]

SSA [REDACTED]

New York

Attn: I-40

SA [REDACTED]

From: Detroit

CI-1/JTTF

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

(S) Case ID #: (S) [REDACTED]

(S) Title: (S) [REDACTED]

(U) Synopsis: (S) Summary translation of 08/16/2000 "Al-Jezira" interview of Scott Ritter in New York in English.

(U) (S) Derived From : G-3
Declassify On: X1

(U) Details: (S) On 08/16/2000, "Al-Jazira", satellite TV station from Doha, Qatar, conducted an interview in New York of Scott Ritter, the former UN American weapons inspector.

(U) (S) As per Detroit Language Specialist [REDACTED] the dialog of the interview is as follows:

(U) (S) The following is a summary translation of the "Al-Jazira" Arabic channel program "Bila-Hodood" (Without Borders), that was aired on Wednesday August 16th, 2000, at 14:05 hrs. The program is hosted by Mohammed Kreishan and featured an interview with Scott Ritter.

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(S) To: Counterterrorism From: Detroit
Re: (S) [redacted] 09/15/2000 b1
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newspaper had reported that this documentary was financed by an Iraqi businessman, Shaker Al-Khafaji. He added that Khafaji had placed the sum of \$400,000.00 in Ritter's account to produce this documentary. Ritter answered that Khafaji is an Iraqi American and holds the U.S. citizenship and that the money is of American origins. He added that he challenges anyone to prove otherwise. Ritter said that this documentary needed financing and no one was brave enough to supply the cash except Khafaji. Ritter is worried about Khafaji who still has a family in Iraq. He added that Iraq is not responsible for this film and the money to finance it was a loan and not a grant.

(U) (S) (5) In the past, while a member of the inspection team, Ritter delivered some harsh statements against the Iraqi leadership. The interviewer asked Ritter whether he noted any changes during his last trip to Iraq in the opinions of the Iraqi leadership with Scott Ritter. His answer was that his interactions with the Iraqi leadership while an inspector for the UN was minimal and any interviews were arranged by the inspection committee. He believes that Tariq Aziz represented the Iraqi viewpoint and their meetings were filled with animosities. Even though Ritter did not agree with Aziz on several issues, none of them tried to overcome the other. He described Aziz as intelligent, emotional, and an educated man.

(U) (S) (6) In regard to any feelings of fear upon his return to Iraq to film his documentary, Ritter claims that his trip was sanctioned by Iraqi officials and he will not apologize for his past statements or actions regarding the Iraqi Government. This film is not about the Iraqi leadership or the politics of that region, it is about the weapons of mass destruction and the Security Council should not condemn 22 million people based on the actions of their government. Ritter added that his return to Iraq was a dangerous venture that no one is willing to take, however, he was greeted with respect and cooperation.

(U) (S) (7) In order to remove the dark cloud placed upon the Iraqi regime, Ritter believes that his trip was essential to change the world's opinion of Iraq. Ritter claims that he tried to arrange for an interview with Saddam Hussein to include in the documentary, however, was not successful. If he was able to

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(S) To: Counterterrorism From: Detroit
Re: (S) [redacted] 09/15/2000 b1
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interview the Iraqi leader, Ritter believes that Western political figures would have given this film much more importance.

(U) (S) (8) In regard to Ritter's past statements about Iraqi officials' misleading actions while the inspectors were in place, he said that he does not allow anyone to mislead him and his resume speaks for itself. The film is centered around the truth and relays the opinions of many. It is made for educational purposes and targeted to the American audience.

(U) (S) (9) Ritter's conscience is clear and he had performed his UN task with honesty and was controlled by the Security Council. He believes that the inspection effort had lost its integrity due to outside interference.

(U) (S) (10) Ritter believes that Richard Butler's statements regarding the presence of weapons and the capability to produce these weapons was an irresponsible act. He testifies that Iraq does not have the capabilities nor the weapons any longer and Butler's statements were like fuel to the fire to keep the sanctions against 22 million innocent Iraqis in place.

(U) (S) (11) Ritter believes that the current American policy calls for Saddam's ousting to facilitate removal of sanctions and that Butler was a tool for the U.S. to implement its decisions.

(U) (S) (12) Ritter believes that as long as the U.S. is part of the Security Council, no decision to remove sanctions will be achieved as long as Saddam remains in power. He adds that some persons within the CIA know the truth about Iraq, however, no one in his right mind will support Iraq as long as the current American policies are in place against Iraq.

(U) (S) At this point, the interviewer started accepting telephone calls.

(U) (S) - Saleh Hasan from Sweden said the following:

(U) (S) Shaker Khafaji lives in the U.S. and it is the right of every Iraqi to finance a film in support of Iraq.

~~SECRET~~

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: [REDACTED]

To: Counter terrorism

Attn: [REDACTED]

SSA [REDACTED]

Attn: I-40

Attn: NS-15,

SA [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]

CI-1

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

gjs

(S)

(U) Case ID #: [REDACTED]

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(S) Title: [REDACTED]

(S)

OO:NY

Synopsis: Asset reporting.

(U) (S)

~~Derived From : G-3~~

~~Declassify On: X1~~

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date:

To:

From:

Squad I-40

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By: dkk

Case ID #: (S)

(S) Title: (S)

(U) Synopsis: (S) Results of asset contact

(U) (S) ~~Derived From : G-3~~
~~Declassify On: X1~~

Administrative:

(S) (S) ASSET:

(S) DATE OF CONTACT:

(U) (S) CONTACTED BY: SA

(S) RELIABILITY:

SA
Has provided reliable
information in the past

(U) Details: (S) IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOURCE. RECIPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF

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To: [redacted] From: [redacted]
Re: (S) [redacted]

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THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE
COORDINATED WITH [redacted]

[Large redacted area]

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(01/26/1998)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 05-02-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-02-2036

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 02/14/2001

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: CTD/ [redacted] Rm. 5437

Atlanta

Attn: Squad 3

SSA [redacted]

Boston

Attn: CT-1

SSA [redacted]

Detroit

Attn: Squad CT-1

SSA [redacted]

Honolulu

Attn: Squad 7

Houston

Attn: CT-1

SSA [redacted]

New York

Attn: Squad I-40

SA [redacted]

San Juan

Attn: CT

SSA [redacted]

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From: Newark

Squad C-10/JTTF

Contact: SA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

hcf

(S) Case ID #: (S) [redacted]

(S) Title: (S) [redacted]

(U) Synopsis: (S) To provide receiving field offices with background information and to set leads for ELSUR references to be reviewed.

(U) (S) ~~Derived From : G-3~~
~~Declassify On: X1~~

(U) [redacted]

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(S) [redacted]

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(S) To: Counterterrorism From: Newark
Re: (S) [redacted] 02/14/2001

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(S) Reference: (S) [redacted]
(S)

(U) Administrative: (S) Attached to this E/C are results of ELSUR checks conducted by FBIHQ as referenced above.

X

(S)

(S)

(S) (S) Receiving field offices are requested to review attached ELSUR results and related files and report any relevant information, regarding [redacted] to Newark.

(U) (S) Newark notes that some of the ELSUR information is dated and may not be available.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date:

To:

From:

I-40

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By: dkk

Case ID #:

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Title: ~~(S)~~

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(U)

Synopsis: ~~(S)~~ Results of asset contact

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date:

To:

From:

I-40

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By: dkk

Case ID #:

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Title: ~~(S)~~

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
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To: [redacted] From: [redacted]
Re: (S) [redacted]

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(U)

Synopsis: (S) Results of asset contact [redacted]

(U)

(S) ~~Derived From: G-3~~
~~Declassify On: X1~~

Administrative:

(S)


(U)

(S) ASSET: [redacted]
(S) DATE OF CONTACT: [redacted]
(S) CONTACTED BY: SA [redacted]
(S) RELIABILITY: Has provided reliable
information in the past

(U)

Details: (S) IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTE TO THE SOURCE. RECIPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH [redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date:

To:

From:

I-40

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By: dkk

Case ID #:

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Title: ~~(S)~~

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(U) Synopsis: ~~(S)~~ Results of asset contact

(U) ~~(S)~~ Derived From : G-3
~~Declassify On: X1~~

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(12/31/1995)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 05-03-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lst
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-03-2036

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: [REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [REDACTED]

SSA [REDACTED]

Attn: CI-2

SA [REDACTED]

Attn: I-40,

SSA [REDACTED]

SA [REDACTED]

Attn: NS-15

From: [REDACTED]

CT-1/JTTF

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

(S)

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

tam

Case ID #: [REDACTED]

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(S) Title: [REDACTED]

(S) Synopsis: [REDACTED]

(U)

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~~Derived From : G-3~~

~~Declassify On: X1~~

(S) Reference: [REDACTED]

(S)
(S)

Administrative: (S) Arrangement made between [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date:

To:

From:

Squad I-40

Contact:

Approved By:

Drafted By:

ibv

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Case ID #:

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Title: ~~(S)~~

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(S) To: [redacted] From: [redacted]
Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

(U) Synopsis: ~~(S)~~ To report results of Asset contact.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Derived From: G-3
~~Declassify On: X1~~

Administrative:

(S) ~~(S)~~ ASSET: [redacted]
~~(S)~~ DATE OF CONTACT:
(U) ~~(S)~~ CONTACTED BY: SA [redacted] and
~~(S)~~ RELIABILITY: SA [redacted]
A CONTACT WITH INDIRECT
ACCESS WHO SPOKE IN
CONFIDENCE BUT DOES NOT HAVE
AN ESTABLISHED REPORTING
RECORD.

(S) Details: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] advised that the Intelligence Services
in Iraq can be cruel and are used against people who speak out
critically of SADDAM HUSSAIN or the regime. People have been
murdered for making negative statements.

(S) [redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date:

To:

From:

Squad I-40

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

Case ID #:

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Title: ~~(S)~~

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Synopsis: ~~(S)~~ Results of asset contact

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date:

To:

From:

I-40

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

dkk

Case ID #:

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Title: (S)

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To: [redacted]

From: [redacted]

Re: (S) [redacted]

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(S) [redacted]

(U)

Synopsis: (S) Results of asset contact [redacted]

(S) ~~Derived From : G-3~~
~~Declassify On: X1~~

Administrative:

(S)

(S) ASSET: [redacted]

(S) DATE OF CONTACT: [redacted]

(U)

(S) CONTACTED BY: SA [redacted]

(S) RELIABILITY: [redacted]

Has provided reliable
information in the past

(S) Details: (S) IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTE TO THE SOURCE. RECIPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

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To: [redacted]

From: [redacted]

Re: [redacted]

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(S)

[redacted]

~~(S)~~ Source said that some of the signals from Iraq are mixed concerning the terrorist incidents. For example, TARIQ AZIZ has sent condolences to pro-Iraqi groups and individuals such as VOICES IN THE WILDERNESS and former US Attorney General RAMZY CLARK. On the other hand, SADDAM HUSSEIN has been gloating over the attacks. According to [redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date

To:

From:

I-40

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

dkk

Case ID #:

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Title:

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(U) Synopsis: (S) Results of asset contact

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Derived From: G-3

Declassify On: X1

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(S) To: [redacted]
Re: (S) [redacted] From: [redacted]

(S)

[redacted]

(S)

ODAY

(S)

HUSSEIN'S newspaper, 'The Babel', is putting forth its own theory on the 11 September 2001 attacks. The newspaper reported that the Israeli Mossad and a bunch of rogue Israeli officers were behind the attacks. The article also said that a bomb went off inside the Pentagon and that it was not hit by a plane [redacted]

(S)

[redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date:

To:

From:

I-40

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

dkk

Case ID #:

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Title: ~~(S)~~

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Synopsis: ~~(S)~~ Results of asset contact

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~~Derived From: G-3~~

~~Declassify On: X1~~

Administrative:

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ASSET:

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(S) To: [redacted] From: [redacted]
Re: (S) [redacted]

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(U) (S) DATE OF CONTACT: [redacted]
(S) CONTACTED BY: SA [redacted]
(S) RELIABILITY: Has provided reliable
information in the past

(U) Details: (S) IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTE TO THE SOURCE. RECIPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date:

To:

From:

Squad I-40

Contact: SA

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Approved By:

Drafted By:

Case ID #:

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Title: ~~(S)~~

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(U) Synopsis: ~~(S)~~ Results of asset contact

(S) ~~Derived From : G-3~~
~~Declassify On: X1~~

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~~SECRET~~

(S) To: [redacted] From: [redacted]
Re: (S) [redacted]

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Administrative:

(S) (S) ASSET: [redacted]
(S) DATE OF CONTACT: [redacted]
(S) CONTACTED BY: SA [redacted]
(S) RELIABILITY: SA [redacted]
Has provided reliable
information in the past

(U) Details: (S) IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOURCE. RECIPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH [redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date:

To:

From:

Squad I-40

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

Case ID #:

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Title: ~~(S)~~

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(U) Synopsis: ~~(S)~~ Results of asset contact

~~(S)~~

~~Derived From : G-3~~

~~Declassify On: X1~~

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~~SECRET~~

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(S)

To: [redacted] From: [redacted]
Re: (S) [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] The source added that the primary goal of the IIS is to protect SADDAM HUSSEIN.

(S)

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date:

To:

From:

I-40

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By: dkk

Case ID #:

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Title: (S)

(S)

(U) Synopsis: (S) Results of asset contact

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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b7E
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Precedence: ROUTINE

Date:

To:

From:

I-40

Contact: SA

Approved By:

(S)

Drafted By:

dkk

(S) Case ID #:

(S) Title:

(U) Synopsis: Results of asset contact.

~~(S) Derived From : G-3~~

~~(U) Declassify On: X1~~

Administrative:

(S) ASSET:

(S) DATE OF CONTACT:

(U) CONTACTED BY: SA

(S) RELIABILITY:

Has provided reliable
information in the past

(U) Details: IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOURCE. RECIPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S)

To: [redacted]
Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted]

From: [redacted]

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(U)

~~(S)~~ Source provided a copy of the AL-MAHJAR newspaper, volume 9, 26 April 2002, which contained an article covering SADDAM HUSSEIN'S birthday party, held at the Ambassador's residence on 28 April 2002. Included in the article were photographs taken at the party of the following attendees:

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~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date:

To:

From:

I-40

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By: dkk

Case ID #:

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(S)

Title:

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(S)

(U) Synopsis: Results of asset contact

(U)

~~Derived From : G-3
Declassify On: X1~~

Administrative: .

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: [REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: SSA [REDACTED]
IOS [REDACTED]
Attn: SSRA [REDACTED]
North County RA

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From: [REDACTED]

Squad I-40

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED] kyb

(S) Case ID #: (S) [REDACTED]
(S) [REDACTED]
(S) [REDACTED]

(S) Title: (S) [REDACTED]
OO: [REDACTED]

(U) Synopsis: (S/NF) Results of source reporting on [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] a U.S. citizen.

(U) (S) ~~Derived From : G-3~~
~~Declassify On: X1~~

(S) WARNING: IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF
ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THESE SOURCES AND NO ACTION TAKEN
WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY [REDACTED]
(S) [REDACTED] FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION,
ESPECIALLY THE ENCLOSURES, MUST BE COORDINATED WITH [REDACTED] IF
DISSEMINATED, THE MATERIAL MUST BE SUITABLY PARAPHRASED TO
PROTECT THE SOURCES.

(S) [REDACTED]
X

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date:

To:

From:

I-40

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

dkk

Case ID #:

Title:

Synopsis: Results of asset contact
February).

Derived From : G-3
Declassify On: X1

Administrative:

ASSET:

DATE OF CONTACT:

CONTACTED BY: SA and SA

RELIABILITY:

Has provided reliable
information in the past

Details: IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOURCE. RECIPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date:

To:

From:

I-40

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By: dkk

(S) Case ID #: ~~(S)~~

(S) Title: ~~(S)~~

(U) Synopsis: ~~(S)~~ Results of asset contact

(U) ~~(S)~~ Derived From : G-3
Declassify On: X1


Administrative:

(S) ~~(S)~~ ASSET:
~~(S)~~ DATE OF CONTACT:
(U) ~~(S)~~ CONTACTED BY: SA and SA
~~(S)~~ RELIABILITY: Has provided reliable information in the past

(U) Details: ~~(S)~~ IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOURCE. RECIPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH

~~SECRET~~

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date:

To:

From:

I-40

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

np

Case ID #:

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Title: ~~(S)~~

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(U)

Synopsis: ~~(S)~~ Results of asset contact.

(U)

~~(S)~~

~~Derived From: G-3~~

~~Declassify On: X1~~

(U)

Administrative:

(S)

~~(S)~~

Asset:

(U)

~~(S)~~

Date of Contact:

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~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: [REDACTED]

To: [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]

I-40

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

dkk

(S) Case ID #: (S) [REDACTED] (S)

(S) Title: (S) [REDACTED]

FCI-IRAQ

(U) Synopsis: (S) Results of asset contact.

(U) (S) ~~Derived From: G-3~~
~~Declassify On: X1~~

Administrative:

(S) (S) ASSET: [REDACTED]

(S) DATE OF CONTACT: [REDACTED]

(S) CONTACTED BY: SA [REDACTED] and SA [REDACTED]

(U) (S) RELIABILITY: [REDACTED]

and SA [REDACTED]
Has provided reliable
information in the past

(U) Details: (S) IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOURCE. RECIPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH [REDACTED]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: [REDACTED]

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To: [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]

I-40

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

dkk

(S) Case ID #: (S) [REDACTED] (S)

(S) Title: (S) [REDACTED]

(U) Synopsis: (S) Results of asset contact.

(U) (S) ~~Derived From : G-3~~
~~Declassify On: X1~~

(S) Administrative:

(S) ASSET: [REDACTED]

(S) DATE OF CONTACT: [REDACTED]

(S) CONTACTED BY: SA [REDACTED] and SA [REDACTED]

(U) (S) RELIABILITY: [REDACTED]

Has provided reliable
information in the past

(U) Details: (S) IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOURCE. RECIPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH [REDACTED]

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(S)

To: [redacted]
Re: (S) [redacted]

From: [redacted]

(S)

[redacted]

(S) ~~(S)~~ Source stated that on a recent television broadcast from Iraq, DR MINA KHAMAS was seated next to SADDAM HUSSEIN. [redacted]

[redacted] Source believes her to be associated with issues dealing with depleted uranium and its alleged effects on Iraqi children. Source views the television broadcast as another indication of her good access to SADDAM HUSSEIN.

(S)

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~/ORCON/NOFORN

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

DATE: 05-13-2009
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/rs
REASON: 1.4 (c)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-13-2034

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 05/30/2004

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: ITOS II
SC M. Chris Briesse
ASC [REDACTED]
UC [REDACTED]

From: Counterterrorism
Baghdad Operations Center
Contact: SSA [REDACTED]

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Approved By: Piro George [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED] tmi

Case ID #: (U) 315E-HQ-1448534 (Pending)

(U) Title: ~~(S)~~ DESERT SPIDER
IT - IRAQ

Synopsis: (S) [REDACTED]

(U) Derived From : G-3
Declassify On: X1

Details: (S/OR/NF) [REDACTED]

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(S) [REDACTED]

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(S) [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~/ORCON/NOFORN

6/3/04

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315E-KA-1442534

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 JG LAG/SAB/TS
ON 05-15-2009

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This medium is classified

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U.S. Government Property

5707(1-97)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 05-13-2009 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/rs

FD-340 (Rev 4-11-03)

File Number _____

Field Office Acquiring Evidence _____

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received _____

From _____

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

(City and State)

By _____

To Be Returned ☐ Yes

☐ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes

☐ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes

☐ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes

☐ No

Title:

Reference: _____

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☐ Original notes re interview of

315E-HA-1448534

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-13-2009 BY 80324 uc law/sah/rs

b7E

315E-HR-1448534

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/rs
ON 05-13-2009

b7E

This medium is classified

SECRET

U.S. Government Property
Protect it from unauthorized
disclosure in compliance with
applicable executive orders,
statutes, and regulations.

SF 707 (1-87)

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 315E-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence FBI BAGHDAD

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received 4/24/04

From
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

FBI OPERATIONS CTR
(Address)

b6
b7C

BAGHDAD, IRAQ
(City and State)

By

To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☒ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☐ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes ☐ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes ☐ No

Title:

DESERT SPIDER;
IT-IRAQ

Reference: _____
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☒ Original notes re interview of

SHADMAN HUSSEIN



Mrs. Beggs
28:55

4/24/04

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SADAM'S ~~WILLINGNESS~~ states
the direction changed from
dialogue to question. I
realized the Q were being
asked in an intelligence
and governmental form.

I Am a captive
Here, I am completely
captive. When I say I
am Pres. of my country &
elected by my people.
Therefore, the Q were if
historical the Q were if
was historical, they would
have been.

The P of a President
should be able to be
accused

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 05-13-2009 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/rs

I only have to do my
name, like name

Based on this I have what
we have discussed has
been sufficient

Therefore, for historical
purposes I have
discussed them
ble to continue would
create a conflict I
do not want.

Therefore I think we
should stop at this
point.

G: what I'd like you to
think about one
next few days is
that the purpose 7-2

no speaking to you was
path for history
benefit to you,

G^o "with my first opening
I found a person
of whom
I know the
man + proved that
was.

G^v "What one thing I can
do is give an
discussion in a fair
look and recognize
and be on his (Hiss's)
side of it there are
not a lot on your side
from the CIA + rest
the world

G: I'd like you to
think about that
and maybe we
can discuss this
in the near future

G: As I told you earlier,
Genevieve

G: Think about that
discuss it, my
and we'll have
an opportunity to
talk about it

END

4156

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 315E-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence _____

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received 05/30/2004

From Saddam Hussein

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

Baghdad, Iraq

(Address)

(City and State)

By

[Redacted]

To Be Returned ☐ Yes

☒ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes

☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes

☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes

☒ No

Title:

Reference: EC.TMI.05302004

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☐ Original notes re interview of

[Redacted]

b7E

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 315E-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence _____

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received 5/19/04

From Saddam Hussein
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

Baghdad, Iraq
(City and State)

By

To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☒ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes ☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes ☒ No

Title: Operation Desert Spider
IT-IRAQ


Reference: 315E-HQ-1448534 - 73
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☐ Original notes re interview of

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b7E

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-14-2009 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/rs



b7E

[Redacted text block]

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 315E-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence _____

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received 5/19/04

From Saddam Hussein
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

Baghdad, Iraq
(City and State)

By

To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☒ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes ☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes ☒ No

Title: Operation Desert Spider
IT-IRAQ

Reference: 315E-HQ-1448534 -73
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☐ Original notes re interview of

b6
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File Number 315E-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence _____

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received 5/19/04From Saddam Hussein

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

Baghdad, Iraq

(City and State)

By _____

To Be Returned ☐ Yes☒ NoReceipt Given ☐ Yes☒ NoGrand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure☐ Yes☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes☒ No

Title:


Operation Desert Spider
IT-IRAQReference: 315E-HQ-1448534 -73

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☐ Original notes re interview ofb6
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b7E

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-18-2009 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/rs



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(Title)

(File No.)

315E-010-1448534

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 315E-HQ-1448534-302 1A1

Field Office Acquiring Evidence FBI BAGHDAD

Serial # of Originating Document 29

Date Received 3/28/04

From SSA [Redacted]

FBI OPERATIONS CENTER
(Address) b6 b7C

BAGHDAD, IRAQ
(City and State)

By SSA [Redacted]

To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☐ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☐ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes ☐ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes ☐ No

Title: DESERT SPIDER;
IT-IRAQ

Reference: _____
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☐ Original notes re interview of

- (1) CD ROM LABELED "COPY, MONITOR #1, 3/28/04, 315E-HQ-1448534,
DEPICTING INTERVIEW OF SADDAM HUSSEIN
- (2) CD ROM LABELED "COPY, MONITOR #2, 3/28/04, 315E-HQ-1448534,
DEPICTING INTERVIEW OF SADDAM HUSSEIN

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-18-2009 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/rs





(File No.)

315E-NQ-1448534-

[illegible]

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 315E-HQ-1448534 - 302 - 1A2

Field Office Acquiring Evidence FBI BAGHDAD

Serial # of Originating Document 30

Date Received 3/28/04

From SSA

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

FBI OPERATIONS CENTER

(Address)

BAGHDAD, IRAQ

(City and State)

By SSA

To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☐ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☐ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes ☐ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes ☐ No

Title: DESERT SPIDER
IT-IRAQ

Reference: _____
(Communication Enclosing Material)


Description: ☐ Original notes re interview of 3/30/04,



(1) CD ROM LABELED "COPY, MONITOR #1, 315E-HQ-1448534,"

DEPICTING INTERVIEW OF SAADAM HUSSEIN

(2) CD ROM LABELED "COPY, MONITOR #2, 3/30/04, 315E-HQ-1448534,"

DEPICTING INTERVIEW OF SAADAM HUSSEIN







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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 07/19/2005

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: ITOS II/ISLU

From: Charlotte

Squad 6

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

(U) Case ID #: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534 ⁴¹ (Pending)

(U) Title: ~~(S)~~ Desert Spider;
IT - Iraq

Synopsis: (U) To cover lead.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Classified By: ~~11109, ITOS II/CTD~~
Reason : ~~1.5(c)~~
Declassify On: ~~X1~~

(U) Reference: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534 Serial 9

(S) Details: ~~(S)~~ The above referenced EC requested all Field
Offices to review [REDACTED] interviews and canvass all
logical sources for any information regarding potential war
crimes committed by the former Hussein Regime. The request was
disseminated to all agents/TFOs working CTD matters within the
Charlotte Division.

Charlotte considers leads 9.1 and 9.2 covered.

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~~SECRET~~

(U) To: Counterterrorism From: Charlotte
Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534, 07/19/2005

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT ITOS II

(U) Read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 06/12/2004

BARZAN IBRAHIM HASAN AL-TIKRITI (Blacklist #38), Presidential Advisor and former Director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), was interviewed at his place of residence, a U.S. military detention facility in Baghdad, Iraq.

Prior to any questions being asked, BARZAN was advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and told they were from Washington, D.C. BARZAN was informed that the interviewers were interested in obtaining additional information regarding former Iraqi President, SADDAM HUSSEIN, who is his half-brother. Before any questions could be asked, however, BARZAN stated that he had been interviewed a hundred times. He began asking a number of questions and making several comments indicative of his anger at being confined in the military detention facility. He claimed that he has been cooperative and was not hiding anything.

Concerning HUSSEIN's general behavior while serving as President of Iraq, BARZAN characterized it as "bad." However, rather than volunteering examples, he told the interviewers to ask him specific question and he would answer.

BARZAN acknowledged he was the former Director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) between 1979-82. He recalled that in 1979, he was present at a meeting of Ba'ath Party officials presided over by HUSSEIN. During the meeting, HUSSEIN announced that a coup had been uncovered and that several members of the Ba'ath Party had conspired with individuals from Syria to overthrow him. HUSSEIN directed a staff member to read the names of the conspirators. BARZAN acknowledged that when the names were read, the guards escorted the individuals out of the room. He was emphatic in his assertions that these individuals were actually involved in an authentic conspiracy to assist Syrian president, HAFEEZ ASSAD, to overthrow the Iraqi regime. He was, however, unable to provide any details to support this assertion, claiming that the service he was in charge of dealt with foreign intelligence exclusively, not domestic issues.

Investigation on 06/09/2004 at Baghdad, Iraq

File # 315E-HO-1448534 ~~CHB~~ ⁻¹⁴⁶ Date dictated 06/10/2004

by SSA [redacted]
SA [redacted]

b6
b7C

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Barzan Ibrahim Hasan al-Tikriti, On 06/09/2004, Page 2

When BARZAN was asked about the disposition of the conspirators, he advised they were tried, convicted and sentenced to death. At first, he denied being present during the executions. However, after continued discussion, BARZAN finally disclosed that HUSSEIN had directed that a Ba'ath Party member from each of the conspirators's districts be present at the executions which were conducted at the Ba'ath Party office in the Mansour district of Baghdad. After initially leading the interviewers to believe that he knew little about these executions, BARZAN acknowledged he had witnessed approximately 20-30 of them. However, he adamantly denied participating in these executions, despite witness accounts to the contrary. Although BARZAN claimed to know little about the executions, he was convinced that they were not unlawful. He reiterated his opinion that all the conspirators, including ABU KHALAD al-SAMMARI, who was in prison at the time of the alleged plot, were guilty. When the interviewers suggested to BARZAN that he may have taken part in these executions out of fear of HUSSEIN or out of a desire to ingratiate himself with him, BARZAN reiterated that he was not involved in the executions, and he was not afraid of HUSSEIN.

BARZAN characterized his relationship with HUSSEIN as official in nature. He stated that HUSSEIN was careful not to allow either him or his half-brother, WATBAN, any "margin." By this, he meant that HUSSEIN wanted to avoid granting them special privileges, since it might encourage them to expect or request more.

BARZAN recalled that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b7C

After completing his assignment as the Director of the IIS in 1982, BARZAN retreated to a farm where he ran a lucrative business selling chicken eggs. In 1988, HUSSEIN appointed him to be the Iraqi Ambassador to Switzerland, a position he held until 1998. BARZAN claimed that shortly after HUSSEIN appointed him to this post, he (HUSSEIN) regretted it because he realized he could not easily control BARZAN.

1988
WgC
5/10/05

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Barzan Ibrahim Hasan al-Tikriti, On 06/09/2004, Page 3

When BARZAN subsequently wrote an article for a newspaper in Baghdad (owned by OUDAY HUSSEIN) offering suggestions on how Iraq could become a better country, he was rebuked by OUDAY and others and accused of having become too Westernized. HUSSEIN asked BARZAN if he had been brainwashed. Later, HUSSEIN attempted to lure BARZAN back to Baghdad with the promise of becoming either a Minister of Intelligence or Minister of Foreign Affairs. When BARZAN declined the offer, HUSSEIN requested an explanation. BARZAN responded that he simply wanted to be left alone. In reality, BARZAN was skeptical of HUSSEIN's motives. He believed that HUSSEIN perceived him as a threat because of his close relationship with the Swiss, the U.S. and with members of the Revolution Command Council (RCC). BARZAN believed that if he accepted a Minister's position in Baghdad, HUSSEIN would find a reason to remove him. Accordingly, BARZAN decided to remain in Switzerland.

After 1979, HUSSEIN'S personality changed significantly. Many of HUSSEIN's "mistakes" occurred after he began avoiding the RCC. Although HUSSEIN had previously been fair, patient and polite, he became increasingly impatient and was often in a hurry. If a subordinate was working on a task for HUSSEIN which required eight hours to complete, HUSSEIN wanted him to complete it in half that time. BARZAN pointed out that HUSSEIN did not travel, nor did he appear to read newspapers. He surrounded himself with "hypocrites and yes men" such as ALI HASSAN AL-MAJID, aka "CHEMICAL ALI." As a result, HUSSEIN received poor information and advice. BARZAN claimed he was very direct with HUSSEIN in pointing out mistakes. However, HUSSEIN ignored BARZAN's advice.

BARZAN stated he has not committed any crimes, nor has he directed others to do so. He denied taking part in any executions. He further denied having any knowledge or involvement in conducting experiments on prisoners using biological or chemical substances. He stated that prisons were never an area of his responsibility.

Although BARZAN repeatedly denied committing crimes against anyone, he claimed that his life would be in jeopardy if he were released and had to live in Iraq. He feared that Iraqi citizens might falsely accuse him of committing atrocities and kill him. When asked to explain why Iraqi citizens would target him specifically, BARZAN intimated that

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Barzan Ibrahim Hasan al-Tikriti, On 06/09/2004, Page 4

his connection with the Ba'ath Party and prior government service would be enough for Iraqis to seek revenge against him. He added that it is not uncommon for some angry and emotional Iraqis to kill innocent people, only to discover later they made a mistake.

At the conclusion of the interview, BARZAN stated that he has long been a friend of the U.S. He added, "you (meaning the U.S.) need a friend." He made it clear, however, that to be of service, he would have to be provided a safe refuge outside of Iraq.

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 315E-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence FBI BAGHDAD

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received 6/09/04

From [Redacted] (Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

FBI BAGHDAD OPERATIONS Center
(Address)

BAGHDAD, IRAQ
(City and State)

By SSA [Redacted]

To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☐ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☐ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes ☐ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes ☐ No

Title: DESERT SPIDER;
IT - IRAQ

Reference: _____
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☒ Original notes re interview of

BARZAN IBRAHIM HASAN AL-TIKRITI
(BLACKLIST #387)

BARZAN NOTES

31 DEC invest term

[REDACTED]

BARZAN WILL NOT

COME TO IRAQ UNTIL WE ARE DONE

DETAINES

[REDACTED]

BARZAN

she tried to call B. in Geneva

- SAOTIA, SAID who you call?

" SAID AM. RESCUE DOWN, BARZAN

WILL KNOW where we are in American will know

KUWAIT

cut neck / better than cutting substance
income

ALI HASSAN - Iranian Hussar

BARZAN PARTIS

CONSPIRACY, SYRIAN

20/30

Court investigation, PUBLICLY NAMED,
OFFICIALS

20-30

50 CASES OF

BEGINNING OF 80's, day

SOLO BARZAN FOR CHEAP PRICE

SOLO BARZAN, ICSP7 HUSSAR KAMAL

B G8 REBEL WHO KICKED PASSIONARY OUT

RECEIVED RESPONSIBILITY OF I.S.

SHEIL 2 AM
SHEIL MURKIN

asked not to die after Sharon

83 → 10 TIMES

AFTER ALL DISASTER, IATGUS STILL

LIKE HIM, OTHERS WERE RIGHT LOS^{es} were

SATIN ALL MISTAKE NOT AGAIN IF CS

S. MISTAKE #1 Run

D #2 don't use TI-2003
TO CHANGE DIRECTION

ALWAYS IN HURRY, NO PATIENCE TO BUILD A POSITION
ON DATE W/ PROBLEM

Not enough information, no TRAVEL, REAS
REASONS, MISSTAKE, STRUCTURE TV

- Close HYPOTHESIS + YES MAN
- CAN'T HELP HIM

CSM
1 ABOVE ~~ANY~~ ABOVE OTHERS

VERY OFFICIAL / MARKIN WOULD BE FLEXIBLE

RED BRIGADE

Protocol, SURVIVANT AND RAC
w/ FRENCH

GERMAN - ~~WEST~~ WEST

~~ISRAELI~~ AUSTRALIA

BRITISH AND M-5

90% / IMAGIS CIRCULAR

PROPAGATE IN EFFICIENT

ALL PASSION

IZARA AL DUN

~ VOAY, HUSNI MURBAIC BELLY DANCER

- DING
SEC

message, ① don't send

SAATH
PASSION

MEMOS

WE KNOW
HOW TO ASACH
GOOD SOLUTION

② PASSION TOLD THEM TO ORGANIZE
A SMALL OFFICE FOR B IN
REPUBLICAN CENTER

HAPPY NO OBLIGATION

NEVER ENTERED

RETURN TO GENEVA: CENSOR, BROKER

IF I ISRAEL AMB; postpone if
PASS

UAE SPEIK

WASTED FAIRING PARTNER NOT FAITHFUL
DIDN'T GO TO WORK OFFICE

SEND MEMBER OF HIS GOV TO AMB LEADERS &
EUROPE, BUREAU CLOSER

ASSASSINATING MARCO 1982

SHO / HIZB DAWA

Shaul Twaiz

Abdul Aziz

HALALOTA NEWS NOT 100 BUT
100S OF PEOPLE TO DO 17 BECAUSE
17 IS A HALVE ACTION

COULD ASK FOR NOT HIRACATE, PUNISH
SPSAL ON

ALI HASAN SHOUTING THREATEN PEOPLE
BECAUSE HE DON'T KNOW HOW TO
PRESSURE TO THEM

SEARCHED

SINCE NOT OPTION, IRAQI PEOPLE WON'T ACCEPT.

RAY WAS RIGHT BUT DIDN'T EXPLAIN
WAR START

- CIA give info

- TELL U.S. TEAM TO GO OUT

AFTER B RESIGNED SAME TEAM
M.I. GEN TOOK OVER

WILLING TO GO

شريف

شريف

UDAH, 90% KILLED

BUT IN SAME TUNNEL ACCEPT PROPOSAL OR
AGAINST THEM, TALKED WORKING AGAINST THEM

RECEIVE PROPOSAL, DON'T ENTER THE TUNNEL
AND PASS-THROUGH AND COME OUT OTHERWISE
SAME AS THEM

9 GENEVET: AND MUSTACHES
[- NOT TALKING - DON'T INVOLVE
ANY INTERNAL MATTER EXTERNALLY,
- GOOD RELATIONSHIP w/ IC-AND + SHIP
SU AS FAR FROM DANGER
+ GOOD RELATIONSHIP w/ ARMY

"SAME COLOR AS THEM"

[REDACTED] WARNING THEM

INTERIOR MINISTER, TELEGRAM, COME TO SAKHON
MA. PER. REFUSE NICELY (MAYBE YOU SAME
COLOR AND FIRE
STAY NOT WANT AS PARTNER
WILL TALK YOU AND FORS YOU

2 AUGUST / MAY 1940 SHALL TALK PLACE OF
LOCATION, ASKED HIM VERY NICE, HIGH
LAW MEN, NICE TALK.
3 MONTHS SENDS MEAT TO LOCATION

LEFT ID DNR WHEN BAZZAN MADE
MENTION OF MISTAKE

- POLIDS
- MOSSY
- SPINCE
- GUY CATERER
- HUGO HENRY
- WISE CHEST

SELFISH

CHANGE VERY FAST

#2 ALL

11/1/19

SADDER, BAZZAN WONT COME BACK

- 20 year old impact politics
- KERRY PUT X
 - CAN'T BEAM EVEN MORNING
 - RESPECTED COUNTRY, IN 12 CASE

WJ
Futuh Barzan Ibrahim
HASAN AL-TIKRITI

th
6/8/04

Defining Moment (BL# 38)

Abul Hasan, by he brought Hussein Karam
a dinner, and gave him highest
position that it was against [unclear]

~ Saddam disagreed.

Hussein said he would
feel shame if the
didn't transfer me
(when

He forgets all the ^{things I did to} support
(Saddam) I gave him.

all of Saddam's behavior is bad.
M. Ministers agree.

US aid to Iran 8



b6
b7C

Date

No.

1999

SMITH Different then
I was I scared
I didn't shoot anyone.

I saw the execution @ 20-30
but didn't participate.

Story about T-12

is friend w/ Sheikh Zayed
UAE

Humor

Son

If Saddam knows or doesn't know
doesn't matter - Action by
Ministers are his responsibility
He ~~is a President~~ Minister
work and make decisions
in his name.

Holabiz with darkest point in
Iraq history.

It's just humanity,
patriotism, yes against
innocent people.

I saw him when I
was in Switzerland

Spann was in a hurry - analogy of work done in 17 hrs
Spann had no patience for people who want

ENVIRONMENTAL
FIGHTING IS
BZZZ module \leq HAS ~~POOR~~ INFORMATION NO.
POOR

- He didn't ~~travel~~ travel
- He didn't read newspapers - no satellite (dot)
- He chose hypocrite type men
like Ali Hassan Majid

Abdul Rani

9) Shannon & Weaver
Inter.

Interim
G3
Common of the
Korean things
+
Isell Soc

He asked why I refused
I said please leave me alone

I didn't go work for SADDAM

I was in Rec over 3300 members

Date

No.

SADDAM'S Achilles

My Relationship w/ was official - no margin - he was always ^{was} taking on inch and a mile) advantage.

If I said no to my son many said day later
If I refused, I would be killed -

Shortly after SADDAM sent me to Syria
he knew he had made a mistake
he wanted to keep me far away from
REC b/c I good relat w/ them -
By I develop a good relationship w/ Swiss,
Americans

MAY 2001 I was present at last
meeting Bath PT.

I wrote an article, I make
a better
IQ.
It's very hard for IQ No.

I sent it to Hammer.

Long time. So he sent it
to the President.

What's happened to you
Ham. What's been happening to you
Since then? I was just the US

Q. Over 91

I spent a lot of time

trying to convince
Hammer to make
French 90% of the way, be-
cause I was to write a
response to the Swiss
note. I was to write a
note to the Swiss
to ask them
to follow
you.

[like G.

Date

No.

After this, Shannon didn't
want me to visit. Don't
~~ignore me but ask~~
~~others about me~~

Example

Sammon's mistakes occurred
when he began ^{Date} avoiding
the Rec

He used to be polit -
like a sponge

When 2nd in command,
he was fair & inclusive

As obvious, he doesn't like to
work with a team

While in Surtgen,
Pres Secty sent me a

telegram from SAOON¹⁹⁷³ asking

why in a TV interview
I didn't _____

Bargan afraid that he will
not be safe if released
here in IRAQ.

- 1 -

b6
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 06/09/04

On 06/03/2004 ABD AL-TAWAB MULLAH HUWAYSH was interviewed at a detention facility in Baghdad, Iraq by Special Agent [redacted] of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Observing the interview were US Government representatives [redacted]. After being advised of the purpose of the interview, HUWAYSH provide the following information:

When SADDAM was under stress, it would affect the way he interacted with others. If he was afraid or fearful of an outcome, he could make severe decisions. When he was under this type of pressure, those around him did not like it at all. He became much less controllable. He would make decisions based not on the actual situation, but rather on personalities. The exercise of his maximum authority could be influenced positively by people whom he liked, such as Husein Kamel. Or, conversly, it could result in Ministers being thrown out of meetings. These strong judgements were not reflective of a man in control.

In 1987, HUWAYSH had a construction company within his Ministry called Al Fao, which was named after the inspiring battle of the Al Fao peninsula during the Iran-Iraq war. There was already an Al Fao company within the Ministry of the Interior and another within the Ministry of Irrigation. HUWAYSH had taken the initiative to organize the changing of his Al Fao construction company to Dar es Salaam (Realm of Peace). This change was listed as an agenda item on a Ministerial meeting over which SADDAM was presiding. The meeting started off with SADDAM commenting on the company name change. There was threatening tone in his voice. HUWAYSH asked to speak in order for him to clarify a mistake that had been made. HUWAYSH understood well SADDAM's character, and explained how this was an oversite that was not supposed to be there. SADDAM cautioned not to let it to go again.

SADDAM did not like any Arab leader of king having anything better than he had. With everything, SADDAM was determined to be the best. HUWAYSH speculated that this could have been related to some suffering in SADDAM's childhood.

Investigation on 06/03/04 at Baghdad, Iraq
File # 315E-HQ-1448534-148 Date dictated _____
by SA [redacted] WJE

b6
b7C

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of ABD AL-TAWAB MULLAH HUWAYSH, On 06/03/04, Page 2

SADDAM himself was not an especially attentive father to his sons. He was fond of saying 'even if my own arm were hurting me, I would it off'. This was to let others know that he had the nerve to do whatever it took to preserve himself over others, no matter how close they were to him.

HUWAYSH was surprised that SADDAM allowed himself to be captured rather than martyring himself. It was understood that Uday and Qusay had C-4 belts with them when they were killed. For sure SADDAM must have had one with him too. SADDAM had invited other Ba'ath members to fight the Americans in a sacred resistance. New groups could have been planned during the secret war of resistance and the party could have been rebuilt. SADDAM had proven himself in the overthrow of the Kasim Regime. HUWAYSH did not believe SADDAM was isolated in this effort, as he was clever and had thugs. To give up would mean he would have to face only bad things. Because of all this, HUWAYSH did not respect SADDAM for surrendering.

In captivity, it should be expected that SADDAM will review his life. He had a stronger binding to life and earthly things, even more so than he did to heaven and God.

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 315E-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence FBIHQ

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received 06/03/04

From ABD AL-TAWAB MULLAH HUWAYS H
(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

ISAGHDAD IRAQ
(Address)

(City and State)

By SA

b6
b7C

To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☒ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes ☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes ☒ No


Title:

DESERT SPIDER
IT-IRAQ

Reference: _____
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☒ Original notes re interview of

Abdul Tawab Mullah Huways H



1989 5/25/89

AGAIN, SEVERAL DECISIONS

HUGHES (CART) RATIONALE Date: 5/25/89

MINISTER MEETING

UNDER PRESSURE, DONT LIKE IT
LESS CONGRUENCE, NOT DECISION ACCORDING
TO SITUATION, HAS AUTHORITY NOT
MAXIMUM, HUMAN BEING SURE, RIGHT
ONLY RE

- through Ministry out of meeting
- [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]
- [unclear] [unclear] REFLECTING COUNCIL MAN

1987

ALFAO construction [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]

change to [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]

issues in motion

CLARIFY [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]
THREATENING TONE [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]
[unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]

DONT LIKE [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]
THE OTHERS; [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]
Now President, ADDRESS [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]
[unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]
TO AS THE BEST.

GOOD FATHER

"ONE OF MY [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]

[unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]

[unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]

[unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]

[illegible]

Date _____ No. _____

1

4. 805 86/82 HERRM. Min

Wm. J. 1. 1. 77/E. 1. 1. 1.

When... But for this

1. Меня собираются

1005 280.25

1A-490 145

for H₂S

100

116

1

E-4m / G. Sanyal University Date: 11/06/20 No.

Quantum Vasy

2. ^{WHITE} MINIMUM, SACRED RESISTANCE
MEETING

- All person in KAMIN REGIME
- Not isolated

Passover, Clever

was good & had things in
his life
HE WILL REVIEW HIS LIFE

— Benzene to life not to pleasure or loss

~~SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Counterterrorism
Re: (U) 315E-HQ-1448534, 05/30/2004

b2
b6
b7C
b7E

(S)

b1

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON DC

(U) For information.

♦♦

~~SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN~~

, 19__

☐ Name Searching Unit - Room 6527☐ Service Unit - Room 6524☐ Forward to File Review☐ Attention ☐☒ Return to ☐ 706 D

Supervisor Room Ext.

Type of References Requested:

☐ Regular Request (Analytical Search)☐ All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)☒ Subversive References Only☐ Nonsubversive References Only☐ Main _____ References Only

Type of Search Requested:

☐ Restricted to Locality of ☐☐ Exact Name Only (On the Nose)☐ Buildup ☐ VariationsSubject ☐

Birthdate & Place 1950 May

Address _____

Localities _____

R# _____

Date 6/6

Searcher

Initials Emy

Prod. _____

FILE NUMBER

SERIAL

b6
b7C

NY - 105-137661

~~SECRET~~

PAGE SIX

b1
b6
b7C

CAPTIONED VISITOR AND PARTY, BRIEFED USDS SECURITY SUPERVISOR

[REDACTED], HANDLING DETAIL COVERING VISIT, ON FBI'S
INTEREST IN POSSIBLE SEPARATE ACTIVITY OF [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED] IS ALERT FOR POSSIBLE
SEPARATE ACTIVITY BY THESE INDIVIDUALS AND ADVISES THAT,
TO DATE, NONE HAS BEEN OBSERVED.

LEAD: WFO, AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

DISCREETLY CONTACT USDS SECURITY SUPV. [REDACTED]
VIA COMMAND POST TO BE SET UP AT SHOREHAM HOTEL, WASHINGTON,
D.C., FRIDAY, JUNE 21, 1974, FOR USDS PROTECTIVE SECURITY
OF CAPTIONED VISITOR AND PARTY. VERIFY CONTINUED PRESENCE

(S) OF [REDACTED] WITH PARTY. ESTABLISH
LOCAL PROCEDURE WHEREBY USDS SECURITY MAY REQUEST BUREAU
SURVEILLANCE OF [REDACTED] SHOULD

THESE INDIVIDUALS SEPARATE FROM CAPTIONED VISITOR.

PRIOR TO RETURN OF PARTY TO NYC, JUNE 23, 1974.

END

b1
b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 04-16-2008

CLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/LSC

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1)

04-16-2033

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

CODE

TELETYPE

IMMEDIATE

1 -

[Redacted]

TO SAC NEW YORK

JUNE 10, 1974

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7C

(S)

[Redacted]

REBUTELCALs TO NEW YORK, JUNE 7, 1974.

BY COPY OF A COMMUNICATION CLASSIFIED "CONFIDENTIAL,"

(S)

[Redacted]

b1

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Ext. Affairs _____
Files & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Legal Coun. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

RLM:sjs
(3)

JUN 11 1974

TELETYPE

~~SECRET~~

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

SEE NOTE PAGE FOUR

RLM

LEB
WTAU/003

R M...

DW

~~SECRET~~

TELETYPE TO NEW YORK

~~SECRET~~

RE:

(S)

(S)

(S)

b1

IT IS OUR RECOMMENDATION THAT

SUBJECT BE PLACED UNDER SURVEILLANCE DURING HIS STAY IN THE
UNITED STATES."

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

TELETYPE TO NEW YORK

SEC

(S)

RE:

(S)

NEW YORK SHOULD ESTABLISH LIAISON WITH [REDACTED]
STATE DEPARTMENT SECURITY, AT NEW YORK, WHO MAY REQUEST BUREAU
SURVEILLANCE OF [REDACTED] SEPARATES FROM SUBJECT.
UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES ARE SUBJECT OR [REDACTED]
TO BE PLACED UNDER SURVEILLANCE. BECAUSE OF DELICATE RELATIONS
BETWEEN U.S. AND IRAQI GOVERNMENTS, UTMOST DISCRETION MUST BE
UTILIZED. INFORMATION RE VISIT SHOULD BE ON A NEED-TO-KNOW
BASIS. PERSONNEL HANDLING MUST BE THOROUGHLY AWARE OF PROVISIONS
OF CURRENT BUREAU INSTRUCTIONS RELATING TO ACT FOR PROTECTION
OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS VISITING THE U.S.

^(e)
~~CLASSIFIED BY 2125, XGDS 2 AND 3, DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION~~
INDEFINITE.

~~SECRET~~

b1

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 11 1974

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TELETYPE~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. A.D. - Adm.
Dep. A.D. - Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

NR 048 NY CODE

11:09P NITEL 6-11-74 PLQ

TO DIRECTOR

ATT: INTD

FROM NEW YORK (105-NEW)

DATE: 08-22-2008
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/LSC
REASON: 1.4 (C.D)
DECLASSIFY ON: 08-22-2033

1P

b1

REBUREAU TEL, JUNE 10, 1974.

CAPTIONED INDIVIDUAL AND PARTY ARRIVED AT NYC VIA AIR FRANCE,
FLIGHT 007, ON TUESDAY, JUNE 11, 1974, AT 3:50 PM. PROCEEDED TO
RESIDENCE AT WALDORF HOTEL, UNDER PROTECTIVE SECURITY OF U.S.

STATE DEPARTMENT (USDS).

NYO CONTINUING TO FOLLOW ACTIVITIES OF [REDACTED] BY LIAISON

WITH USDS SUPERVISOR [REDACTED]

REC-112

CLASSIFIED BY 4539, XGDS 2 AND 3, DATED DECLASSIFICATION

INDEFINITE.

END

PLS HOLD AND ADVISE TIME TO LAST TEL 11:09 P.M. TKS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

51 JUN 24 1974
~~SECRET~~

JUN 13 1974

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b7C

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 05-01-2008

CLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/LSC

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1)

01-2033

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NR 030 NY CODE

9:40 PM NITEL 6/17/74 JJB JUN 17 1974

TO DIRECTOR

ATTN: INTD

FROM NEW YORK 105-137661

2P

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

NRB
TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep. Dir. - Adm.	_____
Dep. Dir. - Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Files & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Inspection	_____
Intell.	_____
Laboratory	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

C/16/20/ALM
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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RENNITEL, JUNE 11, 1974.

END PAGE ONE

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5 JUL 08 1974

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PAGE TWO

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

105-137661

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~~CLASSIFIED BY 4339. XGDS 2 AND 3. DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION
INDEFINITE.~~

END

GHS FBIHQ ACK FOR ONE CLR

NY - 105-137661

~~SECRET~~

PAGE THREE

(S)



ON JUNE 20, 1974, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE, WHO HAS

b1

FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST. ADVISED THAT

(S)



END PAGE THREE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE FOUR

(S)

CLASSIFIED BY 4339, XGDS 2 AND 3, DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION
INDEFINITE.

ADMINISTRATIVE

REBUTEL TO NY, JUNE 10, 1974; BU TEL CALL TO NY,
JUNE 20, 1974: AND NY TEL CALL TO WFO, JUNE 20, 1974.

(S) CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE IS

FOR THE INFORMATION OF WFO, AS SET FORTH IN REBUTEL,
FBI OFFICIAL INTEREST IN CAPTIONED VISITOR AND HER PARTY
IS BASED ON FOLLOWING:

(S)

END PAGE FOUR

~~SECRET~~

b1

~~SECRET~~

PAGE FIVE

(S)

[REDACTED]

IN VIEW OF CAPTIONED VISITOR'S STATUS AS AN OFFICIAL GUEST OF THE U.S., AND THE ASSUMPTION BY USDS SECURITY OF PROTECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR HER DURING HER STAY IN THE U.S. FBIHQ INSTRUCTED THE NYO TO ESTABLISH LIAISON WITH STATE DEPARTMENT SECURITY, AT NEW YORK, WHO MAY REQUEST BUREAU SUR-

(S)

VEILLANCE [REDACTED]

SUBSEQUENT TELEPHONIC INSTRUCTIONS FROM FBIHQ TO THE NYO EXTENDED THIS PROCEDURE TO [REDACTED]

(S)

[REDACTED] IN REBUTEL, THE FOLLWOING INSTRUCITIONS WERE SET FORTH

CONCERNING CAPTIONED VISITOR: "UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCE ARE SUBJECT OR [REDACTED] TO BE PLACED UNDER SURVEILLANCE. BECAUSE OF DELICATE RELATIONS BETWEEN U.S. AND IRAQI GOVERNMENTS, UTMOST DISCRETION MUST BE UTILIZED. INFORMATION RE VISIT SHOULD BE ON A NEED-TO-KNWON BASIS. PERSONNEL HANDLING MUST BE THOROUGHLY AWARE OF PROVISIONS OF CURRENT BUREAU INSTRUCTIONS RELATING TO ACT FOR PROTECTION OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS VISITING THE U.S."

IN VIEW OF ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS, NYO ON ARRIVAL OF

END PAGE FIVE

~~SECRET~~

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NY - 105-137661

~~SECRET~~

PAGE SIX

CAPTIONED VISITOR AND PARTY, BRIEFED USDS SECURITY SUPERVISOR

[REDACTED] HANDLING DETAIL COVERING VISIT, ON FBI'S

(S) INTEREST IN POSSIBLE SEPARATE ACTIVEITY OF [REDACTED]

LEAD: WFO, AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

DISCREETLY CONTACT USDS SECURITY SUPV [REDACTED]

VIA COMMAND POST TO BE SET UP AT SHOREHAM HOTEL, WASHINGTON,
D.C., FRIDAY, JUNE 21, 1974, FOR USDS PROTECTIVE SECURITY
OF CAPTIONED VISITOR AND PARTY. [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED] ESTABLISH

LOCAL PROCEDURE WHEREBY USDS SECURITY MAY REQUEST BUREAU

(S) SURVEILLANCE [REDACTED] SHOULD

THESE INDIVIDUALS SEPARATE FROM CAPTIONED VISITOR.

PRIOR TO RETURN OF PARTY TO NYC, JUNE 23, 1974.

END

SLP FBI HQ CLR

7/1/74 S. H. H. S. J.

7/1/74 S. H. H. S. J.

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 26 1974

TELETYPE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. _____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.: _____
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Ext. Affairs _____
Files & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Legal Coun. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

DATE: 05-01-2008
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/L
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1)
05-01-2033

NR 021 NY CODE

6:25 P.M. NITEL 6-26-74 PLO

TO DIRECTOR

FROM NEW YORK (10-137661) (P)

b2

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY 4339, XGDS, CATEGORY 2 AND 3, INDEFINITE.

ADMINISTRATIVE

(S) CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE IS

END

REC 3 DBS FBIHQ CLR

57 JUL 8 1974

~~SECRET~~

(SENSITIVE SOURCE). JUN 27 1974

~~SECRET~~

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. _____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Ext. Affairs _____
Files & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Legal Coun. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

NR 023 NY CODE

JUN 24 1974

TELETYPE

10:25 PM NITEL 6-24-74 PLQ

TO DIRECTOR

FROM NEW YORK (105-137661) (P)

DATE: 05-01-2008

CLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/LSC

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3 3/10

05-01-2033

~~SECRET~~

ATTN: INTD

0-73 To State, #123 Out/Issued 6/25/74 DTM

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b7C

END PAGE ONE

REC-47

b2

105-265062-9

JUN 27 1974

50 JUL 9 1974

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5-DTM

NY - 105-137661

~~SECRET~~

PAGE TWO

(S)

CLASSIFIED BY ~~FOUR THREE THREE NINE~~, XGDS TWO AND THREE,
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE
ADMINISTRATIVE

b1

(S) CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE IS

(SENSITIVE SOURCE).

END

HOLD

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

DATE: 05-01-2008
CLASSIFIED BY 50024 AD BAW/RS/SC
DECLASSIFY ON: 2002 AD Inv.
05-01-2033

Assoc. Dir.	_____
Dep. AD Adm.	_____
Dep. AD Inv.	_____
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	_____
Comp. Syst.	_____
Ext. Affairs	_____
Files & Com.	_____
Gen. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Inspection	_____
Intell.	_____
Laboratory	_____
Plan. & Eval.	_____
Spec. Inv.	_____
Training	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director Sec'y	_____

JUN 27 1974

TELETYPE

NR 036 NY CODE

11:52 PM NITEL 6/27/74 JJB

TO DIRECTOR

FROM NEW YORK (105-137661) (C)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ATTN: INTD

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(C)

CLASSIFIED BY 4339; XGDS 2 AND 3; INDEFINITE.

ADMINISTRATIVE

RENYNITEL TO BUREAU, JUNE 24, 1974.

NO LHM FOLLOWS.

END

LRF FBIHQ CLR AND TU

MCT-8

REC-25

EX-11

CH 42

JUN 28 1974

b2

7/1/80 S. H. B. J. H.

7/1/80 S. H. B. J. H.

58 JUL 10 1974

~~SECRET~~

State, SS, AAG (2) Port

0-73

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

MESSAGE RELAY

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)
DATE 01-27-2009

Date JUNE 27, 1974

Transmit in CODE via teletype the attached PRIORITY message.
(plaintext or code) (precedence)

FROM: Director, FBI

FIELD DISSEMINATION

TO: RUEADWW/ ☐ The President
RUEADWW/ ☒ The Vice President
☐ Att.

SACS:

RUEADWW/ ☐ White House Situation Room
☐ Att.

RUEHOC/ ☒ Secretary of StateRUEAIIA/ ☒ Director, CIA

RUEKJCS/ ☒ Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
☐ and National Indications Center

LEGATS:

RUEACSL/ ☐ Department of the ArmyRUEBGFA/ ☐ Department of the Air Force (AFOSI)RUEOLKN/ ☐ Naval Investigative ServiceRUEADSS/ ☒ U.S. Secret Service (PID)RUEBWJA/ ☒ Attorney General (☐ By messenger)RUEBWJA/ ☐ Deputy Attorney General (☐ By messenger)RUEBWJA/ ☒ Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division☒ and Internal Security Section☒ and General Crimes SectionRUEBWJA/ ☐ Immigration & Naturalization ServiceRUEOIAA/ ☒ National Security Agency (DIRNSA/NSOC (Att.: SOO))RUEOGBA/ ☐ Federal Aviation Administration☐☐FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 27 1974

11:47AM
TELETYPE

JUL 2 1974

Foreign Liaison Unit
☐ Route through for review
☐ Cleared telephonically

Assoc. Dir. _____ Classification: (Classify if ~~SECRET~~ Bureau Office)

Dep. AD Adm. _____

Dep. AD Inv. _____

Asst. Dir. _____

Admin. _____

Comp. Syst. _____

Ext. Affairs _____

Files & Com. _____

Gen. Inv. _____

Ident. _____

Inspection _____

Intell. _____

Laboratory _____

Plan. & Eval. _____

Spec. Inv. _____

Training _____

Legal Coun. _____

Telephone Rm. _____

Director Sec'y _____

SUBJECT:

INTERNAL SECURITY - IRAQ
PROTECTION OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS - SUBVERSIVE

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT ☒b6
b7C

b1

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 05-01-2008
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAW/BS/LSC
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1)
05-01-2033

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~READ COPY
DO NOT FILE~~

NR 021 NY CODE

6:25 P.M. NITEL 6-26-74 PLQ

TO DIRECTOR

FROM NEW YORK (10-137661) (P)

~~SECRET~~

ATTN: INTD

IP

(S)

CLASSIFIED BY ~~4005~~ XGDS, CATEGORY 2 AND 3, INDEFINITE.

ADMINISTRATIVE

~~CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE IS NY 2348 S. (SENSITIVE SOURCE).~~

END

~~EQ/GREG 3 DBS FBHQ CLR~~

FOR

ONLY

b2

ICATION

b1

b1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

TO :DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 8/9/74

FROM :SAC, WFO (105-125083) (RUC)

SUBJECT
(S)



(OO:NY)

ReNYnitel 6/20/74.

Upon receipt of above communication, liaison was established by WFO with the Office of Protective Security, Department of State (USDS), Washington, D. C., and with USDS protective detail at the command post at the Shoreham Hotel, Washington, D. C.

During stay of captioned individual and her party at Washington, D. C., the Washington Field Office was advised of no incidents of a security nature.

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)
DATE 01-27-2009

EX-101

REC-54

105-265062-10

- 2 - Bureau
2 - New York (105-137661)
1 - WFO

ELG:clb 262

5)
AUG 16 1974



5010-110

~~SECRET~~

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

b1

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE**MESSAGE RELAY**Date JUNE 28, 1974Transmit in CODE via teletype the attached PRIORITY message.
(plaintext or code) (precedence)

FROM: Director, FBI

FIELD DISSEMINATIONTO: RUEADWW/ ☒ The President
RUEADWW/ ☒ The Vice President
Att.: _____

SACS:

RUEADWW/ ☒ White House Situation Room
Att.: _____EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION

AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:

FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE

EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)

DATE 01-27-2009

RUEHOC/ ☒ Secretary of StateRUEAIA/ ☒ Director, CIARUEKJCS/ ☐ Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
☐ and National Indications Center

LEGATS:

RUEACSI/ ☒ Department of the ArmyRUEBGFA/ ☐ Department of the Air Force (AFOSD)RUEOLKN/ ☐ Naval Investigative ServiceRUEADSS/ ☒ U.S. Secret Service (PID)RUEBWJA/ ☒ Attorney General (☐ By messenger)RUEBWJA/ ☒ Deputy Attorney General (☐ By messenger)RUEBWJA/ ☒ Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division☒ and Internal Security Section☒ and General Crimes SectionRUEBWJA/ ☐ Immigration & Naturalization ServiceRUEOIAA/ ☐ National Security Agency (DIRNSA/NSOC (Att.: SOO))RUEOGBA/ ☐ Federal Aviation Administration☐☐

REC-67

105-263062-13

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification: (Classify if to other than Bureau Office)

REC 14 1974

Foreign Liaison Unit

Date through for review
based telephonically

h

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.: _____
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Ext. Affairs _____
Files & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
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Laboratory _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Legal Coun. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

SUBJECT

FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 28 10

407000

JUN 28 1974

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

b6
b7C

DATE: 05-01-2008

CLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/LSC

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1)

05-01-2033

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT

WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

G

NR036 NY CODE

11:52 PM NITEL 6/27/74 JJB

~~TO DIRECTOR~~

~~FROM NEW YORK (105-137777) (C)~~


~~C C C C C C C C C C~~

~~ATTENTION~~

~~VISIT OF MADAM SADEK HUSSEIN AL-TAKRITI~~

~~IRAC PROSECUTION~~

~~DO NOT~~
~~DO NOT~~



CLASSIFIED BY ~~2145~~ / ~~DATE OF~~ ~~DECLASSIFICATION~~
~~INDEFINITE.~~

~~REMARKS~~

~~NO~~

~~REMARKS~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b1

~~SECRET~~

0-73 (Rev. 1-30-74)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

MESSAGE RELAY

Date June 25, 1974

Transmit in CODE via teletype the attached PRIORITY message.

FROM: Director, FBI

FIELD DISSEMINATION

TO: RUEADWW/ ☐ The President
RUEADWW/ ☐ The Vice President
☐ Att.: _____
RUEADWW/ ☐ White House Situation Room
☐ Att.: _____
RUEHOC/ ☒ Secretary of State
RUEAIIA/ ☒ Director, CIA
RUEKJCS/ ☐ Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
☐ and National Indications Center
RUEACSI/ ☐ Department of the Army
RUEBGFA/ ☐ Department of the Air Force (AFOSI)
RUEOLKN/ ☐ Naval Investigative Service
RUEADSS/ ☒ U. S. Secret Service (PID)
RUEBWJA/ ☐ Attorney General (☐ By messenger)
RUEBWJA/ ☐ Deputy Attorney General (☐ By messenger)
RUEBWJA/ ☒ Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division
☒ and Internal Security Section
☒ and General Crimes Section
RUEBWJA/ ☐ Immigration & Naturalization Service
RUEOIAA/ ☐ National Security Agency (DIRNSA/NSOC (Att.: SOO))
RUEOGBA/ ☐ Federal Aviation Administration
☐
☐

SACS:

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AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)
DATE 01-27-2009

LEGATS:

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 25 1974
158P
TELETYPE

Classification: (Classify if necessary in accordance with FBI Policy)

SUBJECT:

INTERNAL SECURITY - IRAQ
PROTECTION OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS - SUBVERSIVE

58 AUG 20 1974
~~SECRET~~

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.: _____
Admin. _____
Crim. Syst. _____
Ext. Affairs _____
Files & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Legal Coun. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

AUG 14 1974

Foreign Liaison Unit
☐ Route through for review
☐ Cleared telephonically

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mww

DATE: 05-01-2008

CLASSIFIED BY 60924 UC BAW/RS/LSC

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1)

05-01-2033

~~9 & D COPY~~
~~DO NOT FILE~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

NR023 NY CODE

10:25 PM NITEL 6-24-74 PLQ

TO DIRECTOR

FROM NEW YORK (105-137661) (P)

2P

~~SECRET~~

ATTN: INTD

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~~END PAGE ONE~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~NY 105-137661~~

~~SECRET~~

~~PAGE TWO~~

(S)

~~CLASSIFIED BY FOUR THREE THREE NINE, AGDS TWO AND THREE,~~

DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE

ADMINISTRATIVE

CATEGORIES

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(S)

CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE IS

(SENSITIVE SOURCE)

END

HOLD

IG KLVOYWEE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE**MESSAGE RELAY**Date JUNE 18, 1974Transmit in CODE via teletype the attached PRIORITY message.
(plaintext or code) (precedence)

FROM: Director, FBI

FIELD DISSEMINATION

TO:

RUEADWW/ ☐ The President
RUEADWW/ ☐ The Vice President
☐ Att.: _____

SACS:

RUEADWW/ ☐ White House Situation Room
☐ Att.: _____RUEHOC/ ☒ Secretary of StateRUEAIA/ ☒ Director, CIARUEKJCS/ ☒ Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
☐ and National Indications CenterRUEACSI/ ☐ Department of the ArmyRUEBGFA/ ☒ Department of the Air Force (AFOSI)RUEOLKN/ ☐ Naval Investigative ServiceRUEADSS/ ☒ U. S. Secret Service (PID)RUEBWJA/ ☐ Attorney General (☐ By messenger)RUEBWJA/ ☐ Deputy Attorney General (☐ By messenger)RUEBWJA/ ☒ Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division☒ and Internal Security Section☒ and General Crimes SectionRUEBWJA/ ☐ Immigration & Naturalization ServiceRUEOIAA/ ☐ National Security Agency (DIRNSA/NSOC (Att.: SOO))RUEOGBA/ ☒ Federal Aviation Administration
☐
☐EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION

AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:

FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE

EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)

DATE 01-27-2009

LEG

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 18 1974

TELETYPE

CONFIDENTIAL

EX-101

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.: _____
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Ext. Affairs _____
Files & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Legal Coun. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

Classification: (C)

PROTECTION OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS

(Text of message begins on next page.)

Foreign Liaison Unit

☐ Route through for review☐ Cleared telephonically

with

AUG 14 1974

58 AUG 20 1974

MAIL ROOM ☐TELETYPE UNIT ☐b6
b7C

b1

~~SECRET~~

NR 530 NY CODE

9:40 PM NITEL 6/17/74 JJB

TO DIRECTOR

ATTN: AVO

FROM NEW YORK 123-137561

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)
DATE 08-22-2008

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~~SECRET~~

(C)

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CLASSIFIED BY ~~2123~~ ~~2123~~ XGDS 2 AND 3. DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION
INDEFINITE.

END

AUDB

~~GHS FBIHQ ACK FOR ONE CLR~~

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

0-73 (Rev. 7-20-73)

MESSAGE RELAY

Date June 21, 1974

Transmit in CODE via teletype the attached PRIORITY message.
(plaintext or code) (priority)

✓ FROM: Director, FBI

FIELD DISSEMINATION

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)
DATE 01-27-2009

TO: RUEADWW/ ☐ The President
RUEADWW/ ☐ The Vice President
☐ Att.: _____
RUEADWW/ ☒ White House Situation Room
☒ Att.: DR. Henry A. Kissinger
RUEHOC/ ☒ Secretary of State
RUEAIIA/ ☒ Director, CIA
RUEKJCS/ ☐ Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
☐ and National Indications Center
RUEACSI/ ☐ Department of the Army
RUEBGFA/ ☐ Department of the Air Force (AFOSI)
RUEOLKN/ ☐ Naval Investigative Service
RUEADSS/ ☒ U. S. Secret Service (PID)
RUEBWJA/ ☐ Attorney General (☐ By messenger)
RUEBWJA/ ☐ Deputy Attorney General (☐ By messenger)
RUEBWJA/ ☒ Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division
☒ and Internal Security Section
☒ and General Crimes Section
RUEBWJA/ ☒ Immigration & Naturalization Service
RUEOIAA/ ☒ National Security Agency (DIRNSA/NSOC (Att: SOO))
RUEOGBA/ ☐ Federal Aviation Administration

LEGATS

REC-34

ST 104

AUG 14 1974

JUN 21 1974

1230 P

Assoc. Dir. _____ Classification: (Classify if to other than Bureau Office)

Asst. Dir.:

Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Files & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
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Inspection _____
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(S) [REDACTED] IT IS OUR RECOMMENDATION THAT SUBJECT BE PLACED UNDER SURVEILLANCE DURING HIS STAY IN THE UNITED STATES."

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Postwar Iraq


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Indexing:
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The Washington Post
Washington, DC

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A20 SATURDAY, MAY 22, 2004

POSTWAR IRAQ

Chalabi Aides Suspected of Spying for Iran

Raid at Leader's Home Targeted His Associates

By SCOTT WILSON
Washington Post Foreign Service

BAGHDAD, May 21—Members of the political organization headed by Ahmed Chalabi are suspected of providing information to Iran on U.S. troop positions in Iraq and of kidnapping a prominent physician from his home, according to U.S. and Iraqi officials familiar with three investigations into a group the Bush administration once favored to run postwar Iraq.

On Thursday, Iraqi police, backed by U.S. soldiers, raided Chalabi's home and the offices of the Iraqi National Congress, a coalition of parties that opposed the government of Saddam Hussein. Until recently, the group received \$335,000 a month from the Pentagon for help in gathering prewar intelligence about Hussein's government and in finding his top lieutenants after the invasion.

Chalabi, a longtime exile leader who was once the Pentagon's preferred choice to be Iraq's postwar leader, characterized the raids as retaliation for his criticism of U.S. policy in Iraq.

Iraq's U.S.-appointed Governing Council, of which Chalabi is a member, met Friday in an emergency session to discuss how to respond to the raid, which many of its members linked to U.S. occupation officials.

In interviews Friday, INC members, senior officers of the Iraqi police force and U.S. officials outlined three distinct investigations into the INC, which in addition to Defense Department funding received \$33 million from the State Department over the past four years.

The inquiries are focusing on allegations of corruption, kidnapping and robbery, and on a U.S. suspicion



An Iraqi soldier keeps watch as demonstrators march in Baghdad to show support for Ahmed Chalabi.

BY THAYER SUDANI—REUTERS

of referring it," said Daniel Senor, Bremer's spokesman.

A senior Iraqi police officer involved in the case said most of the eight suspects the police sought Thursday were involved in an armed robbery and kidnapping last month that was allegedly carried out by INC members.

The officer, who declined to be named for fear of losing his job, said his office had received complaints for months about INC members impersonating police officers, breaking into homes and carrying out robberies. He said police officers had warned the INC offices several times about the allegations. In the past three weeks, he said, police have arrested four INC officials on robbery charges.

"They knew all about this," the of-

ferent activity with foreign governments.

According to Brooke, a former subcontractor on a CIA program in northern Iraq who has a 10-year association with Chalabi, Habib had been at odds with the CIA for a decade. When a CIA officer asked Habib in the mid-1990s to use an INC intelligence network in northern Iraq to gather intelligence against Iran, Habib "told him to stick it in his ear," Brooke said.

In October 2002, the Defense Intelligence Agency took over a State Department program that paid the INC \$335,000 a month to gather intelligence. To qualify, Habib and other INC figures were required to take polygraph tests that focused almost entirely on his connections with foreign intelligence agencies.

support among ordinary Iraqis who never embraced the longtime exile as a potential leader. A small protest gathered Friday in front of the Green Zone, as the compound housing occupation headquarters is known, to protest U.S. treatment of Chalabi and its failure to prevent the assassination Tuesday of the Governing Council's acting leader Izzeddine Salim. But the demonstration dissipated quickly.

"It took them four years to discover he was a liar," said Ali Hashem Ali, 46, a mechanical engineer. "And it took us two days to discover he was a thief and a liar."

But Brooke said the fallout has had political benefits, particularly in galvanizing council support for Chalabi.

"This has been a good thing,"

is a paid agent of the Iranian intelligence service, according to U.S., INC and Iraqi police officials. The adviser, Aras Habib, has a long working relationship with the Defense Intelligence Agency and is now a fugitive.

Chalabi is not wanted for arrest.

One of Chalabi's advisers said Friday that INC officials received advance notice of U.S. plans to search the INC intelligence building and removed their computers weeks ago. The adviser, Francis Brooke, said "nothing of any intelligence value" was recovered in the raids.

With the United States preparing to transfer limited power to an interim Iraqi government in a little more than a month, the move against the INC has been portrayed by Chalabi as a U.S. effort to isolate him before the new government is named.

The Bush administration once regarded Chalabi, a moderate Shiite Muslim businessman who spent decades in exile, as a leading candidate to be Iraq's leader after Hussein was toppled. But over a difficult year of U.S. occupation, Chalabi has accused U.S. officials of failing to move quickly enough to transfer power and has criticized U.N. involvement in the process.

At a hearing on Capitol Hill, some Democratic members of the House Armed Services Committee expressed puzzlement over the latest turn of events regarding Chalabi.

"We support our troops, and we support you gentlemen—it's your civilian bosses in the Pentagon I'm increasingly worried about," Rep. Jim Cooper (D-Tenn.) said to Air Force Gen. Richard B. Myers, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and two other senior officers testifying before the panel. "This seems to be a substantial development in the war, when one of the most highly paid and trusted advisers may have deliberately misled our nation for months and years and some of our officials may have swallowed it hook, line and sinker."

Myers said he knew very little about Chalabi, despite the Iraqi's close relationship with the Pentagon.

"If this man was on the U.S. payroll until last week, what has changed in the last few days to make him the subject of a raid of this type?" Cooper asked.

"That I can't tell you," Myers responded. "What I can tell you is that the organization that he is associated with has provided intelligence to our intelligence unit there in Baghdad that has saved soldiers' lives."

Myers was pressed again on the issue by Rep. Timothy J. Ryan (D-Ohio), who asked, "Have we been duped by a con man?"

"I don't have the information that can allow me to make that judgment," Myers said. "I think that remains to be seen, probably. But I just don't know."

Sometime in the past few weeks,

In April, a respected cardiologist from Baghdad Medical City filed a criminal complaint alleging that he was kidnapped by men he identified as INC members.

The men visited his home one night, accused him of harboring terrorists and asked to search his house, according to the officer who took the complaint. They stole \$20,000 in cash and a computer, then they took him away in an SUV, the officer said.

The doctor said he was hooded and driven to a building where he was interrogated, according to the officer. When the men removed the hood, the doctor said, he recognized four of them as INC members. The men were among the eight suspects whom police officers were seeking Thursday.

The officer, who participated in the raid at Chalabi's house, said Chalabi challenged them politely at his door.

"He asked, 'Why are you guys working with the Americans? You are the major crimes unit,'" the officer recalled. "I said, 'We aren't. We're the police. We have a warrant and we are executing it.'"

Brooke, the INC adviser, said the raids were likely related in part to the investigation of Sabah Nouri, a German national whom Chalabi picked to be the Iraqi Finance Ministry's anti-corruption officer. Nouri was arrested in April after auditors discovered a \$22 million shortfall in the program overseeing Iraq's transition to a new currency this year. Brooke called him "a low-level" INC official.

Brooke said Habib, the INC's longtime intelligence chief, was the primary target of the investigation. A U.S. official in Washington said Habib was being investigated on suspicion of being a paid agent of the Iranian intelligence service and that the allegations stemmed from cur-

Habib acknowledged during the screening he had connections with intelligence services in Syria, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran.


Brooke's account could not be independently verified.

While stirring anger among Iraqi political leaders, Chalabi's plight appears to have generated little fresh

ed. Saddam Hussein is gone."

Staff writers Robin Wright and Thomas E. Ricks in Washington and staff writer Jackie Spinner and special correspondents Huda Ahmed Lazim and Naseer Nouri in Baghdad contributed to this report.

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
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Robert D. Novak

Chalabi's Fall

The story passed around by military officers at the Defense Department is that Ahmed Chalabi, outraged by the arrest of his associates and the raid on his home by U.S.-authorized Iraqi police, quickly got on the phone to the Pentagon. "Get me Wolfowitz!" Chalabi is alleged to have demanded. But it was too late for Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz or anybody else to save the erstwhile American favorite in Iraq.

In fact, Wolfowitz, widely identified as a leader of Pentagon "neocons" who sponsored Chalabi, had signed off on cutting ties with the designated leader of a future democratic Iraq. Defense Department civilians had brought Chalabi to power there against the wishes of the State Department, the CIA, prominent Republican senators and the king of Jordan. Nearly two weeks ago, Chalabi's sponsors gave up on him and quietly canceled his U.S. subsidies. Iraqi police raids were sanctioned by the Pentagon-sponsored Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Baghdad.

Satisfaction among senior officers in the American high command over Chalabi's fall signifies deepening hostility between uniforms and suits at the Pentagon. The uniforms have been humiliated by the televised spectacle of generals in the dock, taking the fall in the Iraqi prisoner-abuse scandal. They now enjoy a measure of revenge in witnessing the fall of the questionable exile anointed by Pentagon civilians.

The last straw for Chalabi, according to intelligence sources, was the discovery of his contacts with the Iranian regime. The same sources say the wealthy Iraqi Shiite had sent armed agents to harass private citizens. Now that his Iraqi National Congress (INC) has lost its \$335,000 monthly intelligence subsidy, Chalabi has dispersed his agents around Iraq, according to U.S. military sources.

Chalabi was a CIA resource many years ago, but the agency dropped him as unreliable. He then was picked up by the neocons as their man in Iraq to replace Saddam Hussein. Richard Perle, who became a leading adviser to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld after 2000, for years had claimed the INC had the ability to smoothly grasp power in Iraq. On Feb. 16, 2001, on CNN's

"Crossfire," he told me, Hussein could be driven from power without U.S. troops by the INC's "political challenge to Saddam [that] will lead ultimately to piercing the veil of his invincibility."

When it actually was an American expeditionary force that pierced the veil, Rumsfeld launched a coup d'état, landing Chalabi in Iraq without Secretary of State Colin Powell's knowledge or approval. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage was particularly opposed to bringing the INC to Baghdad so early, giving them an advantage in the struggle for power.

There was no lack of warning to the Pentagon about its commitment to Chalabi. Jordan's King Abdullah told senators that he informed the Bush administration that Chalabi, wanted on criminal charges in Jordan, is a "thug." The two leading Republicans on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Sens. Richard Lugar and Chuck Hagel, issued similar warnings. The CIA informed President Bush that the INC's intelligence about Iraq was unreliable and often just plain wrong. Powell and Armitage were precise in their forecasts of the embarrassments ahead.

Perle continues to defend Chalabi as the victim of a disinformation campaign by the State Department and the CIA, but Chalabi's previous governmental sponsors developed instant amnesia. Rumsfeld's comment last week after the Chalabi raid displayed the master of obfuscation at his best: "I certainly was not aware there was going to be a raid on a home, if in fact there was one. My understanding is that the Iraqis are involved in this, and you'd best ask them."

Will George W. Bush ask uncomfortable questions about how this man ended up wielding authority over Iraq despite multiple critics in the administration and its congressional allies? Republican senators, who do not yet want to be quoted by name, feel there must be some accountability for this massive blunder, as there must be for the prisoner-abuse scandal. They want the president at least to consider whether Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and others should pay with their jobs for putting Ahmed Chalabi in power.

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by Robert D. Novak

Character: 65D-WF-229053

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PAUL WOLFOWITZ
COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
IRAQI NATIONAL CONGRESS (INC)
RICHARD PERLE
DONALD RUMSFELD
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THE WASHINGTON POST
A19

Chalabi Denies Charges He Spied for Iran

Iraqi Says CIA Chief Is Responsible for 'Smeary' Office

By PETER S. LEVIN
Washington Post Staff Writer

Calling allegations that he spied for Iran a "smeary" Iraqi politician, Ahmed Chalabi lashed out at the Bush administration yesterday, three days after Iraqi police backed by U.S. forces raided his Baghdad home.

Chalabi, once the choice of leading Defense Department civilians to run Iraq, said his calls for Iraqi sovereignty and an end to the U.S. occupation have made him unpopular with the Bush administration, which he said is running a failed occupation.

Chalabi said he will cooperate with any U.S. investigation, but not with an Iraqi one. He volunteered to testify before Congress, where he still counts a number of supporters. As investigators continue their search for several of Chalabi's associates in the Iraqi National Congress, he blamed CIA Director George J. Tenet.

This charge is put out by George Tenet," Chalabi told ABC's "This Week."

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A U.S. intelligence official described Chalabi's allegations as "absurd."

"We would welcome hearing from him before Congress under oath," said the official, who requested anonymity. A suitable line of questioning, the official said, would be the allegation that Tenet and the CIA had trumped up these charges against him.

Chalabi has long been a controversial figure in the Bush administration and Congress, bitterly opposed by influential players in the CIA and the State Department who mistrust him. The debate over his future was one of the administration's messiest political battles before the March 2003 invasion of Iraq.

His strongest backers before the war could be found in the office of

Vice President Cheney's Department of Defense planning list an early pro-Chalabi in the U.S.

After the U.S. invasion, Saddam Hussein, a member of the Governing Council, presided over a month-long, for behind Laura Bush, the House of Representatives. President Bush addressed Chalabi's no

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Chalabi Denies Charges He Spied for Iran

Iraqi Says CIA Chief Is Responsible for 'Smear,' Offers to Testify Before Congress

By PETER SLEVIN
Washington Post Staff Writer

Calling allegations that he spied for Iran a "smear," Iraqi politician Ahmed Chalabi lashed out at the Bush administration yesterday, three days after Iraqi police backed by U.S. forces raided his Baghdad home.

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Vice President Cheney and the Defense Department, where leading postwar planners wanted to establish an early provisional government with Chalabi in the lead.

After the U.S. military toppled Saddam Hussein, Chalabi became a member of the U.S.-appointed Iraqi Governing Council and served a month-long term in the rotating presidency. Four months ago, he sat behind Laura Bush in the gallery of the House of Representatives for President Bush's State of the Union address.

Chalabi is not wanted for a crime, although the government in Jordan, where he was convicted in absentia of embezzling bank funds, reiterated yesterday that a jail cell awaits him.

In the Iraq case, INC members are suspected of providing information to neighboring Iran about the occupation of Iraq, including sensitive intelligence about U.S. troop positions. A warrant has been issued for the arrest of Aras Habib, Chalabi's top intelligence adviser.

U.S. authorities suspect Habib is a paid agent of the Iranian intelligence service.

Chalabi, a regular visitor to Tehran before the war, made no secret of his ties to Iranian intelligence, but he denied delivering secrets.

Chalabi told George Stephanopoulos of ABC News that the United States gave him no classified information. An Iranian government spokesman told reporters yesterday that Chalabi provided no clandestine intelligence.

Chalabi and the INC routed Iraqi defectors to U.S. intelligence agencies, where their reports about Hussein's weapons programs often turned out to be false or unconfirmable. He said yesterday that the INC presented three defectors to U.S. agencies but never vouched for their credibility.

"We gave no information about weapons of mass destruction," Chalabi said. "It was up to them to analyze this. And the responsibility for reporting to the president after analyzing the information is not mine, neither is it the INC's."

Chalabi has spoken increasingly firmly on the need for Iraq to be run



Ahmed Chalabi, on a TV monitor during an interview from Russert, left, was once the choice of top Pentagon civilian

by Iraqis, not by the U.S.-led occupation. Yesterday he predicted that an interim government being negotiated by U.N. envoy Lakhdar Brahimi and U.S. diplomats L. Paul Bremer and Robert D. Blackwill will fail.

A better solution, Chalabi said, would be for Bush to invite the Iraqi leadership to the presidential retreat at Camp David and "iron out the formation of a new government there, with them directly."

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POSTWAR IRAQ

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Responsible for 'Smear,' Offers to Testify Before Congress

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
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Chalabi has spoken increasingly firmly on the need for Iraq to be run



Ahmed Chalabi, on a TV monitor during an interview from Baghdad with Tim Russert, left, was once the choice of top Pentagon civilians to run Iraq.

by Iraqis, not by the U.S.-led occupa- tion. Yesterday he predicted that an interim government being negotiat- ed by U.N. envoy Lakhdar Brahimi and U.S. diplomats L. Paul Bremer and Robert D. Blackwill will fail.

A better solution, Chalabi said, would be for Bush to invite the Iraqi leadership to the presidential retreat at Camp David and "iron out the for- mation of a new government there, with them directly."

Shown in opinion polls to be un- popular in Iraq, and considered un- desirable by Brahimi, Chalabi may believe that his chances of winning a significant role in the next Iraqi gov- ernment would be strongest if Bush took command. But for reasons of domestic politics and the legitimacy of the future government, the White House has made clear that it does not want the president to play such a role.

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Post
Washington, DC

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Denies Charges He Spied

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ON 04-27-2011(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.) unknown
Washington Post
Washington, DCDate: 05/28/2004
Edition: Home Edition
Editorial SectionTitle: Obsessed with Iran
by Jim HoaglandCharacter: 65D-WF-229053
or
Classification:
Submitting Office: WFOIndexing:
~~AHMED CHALABI~~
~~ARAS HABIB~~
~~SADDAM HUSSEIN~~
~~MUKHABARAT~~
~~LAKHDAR BRAHIMI~~
~~HUSSAIN SHAHRISTANI~~

Jim Hoagland

hostail

Obsessed With Iran

George Shultz says that life in official Washington is not one damn thing after another. It is the same damn thing over and over again. A sudden lurch by the Bush administration to using Iraq's Sunnis to contain Iran's Shiite rulers shows that the former secretary of state is on to something, again.

Bush policymakers and spies have made fear of Iran a driving—and highly distorting—force in the continuing war in Iraq. They now resemble the LBJ-era Cold Warriors who were so intent on defeating China and the Soviet Union in Vietnam that they lost sight of the stakes and dynamics of the real war they were fighting.

In Iraq today the CIA is building an Iraqi spy agency from the ruins of Saddam Hussein's Mukhabarat—the secret police unit that was at war with Iran and Syria for two decades. Like ex-Nazis recruited to fight the Soviet peril, these Iraqis come with useful skills and experience in trying to destabilize Tehran. Some of them were on the job during the Iran-Iraq war, when the Reagan administration (in which Shultz served) shared U.S. intelligence with Hussein's regime to prevent the revolutionary ayatollahs of Iran from taking Baghdad. Old intelligence connections die hard.

But the inordinate fear of Iran is rapidly contaminating U.S. relations with the Shiite majority of Iraq. It is also complicating U.N. mediator Lakhdar Brahimi's effort to name an interim Iraqi government. The White House hopes to get the government named and a new Security Council resolution on Iraq approved before President Bush goes to Europe next week.

The Algerian mediator had all but settled on Hussain Shahrستاني, a respected chemist and Shiite, as his interim prime minister. But Shahrستاني withdrew his name Wednesday after it became clear U.S. authorities would not approve him, apparently after they conducted a background check, according to U.S. and foreign sources, in Baghdad and elsewhere.

What the vetting by U.S. agencies turned up is not known. But Shahrستاني escaped to Iran in 1991 after being jailed and tortured for refusing to help Hussein's nuclear program. In eight years in Iran, he is unlikely to have been able to avoid contact with and interrogation by Iranian intelligence.

He is also unlikely to have told Iran anything of his own free will, according to people who know and admire him. But the hard line against Tehran championed by U.S. procon-

sul Paul Bremer and others would have inevitably hurt the chances of Shahrستاني, especially in the poisonous atmosphere created by CIA allegations that Ahmed Chalabi, another Shiite politician with ties to Iran, has given Iran classified information.

In the closed world of smoke and mirrors that exiles and intelligence agencies inhabit, Shahrستاني was a source on Hussein's weapons programs for U.S. government agencies and journalists, as were Chalabi, Ayad Allawi and many others. Shahrستاني was lionized by the television program "60 Minutes" one month before the Iraq invasion.

The ongoing Chalabi-CIA struggle, essentially over who will control an independent Iraq's intelligence service and whether it will ultimately be used to destabilize Iran, is a topic for another day. The more immediate problems belong to Brahimi, who now must publicly deny that the United States is vetting and then passing or blocking his choices for prime minister and other jobs.

That this administration would insist on retaining such power in a rebellious country it spent American lives to occupy is one of those obvious power realities that diplomacy was invented to obscure. As in a Hemingway short story, what is important is what is left out, both in Brahimi's public statements and the latest Security Council draft resolution on Iraq.

The U.S.-British draft is silent on command arrangements and other vital topics. It is intended to maximize U.S. power while seeming to pass authority to a group of mostly political unknowns blessed by Brahimi. Iraqi leaders well known in the West, such as Massoud Barzani or Jalal Talabani, would not get significant jobs.

The premature leak by U.S. officials of Shahrستاني's name as a candidate backed by Ali Sistani has embarrassed the Shiite grand ayatollah and makes it even harder for him to work with Brahimi, a Sunni Arab whose daughter is to be married on Sept. 7 to the son of King Abdullah of Jordan.

The king, a CIA favorite, is not as diplomatic as his future-in-law. Asked recently by the New York Times who should rule Iraq, Abdullah replied: "I would probably imagine ... somebody with a military background who has experience of being a tough guy who could hold Iraq together for the next year." Or in Shultzian terms, the same Saddam thing over again.

jimhoagland@washpost.com

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WASHINGTON METRO FIELD OFFICE

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David Ignatius

WASH POST

5/28/04

Making Do With Lemons

If you're stuck with lemons, make lemonade. That folk wisdom applies to U.S. policy in Iraq, which is as seedy and sour as any foreign policy challenge America has encountered in decades. We certainly aren't making champagne there, but how are we doing in the lemonade business?

As we head into the final month before the handover of sovereignty to the Iraqi people, I'd like to offer the contrarian thought that the Bush administration in the past few weeks has been meeting the lemonade test fairly well. It is correcting earlier errors of judgment and putting policy on a reasonable glide path. That doesn't mean the plane won't crash after June 30. But President Bush's recent moves haven't been as foolish or feckless as some commentators have suggested.

The best example is the decision to jettison the Pentagon's former darling, Ahmed Chalabi. The longtime Iraqi exile is a remarkable man—one of those stubborn, self-motivated missionaries who by the force of their personalities bend the shape of history. Without his advocacy for regime change in Iraq, I suspect Saddam Hussein would still be in power.

But watching Chalabi on the TV talk shows last weekend after his headquarters had been raided in Baghdad, indignantly demanding a congressional showdown between himself and CIA Director George Tenet, it seemed that his ambition had overwhelmed his judgment. He apparently believed he could mobilize his supporters in Washington to attack the administration that had helped fund his operations but had now turned against him.

Chalabi posed three problems for U.S. lemonade makers: The first was that by steering many economic portfolios to his allies, he had gathered too much power over the nascent Iraqi economy.

The second problem is Chalabi's Iranian connection. He has never made any secret of his close ties with Tehran, but the issue became more serious after reports that Chalabi's intelligence chief, Aras Habib, was suspected of being an Iranian agent.

Support for this allegation comes from former CIA officer Bob Baer, who told me that he was informed by colleagues in 1994, when he was part of the agency's Iraq Operations Group, that the U.S. government had solid intelligence that Habib was secretly being paid and controlled by the Iranians and was informing them about American

covert activities in Iraq. Baer said that in 1999 he passed a warning about Chalabi's Iranian connections to Douglas Feith, who later became the Bush administration's undersecretary of defense. Chalabi has denied providing intelligence to Tehran, and Habib has disappeared.

You have to wonder what Chalabi's neo-conservative enthusiasts were thinking backing a man who had been so closely allied with an Iran that arguably poses the biggest strategic threat to Israel. If there's a logic here, it eludes me.

I suspect that Chalabi's ultimate transgression was pushing to position himself as the political representative of Iraqi Shiites—the key constituency in the new Iraq. That was a sensible strategy for Chalabi, but it increasingly put him at odds with U.S. policy—and made him a kind of up-market, secular version of the hotheaded young Shiite mullah, Moqtada Sadr.

Heading toward the June 30 transition, U.S. officials apparently felt it was important to let Iraqis know that Chalabi wasn't America's man. By cutting off his Pentagon funding (and conniving in the raid on his headquarters) they probably hoped to open space for other Shiite leaders who will emerge in the transitional government to be named soon by U.N. special envoy Lakhdar Brahimi.

The secret to making Iraqi lemonade is maintaining Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani's support for a transition jointly supervised by the United States and the United Nations. Despite Chalabi's efforts to derail that process, both Brahimi and U.S. occupation chief L. Paul Bremer seem to be making the relationship work. The best evidence has been Sistani's acquiescence while U.S. troops pummeled his enemy Sadr.

Iraqi lemonade will be a mix of different flavors and local solutions. It will mean adapting U.S. policies to the political realities of Sunni Fallujah and Shiite Najaf. It will mean including recycled lemons who served in the old Iraqi army and bureaucracy; it will mean accepting advice from lemonade tasters in France, Germany and elsewhere.

The concoction won't be sweet, and it may yet explode in the bottle. But this is the messy art of the possible, and the Bush administration at least is learning from its mistakes.

davidignatius@washpost.com

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.) UNKNOWN
Washington Post
Washington, DC

Date: 05/28/2004
Edition: Home Edition
Editorials

Title: Making Do With Lemons
by David Ignatius

Character: 65D-WF-229053
or
Classification: 65D-WF-229053
Submitting Office: WFO

Indexing:
AHMED CHALABI
SADDAM HUSSEIN
ARAS HABIB
BOB BAER
IRAQ OPERATIONS GROUP
DOUGLAS FEITH
LAKHDAR BRAHIMI
AYATOLLAH ALI SISTANI

SP

65D-WF-229053-NC

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MAY 28 2004

WASHINGTON METRO FIELD OFFICE

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92D-WF-
23216-PVLS

Ser. 1

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 11/21/2005

An individual who is not in a position to testify provided
SA [redacted] the following information by telephone on
[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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The source knows [redacted]

[redacted]

The source knows of [redacted]

[redacted]

While the source was [redacted]

[redacted]

Investigation on 11/21/2005 at Falls Church, Virginia
File # SA [redacted] Sub B, 281D-WF-C229021-302 N/A
by jr050343.302 Date dictated 92D-WF-232126-PVLS

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C-1

DATE: 09-19-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 09-19-2036

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-->NEXT TEXT
NEW MAIL JUST ARRIVED: INBOX.9
FORMS.TEXT HAS 1 DOCUMENT
NEXT DOCUMENT (#2325) MOVED FROM INBOX.1 TO DESK.4

TEXT:

SD00017 2890424

PP HQ DE LA NY WF LEGAT BONN

DE SD

P 152015Z OCT 87

FM SAN DIEGO (163D-NEW)

TO ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI PRIORITY

ATTN: [REDACTED] ROOM 4235, TL-242

ATTN: INTERPOL/FPC UNIT, ROOM 7458

LEGAT BONN PRIORITY

DETROIT (INFO) ROUTINE

LOS ANGELES (INFO) ROUTINE

NEW YORK (INFO) ROUTINE

WFO (INFO) ROUTINE

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RYY'ADH [REDACTED] FPC: FCI-IRAG; OO: SAN DIEGO

THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED "~~SECRET~~" IN ITS ENTIRETY
UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED.

THE FOLLOWING REPORT IS FURNISHED FOR INFORMATION OF [REDACTED]

REGARDING [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] LOCATED IN THE UNITED STATES. THE SOURCE [REDACTED]

199 E-42102/102
SEARCHED INDEXED
SERIALIZED FILED
OCT 21 1987
FBI - NEW YORK

AM '87

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PAGE TWO SD 163D-NEW ~~SECRET~~

OF INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT IS A HIGHLY SENSITIVE FOREIGN COUNTER
INTELLIGENCE (FCI)/INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM (IT) SOURCE OF THE FBI
WHO HAS FURNISHED ACCURATE, RELIABLE AND VALUABLE INFORMATION IN
THE PAST AND WHO [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Memorandum

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COPY



To : [REDACTED] (P)

Date 3/18/94

From : SA [REDACTED] (CT-3/TTF)

DATE: 05-18-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-18-2036

Subject: IRAQI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE MATTERS;
FCI-IRAQ;
OO:WMFO

THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED ~~"SECRET"~~ IN ITS
~~ENTIRETY.~~

On [REDACTED] an asset with [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] reported the
following information:

Asset reported that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Iraqi
President SADDAM HUSSEIN, in a public speech after the conclusion
of Ramadan stated that "if the United Nations (U.N.) continues
the heavy sanctions against the people of Iraq, he will be forced
to use whatever resources necessary to combat those devils from
the west." Asset said that the leaders of the Kurdish people
believe that SADDAM will carry out his threat. Asset said that
SADDAM needs to start another conflict to regain support of the
Iraqi people and to get their minds off the internal problems
which they are facing (i.e. lack of food, lack of electricity and
water).

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SADDAM HUSSEIN has experienced internal pressure from
the Iraqi people for his continuous intimidation tactics against
the Kurds in northern Iraq. Recently SADDAM brought two
divisions of The Republican Guard Army into Karkuk, Iraq, to
intimidate the Kurds. U.N. observers reported these actions, and
the U.N. cited IRAQ for violating U.N. Resolution 688.

6-WMFO

(1- [REDACTED])
(1-199M-WF-C-164993 SUB B)
(1-199M-WF-C-162409)

(1- [REDACTED])
(1-SA [REDACTED])
(1-SA [REDACTED])

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CLASSIFIED BY: G-3
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

JHS:jhs
(6)

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199M-WF-C-162409

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MAR 18 1994	
FBI-WASHINGTON	

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(S)

[REDACTED]

According to the asset, the Kurdish people are facing a dilemma because they failed to select a single leader during their last election, which lasted several months. Although the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) won the election by a 55 to 40 percentile in the polls, the People United for Kurdistan (PUK) share 50/50 in their presumed democratic process. A new election has been proposed in 1994, although no date has been set. The people of Kurdistan will be seeking outside support from the U.N. and the U.S. to assist in monitoring the election.

In January, 1994, the PUK and the Islamic Movement (IM), a group that received 5% of the popular vote in the last election, were fighting on the Iraqi/Turkish border and 200 lives were lost. The KDP caused a truce by yielding one vote in the Kurdistan Congress to the IM. The PUK and KDP agreed that the IM will also be on the next electoral ballot.

Asset reported that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Asset reported that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 09/16/2002

To: [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]

Squad CT-1

Contact: SA [REDACTED] ext. [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

(S) Drafted By: MCM: mcm

Case ID #: (S) [REDACTED]
(A)

(S) Title: (S) [REDACTED]

OO: [REDACTED]

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(U) Synopsis: (S) Asset reporting.

(U) (S) Derived From : G-3
Declassify On: X1

(S) Details: (S) On [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] met with [REDACTED]
information:

SA's [REDACTED]

Asset provided the following

(S) [REDACTED]

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(S) To: [redacted] From: [redacted]
Re: (S) [redacted] 09/16/2002

(S) [redacted]
(S) [redacted] He showed asset
(S) of a picture of a man standing with SADDAM HUSSEIN [redacted]
claims that the man with SADDAM [redacted]
(S) [redacted]
[redacted] Asset will provided further
information if there is re-contact.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

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(S)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 01/10/1997

To: FBIHQ

Attn: SSA [redacted] NS-3A
[redacted] NSD, CTMES

From: WFO

NSI-1

Contact: SA [redacted] ext. [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

(S) Drafted By: [redacted] wgp

Case ID #: (S) [redacted]

(U) Title: (S) [redacted]

DOB [redacted]

POB [redacted]

A# [redacted]

(S)

OO:WFO

(U) Synopsis: (S) [redacted]

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(U) (S)

~~Classified By: 15545, NSI-1/WFO
Reason: 1.5(c)
Declassify On: X-1~~

(U) Enclosures: (S) [redacted]

(U) Administrative: (S) This interview was conducted [redacted]
at [redacted]

The interview was managed in two separate intervals lasting
approximately six hours total. The interpreter, a native
speaker, was [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 03/23/2001

To: Washington Field

From: Washington Field

NS-15

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: (S) [REDACTED]

Title: (S) [REDACTED]

OO: WF

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(U) ~~(S)~~ Synopsis: To summarize a Washington times news article by James T. Hackett entitled, "Latest Challenge from Iraq."

(U) ~~(S)~~ Classified By: G-3, NS-15/WF
Reason: 1.5(c)
Declassify On: X1

(U) ~~(S)~~ Details: The article states that since the United States elections, Saddam Hussein has been threatening a holy war against Israel. On December 31, 2000, Iraq staged the biggest show of military force since the 1991 Gulf War. Saddam stood on the reviewing stand firing a rifle into the air during a four hour military parade as more than one thousand Russian-made tanks, artillery, infantry units and new surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles rolled by with jet fighters and sixty helicopter gun ships flying overhead. On December 31, 2000, Israeli Prime Minister Barak said Israel was in a state of strategic alert facing the possibility of war.

(U) ~~(S)~~ The article states that Saddam Hussein is using the situation to try to foment a new Arab war against Israel. He announced in January the establishment of a military command for the special forces he created to support a Palestinian revolt. He also announced the deployment of the Republican Guard's

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(S) To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: (S) [REDACTED] 03/23/2001 b1
b3

Hamorabi tank division toward the Jordanian border. With a population that is more than half Palestinian, Jordan would have trouble preventing Iraqi volunteers from crossing its soil to fight a war against Israel.

(U) (S) The article stated that the Iraqi military parade showed off new and improved weapons and equipment. the well dressed troops wore uniforms and boots imported from Syria, while new Mercedes and Renault trucks reportedly imported under the UN oil for food program were used to carry troops and tow artillery. The one thousand tanks on display, with new engines and parts from Ukraine, showed Saddam has been able to modernize his military despite he UN sanctions. New Russian -made SAM 8 and SAM-9 surface-to-surface missiles were shown as were several new models of surface-to-surface missiles. One missile was described by Iraqi television as similar to the banned al-Hussein. A chemical weapons unit marched with the missiles, underscoring that there have been no inspections of Iraq's weapons program wince Saddam threw out the UN inspectors more than three years ago.

(U) (S) The article stated that this display of missile comes just weeks after Khidir Hamza advised that Iraq was close to producing nuclear weapons. Khidir Hamza was a top nuclear advisor to Saddam Hussein until his defection in 1994.

♦♦

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 08/17/2000

To: [REDACTED]

DATE: 04-28-2011

CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc

From: [REDACTED]

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 04-28-2036

NS-15

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

(S) Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: (S) [REDACTED]
(S)

(S) Title: (S) IRAQI INTERESTS SECTION
(S)

OO: [REDACTED]

(S) Synopsis: (S) To report information from [REDACTED]
(S) [REDACTED] both reliable.

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(U)

~~Classified By: G-3, NS-15/WF
Reason: 1.5(c)
Declassify On: X1~~

(U)

(S) Details: (S) On May 21, 2000, [REDACTED] reliable, stated that
(S)

[REDACTED]

(S) (S) On May 22, 2000, [REDACTED] reliable, stated that
(S)

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

(S)

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 11/06/2000

To: [REDACTED]

Attn: SA [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]

NS-15

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

ras

DATE: 04-28-2011

CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 04-28-2036

(S) Case ID #: (S) 199E-NO-65498 (Pending)

(U) Title: (S) [REDACTED] aka

IT-IRAQ

(S) Synopsis: (S) Reporting information regarding captioned subject, [REDACTED]

(U) (S)

~~Derived From : G-3~~

~~Declassify On: X1~~

(U) Reference: (S) 199E-NO-65498 Serial 6

(U) Details: (S) Referenced communication requested that [REDACTED] provide support for its statement in an earlier communication that captioned subject, [REDACTED] is a zealous supporter of Iraqi President SADDAM HUSSEIN [REDACTED]

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DATE: 04-28-2011
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REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 04-28-2036

(S)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 07/18/2000

To: Counterterrorism

Attn:

SSA

IOS

Room 5437

From:

NS-15

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

ras

Case ID #: (S)

Title: (S)

OO:

Synopsis: (S) Setting lead to regarding possible
Saddam Hussein sympathizer.

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Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

(U)

(NON USPER)

2 - Counterterrorism (Attn. SSA Room 5437)

2 -

1 -

1 -

RAS/ras (EOS0200.EC)

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(S) To: Counterterrorism From: [redacted]
Re: (S) [redacted]

(S)

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(U) (S) An ACS check on [redacted] was negative; however, a review of prior ELSUR material revealed that [redacted] may be a zealous supporter of Iraqi President, SADDAM HUSSEIN.

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DATE: 05-18-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (E)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-18-2036

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315M-WF-
C 216258
ser. 59

- 1 -

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/29/2001

On [] SA [] met with a collaborative source with good access whose reporting has not been previously corroborated, at a predetermined location.

The Source provided the following information []

On [] a source in a position to testify has provided the following unsubstantiated information with regard to

b1
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(S)

(S)

Investigation on []

at []

File # 199F-WF-C-216258 []

Date dictated []

by SA []

~~SECRET~~

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(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.) A20
The Washington Post
Washington, DC

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Date: 05/22/2004
Edition: Home
Postwar Iraq

A20 SATURDAY, MAY 22, 2004

Chalabi Aides Suspected of

Raid at Leader's Home Targeted His Associates

By Scott Wilson
Washington Post Foreign Service

BAGHDAD, May 21—Members of the political organization headed by Ahmed Chalabi are suspected of providing information to Iran on U.S. troop positions in Iraq and of kidnapping a prominent physician from his home, according to U.S. and Iraqi officials familiar with three investigations into a group the Bush administration once favored to run postwar Iraq.

On Thursday, Iraqi police, backed by U.S. soldiers, raided Chalabi's home and the offices of the Iraqi National Congress, a coalition of parties that opposed the government of Saddam Hussein. Until recently, the group received \$335,000 a month from the Pentagon for help in gathering prewar intelligence about Hussein's government and in finding his top lieutenants after the invasion.

Chalabi, a longtime exile leader who was once the Pentagon's preferred choice to be Iraq's postwar leader, characterized the raids as retaliation for his criticism of U.S. policy in Iraq.

Iraq's U.S.-appointed Governing Council, of which Chalabi is a member, met Friday in an emergency session to discuss how to respond to the raid, which many of its members linked to U.S. occupation officials.

In interviews Friday, INC members, senior officers of the Iraqi police force and U.S. officials outlined three distinct investigations into the INC, which in addition to Defense Department funding received \$33 million from the State Department over the past four years.

The inquiries are focusing on allegations of corruption, kidnapping and robbery, and on a U.S. suspicion



An Iraqi soldier keeps watch as demonstrators march in Baghdad.

of referring it," said Daniel Senor, Bremer's spokesman.

A senior Iraqi police officer involved in the case said most of the eight suspects the police sought Thursday were involved in an armed robbery and kidnapping last month that was allegedly carried out by INC members.

The officer, who declined to be named for fear of losing his job, said his office had received complaints for months about INC members impersonating police officers, breaking into homes and carrying out robberies. He said police officers had warned the INC offices several times about the allegations. In the past three weeks, he said, police have arrested four INC officials on robbery charges.

"They knew all about this," the of-

ferent activity with the

According to Bremer's spokesman, a CIA office in the mid-1990s told him to stop gathering intelligence. Habib "told him to stop," Brooke said.

In October 2002, the intelligence Agency took a Department program to pay INC \$335,000 a month for intelligence. To qualify, INC figures were required to pass polygraph tests that focused entirely on his connections to the intelligence agency.

Chalabi Aides Suspected of Spying for Iran

Character: 65D-WF-229053

or
Classification:
Submitting Office: WFO

Indexing:
AHMED CHALABI
IRAQI NATIONAL CONGRESS
SADDAM HUSSEIN
RAS HABIB
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DANIEL SENOR
PAUL BREMER
DANIEL SENOR
BAH NOURI

65D-WF-229053 - NC

-2

WASHINGTON METRO FIELD OFFICE

b6
b7C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

125

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

1 2

8/4/82

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ROUTINE

#F125TRR CG DL DN DE HO IP KC LA MI NY OC PG PD SC SU SD SF SE

WFTDE HQ H0125 #H4YCTR 042125Z AUG 82

DATE: 05-02-2008

CLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/LSC

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1)

05-02-2033

FM DIRECTOR FBI

TO FBI CHICAGO ROUTINE

FBI DALLAS ROUTINE

FBI DENVER ROUTINE

FBI DETROIT ROUTINE

FBI HOUSTON ROUTINE

FBI INDIANAPOLIS ROUTINE

FBI KANSAS CITY ROUTINE

FBI LOS ANGELES ROUTINE

FBI MILWAUKEE ROUTINE

FBI NEW YORK ROUTINE

FBI OKLAHOMA CITY ROUTINE

FBI PITTSBURG ROUTINE

FBI PORTLAND ROUTINE

FBI SACRAMENTO ROUTINE

FBI SALT LAKE CITY ROUTINE

FBI SAN DIEGO ROUTINE

KJ

SK/LLC

JED:SMS (2)

8/4/82

4257

4656

b6
b7C

1



DE-53

199-3551-3

AUG 5 1982

1018+18

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE FOUR DE FBINK 0005 S E C R E T

~~C G-3, D OADR.~~

BT

#0005

NNNN

DE0015 23020000

RR HQ

DE DE

R182000Z AUG 82

FM DETROIT (199-1640) (CI-1) (RUC)

TO DIRECTOR (ROUTINE)

BT

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES VISIT OF SADDAM HUSSEIN'S SON; FCI-IRAQ-
TERRORISM

THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~ IN ITS ENTIRETY.

REFERENCE BUREAU TELETYPE DATED AUGUST 4, 1982.

FOR INFORMATION OF THE BUREAU, CONTACT WITH DETROIT

ASSETS FAMILIAR WITH THE ACTIVITIES OF THE IRAQI

BA'ATH PARTY (IBP) WERE NEGATIVE REGARDING VISIT OF
SADDAM HUSSEIN'S SON ~~TODAY~~ ^{Hussein} TO THE U.S. Iraq

DETROIT WILL REMAIN ALERT FOR ABOVE VISIT AND WILL
ADVISE BUREAU AND INTERESTED OFFICES IF POSITIVE IN-
FORMATION RECEIVED.

~~C & E G3, REASONS (2) (3), DRD OADR.~~

BT

0E-21

~~SECRET~~MESSAGE RELAY VIA TELETYPE
(RESTRICTED USE)

1438/242/005

Date: 8/29/90

PRECEDENCE:

☒ IMMEDIATE☐ PRIORITY☐ ROUTINE

FM: DIRECTOR, FBI

TO:

DATE: 08-20-2008
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/rs
REASON: 1.4 (c, d)
DECLASSIFY ON: 08-20-2033ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE☒ White House/WH/ SITUATION ROOM☐ Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms/BATF/☒ Central Intelligence Agency/CIA/☐ CIA DCD/DCD/☐ Dept. of Energy HQS/DOEHQ/☐ Dept. of Energy Germantown DIV/DOE/☐ Dept. of Justice/DOJ/☐ Dept. of State/DOS/☐ Dept. of the Army/DA/☐ Dept. of Treasury/DOT/☒ Defense Intelligence Agency/DIA/☒ Director National Security Agency/NSA/☒ Director Naval Investigative Service/DIRNAVINSERV/☐ Drug Enforcement Admin./DEA/☐ FAA Washington HQ/FAA/☒ HQ AFOSI Bolling AFBDC/AFOSI/☒ INSCOM Ft. Meade/INSCOM/☐ Nuclear Regulatory Commission/NRC/☐ U.S. Customs Service/UCS/☐ U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Service/INS/☐ U.S. Secret Service/USSS/☐ Other: _____

BT

Classification: ~~SECRET~~ / WNINTEL / ORCON

Addressee Internal Distribution

For: CITE: 0651

Subject:

b1

(S)

☐ See Attached

Approved By:

NIG/TAN

Originator:

Tele Ext.

Room/Div.:

199-3531-5
5438/6
(5045)b2
b6
b7C~~SECRET~~15552mm
Aug 30

DO NOT FILE WITHOUT COMMUNICATIONS STAMP

USE AND PREPARATION OF FORM 0-73

Restrictions on Use

TELETYPE UNIT

30 AUG 90 12 49Z

1. Only incoming teletype messages within the categories listed in MIOG Section 16-1.7 pages 1251 & 1252 may be prepared using form 0-73.
2. Use of Form 0-73 is restricted to incoming teletype messages received at FBIHQ Communications Center within the last 72 hours.
3. Addressees must be Bureau Offices (LEGAT/Field) or other Government Agencies. **Geographical location must be indicated if other Government Agency is located outside the Washington, D.C. area.**
4. Editing of message text is restricted to typed or printed changes of a word or two. Changes to the existing text involving more than a word or two will require the originator to initiate a new message using Form 0-93. Administrative data may be added immediately following the text and must be identical for all addressees.
5. Teletype messages received by the Communications Center that do not meet the above criteria shall be returned to the originator for preparation using Form 0-93.

Preparation of 0-73 Form (Yellow)

1. **Date & Precedence** - Type or print date and indicate precedence by checking the appropriate box.
2. **Addressee(s)** - Type or print addressee(s) immediately following the "TO:" or place a check mark in the appropriate box. Note: When using block "Other," indicate geographical location if addressee(s) is located outside Washington, D.C. If addressee(s) is a military installation, the name of the base, fort, or station must be listed to ensure delivery.
3. **Classification** - Type or print the classification and if appropriate the caveat and warning notices.
4. **Addressee Internal Distribution** - Complete when the originator wishes the message to be distributed to a known entity within a Headquarters Agency (i.e. Division, Section, Unit, etc.). List the addressee(s) abbreviation and the internal distribution, i.e. a message to Dept. of State, Dept. of Justice, and Defense Intelligence Agency; list on the "For" line(s) as follows:
Example: For: DOS For SY/TAG; DOJ for Asst. AG Criminal Div.; DIA For DSOP.
Messages which do not list internal distribution shall be delivered to the agency headquarters where their analyst will effect in-house distribution.
5. **Subject** - Type or print the subject in the space provided or check "see attached" if subject is identical to attached message.
6. **Originator's Boxes** - Type or print the originator's name, telephone extension, room number, and division.
7. **Approved By Box** - Indicate approval for transmission by initialing the approved by box. Note: The person approving the message is solely responsible for assuring all necessary editing changes are accurate and are legible.

Preparation of Message To Be Transmitted

1. **Duplicate Copy & Notations** - Xerox 1 copy of the incoming teletype message. A notation shall be made on the original incoming teletype indicating one copy made for relay to SACS _____, (or LEGATS) _____, (or Government Agencies) _____.
2. **Editing of Duplicate Copy (Heading)** - Using a lead pencil ONLY draw single lines through the first and last lines of the message heading; connect these lines from top right to bottom left forming a "Z" figure. **(Do Not Obliterate the Heading)**
3. **Editing Changes to the Text** - (See Restrictions on Use, item 4)
4. **Administrative Data** - Type or print administrative data immediately following the text.

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 05-05-2008
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/LSC
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-05-2033

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT

28 AUG 90 08 48

FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION

00125 MRI 00306

00 RUCNFB FBINX FBIWMFO

DE FBILA #0017 2400355

ZNY SSSSS

O 280338Z AUG 90

FM FBI LOS ANGELES (199E-WF-396) (P)

TO DIRECTOR FBI/IMMEDIATE/

FBI NEW YORK/IMMEDIATE/

FBI WMFO/IMMEDIATE/

BT

~~SECRET~~

CITE: //3410:CT-1//

PASS: SSTU, SSA



~~SUBJECT: EMBASSY OF IRAQ; IT-IRAQ; OO: WMFO~~

WARNING: FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE; THIS COMMUNICATION IS
CLASSIFIED "~~SECRET~~" IN ITS ENTIRETY.

SERIAL: 90 LA 169/8759/7355/8.

COUNTRY: IRAQ.

SUBJECT:



(S)

(S)

b1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE THREE DE FBILA 00175 ~~SECRET~~

(S)

b1

b6
b7C

REFERENCE LOS ANGELES TELCALL TO SSA [REDACTED] BUREAU,
AUGUST 27, 1990; AND LOS ANGELES TELETYPE TO THE BUREAU, AUGUST
16, 1990 (90 LA 169/8759/7355/B).

b1

CLASSIFIED BY: 8759 DECLASSIFY ON: OADR.

BT

~~CLASS BY G-3~~

#0017

~~DECLASS OADR~~

~~SECRET~~

NNNN

NOV 21 2 54 PM '90

~~SECRET~~

0-73 (Rev. 3-31-82)

1650/264/089

MESSAGE RELAY VIA TELETYPE
(RESTRICTED USE)

Date: 9/20/90

PRECEDENCE: ☐ IMMEDIATE ☒ PRIORITY ☐ ROUTINE

FM: DIRECTOR, FBI

TO:

DATE: 08-20-2008
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/rs
REASON: 1.4 (c, d)
DECLASSIFY ON: 08-20-2033

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

☐ White House/WH/

☐ Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms/BATF/

☒ Central Intelligence Agency/CIA/

☐ CIA DCD/DCD/

☐ Dept. of Energy HQS/DOEHQ/

☐ Dept. of Energy Germantown DIV/DOE/

☐ Dept. of Justice/DOJ/

☒ Dept. of State/DOS/

☐ Dept. of the Army/DA/

☐ Dept. of Treasury/DOT/

☒ Defense Intelligence Agency/DIA/

☒ Director National Security Agency/NSA/

☐ Director Naval Investigative Service/DIRNAVINSERV/

☐ Drug Enforcement Admin./DEA/

☐ FAA Washington HQ/FAA/

☐ HQ AFOSI Bolling AFBDC/AFOSI/

☐ INSCOM Ft. Meade/INSCOM/

☐ Nuclear Regulatory Commission/NRC/

☐ U.S. Customs Service/UCS/

☐ U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Service/INS/

☐ U.S. Secret Service/USSS/

☐ Other: _____

BT

Classification: ~~Secret~~ / Orion

Addressee Internal Distribution

For: 11065111

(S)

b1

☒ See Attached

Approved By: NSA/AN

Tele: 0356 ZAK

Room/Div.: SIOC/6

b2
b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

DO NOT FILE WITHOUT COMMUNICATIONS STAMP

FBI/DOJ

USE AND PREPARATION OF FORM 0-73

Restrictions on Use

1. Only incoming teletype messages within the categories listed in MIOG Section 16-1.7 pages 1251 & 1252 may be prepared using form 0-73.
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3. Addressees must be Bureau Offices (LEGAT/Field) or other Government Agencies. **Geographical location must be indicated if other Government Agency is located outside the Washington, D.C. area.**
4. Editing of message text is restricted to typed or printed changes of a word or two. Changes to the existing text involving more than a word or two will require the originator to initiate a new message using Form 0-93. Administrative data may be added immediately following the text and must be identical for all addressees.
5. Teletype messages received by the Communications Center that do not meet the above criteria shall be returned to the originator for preparation using Form 0-93.

Preparation of 0-73 Form (Yellow)

1. **Date & Precedence** - Type or print date and indicate precedence by checking the appropriate box.
2. **Addressee(s)** - Type or print addressee(s) immediately following the "TO:" or place a check mark in the appropriate box. Note: When using block "Other," indicate geographical location if addressee(s) is located outside Washington, D.C. If addressee(s) is a military installation, the name of the base, fort, or station must be listed to ensure delivery.
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4. **Addressee Internal Distribution** - Complete when the originator wishes the message to be distributed to a known entity within a Headquarters Agency (i.e. Division, Section, Unit, etc.). List the addressee(s) abbreviation and the internal distribution, i.e. a message to Dept. of State, Dept. of Justice, and Defense Intelligence Agency; list on the "For" line(s) as follows:
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 Messages which do not list internal distribution shall be delivered to the agency headquarters where their analyst will effect in-house distribution.
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3. **Editing Changes to the Text** - (See Restrictions on Use, item 4)
4. **Administrative Data** - Type or print administrative data immediately following the text.

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 05-05-2008
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/LSC
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-05-2033

W512

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
~~0000000000~~

~~00~~

~~SECRET~~

~~0000000000~~

~~0000000000~~



b6
b7C

(S)
SUBJECT: [REDACTED] 00: WMFO.

WARNING: FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION; THIS
COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED "SECRET" IN ITS ENTIRETY.

b1

SERIAL: 90 LA 169/8759/7355/11.

(S) COUNTRY: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S) [REDACTED]

DOI: SEPTEMBER 8-10, 1990.

(S) [REDACTED]

b1

3) IT HAS BEEN ANNOUNCED TO THE IRAQI POPULATION BY
REPRESENTATIVES OF SADDAM HUSSEIN THAT IRAQ IS RECRUITING
PALESTINIANS TO COMMIT TERRORIST ACTS AGAINST UNITED STATES
TARGETS IN AND ABOUT SAUDI ARABIA.

(S) [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~PAGE THREE DE FBIR 00043 SECRET~~



(S)

b1

6) TELEPHONE CALLS FROM THE UNITED STATES ARE GETTING
THROUGH TO BAGHDAD, IRAQ.


~~ADMINISTRATIVE:~~

~~FINAL INVESTIGATION AUTHORIZED, JULY 20, 1970.~~

~~RE LOS ANGELES TELCAL TO [REDACTED] FBIHQ, SEPTEMBER 12,~~

b6
b7C

~~1990.~~



(S)

b1

~~SECRET~~

**Federal Bureau of Investigation
Records/Operations Sections**

FR UTD _____, 19____

- ☐ Name Searching Unit, 4989, TL# 121
☐ Service Unit, 4654, TL# 225
☐ Special File Room, 5991, TL# 122
☐ Forward to File Review, 5447, TL# 143
☐ Attention _____
☐ Return to _____

DATE: 05-02-2008

CLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/LSC

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(C)

05-02-2033

Supervisor, Room, TL# , Ext.

Scope of Search: (Check One)

- ☐ Automated Data Base - 5 & 20
☐ Automated Data Base - 5 & 30
☐ Unrestricted (ADB & Inactive Index)

Type of Search Requested:

- ☐ All References (Security & Criminal)
☐ Security Search
☐ Criminal Search
☐ Main _____

References Only

Special Instructions:

- ☐ Exact Name Only (On the Nose)
☐ Buildup ☐ Variations
☐ R ☐ f

(3)

Subject
AKA(s)

Birthdate & Place

SSAN

Localities

R#

Date _____

Searcher Initials

Prod.

[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

**Federal Bureau of Investigation
Records/Operations Sections**

FR UTD _____, 19____

- ☐ Name Searching Unit, 4989, TL# 121
☐ Service Unit, 4654, TL# 225
☐ Special File Room, 5991, TL# 122
☐ Forward to File Review, 5447, TL# 143
☐ Attention _____
☐ Return to _____

DATE: 05-02-2008
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/LSC
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-02-2033

Supervisor, Room, TL# , Ext.

Scope of Search: (Check One)

- ☐ Automated Data Base - 5 & 20
☐ Automated Data Base - 5 & 30
☐ Unrestricted (ADB & Inactive Index)

Type of Search Requested:

- ☐ All References (Security & Criminal)
☐ Security Search
☐ Criminal Search
☐ Main _____

References Only

Special Instructions:

- ☐ Exact Name Only (On the Nose)
☐ Buildup ☐ Variations

Sub
AKA

6

Birth date & place

SSAN

Localities

R# _____ Date _____ Searcher Initials _____
 Prod. _____

[illegible]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FBI/DOJ

DATE: 05-02-2008

CLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/LSC

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 05-02-2033

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

TIS REPORT 01/02/91

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

(S)

b1

~~SECRET~~
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
TIS REPORT



+++++

(S)

b1

~~SECRET~~
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
TIS REPORT 01/02/91

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

(S)

DATE: 05-02-2008
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/LSC b1
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-02-2033

~~SECRET~~
~~CLASSIFIED BY G-3~~
~~DECLASSIFIED BY OADR~~

~~SECRET~~
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
TIS REPORT 01/02/91

b1

(S)

FILE INFORMATION

DATE: 05-02-2008

CLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/LSE

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 05-02-2033

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
TIS REPORT 01/02/91

(S)

b1

~~SECRET~~
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
~~SECURITY REPORT~~

(S)

b1

DATE: 05-02-2008

CLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/LSE

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 05-02-2033

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
TIS REPORT 01/02/91

b1

~~SECRET~~
~~CLASSIFIED BY G-3~~
~~DECLASSIFIED BY OADR~~

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#02

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FD-654 (Rev. 1-3-91)

Date

3/28/07

Classification of Mail:

- ☐ Unclassified
☐ Confidential
☐ Secret
☒ Top Secret*
☐ SCI*
☐ Other

Mail Category:

Letter encl. Airtel _____
LHM _____ Memo _____
Report _____ Other _____
Teletype _____

FD-5

Subj

Date

Description of Mater

b1

199-HQ 3551

This serial has been removed and placed in:

☒ Special File Room, Room 5991, FBIHQ

☐ _____

(Field Office - Room, Cabinet, or other
location where material is stored)

This action taken based upon authority of:

☐ TS/SCICO, FBIHQ, 62-116065

☐ Field Office Manager - _____

File and Serial number

(Signature and Title of Approving Official)

Date

*requires special handling

~~SECRET~~

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGE-OUT

SEP
CLASS
SECRET
SEP
REC

AIRTEL
~~SECRET~~

10/15/90

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Director, FBI

SAC, Cleveland
WMFO

DATE: 05-02-2008
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/LSC
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-02-2033

UNSUBS
THREAT TO KILL IRAQI PRESIDENT
SADDAM HUSSEIN
SEPTEMBER 14, 1990
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM - IRAQ
OO: CLEVELAND

This communication is classified ~~SECRET~~ in its
~~entirety~~.

Enclosed for receiving offices is one photocopy of a
letter from the U.S. Department of State and the attachments
thereto.

FBI Headquarters records indicate a reference to one

(S)

b1

Receiving offices should conduct appropriate indices
checks for individuals mentioned in the attached letters and
advise FBI Headquarters whether any confirming information is
available regarding the plot mentioned therein.

Enclosure

~~Classified by G-3~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~

~~SECRET~~

Dep. Dir. _____
ADD Adm. _____
ADD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Insp. _____
Intell. _____
Lab. _____
Legal Coun. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Cong. Affs. Off. _____
Off. of EEO _____
Off. Liaison &
Int. Affs. _____
Off. of Public Affs. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

1 [Redacted Box]
1 - Unit File

TAN: [Redacted Box] (5)

MAIL ROOM

b6
b7C



SSR
CLASS
SRC'D
SER
REC

RECEIVED
TELETYPE
UNIT

4 SEP 90 22

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

0167 MRI 01001

00 RUCNFB BON FBIWMFO

DE FBINY #0014 2472005

ZNY SSSSS

O 042004Z SEP 90

FM FBI NEW YORK (199H-BN-10153) (RUC)

TO DIRECTOR FBI/IMMEDIATE/

LEGAT BONN/IMMEDIATE/

FBI WMFO/IMMEDIATE/

BT

~~SECRET~~

CITE: //3540//

PASS: HQ FOR BRUSSELS.

DATE: 05-02-2008
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/LSC
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-02-2033

b6
b7C

(S) SUBJECT:

00:BN.

THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED "~~SECRET~~" IN ITS ENTIRETY.

RE: LEGAT BONN TELETYPE, DATED AUGUST 30, 1990.

REFERENCED COMMUNICATION DETAILED INFORMATION PROVIDED BY

b1

10

1990

PAGE TWO DE FBINY 0014 ~~SECRET~~

NEW YORK WAS REQUESTED TO CONDUCT INDICES CHECKS ON THE

(S) FOLLOWING:

(S) NEW YORK INDICES, HOWEVER, REVEAL NO INFORMATION RELATIVE T

~~SECRET~~
BT

#0014

NNNN

b1

DATE: 05-02-2008
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/LSC
REASON: 1.9(a)(2)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-02-2033

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

SSP
CLASS
SRC'D
SER
REC

0043 MRI 01865

RR SIOC FBIJN

DE FBIME #0004 0392013

ZNY SSSSS

R 082006Z FEB 91

FM FBI MEMPHIS (199E-HQ-24472) (P)

TO FBI SIOC/ROUTINE/

FBI JACKSON/ROUTINE/

BT

~~SECRET~~

CITE: //3440//

(S) [REDACTED] OO: FBIHQ;
SUBJECT [REDACTED]
INFORMATION CONCERNING SADDAM HUSSEIN; IT - IRAQ.

THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED "SECRET".

RE JACKSON TELETYPE, DATED FEBRUARY 1, 1991, AND SIOC
TELETYPE, DATED FEBRUARY 5, 1991.

IN REFERENCED COMMUNICATIONS, MEMPHIS WAS INSTRUCTED TO
IDENTIFY AND INTERVIEW [REDACTED] ON FEBRUARY 6,
1991; [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, WAS

199-24472-010
b1
b6
b7C
b7D
ORIGINAL

199-3551-11

PAGE TWO DE FBIME 0004 ~~SECRET~~

CONTACTED AND COULD PROVIDE ONLY GENERAL PERSONALITY

ASSESSMENT INFORMATION. [REDACTED] REQUESTED CONFIDENTIALITY.

ACCORDING TO [REDACTED]

199-24477-300
b6
b7C
b7D

PAGE FOUR DE FBIME 0004 ~~S E C R E T~~

~~C BY G3; DECL: OADR~~

BT

#0004

NNNN

DATE: 05-02-2008.

CLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/LSC

FD-36 (Rev. 8-29-85)

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 05-02-2033

~~SECRET~~

FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

TRANSMIT VIA:

☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ AIRTEL

PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date 12/18/90

1 TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
2 FROM : SAC, WMFO (199E-CV-43856) (RUC)
3 SUBJECT : UNSUBS;
4 THREAT TO KILL IRAQI PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN
5 SEPTEMBER 14, 1990;
6 IT-IRAQ;
7 OO:CLEVELAND

8 THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED "SECRET" IN ITS
9 ENTIRETY.

Reference Bureau airtel to Cleveland and WMFO,
dated 10/15/90.

10
11
12 All logical inquiries were made regarding the
13 aforementioned individuals, and WMFO has no additional
14 information regarding captioned matter.

15 Inasmuch as WMFO is conducting no further
16 investigation at this time, this case is being placed in RUC
17 status.

18 CLASSIFIED BY: G-3
19 DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

20 2-Bureau
21 1-Cleveland
1-WMFO

ABH:hm
(4)

~~SECRET~~

DEC 27 1990

Approved: 780/1

Transmitted

Number

(Time)

Per [Signature]

~~SECRET~~

b1

DATE: 05-02-2008

CLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/LSE

FD-36 (Rev. 12-2-87) (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 05-02-2033

~~SECRET~~

FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

TRANSMIT VIA:

- ☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ AIRTEL

PRECEDENCE:

- ☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

- ☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date 11/8/90

1 To : DIRECTOR, FBI
2 From : SAC, CLEVELAND (199E-CV-43856) (P)
3 Subject: ~~INSUBS;~~
4 Threat to Kill Iraqi
5 President SADDAM HUSSEIN
6 September 14, 1990
7 IT-IRAQ
8 OO: CV

7 This airtel is classified "~~SECRET~~" in its entirety.

8 PII on 10/15/90, and will expire on 2/11/91. (Presumed
9 USPER)

10 Rebuairtel to CV and WMFO, 10/15/90.

(S) 11 [REDACTED]
12 [REDACTED]
13 The Cleveland, Ohio area telephone directory
14 contains no listings for anyone surnamed [REDACTED]
15 Inquiry with the Ohio Bell Telephone information operator determined
16 no listing for above surnames.

(S) 17 Inquiry regarding Ohio driver's license and auto
18 registration determined no listing for anyone surnamed [REDACTED]
19 [REDACTED]

17 Cleveland has received no additional information to
18 confirm that available regarding captioned matter.

- 19 ② - Bureau
20 2 - WMFO
21 2 - Cleveland

GAH:ral
(6)

~~SECRET~~

Approved: _____

Transmitted _____

(Number)

(Time)

Per _____

~~SECRET~~

CV 199E-CV-43856

LEAD

WMFO:

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

Complete investigation as outlined in reairtel and furnish results to Bureau and Cleveland so this matter may be brought to a logical conclusion.

2*

~~SECRET~~

0084 MRI 02180

PP SIOC FBIME

DE FBIJN #0003 03221

ZNY SSSSS

P 012123Z FEB 91

FM FBI JACKSON (199E-HQ-24472) (P)

TO FBI SIOC (199E-HQ-24472)/PRIORITY/

FBI MEMPHIS/PRIORITY/

BT

~~SECRET~~

CITE: //3320:SQ2//

SSP
CLASS
SRC'D
SER
REC

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 05-02-2008
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/LSC
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-02-2033

b1

b6
b7C

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] INFORMATION CONCERNING
SADDAM HUSSEIN; IT - IRAQ; OO: BUREAU.

THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED "SECRET" IN ITS ENTIRETY.

AT 10:30 A.M., 2/1/91, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] OF MISSISSIPPI,

TELEPHONICALLY ADVISED SAC, JACKSON OF A TELEPHONE CALL HE JUST
RECEIVED FROM [REDACTED] WHOSE

CREDIBILITY IS WELL KNOWN TO [REDACTED] TOLD [REDACTED] OF A
RECENT CONVERSATION HE HAD WITH A FEMALE CLIENT CONCERNING

b6
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b7D

199-3551-14 2083

ORIGINAL FILED IN 199-24472-121

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE. THE CLIENT (NAME NOT PROVIDED) IS

A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF [REDACTED] AND DESCRIBES HIM AS VERY "PRO U.S."

AND AN INDIVIDUAL WHO HAS STATED HE FEELS HUSSEIN IN CRAZY.

[REDACTED] REPORTEDLY [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ACCORDING TO COMMENTS [REDACTED] MADE TO

[REDACTED] CLIENT, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b6
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b7D

THIS INFORMATION IS BEING PROVIDED TO MEMPHIS IN ORDER THAT

[REDACTED] (PHONETIC) MAY BE FULLY IDENTIFIED AND

CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO HIS INTERVIEW IN VIEW OF HIS ALLEGED

[REDACTED] "PRO U.S." ATTITUDE.

BT

#0003

NNNN

199-3551-14

DATE: 05-02-2008
CLASSIFIED BY: 60334 UC BAW/RS/LSC
FD-36 (Rev. 8-29-85)
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-02-2033

FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

TRANSMIT VIA:

☒ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☐ AIRTEL

PRECEDENCE:

☐ Immediate
☒ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET
☒ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

Date 2/4/91

352

CLASS

SRC'D

SER

REC

FM FBI SIOC

TO FBI JACKSON/PRIORITY/

FBI MEMPHIS/PRIORITY/

BT

~~SECRET~~

CITE: //0651//

(S) SUBJECT: [REDACTED] OO: FBIHQ;
INFORMATION CONCERNING SADDAM HUSSEIN; IT-IRAQ.

THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED "SECRET".

REFERENCE JACKSON TELETYPE TO FBI SIOC DATED 2/1/91.

MEMPHIS IS REQUESTED TO IDENTIFY AND INTERVIEW [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE TO OBTAIN ANY INFORMATION THAT WOULD BE
RELEVANT TO CAPTIONED INVESTIGATION, AND PROVIDE RESULTS TO
FBI SIOC AND JACKSON DIVISION.

~~C BY G-3; D ON:~~ OADR

Approved: TP Original filename: NW105300.035

Time Received: _____ Telprep filename: NW105300.035

MRI/JULIAN DATE: 270 / 036 ISN: 003

FOX DATE & TIME OF ACCEPTANCE: 0243 5 Feb 91

ORIGINAL FILED IN

^PAGE 2 FBISIOC (199E-HQ-24472) ~~SECRET~~

BT

DATE: 05-05-2008
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/LSC
REASON: 1.4 (C,D)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-05-2033

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

0010 MRI 00661

PP SIOC

DE FBINK #0003 0421510

ZNY SSSSS

P 111507Z FEB 91

FM FBI NEWARK (199E-NK-2377) (P)

TO FBI SIOC/PRIORITY/

BT

~~SECRET~~

CITE: //3510:C-10//

PASS: FBIHQ, CID/CTS, IT-SSTU, SSA [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

(S)

b1

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] OO: FBIHQ

IRAQI INTELLIGENCE MATTERS; IT-IRAQ; OO: NK.

SECTION ONE OF THREE

THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED "SECRET" IN ITS ENTIRETY.

REQUEST OF FBIHQ:

FBIHQ IS REQUESTED TO DISSEMINATE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION
TO THOSE U.S. AGENCIES DEEMED APPROPRIATE.

DUE TO THE NATURE OF THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION, IT IS SOURCE
SENSITIVE. DIVULGENCE OUTSIDE THE BUREAU, WITHOUT ADEQUATE

PAGE TWO DE FBINK 0003 S E C R E T

PARAPHRASING WOULD RESULT IN THE COMPROMISE OF THIS SOURCE.

SERIAL: 90 NK 507/3353/6616/4

COUNTRY: IRAQ

SUBJECT: PERSONALITY PROFILES AND INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION
REGARDING IRAQI PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN, FAMILY MEMBERS AND
THOSE IRAQIS INVOLVED IN THE INNER CIRCLE OF POWER IN IRAQ.

DATE OF INFORMATION: EARLY JANUARY, 1991.

(S)

REFERENCE: REFERENCE IS MADE HEREIN TO A PRIOR NK TELETYPE
TO FBIHQ, DATED 9/26/90, CAPTIONED AS ABOVE.

b1

(S)

UDAI AL-TIKRITI, (DOB: 6/18/64) SON OF IRAQI PRESIDENT
SADDAM HUSSEIN AND PRESIDENT OF THE IRAQI SPORTS FEDERATION IS
PORTRAYED AS A RUTHLESS EGOTIST WHOSE MAIN HOBBIES INCLUDE SPORTS
CARS AND THE PROCUREMENT OF BEAUTIFUL WOMEN.

A PAINFULLY SHY INDIVIDUAL THROUGHOUT HIS EARLY LIFE UDAI

TOOK ADVANTAGE OF HIS FATHER'S ELEVATED STATUS TO PRESIDENT IN 1979 TO ACCRUE UNTOLD WEALTH GAINED FROM BLACK MARKETING AND KICKBACKS FROM IRAQI COMPANIES.

UDAI, A MEMBER AND OFFICER OF THE EXCLUSIVE RASHID CLUB IN MANSOUR CITY, BAGHDAD IS DESCRIBED AS A SADIST WHO DERIVES GREAT PLEASURE IN CONTROLLING PEOPLE AND EVENTS. UDAI ATTACHED HIMSELF TO A COTERIE OF IRAQI PLAYBOYS WHO SPENT MOST EVENINGS SEEKING OUT BEAUTIFUL WOMEN IN THE NIGHTCLUBS AND HOTELS OF BAGHDAD. UDAI PROCURES WOMEN THROUGH INTERMEDIARIES AND FRIENDS.

IF AN APPROACH WOULD FAIL, UDAI WOULD SUBJECT THAT PERSON OR INTERMEDIARY TO HUMILIATION AND EVEN TORTURE. UDAI EMPLOYED A NUMBER OF ARTIFICES TO ADMINISTER PUNISHMENT INCLUDING JAILINGS, BEATINGS, WHIPPINGS AND OTHER METHODS. ON CERTAIN OCCASIONS HE WOULD SHAVE PEOPLE'S HAIR AND SUBJECT THEM TO FIERCE GUARD DOGS AND ELECTRIC CATTLE PRODS. UDAI HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS EXTREMELY POSSESSIVE AND JEALOUS. ANY INDIVIDUAL WHO DARED TO BREAK HIS/HER FRIENDSHIP WITH UDAI WAS SEVERELY BEATEN AND PARALYZED.

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b7D

b6
b7C
b7D

UDAI MAINTAINS A DISTANT RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS FATHER, SADDAM HUSSEIN, WHO PUT HIM UNDER HOUSE ARREST AND EXILED HIM TO SWITZERLAND FOR A SHORT PERIOD IN 1988-89 FOR THE DEATH OF SADDAM'S BODYGUARD. SADDAM HAS BEEN VERY STRICT WITH UDAI HAVING BEEN PLACED IN A PRECARIOUS POSITION WHEN UDAI MURDERED HIS (SADDAM'S) VALET AND BODYGUARD, KAMAL HANNA.

b7D

IN 1988, UDAI AND HIS CLOSET FRIENDS WERE CELEBRATING HIS WEDDING ENGAGEMENT AT HIS VILLA IN HABANIYA. AT THE TIME, HOSNI MUBARAK'S WIFE WAS VISITING BAGHDAD AS A GUEST OF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT AND WAS STAYING AT A NEARBY GUEST HOUSE.

IN CELEBRATION OF HIS ENGAGEMENT, UDAI AND HIS ENTOURAGE FIRED THEIR GUNS INTO THE AIR ONLY TO OBSERVE TRACER FIRE COMING FROM A NEIGHBORING VILLA. UDAI DETERMINED THAT THE SHOOTING WAS COMING FROM THE VILLA OF KAMAL HANNA, THE PERSONAL VALET AND BODYGUARD OF SADAM HUSSEIN.

UDAI WARNED HANNA TO DESIST FROM FURTHER SHOOTING BUT HANNA REPLIED BY ASKING UDAI TO JOIN IN HIS FAMILY'S CELEBRATION. HANNA WAS INTOXICATED AT THIS POINT. UDAI RETURNED TO HIS VILLA AND A BRIEF PERIOD OF QUIET ENSUED. HOWEVER, SHORTLY THEREAFTER, HANNA'S PARTY RESUMED THEIR SHOOTING.

UDAI BECAME FURIOUS AND RETURNED TO HANNA'S RESIDENCE. UDAI SCREAMED AT HANNA THAT HE WAS INSULTED AND THAT MUBARAK'S WIFE

PAGE SIX DE FBINK 0003 ~~SECRET~~

WAS STAYING NEARBY. HANNA IGNORED HIM. UDAI SEIZED A WOODEN
CANE AND IN FRONT OF A HORRIFIED GROUP OF HANNA'S FAMILY MEMBERS
(40 TO 50 PEOPLE) STRUCK HANNA ON THE BACK OF THE HEAD. HANNA
COLLAPSED TO THE FLOOR. [REDACTED]

b7D

BT

#0003

NNNN

0011 MRI 00669

PP SIOC

DE FBINK #0004 0421512

ZNY SSSSS

P 111510Z FEB 91

FM FBI NEWARK (199E-NK-2377) (P)

TO FBI SIOC/PRIORITY/

BT

~~S E C R E T~~

CITE: //3510:C-10//

PASS: FBIHQ, CID/CTS, IT-SSTU, SSA

b6
b7C

(S)
SUBJECT OO: FBIHQ

b1

IRAQI INTELLIGENCE MATTERS; IT-IRAQ; OO: NK.

SECTION TWO OF THREE

b6
b7C
b7D

SADDAM KEPT HIS SON UNDER HOUSE ARREST BUT RELENTED UPON THE PLEADINGS OF HIS WIFE AND OTHER FAMILY MEMBERS. UDAI WAS SENT PACKING INTO EXILE TO GENEVA, SWITZERLAND AT THE IRAQI MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS.

b6
b7C
b7D

IN THE SPRING OF 1990, UDAI RETURNED TO BAGHDAD, IRAQ, FROM GENEVA SWITZERLAND. HE HAS TRAVELLED TO THE UNITED STATES ONLY ONCE IN 1981.

SADDAM HUSSEIN , THE PRESIDENT OF IRAQ, IS DESCRIBED BY T-1 AS AN EXTREMELY STRONG FIGURE. SADDAM WAS BORN IN OUDJA, TIKRIT. HE IS A VERY SERIOUS AND PRIVATE PERSON. HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS FAMILY, IS ON THE WHOLE, GOOD. AS

PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED, HE MAINTAINS A DISTANT RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS SON UDAI. HUSSEIN [REDACTED] IS THE FATHER OF UDAI, KUSAI (DOB 1966), [REDACTED] T-1 DESCRIBES HUSSEIN AS EXTREMELY DEVOTED TO HIS [REDACTED] FAMILY. SADDAM HUSSEIN IS A NATIVE OF TIKRIT AND ENJOYS HORSEBACK RIDING, HUNTING AND FISHING. SADDAM UTILIZES A PRIVATE HELICOPTER IN WHICH TO HUNT BIRDS (USUALLY IN TIKRIT). SADDAM HAS A NAGGING BACK PROBLEM AND HAS NO REGULAR PHYSICAL EXERCISE SCHEDULE. HE DOES HOWEVER, SCRUPULOUSLY WATCH HIS DIET AND DOES NOT DRINK. HE ENJOYS A GOOD HAVANA CIGAR FROM TIME TO TIME.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] HE IS A SUNNI MUSLIM AND IS RELIGIOUS. ALTHOUGH HE IS NOT FREQUENTLY SEEN IN THE MOSQUE, HE PRAYS FIVE TIMES DAILY.

b6
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0013 MRI 00769

PP SIOC

DE FBINK #0005 0421540

ZNY SSSSS

P 111532Z FEB 91

FM FBI NEWARK (199E-NK-2377) (P)

TO FBI SIOC/PRIORITY/

BT

S E C R E T

CITE: //3510:C-10//

PASS: FBIHQ, CID/CTS, IT-SSTU, SSA [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

(S)

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

OO: FBIHQ

b1

IRAQI INTELLIGENCE MATTERS; IT-IRAQ; OO: NK.

SECTION THREE OF THREE

b7D

[REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

PAGE TWO DE HQ 0125 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

FBI SAN FRANCISCO ROUTINE

FBI SEATTLE ROUTINE

FBI WASHINGTON FIELD ROUTINE

BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

(C)

b1

~~C AND E 538, REASONS 2 AND 3, DRD AUGUST 4, 2002.~~

BT

1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date:

To:

From:

I-40

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

dkk

Case ID #: ~~(S)~~

(S)

Title: ~~(S)~~

(S)

(U)

Synopsis: ~~(S)~~ Results of asset contact

(U)

~~(S)~~

~~Derived From : G-3~~

~~Declassify On: X1~~

Administrative:

(S)

~~(S)~~

ASSET:

(U)

~~(S)~~

DATE OF CONTACT:

~~SECRET~~

b1
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b7D
b7E

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date:

To:

From:

Squad I-40

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

Case ID #:

(S)

Title:

(S)

(U) Synopsis: Results of asset contact.

(U) Derived From : G-3
Declassify On: X1

Administrative:

~~SECRET~~

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b7E

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date:

To:

From:

I-40

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By: :np

Case ID #: ~~(S)~~

~~(S)~~

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~~(S)~~

Title: ~~(S)~~

~~(S)~~

(U)

Synopsis: ~~(S)~~ Results of asset contact

(U)

~~(S)~~

~~Derived From: G-3~~
~~Declassify On: X1~~

(U)

Administrative:

~~(S)~~

~~(S)~~

Asset:

~~(S)~~

Date of Contact:

(U)

~~(S)~~

Contacted by: SA
SA

~~SECRET~~

b1
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~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: [REDACTED]

b1
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b7C
b7D
b7E

To: [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]

I-22

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

(S)

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

np

Case ID #: [REDACTED]

(S)
(S)
(S)
(S)
(S)
(S)

(S)

Title: (S)

(S)

(U)

Synopsis: (S) Results of asset contact.

(U)

(S)

~~Derived From : G-3
Declassify On: X1~~

Administrative:

(S)

(U)

(S)
(S)
(S)

Asset:
Date of Contact:
Contacted by:

SA
SA

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S)

To: [redacted] From: [redacted]
Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted]

b1
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(U)

~~(S)~~

Reliability:

As yet to be determined

(U)

Details: ~~(S)~~ IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED WHEN HANDLING ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THE SOURCE. ANY DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION FROM THE SOURCE MUST BE COORDINATED WITH [redacted] IF DISSEMINATED, THE MATERIAL MUST BE SUITABLY PARAPHRASED TO PROTECT THE SOURCE.

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date:

b1
b6
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b7E

To:

From:

I-40

Contact: SA

Approved By:

(S)

Drafted By:

dkk

Case ID #:

(S)
(S)
(S)
(S)
(S)
(S)
(S)

(S)

(U)

Title:

(S)

(S)

(U)

Synopsis:

(S) Results of asset contact.

(U)

(S)

~~Derived From: G-3~~

~~Declassify On: X1~~

Administrative:

(S)

(S)

ASSET:

(S)

DATE OF CONTACT:

(S)

CONTACTED BY: SA

(U)

(S)

RELIABILITY:

Has provided reliable
information in the past

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S)

To: [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]

Re: (S) [REDACTED]

b1
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b7E

(U)

Details: (S) IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOURCE. RECIPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH FBI [REDACTED]

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b1
b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date:

To:

From:

Squad I-40

Contact: SA

Approved By:

(S)

Drafted By:

pg

Case ID #:

(S)

Title:

(S)

(S)

(U) Synopsis: To report asset contact on

(U) Derived From : G-3
 Declassify On: X1

(S) Administrative: ARE HIGHLY
SENSITIVE AND RELIABLE SOURCES WHOSE INFORMATION HAS BEEN
CORROBORATED IN THE PAST.

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: [REDACTED]

To: [REDACTED]

Counterterrorism

Attn: SSA [REDACTED]

Attn: IOS [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]

I-22

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

b1
b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

dkk

(S) Case ID #: (S) [REDACTED]

(S) Title: (S) [REDACTED]

(S) Synopsis: (S) Results of asset contact regarding [REDACTED] fax.

(U) (S)

~~Derived From: G-3~~
~~Declassify On: X1~~

Administrative:

(S) ASSET: [REDACTED]

(S) CONTACTED: [REDACTED]

(S) CONTACTED BY: SA [REDACTED]

(S) RELIABILITY:

Has provided reliable
information in the past

(S) Enclosures: (S) One copy of a fax [REDACTED]

(U) Details: (S) IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME
CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION
ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOURCE. RECIPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~


(S)

To: [redacted] From: [redacted]
Re: (S) [redacted]

b1
b7D
b7E

ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF
THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE
COORDINATED WITH FBI [redacted]

(S)



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: [REDACTED]

b1
b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

To: [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]

Squad I-22

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

(S) Case ID #: (S) [REDACTED]

(S) Title: (S) [REDACTED]

(U) Synopsis: (S) Results of asset contact [REDACTED]

(U) (S) Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

(S) Administrative:

(U) (S) ASSET: [REDACTED]
(S) DATE OF CONTACT: [REDACTED]
(S) CONTACTED BY: SA [REDACTED]
(S) RELIABILITY: Has provided reliable
information in the past

(U) Details: (S) IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOURCE. RECIPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH FBI [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date:

To:

From:

I-22

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By: dkk

Case ID #:

Title:

Synopsis: Summary of asset contact

~~Derived From: G-3~~
~~Declassify On: X1~~

Administrative:

ASSET:
CONTACTED:
CONTACTED BY: SA
RELIABILITY: Has provided reliable information in the past

IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOURCE. RECIPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

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
(S)

To: [redacted]
Re: (S) [redacted]

From: [redacted]

THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE
COORDINATED WITH FBI [redacted]

(S)



♦♦

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date _____

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To:

From :

I-22

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

 $\mathbb{d}kk$

Case ID #:

[illegible]

(S)

Title:

(S)

{ 5 }

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S)

To: [redacted]
Re: [redacted]

From: [redacted]

(S)

b1
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b7E

(U) ~~(S)~~ Synopsis: Report of asset contact.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Derived From : G-3
Declassify On: X1

(S) Administrative:

(U) ~~(S)~~ ASSET: [redacted]
~~(S)~~ CONTACTED: [redacted]
~~(S)~~ CONTACTED BY: SA [redacted]
~~(S)~~ RELIABILITY: Has provided reliable
information in the past

(U) ~~(S)~~ Details: IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOURCE. RECIPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH FBI [redacted]

(U) ~~(S)~~ Source stated that on 28 April 2002, a reception was held at the residence of the Ambassador to the Iraqi Mission

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S)

To:

Re:

From:

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to the United Nations (IMUN), MOHAMMED AL-DOURI, in honor of
Iraqi President SADDAM HUSSEIN'S birthday.

(S)

~~SECRET~~

(12/31/1995)

DATE: 05-05-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-05-2036

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: [REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: MEU, SSA [REDACTED]

IOS [REDACTED]

SA [REDACTED]

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b7E

From: [REDACTED]

Squad I-22

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

(S)

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

np

Case ID #: (S)

(S)
(S)
(S)
(S)
(S)

(S)

(S)

Title: (S)

OO: [REDACTED]

(U)

Synopsis: (S/NF) Results of asset contact.

(U)

(S)

~~Derived From : G-3
Declassify On: X1~~

Administrative: (S)

(S)

Asset: [REDACTED]

Date of Contact: [REDACTED]

Contacted by: SA [REDACTED]

Reliability: [REDACTED]

Has provided reliable
information in the past

(S)

WARNING: IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF [REDACTED] EXTREME
CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION
ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN WHICH COULD
CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS SOURCE. FURTHER
DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH THE

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

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(S) To: Counterterrorism From: [redacted]
Re: (S) [redacted]

[redacted] IF DISSEMINATED, THE MATERIAL MUST BE SUITABLY PARAPHRASED
TO PROTECT THE SOURCE.

(S) Details: ~~(S/NF)~~ [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

referendum in question, was the one that took place in Iraq on or about 10/16/2002. The referendum asked the Iraqi people to vote whether they wanted to keep Saddam Hussein as their leader for another seven years.

(U) ~~(S/NF)~~ No further information was provided.

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: [REDACTED]

To: [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]

I-22

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

kyb

Case ID #: [REDACTED]

Title: [REDACTED]

OO: [REDACTED]

Synopsis: Results of asset contact.

Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

Administrative:

Asset: [REDACTED]

Date of Contact: [REDACTED]

Contacted by: SA [REDACTED]

Reliability: Has provided reliable
information in the past

**WARNING: IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF [REDACTED] EXTREME
CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION
ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN WHICH COULD
CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS SOURCE. FURTHER
DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH THE**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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(S)

To: [redacted]
Re: (S) [redacted]

From: [redacted]

[redacted] IF DISSEMINATED, THE MATERIAL MUST BE SUITABLY PARAPHRASED
TO PROTECT THE SOURCE.

(S)

X

(S)

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date:

To:

From:

I-22

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

Case ID #:

(S)
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(S)
(S)
(S)
(S)
(S)

(S)

Title: ~~(S)~~

~~(S)~~

(S)

(U)

Synopsis: ~~(S)~~ Summary of asset contact.

(U)

~~(S)~~

~~Derived From : G-3
Declassify On: X1~~

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

(S) To: [redacted] From: [redacted]
Re: (S) [redacted]

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b7E

Administrative:

(S) (S) ASSET: [redacted]
(S) CONTACTED: [redacted]
(U) (S) CONTACTED BY: SA [redacted] and SA [redacted]
(S) RELIABILITY: Has provided reliable information in the past

(U) Details: (S) IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOURCE. RECIPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH FBI [redacted]

(S) Source stated that STEPHEN PELLETIERE of the New York Times wrote an op-ed piece clearing SADDAM HUSSEIN of gassing the Kurds. [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: [REDACTED]

To: [REDACTED]

(S)

From: [REDACTED]

CD-22

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

dkk

Case ID #: (S) [REDACTED]

Title: (S) [REDACTED]

Synopsis: (S) Summary of asset contact [REDACTED]

(U)

~~Derived From : G-3~~
~~Declassify On: X1~~

Administrative:

(U)

(S) ASSET: [REDACTED]

(S) CONTACTED BY: SA [REDACTED]

(S) DATE OF CONTACT: [REDACTED]

(S) RELIABILITY:

Has provided reliable
information in the past

(U) Details: (S) IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOURCE. RECIPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH FBI [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: [REDACTED]

To: [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]

CD 22

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

(S)

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

dkk

Case ID #: (S)

(S)
(S)
(S)
(S)
(S)
(S)
(S)

(S)

Title: (S)

(S)

(S)

(U) Synopsis: (S) To report on asset contact.

(S)

~~Derived From: G-3~~
~~Declassify On: X1~~

(S) Administrative:

(S)

ASSET: [REDACTED]

(S)

CONTACTED BY: SA [REDACTED]

(S)

DATE OF CONTACT: [REDACTED]

(U)

(S)

RELIABILITY:

Has provided reliable
information in the past

(U) Details: (S) IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME
CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION

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~~SECRET~~

(S) To: [redacted] From: [redacted]
Re: (S) [redacted]

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ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOURCE. RECIPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH FBI [redacted]

(S) [redacted]
(S) [redacted]
(S) [redacted]
(S) [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: [REDACTED]

To: [REDACTED]

Attn: SA [REDACTED]

Squad 11

From: [REDACTED]

CD 22

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

dkk

(S) Case ID #: (S) [REDACTED]

(S) Title: (S) [REDACTED]

(S) Synopsis: (S) To report on asset contact [REDACTED]

(U)

~~Derived From : G-3~~
~~Declassify On: X1~~

(S) Administrative:

(S) ASSET: [REDACTED]

(S) CONTACTED BY: SA [REDACTED]

(U) (S) DATE OF CONTACT: [REDACTED]

(S) RELIABILITY:

Has provided reliable
information in the past

(U) Details: (S) IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOURCE. RECIPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH FBI [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 05-05-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-05-2036

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: [REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: SSA [REDACTED]

Attn: SSA, Squad 11

From: [REDACTED]

CD 22

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

(S)

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

dkk

(S) Case ID #: (S) [REDACTED]

(S) Title: (S) [REDACTED]

(U) Synopsis: (S) To report on asset contact.

(U)

~~Derived From: G-3~~
~~Declassify On: X1~~

Administrative:

(S) ASSET: [REDACTED]

(S) CONTACTED BY: SA [REDACTED]

(U) (S) DATE OF CONTACT: [REDACTED]

(S) RELIABILITY:

Has provided reliable
information in the past

(U) Details: (S) IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOURCE. RECIPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH FBI [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: [REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: SSA [REDACTED]
IOS [REDACTED]

b1
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b7E

From: New York

I-40

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

(S)

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

kyb

Case ID #: [REDACTED]

(S)
(S)
(S)
(S)

Title: (S) 56TH UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY;

OO: [REDACTED]

(S) (S) (U) [REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED]

Details: (S/NF) The New York Field Office (NYO) is requesting that FBIHQ contact the United States Department of State (USDOS) immediately and ask the USDOS to deny Iraqi government official [REDACTED] a United States (U.S.) entry visa.

(S) (S) (S/NF) On [REDACTED] a highly sensitive and very reliable source, informed [REDACTED]

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

b1
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(S) To: Counterterrorism From: New York
Re: (S) [REDACTED]

(S)

(S)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The NYO is therefore requesting that FBIHQ contact the
USDOS immediately and ask the USDOS to deny [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] a U.S. entry visa or to revoke the visa if they have
already issued it.

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 05-31-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-31-2036

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: [REDACTED]

To: FBIHQ

Attn: NS-3B, SSA [REDACTED]

IOS [REDACTED]

New York

Attn: I-40, SSA [REDACTED]

SA [REDACTED]

Tampa

Attn: Sq 6, SSA [REDACTED]

SA [REDACTED]

b1
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From: [REDACTED]

C-10/JTTF

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

jha

(S) Case ID #: [REDACTED]

Title: HARD THYME;
AOT-IT;
OO:NEWARK

(S)

ARMED AND DANGEROUS

Synopsis: Cooperating Witness (CW) reporting.

(S) Details: On [REDACTED] author debriefed [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

(12/31/1995)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 05-31-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc haw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-31-2036

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b1
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Precedence: ROUTINE

Date:

To:

From:

I-40

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

lkb

Case ID #:

(S)

Title:

(S)

(U)

Synopsis: ~~(SECRET)~~ Results of asset contact.

(U)

~~(SECRET)~~

Derived From : G-3

Declassify On: X-1

(S)

Administrative: ~~(S)~~

ASSET:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b1
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b7E

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: [REDACTED]

To: [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]

I-40

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

(S)

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

lkb

Case ID #: (S) ~~(SECRET)~~

~~(SECRET)~~

~~(SECRET)~~

~~(SECRET)~~

~~(SECRET)~~

Title: ~~(SECRET)~~

~~(SECRET)~~

(S) ~~(SECRET)~~

~~(SECRET)~~

~~(SECRET)~~

(U)

Synopsis: ~~(SECRET)~~ Results of asset contact.

(U)

~~(SECRET)~~

~~Derived From: G-3~~

~~Declassify On: X1~~

Administrative: (S) ~~(S)~~

ASSET: [REDACTED]

DATE OF CONTACT: [REDACTED]

CONTACTED BY: SAs [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S)

To:

Re: ~~(SECRET)~~

From:

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RELIABILITY:

Has provided reliable information in
the past.

(S)

~~SECRET~~

(01/26/1998)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 05-31-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-31-2036

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date:

[Redacted]

b1
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b7E

To:

[Redacted]

From:

[Redacted]

I-40

Contact: SA

[Redacted]

Approved By:

[Redacted]

Drafted By:

[Redacted]

lkb

Case ID #:

~~(SECRET)~~

(S)

(S)

Title:

~~(SECRET)~~

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: [redacted]

From: [redacted]

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b7E

(S)

[redacted]

(S)

[redacted]

(U)

Synopsis: ~~(SECRET)~~ Results of asset contacts.

(U)

~~(SECRET)~~

Derived From : G-3
Declassify On: X1

Administrative: ~~(SECRET)~~

(S)

ASSET: [redacted]

DATE OF CONTACT: [redacted]

CONTACTED BY:

SAs [redacted]

RELIABILITY:

Has provided reliable information in the past.

(U)

Details: ~~(SECRET)~~ IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE. RECIPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION SHOULD BE COORDINATED WITH FBI [redacted]

(S)

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: [REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [REDACTED]

Attn: CI-2,

SA [REDACTED]

Attn: I-40

SA [REDACTED]

SA [REDACTED]

b1
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b7E

From: [REDACTED]

CT-1/JTTF

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

(S)

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

: tam

Case ID #: [REDACTED]

(S)
(S)
(S)
(S)

Title: (S) IRAQI INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

Synopsis: (S) Asset debrief.

Derived From: G-3

Declassify On: X1

Details: (S) On [REDACTED] the asset, [REDACTED]
(S) reliable, was interviewed by the writer and provided the
following information:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date:

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To:

From:

Squad I-40

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

klk

(S) Case ID #: (~~SECRET~~)

(S) Title: (~~SECRET~~)

Synopsis: (~~SECRET~~)

(U) (~~SECRET~~) ~~Derived From: G-3~~
~~Declassify On: X1~~

(U)

(S) Details: (~~SECRET~~)

~~SECRET~~

(S)

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: [REDACTED]

b1
b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

To: [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]

Squad I-40

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

(S)

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

pg [REDACTED]

Case ID #: [REDACTED]

(S)

(S)
(S)
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(S)
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(S)
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(S)
(S)

(S)

Title: [REDACTED]

(U)

Synopsis: (S) Asset debriefing [REDACTED]

(U)

(S)

Derived From : G-3

Declassify On: X1

Administrative:

(S)

(S)

Asset: [REDACTED]

Date of Contact: [REDACTED]

Contacted by: SA [REDACTED] and SA [REDACTED]

Reliability: [REDACTED]

An asset with indirect access whose information

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S)

To: [redacted]
Re: (S) [redacted]

From: [redacted]

b1
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b7E

has been corroborated in
the past.

DUE TO THE SINGULAR NATURE OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN,
EXTRACTION OR DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE MUST BE COORDINATED
WITH FBI, [redacted]

(U)

Enclosures: (S) This communication contains the following items
stored in a 1A envelope:

(S)

3) Daily News article dated 8/22/2002, page 8, titled "Planning
to Hit Iraq."

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: [redacted]

From: [redacted]

Re: (S) [redacted]

b1
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b7E

(S)

(S)

(S) [redacted] a newspaper article from the Daily News titled "Planning to Hit Iraq" dated August 22, 2002. This article was regarding ABU NIDAL who, according to the Iraqi Government, recently committed suicide. In a photograph displayed at the top right of the article, there is a figure of what the newspaper states is the Iraqi Intelligence Chief. According to the paper, the IIS Chief's name is TAHER JALEEL AL-HABOUSH. The asset advised [redacted]

(S)

X

(U)

(S)

The asset recalled that [redacted]

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET / NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b1
b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: [REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: SSA [REDACTED]

Attn: IOS [REDACTED]

Attn: SSA [REDACTED]

NS15

From: [REDACTED]

I-22

Contact: [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

dkk

Case ID #: [REDACTED]

Title: [REDACTED]

Synopsis: [REDACTED] To provide reporting on [REDACTED]

~~Derived From : G-3~~

~~Declassify On: X1~~

Administrative:

ASSET: [REDACTED]

DATE OF CONTACT: [REDACTED]

CONTACTED BY: SA [REDACTED] and SA [REDACTED]

RELIABILITY: [REDACTED]

Has provided reliable
information in the past

~~SECRET / NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~ / ~~NOFORN~~

b1
b7D
b7E

(S) To: Counterterrorism From: [REDACTED]
Re: (S) [REDACTED]

(U) Details: (S) IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOURCE. RECIPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH FBI [REDACTED]

(S)

~~SECRET~~ / ~~NOFORN~~

(12/31/1995)

DATE: 05-31-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-31-2036

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: [REDACTED]

b1
b7D
b7E

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: SSA [REDACTED]

IOS [REDACTED]

Counterintelligence

Attn: SSA [REDACTED]

CD-4C

Attn: SA [REDACTED]

IT-4

From: [REDACTED]

Squad I-22

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

kyb

(S)

Case ID #: [REDACTED]

(S)
(S)
(S)
(S)

Title: [REDACTED]

(S)

OO: [REDACTED]

(U) (S) ~~Derived From: G-3~~

~~Declassify On: X1~~

(S) ~~WARNING: IN VIEW OF THE EXTREME SENSITIVITY OF [REDACTED]~~

~~CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY
INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THESE SOURCES AND NO ACTION TAKEN WHICH
COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF [REDACTED]~~

(S) ~~FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE
COORDINATED WITH THE [REDACTED] IF DISSEMINATED, THE MATERIAL MUST BE
SUITABLY PARAPHRASED TO PROTECT THE SOURCES.~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

26 Federal Plaza
New York, New York 10278
March 18, 2003

(S)



This document is classified "~~SECRET/NOFORN~~" in its entirety.

b1 b7E

OFFICE OF ORIGIN: NEW YORK

(S/NF) Iraq is considered a threat country under the National List. The definition of a threat country is a foreign government or entity whose activities are hostile and pose a threat to the security of the United States.

(S)



~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 03/02/2003

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: MEU SSA [redacted]
IOS [redacted]

b1
b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

From: [redacted]

Contact: SA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted] np

Case ID #: (S) [redacted]

Title: (S) CHANGED
[redacted]

OO:NY

(U) Synopsis: (S) To inform FBIHQ that a [redacted]
[redacted]

(U) (S) Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

(S) Previous Title: (S) Title marked "Changed" to reflect previous
title. Title previously carried as [redacted]

(U) [redacted]

(U) Enclosure(s): (S) [redacted]

Details: (S) This EC is to inform FBIHQ that [redacted]
[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S) To: Counterterrorism From: [redacted]
Re: (S) [redacted] 03/02/2003

(S) (S) [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

(U) (S) The sources utilized for the information which
comprise enclosed LHM are characterized by "T" designation and
are designated as follows:

- (S) 1. T1 is [redacted] (sensitive and reliable)
2. T2 is [redacted] (sensitive and reliable)

LEAD(s) :

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: [REDACTED]

b1
b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

To: New York

From: New York

I-22

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

np

Case ID #: (S) [REDACTED]

(S) Title: (X) [REDACTED]

OO: [REDACTED]

(U) Synopsis: (S) Interview of captioned subject, request case be placed into a closed status and to claim a statistical accomplishment.

(U)

~~Derived From: G-3~~
~~Declassify On: X1~~

(U) [REDACTED]

(U) Details: (S) Details: (S) IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED WHEN HANDLING ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THE SOURCE. ANY DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION FROM THE SOURCE MUST BE COORDINATED WITH THE [REDACTED] IF DISSEMINATED, THE MATERIAL MUST BE SUITABLY PARAPHRASED TO PROTECT THE SOURCE.

(S) (S) (X) On [REDACTED] (extremely sensitive and reliable source who was in a position to know). provided Squad I-22 with a list [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

(S) [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 01/14/2004

To: Counterterrorism

Attn:

SSA
IOS

New York

From: New York

CD-22

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

kgr

Case ID #:

Title:

Synopsis: Results of an interview with on request to place case in closed status, and to claim a statistical accomplishment.

(U) (S)

Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

(U) Details: On at approximately
Special Agents and interviewed

telephone number

(S) currently resides at
date of birth (DOB)
and a social security account number (SSAN)
Interviewing Agents explained to the reason for the
interview, stated the following information.

~~SECRET~~

(S)

b1
b6
b7A
b7C
b7E

(01/26/1998)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 05-31-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-31-2036

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date:

To:

From:

I-40

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By: :lkb

Case ID #: ~~(SECRET)~~

b1
b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

(S)

Title: ~~(SECRET)~~

(S)

(U)

Synopsis: ~~(SECRET)~~ Results of asset contact.

(U)

~~(SECRET)~~

~~Derived From : G-3
Declassify On: X1~~

(U)

Administrative: ~~(SECRET)~~

~~SECRET~~

(S)

~~SECRET~~

b1
b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

(S)

To:

Re:

From:

~~(SECRET)~~

(S)

ASSET:

DATE OF CONTACT:

CONTACTED BY:

SAs

RELIABILITY:

Has provided reliable
information in the past.

(U)

Details: ~~(SECRET)~~ IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOURCE. RECIPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION SHOULD BE COORDINATED WITH FBI

(S)

(U)

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date:

To:

From:

Squad I-40

Contact: SA

b1
b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

Approved By:

Drafted By:

Case ID #:

(S)

() () () () () () () () () ()

Title:

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S)


To: [redacted]

From: [redacted]

Re: (S) [redacted]

b1
b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

(S)



(U)

Synopsis: (S) Results of asset contact [redacted]

(U)

(S)

Derived From : G-3

Declassify On: X1

(S)

Administrative: (S)

ASSET: [redacted]

DATE OF CONTACT: [redacted]

CONTACTED BY: SA [redacted]
SA [redacted]

RELIABILITY:

Has provided reliable
information in the
past.

(U)

Details: (S) IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCE, EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOURCE. RECIPIENTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION. ANY DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH FBI [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b1
b7D
b7E

(S)

To:

Re:

From:

(S)

(S) The source stated that SADDAM HUSSEIN recently made a speech calling for a Holy Jihad against the US including all Zionists and the US administration. HUSSEIN also told the Iraqi Foreign Minister to tell the United Nations (UN) that he will offer money to poor Americans.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b1
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(S)

To: [redacted]
Re: (S) [redacted]

From: [redacted]

source that one could only imagine how embarrassing it would be to the US if Iraq was to actually send money to Americans. The source added that the UN refused HUSSEIN's offer. The source also commented that any group in Iraq or abroad could take HUSSEIN's statements for a Holy Jihad literally and proceed to carry out a destructive plan. The source believed that a group would anticipate being regarded as heroes by HUSSEIN.

(S)

~~SECRET~~

(12/31/1995)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 05-31-2011
FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-31-2036

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: [REDACTED]

To: [REDACTED]

Attn: SA
SA
SA
SA

b1
b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

From: [REDACTED]

I-40

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

cr

(S)

(S)

Case ID #: (S) [REDACTED]

(S)

Title: (S) [REDACTED]

OO: [REDACTED]

(U)

Synopsis: (S) Results of asset contact.

(U)

(S)

~~Derived From: G-3~~
~~Declassify On: X-1~~

(U)

(U)

Administrative: (S)

(S)

ASSET: [REDACTED]

DATE OF CONTACT: [REDACTED]

CONTACTED BY: SA [REDACTED]

RELIABILITY:

Reliability has yet to be determined

(S)

WARNING: IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF [REDACTED] EXTREME
CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY INFORMATION
ATTRIBUTED TO THE SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN WHICH COULD
CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THE SOURCE. FURTHER
DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION REQUIRES THE APPROVAL OF THE
[REDACTED] SQUAD I-40. IF DISSEMINATED, THE MATERIAL MUST BE SUITABLY
PARAPHRASED TO PROTECT [REDACTED]

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S) To: [redacted] From: [redacted]
Re: (S) [redacted]

b1
b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

(U) Details: (S/NF) On [redacted] source was debriefed by [redacted]
[redacted] Special Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of State for
Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State, [redacted]
and the writer at an undisclosed location.

(S)

(U)

X

(U)

X

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(12/31/1995)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 06-01-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C, D)
DECLASSIFY ON: 06-01-2036

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 10/04/2001

To: New York

From: New York

Squad I-40

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED] psc

Case ID #: (S) [REDACTED]

Title: (S) [REDACTED]

UPLOADED

WITH/TEXT [REDACTED]

WITH/OUT TEXT [REDACTED]

BY [REDACTED]

DATE 11/10/02

Synopsis: (S/NF) Meeting between [REDACTED]

Derived From: G-1

Declassify On: X-1

Details: (S/NF) On [REDACTED] Special Agent [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] met with [REDACTED]

The main topic of discussion was the recent terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon and United Airlines Flight 93.

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
OCT 04 2001	
FBI - NEW YORK	

(12/31/1995)

DATE: 06-01-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 06-01-2036

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date:

To:

From:

I-40

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

js

Case ID #:

Title:

Synopsis: Summary of asset reporting.

Derived From : G-3

Declassify On: X-1

Enclosures: Source provided materials from

Details:

ASSET:

CONTACT DATE:

CONTACTED BY: SA

RELIABILITY: Has provided reliable information.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b1
b7D
b7E

To: [redacted]

From: [redacted]

Re: (S) [redacted]

(S)

(S) [redacted]

(S)

(U) (S) The purpose of the conference was to discuss "Iraq After Sadaam Hussein, 2020." The conference invited various scientists to discuss rebuilding Iraq after Hussein's regime fell. There were people invited from the fields of economy, agriculture, education, and engineering. They were concerned with recruiting people of higher education who had left Iraq because of Saddam to return after his fall.

(U) (S) There was another meeting of the INA/INC in New York City during the last week of September. Secretary of State Madilene Albright addressed a coalition of the Iraqi Oppositionists.

(U) (S) The source provided materials [redacted]

(S)

~~SECRET~~

(S)

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 06-01-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 06-01-2036

b1
b6
b7C
b7D

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

On

[REDACTED] (PROTECT
IDENTITY), DOB: [REDACTED] POB: [REDACTED] Social Security
Account Number: [REDACTED] U.S. Department of Justice
Immigration and Naturalization Alien Registration Number:
[REDACTED] was interviewed
in the vicinity of [REDACTED] was
advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature
of the interview. He provided the following information:

[REDACTED]

(S)

N/A

SA [REDACTED]

SA [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

Hidden bin Laden plotting attacks: U.S.

By NILES LATHAM in D.C.
and URI DAN in Jerusalem

U.S. and Israeli policy-makers believe Islamic terror chief Osama bin Laden has fled his mountain base camp in Afghanistan and gone underground to launch new attacks on American targets.

The fanatic Saudi billionaire left his camp in the Kandahar region of Afghanistan last week and is believed to have moved north to a more remote region and may be preparing to leave the country altogether.

Bin Laden, who has his

own personal jet, is said to be traveling with his four wives and his military commanders. His possible destinations include Chechnya and Somalia, where he has extensive ties with Islamic militias that could provide a safe haven.

Saddam Hussein has also offered him asylum in Iraq.

Reports from the Taliban, the Islamic militia that controls much of Afghanistan, that bin Laden disappeared because he had a falling out with his hosts are being dismissed by U.S. officials as "disin-

formation."

"We believe that he is cooking up something big and he didn't want the Taliban, with whom he has very good relations, to pay the price of American retaliation," said Yousef Bodansky, staff director of the House Task Force on Terrorism.

Although the U.S., in the six months since the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, has put tremendous pressure on his organization, the Clinton administration believes that much of bin Laden's

See BIN LADEN on Page 24



OSAMA BIN LADEN
"Something big" cooking.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 06-01-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc

315-NY-
26 2835
Sub UBL
Connect 13



New York Daily News

received
2/99

199M-NY-262835 Sub UBL
Connect 13

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
FBI - New York	

66
b7C

U.S.: Bin Laden secretly plotting

BIN LADEN from Page 2

worldwide infrastructure remains intact and ready to strike.

"There is not the slightest doubt that Osama bin Laden and his worldwide allies and sympathizers are planning further attacks against us," CIA Director George Tenet warned Congress earlier this month. "I must tell you that one or more of bin Laden's attacks could occur at anytime."

Another U.S. counter-terrorism specialist noted, "The impression is that he's on the run. He needs something big to demonstrate to his constituency that he's still a player."

Bin Laden's vanishing act came 10 days after Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth met with Taliban leaders and demanded that they expel the terrorist leader so he could stand trial in New York for the East Africa embassy bombing that killed 239 people.

The U.S. warned the Taliban that it reserves the right to launch new missile strikes to "prevent terrorist attacks or in retaliation to terrorist attacks."

Last Wednesday, in the wake of bin Laden's disappearance, Inderfurth summoned Abdul Kakeem Mujahid, the Taliban's representative to the United Nations, to Washington to demand information on bin Laden's whereabouts and was told "he is not in the area in control of the Taliban."

The Taliban, desperate for international recognition and foreign investment, may be technically correct in that statement. The region where bin Laden is believed to be hiding is controlled by former Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's militia, the Hezb-I-Islami, which is allied with but not part of the Taliban.

"I think it's not a secret that bin Laden continues to threaten Americans, American civilians, American interests and therefore his presence anywhere but in the hands of justice is unacceptable to the U.S.," said State Department spokesman James Foley.

The massive U.S. effort to neutralize bin Laden since the East African bombings has produced mixed results, say terrorism experts.

While dozens of bin Laden operatives have been arrested, U.S. officials note that they may

Laden's whereabouts and was told "he is not in the area in control of the Taliban."

The Taliban, desperate for international recognition and foreign investment, may be technically correct in that statement. The region where bin Laden is believed to be hiding is controlled by former Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's militia, the Hezb-I-Islami, which is allied with but not part of the Taliban.

"I think it's not a secret that bin Laden continues to threaten Americans, American civilians, American interests and therefore his presence anywhere but in the hands of justice is unacceptable to the U.S.," said State Department spokesman James Foley.

The massive U.S. effort to neutralize bin Laden since the East African bombings has produced mixed results, say terrorism experts.

While dozens of bin Laden operatives have been arrested, U.S. officials note that they may be only scratching the surface of a massive worldwide crusade of terror.

Intelligence experts say that most of the bin Laden operatives who have been arrested are "foot soldiers and messenger boys" for the network of Afghan war veterans known as al Qeda.

"The inner circle remains intact," said Bodansky.

Last month's arrest in India of Sayed Abu Nasir with 2 kilograms of a powerful explosive known as RDX highlights the difficulty the U.S. faces in confronting this shadowy, highly compartmentalized enemy.

Nasir was part of a seven-member bin Laden cell plotting to blow up the U.S. embassy in New Delhi. While his arrest was hailed as a victory, U.S. officials noted that the rest of the cell — including the actual bombers and bomb makers — escaped.

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: IMMEDIATE

Date: 03/24/2003

To: New York

Attn: INTEL DESK
LEAD DESK
INV. DESK
SQUAD I-4
SQUAD I-22

From: New York

Squad I-21

Contact: SA [redacted] ext [redacted]

Approved By: SSA [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted] eso

(U) Case ID #: (S) [redacted] (Pending)

(U) Title: (S) HANDWARMER;
IT-IRAQ
OO:NY

(U) Synopsis: (S) To set lead in captioned matter.

(U) (S) ~~Derived From: G-3~~
~~Declassify On: X1~~

(U) Details: (S) On [redacted] at approximately [redacted] hours,
[redacted] telephone number [redacted]

b6
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b7E

[redacted] See attached ACS check on the subject's name.

JTTF LEAD#: [redacted]

Priority: Routine

Received Date/Time: [redacted] hours

Complaint taken by: [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~315N-NY-
293738-302
Ser. 17

DATE: 06-01-2011

CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 06-01-2036

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 06/19/2007

Individual, who is in a position to testify, provided the
following information:

(S)

b1
b6
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b7D

Investigation on

at

File # 315N-NY-293738

Date dictated

Det

Det

by

SA

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 12/29/2006

To: All Field Offices

Attn: ADICs/SACs/ASACs
FIG Supervisors
JTTFs
Field Reports Officers

All Legats
Counterterrorism

Attn: Legal Attaches

Attn: SC [REDACTED]

UC [REDACTED]

International Operations

Attn: SAC [REDACTED]

SC [REDACTED]

Intelligence Directorate

Attn: SC [REDACTED]

From: Counterterrorism

Contact: [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

415X-NY-

C 232257

Ser. 630

b1
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b7E

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

(U)

Case ID #: (S) 315-HQ-C1275509-282

Title: (S) [REDACTED]

(S)

Synopsis: (S) This Electronic Communication (EC) establishes
ad-hoc requirements for assessing [REDACTED]

(S)

(U)

Derived From: G-3

Declassify On: X1

Reference: (S) 66F-HQ-A1433808-E Serial 94

(U)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism
(U) Re: ~~(S)~~ 315-HQ-C1275509-282, 12/29/2006

Administrative: These ad-hoc intelligence requirements were developed by Counterterrorism Division. [REDACTED]

b1
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b7C
b7E

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] This EC was also reviewed by National Security Law Branch Attorney [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and relevant FBI standing requirements. These ad-hoc intelligence requirements will remain in effect for 90 days.

Details: ~~(S)~~ The Counterterrorism Division (CTD) [REDACTED] requests that all divisions [REDACTED]

(S)

(U) ~~(S)~~ Background: ~~(S)~~/NF) On November 5, 2006, former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was found guilty of crimes against humanity and sentenced to death by hanging. Saddam Hussein, a Sunni Muslim, was convicted for the killing of 148 men and youths in the predominantly Shia town of Dujail, Iraq, in 1982 in retaliation for an assassination attempt against his life. Saddam Hussein's half brother Barzan Al-Tikriti and former Chief Judge Awad Hamed Al-Bandar were also sentenced to death. Former Vice President Taha Yassin Ramadan received a sentence of life imprisonment. Two other senior Ba'ath Party officials, Abdullah Kadhem Ruaid and Abdullah Rawed Mizher, were found guilty and each sentenced to fifteen years in prison. Ba'ath Party official Muhammad Azawi Ali was acquitted of all charges.

(U) ~~(S)~~/NF) As of 29 December 2006, the exact date of Saddam Hussein's execution remains unknown.

Intelligence Target

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) To: All Field Offices From: Counterterrorism
Re: (S) 315-HQ-C1275509-282, 12/29/2006

(S)

b1

Reporting and Requests for Assistance

(U) Any potential threat information developed relative to these requirements, and not listed under the Urgent Report Guidelines on the Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC) website should be immediately forwarded to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Threat information that IS listed under SIOC's Urgent Report Guidelines should be disseminated via the instructions located on SIOC's website.

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(U) Responses should be prepared in electronic communication (EC) format and submitted to the appropriate investigative and analytical units in the Counterterrorism Division (CTD). In addition, responses should also be prepared in Intelligence Information Report (IIR) format by the Field Intelligence Groups (FIG) and submitted to the Counterterrorism Division, [REDACTED] via FIDS. When responding to this requirement set, please note the identifier following each requirement: [REDACTED]

(U) Information developed from these collection requirements (including threats) and requests for assistance should be forwarded by email or phone to each of the following units:

1. (U) FBIHQ, Counterterrorism Division, [REDACTED]

SIA [REDACTED]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Complaint Form

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 05-23-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc

62-0

NOTE: Hand print names legibly; handwriting satisfactory for remainder.

Indices: ☐ Negative ☐ See below

Subject's name and aliases

Sadam Hussein
Osama Bin Laden

Character of case

Sadam Hussein/Osama Bin Laden

Complainant ☐ Protect Source

Complaint received

☐ Personal ☒ Telephonic Date 8/5/03 Time 11:30 am

Address of Subject

Complainant's address and telephone number

Complainant's DOB

Sex

Female

Subject's
Description

Race

☐ Male

Height

Hair

Build

Birth date and birth place

Age

☐ Female

Weight

Eyes

Complexion

Social Security Number

Scars, marks and other data

Employer

Address

Telephone

Vehicle Description

Facts of Complaint

[redacted] called and said that [redacted]

yd
(1)

Do not write in this space.

62-0-23447

MST

BLOCK STAMP

(Complaint received by)

217 yd 01.71

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 05-24-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-24-2036

FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

415-MM-

C9P566

Ser

1811

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription

A source, who is in a position to testify, provided the following information to Special Agent (SA) [redacted] and [redacted]

[redacted] male, who is in [redacted] told the source he was [redacted]

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(S)

Investigation on

at

File

Date dictated

by

SA

GAM:rk

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~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: [redacted]

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [redacted]

UC [redacted]

[redacted]
Tampa

From: [redacted]

Squad NS-6

Contact: [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

cdd

Case ID #: [redacted]

Title: [redacted]

IRACI INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

ET AL;
AOT, IT

Synopsis: [redacted]

To provide additional information regarding [redacted]

[redacted] to assist in [redacted] upcoming interview of
Due to the below described details, [redacted] requests
be interviewed at [redacted]
and in the presence [redacted]

re all pertinent national security issues involving

Iraq.

(U)

Derived From: G-3

Declassify On: 08/22/2002

Reference: [redacted]

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~~SECRET~~

(S)

To: Counterterrorism From: [redacted]

Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted]
[redacted]

(U)

~~(S)~~ Administrative: Re [redacted] EC to [redacted] and receiving offices, dated August 16, 2002 and [redacted] EC to [redacted] and receiving offices, dated July 16, 2002.

(U)

~~(S)~~ Details: On [redacted] resident, advised that [redacted] could provide relevant information pertaining to [redacted] also provided information which indicated that [redacted] may have relevant information regarding individuals [redacted]

(U)

~~(S)~~ On [redacted] was contacted by [redacted] regarding his detailed knowledge of [redacted] stated that [redacted] wants to provide current and historical information regarding numerous national security matters pertaining to Iraq and President HUSSEIN. [redacted] first met [redacted]
[redacted]

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(U)

~~(S)~~ [redacted]
[redacted]

(U)

~~(S)~~ [redacted]
[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterterrorism From: [redacted]

Re: (S) [redacted]
[redacted]

(U)

(S)

(U)

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(U)

(S)

(U)

(S)

(S) For information of receiving offices, and as detailed above, all of [redacted] statements are hearsay. [redacted] is awaiting to be contacted [redacted] at his home address and telephone number (previously provided to [redacted] requests [redacted] conduct the interview at [redacted] and in the presence, [redacted]

(U) (S) [redacted] is willing to travel outside of [redacted] to be interviewed, if deemed necessary.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: IMMEDIATE

Date: [REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: DD/CTC [REDACTED]

UC
SSA
IOS
IOS

SC

SSA

IOS

IOU-1, UC

Legat

SSA

Squad 17A

IT

International Operations

[REDACTED]

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From: [REDACTED]

Squad T-3
Contact: [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

(S)

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

cdd

(S) Case ID #: (S) [REDACTED]

(S) Title: (S)

TRAOI INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

(U) Synopsis: (S)

FBI Miami received uncorroborated information from an individual whose reliability is undetermined. This information is that [REDACTED]

(U)

~~Derived From: G-3~~
~~Declassify On: X1~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 05-23-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-23-2036

NOTE: Hand print names legibly; handwriting satisfactory for remainder.

Indices: ☒ Negative ☐ See below

Subject's name and aliases

JABER A. ELBANEH;
AYMAN AL-ZAWAHIRI;
USAMA BIN LADEN;
SADAM HUSSEIN;

Character of case

265-T-4

Complainant ☐ Protect Source

Complaint received

☒ Personal ☐ Telephonic Date 6/30/03 Time 10:30 am

Address of Subject

Complainant's address and telephone number

Complainant's DOB

12/11/44

Sex

Male

Subject's
Description

Race

☐ Male

Height

Hair

Build

Birth date and birth place

Age

☐ Female

Weight

Eyes

Complexion

Social Security Number

Scars, marks and other data

Employer

Address

Telephone

Vehicle Description

Facts of Complaint

Complainant, [redacted] states that he has
information relative to [redacted]

rza
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Do not write in this space.

(Complaint received by)

BLOCK STAMP

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~~SECRET~~

DATE: 05-23-2011
FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-23-2036

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: IMMEDIATE

Date: 07/06/2002

To: Director

Attn: Executive AD Dale Watson
CT Unit Chief [REDACTED]

WFO
Los Angeles
Canberra
Miami

SAC
SAC

[REDACTED]
SAC Hector M. Pesquera
A/ASAC [REDACTED]
ASAC [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

From: Miami.

NS-6

Contact: SA [REDACTED]
SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED] :blm

(S)

(S) Case ID #: (S) [REDACTED]
(S) 163A-CN-2324 (Pending)

Title: (S)

AKA;

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AOT - IT
OO: MIAMI

(S)

(S)

OO: CANBERRA
(163A-MM-2324)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S) To: Director From: Miami
Re: (S) [redacted] 07/06/2002

(S) Synopsis: (S) To O & A a captioned [redacted] matter, to provide results of investigation conducted to date, and to set appropriate leads.

(U) (S) ~~Derived From: G-3~~
~~Declassify On: X1~~

(U) Administrative: (S) Reference Los Angeles EC to Counterterrorism and Miami, dated July 03, 2002; Miami EC to Counterterrorism and receiving offices, dated July 02, 2002; and Canberra EC to Counterterrorism and receiving offices, dated July 02, 2002.

Details: (S) Per the referenced EC from Legat Canberra, information was provided that captioned subject [redacted] date of birth [redacted] reportedly [redacted]

(S)

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(U) (S) Investigation conducted by the Miami FBI determined that [redacted]

[redacted] The above information was provided to the INS Miami and the FBI Los Angeles Division and on July 02, 2002, at the request of Miami agents from the Los Angeles Division interviewed [redacted] advised that [redacted] confirmed that [redacted] and denied any relationship to President SADDAM HUSSEIN.

(U) (S) [redacted] [redacted] was interviewed by FBI Miami SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] prior to [redacted] was cooperative with the interviewing agents and stated that [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

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- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 07/04/2002

(S) [redacted] At approximately 6:00pm on July 03 2002, Special Agents (SA) [redacted] and [redacted] members of the Joint Terrorism Task Force, (JTTF) assisted Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) SAs, [redacted] and INS Section Chief William West [redacted]

[redacted] date of birth [redacted]

b1
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[redacted] voluntarily provided the following information:

[redacted] emphatically expressed that [redacted] Iraqi President SADDAM HUSSEIN. [redacted]

Investigation on 07/03/02 at Miami, Florida

(S) File # [redacted] 163A-CN-2324

Date dictated 07/04/02

by SA [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

DATE: 05-23-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-23-2036

Date of transcription 07/10/2002

[redacted] date of birth [redacted]
was advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and of the
nature of the interview. He then provided the following
information at the [redacted]

[redacted] home address is [redacted]
[redacted] and his home telephone number is [redacted]
[redacted] father, currently lives in [redacted]
[redacted] home telephone number is [redacted]
[redacted] where he lives [redacted] is
married to [redacted]
[redacted] mother, date of birth [redacted] lives with [redacted]
[redacted] can be
contacted at home telephone number [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] reiterated that he has never been approached by
anyone in the Iraqi Government, to include both Iraqi military and
intelligence officials. Additionally, [redacted] has no known
acquaintances who are Iraqi intelligence officials or are
associated with any Iraqi intelligence officials. [redacted] indicated
that in the future, should he ever encounter any problems with the
Iraqi Government, he would definitely contact the appropriate [redacted]
[redacted]

(S)

Investigation on 07/05/2002 at [redacted]

File # [redacted] 163A-CN-2324

Date dictated 07/10/2002

by SA [redacted] BLM:blm

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: IMMEDIATE

Date: 10/08/2002

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [redacted]

UC
SSA
Legat

From: [redacted]

Squad NS-6

Contact: [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

cdd

(S) Case ID #: (S) [redacted]

(S) Title: (S) IRAQI INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

(S) (S) ET AL;
AOT:IT

(U) Synopsis: (S) [redacted] third party provided
intelligence regarding [redacted]

(U) (S)

~~Derived From: G-3~~
~~Declassify On: X1~~

(S) Reference: (S) [redacted]

(U) Administrative: (S) Re [redacted] telcalls to Counterterrorism, [redacted]
[redacted] SSA [redacted] on October 07-08, 2002 and [redacted] EC to
Counterterrorism and receiving offices, dated August 22, 2002.

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DATE: 05-24-2011

FBI INFO.

CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 05-24-2036

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 10/28/2002

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [redacted]

UC [redacted]

SSA [redacted]

IOU-1, UC [redacted]

Legat [redacted]

From: [redacted]

Squad NS-6

Contact: [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

(S)

Drafted By: [redacted]

cdd

Case ID #: [redacted]

Title: [redacted]

IRAQI INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

(S)

ET AL;

AOT-IT

Synopsis: [redacted]

(S) Per previous administrative coordination between London and Miami, London is requested to have [redacted] conduct a second interview of [redacted]

(U)

Derived From : G-3

Declassify On: X1

Reference: [redacted]

Administrative: [redacted]

(S) Re [redacted] EC to [redacted] and receiving offices, dated October 21, 2002 and [redacted] EC to [redacted] and receiving offices, dated October 18, 2002.

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(Rev. 10-01-1999)

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 01/07/2003

To: Counterterrorism

Attn:

SSA [redacted]

SA [redacted]

Squad CI-1

[redacted]
Miami

From: Miami

Squad T-3

Contact: [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]:cdd

(U) Case ID #: (S) 199E-MM-C101114 (Pending)
(U) [redacted] (Pending)

(U) Title: (S) 2002 CONFLICT WITH IRAQ - MIAMI;
IT - IRAQ
DARKENING CLOUDS;
IT - IRAQ

315E-MM-
C101114
Serial 6

b1
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b7A
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b7E
b3

(U) Synopsis: (S) To provide information to Detroit regarding [redacted]
[redacted] who possibly resides in [redacted] Division.

(U) Derived From : G-3, T-3/JTTF/Miami
Reason : 1.5(c)
Declassify On: X1

References:

(U)
(U)
(U)
(U)
(U)
(U)

[redacted]

(U) Enclosure(s): (S) Enclosed for [redacted] as attachments are the following:

1. One colored State of [redacted] Driver's License photograph of [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 03/14/2003

To: Counterterrorism

Attn:

SSA
SSA
IOS

From:

T-3

Contact:

SA

JTTF/SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

iam

(U)

Case ID #:

(S)

199E-MM-C101114

(Pending)

(S)

(Pending)

(U)

Title:

(S)

2003 CONFLICT WITH IRAQ-MIAMI;
IT - IRAQ

DARKENING CLOUDS;
IT-IRAQ

315E-MM-
C101114
Ser. 150

b1
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b7C
b7D
b7E
b3

(U)

Synopsis:

(S)

To report results of Asset debriefing.

(U)

(S)

Classified By: G-3, T-3/JTTF/Miami

Reason: 1.5(c)

Declassify On: X1

(S)

Details:

(S)

On

[redacted] hereinafter referred to as Asset), who has provided information, some of which has been corroborated, met with SA [redacted] a member of the [redacted] Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and SA [redacted] and provided the following information:

Note that elements of the information contained herein are singular in nature and their disclosure will compromise the source of this information.

~~SECRET~~

315E-MM-

C101114

Serial 375

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 03/24/2003

On March 20, 2003, [redacted] date of birth [redacted]
[redacted] place of birth [redacted] Social Security Account Number [redacted]
[redacted] home address [redacted]
[redacted] home telephone number [redacted] cellular telephone
number [redacted] was interviewed in his home. Also present
throughout the entire course of the interview were Special Agent
[redacted] from the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) and Special Agent [redacted] from United States
Customs (USC). After being advised of the identities of the
interviewing Agents as well as the nature of the interview,
[redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7CInvestigation on 03/20/2003 at [redacted]File # 199E-MM-C101114 [redacted]Date dictated 03/24/2003

by SA [redacted] bk

b6
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b7C

199E-MM-C101114, [REDACTED]

b7A

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 03/20/2003, Page 3

[REDACTED] denies having any foreign property or business interests.

[REDACTED] has never been associated with the BAATH or any other political parties. When questioned, [REDACTED] described the BAATH party as Hussein's personal political party.

[REDACTED] denies ever having been in Tikrit, Iraq.

b6
b7C

[REDACTED] did not have any evident tattoos or other physical deformities.

[REDACTED] does not have a current passport.

When asked about the current war in Iraq, [REDACTED] stated he hoped Hussein and his followers would be ousted permanently. [REDACTED] believed this would be best for all of the Iraqi people. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] described Hussein as a master of propaganda. [REDACTED] also stated the people of Iraq live in constant fear of Hussein and his regime.

[REDACTED] is willing to speak to Agents of the government at any time and encouraged us to recontact him if necessary.

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
ON 05-24-2011

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 03/26/2003

~~SECRET~~

~~Derived From: G-3~~
~~Declassify On: X1~~

(U) On March 21, 2003, [redacted] date of birth [redacted]
[redacted] Social Security Account Number [redacted] was
interviewed at [redacted]

entire course of the interview were Special Agent [redacted] from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and Special Agent [redacted] from United States Customs. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents as well as the nature of the interview, and after having Special Agent (SA) [redacted] read the FD-395 Advice of Rights Form in its entirety and having [redacted] sign this form, [redacted] provided the following information:

(U) [redacted] was born in [redacted]
[redacted] has lived in [redacted] for
approximately [redacted]

b6
b7C

(U)

Investigation on 03/21/2003 at

(U) File # (S) 199E-MM-C101114, [REDACTED] dictated 03/26/2003

- b6
- b7A
- b7C

by SA [redacted] : b6

~~SECRET~~

-1-

315E-MM-

C101114

732

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 03/31/2003~~SECRET~~~~Derived From: G-3~~~~Declassify On: X1~~

(U) On 03/27/2003, [redacted] telephonically contacted the writer at the Miami Headquarters Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. After being advised of the identity of interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C

(U) [redacted]

(U) [redacted]

was born [redacted]

in [redacted]

[redacted] No member of his family has personally met Saddam Hussein.

(U) [redacted]

he never had direct contact with Saddam.

(U) Investigation on 03/27/2003 at Miami, Florida (telephonically)

File # ~~(S)~~ 199E-MM-C101114 [redacted] Date dictated 03/31/2003

by SA [redacted]

~~SECRET~~b6
b7A
b7C

(U) ~~(S)~~ 199E-MM-C101114 [redacted]
~~SECRET~~

b7A

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 03/27/2003, Page 3

(U) [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted] are not in favor of what Hussein has
done to Iraq since coming to power. [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] has openly
voiced his dislike of Hussein.

[redacted] agreed to re-contact at the writer discretion.

(U) [redacted] provided the following contact
information: primary residence is [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

315E-MM-
C 101114

Ser. 805

Date of transcription 03/24/2003

~~SECRET~~~~Derived From: G-3~~
~~Declassify On: X1~~

(U) [redacted] date of birth [redacted]
[redacted] home address [redacted]
[redacted] home telephone number [redacted] State of [redacted]
driver's license number [redacted] employed as a [redacted]
[redacted] work telephone number [redacted] was
advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and of the nature
of the interview. He then provided the following information at
his work address:

(U) [redacted] insisted that he made no false statements
to Special Agent (SA) [redacted] and SA [redacted]
during his January 29, 2003 interview.

b6
b7C

(U) [redacted] stated he had no relatives who were
formerly Iraqi scientists who worked on Iraqi President SADDAM
HUSSEIN's weapons of mass destruction programs. [redacted]
emphasized he had no relatives who currently reside in Switzerland
or Sweden.

(U) [redacted] stated he is not a current or former
participant in any international heroin distribution network.
[redacted] explained that he could not possibly be involved in an
international heroin distribution network because he does not use
heroin. [redacted] said he knows nobody who lives in Malaysia or
China. [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted] maintained that he knows nobody who was ever arrested and
successfully prosecuted for distributing heroin.

(U)

Investigation on 03/06/2003 at [redacted]
(S) 199E-MM-C101114, [redacted] 03/06/2003
File # [redacted] Date dictated
SA [redacted] CDD:cdd ~~SECRET~~
by [redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C

315A-MM-
C99102-
AA96
Ser 7~~SECRET~~

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/10/2002

[redacted] also known as (aka) [redacted]
[redacted] was
interviewed at [redacted] by Special Agent
(SA) [redacted] FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
(FBI) and SA [redacted] NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
(NCIS) [redacted] provided Arabic/English translation.
[redacted] voluntarily provided the following information:

b1
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b7C
b3Investigation on 10/10/2002 at [redacted]

(S) File # [redacted]

Date dictated 10/10/2002by FBI SA [redacted] acd
NCIS SA [redacted]~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 05-24-2011

CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 05-24-2036

35N-MM

C 99102-

AAAW

Ser 9

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/25/2002

On [REDACTED]

also known as [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was interviewed at [REDACTED]
Present for the interview were SA [REDACTED] Naval Criminal
Investigative Service (NCIS), and SA [REDACTED] Federal
Bureau of Investigation, (FBI). [REDACTED] provided
Arabic/English translation. [REDACTED] voluntarily provided the
following information:

b1
b6
b7C
b3

[REDACTED] HUSSEIN wants to be the next "Arab
Emperor". HUSSEIN wants to be the leader who revives Babylonian
culture (an infidel culture) and applies it to all Muslims. HUSSEIN
uses the Baath Party and western technology in order to secure

Investigation on 10/23/2002 at [REDACTED]

File # [REDACTED]

Date dictated 10/23/2002

by SA [REDACTED]

:acd

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~b1
b3

(S)

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 10/23/2002, Page 2

greater power in the region. [REDACTED] believes that if HUSSEIN were deposed, Iraq would "break up".

[REDACTED] believes HUSSEIN spends more than 70-80% of Iraq's wealth on the military. [REDACTED] stated HUSSEIN unsuccessfully attempted to separate religion from politics within the country. He held summits with competing parties and other Arab nations in order to cement his hold on power.

[REDACTED] was asked to compare HUSSEIN's ideas for the Arab world with those of USAMA BIN LADEN, but he refused to do so. When the comparison was made, [REDACTED] stated BIN LADEN's views on Iraq and HUSSEIN are best represented in the USS Cole video, which he created. [REDACTED] refused to answer any questions concerning his opinion on the matter, but admitted BIN LADEN wanted the specific footage of HUSSEIN and his treatment of children in Iraq, included in the video. [REDACTED] believes the message of the USS Cole video is very clear and the subsequent reaction of the world is a political, military, and religious victory for Islam.

b6
b7C

[REDACTED] admitted to investigators that he was also known by the name [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

DATE: 05-24-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-24-2036

35N-MM-

- 1 -

C99102-
AA96
Ser B

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 11/15/2002

[redacted] was
interviewed on November 14, 2002, at [redacted]
[redacted] The interview was conducted by Special Agent (SA) [redacted]
[redacted] Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), SA [redacted]
[redacted] Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), and
Contract Linguist [redacted] The interview was conducted in
Arabic. [redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C

[redacted]

b1
b6
b7C
b3

Investigation on 11/14/2002 at [redacted]

(S) File # [redacted]

Date dictated 11/14/2002

by SA [redacted]:acd

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~b1
b3

(S) [REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 11/14/2002, Page 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] said everyone knew that Saddam Hussein was selling a lot of oil and that 70-80% of the profits were going towards building weapons, instead of going back into the economy. [REDACTED] does not have any direct knowledge of any weapons of mass destruction. All he knows is what he saw on the news.

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 08/01/2002

315N-MM-
C99 102-
AA 145
Ser 7

On [redacted]
[redacted] was contacted for
interview at [redacted] by Special Agents
[redacted] Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI). Additionally, Technical Sergeant (T/Sgt) [redacted]
[redacted] U.S. Air Force Language Specialist, was present for the
duration of the interview and provided Arabic-English translation.

b6
b7C

[redacted]
[redacted] 1994 which was the same year that SADDAM
HUSSEIN threatened to invade Kuwait a second time. [redacted]
[redacted]

Investigation on 07/31/2002 at [redacted]

File # [redacted]

Date dictated 08/01/2002

by SA [redacted] gaf

b1
b6
b7C
b3

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~DATE: 05-24-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-24-2036

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 07/07/2002

415A-MM-
C 99102-
AA 490
Ser-9

[redacted] was interviewed
on 07/07/2002 at [redacted] The interview
was conducted by SA [redacted] Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Language Specialist [redacted] (Farsi translator)
and another U.S. government official. [redacted]
[redacted] The interview began at
approximately 1020 hours. [redacted] provided the following
information:

b6
b7CInvestigation on 07/14/2002 at [redacted]

(S) File # [redacted]

Date dictated 07/07/2002

by SA [redacted]

b1
b6
b7C
b3~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~DATE: 05-24-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-24-2036

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 09/04/2003

On September 4, 2003, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] date of birth [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

[REDACTED] was interviewed at [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] by Special Agents (SA) [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
Federal Bureau of Investigation. The interview was conducted in
English and some Arabic. Linguist [REDACTED] was present during
this interview for translation.

The purpose of this interview was to ascertain
information on [REDACTED] was
initially shown a photo line-up consisting of seven (7)
photographs. [REDACTED] positively identified the photograph of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Investigation on 09/04/2003 at [REDACTED]b1
b6
b7C
b3

(S) File # [REDACTED]

Date dictated 09/04/2003

by SA [REDACTED] lah

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

DATE: 05-24-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-24-2036

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

315A-MM -
C99102-AA
632
Ser 15

Date of transcription 10/24/2002

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] place of birth [redacted]

[redacted] was interviewed at [redacted]

[redacted] Also present during the interview was Special Agent (SA) [redacted] Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI). After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

Initially, [redacted] discussed [redacted]

[redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted]

[redacted]

Investigation on 10/24/2002 at [redacted]

(S) File # [redacted]

Date dictated 10/24/2002

by SA [redacted] sjb

b1
b6
b7C
b3

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: [REDACTED]

To: National Security

Attn: NS-2B, IOS [REDACTED]

Miami

Attn: SSA [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]

NS-2

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

dm

dm

(S) Case ID #: (S) [REDACTED]

(U) Title: (S) IRAQI INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(S) Synopsis: (S) To provide FBIHQ with copies of documents
provided by [REDACTED] for review and dissemination as appropriate.

(U) (S) Derived From : G-3
Reason : 1.5c
Declassify On: X1

(S) Enclosures: (S) Enclosed for FBIHQ are copies of documents
provided by [REDACTED] and an English summary translation
prepared by the FBI, as set forth in the Details Section of this
communication.

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

~~SECRET~~

8-25-68

2.03.96

IC

I

ЗЦ.
ЗМ.
Ш.честь,
и. мазутдом 6а
163-3539
ДружбаАЧ
сия"надоело,
и-пекарня
в. то мет.
необходимискающего
только
становках
ишь!
крушения
го самая
спирта в

за два миллиона долларов»

Юрий КОВАЛЕНКО, «Известия»

Отсчитанные Саддамом Хусейном два миллиона долларов предопределили победу Багдада над Москвой, сумевшей наскрести всего миллион «зеленых», а также над другими городами-претендентами — Баку и Монреалем.

Недавно избранный президент ФИДЕ Кирсан Илюмжинов потряс мировую общественность, остановив свой выбор на иракской столице в качестве места проведения финала чемпионата мира по шахматам между 44-летним Анатолием Карповым и Гатой Камским, 21 год.

Матч должен начаться в Международный день защиты детей 1 июня в багдадской гостинице «Эль-Рашид», состоять из 20 партий и продолжаться не более 40 дней. Первый ход конем, пообещал президент ФИДЕ, в чемпионате сделает сам Саддам Хусейн, который в дальнейшем станет двигать пешками, а не танками.

В свою очередь шахматисты посулили отдать из призового фонда 500 тысяч на лекарства иракским детям. Однако, похоже, что ни гротескостеры, ни дети этих денег не получат по той простой причине, что государственный департамент США запретил уроженцу Сибири

Гате Камскому, ставшему американским гражданином, участвовать в этом матче. Основание тому — на Ирак распространяются санкции ООН. Правда, ФИДЕ и претенденты на чемпионское звание не оставляют надежды на то, что госдеп отменит свой вердикт. Тем не менее большинство обозревателей убеждено в обратном.

Зачем же, спрашивается, Кирсану Илюмжинову надо было совершать такой ход, который сразу расценили как провокационный? Тем самым ФИДЕ во главе со своим президентом, пишет французская пресса, продала душу дьяволу за 2 миллиона.

Президент Калмыкии на пресс-конференции в Париже, напоминая, что шахматы появились в арабских странах, утверждал, что экономическая блокада ООН не распространяется на эту благородную игру, которая является «послом мира». Шахматы, убеждал он журналистов,

учат доброте, миру, способствуют урегулированию конфликтов за доской и проч., и проч.

Кирсан Николаевич в беседе с журналистами хладнокровно поведал и о том, как его принимал иракский деспот несколько дней спустя после расправы над своими родственниками. Среди казненных был Саддам Камель, которого сам Илюмжинов называет своим другом и который недавно останавливался в его резиденции.

Взявший слово на той же пресс-конференции Анатолий Карпов возложил вину за развал шахматного движения на бывшего многолетнего лидера ФИДЕ Ф. Кампоанеса и подчеркнул, что старая ФИДЕ умерла. Что же касается Гарри Каспарова, то у него, по мнению Анатолия Евгеньевича, остается самый последний шанс вернуться в лоно ФИДЕ.

Наконец, Илюмжинов сообщил, что он собирается в скором времени открыть свое посольство в Париже, в который, кстати, в 1814 году, по его словам, первыми на верблюдах в составе царской армии вошли калмыки.

ПАРИЖ.

ХОККЕ

Юрий ЦЫБАНИН

Главным тренером в августе — Владимир Васильев Федерации хоккея с коньками России.

Согласие по поводу достигнутого соглашения Федерации хоккея с коньками России с Федерацией хоккея с коньками России. В позиции ранее Фетисовым, чтобы игроки в тайным голосованием, Владимир Макаров.

По-прежнему генеральным менеджером. По словам Сыча, решать исполком также считает возможным в тренерский состав представителя.

Президент Федерации хоккея с коньками России в августе на базе этого игрового в гостинице. Учет соблюдения правил работы в ка кинорежиссеруется для подготовки для недели диванной (или) планов российских.

Чтобы обыграть Сергея Бубку, соперник назвал его именем свою собаку

КИШЕВ

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EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
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AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)
DATE 04-25-2011

MESSAGE RELAY VIA TELETYPE
(RESTRICTED USE)

Date: 6/30/83 PRECEDENCE: ☐ IMMEDIATE ☒ PRIORITY ☐ ROUTINE

FM: DIRECTOR, FBI

TO:

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

- ☒ White House/WH/
- ☐ Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms/BATF/
- ☒ Central Intelligence Agency/CIA/
- ☐ CIA DCD/DCD/
- ☒ Dept. of Energy/HQS/DOEHQ/
- ☐ Dept. of Energy/Germantown-DIV/DOE/
- ☒ Dept. of Justice/DOJ/
- ☒ Dept. of State/DOS/
- ☐ Dept. of the Army/DAA/
- ☐ Dept. of Treasury/DOF/
- ☒ Defense Intelligence Agency/DIA/
- ☒ Director National Security Agency/NSA/
- ☐ Director Naval Investigative Service/DIRNAVINSERV/
- ☐ Drug Enforcement Admin./DEA/
- ☐ FAA Washington HQ/FAA/
- ☒ HQ AFOSI-Bolling AFB/AFOSI/
- ☐ INSCOM-Ft. Meade/INSCOM/
- ☐ Nuclear Regulatory Commission/NRC/
- ☐ U.S. Customs Service/UCS/
- ☒ U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Service/INS/
- ☒ U.S. Secret Service/USSS/
- ☐ Other: _____

BT

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Addressee Internal Distribution

For: _____

Subject: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - IRAQ

☐ See Attached

Approved By: <u>EVO/AM</u>	Originator: <u>MORIN</u>	Tele Ext. <u>4646</u>	Room/Div. <u>4084/INTD</u>
----------------------------	--------------------------	-----------------------	----------------------------

64 AUG 23 1983
216

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUL 5 1983

DO NOT FILE WITHOUT COMMUNICATIONS STAMP

FBI/DOJ

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DATE 04-25-2011

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Crim. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Insp.	_____
Laboratory	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Plan. & Insp.	_____
Rec. Mgnt.	_____
Tech. Serv.	_____
Training	_____
Public Affs. Off.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director's Sec'y	_____

OO HI

DE PD

170233Z JAN 80

FM PORTLAND

TO DIRECTOR IMMEDIATE

BY

CONF. INTEL


~~SECRET~~

~~SECTION ONE OF TWO~~

PD

[REDACTED]; FCI - IRAN - TERRORISM.

1. BACKGROUND



ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

84 NOV 7 1980

90

DATE: 04-25-2011

CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc

REASON: 1.4 (2, D)

DECLASSIFY ON: 04-25-2036

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

- ☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ AIRTEL

PRECEDENCE:

- ☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

- ☐ TOP SECRET
☐ SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

SECRET

Date 3/16/92

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
(ATTN: CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION,
[redacted] SSA [redacted])

FROM: SAC, PHILADELPHIA (199K-WF-3078) (ARA) (P)

SUBJECT: [redacted]

OO:PH

OO:WMFO
(199K-WF-3078)

OO:WMFO

This communication is classified "~~SECRET~~" in its
entirety.

- ③ - Bureau (RM)
1 - TRAC
2 - Boston (SQ C-7) (RM)
2 - Detroit (RM)
2 - Houston (RM)
2 - Newark (RM)
2 - New York (SQ IT-2) (RM)
2 - San Francisco (RM)

DARo:rmc
(24)

- 5 - WMFO (SQ C-1) (RM)
2 - 199K-WF-3078
2 - [redacted]
1 - 199H-WF-170886

- 4 - Philadelphia
1 - 199K-WF-3078 (SQ 10)
1 - [redacted] (SQ 10)
1 - [redacted]

~~SECRET~~
~~CLASSIFIED BY G-3~~
~~DECLASSIFY ON OADR~~

Approved: BER/DAE Transmitted

(Number)

(Time)

Per

[REDACTED]
~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
b6
b7C

[REDACTED] stated that he has never been interviewed or contacted by the Iraqi, Yemeni, Soviet, or Polish Intelligence Services. [REDACTED] or received pressure from any country for extraordinary cooperation. He stated that he is not here on any type of hidden agenda and asserted that he had been completely candid during the interview. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] He is not a member of the Iraqi Baath Party, does not agree with the activities and behaviour of the current regime of Saddam Hussain, and is a non-practicing Moslem.

[REDACTED] agreed to further interview contacts as necessary and agreed to notify the interviewer if he receives any type of pressure for extraordinary activities directed against the United States on behalf of Iraq, Poland or any other country.

3
~~SECRET~~

0002 MRI 01703

PP SIOC FBIBA FBIDN FBIDE FBIJN FBILA FBINY FBIWMFO
PAR

DE FBINK #0018 1071318

ZNY SSSSS

P 162102Z APR 91

FM FBI NEWARK (199E-LA-115677) (P)

TO FBI SIOC/PRIORITY/

FBI BALTIMORE/PRIORITY/

FBI DENVER/PRIORITY/

FBI DETROIT/PRIORITY/

FBI JACKSON/PRIORITY/

FBI LOS ANGELES/PRIORITY/

FBI NEW YORK (199E-NY-271)/PRIORITY/

FBI WMFO/PRIORITY/

LEGAT PARIS (199M-PA-7680)/PRIORITY/

BT

~~SECRET~~

SECTION TWO OF THREE SECTIONS

CITE: //3510:C-10//

PASS: SIOC, CID/CTS, [REDACTED]

SSA [REDACTED]

SSA [REDACTED]

PTU, SSA [REDACTED] OLIA.

b6
b7C
b7E

b1
b3

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA
☐ Teletype
☐ Facsimile
☒ AIRTEL

PRECEDENCE
☒ Immediate
☒ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION
☒ TOP SECRET
☒ SECRET
☒ CONFIDENTIAL
☐ UNCLAS E F T O
☐ UNCLAS

CLASSIFIED BY 58124 and new sub class
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-16-2036

Date 9/20/90

TO: Director, FBI
Attn: INTD CI-2B

FROM: S/C CHICAGO

CHANGED

SUBJECT:

OO:CC

This entire document is classified ~~Secret~~ unless otherwise noted

Title marked changed to add additional middle name of [redacted]

Full investigation initiated 3/8/90.

Request of the Bureau:

Bureau requested to disseminate copies of LHM to the Central Intelligence Agency and other appropriate agencies.

Captioned was interviewed per Bureau Authority on 9/20/90. Results contained in enclosed LHM.

Investigation continuing.

3-Bureau (enc 5)
1-CI-3B
1-Chicago
DJO/S

ENCLOSURE

SECRET
CLASSIFIED BY 3827
DECLASSIFY ON OADR

LHM
P. 2, 3
[initials]

2 OCT 1 1990

Nov 09 2000

Approved:

Ans BY [signature]

Transmitted

(Number) (Time)

Per

no dissemination

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE: 05-18-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-18-2036



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. [REDACTED]

b1
b3

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
60604

SECRET

September 20, 1990

[REDACTED]

This ~~entire~~ document is classified ~~secret~~ unless
otherwise noted.

[REDACTED] date of birth [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] was interviewed by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) on September 20, 1990 and the following
information was obtained.

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SECRET
CLASSIFIED BY 3827
DECLASSIFY ON OADR

(S)

[REDACTED]

b1
b3

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CLASS

SER

REC

0001 MRI 01702

PP SIOC FBIBA FBIDN FBIDE FBIJN FBILA FBINY FBIWMFO
PAR

DE FBINK #0017 1071317

ZNY SSSSS

P 162102Z APR 91

FM FBI NEWARK (199E-LA-115677) (P)

TO FBI SIOC/PRIORITY/

FBI BALTIMORE/PRIORITY/

FBI DENVER/PRIORITY/

FBI DETROIT/PRIORITY/

FBI JACKSON/PRIORITY/

FBI LOS ANGELES/PRIORITY/

FBI NEW YORK (199E-NY-271)/PRIORITY/

FBI WMFO/PRIORITY/

LEGAT PARIS (199M-PA-7680)/PRIORITY/

BT

~~SECRET~~

SECTION ONE OF THREE SECTIONS

CITE: //3510:C-10//

PASS: SIOC, CID/CTS, [REDACTED]

SSA [REDACTED]

SSA [REDACTED]

PTU, SSA [REDACTED] OLIA.

DATE: 06-01-2011

CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/bab/lac

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 06-01-2036

199-25075
13

Dep. Dir.	
ADD Adm.	
ADD Inv.	
Asst. Dir.:	
Adm. Serv.	
Crim. Inv.	
Ident.	
Insp.	
Intell.	
Lab.	
Legal Coun.	
Rec. Mgnt.	
Tech. Serv.	
Training	
Cong. Affs. Off.	
Off. of EEO	
Off. Liaison & Int. Affs.	
Off. of Public Affs.	
Telephone Rm.	
Director's Sec'y	

b6
b7C
b7E

199-25075-13

105-264094-91
105-760476-501

0-2370 CIA + DIA 5/6/91

(File No.) 315E-49-1448534 -

We had no goal to keep fighting.

So cease fire ~~okay~~

Q. But JAR had some requests,
ie: withdrawal from

Q. what were other requests of JAR
during the peace agreement?

S. I don't remember any longer
but JAR points made by
delegation.

Q. One of requests by JAR in Van
was the Authority of helos.
- that was asked of Gen
Schwabert - Does he remember?

S. No.

STATED BY THE BEN

[Leaning fwd.]

scratching head

~~with~~ rubbing back of head.

3/10/04 Interview

b6
b7c

5/10/05
Rashed

Concerned about his outdoor exercise

Wants a haircut

Wants writing material

"We must a day"

"You force me to have to repeat myself 10 times
This I don't like for myself"

G. Responds - It's not that I want you to ask;

It's a matter of priorities

I got you the Sunni ---

I got you the Dentist.

I got you the table

I don't forget anything he asks.

S - What priorities?

My vision

G. Sunday for Eye Doctor

JOKING
LAUGHING

[Rubbing face

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 05-12-2009 BY 60324 UC BAW/SAB/LSC

S. What did you gain by destroying grave of dead man?
— Michel Aflaq's tomb — ~~he~~ paid for it.

G. Don't know why tomb damaged? — Will check &
see if rumors are true

(show him pictures of
STARLIN's statue
being pulled down)

(He concerned about his legacy)

S. It was also said that his ^(BKR's) ~~statues~~ ^(statues)
statues were destroyed.

G. I'll try to look into this — See if
the rumors are true
Cause I have not heard that

S. To tell the truth I was very surprised
even though this was the worst
I can be expected.

(Rubbing left ~~ear~~ — playing
with hands in front of him)

27:30

S. I did hear it on Iraq & western radio

G. Any other Q before we begin?

S. In the last meeting,
I did not want to (move on) w/o finishing ...

G. re: Kuwait invasion by Iraq - this cost
of damage was estimated to be 180 million.
Are you surprised by that?

S.

When is the neutral ally coming with that timber?
When a prosecutor makes a claim, the accused is asked
Otherwise, it's a matter of the world returning to the
law of the jungle. That the strong applies the laws
one may say we are talking about Kuwait
and Iraq, so why is America being thrown in
in the middle?
And I will answer that the entire issue is at
one plank.
Therefore, when I ask why is America

isn't America

Is the one using 180 billion
Is he going to stay tonight?

The hatred of the Kuwaiti ruler
has made them stupid - just
as their arrogance made them
stupid

And how wealthy (Kuwait)
be able to resist an 180 billion
& be deducting that amt.

By keep reminding IQ on a
daily basis - - - -

by returning Kuwait to IQ

etc

The 180 being deducted from
milk for their babies, daily bread
education, schools from health

5. it may be ~~easy~~ for American a country
across Atlantic to say we'll make it a poor.
But what ~~about~~ ^{for the} Kuwait? I'm w/ the
thought that they are living right
next to a hungry country.

Q. you are among the law. In
our world & society, the UN
is the recognized Int'l body

It is the int'l governing body

There are times you may
disagree w/ the law

persons are expected to abide by the law

K. had been recog. int'l as a
sovereign country & the example
in court, K. would have made its
case in court for the 150 b.M. in
damage caused

Ge. Kuwent in best position to estimate damage

I would like pen & paper so I can record my answers so we can be precise.

(*) (He is handed pen & paper) and begins writing

5. When someone who goes into your house & takes property - who is the best one to describe the loss?

That is how Kuwent came up w/ the 180 billion.

However, when accused people have right to defend Actor

~~INTERVIEW PEN~~

5. What is the neutral and legal entity
that asked for Kwant to
explain how they come up w/
this figure?

Therefore, the Kwant can say
anything, and no one will
correct them.

Claiming 70 soldiers buried
alive in their
sail by Westerners themselves
& Anwarza did not deny.

Q: The figure is not that important
b/c K. are not asking
for restitution.

D + K. wanted action taken.
That should be done by a court
and a neutral entity.

but K. not pursuing
compensation from DQ.

B + A K. interested in
158 K. nationals who
are now's and missing.
K. alleged they were taken
by DQ army + not returned.

Claims he will always consult on
certain issues - i.e. R.C.C.

Q: As to Human Rights Watch, I &
Used Human shields
What was the ~~goal~~ goal?

S: What do mean by human shields / Legitimate

B

G. I'll have my translator read
a letter to you

S. I have no information on this
That was recounted in one of the
for 61 days. It is a legit IP

I Answered (looking down)
notionless

G.

Were the captives Aska, Kelly
were put in a situation

C. Who were these Kurdish captives?

S. We released them.

I remember one of them

S. This letter was dated 2003.
after Gulf War.

It is a forgery. It is impossible

S. This is impossible - a forgery

I thought this was 1991

G. + Recounted by US military. This is a forgery

After there is something that is wrong.

S. It's not my handwriting

HEAD DOWN

G. Why didn't I

S. I answered

Maybe I wasn't ^{with} you asked me

Don't you think it is
strange that we are
asked why we
didn't use

It's not our policy to use
Chen Weiye's
agent Coalite from

G. Why do you think this Q
is strange?

Don't you think it is strange at
this point & setting

~~I didn't think it was~~

Strange that George
why we are asked why didn't use chem weapons,

It's not a ~~matter~~ our
policy to use chem weapons
against Coalition Forces.

~~S. I may also ask Q~~

B. why do you think this Q is
strange?

S. Of course it is strange.
By strange, I didn't mean
Strange that George was asking
~~that~~ by a strange Q I have any merit
before

Respect
for
George

S. How would DQ have been used
if they had used WMD?
wouldn't they have been stopped?

We're discussing History not
unrealistic opposition

S.: If we are to be asking Q
then I must be able to
ask Q.

S. How would the book be described
if it used words?
wouldn't it be called 'stupid'?

Maybe Israel would have liked

Israel likes destruction
If it had a chance to kill all
Arabs, it will do so.
It wishes Arabs hated by whole world
If " Arabs were weak

G: who represented ID during cease fire agreement?

S.

G: What were their position during cease fire?

S.

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FD-340b (Rev. 2-5-93)

DATE: 07-27-2009
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/rs
REASON: 1.4 (c)
DECLASSIFY ON: 07-27-2034

Universal Case File Number 315E-HQ-#148534- ^{1A3}

Field Office Acquiring Evidence _____

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received 3/10/2004

From SSA [redacted]
(Name of Contributor)

FBI-BOC
(Address of Contributor) ^{b6}

BAGHDAD, IRAQ
(City and State) ^{b7C}

By SSA [redacted]
(Name of Special Agent)

To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☒ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant
to Rule 6 (e), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes ☐ No

(S)

Title

DESERT SPIDER


Reference: _____
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☒ Original notes re interview of

SADDAM HUSSEIN

INTERVIEW CONDUCTED ON
3/10/04

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 05-18-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-18-2036

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 04/07/2003~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

INTERVIEW OF [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was contacted [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] by Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED]
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI), Atlanta Division, Columbus
Resident Agency, and Special Agent in Charge (SAC) MARC T. ZEIDER,
United States Army Intelligence, 902nd Military Intelligence Group,
Fort Benning, Georgia. [REDACTED] was advised of the interviewing
agents' identity via the exhibition of their FBI and Military
Intelligence credentials. [REDACTED] was advised of the purpose and
nature of the interview and specifically advised that this
interview was totally voluntary, and he was not suspected of any
wrong-doing. [REDACTED] noted he would cooperate and thereafter
voluntarily advised as follows:

[REDACTED] was born on [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b1
b6
b7A
b7C
b7D
b3

~~SECRET~~Investigation on 03/25/2003 at [REDACTED]

File # [REDACTED]

Date dictated 04/04/2003

by SA [REDACTED] : sbv

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 12/18/2007

On Monday, [redacted] in accordance with a [redacted]
[redacted] was interviewed at [redacted]
[redacted] The interview was conducted at the request
of [redacted]
[redacted] Present at
the interview were [redacted]
and [redacted] who had to leave after a short time [redacted] due to
[redacted] Also present were Assistant United States Attorneys [redacted]
[redacted] Interviewing Agents were SA [redacted]
[redacted] TFO [redacted] and TFO [redacted]

b6
b7A
b7C
b7D

It should be noted that [redacted] was interviewed [redacted]
[redacted]

There are two previous 302s written to the file.

[redacted] started with [redacted] wanting to explain
or clarify several previously addressed topics which are detailed
below:

[redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted]

Investigation on [redacted]

at [redacted]

File # [redacted]

Date dictated [redacted]

by SA [redacted]
TFO [redacted]

TFO [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

(S)

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 03/25/2003 , Page 4

[REDACTED] has toppled. [REDACTED] cited this skepticism and unwillingness to provide cooperation as being based upon the above situation that occurred in 1991 with the Kurds.

[REDACTED] was specifically asked if he had ever been recruited by Iraqi intelligence agents while in the United States to provide information, and [REDACTED] answered in the negative. [REDACTED] noted that at no time has he ever been contacted by any person who asked him to do anything that was illegal or improper. [REDACTED] was cautioned by the interviewing agents to reflect upon his answer, noting that he should take a moment to review his memory, as this was a question that included the entire time frame from 1989 to the present. [REDACTED] reflected and noted that he has never been contacted by anyone whom he believed to be an Iraqi intelligence agent or any person, who has ever asked him to provide information, identification of individuals, telephone numbers, or other contacts of any person within the United States or in Iraq, in an effort to assist the SADDAM HUSSEIN regime.

b1
b6
b7A
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b7D
b3

[REDACTED] noted he would cooperate fully with [REDACTED] United States Army, and the FBI, and provide any and all assistance necessary to assist in the removal of SADDAM HUSSEIN's regime.

SA [REDACTED] inquired of [REDACTED] if he had ever suffered any discrimination or persecution at any time in the United States and specifically, in the recent past. [REDACTED] noted that he had not, and found almost all Americans to be friendly and easy-going. [REDACTED] was invited to contact the FBI should he become a victim of a perceived or actual hate crime in the future.

[REDACTED] provided the following background information regarding himself and family:

Full name:
Race:

[REDACTED]
White~~SECRET~~

87-CG-124896

- 1 -

Ser. 9

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 01/31/2006

[redacted] social
security account number [redacted] currently residing at [redacted]
[redacted] telephone number
[redacted] (cellular), was interviewed at the FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION (FBI), 219 S. Dearborn, Room 905, Chicago, Illinois.
Also present for the interview of [redacted]
[redacted] law office
is located at [redacted]
[redacted] telephone number [redacted] After being advised of the
identities of the interviewing Officer and Agent, and the purpose
of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

Investigation on 01/30/2006 at Chicago, Illinois

File # 87-CG-124896; [redacted]

Date dictated b7A

TFO [redacted]

b6

by SA [redacted]

b7C

87-CG-124896

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 01/30/2006, Page 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] the trial of
KHALED DUMEISI, who had been prosecuted by the United States for
being a spy for SADDAM HUSSEIN. [REDACTED]

b6
b7C
b7D

[REDACTED] (unknown correct
spelling).

[REDACTED]

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

87-CG-124896

Date of transcription 02/02/2006

Or, Ser 11 [redacted] and SA [redacted]
interviewed the FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION [redacted]
During this [redacted] mentioned that she recently [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] Open source research on AL-FAISAL,
via the internet, revealed the following:

TOUJAN AL-FAISAL, born in 1948, was a former television and cyber journalist as well as a women's rights advocate. She also was Jordan's first female Member of Parliament being elected in 1993 and serving until 1997. In 1996 she was also elected to the INTER-PARLIAMENTARY COUNCIL which is the governing body of the INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION.

In 1996 AL-FAISAL was a keynote speaker for the BIRZEIT SOCIETY CONVENTION. BIRZEIT is a town in the WEST BANK and every two years PALESTINIANS, whose origins come from BIRZEIT, gather for a convention. The convention was held at the ANAHEIM MARIOTT HOTEL in Anaheim, California. In an interview she claimed to be one of 22 opposition members in the 80-seat JORDANIAN PARLIAMENT. She became critical of the JORDANIAN PARLIAMENT for approving a peace treaty with Israel as well as lifting an embargo on Israel.

In March 2002 AL-FAISAL published a letter criticizing some members of the JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT. This letter was posted on the Houston-based ARAB TIMES website. AL-FAISAL was convicted of slandering the JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT and sentenced to 18 months in jail. She eventually received a royal pardon however this did not annul her conviction. AL-FAISAL attempted to run for reelection to the JORDANIAN PARLIAMENT in 2003 but her application was rejected on the grounds that she had previously committed a non-political offence.

AL-FAISAL was also suspected of profiting from Iraqi oil sales that SADDAM HUSSEIN's regime had allegedly offered her in exchange for cultivating political and popular support in her country. It is alleged that AL-FAISAL received 3 million barrels of oil from the UNITED NATIONS OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAM then selling same for profit. It is alleged that she was known for her support of SADDAM HUSSEIN and his regime.

Investigation on 02/01/2006 at [redacted] b6
b7A
File # 87-CG-124896; [redacted] Date dictated b7C
b7D
by TFO [redacted]

87-CG-124896

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 02/01/2006, Page 2

It shall be noted that all above information was solely derived from reports on different internet websites and none of the information has been verified.

Information obtained from following websites:

- www.answers.com
- news.bbc.co.uk
- www.ipu.org
- www.washington-report.org
- www.dawn.com
- www.defenddemocracy.org
- www.globalpolicy.org
- old.krg.org
- www.memri.org

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 05/15/2003

[redacted] born [redacted] driver's
license number [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] was interviewed at 219 South Dearborn Street,
Chicago, Illinois. After being informed of the identity of the
interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted]
provided the following information:

[Redacted area]

[Redacted area]

Investigation on 05/13/2003 at Chicago, IllinoisFile # 97A-CG-118544

Date dictated _____

by SA [redacted] SA [redacted] SA [redacted]

WORK COPY

DATE: 05-19-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-19-2036

CG199H-1682

~~SECRET~~

This insert is ~~classified~~ "~~SECRET~~".

The following investigation was conducted by SAs [redacted]
[redacted] and [redacted] at [redacted]

(S) On [redacted] [redacted] an asset who
has provided reliable information in the past, and who is in a
position to know, advised as follows:


(S)

(S)

(S)

(S)

b1
b6
b7C
b7D
b7E
b3



~~SECRET~~

1997-06-25

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
SEP 19 1990	
FBI - ALBANY	

135

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 05-19-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-19-2036

(S) On [redacted] source [redacted] provided the
following information to Special Agent (SA) [redacted]



(S)

b1
b6
b7C
b7D
b3

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 05-19-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-19-2036

199H-5
199H-10
199H-19
65H-CG-74810

The following investigation was conducted by SA [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED] On [REDACTED] an
asset who has provided reliable information in the past and who
is in a position to know, advised as follows:

(S)

(S)

(S)

b1
b6
b7C
b7D
b7E
b3

Asset remains reliable and stable.

①

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7C

141

199H-CG-76208

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
FEB 20 1990	
FBI - CHICAGO	

OW2

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 05-19-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-19-2036

031 MRI 00442

P RUCNFB FBICG FBIDE FBIHO FBINY FBIOM FBISF

E FBILA #0021 0450623

NY SSSSS

140338Z FEB 91

M FBI LOS ANGELES (199H-2621) (CT-1/SARA) (P)

O DIRECTOR FBI/PRIORITY/

BI CHICAGO/PRIORITY/

BI DETROIT/PRIORITY/

BI HOUSTON/PRIORITY/

BI NEW YORK/PRIORITY/

BI OMAHA/PRIORITY/

BI SAN FRANCISCO/PRIORITY/

T

~~SECRET~~

ECTION ONE OF TWO SECTIONS

ITE: //3410:0670//

(S)

SUBJECT:

OO: LOS ANGELES.

THIS COMMUNICATION IS ~~CLASSIFIED "SECRET"~~ IN ITS ENTIRETY.

U.S. PERSON.

~~SECRET~~

SAC
ASAC I
ASAC II
ASAC III
OSM
Sq 5
Sq 5A
Sq 5B
Sq 5C
Sq 5D
Sq 6
Sq 6A
Sq 6B
Sq 6C
Sq 6D
Sq 7
Sq 7A
Sq 7B
Sq 7C
Sq 8
Sq 9
Sq 10
Sq 11
Sq 12
Sq 13
Sq 13A
Sq 14
Sq 15
Sq 16
OCDETF

23, 4, 5, 6, 7
9, 10, 11, 12

Lopes
199H 749
199H 76208

FOIMS
MANUAL

~~SECRET~~

199H 76208 149

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
FEB 14 1991	
CHICAGO	

b6
b7C

b7E

(S)

PAGE FOUR DE FBILA 0021 ~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

(S) INVESTIGATION AT LOS ANGELES HAS ALSO REVEALED THAT [REDACTED]
ORGANIZATION IS TAKING AN ACTIVE ROLE IN ORCHESTRATING ANTI-WAR
DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, JOINING VARIOUS COALITION
GROUPS THAT ARE OPPOSED TO U.S. INTERVENTION IN THE GULF. ALL
ACTIVITIES IN THIS REGARD APPEAR TO BE PEACEFUL WITH NO
INDICATIONS OF PLANNED VIOLENCE.

b1
b3

(S)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ORGANIZED EFFORTS TO
ORCHESTRATE PEACE DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES INCLUDE
ATTEMPTS TO MOBILIZE THE PALESTINIAN COMMUNITY AGAINST U.S.

PAGE FIVE DE FBILA 0021 S ~~SECRET~~

INTERVENTION IN THE GULF, AS WELL AS ESTABLISH LINKAGE BETWEEN
SADDAM HUSSEIN'S INVASION OF KUWAIT AND THE RESOLUTION OF THE
OUTSTANDING PALESTINIAN HOMELAND ISSUE, VIS A VIS PRESSURE ON
ISRAEL.

(S)

b1
b3

DATE: 05-19-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-19-2036

~~SECRET~~

199H-5
199H-799
199H-1682

PEB:aq

The following investigation was conducted by Special
Agent (SA) [REDACTED]

(S) On [REDACTED] an
asset who has provided reliable information in the past and who
is in a position to know, advised as follows:

b1
b6
b7C
b7D
b7E
b3

(S) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] advised that RAMSEY CLARK will be speaking at
the Jerusalem Center in Chicago, Illinois, on March 10, 1991.

(S) [REDACTED]
Asset remains reliable and stable.

Information herein obtained confidentially; informant's name is not to be disclosed in a report or otherwise
unless it has been decided definitely that this person is to be a witness in a trial or hearing.

~~SECRET~~

159
199H-799
SEARCHED _____ INDEXED _____
SERIALIZED _____ FILED _____

FEB 26 1991

FBI - CHICAGO

DATE: 05-19-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-19-2036

~~SECRET~~

199H-10
199H-1682
199H-1822
199H-76208
199E-HQ-24472
JJC:aq

(S)

On

advised SA

(S)

(S)

(S)

(S)

b1
b6
b7C
b7D
b3

①

To date, source remains stable and reliable.

2*

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7C

199H-CG-76208

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
MAR 04 1991	
FBI - NEW YORK	

002

DATE: 05-19-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-19-2036

~~SECRET~~

199H-10
199H-1682
199H-1822
199H-76208
199E-HQ-24472
JJC:aq

(S)

On [redacted] advised SA [redacted] that a pro-Palestinian meeting/lecture was held on February 10, 1991, at the University of Illinois at Chicago, Illinois Hall. Approximately 120 people were present. A majority of the people present were Arab women.

b1
b6
b7C
b7D
b3

Most of the discussion was centered on gaining support for Iraq and SADDAM HUSSEIN among Palestinians in the United States.

MARY DIAB, of the Union of Palestinian Women Association in North America spoke briefly about women's role in Palestine and how they can take an active part in the Palestinian uprising/Intifadah.

CAMILIA ODEH spoke about the Palestinian women's role in the United States and their need to show strong support for SADDAM HUSSEIN and his quest to free Palestinians from Israel's occupation. ODEH feels the strongest show of support for Iraq is via massive demonstrations throughout the United States.

The keynote speaker was MAHA KHOURI, a PLO representative to the United Nations and Executive Committee member of the Palestinian Women's Union in the United States. KHOURI was very much against the war and felt that Iraq was completely justified in its "annexation" of Kuwait. KHOURI stated that Israel was the "instigator" of the violence in the Middle East. KHOURI stated that the war was just an excuse to push the Palestinian issue out of the spotlight where it will again be ignored by the United States.

Also present at the meeting/lecture were [redacted] and [redacted] and another man named [redacted] (LNU).

b6
b7C

Information herein obtained confidentially; informant's name is not to be disclosed in a report or otherwise unless it has been decided definitely that this person is to be a witness in a trial or hearing.

~~SECRET~~

199H-76208-1161

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
MAR 04 1991	
FBI - (LNU)	

[redacted] Out

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 06/12/2001

To: Chicago

From: [REDACTED]

CI-2

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED] mkc

(S)

(S) Case ID #: (S) [REDACTED] (Pending)

(S) Title: (S) TRAOT INTELLIGENCE MATTERS;
[REDACTED]

(U) Synopsis: (S) Information provided by Asset.

(U) (S) Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

(S) Details: (S) On [REDACTED] an asset with
excellent access whose reporting, though limited, has been
corroborated provided the following information:

b1
b6
b7C
b7D
b7E
b3

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 02/10/2003

To: Chicago

From: Chicago

Squad CI-2

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

ab

(S) Case ID #: (S) [REDACTED]

Title: (S) CHANGED

aka [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]
OO: CHICAGO

(U) Synopsis: (S) Closing of captioned investigation.

(U) (S) Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

(S) Previous Title: (S) Title marked "Changed" to reflect alias of [REDACTED] OO: CHICAGO

(S) Title previously carried as [REDACTED]
OO: CHICAGO."

(U) [REDACTED]

(U) Details: (S) Investigation was initiated on captioned subject based upon Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) file review information which identified subject as [REDACTED] Investigation was initiated to fully identify [REDACTED]

(U) (S) Background checks were conducted to include the following: FBI/ACS, ELSUR, Confidential Indices, FBI Global Search, FOIMS, Illinois Drivers License, and NCIC. No derogatory information could be ascertained for subject

~~SECRET~~

b1
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b7D
b7E
b3

~~SECRET~~

(S) To: Chicago From: Chicago
Re: (S) [redacted] 02/10/2003 b1
b3

(U) Internet Searches were positive for identifying subject in Google and associated web sites, [redacted] and LexisNexis:

b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

(U) (S) On 2/7/03, an interview was conducted of [redacted]
[redacted] at his new residence, [redacted]
[redacted] wherein he divulged the following:

(U) [redacted]

(U) [redacted]

(U) [redacted]

(U) [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S) To: Chicago From: Chicago
Re: (S) [REDACTED] 02/10/2003

b1
b3

(U) [REDACTED] "

b6
b7C
b7D

[REDACTED] subject
believed everyone in Iraq had the capability to rise to whatever
rank he aspired, even if he were Assyrian, Christian, Kurd, or
Muslim minorities. Subject cited Tariq Aziz, Saddam Hussein's
Deputy Prime Minister, how he rose through the ranks even though
he was Chaldean Christian. [REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED]

(U) (S) Subject discussed Saddam Hussein and called him
"wickedly smart" in that he kept competent people around him and
"purchased his way out" or "eliminated" the mistakes he made.
Subject had no respect for either of the Hussein sons, Uday or
Quasay and believed they had caused more harm to Hussein's rein
than public opinion knew in their exploits. Subject advised he
was not a member of the Ba'ath Party. Subject admitted he kept
track of Arab events as he subscribed to the Al Jazeera News
station via cable television.

(U) (S) [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 04/17/2003

To: Chicago

From: Chicago

Squad CI-2

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

tmd

(S)

(S) Case ID #: (S) [REDACTED]
(U) (S)

(S) Title: (S) [REDACTED]

(U) Synopsis: (S) subject.

To report results of interview of captioned

(U) (S) ~~Derived From : G-3~~
~~Declassify On: X1~~

(U) [REDACTED]

(U) Details: (S)

POB [REDACTED]

social security number [REDACTED]

DOB [REDACTED]

address [REDACTED]

number [REDACTED]

cellular telephone [REDACTED]

(U) (S) On [REDACTED] Chicago interviewed [REDACTED] at his
place of business [REDACTED]

telephone number [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] provided the following information:

(U) (S) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b1
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b7A
b7C
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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 10/10/2002

To: Counterintelligence
San Francisco

Attn: CD-1B
Squad 16-C

From: Cincinnati
Squad 4/Athens RA
Contact: SA [REDACTED]

b1
b6
b7C
b7D
b7E
b3

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED] dtm

(S) Case ID #: (S) [REDACTED]
(S)
(S)

(S) Title: (S) [REDACTED]

Synopsis: (U) Cincinnati has initiated an investigation
targeting captioned subject.

(U)

(S) ~~Derived From : G-3~~
~~Declassify On: X1~~

(U) [REDACTED]

Non-USPER)

(S) Reference: (S) [REDACTED]

(S) Details: (S) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~b1
b6
b7A
b7C
b7D
b3

(S)

Continuation of FD-302 of

, On 03/25/2003, Page 3

[redacted] provided his opinion regarding the Kurdish people and the other general Iraqi populous. [redacted] noted that in his opinion, "99 percent of the Kurds" wished to topple SADDAM HUSSEIN and "hate him." [redacted] cautioned, however, that many of the Kurds feel betrayed by the United States, due to its military stance in 1991. [redacted] elaborated, noting that signals were sent by the United States government that the Kurdish uprising would be supported to topple SADDAM, and that several people were subsequently killed fighting SADDAM and his regime; however, no United States assistance actually followed. [redacted] noted, in summation, in his opinion, that the average person in Iraq will be glad when SADDAM HUSSEIN's regime ends. They will also be skeptical to provide any assistance until it is certain the regime

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum



To : SAC Los Angeles [REDACTED]

Date 1/24/97

From : SA [REDACTED]

Subject : [REDACTED]

Dates of Contact

File #s on which contacted (Use Titles if File #s not available)

46E-LA-162960

Purpose and results of contact

- ☐ NEGATIVE
☒ POSITIVE
☐ STATISTIC

Description of
Statistical Accomplishment

Title of Case

File No.

b6
b7C
b7D

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8-26-99 BY SP5 JST
99-311

Information contained herein was obtained confidentially. The informant's name is not to be disclosed in any form unless a conscious decision has been made to disclose his/her identity by an appropriate FBI official.

PERSONAL DATA

1 - [REDACTED]

1 - 46E-LA-162960

Init. SMC/pah

()

see reverse side for statistics

SMC-W1.209

SEP - 3 1997

FBI - LOS ANGELES

A-673
46E-LA-162960-
#

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 11/18/2004

To: Little Rock

From: Little Rock

Squad 5

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]:ejt

(U) Case ID #: ~~(S)~~ 315S-LR-42585 (Pending)

(U) Title: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]
IT - PALESTINIAN REJECTIONIST ORGANIZATIONS;
OO:LR

(U) Synopsis: ~~(S)~~ Summary of case file and general information
contained in [REDACTED] on subject [REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S)~~ Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

b1
b6
b7C
b7E
b3

(U) [REDACTED]

(U) Enclosure(s): ~~(S)~~ Select references taken out of [REDACTED] on subject
[REDACTED] and author's time line for subject.

Details: ~~(S)~~ A search for subject [REDACTED] in [REDACTED]
resulted in numerous positive hits including the discovery of
five separate case numbers of past FBI cases on the subject and
associates. These cases are as follows:

(S)



315S-LR-
42585
Serial 9

(U) ~~(S)~~ A review of the above cases and other
miscellaneous documents found on [REDACTED] was conducted and the
following information was obtained. In addition to the

~~SECRET~~

3/5M-LA
226986-
DEF
Serial 12

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription

On [redacted] date of birth [redacted]
[redacted] place of birth [redacted] son of [redacted]
[redacted] and [redacted]
[redacted] current residence [redacted] was advised of the
identity of the interviewing agent and the purpose of the
interview. The translator was [redacted] then
provided the following information:

[redacted] did not speak English and the entire interview
was conducted in [redacted] was very cooperative and spoke
freely about [redacted]

[redacted] Immediately upon initiation of the interview,
[redacted] indicated his appreciation for being called and clearly
indicated that [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

[redacted] indicated that [redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted] indicated that he never liked Saddam Hussein
[redacted]

[redacted] then agrees to future interviews [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

Investigation on

at

File # 315D-LA-226986-DEF

Date dictated

by SA

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

QUESTION

[redacted] (dob: [redacted])

[illegible]

b6
b7C
b7D

Investigation on [redacted] at [redacted]

File # 281H-LA-199755

by SA [redacted]

Date dictated

281-11-LA-
199755
Ser 30

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 03/11/2004

On 03/11/2004, [redacted] date of birth [redacted]
[redacted] place of birth [redacted]
[redacted] current residence [redacted] was interviewed by SA
[redacted] Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and
Language Analyst, [redacted] FBI. The interviewing
agent told [redacted] the purpose of the interview and [redacted]
provided the following information:

[redacted] AND THE INTERVIEW

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] IN THE UNITED STATES

[redacted]

Investigation on 03/11/2004 at [redacted]File # 315D-LA-226986Date dictated 03/11/2004

by SA [redacted]

315D-LA-226986

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 03/11/2004, Page 3

MEK DEFECTORS

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C
b7D

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MEK AND SADDAM HUSSEIN

The MEK and SADDAM HUSSEIN both wanted to overthrow the Iranian government through armed struggle. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

LOS ANGELES PHOTO SPREAD

[REDACTED] was shown six photo spreads with six photos per page. The six subjects were FBI Los Angeles subjects. [REDACTED] did not recognize any picture in the spread.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-26-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc

205A-LA-
C 229604
Ser 9

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 03/08/2002

On 3/7/2002 at approximately 3:40pm, SA [redacted] received a telephone call from [redacted] (previously identified). Agent [redacted] was paged to telephone number [redacted]. The latter phone number was said to be at the subjects work location. [redacted] voluntarily provided the following information:

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

Investigation on 3/8/2002 at [redacted]
File # 265A-LA-C229604 Date dictated _____
by SA [redacted]

315D-LA-
226986
Ser. 420

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-26-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc

315D-LA-
226986
Ser. 432

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 03/05/2004

On 03/05/2004 [redacted] date of
birth [redacted] place of birth [redacted] United States (U.S.)
Alien Registration Number [redacted] current residence [redacted]
[redacted] was advised of the identity of the interviewing agent, the
identity of the Language Analyst, [redacted] Federal
Bureau of Investigation, and the purpose of the interview.
[redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C
b7DFAMILY

[redacted] parents are [redacted]
[redacted] place of birth [redacted] father, and [redacted]
[redacted] place of birth [redacted] mother.

[redacted] is approximately [redacted] years of
age and lives in [redacted]

[redacted] is between [redacted] years of
age and lives [redacted] in [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Investigation on 03/05/2004 at [redacted]File # 315D-LA-226986

* Date dictated _____

by [redacted]

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 03/11/2004

On 03/11/2004, [redacted] date of birth [redacted]
place of birth [redacted] Social Security Account Number [redacted]
[redacted] current residence [redacted]
was interviewed by SA [redacted] Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), and Language Analyst, [redacted]
FBI. The interviewing agent told [redacted] the purpose of the
interview, and [redacted] provided the following information:

FAMILYb6
b7C
b7DIN THE UNITED STATESInvestigation on 03/11/2004 at [redacted]File # 315D-LA-226986

Date dictated

by SA [redacted]

315D-LA-
22 6986
Ser. 433

315D-LA-226986

b6
b7C
b7D

Continuation of FD-302 of

[Redacted]

, On 03/11/2004, Page 2

[Redacted]

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MEK AND SADDAM HUSSEIN

The MEK and SADDAM HUSSEIN were both against the Khomeini regime. HUSSEIN said the MEK were "his guests."

[Redacted]

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 03/04/2004

[redacted] (W/F, DOB [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted]

[redacted] The interview was conducted in [redacted] translated by SA [redacted]
After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and
the nature and purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the
following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] was born on [redacted] in [redacted]
[redacted] stated that [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

Investigation on 3/3/04 at [redacted]File # 315D-LA-226986Date dictated 3/4/04

by SA [redacted]

315D-LA-
226986
Ser. 465

315D-LA-226986

Continuation of FD-302 of , On 2/3/04, Page 2

said that the mujahedin organization in Iraq was independent from the government of Saddam Hussein.

b6
b7C
b7D

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-26-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc

315D-LA-
2 21986
Ser. 444

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 03/14/2004

[redacted] (W/M DOB [redacted]) was interviewed at [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents, and the nature and purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] started the interview by saying that [redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted] said he was born in [redacted] on [redacted] He
[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7DInvestigation on 3/14/04 at [redacted]File # 315D-LA-226986Date dictated 3/14/04by SA [redacted]
SA [redacted]

315D-LA-226986

Continuation of FD-302 of

[Redacted]

, On 3/14/04

, Page 3

[Redacted]

[Redacted] was asked if the mujahedin organization had a relationship with the government of Saddam Hussein and he replied that he did not know. [Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-26-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc

315D-LA-
226956
Ser. 468

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 03/05/2004

[redacted] (W/M DOB [redacted]) was contacted
at [redacted]

The interview was conducted by SA [redacted]
[redacted] and SA [redacted]. The interview was conducted in [redacted]
translated by SA [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the
interviewing Agent and the nature and purpose of the interview,
[redacted] provided the following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

At the onset of the interview, [redacted] voluntarily
provided his identification documents, which were reviewed by the
interviewing Agents and are summarized as follows:

- U.S. Department of Justice Permit to Reenter the United
States; contains Immigration # [redacted] DOB [redacted] issued
[redacted] expired [redacted] shows one stamp from
[redacted]

- U.S. Resident Alien Card; [redacted] DOB [redacted]
Alien Registration Number [redacted]

[redacted] was born in [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

Investigation on 3/3/04 at [redacted]File # 315D-LA-226986Date dictated 3/5/04by SA [redacted]
SA [redacted]

315D-LA-226986

Continuation of FD-302 of

[Redacted]

, On 3/3/04

, Page

3

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

[Redacted] was asked to describe the relationship of the mujahedin organization to the former Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein. He said that the mujahedin organization was totally independent from Hussein's government.

[Redacted]

[Redacted] provided no further information.

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription

On [redacted] an individual, who has agreed to testify,
provided the following information:

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

315E-LA-
284234
Ser. 147

Investigation on

at

File #

SA

315E-LA-234234

Date dictated

by

SA

sjl

-1-

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription

Individual (source), who has agreed to testify, provided the following information.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

315N-LA-
242579-
CRIM
Ser. 121

Investigation on

at

File # 315N-LA-242579-CRIM;

Date dictated

by

SA

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 03/23/2004On 03/02/2004

DOB [REDACTED]

POB [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was interviewed at

[REDACTED] After being advised of the nature of the
interviewing agents, and the nature of the interview, [REDACTED]
provided the following information.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated that the MEK had no relationship with the
former Iraqi Government or Saddam Hossein. The MEK and the Iraqis
were totally separate and independent.

[REDACTED] did not appear to have any intention of providing
any substantive information, and the interview was terminated.

b6
b7C
b7DInvestigation on 03/02/2004

at [REDACTED]

File # 315D-IA-226986Serial 496

Date dictated _____

by

SA [REDACTED]
SA [REDACTED]

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES DIVISION, CLARKSBURG, WV 26306**

THIS FORM IS TO BE COMPLETED BY THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI) OR A FIELD OFFICE OF THE FBI. IT IS NOT TO BE COMPLETED BY ANY OTHER AGENCY. IF A FIELD OFFICE IS REQUESTED WHETHER TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION OR TO PROVIDE INFORMATION, THE FIELD OFFICE SHALL INDICATE THE TYPE OF ACTION WHICH WILL BE TAKEN BY THE FIELD OFFICE.

SEARCHED <input type="checkbox"/> INDEXED <input type="checkbox"/> SERIALIZED <input type="checkbox"/> FILED <input type="checkbox"/>	DATE OF ARREST <div style="text-align: center; font-size: 1.2em;">1 12 04</div>	CONTRIBUTOR <div style="text-align: center;">DCFBIO14Z</div>	FBI-CNTR TERR DIV 13 WASHINGTON, DC
NAME OF SUBJECT [REDACTED]	DATE OF BIRTH <div style="text-align: center; font-size: 1.2em;">1 12 04</div>	ADDRESS <div style="text-align: center; font-size: 1.2em;">Iraq</div>	COUNTRY OF CITIZENSHIP <div style="text-align: center; font-size: 1.2em;">Iraq</div>
LEGAL NAME, NICKNAMES AND ALIASES RESIDENT COMPLETE ADDRESS SOCIAL IDENTIFICATION NUMBER <div style="text-align: center; font-size: 1.2em;">FBI</div>			
EMPLOYER IF U.S. GOVERNMENT, INDICATE SPECIFIC AGENCY IF MILITARY, LIST BRANCH OF SERVICE AND SERIAL NO.		OCCUPATION EDUCATION ADDITIONAL STATE BUREAU STAMP	
<div style="font-size: 1.5em; font-family: cursive;">Military Detainee - Iraq</div>			

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CRIMINAL

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STATE USAGE

NEW RECORD

COMPARISON

ADMINISTRATIVE LEADS

AMENDMENT

BLANK

Hussein, Saddam Al-Tikriti

STATE IDENTIFICATION NO.

DATE OF BIRTH

4 28 37

M






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BLK



(01/26/1998)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 05-26-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-26-2036

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 01/29/1998

To: NSD

Attn: NS-3B [REDACTED]
UNIT CHIEF
ROOM 5437

Portland

Attn: SA [REDACTED]
TFA [REDACTED]

From: Portland

Squad 4

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED] jaw

(S) Case ID #: (S) [REDACTED]
199E-PD-39233

(S) Title: (S) [REDACTED]

(S) Synopsis: (S) Interview of [REDACTED] captioned
subject [REDACTED] conducted on [REDACTED]

(U) (S) Classified By: 4863, 4/PD
Reason: 1.5©
Declassify On: X1

(U) Details: (S) [REDACTED]

(S) (S) FBI, Portland learned from [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] that captioned subject [REDACTED]

(S) (S) SAC, Portland earlier had provided authority to
interview subject [REDACTED]
via EC dated 12/16/1997. Because [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] a decision was made after

~~SECRET~~

199E-PD-
39233
Serial 46

b1
b6
b7C
b7D
b7E
b3

(01/26/1998)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 05-26-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-26-2036

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date:

To:

From:

4

Contact:

Approved By:

Drafted By:

lr

(S) Case ID #:

(U)

(S) 199M-PD-41713 (Pending)
(S) 199I-PD-41613 (Pending)
(S) 199M-PD-42010 (Pending)
(S) 199M-PD-42083 (Pending)

b1
b6
b7C
b7D
b7E
b3

(S) Title:

IT/IRAQ

(U) Synopsis: To report debriefing of asset.

(U) Classified By: 4863, 4/PD
Reason : 1.5©
Declassify On: X1

(U)

(S) Details: was debriefed on and
provided the following information:

~~SECRET~~

315E-PD-
C41713
Serial 17

(12/31/1995)

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 10/21/99

To: National Security

Attn: NS-3A, SSA

Bangkok
Chicago
Cleveland
Copenhagen
Dallas
Denver
Detroit
London
Los Angeles
New Haven
New York
Omaha
Phoenix
Portland
Riyadh
San Antonio
San Francisco

Attn: SA

Attn: SA

Attn: SA

3150-PO-
C 40640
Ser. 145

From: Houston

CT-1

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

dj

Case ID #: (S) 199M-HO-31400-27 (Pending)

Title: (S) SAYED MUHAMMED ZAKY, AKA ET AL;
IT-HIZBALLAH

Synopsis: (S) Weekly EC reporting source information.

Derived From: G-3

Declassify On: X-1

(U)

Administrative: (S) Sayed Muhammed Zaky Al-Swij is believed to

~~SECRET~~

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b7C
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(Rev. 01-31-2003)

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 05/24/2004

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [REDACTED]

SSA
IOS

From: Philadelphia

Squad 17

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

kml

(U) Case ID #: (S) 315D-PH-95916 (Pending)

(S) 315E-PH-94983 (Pending)

(S) Title: (S) [REDACTED]

IT-IRAN

(S)

(S) Synopsis: (S) Source reporting on captioned investigations to include the [REDACTED]

(U)

~~Derived From: G-3~~

~~Declassify On: X1~~

(S) Enclosure(s): (S) [REDACTED]

(S) Details: (S) [REDACTED]

(hereafter SOURCE) was interviewed by

SA [REDACTED]

and Det. [REDACTED]

on [REDACTED]

and [REDACTED]

(S)

~~SECRET~~

315E-PH-
94983
Ser. 45

b1
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~~SECRET~~

Document Details

First Previous Serial#: Go Next Last

Classification: S
Authority: G-3
SCI Flag:
IRS Tax:
FD 501:

Duration:
Rule(s):
Handling Caveats:
Secure Doc:

Case ID: 315E-PH-C93865-A
Serial Number: 13

Additional Serialized References

Case ID t2:
Serial Number: 12
Case ID t2:
Serial Number: 2

Download Document

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date:

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: 4383

From: Philadelphia

Squad 12 / DT / JTTF

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By: egw

(U) Case ID #: (S) (Pending)

(U) (S) 199E-PH-C93865-A (Pending)

(U) Title: (S) DARKENING CLOUDS
IT-IRAQ

(U) Synopsis: (S) Interview of

(U) (S) Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

(U) Details: (S) For the information of Counterterrorism, the
following information was obtained during the Philadelphia Iraqi
Initiative interview on

(U) (S) born
drivers license number was interviewed at

telephone number resides at
 telephone
number Also present during the interview was

315E-PH-
C93865-A
Serial 13

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Document Details

First Previous Serial #: Go Next Last

Classification: S
 Authority: G-3
 SCI Flag:
 IRS Tax:
 FD 501:

Duration: X1
 Rule(6e):
 Handling Caveats:
 Secure Doc:

Case ID 315E-PH-C93865-A
 Serial Number: 71

Additional Serialized References

Case ID t2:
 Serial Number: 69
 Case ID t2:
 Serial Number: 2

Download Document

315E-PH-
 C93865-A
 Serial 71

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: To: Counterterrorism Attn: 4383

From:
 Squad 12 / DT / JTTF
 Contact: SA

Approved By: Drafted By: legw

Case ID #: (S) 199E-HQ-1404383-PH (Pending)
 (S) 199E-PH-C93865-A (Pending)

Title: (S) DARKENING CLOUDS
 IT-IRAQ

Synopsis: (S) Interview of Asset.

(S) Derived From: G-3
 Declassify On: X1

Details: (S) For the information of Counterterrorism, the following information was obtained during the interview of an Asset on Also present during the interview was Special Agent (Treasury Department).

(S) Asset has been (S) Asset believes that

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Document Details

First Previous Serial #: Go Next Last

Classification: S
Authority: G3
SCI Flag:
IRS Tax:
FD 501:

Duration:
Rule(6e): X1
Handling Caveats:
Secure Doc:

Case ID: 315E-PH-C93865-B
Serial Number: 59

Additional Serialized References

Case ID t2:
Serial Number: 43

[Download Document](#)

315E - PH -
C 93865 - B
Serial 59

b6
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b7D

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]
[redacted] born [redacted]
drivers license number [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted]
[redacted] telephone number [redacted]
Also present during the interview was [redacted]

[redacted] telephone number [redacted] and [redacted]
[redacted] All information contained herein is unclassified except
where shown otherwise. After being advised of the identity of the
interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, [redacted]
provided the following information:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Document Details

First Previous Serial #: Go Next Last

Classification: S
Authority: G-3
SCI Flag:
IRS Tax:
FD 501:

Duration: X1
Rule(s):
Handling Caveats:
Secure Doc:

Case ID: 315E-PH-C93865-A
Serial Number: 8

Additional Serialized References

Case ID t2: b7A
Serial Number: 9
Case ID t2:
Serial Number: 1

[Download Document](#)

315E-PH-
C93865-A
Serial 8

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 03/27/2003

To: Counterterrorism Attn: 4383

From:

Squad 12 / DT / JTTF

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By: egw

Case ID #: (S) Pending)

(S) 199E-PH-C93865-A (Pending)

Title: (S) DARKENING CLOUDS
IT-IRAQ

Synopsis: (S) Interview of

Reference: (S) EC dated Initial interview of

(S) Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

Details: (S) For the information of Counterterrorism, the
following information was obtained during the Philadelphia Iraqi
Initiative interview on

(S) (protect identity), born
 drivers license number was
interviewed at telephone number
 resides at
 telephone number Also present during

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(12/31/1995)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 05-20-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-20-2036

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 11/04/1999

To: NSD

Attn: NS-3B

Attn: International Terrorism

From:

International Terrorism

Contact: SA Ext.

Approved By:

Drafted By: :gl

(U) Case ID #: (S) 199-0

(U) Title: (S) INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
IT-IRAQ
OO:

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ser
1232

Synopsis: Asset provided information on

Enclosure(s): Enclosed for are copies of

(U) (S) Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X-1

Details: (S) ASSET:

(S) CONTACT DATE:

CONTACT: SA

RELIABILITY: Provided accurate and reliable
information in the past.

(S) (S) On provided information on

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 03/31/2003

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [redacted]

SSA [redacted]

From: [redacted]

Joint Terrorism Task Force [redacted]

Contact: [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

st

Case ID #: (S) 199E-DL-97498 (Closed)

Title: (S) [redacted]

IT - IRAQ

Synopsis: (S) To advise Counterterrorism of closure of
[redacted] regarding captioned subject.

Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

Outside the Scope

(U) [redacted]

Details [redacted]

(U) Pursuant to the Iraqi interview initiative, on
[redacted] SA [redacted] conducted an extensive
interview with [redacted] and was able to obtain the following
information.

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~~SECRET~~

199E-DL-
97498
ser 5

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~~SECRET~~

(U) To: Counterterrorism From: [redacted]
Re: (S) [redacted]

(U) (S) [redacted]
[redacted]

(U) (S) [redacted]
[redacted]

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(U) (S) [redacted]
[redacted]

(U) (S) [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] SADDAM HUSSEIN [redacted]
[redacted] has never been,
and does not know anyone who has, associated with the MUSLIM
BROTHERHOOD. [redacted] has not heard of any domestic Iraqi
intelligence activities. [redacted]
[redacted]

(U) (✓) Ninety percent of Iraqis are against the government. This belief crosses religious affiliations, but Sunnis will cooperate more with HUSSEIN. The Shi'a will welcome US ground troops because the Shi'a need someone to help them. Iraqis know what they see on government TV is not true because knowledge of America is more widespread now than during the Gulf War. If Iraqis get the chance to leave Iraq, they will leave.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Counterterrorism From: [redacted]
(U) Re: (S) [redacted]

People in Baghdad will likely leave, but those in the south are more apt to remain. Iraqis living in the United States feel safe from HUSSEIN.

(U) (S) There is no indication of civil unrest in Iraq, people are united against HUSSEIN. Most people in southern Iraq were not exposed to the UN. The current standard of living in Iraq is very poor, however, many consumer goods are available to buy, but no one has money to buy them. People who don't have family members sending them money from outside Iraq, do not have enough money to live. Since 1991, electrical systems have been broken. There is power rationing and many people have generators. The phone systems are good, but as of today they are not working.

(U) (S) HUSSEIN has chemical weapons and used them during the Iran-Iraq War. [redacted]

[redacted]

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(U) (S) [redacted]
[redacted]

(U) (S) [redacted]
[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: [REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [REDACTED]

5437

SSA [REDACTED]

SSA [REDACTED]

IOS [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]

Squad 14, JTTF

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

frh

Case ID #: (S) 199E-DN-61784 (Pending)

Title: (S) [REDACTED]

IT-IRAQ

315E-DN-
61784
Serial 69

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(U) Synopsis: (S) Report on [REDACTED] interview of captioned subject.

~~Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1~~

(U) [REDACTED]

(S) Details: (S) On [REDACTED] captioned subject [REDACTED]

each called SA [REDACTED]

SA [REDACTED]

SA [REDACTED]

and Language Specialist

interviewed [REDACTED]

Captioned subject advised the following:

(S) In a follow-up to information he provided on [REDACTED]

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 05-20-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-20-2036

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 03/21/2003

Individual, who has agreed to testify, provided the
following information to SA

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(S)

Investigation on 03/21/2003 at (telephonically)

File # Date dictated 03/21/2003

by SA : mac

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date:

To:

From:

ITTE IT-1

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

Case ID #:

Title:

Synopsis: Asset reporting.

~~Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1~~

(U)
gra

Details: (U) On an Asset who has reported reliably in the past provided the following information:

~~SECRET~~

315E - DL-
97109
Serial 8

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(Rev. 01-31-2003)

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: [REDACTED]

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [REDACTED]

b6
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From: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ITTE JT-1
Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

(U) Drafted By: [REDACTED] jem

(U) Case ID #: (S) 199E-DL-98862 (Pending)
(S) [REDACTED] (Pending)

(U) Title: (S) FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE GATHERING PROJECT;
IT-IRAQ

(U) Synopsis: (S) To provide foreign intelligence for possible dissemination.

(U) (S) ~~Derived From: G-3~~
~~Declassify On: X1~~

(U) Reference: (S) 199E-DL-98862 Serial 115

(U) Details: (S) On [REDACTED] an Asset who has reported reliably in the past, provided the following information (*all names contained herein are phonetic*):

(U) [REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED]

315 E-DL-
C98862
Ser.
137

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: IMMEDIATE

Date: 03/07/2003

To: Dallas
Counterterrorism

Attn:

SSA
IOS

From: Dallas

CT-FW / Fort Worth RA

Contact:

Approved By:

Drafted By:

:sc

Case ID #:

Title:

Synopsis: To report investigation and claim statistical accomplishment.

Derived From : G-3
Declassify On: X1

Details:

male

SSAN.

was identified in as an individual from Iraq, a country with a known nexus to terrorism.

Interview authority was obtained from SSA

On was interviewed without appointment at his residence,

telephone number cell

~~SECRET~~

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FD-340 (7-19-00)

Universal Case File Number 315E-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence: CTD, BAGHDAD OPS CENTER

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received _____

From _____

(Name of Contributor)

(Address of Contributor)

(City and State)

By SA

To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☒ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes ☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes ☒ No

Title: _____

Reference: EC DATED

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☐ Original notes re interview of

b6
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~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 02/17/2004

To: Records Management

Attn: Record Mgmt. Center Unit
A/UC [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

From: Counterterrorism
Iraq/Syria/Libya Unite Room 4383
Contact: SSA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

sasj [REDACTED]

Case ID #: (S) 315E-HQ-1448534-10
(S) 315E-HQ-1448534-1A-1
(S) 315E-HQ-1448534-1B-1
(S) 315E-HQ-1448534-302-1
(S) ~~315E-HQ-1448534-BC-1~~
(U) (S) 315E-HQ-1448534-CE-1
(S) 315E-HQ-1448534-ELA-1
(S) 315E-HQ-1448534-EL1-1
(S) 315E-HQ-1448534-EL1A-1
(S) 315E-HQ-1448534-EL1B-1
(S) 315E-HQ-1448534-LAB-1
(S) 315E-HQ-1448534-NC-1

(U) Title: (X) DESERT SPIDER
IT - IRAQ

(U) Synopsis: (X) Opening of subfiles for captioned matter. AD
authority to restrict subfile 302.

~~(S) Classified By: 11109, IPTOS/CTD
Reason: 1.5(c)
Declassify On: X1~~

(U) Full Field Investigation Instituted: 05/04/2004 NONUSPER

(U) Administrative: (X) Per all SAC, EC from CTD dated
12/25/2002, no case restrictions in ACS or [REDACTED]

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Records Management From: Counterterrorism

(U) Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534, 02/17/2004

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Action)

RECORDS MANAGEMENT

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) ~~(S)~~ RMD will ensure the aforementioned subfiles will be opened and that access to sub 302 will remain restricted to the above mentioned personnel.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(U) To: Records Management From: Counterterrorism
Re: (S) 315E-HQ-1448534, 02/17/2004

restricted in the Automated Case Management System (ACS).
Access will be granted to the following individuals:

UC

UC

SSA George Piro

SSA

SSA

SSA

SSA

IA

IA

IA

IA

IA

RO

ITOS II Deputy Section Chief

ITOS II Section Chief

D/AD Counterterrorism Division

AD Counterterrorism Division

EAD Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence Division

OSC Baghdad Operations Center

D/OSC Baghdad Operations Center

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Records Management From: Counterterrorism
(U) Re: ~~(S)~~ 315E-HQ-1448534, 02/17/2004

[] may be made without the approval of the Assistant Director of the Counterterrorism Division.

b7E

(U) Details: ~~(S)~~ The captioned investigation was opened to capture intelligence and evidence as it relates to the national security investigation targeting Saddam Hussein. This EC establishes the subfile system for capturing information regarding Hussein. The following subfiles will be established:

1A - Will be a repository for all contemporaneous notes and items which will need to be retained that are not evidentiary in nature.

1B - will document FD-192 bulky records and will be a repository for evidentiary material.

302 - will be a repository for FD-302's, inserts and classified LHM's which document interviews conducted of captioned subject and additional High Value Detainees.

BC - will be a repository for background information on captioned subject and his closest associates.

CE - will be used maintain all records regarding expenditures of case funds in captioned matter.

ELA - will be used to maintain all documents regarding the administration of electronic surveillance in captioned matter.

EL1 - will document all original elsur logs developed or maintained in captioned matter.

LAB - will be a repository for all laboratory requests, reports and findings in captioned matter.

NC - will be a repository for all pertinent newspaper clippings deemed of significant value that they will add to the overall progression of the investigation.

This EC also documents the fact that due to the sensitive nature of the interviews of captioned subject, and the request of the Department of Justice, Office of the Deputy Attorney General [noted in immediate EC from Counterterrorism to General Counsel, dated 02/06/2004] the 302 subfile will be

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 06/05/2007

To: Albany

ATTN: FIG Squad 9
SSA [REDACTED]

Counterterrorism

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b7E

ATTN: Albany JTTF
SSA [REDACTED]

ATTN: [REDACTED]

ATTN: [REDACTED]

Baghdad

ATTN: LEGAT [REDACTED]

From: Albany

Squad 3 @ Ithaca Resident Agency

Contact: SA [REDACTED] Cell [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

dls

(S)

Case ID #: (S) [REDACTED]

(S)

Title: (S) [REDACTED]

Albany Field Intelligence Group
Intelligence Production

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(U) (S) Foreign Visitors/Workers In Albany Territory;

FCI-FIA(Subjects Not Under Active Investigation)

(U) Synopsis: (S) To provide intelligence regarding arrival and
extended stay of [REDACTED]

(U) (S) Derived From : FBI SEC #3
Declassify On: 25X1-human

Enclosure(s): (U) Attached to this communication are copies of
passports and United States Department of State J-1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy -

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 03/05/2004

To: [redacted]

From: [redacted]

Squad 3

Contact: SA [redacted]

Original
retained in
Albany

Approved By: [redacted]

ghe/alm

Drafted By: [redacted]

(U)

Case ID #: (S) AL 315D-0

(S) AL 315G-0

(S)

(S) [redacted]

(S)

Title: (S) [redacted]

(U)

Synopsis: (S) Results of contact with [redacted] asset on [redacted]

(U) (S)

Derived From: G-3

Declassify On: X1

(S)

Details: (S) On [redacted] who continues to
provide valuable and reliable information. contacted [redacted] It
was advised that asset [redacted]

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(S)

(S) On [redacted] met with [redacted] During
the course of the meeting, asset provided information pertaining
to [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

315-0-152

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 01/30/2003

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: [redacted]
[redacted]

From: Atlanta

Squad 13 / JTTF

Contact: [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

:tjr

Case ID #: (S) 199D-AT-90661 (Pending)

(S) 199D-AT-C86509 (Pending)

Title: (S) [redacted] aka;

IT-IRAN

USPER

MUJAHEDIN EL KHALQ (MEK)

IT-IRAN

Synopsis: (S) To document results of interview with captioned subject.

Derived from : G-3

Declassify on: X1

Details: (S) On [redacted] writer and SA [redacted] interviewed [redacted] at his place of residence, [redacted]

The premise for this interview was a follow up of an interview that WFO SA [redacted]

conducted with [redacted] at [redacted] The interview at [redacted] was conducted due to [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

315 D-AT-
90661
Ser 77

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DATE: 05-18-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-18-2036

1990-AQ-
52110
Ser 29

~~SECRET~~

(U) ~~(S)~~ [redacted] male born
on [redacted] Social Security Account Number [redacted] a
resident of [redacted] home telephone number [redacted]
[redacted] was interviewed at [redacted]
[redacted] After being advised of the
identity of Special Agent (SA) [redacted] and SA [redacted]
[redacted] and advised that the purpose of the contact was to
follow-up on the interview conducted on [redacted]
provided the following information:

(U) ~~(S)~~ [redacted]
[redacted]

(U) ~~(S)~~ [redacted]
[redacted]

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(U) ~~(S)~~ [redacted]
[redacted]

(S) [redacted]
SA [redacted]
SA [redacted]

[redacted]

(S)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(U)

~~(S)~~

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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(U)

~~(S)~~

AL-DAWA is the opposition party in Iraq, and in the 1970's, the group killed the leadership of Iraq. When SADDAM HUSSEIN came into power, he rounded up members of AL-DAWA and executed some of them and imprisoned others as a warning to the people of Iraq. AL-DAWA is not loyal to Iran and does not believe in the teachings of Hizballah or KHOMEINI. The organization does not obtain support for the Iranian Government. AL-DAWA believes in educating the people to make their own (political) decisions about what happened in Iraq. AL-DAWA was formerly based in Iran, however most members of the organization are now living in Syria.

[REDACTED]

(U)

~~(S)~~

[REDACTED] would not provide his work address or telephone number. He advised that [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

(U) To: ?? From: [redacted]
Re: ~~(S)~~ AL 315D-0

(U) ~~(S)~~ AL 315G-0
, 03/05/2004

(U) ~~(S)~~

(S) [redacted]

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(S) [redacted] Saddam Hussein numerous references
with the primary file number HO 58-11887. [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

(U) ~~(S)~~ This was the extent of assets' report concerning
captioned matter. The asset was thanked for this information and
his continuing assistance.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 05-17-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-17-2036

NOTE: Hand print names legibly; handwriting satisfactory for remainder.
Indices: ☐ Negative ☐ See below

Subject's name and aliases

SADDAM HUSSEIN

Character of case

[REDACTED]

Complainant ☒ Protect Source

[REDACTED]

Complaint received

☐ Personal ☒ Telephonic Date [REDACTED] Time 9:00 am

Address of Subject

Complainant's address and telephone number
(work)
[REDACTED]

Complainant's DOB

Sex

Male

Subject's Description	Race	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Male	Height	Hair	Build	Birth date and birth place
	Age	<input type="checkbox"/> Female	Weight	Eyes	Complexion	Social Security Number
Scars, marks and other data						

Employer

Address

Telephone

Vehicle Description

Facts of Complaint

PROTECT SOURCE

Complaint [REDACTED] advised he works as [REDACTED] had
knowledge that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED]

Do not write in this space.

dgb

SA [REDACTED]

(Complaint received by)

BLOCK STAMP

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET//X1~~

b1

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 03/21/2003(U) ~~(S)~~ All information contained herein is unclassified except where shown otherwise.

(U) [redacted] (Last, First, Middle), [redacted]
[redacted] Texas, [redacted] was contacted on [redacted]
Her date of birth is [redacted] Social Security Account Number
[redacted] Driver's License Number [redacted] Passport
Number [redacted] which was issued on [redacted]
Her Passport expires on [redacted] After being apprised of the
reason for contact, and identities of the interviewing agents she
provided the following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

(U)

(U)

(U) [redacted]
Texas [redacted]
[redacted]

(U) [redacted] nor [redacted] are SADDAM HUSSEIN
sympathizers. When asked this question she responded, "absolutely
not." She is not aware of anyone who may be planning to strike
against the U. S. or U. S. targets. She, nor [redacted]

Classified By: 11344, HOS 2 /CTD
Reason: 1.4(c)
Declassify On: X1

~~SECRET//X1~~Investigation on 3/20/2003 at [redacted] TexasFile # [redacted] Date dictated 3/21/03by SA [redacted]b1
b6
b7A
b7C
b3

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 06/01/2005

To: Houston

From: Houston

CT-3

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED] gag

Case ID #: 315T-HO-C61622 (Pending)

Title: THREAT ASSESSMENT;
TERRORISM MATTERS;
AOT-IT315 - HO-
C 61622
Serial 3610

Synopsis: Houston documents threat assessment reference [REDACTED]

Reference: 315T-HO-C61622 Serial 3451

b6
b7C
b7D
b7EAttachment(s): Texas Driver's license photographs for [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] and [REDACTED]Details: By way of background, on [REDACTED] complainant, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] advised FBI Houston [REDACTED] (phonetic), who
works [REDACTED]

Houston has been unable to contact [REDACTED]
reference stated information. Complaint duty personnel advised
they believe [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] though that was never confirmed. Investigation
reveals [REDACTED]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 12/08/2004

To: Houston

From: Houston

CT-3

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

gag

Case ID #: 315T-HO-C61622 (Pending)

Title: INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM ACTIVITY REPORTING

[REDACTED]
THREAT ASSESSMENT;
AOT-IT

315-HO-
C61622
Serial
2957

Synopsis: Houston documents threat assessment of captioned subject.

Reference: 315T-HO-C61622 Serial 2837

Attachment(s): [REDACTED] driver's license photograph and background checks for [REDACTED]

Details: By way of background, on [REDACTED] an anonymous complainant [REDACTED] advised FBI Houston that [REDACTED]

According to [REDACTED]

Houston investigation reveals that [REDACTED]

~~SECRET//X1~~

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On [REDACTED]

, Page 2

serves/served in the Iraqi military or intelligence. . She has no contact or ties with members of the Iraqi military or intelligence.

(U) [REDACTED]

b6
b7A
b7C
b7D

(U) She does not recall [REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED]

indicated that no one in her family likes SADDAM HUSSEIN and she feels the war situation is terrible.

[REDACTED] further added, SADDAM HUSSEIN has made it bad for everyone (Iraqi nationals), including those in the U.S. [REDACTED]

~~SECRET//X1~~

Complaint Form

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 05-16-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc

NOTE: Hand print names legibly; handwriting satisfactory for remainder.

Indices: ☐ Negative ☐ See below60F-SD-
C64472
Serial
2566

Subject's name and aliases

Sadam Husane/Iraqi Military

Character of case

Terrorism

Complainant ☒ Protect Source

Complaint received

☐ Personal ☒ Telephonic Date [redacted] Time [redacted]

Address of Subject

Complainant's address and telephone number

[redacted] (business)

Complainant's DOB

Sex

Male

Subject's
Description

Race

☐ Male

Height

Hair

Build

Birth date and birth place

Age

☐ Female

Weight

Eyes

Complexion

Social Security Number

Scars, marks and other data

Employer

Address

Telephone

Vehicle Description

Facts of Complaint

PROTECT SOURCE

[redacted] called the FBI from [redacted]

[redacted] and advised [redacted]

abm

Sq 7

(Complaint received by)

Do not write in this space.

BLOCK STAMP

b6
b7C
b7D

~~SECRET/SCI~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 04/28/2003

To: San Diego

Attn: [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]

Contact: [REDACTED] (NCIS)

Approved By: [REDACTED]

(S) Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: (S) [REDACTED]

(S) Title: (S) [REDACTED]

(U) Synopsis: (S) Information regarding [REDACTED]
Iraq

(U) (S) ~~Derived From: G-3~~
~~Declassify On: 04/28/2003~~

(U) Details: (S) A confidential NCIS source which has provided
reliable information in the past [REDACTED]

b1
b6
b7C
b7D
b7E
b3

~~SECRET/SCI~~

no SCI information
contained in document
uc/Baw 60324 2/2/2011

415F-SJ-
C 35271
Ser. 96

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b6
b7A
b7C
b7DDate of transcription 03/29/2004

On [redacted] Individual who has not agreed to testify,
provided the following information:

Individual stated that he/she had no first hand knowledge
of atrocities conducted by the regime of former Iraqi leader SADDAM
HUSSEIN. Individual commented that [redacted]

Investigation on 03/23/2004 at [redacted]
File # [redacted] Date dictated _____
by SA [redacted] MR [redacted]

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

315T-SJ-
C 37938
Ser. 347

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 07/07/2004

To: San Juan

From: San Juan

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

(U) Drafted By: [REDACTED] dmk

Case ID #: (S) 315E-SJ-C37938 (Pending)

(U) Title: (S) UNITED STATES VIRGIN ISLANDS (USVI);
JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE (JTTF) ANNEX
315E-SJ-C37938

(U) Synopsis: (S) To document Source reporting.

(U) (S) Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

(U) [REDACTED]

b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

(U) Details: (S) On [REDACTED] an Individual, who is not in the position to testify, provided the following information to this writer:

(U) (S) He/She advised that [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

315-SI-
C52334-
G
Ser. 33

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 04/30/2002

[redacted] (protect identity), born [redacted]
[redacted] Social Security Account Number [redacted] Alien
Identification Number [redacted]
[redacted] phone number [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted]
[redacted] Federal Bureau of Investigation
regarding his knowledge of criminal and terrorist activities.
Language Specialist [redacted] Chicago Division, assisted with
translation. After being advised of the identities of the
interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted]
provided the following information:

b6
b7C
b7D

Investigation on 04/25/02 at [redacted]
File # [redacted] 265-SI-C52334-G Date dictated 04/26/02
by SA [redacted] SA [redacted] kk

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

ENC. BEHIND FILE

File Number 315E-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence _____

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received 6/14/04

From Saddam Hussein

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

Baghdad, Iraq

(City and State)

By

To Be Returned ☐ Yes

☒ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes

☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes

☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes

☒ No

Title: Operation Desert Spider
IT-IRAQ

b2
b6
b7C
b7E

Reference: 315E-HQ-1448534 - 78

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☐ Original notes re interview of

~~SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN~~

To: Counterterrorism From: Counterterrorism
Re: (U) 315E-HQ-1448534, 06/14/2004

[REDACTED]
(U) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b2
b7E

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON DC

(U) For information, read and clear.

♦♦

~~SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN~~

~~SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 06/14/2004

To: Counterterrorism

Attn: ITOS II
SC M. Chris Brieese
ASC [REDACTED]
UC [REDACTED]

From: Counterterrorism
Baghdad Operations Center
Contact: SSA [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Approved By: Piro George [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED] tmi

Case ID #: (U) 315E-HQ-1448534 - 78 (Pending)

(U) Title: (S) DESERT SPIDER
IT - IRAQ

(S) Synopsis: (S) [REDACTED]

(U) ~~Derived From: G-3~~
~~Declassify On: X1~~

(S)

b1
b2
b7E

(S)

(S)

~~SECRET/ORCON/NOFORN~~

EC.TMI.D6132004

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 06/07/04

On 06/02/2004, [REDACTED] was interviewed at a detention facility in Baghdad, Iraq by Federal Bureau of Investigation Supervisory Special Agents [REDACTED] George L. Piro and Special Agent [REDACTED]. After being explained the purpose of the interview, [REDACTED] provided the following information:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C
b7D

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Investigation on 06/02/2004 at Baghdad, IraqFile # 315E-HQ-1448534Date dictated 06/07/2004

SSA George L. Piro SSA [REDACTED]

by SA [REDACTED]

b6
b7C
b7D

340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 315 - HQ - 1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence FBIHQ (BIGHADJ)

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Recd 6/2/04

From _____

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

(City and State)

By _____

To Be Returned ☐ Yes

☒ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes

☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes

☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes

☒ No

Title

DESERT SPIDER
IT - IRAQ

Reference _____

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description:

☒ Original notes re interview of

b6
b7C
b7D

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 06/02/04

On 06/02/2004, [] interview that began mid-morning, resumed after [] had eaten his lunch. Federal Bureau of Investigation Supervisory Special Agent [] who took part in the earlier 06/02/2004 interview, did not participate in this afternoon session. During the afternoon interview [] provided the following information:

b6
b7C
b7DInvestigation on 06/02/2004 at Baghdad, IraqFile # 315-HQ-1448534

Date dictated _____

SSA George L. Pires

by SA []

b6
b7C
b7D

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 02/21/2003

To: Newark

Attn: Command Post

From: Newark

C-9

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED] ck

Case ID #: (S) 199E-NK-109094 (Pending)

Title: (S) [REDACTED]
IT - IRAQ

199E-NK-
109094
Ser.3

Synopsis: (S) To report investigation conducted by SA [REDACTED] in furtherance of Iraqi Asylum Seekers interview initiative, particularly the interview of [REDACTED]

Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

Reference: (S) 199E-NK-C108526 Serial 32

Enclosure(s): (S) Enclosed For Newark are the following:

1. 1A envelope containing the following items:
 - a. Original interview questionnaire.
 - b. CCH, DMV, [REDACTED]
 - c. INS Photo of interviewee.
 - d. INS applications.
 - e. Interview notes.

b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

Details: (S) On 02/20/03, Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED] and (SA) [REDACTED] interviewed [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] at his place of residence [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] provided the following information:

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date:

To:

From:

Squad C-20

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By: jaj

(S) Case ID #: ~~(S)~~
(U) ~~(S)~~ 315Q-NK-105283 (Pending)

(S) Title: ~~(S)~~
IT-IRAQ

(S)

(S) Synopsis: ~~(S)~~ Debrief of Asset

(U) ~~(S)~~ Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

(U) Details: ~~(S)~~ this writer debriefed
captioned Asset and received the following information:

(S)

(U)

~~SECRET~~

315Q-NK-
105283
Ser. 142

b1
b6
b7C
b7D
b7E
b3

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date:

To:

From:

Squad C-20

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

jaj

(S) Case ID #:

(U)

(S) 199Q-NK-105283 (Pending)
(S) 315Q-NK-89949 (Pending)

(S) Title:

(S)

IT-IRAQ

(S)

(S)

(U)

(S)

AOT-IT-WC;
OO:

(U)

Synopsis:

(S)

Debrief of captioned Asset.

(U)

(S)

Derived From : G-3
Declassify On: X1

(U)

(S)

(U)

(S)

315Q-NK-
105283
Ser. 124

b1
b6
b7C
b7D
b7E
b3

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date:

To:

From:

Squad C-20

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

jaj

(S) Case ID #:

(U)

199Q-NK-105283 (Pending)

(S) Title:

(S)

IT-IRAQ

(S)

(U) Synopsis:

(S)

Debrief of captioned Asset.

(U)

(S)

Derived From : G-3

Declassify On: X1

(U)

Details:

(S)

On writer debriefed captioned Asset who provided the following information:

~~SECRET~~

315Q-NK-
105283
Ser. 109

b1
b6
b7C
b7D
b7E
b3

(S)

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number 315E-HQ-1448534

Field Office Acquiring Evidence _____

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received 5/19/04

From Saddam Hussein

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

Baghdad, Iraq

(City and State)

By _____

To Be Returned ☐ Yes

☒ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes

☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes

☒ No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

☐ Yes

☒ No

Title: Operation Desert Spider
IT-IRAQ

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 07-09-2009 BY uc/baw 60324

Reference: 315E-HQ-1448534 - 73

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☐ Original notes re interview of

b7E

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 05-18-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-18-2036

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 05/09/2002

Individual, who is in a position to testify, provided the
following information:

Individual advised [REDACTED]

b6
b7C
b7D

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

P1
WHS

[REDACTED]

file. [REDACTED] is maintained in the FD-340 section of this case

UPLOADED TO ACF/ECF:
BY [REDACTED] 5/24/02 Jm

(S)

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
MAY 09 2002	
FBI [REDACTED]	

b1
b6
b7C
b7D
b3

Investigation on [REDACTED] at [REDACTED]

File # [REDACTED]

Date dictated 05/09/2002

by SA [REDACTED] dwl

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

DATE: 05-18-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-18-2036

b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 03/21/2003

"All information contained herein is unclassified except where shown otherwise."

Lead Control Number: [REDACTED]

In order to obtain information regarding 1) force protection of U.S. troops, 2) possible terrorist attacks against the U.S., and 3) potential civil rights violations and/or hate crimes, [REDACTED] was contacted by Special Agents (SAs) [REDACTED] of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE), and [REDACTED] Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

[REDACTED] date of birth (DOB) [REDACTED] SSAN [REDACTED] home telephone number [REDACTED] was advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the inquiry. [REDACTED] provided the following information:

At the beginning of the interview, [REDACTED] showed a valid [REDACTED] driver's license to the interviewing agents. [REDACTED] was born in [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Investigation on [REDACTED] at [REDACTED] (telephonically)
File # [REDACTED] 199E-HQ-C85883-53;
by SA [REDACTED] TFO [REDACTED] dictated 03/21/2003
SA [REDACTED] ss

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b3

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

DATE: 05-18-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-18-2036

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 05/20/2002 b6
b7C
b7D

Individual, who is in a position to testify, provided the following information regarding a previous interview:

Individual advised [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(P) ✓
WAS

[REDACTED]

5/31/02

(S)

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
20 2002	
05/20/2002	

b1
b6
b7C
b7D
b3

Investigation on [REDACTED] at [REDACTED]

File # [REDACTED]

Date dictated [REDACTED]

by SA [REDACTED] dwl

~~SECRET~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-18-2011 BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc

315-BA -
C101236
Scr. 4881

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 05-18-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-18-2036

U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation



In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

One Center Plaza
Boston, MA 02108-1801

~~SECRET~~

April 23, 1999

(S) [Redacted]

This communication is classified ~~'SECRET'~~ in its
entirety.

(S) ~~(S)~~ The Boston Office of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) has been regularly apprised of information
pertaining to certain principals associated with captioned

(S) [Redacted] This information has been furnished
by an individual hereinafter referred to as T-1, who may be
characterized as an established source with good access whose
reporting has been evaluated as consistently reliable.
Information reported by T-1 will be prefaced below by the date in
which T-1 initially furnished same.

[Date of information (DOI): [Redacted]]

(S) ~~(S)~~ On [Redacted] a second individual,
hereinafter referred to as T-2 [Redacted]

(S) [Redacted]

[DOI: [Redacted]]

(S) [Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

(S)

~~SECRET~~DATE: 05-18-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 05-18-2036

- 1 -

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/11/2003

Source, who is in a position to testify, provided the following information:

There is no concentrated community of Iraqis living in Maryland, such as the Russian-Jewish community concentrated in the Pikesville/Owings Mill/Reisterstown Road area of Baltimore City/County. In fact, because of the current world situation involving Iraq and the United States, most Iraqis will claim to be from other countries such as Kuwait or Saudi Arabia, in order to avoid any stigma attached to being an Iraqi.

Just like there is no area with a concentration of Iraqis living in it, there are no leading Iraqi civic/community groups, nor any recognized spokesmen for the Iraqi emigres in Maryland. Any such civic leaders would be found in the leaders of various mosques, though the Source is not aware of any exclusively Iraqi mosques in Maryland.

However, the Source is aware of several mosques with either a significant Iraqi presence in its membership or Iraqis who hold leadership positions within the mosque.



(S)

Investigation on [redacted] at [redacted] (telephonically)
File # [redacted] b1 [redacted] Date dictated 02/11/2003
by SA [redacted] MWF:mwf b3 [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: Routine

Date: 01/19/2000

To: National Security Division

Attn: SSA [REDACTED]
NS3B, room 5437

New York

b6
b7C

From: New York

I-40

Contact: SA [REDACTED] Ext. [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

(S)

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

(S) Case ID #: (S)

(S)

(S)

Title: (S)

(S)

(S)

b1
b3
b7E

~~SECRET~~


~~SECRET~~

To: NSD From: New York

Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 01/19/2000

b1
b3

(S)



♦♦

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: NSD From: New York

Re: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] 01/19/2000

b1
b3

(S)

OO: NY

OO: NY

Synopsis: (S) [redacted]
[redacted]

(U)

~~(S)~~

~~Classified By: G-3, I-40/1~~

~~Reason: 1.5(c)~~

~~Declassify On: X-1~~

Details: (S) [redacted]
[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 04/07/2003

To: Omaha

From: Omaha

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

mhg

Case ID #: 265A-OM-49003 (Pending)

Title: IT MATTERS;
OMAHA DIVISION

Synopsis: Complaint call received on [REDACTED]

Details: On [REDACTED] writer received a complaint call from [REDACTED] cellular phone number [REDACTED] who provided the following information:

[REDACTED] stated that he was [REDACTED]

A check of indices for [REDACTED] met with negative results.

415-OM-
C.49003
Serial 218

b6
b7C
b7D

(01/26/1998)

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 uc baw/sab/lsc
ON 05-16-2011

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 03/31/1998

To: Omaha

From: Omaha

Squad 4

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED] rmk

OM 199-0
Ser. 292

(U) Case ID #: ~~(S)~~ 199-0 (Pending)

(U) Title: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

(U) Synopsis: ~~(S)~~ Results of interview with [REDACTED]
on 3/23/98.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Derived From : G-3
Declassify On: X1

(U) Details: ~~(S)~~ On [REDACTED] writer conducted an interview of [REDACTED] in regards to a telephone call she had placed to the Omaha Division on [REDACTED]. This interview took place at the residence of [REDACTED] noted as [REDACTED]. The purpose of the interview was based on a referenced telephone call that revealed [REDACTED] is concerned about [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED]. She also noted that [REDACTED].

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(U) ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] voluntarily provided her date of birth as [REDACTED] a place of birth as [REDACTED] and a Social Security Account Number as [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED].

~~SECRET~~